GETTINGAWAYWITHMURDER

BenazirBhutto’sAssassinationandthePoliticsofPakistan

HERALDOMUÑOZ

W.W.NORTON&COMPANY

NewYork•London

Dedication

ToPamela,mywifeandpartner,andtomydaughterPaloma

Contents

Cover

TitlePage

Dedication

ListofIllustrations

Preface

1AMurderForetold

2AnEarlyHistoryofInstability

3ViolenceintheFamilyandintheNation

4OntheRoadtoIslamabad

5TheUSGravitasinPakistaniAffairs

6TheUS-BrokeredReturnofBhuttotoHerHomeland

7TheAssassination

8Whodunit?

9TheInvestigation’sRepercussions

Epilogue:ReflectionsonBhutto,binLaden,andPakistan’sTiestotheUnitedStates

Notes

Acknowledgments

Index

Copyright

AlsobyHeraldoMuñoz

ListofIllustrations

1 BenazirBhuttoather1988swearing-inceremonyasprimeminister(Alfred/SipaPress)

2 PakistaniprimeministerLiaquatAliKhanmeetsUSpresidentHarryS.Truman(UnitedStatesDepartmentofState,courtesyofHarryS.TrumanPresidentialLibrary)

3 TheBhuttofamily(APPhoto)4 TheUNcommissionatBenazirBhutto’sassassinationsite(BenDotseiMalor)

5 USpresidentGeorgeW.BushandPakistanipresidentPervezMusharraf(GeorgeW.BushPresidentialLibraryandMuseum)

6 BenazirBhuttoreturnstoPakistanafteryearsofself-exile(DanielBerehulak©Getty)7 Deadandwoundedattheassassinationsite(JohnMoore©Getty)8 UNcommissionmeetingwithInteriorMinisterRehmanMalik(TheUNCommissionofInquiry)

9 DeliveryoftheUNcommission’sfinalreporttoUNSecretary-GeneralBanKi-moon(UNPhoto/MarkGarten)

Preface

INTHESOUTHERN-hemispheresummerofJanuary2009,whilemywifeandIvacationedinChileatacousin’shomebyacalmrivernearthetownofValdivia,IgotanurgentcallfromtheofficeofUnitedNationsSecretary-GeneralBanKi-mooninNewYork.Hischiefofstaff,AmbassadorVijayNambiar,transmittedarequestfromthesecretary-general:WouldIbeabletoleadacommissiontoinvestigatetheassassinationofformerPakistaniprimeministerBenazirBhutto?

NambiarsaidthatSecretary-GeneralBanhadagreedtoconstitutethecommissionattherequestofthePakistanigovernment,presidedoveratthatpointbyBenazirBhutto’swidower,AsifAliZardari.This commission would carry out an inquiry to shed light on the facts and circumstances of theformer primeminister ’smurder andwould not be an international tribunalwith the obligation toestablish criminal responsibilities. There would be two other high-level commissioners, yet to bedetermined,butthesecretary-generalwantedfirsttoannouncethecreationofthecommissionanditschairperson.

I responded that I would have to consult the president of Chile,Michelle Bachelet, as well asinform the foreign minister. It was highly unusual that a sitting ambassador to the UN would beentrustedwithsuchadelicateduty.Generally,headsofUNcommissionsareformerpresidents,primeministers,foreignministers,orambassadors.Nambiarrequestedaresponseassoonaspossible.

I had seriousdoubts about accepting suchhigh responsibility.The case looked like a lose-losesituation; any conclusion could leave many sides disappointed or even angry. I could not forceanyone to testify,my powerswould be limited, and public expectationswould be high.Moreover,Pakistanipoliticalcultureischaracterizedbyrumorsandconspiracytheories,asPakistaniwriterAliSethisuggestedinanessayabouttheterroristattackinLahoreagainsttheSriLankannationalcricketteam.Whileinterviewingpeopleinthestreetabouttheculprits,hewastoldthatitcouldhavebeentheworkof“terroristsorcriminals....Butitcouldbetheagencies.Itcouldbethegovernment.ItcouldbeIndiaalso.”1

Ihadvisitedthecountryandreadaboutit,butIwasfarfrombeinganexpert,andIcamefromanationgeographicallyandculturallydistantfromPakistan.Then,Ireasoned,Chiledidnothaveanyhidden agenda, interests, or prejudices regarding Pakistan—a plus in the eyes of the UN and theIslamabadgovernment.The taskwouldbedangerous;but thesecretary-generalhadprobably takeninto consideration, when offering me this challenge, that I had presided over the Al-Qaida andTalibanSanctionsCommitteeoftheUNSecurityCouncilduring2003and2004.

President Bachelet reacted very positively when I consulted her on how to respond to thesecretary-general’srequest.“It’sarecognitionofyourpersonaltrajectoryandanhonorforChile,”shesaid.“Goaheadandaccept.”Ithusfeltcompelledtotakeonthisdifficulttask.

Secretary-GeneralBanKi-moon informed theSecurityCouncilonFebruary2,2009, that, afterconsultationswithmembersof thecouncilandas requestedby thegovernmentofPakistan,hehad

decided to establish “an international commission in connection with the assassination on 27December2007offormerPrimeMinisterofPakistanMohtarmaBenazirBhutto.”Thecommission,he stated, would be composed of “a panel of three eminent personalities having the appropriateexperience and reputation for probity and impartiality.” In an addendum, the secretary-generaloutlined the functioning conditions and responsibilities of theCommission of Inquiry.2 In a letterdatedFebruary3,thepresidentoftheSecurityCouncil“tooknote”ofthedecisionofthesecretary-generalandmadementionof the intention to“submit the reportof thecommission to theSecurityCouncilforinformation.”3

On February 10, the secretary-general—having just returned from a trip that had taken him,amongotherplaces,toAfghanistanandPakistan—announcedthattheUNcommissiontoinvestigatetheassassinationofformerprimeministerBenazirBhuttowouldbeheadedbyme.BanaddedthathehaddiscussedthematterinIslamabadwithPresidentZardariandPrimeMinisterYousufGilani.Mydesignation had leaked one week earlier when the ambassador of India to the United Nations,NirupamSen,hadrevealedtoanewsagencythatIwouldleadtheCommissionofInquiry.4

I recalled having met Benazir Bhutto in the early ’90s, while I was ambassador to theOrganization of American States (OAS), at a seminar on democratic transitions held in the USCongress.Wewereonthesamepanel;shespokeaboutPakistan,andIgaveapresentationonChile.Shewasthestaroftheeventandseemedpoisedandconfident.Wewereabletochatforawhile.IsaidthatwhiledoingmyPhDattheKorbelSchoolofInternationalStudiesattheUniversityofDenver,Ihadoftendiscussedher father ’s1977militaryoverthrowandarrestwithmygoodPakistani friendandclassmate,MustaphaKemalPasha,whoattendedallthesolidaritydemonstrationsthatIorganizedagainstthePinochetdictatorshipandthe1973coupthathadoverthrownChileanpresidentSalvadorAllende.Benazir toldme thatZulfikarAliBhuttoadmiredAllendeandknewperfectlywell that theUnited States had plotted with rightists in Chile to oust his socialist government. The rest of ourdialoguewasabriefexchangeofpleasantriesduringourrespectivelectures.

Now,almosttwentyyearslater,IwouldleadtheinquiryintotheassassinationofthecharmingandintelligentwomanIhadmetatthatseminarinWashingtonDC.IvaguelyrememberedhavingseenonTV a grainy video of themoment of her assassination. I had then thought that securitymust havelapsed,becauseIrecalledherwavingtoasurroundingcrowdwithoutsolidprotection.

BENAZIRHADNOTbeenbornapolitician.Shehadalwayswantedtobeadiplomatandpreferredintellectualdebatestothecorridorsorsmoked-filledroomsofpowerpolitics.ButthekillingofherfatherbytheZiaul-Haqdictatorshipchangedher.Shebecameadetermineddaughterreadytotakeonthemilitarydictatorwhohadeliminatedherfather;intheprocess,sheevolvedintoapoliticalleaderand inheritor of the Bhutto mantle. Benazir Bhutto became, per the title of her autobiography, aDaughterofDestiny.Tobesure,shechangedmanymoretimesinthecomingyears,twicebecomingprimeminister,facingexile,dealingwiththerealitiesofworldpolitics,andnegotiatingwithdictatorMusharrafadealtoreturnhomeaftermorethanadecadeintohersecondexile.

BornonJune21,1953,Benazirwasalsoadaughterof fortune, theeldestof fourchildren inawell-to-dofamily in thesouthernprovinceofSindh.HerEnglishgovernesscalledher“Pinkie,”asdidtherestofherfamily,andatayoungageBenazirenrolledinaneliteCatholicschool.Englishwasherfirstlanguage,herUrduwaslessfluent,andshebarelyspokeanySindhi.HerworldopenedupwhensheattendedRadcliffeCollegeand, inherwords,was“forced . . . togrowup.”5ButBenazirwas a woman of contradictions: modern-minded, with degrees from Harvard and Oxford, she

acceptedanarrangedmarriage toscale the ladderofpower in theconservativepoliticalcultureofPakistan.Onewritercharacterizedheras“afeudalprincesswiththearistocraticsenseofentitlementthat came with owning great tracts of the country and the Western-leaning tastes that such abackgroundtendstogive.”6

BenazirBhuttowasoneofPakistan’smostimportantpoliticalfigures,arespectedworldleader,and the leading stateswoman in the Islamic world. TheWest, despite occasional doubts about herabilities to govern, largely considered her a progressive figure who could advance the cause ofdemocracyandcounterterrorisminhernativecountry.BhuttowasalsohatedandfearedbymanyinPakistan, particularly by the so-called “Establishment”—sections within the army and securityservices,certainbusinessmen,andIslamistextremists.Theydislikedanddistrustedherpopularity,hertiestotheWest,andhermodernizingpoliticalagenda.Herpoliticaladversariesleveledaccusationsofcorruptionagainstherandherfamily,particularlyherhusband,AsifAliZardari,whilethemediaandotherskepticscriticizedherlavishlifestyle.

Bhutto’s murder occurred shortly after her return to Pakistan in the midst of an electoralcampaign. TheUnited States andGreat Britain had facilitated her return. She knew that shewas asecuritytargetbutfeltcompelledtogobackdespite thedangersanddespite thefact thatherfather,Zulfikar,andtwobrothershaddiedunnaturaldeaths.TherewasnoshortageofpeopleandgroupsinherhomecountrythatwantedBenazirBhuttodeadandhadthepowerandmeanstoeliminateher.

Against the backdrop of a Pakistani political history of unconsolidated democracy, betrayals,corruption, unsolved political assassinations, religious radicalism, and foreign influence—particularlythatoftheUnitedStates—Benazirreturnedinordertotry,onceagain,torallyherpeopleforthecauseofdemocracy,secularism,andmoderation.AsaproudmemberoftheBhuttoclan—afamily thatdatesback tograndfatherSirShahnawazBhutto,aSindhi feudal lordwhohadbeen thedewaan(primeminister)ofthestateofJunagadhintheIndiancolonialgovernmentbeforepartition—she felt she had no other choice; itwas her destiny and legacy to return to her homeland.Mostobservers believed Benazir would confront an insurmountable challenge in trying to restoredemocracy to Pakistan, and friends feared her days were numbered the moment she boarded thatflighthomefromDubaionOctober17,2007.

AFEWMONTHSaftermydesignationaschairmanoftheCommissionofInquiry,theUNcompletedthe team, naming two additional commissioners: former attorney general of Indonesia MarzukiDarusman and former deputy commissioner of the Irish Police Peter Fitzgerald. In the process ofinvestigation,Ibecamegoodfriendswithbothofthem,withourchiefofstaff,MarkQuarterman,andtheanalystsandothermembersoftheteam.

Thisbookisbasedonthebehind-the-scenesevidenceandexperiencesweencounteredduringtheyearlonginquiry,whichculminatedinthepresentationofareportonApril15,2010,whichhadanimportantinternationalimpact.Thisbookmakesabundantuseofthisreportinchapters7and8butgoeswellbeyondit,supplementedbymyownextensiveresearchintotheassassinationanditscontextandbymyreflectionsonlargermatters,liketheUS-Pakistanties.

In fact, this book is as much about the Bhutto murder investigation as it is about the broadercontext ofmodern Pakistan and the critical US-Pakistani relationship. Benazir ’s tragic death is anentrypointforamuchbiggerstory:Pakistan’spostindependenceevolutionandtheinfluenceofkeyoutsideactors,includingtheUnitedStates.

InternationalmediapointedtomybackgroundasanactiveopponentofdictatorAugustoPinochetinChile,aswellasmypoliticalanddiplomatictrajectory,asakeyfactorbehindmydesignationand

as a component inproducingwhatwas seen as a substantive andunbiased report.7 Iwould like tothink thatmy experience preparedme to observe and penetrate the political and social context ofBenazirBhutto’sassassinationandtofocusonthesubstantivedriversofthecrime.

ThisbookisanexaminationofpoliticallifeanddeathinPakistan—notjustalookatthenarrowsubjectmatteroratreatmentlimitedtostatementsbypoliticalactors.ThisismypersonalviewofthemurderofBenazirBhuttoandhertimesandinnowaycompromisesornecessarilyreflectstheviewsof the United Nations or those of the members of the Commission of Inquiry. This is a criticalanalysisoftheassassinationofamajorpoliticalleader,hercountry,andhercircumstances.

BenazirBhuttoontheoccasionofherswearing-inasprimeministerafterherpartywonthelargestblocofseatsintheNationalAssemblyinthe1988election.HercoalitiongovernmentfacedtensionswiththearmyandwithPresidentGhulamIshaqKhan,leadingtoher

dismissalinNovember1990.

1

AMurderForetold

ITWASA warm afternoon on August 15, 2007, when Benazir Bhutto arrived at the Council onForeignRelationsbuildingonEastSixty-EighthStreetandParkAvenueinManhattantogiveapublictalk.ItwasanunusualmeetingasthecouncilrarelyschedulesactivitiesinthelazyfinalmonthoftheNewYork summer, butBhutto drewabig audience interested inPakistan and international affairs.Moreover,therewasgreateagernesstoknowherintentions.Manypresumedshewouldreturntoherhomelandafter a longvoluntaryexile to leadaprocessofdemocratic reconstruction.Scholar andformerUSdiplomatRichardHaass,thecouncil’spresident,introducedBenazirwithapersonaltouch,recalling that they had met thirty years ago at Oxford, where they had both studied. The formerPakistaniprimeministerwasrelaxedandamicable;shehadpreparedwellforthisoccasionknowingthatthiswasanimportantvenuetospeakontherecordaboutherpoliticalplanstoPakistanandtotheworld.

Benazirbeganbytracinghercountry’stroublesoverthepasthalfcentury,beginningwiththefirstmilitarytakeoverin1958,andemphasizingthatfourmilitarydictatorshipshadruledhernationinthelast thirty years. She wanted the public to understand the challenges of Pakistan: unconsolidateddemocracy, betrayals, corruption, political assassinations, socioeconomic inequality, foreigninfluence,andgrowingreligiousradicalism.

Afterherbrief introduction,Benazirmadea formalannouncement toherUSaudience thatwasthe product ofmonths of reflection—an announcement that despite the opposition ofmany of herclosestfriends,mostlyforsecurityreasons,shefeltobligedtocarry through:“Iplantoreturn thisyear toPakistan,” she said, “to leadamovement for the restorationofdemocracy. I seek to leadademocraticPakistanwhichisfreefromtheyokeofmilitarydictatorshipandthatwillceasetobeahaven of international terrorism; a democratic Pakistan that would help to stabilize Afghanistan,relievingpressureonNATO troops; a democraticPakistan thatwouldpursue thedrugbarons andbust up the drug cartel that today is funding terrorism.” Bhutto added that shewould fight for “ademocraticPakistan thatputs thewelfareof itspeopleat thecenterpieceof itsnationalpolicy”andclosed her remarks reiterating her determination to confront the “forces of militancy andextremism.”1

Benazir Bhutto had skillfully hit all the right notes for her attentiveAmerican audience. But aquestionduringtheQ&Aperiodrevealedsomeskepticism.Wouldshebeabletotackledelicateissuesthat she had been incapable of solving during her two previous terms as prime minister? Herpreviousstintsinofficehadbeeninconclusive,andthecountryhadonlybecomemorecomplicatedintheyearssince.Wouldanagreementof“politicalcohabitation”withrulingdictatorGeneralPervezMusharrafwork?

Yes, the challengesofPakistanwere formidable,Bhutto admitted, butwas there abetter optionthan her for a future of stability and democracy?As for the negotiationswithMusharraf,Benazircandidlyexplainedthatwhileagreementshadbeenreachedonseveralissuesandhehad“committedtotakingcertainconfidence-buildingmeasures,”tangibleproofhadnotmaterialized.Itremainedtobeseen,Benaziradded,“ifitisjusttalkorisitgoingtoturnintoawalk.”2

Regarding her differenceswithMusharraf, Benazir postulated that therewere “two fault lines:Onebetweendictatorshipanddemocracy,and thesecondbetweentheforcesofmoderationand theforcesofextremism.”WhileonesetofproblemsdealtwiththeunavoidablefactthatMusharrafhadbeenacoupleader,Benazirvaluedhisdeclaredintentiontofollowamoderatepathsothatmoderateforcescould“worktogetherforatransitiontodemocracy.”3BhuttocomplainedthatMusharrafdidnot want her to return to Pakistan before the scheduled December elections: “He says it will bedestabilizing.”But she dismissed this argument: going homemight be “destabilizing to the rulingparty,”shesaid,“butitwon’tbedestabilizingtothenation.”MakingreferencetoexiledleaderNawazSharif, whowas also seeking to return to Pakistan, she added, “Elections cannot be free and fairunlesstheleadersofallpartiesareallowedtocontest,andcontestfreely.”4

AboutamonthafterherCouncilonForeignRelationsspeech,BenazirBhuttowroteinanop-edintheWashingtonPostthatshehaddecidedtoreturntoPakistanafteralongexile“tobringchange”to her country. According to Benazir, the central challenge facing Pakistan was “moderation vs.extremism.”ShejustifiedherdialoguewithGeneralPervezMusharrafandexpressedherhopethathe“wouldresignfromthearmyandrestoredemocracy.”5

ButwhileshehadsternwordsforMusharraf,Benazir feared individuals linked to thePakistaniintelligence agencies. Pakistan has threemajor intelligence agencies.The IntelligenceBureau (IB),the main civilian intelligence agency, focuses on domestic intelligence and reports to the primeminister;ithasgenerallybeenledbyahigh-rankingmilitaryofficial.TheMilitaryIntelligence(MI)is thesectionof thearmythatspecializes in intelligenceandreports to thechiefofarmystaff.TheInter-ServicesIntelligence(ISI)isthepreeminentagencyamongthethree.Nocommonintelligenceservice,theISIhasactivelyintervenedinpoliticalelections,organizedpoliticalpartiesandalliances,and created andmanaged radical Islamic groups. It draws in the intelligence capacity of the threemilitaryservicebranchesinadditiontoitsownautonomousstrength.Formally,theISIcommunicatesinformation to theprimeminister,but inpractice it reports to thechiefofarmystaff.BenazirwasparticularlydistrustfulofISIofficers,whosympathizedwithreligiousextremistsandviewedherasanenemy.

“WhenmyflightlandsinPakistan,”shewroteintheaforementionedWashingtonPostop-ed,“IknowIwillbegreetedwithjoybythepeople.OnceIleavetheairport,Iprayforthebestandpreparefortheworst.”Benazir ’spessimismaboutherpersonalsafetywasevidencedduringaprivateplaneflighttoAspen,Colorado,whereshetraveledalongwiththeUSambassadorZalmayKhalilzadandhiswife,writerCherylBenard,shortlybeforeBhutto’sreturn toPakistan inOctober2007.WhenaflightattendantofferedBenazirsomefreshlybakedcookies,shedeclined,sayingshewastryingtoloseweight.But thenshecalled thestewardessbackanddeclared inanexpressionofblackhumor,“Ohwhat’sthedifference,I’llbedeadinafewmonthsanyway.”6

Benazir and her entourage had become particularly worried about her security after officialPakistani and foreign sources communicatedmessages about possiblemilitant attacks against her.TheMusharrafgovernmenthad toldher that foursuicidebombersquadswouldattempt tokillher.Bhutto,inturn,hadwrittenalettertoGeneralMusharraftellinghimthatifmilitantsassassinatedher,

itwouldbeduetothehiddenhandofclosesympathizersofhisregime.Intheop-ed,shesetOctober18as thedayofher return,atwhichpointshewouldassume leadershipofher family’s traditionalparty,thePakistanPeople’sParty(PPP),anditselectoralcampaign.

MusharrafwasfuriouswhenBhuttomadeherannouncement.Thegeneralbelievedthatheractionrepresented“atotalbreachoftheagreement”thatBhuttowouldwaituntilaftertheelectionstoreturn.BenazirapparentlywasequallystunnedbyMusharraf’siratereaction,assheperceivedthatnohardandfastagreementhadbeenreachedonthesissue.TheinconclusivenegotiationshadstretchedbacktoJuly2007,whenthePPP’sCentralExecutiveCommitteehaddecidedattheirLondonmeetingsthatBenazirwould continue tohead theparty and thatherparticipation in the campaignwas crucial toelectoralsuccess.WhenBhuttoannouncedherdecision,Musharraf’s teamreiterated theirwarningsabouthersecurity,astheycontinuedtodoaftershereturned.

BeforeherpriorreturntoPakistaninApril1986,Benazirhadalsoreceivednumerousthreatsandinformationaboutpotentialassassinationplots.Atthattime,shehadflowntoWashingtonDCtoholdmeetingswithSenatorsTedKennedyandClaibornePell,CongressmanStephenSolarz,andothers.Atthe time, shemade her decision to intensify the fight for democracy in the context of the fall ofdictators FerdinandMarcos in the Philippines and Baby Doc Duvalier in Haiti. She had receivedencouragingwordsofsupport,althoughtheReaganadministrationstoodsolidlybehinddictatorZiaul-Haq.MarkSiegel,afriend,hadboughtBenazirabulletproofvest.Thethreatsin1986werereal,buttheywouldbecomeaclearandpresentdangerinthepost-9/11period.

Twentyyearslater,in2007,MusharrafandhisgovernmentalsotransmitteddramaticwarningstoBenazir, but she received themwithmisgivings. She understood the risks that she faced.However,Bhuttofelt thatMusharrafwasusingthose threats to intimidateherso that, lackingpropersecurity,shewouldnot return toPakistan tocampaign.Herunderlyingsuspicionofariggedelectiondrovehertoconductanextensiveandactivecampaign,withahighdegreeofpublicexposureregardlessoftherisk.

ONOCTOBER18,2007,BhuttoboardedanEmiratesAirlinesflightfromDubaitoKarachi,landingaround1:40 p.m. at Jinnah InternationalAirport. She had avoided flying onPakistani InternationalAirwaysbecauseMusharraf—whoultimatelycontrolled thestateairline—couldprevent theaircraftfromlanding.Afternineyearsofexile,Benazirwas finally returning toherhomeandherpeople.For reasons of security, a deliberate decision was made for her husband and children to remainbehind.HugecrowdsgreetedherattheairportandalongtheShahrah-e-Faisalhighway.ThethrongsofsupporterssloweddownhercavalcadeenroutetotheMuhammadAliJinnahmausoleum,whereshewastodeliveraspeech.

Benazir intended to rely on her own jamming equipment to block any cell phone signals thatmighttriggerroadsideimprovisedexplosivedevices,buttheMusharrafgovernmenthadrefusedherpermission to use such equipment, offering instead to provide that service for her. The arrival ofbulletproofvehiclesalsometwithobstacles,sothePPPdecidedtoconstructanarmor-platedflatbedtruckthatputBenazirfourmetersoffthegroundtobebothprotectedandvisibletothecrowds.Thetopofthetruckhadavirtuallyimpenetrablebulletproofacrylicledge,andtheinteriorwasinsulatedtoensuresurvivalincaseofabombattack.

Shewasinanupbeatmood,aswerethemembersofthecaravanandthecrowds.Alargegroupofunarmed,youngvolunteersholdinghands—theJaanNisaarBenazir(“thosewillingtogivetheirlivesforBenazir”)—formedahumanshieldaroundthevehicle.

The procession moved very slowly as night fell over Karachi. Benazir observed a curious

phenomenonduring the drive.As the truck approached street corners, the streetlights dimmed andthenwentoff.AtrustedaidewasdispatchedtotheutilitycompanyKESCtolobbythemtoswitchthelights on but was not successful. Bhutto’s party colleagues and friends became agitated, as thejammingdevicesdidnotseemtobeworking;peopleinthetruckweremakingandreceivingcallsontheir cell phones.An attempt to contactGeneralMusharraf’sNational SecurityCouncil adviser tocomplainaboutthejammersfailed.

Asmidnightapproached,andafternearlytenhoursonherfeet,Benazirtookarestanddescendedto the lower level of the truck with the former Pakistani ambassador to the United States, AbidaHussain. Then Bhutto and her political secretary, Naheed Khan, began going over the speech shewould deliver at the Jinnah mausoleum. At that moment, as the truck neared the Karsaz FlyoverBridge, an explosion blewup a police van escortingBhutto’s truck, breaching the human securitycordonaroundit.Asecondmuchmorepowerfulexplosionfollowed,rockingtheheavytruck.TheexplosionperforatedBenazir ’s eardrum, temporarily deafeningher.Fire shot up around the truck.Bloodandburningbodypartswerestrewneverywhere.

Minutesearlier,amanholdingupababydressedinPPPcolorshadmotionedtoBhuttototakethebaby,butwhensheaskedthecrowdtomakewayforhim,hehesitatedandinsteadtriedtohandthebaby over to someone in the crowd. “Don’t take the baby; don’t let the baby up on the truck,” aloudspeaker from an escorting police carwarned. By then, Bhutto had gone inside the truck. Thebomb attack resulted in 149 deaths and 402 injuries. Itwas speculated that the baby’s clotheswerelinedwith plastic explosives.7 Benazir, unhurt, was whisked away through back streets to BilawalHouse,herfamilyhome.

After the attack, Bhutto stopped short of accusing the government but pointed the finger atindividuals who she felt were abusing their positions of power.8 She blamed factions within themilitary and the intelligence services of being involved in the assassination plot. Regardless, onOctober21,2007,sheattemptedtofileaformalcomplaintintheformofaFirstInformationReport(FIR)tosupersedeaKarachipolice’sFIR,whichshebelievedtobetoonarrowinscope.

Inhercomplaint,whichwasregisteredonlyafteraprotractedcourtprocess,shereferredtothethreatagainstherposedbypersonsshenamedinanOctober16,2007,lettershehadsenttoGeneralMusharraf.ThoughBhutto’scomplaintdidnot list thesepersons,PakistaniandforeignmediasoonreportedthatBhutto’sletterreferredtoLieutenantGeneral(ret.)HamidGul,directorgeneraloftheMI under theGeneral Zia ul-Haq dictatorship and director general of the ISI duringBhutto’s firsttenureasprimeminister;Brigadier(ret.)IjazShah,directorgeneraloftheIBandformerISIofficial;and Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi, Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid (PML-Q) chief minister of PunjabProvinceandoneofMusharraf’sclosepoliticalallies.TheMinistryoftheInteriorlaterdeniedanyinvolvementbythesemenintheattack,whiletheheadoftherulingPML-Qparty,ChaudhryShujaatHussain,respondedbyaccusingAsifAliZardari,Bhutto’shusband,ofarrangingtheblaststostiruppublicsympathy.9

Benazir demanded publicly that the FederalBureau of Investigation (FBI) or ScotlandYard bebroughtintoassistintheinvestigationoftheattack.TheMusharrafgovernmentimmediatelyrefused,arguingthatbringinginforeignpoliceagencieswouldconstituteaviolationofPakistanisovereignty.Musharraf had phoned Bhutto to express his “shock and profound grief” and to assure her that a“thoroughinvestigationwouldbecarriedouttobringtheperpetratorstojustice.”10Afterthatformalphoneconversation,thetwosidesstoppedtalkingtoeachotherforseveralweeks.

Karachi is inSindhProvince,but theSindhpolice investigationof theattackneveradvanced.A

former high-level ISI official told our commission, however, that the ISI conducted its owninvestigationand,neartheendofOctober2007,capturedanddetainedfoursuspectsfromamilitantcell;thewhereaboutsofthesefourcouldnotbedeterminedbythecommissionduringthetimeofourinvestigation.

Relations between Bhutto and Musharraf degraded further after the general, on November 3,2007,declaredemergencyrule,suspendedtheconstitution,andsackedthechiefjusticeofPakistan.Afewdays later, citing security concerns, thegovernmentplacedBhuttounderhouse arrest.BenazirBhutto was convinced that Musharraf was trying to intimidate her and to prevent her fromcampaigning for national elections. Protests, led by Bhutto’s PPP, flared throughout the country,forcing him to lift the emergency rule onDecember 16.Despite the close call inKarachi, Bhuttoresumedherelectoralcampaignalmost immediately, requestingadequatesecuritysupport fromthegovernment,which,shecomplained,thecampaignwasn’tgetting.Inthemeantime,theformerprimeminister and her closest advisers continued to receive intelligence about possible bomb attacksagainstherinvariouscities.

On December 27, 2007, Bhutto was scheduled to give a speech at an electoral rally inRawalpindi’s Liaquat Bagh,11 a park named after Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, who wasmurdered there in1951.Benazir fearedforher life,butshefeltshehad tocampaignforageneralelection—onlyelevendaysaway—thatwaswidelybelievedwouldreturnhertopowerandsteerthecountrytodemocracy.

WHATWEKNEWaboutthedayofBenazirBhutto’sassassinationbeforeinitiatingourinvestigationwasconfusingandcontradictory.Thereweredisagreementsaboutbasicfactsandmuchcontroversyabouttheassassinorassassins,thecauseofdeath,theformerprimeminister ’sentourage,andwhatthebehaviorofthepolicehadbeen.

Thecampaignrally,accordingtowitnesses,waslarge—inthethousands.Benaziraddressedtherally froma stage, a fewmeters above the crowd,decoratedwith largeportraits ofher father, thefounder of the PPP, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The crowded stage, filled with local parliamentarycandidates, national party leaders, and security guards, created an atmosphere of informality andimprovisation.

Thepolicepresencewasrelativelylight,althoughotherreportsaffirmeditwasstrong.Togetinthepark,peoplesupposedlypassedthroughmetaldetectorsandwerefriskedbythepolice.

AfterBenazir concluded her speech, she boarded her bulletproof vehicle and began to exit thepark, surrounded by the JaanNisaarBenazir—the youngmale volunteerswho formed her humanshield. As her convoy pulled out of the park, press reports affirmed that she emerged from thevehicle’s sunroof to wave to the crowd. Witnesses told a newspaper that “there was a volley ofgunfire,followedalmostimmediatelybythethunderousblastofthesuicidebomb.”12

TheNew York Times reported that Bhutto had been “shot in the neck or head, according todifferentaccounts....Secondslaterasuicidebomberdetonatedhisbomb.”Thenewsstoryaffirmedthat the attack “bore hallmarks of the Qaida-linked militants in Pakistan,” although, it added,“witnesses described a sniper firing from a nearby building.”13 Somemedia quickly changed thestoryaboutBhutto’scauseofdeath,blamingshrapnelfromtheexplosion.

ABBCNewsreportquotedPakistanimedia thatsuggested that thepoliceandrangersguardingcheckpointsaroundtheexitgateofLiaquatBaghhadlefttheirpostsbeforeBenazir ’svehicledroveoutofthepark.14TheBBCNewsalsocitedpolicesources that“confirmedreportsMs.Bhuttohad

beenshot in theneckandchestbeforethegunmanblewhimselfup.”15FarooqNaek,a lawyerandseniorofficialofthePPP,gaveaslightlydifferentversiontoAgenceFrancePresse:“Twobulletshither,oneintheabdomenandoneinthehead.”16

DawnNewsTV,arespectedPakistaninewsorganizationwithaTVchannelandamajorprintandelectronicdailynewspaperinEnglish,airedblurryimagesofanarmedassassinwearingsunglassesopeningfireatBhutto“withremarkableaplomb,”oneortwometersawayfromthevehiclewithnooneobstructinghimor thevehicle.A“professionalsharpshooter”was thewaymanycharacterizedtheloneassassin.However,otherwitnessesclaimedthereweretwoattackers:agunmanandasuicidebomber.

Dawn newspaper asserted, basedon images telecast byDawn-NewsTV, that itwas “abundantlyclearthattherewasnosecuritycordonaroundMs.Bhutto’svehicle...givinglietothegovernmentclaimthatshehadreceivedVIPsecurity.”17PPPactivistZamurdKhanwasquotedbytheNewYorkTimesassayingthatBenazirhadbeenshotintheheadfromgunfirethatoriginatedfrombehindhervehicle“inabuildingnearby.”18

TheTelegraphindicated,quotingaleaderofthePPP,that“twoshotshitMs.Bhuttointheneckandshoulder.”Itfurtherreportedthat“adoctorontheteamthatattendedhersaidthemaincauseofdeathwasabulletthatenteredthebackofherneckanddamagedherspinalcordbeforeexitingthesideofherhead.Anotherbulletpiercedthebackofhershoulderandcamethroughherchest.”19

AreportbyRTTNews20announcedthattheperpetratoroftheassassinationhadbeenidentified.ItalsocitedPPPactivistswhosingledoutKhalidShahenshah,oneofBenazir ’ssecurityguardswhohadsubsequentlygoneundergroundandwhohadbeencaughtonTVfootagemakingsuspicioussignalswhilestandingon thedaisnext toBhutto,prior to theexit fromtherallywhereshewasmurdered.ShahenshahwaspositionedtoBhutto’sleftduringherspeech,andhecontinuallyglancedtohisleftand crouched down several times as if, according to some, to get out of the line of fire, whileappearingtorunhisfingersacrosshisthroat—auniversalgesturefordeath.ThesameRTTreportmentioned that Bhutto had hired Shahenshah on the recommendation of security adviser RehmanMalik,ministeroftheinterioratthetimeofthelaunchingoftheUNCommissionofInquiry.

Aswillbediscussedlater,thecommissionheardnumerousconflictingaccountsofBenazir ’striptothehospital.AtRawalpindiGeneralHospital,doctorstriedforthirty-fiveminutestoresuscitatetheformerprimeministerwithoutsuccess.Dr.AbbasHayatdeclaredtothepressthatBhuttohadwoundstoherheadaswellasshrapnelinjuries.Dr.MuhammadMussadiqKhan,atopsurgeonwhoattendedBhutto at the hospital, said that she was “clinically dead” on arrival. No autopsy was performed,DawnNewsTVreported,becausethepolicedidnotrequestone.ThegovernmentrepliedthatBhutto’shusband,AsifAliZardari,hadwaivedtheautopsy.

AFTERTHEATTACK, thesceneof theblastwasquicklywashedwithahigh-pressurehoseby thelocal fire company. A day later, Brigadier Javed Cheema of the Interior Ministry gave a pressconferencewherehe informed themedia thatBhuttohaddiedofaskull fracturecausedbya leverattached to the sunroof of her bulletproof vehicle. He further announced that interceptedcommunications permitted the government to state that Baitullah Mehsud, a tribal leader innorthwesternPakistan,hadorderedtheassassinationwithsupportfromAl-Qaida’sterroristnetwork.

TheCIAcame to thesameconclusionaccording todeclarationsmadeby theagency’sdirector,MichaelV.Hayden.SomeGeorgeW.Bush administrationofficials outside theCIAwhodealtwithPakistani matters were less confident, with one, according to the Washington Post, qualifying

Hayden’sassertionasmerely“averygoodassumption.”21The controversy surrounding Bhutto’s death forced the Musharraf government to agree to a

narrowprobe byScotlandYard to “support and assist” thePakistani authorities in establishing the“precisecause”ofBhutto’sdeath.

The PPP leaders strongly disagreed with the notion that Benazir had died from an accidentalwound caused by hitting her head against the lever of the sunroof of the vehicle. SherryRehman,spokeswomanforthePakistanPeople’sParty,whowaswithBhuttointhehospitaldeclared,“Shediedfromabullet injury.Thiswasandisourposition.”22SenatorSafdarAbbasi,amedicaldoctorandlongtime friendofBenazir,whowas actually in the vehiclewith her at the timeof the fatal attackreasoned that “the way she died—an instant death—suggests very sharp sniper fire, a typicalintelligenceoperation.”23Hiswife,NaheedKhan,whowasalsoapassenger inBhutto’svehicleonDecember27, agreed: “Therewerebullets coming fromdifferentdirections. . . .Thereare lotsofhighbuildingsoverlookingthearea....Thiswasatypicalintelligenceoperation.”24

The PPP demanded a United Nations investigation of the assassination. In early January 2008,widowerandnowPPPleader,AsifAliZardari,wrote in theWashingtonPost,“Icallon theUnitedNationstocommenceathoroughinvestigationonthecircumstances,factsandcover-upofmywife’smurder, modeled on the investigation into the assassination of former Lebanese Prime MinisterRafiq-al-Hariri.”25 When Zardari became president of Pakistan on September 6, 2008, the callbecamenotmerelyapopularnotionbutanofficialrequestfromaUnitedNationsmemberstatetothesecretary-generaloftheorganization.Fivemonthslater,BanKi-moon’sofficecalledmeinChileandtheinvestigationbegan.

PakistaniprimeministerLiaquatAliKhanmeetsUSpresidentHarryS.TrumanduringavisittotheUnitedStatesinMay1950.PrimeMinisterKhanwasassassinatedin1951atCompanyBagh,laterrenamedLiaquatBagh,thesamelocationwhereBenazirBhuttowas

killedin2007.

2

AnEarlyHistoryofInstability

ON OCTOBER 16, 1951, around 4:00 p.m., Pakistan’s first prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan,arrivedatCompanyBagh(EastIndiaCompanyGardens)inRawalpindiforapoliticalrally.Acrowdof about one hundred thousand people had assembled to listen to a public speech by the primeminister in ameeting organized by the PakistanMuslimLeague. PrimeMinisterAliKhanwas ingoodspirits.Hehadtoldhiswifehewasgoingtomakethespeechofhislife.1

Theprimeministerhadinstructedhisassistantsthatonlyhewouldaddressthecrowdandthathe’dbealoneonthedais,sittingonthesoleavailablechair.Therewouldbenoprotectivecanopyabovetheplatformsothatpeoplewouldhaveafullviewoftheirleader.

The meeting began at 4:10 p.m. with the recitation of the Holy Quran, followed by briefwelcomingintroductionsbythepresidentofthemunicipalcommitteeandbythepresidentofthecityMuslimLeague,whoinvitedtheprimeministertoaddressthemultitude.

Prime Minister Ali Khan walked to the microphone and had barely said, “Baradran-i-millat”(Dearbrothers)whentwoshotsfroma9mmpistolrangintheair.Theprimeminister,hitbyabullet,staggered and fell on his back, mortally wounded. A few seconds later, another shot rang out,followedbysilenceandsurprisefirst,andthenbycriesandweepingfromthecrowdastheyrealizedtheirleaderhadbeenhit.

Theassailantwhohadfiredontheprimeministerwasquicklyseizedandbeatenbypeopleinthecrowd.Thekillerwasatwenty-nine-year-oldAfghanbythenameofSaidAkbar,thesonofatriballeaderofKhost,Afghanistan.AkbarwasresidinginAbbottabad—thesametownthat,decadeslater,wouldbecomefamousasthefinalhideoutofOsamabinLaden.

An unconscious prime minister was rushed to the CombinedMilitary Hospital in Rawalpindi,wherealleffortstosavehimfailed.Hesuccumbedtohiswoundsat4:50p.m.

Eventhoughthecrowdhadoverpoweredanddisarmedtheassassin,apolicesubinspectorshottheman, killing him instantly. Despite having given his subordinate the order to shoot the assailant,PoliceSuperintendentKhanNajafKhanrushedfromthirteenyardsawaytofirepoint-blankatAkbarfivetimes.

TheparkwherePrimeMinisterAliKhanwasassassinatedbecameknownasLiaquatBagh—thesameplacewherePrimeMinisterBenazirBhuttowouldbemurderedalmostsixtyyearslater.OneoftheemergencydoctorswhoattendedPrimeMinisterAliKhanwasthefatherofDr.MussadiqKhan,oneofthedoctorswho,fifty-sixyearslater,triedtoreviveBenazirBhutto.2

TheeliminationoftheassassinSaidAkbarbythepoliceonlyfueledconspiracytheoriesthatarestill around today.Akbar had significant amounts ofmoney at his home inAbbottabad and on hisperson,whichsuggestedhemighthavebeenahiredassassin.Akbarandhisbrotherhadparticipated

in a failed uprising against the Afghan king’s government in the mid-1940s and had ended upreceiving protection and a pension fromGreatBritain. In January 1954, the Pakistani governmentannouncedthat it intendedtorequestanAmericanFBI investigation into theassassinationofPrimeMinister Liaquat, but the request nevermaterialized. Instead, a retired ScotlandYard detectivewashiredandproducedareportconcludingthatthemurderhadbeentheworkofalonefanatic.Earlier,apromising Pakistani police investigation was frustrated when the inspector responsible for it,NawbazadaMirzaAitizazuddin,diedinaplanecrashonAugust26,1952.3Anarticlewrittenin2010byaPakistanischolararguesthattheAfghanwasnotreallytheassassin,asaninquirycommissionappointedbythegovernmentconcluded,butthathewasascapegoatandthattheprimeministerhadbeenkilledaspartofanobscureandcold-bloodedpoliticalplot.4

SINCETHEVERYbirthofPakistan,followingindependencefromBritainandthepartitionofIndiainAugust1947,thecountryhasexperiencedahistorymarkedbyviolence,militaryrule,andpoliticalcorruption.Justmonthsafterthepartition,thecountrysufferedtheuntimelynaturaldeathin1948ofMuhammadAliJinnah,thefatherofthenationandfirstgovernor-general.Jinnahhadagitatedforthetwin goals of independence fromBritish rule and the creation of an independent state for India’sMuslims,butdespitethisreligiouspreference,hehadintendedtobuildasecular,democraticstate.5Hisdeathand thecountry’s firstwarwith India,over thedisputed territoriesofKashmir, sidelinedeffortstoconstructastablepoliticalsystemandmarkedthebeginningofacycleofviolence,wars,andenmitythathasendureduntiltoday.

Moreover,ethnicnationalismwoulderode the ideaofPakistanasamultiethnicstatewithequalrightsforall.Despitethestatedgoalofethnicequality,therehasalwaysbeenaperceptionofPunjabidominance.Atdifferentmoments,Balochnationalists,Pashtunnationalists,BengalisinEastPakistan,Sindhis,andMuhajirshavequestionedthatorderandclashedwith thecentralgovernmentandeachother,attimesseekinggreaterautonomythroughuprisings.

AfterJinnah’sdeath,thecountryexperiencedthelossofanotherleaderwiththeassassinationofLiaquatAliKhan.Pakistan’sfirstfewyearsasanindependentnationweremarkedwithinstability.

Duringthe1950s,Pakistanhadsevendifferentprimeministers,eachunsuccessfullyattemptingtocomplete thefive-year termsestablishedby law.Amidgrowingchaos in1958,GeneralAyubKhanseizedpowerfromPresident IskanderMirza inabloodlesscoupd’état.Twentydaysearlier,Mirzahad instituted martial law and abrogated the 1956 constitution. From 1958 on, the military’sentrenchmentinPakistanipoliticswouldbecomethenorm.

Self-appointedfieldmarshalAyubKhan,theonlyfive-stargeneralinPakistan’smilitaryhistory,promisedtoliftmartiallawandcalledonseveralpoliticianstojointhenewgovernment.Benazir ’sfather, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a young highly educated and brilliant politician, was one of thoseapproached by themilitary.Despite his reservations about serving amilitary regime, he joined asministeroffuel,power,andnaturalresources.

Pakistan, like all nations at the time, was caught up in the polarization of the ColdWar. ThecountrywasbecomingabastionfortheUnitedStatesinthegrowingEast-Westconflict,allowingalargeCIAofficetobesetupinKarachi,permittingU-2spyplanestoflyovertheSovietUnionfroman air base near Peshawar, and joining SEATO—the SoutheastAsian counterpart ofNATO—aftersigningaMutualDefenseAssistanceAgreementwiththeUnitedStatesinMay1954.Indiaandothercountries from the region refused to become part of SEATO. The Central Treaty Organization(CENTO)followed in1955asanattempt tosecureUSinterests in theMiddleEast;again,Pakistan

joined.Notsharingthepro-USsentimentofhiscolleagues,Bhuttonegotiatedanimportantoilagreement

with theSovietUnion andbegan tobuild an independent powerbasewithin theAyubgovernment,favoringThirdWorldandnonalignedpolicies.In1963hewasnamedforeignministerandbegantoopenlydisagreewithGeneralAyub’scontinuingalliancewithWashington.Ayubdidnotcaremuchabout foreign policy, except to safeguard Pakistan’s alliance with the United States to ensure thatAmericanmoneywould continue to flow to themilitary.OnceBhutto took the helm of Pakistan’sforeignpolicy,theUSmoneydriedup.

RelationsbetweenPakistanandChinadeterioratedunderGeneralAyub,asSEATOwasanevidentAmericaninstrumentaimedatChina.Bhutto,however,engineeredarapprochementwithChina.Thetwo countries signed a historic border agreement, resumed official trade relations, and, in 1964,BeijinggavePakistananinterest-freeloanof$60milliontocompensateforthelossofUSaid.

TheUnitedStateswithheldaidtoPakistanwhile,atthesametime,increasingittoPakistan’srival,India.In1965GeneralAyubwasuninvitedtovisitWashingtonafterZulfikarAliBhuttoopposedtheexpandingAmericanwarinVietnam.

But thecatalystfor thebreakupbetweenBhuttoandAyubcameasaresultof the1965warwithIndia over Jammu andKashmir. Surprisingly, theWhite House cut off military aid to both sides,disappointing Pakistan, which assumed the United States would be on the side of its SEATO andCENTOally.India,bycontrast,wassupportedbytheSovietUnion.OnlyChinacameoutinsupportofPakistan,declaringIndiatheaggressorinthewarandissuinganultimatumtoIndiatowithdrawitsmilitarydeploymentalongtheChina-Sikkimborder.

The1965India-PakistanwarendedwhenbothacceptedaUNSecurityCouncilresolutiontoceaseallhostilities.AttheSovietUnion’sbehest,GeneralAyubandIndianleadersmetinTashkent,wheretheTashkentAgreementwassigneddetailingthewithdrawaloftroops,therepatriationofPOWs,andthe restorationof the cease-fire line.Bhutto opposed theTashkentAgreement, resigned as foreignminister, and left the Ayub government. Bhutto’s popularity grew considerably following hisresignation.

Meanwhile, discontent flourished in Pakistan as Mahbub ul-Haq—a distinguished Pakistanieconomistwho,alongwithAmartyaSen,conceived theUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme’s“humandevelopment”approachtomeasuredevelopmentbeyondeconomicgrowth—denouncedtheincreasingconcentrationofwealthandgrowingdisparitiesinhisowncountryamongindividualsandregions,includingEastandWestPakistan.

TheAyubregimebegantoharasstheBhuttofamilybusinessesasZulfikarbecameamorestridentpubliccriticoftheregime.Bhuttothendecidedtocreatehisownpoliticalparty,andonNovember30,1967,despiteanAyubregimebanonpublicmeetings,delegatesmetinthegardenofaprivatehousetofoundBhutto’sPakistanPeople’sParty.ThePPPhadapopulistmessagesummedupintheslogan,“Roti,kapra,aurmakam”(Bread,clothing,andshelter).

AstheAyubregimeprogressivelylostground,thePPPgrewintothemostpowerfulpartyinWestPakistan, while the Awami League, under the direction of SheikhMujibur Rahman, surged as thepredominantforceinEastPakistan.

TheAwamiLeagueput forwarda six-pointprogram in1966, inwhich it demanded significantdegrees of autonomy for East Pakistan, with the federal government only limited to the areas ofdefenseandforeignpolicy.Rahmanalsodemandedacompletereformofthepoliticalsystemandtheend of Ayub’s regime. Ayub rejected the six-point program and, in 1968, had Mujibur Rahmanarrested.

Against a backdrop of rising instability andAyub’s heart ailment, onMarch 26, 1969,GeneralAghaMohammadYahyaKhan, thearmy’scommander inchief,proclaimedmartial law,abrogatedthe 1962 constitution, assumed the presidency of Pakistan, surrounding himself with a team ofmilitaryadvisers,andpromisedelectionsforthefollowingyear.Ayubleftquietly.

Elections were held in December 1970, with twenty-three parties disputing 291 seats in theNationalAssembly.Asexpected,theAwamiLeaguewonhandilyinEastPakistan,andBhutto’sPPPwonthemajorityofseatsinWestPakistan(splitintofourprovincesinsteadof“OneUnit,”aswasthecase until then). The military had underestimated the force of Bhutto’s populist platform andoverestimated thesupport for thereligiousandconservativeparties. Inamemoir, formerPakistaniambassadorJamsheedMarkerrevealsthatthethenUSnationalsecurityadviserHenryKissingertoldhim,“Everywhereelseintheworldelectionshelptosolveproblems;inPakistantheyseemtocreatethem.”6

NegotiationstowardanagreementtosharepowerbetweentheAwamiLeagueandthePPPwerevetoedbythearmyinMarch1971,andriotsbrokeoutinEastPakistan,which,atthetime,madeup56percentofPakistan’spopulation.

The military violently repressed the demonstrations in East Pakistan. Talks between GeneralYahyaKhan,Bhutto, andMujibur failed, and the armyproceeded toban theAwamiLeague, arrestMujibur,andforbidpoliticalactivitiesinallofPakistan.Thecountryplungedintocivilwar,andthearmy massacred thousands of East Pakistani rebels. Within a few months, millions of Bengalisbecamerefugees,andmanyofthemflowedfromEastPakistantoIndiaseekingsafehaven.

Bythesecondhalfof1971,IndiabegantotrainandequipaBengaliliberationarmy.Soonafter,GeneralYahyaKhanannouncedanall-outwar;aprovisionalgovernmentofBangladeshwasformed.Following Pakistani air strikes across the cease-fire line in Kashmir into northern India in earlyDecember1971,theNewDelhigovernmentlaunchedmassiveattacksintoEastPakistan,controllingtheterritorywithinafewdaysandrecognizingtheprovisionalgovernmentofBangladesh.

OnDecember16,Pakistanimilitaryforcessurrendered,andacease-firewasputinplace.GeneralYahyaKhanhadnooptionbuttoresign;hehandedthepresidencyovertoZulfikarAliBhutto,whohadjustreturnedtoIslamabadfromtheUNSecurityCouncilinNewYork,wherehehadbeensenttodotheimpossible:salvagethePakistaniposition.

BHUTTOBECAMEPAKISTAN’S president and civilian administrator of martial law. He quicklystrengthened relations with China andwas able to get from the Chinese a write-off of significantloans and the cost of new military hardware. Around that time, he initiated Pakistan’s nuclearprogram,whichwasacceleratedwhen,inMay1974,Indiatestedanuclearbomb.Inparallel,Bhuttonegotiated with Indira Gandhi the Simla Agreement that normalized, to a great extent, bilateralrelationsbetweenthetwocountries.TheSimlaAgreementwasconsideredabigsuccessforBhutto,whohadtraveledtothenegotiationsinnorthernIndiaaccompaniedbyhisyoungdaughterBenazir,whobecameaprivilegedobserverofthenegotiations.In1972,BhuttoalsorescindedmartiallawandtaskedtheNationalAssemblywithdraftinganewconstitution.

Among Bhutto’s major accomplishments was the 1973 constitution, approved by consensus inAugust of that year. Under the new constitution, Zulfikar assumed the post of prime minister,relinquishing thepresidency,whichwas largely ceremonial by then.The1973 constitutiondefinedPakistan as a federal Islamic republic with a parliamentary government. Meanwhile, the PPPmobilized millions of people in favor of secularism and democracy and against mullahs and themilitary.

ThePakistanMuslimLeague,oncethepartyofthemoderateJinnah,hadbecomethepartyofthemilitary, which, in the new constitution, saw its powers curtailed at the hands of the federalgovernment.Bhuttomastermindeddomesticindustrialization,landreform,andinfrastructureworksandpursuedanactivistforeignpolicy,whichhadasitshighlighttheholdingoftheIslamicSummitoftheOrganizationoftheIslamicConference(OIC)inLahorein1974.

Controlling the levers of power, Bhutto amended the 1973 constitution to allow the federalgovernmenttobanpoliticalpartiesandcurbtheautonomyofthecourts.Fearfulofarmyplotsagainsthim,BhuttohadagroupofofficersarrestedinApril1973.HealsoremovedGeneralGulHassan,thearmy commander in chief, and Air Marshal Rahim Khan, the air force chief, accusing them of“Bonapartism” and sending them off in golden exile as ambassadors to Vienna and Madrid,respectively.

Bhuttohadalreadygivenintothepressuresofthesmallreligiouspartiesinthe1973constitutionbydeclaringthatPakistanwasan“Islamicstate”inwhichonlyaMuslimcouldbecomeitspresidentorprimeminister,andestablishingtheCouncilofIslamicIdeology,chargedwiththeIslamizationoflaws. Years later, when embattled and needing political support, he made further concessions toreligious parties by banning alcohol, driving the country’s gambling and entertainment sectorunderground, supporting a parliamentary motion to declare the Ahmadis as non-Muslims, anddeclaringFridaysthedayofprayers,apublicholiday.

In1976,ZulfikarAliBhuttonamedGeneralZiaul-Haqasarmycommanderinchief,goingovertheheadsoffiveseniorgenerals.Ziawasperceivedasobedient,lackinginpoliticalaspirations,andareligious,unsophisticated individual.Hewasalso thefirstarmycommanderwhowasnot fromtheeliteranksofthemilitaryacademy.

In the run-up to the national parliamentary elections, the country was rocked by disorder,boycotts, and strikes organized by an opposition coalition and, according to Bhutto, supposedlyfunded by theUnitedStates. In July 1977,General ul-Haq overthrewZulfikarAliBhutto, declaredmartial law, and appointed himself chief martial law administrator. Prime Minister Bhutto wasarrested.

Bhuttohadintroducedimportantsocialandeconomicchanges,campaignedagainstthemilitary-religious alliance that had ruled Pakistan for years, and turned Pakistan into a nuclear country—adevelopment not welcomed by the United States and other powers. But toward the end of hisadministration,Zulfikarhadturnedintoanautocraticruler,riggedparliamentaryelections,andgivenintoIslamistsinhisattempttoholdontopower.

ZulfikarAliBhuttowas releasedand rearrested several timesuntil theZiadictatorshipaccusedhimofconspiracytomurderapoliticalopponent,AhmedRazaKasuri.Amaverickmemberof thePPP,Kasuri had been shot at three years earlier in an incident inwhich his father died.An initialinquirybytheHighCourthadclearedPrimeMinisterBhuttoofanyconnectionto thecrime.AfterbeingdeniedaslotinthePPPtickettoParliament,KasuridecidedtocooperatewiththemilitarybyonceagainfilingchargesagainstBhutto.

DespiteavigorousinternationalcampaignandappealsbyseveralheadsofstatetosaveBhutto’slifeafteradeath sentencewashandeddownby theSupremeCourt, the formerprimeministerwasexecutedonApril4,1979.HediedinthecentraljailofRawalpindi,thegarrisoncitywherePakistan’sfirst primeminister,LiaquatAliKhan,hadbeenassassinated and the samecitywhereZulfikarAliBhutto’sdaughter,Benazir,wastobemurdered.

BenazirBhutto’sfamilyinJuly1978.FromlefttorightareBenazir’smother,BegumNusratBhutto;brotherShahnawazBhutto;fatherandformerprimeminister,ZulfikarAliBhutto;andBenazirnexttoherfather.BrotherMirMurtazaBhuttoisseatedatbottomleftandsisterSanamBhuttoatbottomright.Sanam,whokeptalowprofileinactivepolitics,isthesolesurvivingmemberofthefamilytoday.

3

ViolenceintheFamilyandintheNation

ATTHETIME of her father ’s death, Benazir Bhutto had no intention of becoming a politician,becauseshehadseenfirsthandthestrainsoflifeinpolitics.Instead,sheaspiredtobecomeadiplomatinPakistan’sForeignService.Inherlateteens,Benazirenjoyedaccompanyingherfathertosummitsandstatevisits,liketheonetotheUnitedStatesin1973whenshewasseatednexttoHenryKissingerataWhiteHousedinneror,inFebruary1974,whenthetwenty-year-oldflewhometojoinherfatherandtherestofthefamilyattheIslamicSummitthattheprimeministerhadconvenedinLahore.

Between 1969 and 1973, Benazir attended Radcliffe College at Harvard, where she obtained abachelor ’sdegree,majoringingovernment.Collegeofferednewexperiencesfortheyoungwomanaccustomed toa lifeofprivilege.Thiswas the first timeshewalked toclasses, since inPakistanachauffeur always drove her around and picked her up. Benazir wrote that in the United States, atRadcliffe, she“experienceddemocracy for the first time”and that there shehad spent“fourof thehappiestyearsof[her]life.”1

BhuttourgedhisdaughtertoleavetheUnitedStates,soasnottoputdownroots,toattendOxfordUniversity. She arrived at Oxford in the autumn of 1973 to undertake graduate-level courses inphilosophy, politics, and law; from there, Benazir traveled to Pakistan regularly. “I feel a strangesensationinimaginingyouwalkingonthefootprintsIleftbehindatOxfordtwenty-twoyearsago,”wrote Prime Minister Bhutto affectionately to his daughter as she entered Oxford.2 Zulfikar AliBhuttohadencouragedhisdaughtertostudythelivesoflegendaryfemaleleaderslikeJoanofArcand IndiraGandhi.AtOxford,Benazir soondemonstrated her talents as a leader bybecoming thefirstAsianwomantoheadtheprestigiousOxfordUniondebatingsociety.DuringhertimeatOxford,Benazir also reconnectedwithheryoungerbrotherMirMurtaza,whobeganhis firstyear there in1976.

Benazirwas twenty-fouryearsoldwhen she returned toPakistan in1977, after completingherstudiesatOxford.Shewasexcitedaboutherhomecoming.Herfatherhadarrangedforhertoworkatthe prime minister ’s office during the summer and at the Inter-Provincial Council of CommonInterests. In September Benazir would be part of the Pakistani delegation to the United NationsGeneral Assembly debates, and she would return to Pakistan in November to take her foreignministry exams inDecember.Butwhen she returned to her country in June of that year, itwas towitness the downfall of her father and to face house arrest and imprisonment under the Ziadictatorship.

ZulfikarAliBhutto’sdeath,byorderoftheZia-controlledjudiciary,wasadefiningmomentforBenazir.Shedecidedtobecomeapoliticianinordertotakeonthemilitarydictatorandtopreserveher father ’s legacy.She inherited themantle of leadershipof her father ’sPPP, althoughZulfikar ’s

wife,BegumNusratBhutto, had been named acting chairperson.Benazir ’s youngest brothers,MirMurtaza and Shahnawaz, went into exile to attempt to organize a resistance against the Ziadictatorship. In Pakistan, Nusrat and Benazir spent time in jail, while the Zia regime arrested andtortured thousandsofoppositionactivists,bannedpolitics,censored themedia,and introducednewIslamiclawsthatvictimizednon-Muslimminoritiesandwomen.

TheZiadictatorshipengaged ina tightalliancewith theUnitedStates tocarryout jointactionsagainsttherecentSovietoccupationofAfghanistan.Moreimportantly,Zia,ahighlyreligiousman,deepenedSunni-ledIslamizationofPakistanandofthearmy.InhisfirstpublicstatementfollowingthecoupinJuly1977,Ziadeclared,“Pakistan,whichwascreatedinthenameofIslam,willcontinuetosurviveonlyifitstickstoIslam.”HeviewedtheIslamicsystemas“anessentialprerequisiteforthecountry.”3Governmentofficeswereinstructedtoallowbothtimeandspacefordailyprayers,whichheadsofdepartmentswereexpectedtolead.Thedresscodeofthebureaucracychangedfromtiesandthree-piecesuitstoachkans,shalwars,andwaistcoats.Publicdisplaysofpietybegantobeconsideredgoodform.Theritualschanged inarmyofficers’messes,with thedisappearanceof formaldinnernights at which port wine traditionally concluded the evenings’ meals. During the holy month ofRamadan,restaurantsandfoodconcessionswereorderedtoclosefromsunrisetosundown.Smokingcigarettes, drinkingwater, or eating in public duringRamadan became punishable by arrest. Zia’sShariat courts issued the Hudood Ordinances under which, for example, four Muslim men wererequiredaswitnessestoproveawoman’schargeofrape.Withoutsuchevidence,awomanclaimingshehadbeenrapedcouldbechargedwithadultery.Despiteprofessionalwomen’sprotests, in1984theLawofEvidencewaspassed,underwhichawoman’stestimonywasmadeworthonlyhalfthatofaman’stestimony.

Maulana Maudoodi, the leader of the extremist religious party Jamaat-e-Islami, became thespiritual fatherof thedictator andamajor supporter inZia’s efforts to raise funds for theAfghanmujahideen. Allied with the Reagan administration, Zia increased the size of the ISI agency toorganizeandsupport themujahideen in theirbattleagainst theSoviets.The ISIchanneledabout$8billionfromtheUSgovernmenttotheAfghanfightersandtrainedtheTalibantroops.

General Zia made the works of MaulanaMaudoodi compulsory reading in the armed forces.Maudoodi,whohadstrongtieswiththeSaudiclergy,consideredAliJinnah,thefounderofPakistan,a “nonbeliever” and also declared ZulfikarAli Bhutto andBenazir to be nonbelievers.Maudoodi,togetherwiththeISIandthearmy,becamekeypillarsofZia’sdictatorship.

Deobandi madrassas flourished under Zia ul-Haq. The Deobandi movement was rooted in aschool of thought originating from the Dar ul-Ulum madrassa in 1867 in Deoband, India, themembers ofwhichwere as conservative as theWahhabis in SaudiArabia. The power of the civilcourtsdeclinedasShariacourtsandmilitarytribunalsgainedground,supportedbyZia.Hecreatedthe International Islamic University in Islamabad to gather leading Wahhabis and the MuslimBrotherhood.InDecember1984,ZiaheldareferendumonIslamization,withvotershavingtochoosebetweena “yes”vote in favorof Islamic lawsandGeneralZiaul-Haq staying inpoweror a “no”vote.Ziagot98percentapprovalinhisreferendum.

In1981,ninepoliticalparties, includingsome thathadopposedZulfikarAliBhutto,united intotheMovementfor theRestorationofDemocracy(MRD),demanding theholdingof“free, fair,andimpartialelections.”WhentheZiaregimerefused,theMRDtookitsoppositiontothestreets.Benazir,justtwenty-eightatthetime,wouldbecometheleaderofthemovement.

TheZiaregimerepeatedlyarrestedBenazirorkeptherunderhousearrestfornearlysixyears.ThepresswasbannedfromprintingtheBhuttoname.Benazirwasseverelyaffectedbyherfather ’s

death, and inprison she sufferedear infectionsandother ailments. In1984, thanks to internationalpressure on her behalf, shewas released from jail formedical treatment and allowed to travel toLondon; from there, she began to lobby throughout Europe and the United States for Pakistanidemocracy.

With hermotherNusrat’s support, andwhile her two younger brotherswere in exile trying tomountamovementofarmedresistanceto thedictatorship,BenazirformallysupplantedNusratandassumed the title of chairperson of her father ’s party, which she already controlled. In 1986 shedecidedtoreturntoPakistan.OnApril10,1986,shearrivedinLahoretoawelcomebyhundredsofthousandsofPakistanis.Thereafter,BenazirbecamethefaceofZiaul-Haq’sopposition.

InMay 1988, General Zia dismissed his handpicked prime ministerMuhammed Khan Junejo,dissolvedParliament,andcalledforelections.Afewweekslater,inJune,ZiaannouncedthatSharialawwasnowthesupremelawof the land.Healsoannouncedthat theelectionswouldbeheldonapoliticalpartylessbasisandthattherewouldbenopartysymbolsontheballots.BenazirwenttotheSupremeCourttochallengeZia’selectionrules,hopingforfreeandfairelections.

OnthemorningofAugust17,1988,GeneralZiaul-Haq,accompaniedbyfiveothergenerals,theUSambassadortoPakistan,ArnoldRaphel,andtheAmericanmilitaryattaché,flewtoBahawalpur,about 330 miles south of Islamabad; they then headed by helicopter to a test site to watch ademonstration of an American-made battle tank, which the Pentagon was pressing Pakistan topurchase.Withthetestsover,ZiaandhisentouragereturnedtoBahawalpurforlunch.Afterthemeal,Zia excused himself to say his prayers, and soon after, the party boarded the presidential plane, aLockheedC-130,toflybacktoIslamabad.

TheC-130tookofffromBahawalpuronscheduleat3:46p.m.Soonaftertakeoff,thepresidentialplanefailedtorespondtothecontroltower.Witnessessawtheaircraftplungingandexplodingintoaball of fire as it hit the ground at 3:51 p.m. The mystery surrounding the plane crash has neverdissipated.

AjointPakistani-USinvestigationof thecrashnevercametoaconclusion.AseparatePakistaniinquiryyieldeda365-pagesecret report—ofwhichonlya27-pagesummarywas released—rulingoutmechanical failure as causing the crash and concluding that it had been the result of an act ofsabotage.Although no firm evidence of an explosion in the aircraftwas discovered, the Pakistanireportassertedthatchemicalsthatcouldbeusedinsmallexplosiveswerefoundinmangoseedsorpeelsonboardandonapieceofropeintheaircraft.4GeneralMahmudAliDurrani, theofficer inchargeof the tank tests, had loaded twoboxesof localmangoeson theplane.Hehadordered themangoestobethoroughlychecked,althoughmorehadbeenloadedattheBahawalpurAirportoverwhichheclaimedhehadnocontrol.Thereportaddedthatthe“useofachemicalagenttoincapacitatethepilots,andthusperpetratetheaccident,[remained]adistinctprobability.”5However,noautopsieswereperformedonthecrewtoascertainiftheyhadbeenpoisonedbygas.

Many theories emergedabout thecrash.HamidGul, thedirectorof the ISI at the time, told theTimesthatZiaul-Haqhadbeenkilledinaconspiracyinvolving“aforeignpower.”6ThesuggestionwasthattheCIAhadcarriedouttheassassination,eventhoughhighAmericanofficialswereamongthevictims.AnotherversionblamedtheKGBactinginretaliationagainstZiaforhisstrongsupportoftheAfghanmujahideeninsurgencyagainsttheSoviets.

TheUSCongressheldanumberofhearingsaboutthecrash,butnoofficialreportwasevermadepublic. The FBIwas kept away from the case for a year, under orders from the Pentagon, and itseventual investigation came too late to examine critical evidence. Although the US Air Force

concluded that the crashhadbeen causedby amechanical problemcommon to theC-130 aircraft,John Gunther Dean, then US ambassador to India, pointed the finger at the Mossad, the Israeliintelligence agency. He believed they orchestrated Zia’s assassination in retaliation for Pakistan’shavingdevelopednuclearweaponstocounteractIndiabuteventuallyuseagainstIsrael,andtodisruptthePakistani-Americanalliance.7

Former deputy director of the CIA Vernon Walters wrote in his autobiographical book, TheMighty and theMeek, that the plane crash that killed Zia “may or may not have been caused bysabotage.”8 Another theory, with little supporting evidence, pointed to some dissatisfied armygeneralsandeventothepilotoftheC-130plane,who,supposedly,hadconfidedtoanassociatethathe hated Zia for his repression of the Shia religious leaders. Zia ul-Haq’s son Ijaz ul-Haq, in aninterviewwithNewYorkTimesreporterBarbaraCrossetteayearafterthecrash,saidthathewas“101percent sure” that the armed resistance group of Mir Murtaza Bhutto had been responsible forblowinguptheplane.9

Despitetheenduringmystery,Zia’sdeathreopenedthewindowtodemocracyinPakistan.GhulamIshaqKhan,presidentoftheSenate,assumedtheroleofactingpresidentand,knowingwherepowerlay, immediatelyasked thenewheadof thearmy,GeneralMirzaAslamBeg,whathewanted todowiththecountry.GeneralBegoptedfordemocraticelectionsinthefallof1988.BenazirdecidedtocompeteforaseatinParliament.

ElectionswereheldinNovember1988,andLieutenantGeneralHamidGul,thedirectorgeneraloftheISI,playedanactiveroleinvoteriggingandmanipulation.GreatswathsofISImoneyhelpedcreatearight-wingcoalitionofnineIslamicpartiesandtheMuslimLeague—theIslamicDemocraticAlliance.DespitetheinterferenceoftheISI,BenazirandthePPPemergedtriumphant,beatingZia’sprotégé,NawazSharif.

BEFORETHEELECTIONS, inDecember1987,Benazir hadmarriedAsifAliZardari inKarachi.Prior to that,being inher thirtiesandsingle, shedecided that itwasn’tproper toaspire tobecomeprimeministerasanunmarriedwoman.ThePakistanipublicwasbarelyreadyforamodern,highlyeducatedfemaleleader,letaloneasinglewoman.BenazirfearedthatfewmenwouldacceptherasaseriouspoliticalfigureinanIslamicsociety.Zardari,anavidpoloplayerwhohadhisownsquad,aloveroflivingthehighlife(youngZardarireportedlyhadsetupadiscoinhishouse),andamemberof the land-owning Zardari tribe from Sindh Province, did not have that problem, though hewasclearlyher inferior.Bhutto’smotherandanauntarrangedthemarriage,whichBenazir justifiedbycomparingittocomputerdating.10SherecognizedthatherfriendsintheWestwouldfinditdifficultto understand the peculiar cultural and political circumstances that had led her to an arrangedmarriage.11

Benazirhadgrownprogressivelyapartfromhertwobrothers,MirMurtazaandShahnawaz,whodisagreed with her realpolitik approach to Pakistani public life and Zardari’s growing politicalinfluence.Mirhadurgedhisfathertoresist theZiacoup,butZulfikarhadrespondedthatonemustnever resist amilitary coup.On their father ’s instructions,Mir and Shahnawaz reluctantly left forEnglandandSwitzerland,respectively.BenazirstayedbehindinPakistantohelpherfatherwithhisdefenseandtomaintainpopularsupportinthestreets.SchooledinEnglish,BenazirhadtobetutoredinUrdusoshecouldspeakonherjailedfather ’sbehalf.Benazirtouredtheprovincescoachedbyherfather.

MirandShahnawazlefttheirstudiesanddedicatedthemselvesfull-timetothecauseofgathering

international support for their imprisoned father.Playing the roleof the responsibleeldest sibling,BenazirwrotetoMirtopassoninstructionsfromherfathertoavoidalavishlifestyleabroadandtorefuse interviews with Indian and Israeli papers, for they could be politically misconstrued inPakistan. After their father ’s death, Mir and Shahnawaz went into exile to organize an armedresistanceagainstthedictator,firstfromneighboringAfghanistanandlaterfromSyria.

Inthesummerof1985,theBhuttosdecidedtoholdafamilyreunioninNice,France.Shahnawaz,theyoungestofBenazir ’sbrothers,haddecidedtoliveintheopen,abandoningSyriaandceasingtoorganizearmedresistanceandviolenceagainstZia’sdictatorship.

Nusrat,Benazir ’smother,traveledfromGeneva,MirMurtazafromDamascus,andBenazirandsisterSanamfromLondon.Theextended family, includingchildren, spenthappydaysat thebeachpracticingsports,organizingbarbecues,anddiningout.

Benazir recalled inherautobiography thatShahnawazseemedhappy,except for the fact thatheintended todivorcehiswife,Rehana, fromwhomhehadseparated twicealready, reconcilingeachtimebecauseoftheirdaughter.12Shahnawaz,whomthefamilycalled“Shah,”wasconcernedaboutBenazir ’s security and tookher shopping for abulletproofvest.Shahnawazwas also considered atarget of the Zia dictatorship, particularly because hewas themilitary leader of the two brothers,whileMirwasthepolitician.Mir toldhissister thatbothbrotherscarriedvialsofpoisonwherevertheywentincasetheywerecaughtbyZiaagents—thusoptingfordeathinsteadofprison.

On the morning of July 18, Mir received a phone call from Shah’s wife, who asked him tourgentlycomeandseehisbrother. “Something iswrong”withShahnawaz,Rehanadeclared.UponenteringShah’sapartment, theyfoundhimlyingfacedownonthe livingroomfloor.Hewasdead.Mir told thepolicewhoarrivedon the scene that he suspected that hisbrotherhadbeenpoisoned,adding that Shah had already survived four attempts on his life; but no immediate proof could befoundtosupportthatassertion.Subsequentpoliceinvestigationdidreveal,however,thattherewasastrongpoisoninhissystem.

Theoriesabouthisdeathspreadquickly.Somesaid thathehadcommittedsuicide,ahypothesisdenied by the closest relatives and the circumstances of the Bhutto family get-together. Othersasserted that Shahnawaz had been murdered over arguments about family assets stashed away inSwitzerland. The Zia-controlled press reported that Shah had been a suicidal gambler. The policeinvestigatedRehanabecauseninehourshadpassedbeforethefamilyandpolicehadbeensummonedto the scene and because the couple had a stormy relationship. Benazir and Mir Murtaza filed amurder case againstunknownpersons.Thepolice arrestedRehanaunder the chargeofnothavingaidedherdyinghusband,buttheyeventuallyreleasedherandallowedhertoleaveFrance.

BenazirpersonallyaccompaniedShah’sbodytoPakistanonAugust21,1985,aftertheZiaregimereluctantly agreed to allow his burial in Larkana. Shewas arrested five days later inKarachi andremainedunderhousearrest—despiteexpressionsof“dismay”bytheReaganadministration—untilNovember3whenshewasallowedtoleaveforFrancetogiveherdepositiononthedeathcaseofherbrother.

ThetheorythatGeneralZiahadorderedthehitonShahnawaz’slifegainedgroundwithtime.Butthecasewasneversolved,andnoresponsiblepartywaseveridentified.13

ONDECEMBER2,1988,attheageofthirty-five,Bhuttowassworninasthedemocraticallyelectedprimeminister,theyoungestpersonandfirstwomaninhistoryeverelectedtoheadanIslamicstate.Bhutto’spartyhadwon the largestnumberofseats in theNationalAssemblybuthadnotsecuredaclear majority. She had defeated Nawaz Sharif, the ISI-backed candidate who, following his

supporters’ recommendation, secured the post of chief minister of Punjab Province instead ofholding a seat in the National Assembly. Hamid Gul, the ISI director general, and General AsadDurrani,ex–ISIchiefand,atthetime,MIdirector,pridedthemselvesonNawazSharif’sloyaltytothelegacyofZiaul-HaqwhohadreturnedtoSharifthefamily-ownedsteelmillbusiness,nationalizedbyZulfikarAliBhutto.Theybelievedthatalthoughhehadbeendefeatedonthisoccasion,Sharifcouldexercise power in Punjab, beyondBenazir ’s reach.Nawaz supporters affirmed thatBenazirwouldfunctionallybetheprimeministerofthecapitalonly—notintherestofthecountry.

ThearmyinitiallyrefusedtoallowBhuttotoassumeherdutiesasprimeminister,butWashingtonsteppedintobrokeradeal:Benazirwouldleaveforeignpolicyandthenuclearprograminthehandsof the army and she would agree not to interfere in the military or defense sector budget andpromotions.Also,severalZiasupporterswouldcontinueingovernmentfunctions.

Bhutto introduced various modernization reforms. She lifted bans affecting labor unions andstudent associations, ordered the release of political prisoners, removed constraints on thefunctioningofnongovernmentalorganizations, favoreduncensoredmediareporting,andsought toimprovetieswithIndia.Benazirreversedsomepoliciesintroducedbyherfather,includingreturningPakistantotheBritishCommonwealthandprivatizingsomeindustriesthatherfatherhadnationalizedorplacedinthepublicsector.AccusedoffavoringWesternization,thenewprimeministerdecidedtocoverherheadwithawhitedupatta,whichherfatherhadoncerecommendedshewearwhenvisitingtheconservativetribalareas.ShewasthefirstwomanintheBhuttofamilytohideherhair,apparentlyapoliticalmovetokeepthesupportofIslamicgroupsandleaders.

Five months after she became prime minister, she dismissed General Hamid Gul from hisposition as director general of the ISI,which controlled the Pakistani participation in the ongoingAfghanwar,becauseshehad learned thatGulwasconspiringwith theopposition toousther frompower.HamidGulandthearmyweresopowerfulthatBenazircouldnotretirethegeneralbutonlytransferhimtoanother importantpost.Shenamedaretiredgeneralasheadof theISI,amove thatbotheredarmycommanderGeneralBeg.Consequently,heisolatedtheISIandinstructedtheMItofillthevoid.

Osama bin Laden appeared in the Pakistani political landscape in late October 1989 when,according toBenazirBhutto, he provided $10million to fund a no-confidence vote in Parliamentagainst the prime minister. The objective was to buy out supporters of Bhutto in the NationalAssemblysoas tooverthrowhergovernmentand install,with thehelpof ISIofficers,a theocraticregimeinPakistan.14BenazirphonedUSpresidentGeorgeH.W.BushtolethimknowthatPakistanimilitary hardliners who had supported the mujahideen now were attempting to bring down hergovernmentwiththehelpofforeignmoney.ShealsorelayedtoBushthattheSaudiKing’sadvisershad informedher that thefundsfor theno-confidencevote—whichwasdefeatedby twelvevotes—hadcomefromaSaudibusinessmancalledbinLaden.

DuringBenazir ’stimeasprimeminister,Zardariandsomeassociateswereaccusedofbenefitingfrom kickbacks, which earned him the nickname “Mr. Ten Percent.” In a 2002 interview Bhuttoadmittedthatherhusbandwas“notanangel.”He“associatedwithcertainpeople,whichgavehimabadname.Ithinkmyhusbandalsohadadifferentviewaboutpatronagethanwhatisnowacceptable,”shedeclared;atthesametime,shedefendedhim,denyinghehadbrokenthelaworstolenmoney.15Benazirwas also accusedofbeingadeficientmanager and indecisive.Herdisagreementswith thepresidentandthearmyoverpersonnelmattersledtotheperceptionthatshewasnotincharge.

Her governmentwas dismissed inAugust 1990 by President IshaqKhan under a controversial

EighthAmendmentprovisiontotheconstitution,whichdatedfromtheZiaera,givingthepresidentthepowertodismisstheprimeminister.Benazirwaschargedwithcorruption—forwhich,however,shewasnevertried—andfortheinabilitytomaintainlawandorderinthefaceofethnicandsectarianviolence. “TheMilitary Intelligencewas conspiring againstmy government from the first day,”16declaredBenazirinapressconferencethedayafterherdemotion.ThiswasbecomingthenormofpoliticsinPakistan:presidentsdismissingprimeministersoncorruptionchargesandoustedleadersaccusingintelligenceagenciesofinterferenceingovernmentalaffairs.

NawazSharifcametopowerinthe1990elections,backedbytheIslamicJamhooriIttehad(IJI),anallianceofconservativeandreligiouspartiescreatedandfundedbytheISI.Benazirbecameleaderof the opposition. Sharif’s government was more pro-business than Benazir ’s, and he, as a Zialoyalist,continuedgivingsignificantpoliticalspacetoIslamicgroups.Hepubliclydeclaredthatthearmyshouldhavenothingtodowithpolitics,buttheprimeministersoughttoinfluencearmymatterssurreptitiously.More importantly, Sharif attempted to reduce the president’s powers, and in April1993,PresidentKhandismissedhimasprimeminister,againundertheEighthAmendmentprovision,for the usual reasons: corruption andmisadministration. Surprisingly, amonth later, the SupremeCourtoverturnedthepresident’sdecisionandreinstalledNawazSharifasprimeminister.Acoupleofmonthslater,thearmyforcedbothSharifandPresidentKhantoresign.

BENAZIR RETURNED TO power in the October 1993 elections, retaking her unfinished reformagendaasprimeminister.CriticsobjectedtoBhutto’sdesignationofherhusband,AsifAliZardari,toacabinetpostinthegovernment.

AnassassinationattemptbefellBenazirinthefallof1993.RamziYousef,aterroristwithtiestothe ISI and nephew of Al-Qaida leader Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, placed a bomb in front ofBenazir ’shousewiththeintentionofactivatingitbyremotecontrolasshedroveoutofhergarage.The attempt was frustrated as passing policemen drove Yousef away. Benazir recalled in herautobiographythatamoreelaborateplaninvolvingYousef,Al-Qaida,andtheintelligenceagencies—which failed for logistical reasons—“was based on assassinating me and making it look like mybrother[MirMurtaza]wasresponsible.”17

The relationship betweenBenazir and her brotherMirMurtaza had been growing strained foryears.Benazirconsideredherbrotherapoliticalnovice.Whileshewasinjail,Benazirlearnedofherbrother ’sroleinthehijackingofaPakistanipassengerplaneinwhichapassengerhadbeenshot.TheAl-Zulfikargroup,anorganizationledbyMirBhutto,claimedresponsibility.Benazircriticizedtheincident.ShefeltitplayedintoZia’sstrategyofheightenedconfrontationtooffsetgrowingdomesticdissatisfactionwiththedictatorship.

Benazir and Mir Murtaza strongly disagreed on anti-Zia tactics. “Only violence can answerviolence,” Mir advocated, while Benazir favored peaceful struggle and mobilization to enableelections.In1993,MirrejectedtheconditionsimposedbythemilitaryonthePPPgovernmenttostayoutofdefensesectordecisionsandnotmeddlewiththeISI,whileBenazirsawthattherewasnootherchoiceand that realpolitikdictated theneed toaccept such limitations tohergovernment’spowers.Their differences were so marked that they had decided not to discuss politics during familygatherings.18

MirMurtazawasstillinexile,anxioustoreturntoPakistan.Benaziropposedtheidea,however,because it would raise political problems for her, since her brother still faced judicial chargesbroughtagainsthimbytheZiaregime.TheprimeministertoldMirthatitwasunknownhowmany

caseswerestillopenagainsthim,asshehadbeeninformedthattheISIhad“losthisfile.”19BenazirsawherfuturealignedwiththeWest,whiledomesticallyshewouldhavetogetalongwith

thepowersthatbe,includingtheISI,thereligiousgroups,andtheentrepreneurialclass—thatis,theso-calledestablishment.

Bhutto became an active and founding member of the Council of Women World Leaders, anetworkofcurrentandformerprimeministersandpresidents.Despitevoicingconcernforwomen’ssocial and health issues, she failed to propose domestic legislation to empowerwomen.Benazir ’srelationswith theSupremeCourtbecamestrainedwhen it reversedherappointmentof twentynewjudges to thePunjabHighCourt, someofwhomwereknownasherparty sympathizers.Benazir ’spolitical rival Nawaz Sharif hardened his opposition to the prime minister when her governmentjailedSharif’sagedfatheronchargesoffraud.

By1993,MirMurtazadecidedhehadtoreturntoPakistan.Benazirhadrefusedtogivehimandhis group slots to run for congressional elections on thePPP ticket andhad recommended that he“leaveSyria,aroguestateinherestimation,andsettleinLondonforafewyears.”20ShehadspokentoMargaret Thatcher about the possibility of himmoving to London, and the British leader hadagreed. But Mir had been reluctant to move. Instead, he had decided to run for office as anindependent,andwon.BythenMirhadbecomeanopencriticofhissister ’sgovernmentandofthecorruptionassociatedwithBenazir ’shusband,AsifAliZardari.

WhenMirMurtazalandedinKarachi,afterflyingfromDamascusviaDubai(asthegovernmentof Islamabad initially refused to allow theSyrian presidential plane carrying him to land), hewasarrestedandendedupspendingeightmonthsinjail.Thechargesincludedcrimesrelatedtothe1981hijackingcaseof thePakistan InternationalAirlinesplane thathad leftonepassengerdead.HewasnowanopponenttothegovernmentledbyhissisterBenazir.21

Mirwaseventuallyreleased,althoughcasesagainsthimremainedactive incourt,whichforcedhimtoconstantlyappearathearings.HetouredPakistan,speakingonhisusualtopics—namely,thecorruptionofthePPP.Benazir,inturn,sawherbrotherasanimmatureradical,evenportrayinghimasa“terrorist,”particularlywhenhespokeagainstthegovernmentrepressiononethnicMuhajirsinSindh—apopulationthatspeaksUrduasopposedtoSindhiandissupportedbytheultra-nationalistMuhajirQuamiMovement—inthecontextofgrowingethnicviolence.

Benazir andMirMurtaza did not see eachother after his return toPakistanuntilMay1996. In1995,Mirsetuphisownparty,whichhenamedthePPP(ShaheedBhutto).Benazir leftherbrotheruntouchedby thestateapparatus,butshehadmanyofhis followers thrownin jail.TheISImade itcleartoMir ’ssupportersthatiftheychangedsides,theywouldbefreed.

MirMurtazablamedBenazir ’shusbandforhispersecution.AccordingtoRajaAnwar,aformerstudentleaderandguerrillacompanionofMirinexile,Mirwasconvincedthat“Benazir ’snegativeattitudetowardshimwastheresultofAsif’sinfluence.Mirhadnothingbutcontemptforhisbrother-in-law,whomheconsideredunworthyofhissister.”22

Onetime,duringaninformalmeetingwithbrother-in-lawZardari,MirandhisguardsgrabbedBenazir ’shusbandandshavedoffhalfofhisiconicmustache,forcingZardaritoshaveofftheotherhalf, to thedelightofMir ’sfriendsandthemedia.23Justbeforehisdeath,MirhadhappenedtobewithZardarionthesameflightfromIslamabadtoKarachi.Afterarrivingattheairport,Mir ’sarmedguards followed and harassed Asif, aiming their automatic weapons from their cars at the primeminister ’shusband.Zardariwas terrifiedand, insteadofgoing tohishouse,changeddirectionandwenttohisfather ’shome.Onceinside,ZardariphonedAbdullahShah,chiefministerofSindh,and

gavehimhellforimproperprotection.HethenlearnedthatthepolicehadbeenlookingforoneofMir ’stoplieutenants.24

MirMurtazadiedinfrontoftheBhuttohouseat70CliftoninKarachionthenightofSeptember20,1996,afterbeingshotbypolicemenwhohadsupposedlycometoarresthim.Thestreetlightshadbeen turned off. Gunfire broke out, with the police killing three of Mir ’s guards and woundingseveralothers.Mirwasshotseveraltimes.Twopolicemenwereinjured,thoughbytheirownactions,asforensicexaminationslaterproved.Theonlyspentammunitioncamefrompolice-issuedweapons.FatimaBhutto,MirMurtaza’sdaughter,describesthelastmomentsofherfather ’slifeinhermovingmemoir,SongsofBloodandSword:“Thelastshot,Papa’sautopsyshowed,wasfiredintohisjawatpoint-blankrange....Thestreetoutsideourhousewashosedclean;allthebloodandglasswas[sic]washedaway.BythetimeMummyandIleftthehouseataround8.45,somefifteenminuteslater,thepolicehadremovedalltheevidence.”25

TheprimeministerflewthatsamenightfromIslamabadtoKarachiandwenttothehospitalwhereherbrotherhadbeentakenfortheautopsy,accompaniedbyacoupleofpoliceofficerswhohadbeenatthesceneoftheshooting.Shewasweepingandbarefoot,asignofrespectforherdeceasedbrother.Inher autobiography,Benazir claimed that shewasparticularly “distraught because [theyhad] justreconciledaftersomeyearsofpoliticalestrangement.”26

Consideringthewidespreadrumorsandaccusations implicatingBenazirandherhusbandin thegangland-style execution ofMirMurtaza,27 the primeminister invited a team of former ScotlandYarddetectives,ledbyRoyHerridge,toconducttheirownindependentinvestigationofthecase.Theinterimreportfoundevidenceofapoliceconspiracyandofanunidentifiedgunmanatthescene.TheHerridge team was paid and invited to leave Pakistan by President Farooq Leghari after he hadremoved Benazir as primeminister.With Benazir out of office, the government no longer madedecipheringMir ’sassassinationapriority.

InNovember1996, severalconvergingstormssank theBhuttoadministration.First, corruptionscandals involved Zardari, which eventually landed him in jail. Second, ethnic violence flaredbetween native Sindhis and the Muhajir refugees from India and their descendants. Then, thehypotheticalimpositionofanagriculturaltax,agreedbytheBhuttogovernmentandtheInternationalMonetary Fund, met with the strong opposition of the powerful landed elite. Mir Murtaza’sscandalousmurderwasthelaststraw.PresidentFarooqLeghari,aPPPmember,invokedtheEighthAmendment to dismissBenazir as primeminister,while rejecting her accusation—which she laterdenied—thatboththearmyandthepresidencywerebehindMir ’smurder.

TheMirMurtazacasewasneversolved.Oneversionoftheeventsstatedthathisguardshadfiredfirst and killedMirMurtaza accidentally in the alleged cross fire. Benazir ’s government opposedMir ’s relatives’ intention to file a criminal case against the police and, instead, set up a judicialinquiryintothecase.Thetribunal,althoughnotempoweredtopasssentences,establishedthattherehadbeennoshootoutorcrossfireandthatthepolicehadusedexcessiveforceandlefttheinjuredtodieonthestreet.

Former interiorminister general (ret.)NaseerullahBabar said that the ISIwas involved in themurderofMirMurtazaBhutto.HeaffirmedthathehadformedacommissiontoprobeintotheISIroleinthecasebutthatpressurehadmountedagainsttheinquiryuntilitwasdropped.MirMurtaza’slawyersfiledacriminalcasein1997againstAsifAliZardari,AbdullahShah—thechiefministerofSindhProvince—andtwopolicemenforconspiracytomurder.Zardariwasacquitted,andtothisday,MirMurtaza’sdeathremainsshroudedinmystery.

AfterBhuttowasdeposedasprimeminister,NawazSharifreturnedtopowerfollowingadecisivevictory by his party in the February 1997 parliamentary elections. This time hemoved quickly tocurtail thepowersof thepresidencyand the judiciary.TheParliamentapprovedanamendment thatremovedthepresident’sEighthAmendmentpowerstodismissthegovernment.

BhuttoleftPakistanforDubaiin1998onaself-imposedexile.ShekeptherjobasleaderofthePPPduringthefollowingnineyears.Animportantpartofheractivitiesduringthislongexileabroadwas to fight the corruption charges leveled against her in Pakistan, as well as in Spain andSwitzerland,andtosecurethereleasefromaPakistanijailofherhusband,whofacedchargesbothfor corruption and for his alleged involvement in themurder ofMirMurtaza Bhutto. Despite thedocumentedaccusationsagainstZardari—whichwereabundantlycoveredinnumerouspressreports,includinga1998NewYorkTimesarticleentitled“HouseofGraft:TracingtheBhuttoMillions”28—she felt loyal to the father of her three children and her political partner. Some close advisersrecommendedabandoninghimforthesakeofherpoliticalcareer,butBenazirrefused,standingbythemanwho had “presented her on their engagementwith a ring engravedwith thewords: ‘Untildeathdouspart.’”29Afterall,someobserversreflected,corruptionwasendemicinPakistan,wheregovernment officials at the federal and local levels, generals, policemen, and business people allparticipated,tovaryingdegrees,incorruptpractices.

InApril 1999, a two-judgeEhtesab (accountability)Benchof theLahoreHighCourt convictedBenazirandherhusbandofcorruptionandsentenced themto fiveyears inprison, fined them$8.6million, and disqualified them from holding public office. The EhtesabBench had been set up byNawaz Sharif—who made a businessman friend of his its president. Two years later, Pakistan’sSupremeCourtruledthatBenazirBhutto’s1999convictionhadbeenbiasedandorderedaretrial.30

IN OCTOBER 1999, General Pervez Musharraf seized power from the democratically electedgovernment of PrimeMinisterNawazSharif in a dramatic coup d’état.Tension had been brewingbetweenSharifandthearmyeversinceMusharrafhadsentPakistanimujahideenacrosstheLineofControlinnorthKashmir.TheKargiloffensive,asitwasknown,provokedaforcefularmedreactionfrom India, which threatened to escalate to full-out war. After the crisis subsided, the SharifgovernmentannouncedMusharraf’sdismissal, andonOctober12,1999, as themilitarychief flewbacktoKarachifromanofficialmissiontoSriLanka,theydecidedtokeephiminexilebyimpedinghisplanefromlandingattheKarachiairport.

At about 6:45 p.m., Pakistani International Airlines (PIA) flight 805 carrying Musharraf wasinformed that itwould have to leavePakistani airspace, even though it had only one hour and tenminutesof fuel remaining.Given the limitedfuel, theplanehadnooptionbut toattempt to land inhostile India, and it was not at all clear that the plane would make it there safely. After severalmoments of extreme tension,MajorGeneralMalik IftikharAliKhan, the commander of an armydivisioninKarachi,rebelledandradioedthepilot,tellinghimthateverythingwasallrightandaskinghimto“tellthechieftocomebackandlandinKarachi.”31ThearmythenarrestedSharifandseveralseniorgovernmentofficials,andthePIAflightfinallylandedinKarachi,withMusharrafasthenewdefactoleaderofPakistan.

Sharif, the deposed prime minister, was convicted in April 2000 on charges of hijacking anaircraftandtreasonandsentencedtolifeimprisonment.Butafterayearinjail,hewaspardonedandsentoff intoexile toSaudiArabiaat the requestof theSaudi royal family.Sharifwasdisqualifiedfrompublicoffice for twenty-oneyearsandwasrequired to forfeitabout$9million inproperties.

TheMusharrafregimealsopursuedrenewedcorruptioninvestigationsagainstBhuttoandZardari.NawazSharifandBenazirBhutto,nowbothinexile,formedanallianceofoppositionparties,the

Alliancefor theRestorationofDemocracy,whichheldprotestrallies inPakistanthatwerebrutallyrepressed.Musharraf referred toBhuttoandSharifas“uselesspoliticians.”Bhutto respondedfromLondon that the Pakistani army was “infected by extremists.” By disqualifying the mainstreampoliticalleaders,sheadded,“thearmyplansavacuumwhichcanbefilledbyextremistslinkedtotheTaliban.”32

In June 2001, General Musharraf dismissed the president and assumed the presidential posthimselfwhileretainingthechiefexecutivepositionandaddingthenewroleofchiefofarmystaff.Hejustifiedthisdictatorialactionasbeing“inthesupremenationalinterest.”33

In2002, thegeneralamendedPakistan’sconstitution tobanprimeministersfromservingmorethan two terms, thus disqualifying both Bhutto and Sharif. With the opposition out of the way,Musharraf won the election of October 2002, legitimizing his rule. Beyond his electoral support,skewedthoughitmayhavebeen,GeneralMusharrafhadthebackingofwhatisknowninPakistanastheEstablishment—thedefactopowerstructurewhosepermanentcoreisthemilitaryhighcommandand intelligence agencies, in particular the powerful, military-run ISI, as well as the MI and theIntelligence Bureau (IB). He had agreed with a coalition of Islamic parties to leave the army byDecember31,2004,andwithsuchapromise,hemusteredatwo-thirdsmajorityinParliamenttopassan amendment that retroactively legalized his 1999 coup and other decrees, although the generalrenegedonhiswordandkepthisarmypost.TheParliamentobligedbypassingabillenablinghimtokeepbothoffices.

By the timeMusharraf took over, the post of primeminister had been suspended five times inPakistandue tomartial laworanother formofmilitary intervention,andnoelectedcivilianprimeministerhadeverservedafullfive-yearterm.Themilitaryhadbeendirectlyrulingthecountryforthreeofthesixdecadessinceindependence.

ThecommissionersandstaffoftheUNCommissionofInquiryattheexactsiteatLiaquatBagh,Rawalpindi,whereBenazirBhuttowaskilled,inspectingtheareaandinterviewingseniorpolicemenaboutthefactsandcircumstancesoftheassassination.

4

OntheRoadtoIslamabad

“THE BHUTTO COMMISSION communications have been intercepted by an unknown party,”ChiefofStaffMarkQuartermantoldmenervouslyafewhoursbeforewewereduetodepartonourfirstvisittoPakistan.“APakistanigovernmentsourcehasurgentlycontactedmetoconveytoyouthisinformation,” Quarterman said. “Whoever intervened with our electronic mail knows about ouragendainIslamabad.”

“WehavetotelltheUNDepartmentofSafetyandSecurityandseektheiropinion,”Ireplied.Whenwecontactedthedepartment,knownastheDSS,theyaskedustoconsidersuspendingthe

trip.Ifeltthiswasoverlycautious.“Look,anyonecouldbeinterestedinfindingoutaboutourcommunications—notjustPakistanis,”

Itoldourchiefofstaff.“Iintendtogoahead.”ItwasJuly14,2009.SincewewerescheduledtoleaveforPakistanthatday,wedecidedtorevisit

theissuewiththeDSSduringourstopoverinDubaienroutefromNewYorktoIslamabad.At theDubai airport, after our long and tiring trip, theDSS agreed thatwe should proceed to

Pakistan but advised us not to leave the security perimeter in Islamabad known as the “red zone.”Because any hotel or place of public access would represent a high security risk for thecommissioners,wewouldbestayingat theSindhHouse,aresidenceforhighofficialsfromSindhProvinceduringtheirjourneystoIslamabad.TheMinistryoftheInteriorhadbeenabletosecurethatvenueforourcommissionduringourvisits.TheSindhHousewasn’ttheidealsafehouseavailable—the better-equipped one was the Punjab House—but Sindh offered the best security conditionsaccording to an advance team that had evaluated the options. On every mission, newspapers inPakistan reported that “strict security measures were in place at the Benazir Bhutto InternationalAirport(inIslamabad)astheU.N.teamarrived.”1

The strong recommendation by the DSS not to leave the “red zone” of Islamabadwas highlyproblematic.For reasons inherent to thenatureof the inquiry,aswellas forsymbolicmotives,weneeded tovisit thesiteofBenazir ’sassassination inRawalpindi,asuburbof thePakistanicapital. Idecidedwehad togo toRawalpindi.Decoyplans—different timesofdeparture forRawalpindi, aswellasdifferentmeansoftransportation—wouldbemadetodeceiveanyoneinterestedinharmingus.

Themissionwewereembarkinguponwasparticularlydifficultbecausewedidn’tknowwhatwewereupagainst.Certainly,thereweresomepoliticalactorsopenlyopposedtoourinvestigation.WealsoanticipatedpossibleresistanceandobstructionwithinsectorsclosetothearmyandtheISIsecretservice.

AnarticleintheGuardiansummarizedthechallengewewerefacing:“Thethree-manunit...willfind themselves plunged into amurkyworkof conspiracy theories, power politics and conflicting

agendas.”2Indeed,Bhutto’sassassinationwassteepedincontroversy.ButtheGuardiandidnotgofarenough. The commission soon encountered a country deeply skeptical of authority and the justicesystembecauseofwidespreadcorruption,abundantbehind-the-scenespoliticaldealmaking,andtheregularimpunitythathadmetpreviousunsolvedpoliticalassassinations.

UPON OUR ARRIVAL in Islamabad in the early hours of Thursday, July 16, the Pakistanigovernment prepared a hospitable reception at our safe house and deployed for us a heavyantiterrorist security detail. Several UN policemen accompanied the commissioners for “closeprotection.”Duringour first fewhours in Islamabad, Iwas shocked to learn that our affable non-English-speaking cook at the Sindh House knew in detail our agenda in the Pakistani capital. IcomplainedtoourchiefofstaffandtoanaidetotheministeroftheinteriorwhoactedasourcontactpersoninthePakistanigovernment.Noconvincingexplanationwasevergiven,exceptthatthecookhadtobeawareaboutwhenwewouldbearoundtopreparethedailymeals.

The work of our inquiry commission had begun in early July 2009, when the threecommissionersandthefullstaffhadgatheredinNewYorkforplanningsessionsandmeetingswithhighUNofficialsandwiththeambassadorofPakistantotheUnitedNations,AbdullahHaroon,andhisaides.OurpriorityhadbeentofirmupourprogramforthefirstvisittoPakistanfromJuly15to18,2009.Wehadentrustedadministrativeandlogisticdetailstoourablestaff.

The first visit to Islamabad began with a meeting with our chief contact in the Pakistanigovernmentandoneoftheprincipaladvocatesoftheinvestigation,InteriorMinisterRehmanMalik.He was the key interlocutor in our investigation not only as the official point of contact in thegovernmentbutalsoastheex–securityadviserofBenazirBhuttoandoneofthecloseaideswhohadaccompaniedheronthedayofthemurder.

Malikwasborn in1951 ina townnorthofLahore,hadearnedadoctorate incriminology,andhadspentnearlythreedecadesintheFederalInvestigationAgency,risingtothetopduringBhutto’ssecond termasprimeminister.Sackedand jailedby theNawazSharifgovernment in1998,hehademergedasBenazir ’s principal security adviserwhilebothwere in exile inLondon.According toone source,Malik became a business partner ofBenazir, and bothwere investigated by a Spanishcourt,whichwaslookingintoacompanytheywereassociatedwithcalledPetrolineFZC,“whichhadmadequestionablepaymentstoIraqunderSaddamHussein.”3

RehmanMalikresembledanItalianactorfromaBmovie.Gracedwith jet-blackcurlyhairandsporting a mustache, he dressed sharply in impeccable suits—colorful ties, silk handkerchiefsregularly adorning the front jacket pocket—and pointed leather shoes.His capacity for hardworkimpressedus.Onseveraloccasions,wemetwithhimatmidnight,converseduntiltwoorthreeinthemorning, and saw him again at breakfast by eight, where he appeared fresh and ready while westruggledwithjetlagandexhaustionduetolackofsleep.

WemetMinisterMalikathisofficeinacompoundofgovernmentbuildings.Insteadofaworkingmeetingacrossatable,MinisterMalikreceivedusinaformalsettingoftworowsofchairs—usononeside,hisadvisersontheother—withtheministerinthemiddle.

On this first meeting at the Ministry of the Interior, Malik expressed his satisfaction with theUnited Nations having agreed to conduct this investigation and with our personal commitment tocarry out this challenging duty on behalf of Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. Much to ourastonishment,MinisterMalikinformedusthattheirowninternalinvestigationhadmadegreatstrides,thatthepolicehadconfessionsfromfourindividualsaccusedofBenazir ’smurder,andthattheywereincustody.

“I thinkyourworkwillbemadeeasywhenyouread thisdocument,”MinisterMaliksaidashehandedmeaboundreportentitledSummaryofInvestigationandTrialConductedSoFarforUNFact-FindingCommission.Theseventy-pagereportwasdatedJune20,2009,signedbytheMinistryoftheInterior,andlabeled“Restricted.”

“Thanks; I’m sure thiswill be very useful,” I respondedwhile I quickly leafed through a fewpagesandsawthattheindexincludedannexessuchaswitnessstatements,asummaryoftheScotlandYardreport,a listofseizedarticlesat thecrimescene,namesofcourt judges,specialprosecutors,defenselawyers,andsoforth.

“Thisisverycomplete,”Malikadded.“Thisisyourownreportreadytobeissued,ofcourse,withthechangesandadditionsthatyoumayseefit.”

Ilookedatmyfellowcommissionersinpuzzlement.TheinteriorministerwashandinguswhatheexpectedwouldbethedraftfinalreportoftheCommissionofInquiry.Inshort,hismessagewasthatourinvestigationcouldverywellconcludethereandthen;wedidnothavetobotherwithanydetailedinquiry.Itwasasignofthingstocome.

OurrelationshipwithMinisterMalikwasrocky.HeneversatisfactorilyansweredourquestionsabouthisroleandactionsduringthemomentssurroundingBhutto’sassassination.Ourinsistenceonchecking details—for example, the distance between his vehicle and the scene of the crime at themoment of the attack—clearly made him uncomfortable. Malik informed us that he had receivedimportant information from a “brotherly country” about serious threats to Benazir Bhutto andhimself;butdespiteourrequests,heneverfurnishedthedetailsofthosethreats.Onotheroccasions,hewouldprovideuswithincompleteinformationtobedevelopedatanextconversation.

Theministerwasalwayscordial andcourteous,dispensinggifts after everyvisit,which, aswetold him,we could not accept due toUnitedNations ethics rules.He insisted, and those fine giftsendedupinthecareoftheUNEthicsOfficeinNewYorkCity.

WehadadisagreementwiththeMinistryoftheInterioraboutthequalityofourprotectionduringour second visit when the antiterrorist police contingent was replaced by nonspecialized securitytroopswhowouldpointtheirautomaticriflesatourvehicles,insteadofupwardsoratthefloor,whenriding in theprotection trucks in frontofus.Ourcomplaintsweregenerallyaccommodated;but afewmonthsafterthestartofourwork,wedidnotfeelaswarmlywelcomedaswedidattheoutset.

Onourfirstdayofwork,wepaidavisittoBenazirBhutto’swidowerandpresidentofPakistan,Asif Ali Zardari. He had been named cochairman of the PPP after Benazir ’s murder and hadimmediatelydemandedaUNprobeintothecrime.

After thePPP leader ’sassassination, theparliamentaryelectionsscheduled for January8,2008,forwhichshewascampaigning,werepostponedtoFebruary2008.ThePPPalliedwiththePakistanMuslimLeague-Nawaz (PML-N), ledbyNawazSharif, andemergedvictorious.ThenewcoalitionputforthYousufRazaGilaniasprimeminister.Musharraf’spositionbecameincreasinglyuntenable,andhe resigned thepresidency inAugust to avoid impeachmentprocedures inParliament.Zardariwas then thrust from being an operator behind the scenes, and a political partner of his wife, topresidentofPakistanafterwinningtheelectoralcollegecontestinSeptember2008.Inthemeantime,the Pakistani government had officially contacted the UN secretary-general to request theestablishmentofacommissiontoprobeBhutto’sassassination.

DuringthatJuly2009visittoZardari,heavysecurityslowedouraccesstothepresidentialpalace.Despiteacourteoustreatmentbypresidentialstaff,wehadtoleaveourcellphonesataguardstationfor security reasons. Later, a high official apologized, explaining that in our case suchoverzealousnesshadbeenunwarranted.

Thecommissionersandourchiefofstaffsatinarowofchairsacrossfromarowwithseveralkeyministers andBhuttoandPresidentZardari’s children. In themiddlewas thepresidential chair.Zardariwas cordial and appreciative about the establishment of the commission and our personalinvolvement.HeexplainedtheimportanceofourinvestigativeworkforhisfamilyandforPakistan.Thepresident remindedus that from theverybeginning, immediatelyafter theassassinationofhiswife,hehadrequestedanimpartialinvestigationconductedbytheUnitedNations.

Much of the conversation was general, as the formal context did not allow for any in-depthqueriesabout thefactswewere interested in. Ioutlinedourprogramof interviews,which includedpolicemen, witnesses, authorities, and representatives of civil society. I told the president that weintendedtovisitthesceneofthecrimeinRawalpindi.Thechildren,includingPPPchairmanBilawal,followedthedialogueattentivelybutdidnotintervene.

WerequestedaprivateconversationwithPresidentZardaritoinquireaboutkeyfactsrelevanttoourwork.Heaccommodatedusonatleasttwofurtheroccasions;ourinterviewsincludedalengthyand emotionally charged question-and-answer session at his suite at the InterContinental Hotel inManhattanduringhisattendanceattheSeptember2009GeneralDebateoftheUNGeneralAssemblyinNewYork.

VISITINGTHE SCENE of the crimewas complicated. As it involved leaving the “red zone,” wemade fakearrangements togobyhelicopter the followingday—Friday, July17—in theafternoon.Weevenputthedetailsinourupdatedagenda.Instead,weleftat5:00a.m.inacaravanofvehiclestoavoiddetectionbyanyoneinterestedinblockingourworkorharmingusandtoavoidthepressthatfolloweduseverywhere.

TheroadstoRawalpindihadlittletraffic,andtheyactuallylookeddeserted,asthepoliceblockedcrossstreetsalongour route forus.AtLiaquatBagh, theparkwhereBenazirwasassassinated,weexpectedtomeetseniorRawalpindipoliceofficerswhohadfirsthandinformationabouttheeventsofDecember27,2007.

When we arrived at Liaquat Bagh, we found that the police had cordoned off a two-blockperimeter.Aswe got out of our vehicles, I noticed a small crowd about two blocks away, behindpolice barriers. Peter Fitzgerald, the Irish commissioner, pointed outwhatwas going on: “It’s thepress,Heraldo.Therearebunchesof them.”Infact,wecouldsee thecamerasand telephoto lensespointed toward us. Someone had tipped off the press about the exact timewewould be at LiaquatBagh.

TheseniorpoliceofficersguidedusalongthecoursethatBenazirhadtakentoentertheparkinglotand thebackof theplatformfromwhereshehadaddressed thecrowd.Wewentup thewoodensteps,andIwalkedaroundwherethedaiswouldhavebeenlocatedthatday.FromthereIcommandedagoodviewof the entirepark and the adjacentbuildings. I sawsharpshootersonnearby rooftopswho had been posted for our security. A Thai UN policeman in charge of my close protectionpromptlyaskedmetoleavetheplatform.“Thisisnotsafe.Youaretooexposed,”hesaid.

WedescendedintotheparkinglotandwalkedthepathBhuttohadfollowedoutofLiaquatBaghandstoppedattheexactspotofherassassination.Weaskedmanyquestions:Whyhadsheturnedrightinsteadofleftasoriginallyplanned?Whywastheaccesstotheleftblocked?Whatpreventiveworkhad been done before her arrival?Howmany policemen and police vehicleswere escorting her?Whyweretheresomanypeoplearoundhervehicle?Ourstafftookabundantnotes.Thepolicemengave ample explanations that attempted to show they had done their job. Our retired Irish deputypolicechief,PeterFitzgerald,wasskeptical.Ifeverythinghadbeensoperfect,whythenhadtheprime

ministerbeenassassinated?heaskedme.Weannounced to thePakistaniofficials thatweneeded tointerrogatetheRawalpindipoliceofficersseparatelyduringourvisit.

Localmediaprovidedabundantcoverageofourvisit toRawalpindi.ThenewspaperTheNationwrotethat“amidtightsecurity,”theUNcommissionteam“parkedavehicleaswasusedbyBenazirBhuttoatthetimeofassassinationandexaminedthekillingscene.”Then,thenewsstorycontinued,“theteamalsoexaminedthenearbybuildingsandtreesatLiaquatBagh.TheU.N.officialstooksnapsof thesiteandmadesketches,andalsoexamined thestagewhereBenazirBhuttohaddeliveredherlastaddress.”4

We foundmanywitnesses of the crime—politicians, diplomats, friends ofBenazir Bhutto, andmembers of civil society—more than willing to cooperate, providing us with their testimony,opinions, and hypotheses about themurder.Military officials and policemen tended to be cautiousand,insomecases,werevisiblyedgyaboutspeakingtothecommission.Butsomeactiveandretiredintelligence officials weremuchmore forthcoming. At the SindhHouse, where we conducted themoresensitiveinterviews,wesawhighuniformedofficialsbecomeagitatedandperspireprofuselyas they attempted to answer our queries. One fellow commissioner, former Indonesian attorneygeneralMarzukiDarusman,wasparticularlycalmaboutasking incisivequestionsandpointingoutcontradictions. The Rawalpindi policemen’s behavior shifted from initial arrogance and self-assurednesstodefensivenervousnessaswepressedthemwithdetailedquestions.“Thisguyislying,”ourformerIrishcopannouncedatonepointwhenPoliceChiefSaudAzizrepeatedlychangedpartsofhistestimonyorsuddenlyrecalledfactshehadclaimedtohaveforgottenonlyafterwepresentedhimwithevidencewealreadypossessed.

Towardtheendofthefirstvisit,thecommission’smediaadviser,BenMalor,counseledustogiveapressconferencetosatisfymediacuriosityandavoidspeculation.Thepressconference,heldattheSerenaHotel,attractedaboutsixdozenjournalistsfrommediaoutletsaroundtheworld.Aschairmanof thecommission,Igaveabriefstatementexplainingthenatureofourmandate. Ihopedto lowerexpectationssomewhat.Theoddswereagainstusthatwewouldbeabletoidentifyculprits.AsItoldthe journalists, our planwas to conduct interviews on a voluntary basis in Pakistan and abroad asneeded. Then I described our agenda of official meetings during that first visit, thanked thegovernment for providing us with detailed materials, and emphasized that since ours was not acriminalinvestigation,itwasuptothecompetentPakistaniinstitutionstoestablishresponsibilitiesinthe crime. I also stressed that our work would be guided by objectivity, independence, andprofessionalism. Many questions were posed, some that revealed skepticism about the eventualoutcome of the commission’s inquiry. Only one or two questions suggested a veiled hostility,includingoneaboutwhetherwewouldinterviewfugitiveTalibanleaderBaitullahMehsud.

SECURITYISSUESSURROUNDEDourvisitstoPakistan.AftertheJulyvisit,Ihadaconversation,accompaniedbyourcommission’schiefofstaff,withUNunder-secretary-general forsecurityandsafetyGregoryStarr,whoanalyzedourtaskwithcold-bloodedrealism:“Youhavethebestpossiblesecurity, but nothing is fail-safe,” he said. “The bulletproof car that is being provided for you inPakistanisanarmoredB6levelvehicle,whichwillresisthigh-poweredriflefire.But,ofcourse,ifasuicidebomberwithanexplosivesjacketwrapshimselfaroundyourcar,thereisnoprotectionthatwillkeepyousafe.”

BetweenoursecondandthirdvisittoPakistan,onOctober5,2009,asuicidebomberwearinganimprovised explosive device and dressed in a uniform of the Frontier Constabulary, a Pakistaniparamilitary force,madehiswaypast the securityperimeter and into theofficesof theUNWorld

FoodProgram(UNWFP),wherehedetonatedhisdevice.FiveUNWFPemployeeswerekilledandsixothers were injured. The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the same group that had successfullyattackedthePearlContinentalHotelinPeshawarinJuneusingavehicle-borneimprovisedexplosivedevice,laterclaimedresponsibilityfortheattack.

NotonlywasourmissioncontroversialanddangerousintheeyesofsomePakistanisectors,butjihadist leaders had been targeting theUnitedNations as an infidel organization. In anApril 2008speech,Al-Qaida’ssecond-in-command,Aymanal-Zawahiri,haddeclared,“TheUnitedNationsisanenemyof IslamandMuslims. It is theonewhich codified and legitimized the establishment of thestateofIsraelanditstakingoveroftheMuslims’lands.”5

Astheworkofthecommissionprogressed,someinterestsinPakistanapparentlycametoviewitasmenacing. Prior to our third visit in February 2010, our invitation to use the SindhHousewaswithdrawn, supposedly due to a request by the governor of Sindh. After we protested toMinisterMalik, the house was again placed at our disposal. CommissionerMarzuki Darusman’s flight viastate-ownedPakistanInternationalAirlinesfromJakarta toIslamabadwascanceled,causinghimtomissthatthirdvisit;somePakistanisinterpretedthecancellationashavingbeenintentional.

In early February 2010, as we prepared to wind down our investigative work, we received adisquietingmessagefromacrediblefriendlysourceinPakistan:“Thecommissioners’securitymaybeindanger.Thesepeoplearethugsandtheyarecapableofanythingifitfitstheirinterests.Besides,theyareparochial anddon’tknowhow theworldoperates.”Wenever learnedwho“thesepeople”referredto,butwehadanideaandtookduenoteofthewarning.

Informationleaksplaguedourwork.AftertheOctober2009suicideattackontheUNWFPoffices,theUNDepartmentofSafetyandSecuritystronglyadvisedthatwepostponeourthirdvisitscheduledforNovember.Wedecidedtofollowthedepartment’sadviceand, tooursurprise,adetailedarticleaboutthesuspensionofourvisitappearedinthePakistanimedia.ThearticleincludedquotesfromaconfidentialnotewehadsenttotheIslamabadgovernmentrequestingthatarrangementsbemadeforustointerviewGeneralPervezMusharraf.6

AssumingthattheSindhHousewouldhavehiddenlisteningdevices,ourcommissionteamoftenwalkedaroundthegardensofthepremises,sometimesinthescorchingsun,todiscusssomeofthemoredelicateissuesweencounteredinourinquiryortoadoptdecisionsthatneededtoremainsecret.

Aswedepartedafterourinitialvisit,protocolofficialsaccompaniedustotheairportVIPlounge.One individual, whom I remembered seeing during our arrival and who identified himself as a“diplomaticliaison,”approachedmewhenIwasseatedlookingoverpapersand,afterexpressingthathe hoped we had had a good visit, asked me who I thought had committed Benazir Bhutto’sassassination.

“Look,wejustbeganourinquiry,”Isaid,tryingtobecourteous,“andasyouknow,it’snotuptoustoidentifyculprits.”

“Yes,Iunderstand.Butdoyouatleasthaveanysenseaboutwhomighthavedoneit?”heinsisted.“AsIsaid,thisisnotpartofourwork,”Ireplied,abitannoyed.“Butjustthinkofitasahypothesis:What’syourbesthunchaboutwhomighthaveperpetratedthe

murder?”ItwassuchanobviousploytogatherintelligencethatIsimplystoodupandwalkedawaytojoin

therestoftheteammembersontheotherendoftheroom.When,aboardtheplane,ItoldmycolleaguesaboutthedisagreeabledialogueIhadjusthadwith

the“diplomaticliaison”intheVIProom,oneofthemtoldmehehadexperiencedexactlythesame

interrogationfromthesameindividual.Weneversawthe“diplomaticliaison”againonanyofoursubsequentvisits.

PresidentGeorgeW.BushandPakistanipresidentPervezMusharrafshakehandsafterconcludingajointpressconferenceinIslamabad,duringavisitoftheUSpresidenttoPakistanonMarch4,2006.

5

TheUSGravitasinPakistaniAffairs

AS THE IRONY of history would have it, on the morning of September 11, 2001, GeneralMahmood Ahmed, the director general of Pakistan’s secret intelligence service, the ISI, was onCapitol Hill meeting with Porter Goss, chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee. GeneralAhmadwas there explaining that Pakistanwas doing its best to convince theTaliban to hand overOsamabinLadentoUSauthorities.

TheISIhadcultivateddeeptieswiththeTalibanasawayofcounteringthegrowinginfluenceofIndiaandRussia inAfghanistan. ItwasPakistan, through itsmilitary, thathadprovided theTalibanfighters with the support and assistance that had allowed them to seize power in the mid-1990s,dislodging the Northern Alliance–dominated Afghan government. Now, the 9/11 attacks and thesubsequent US reaction obliged Pakistan to make a choice: either sever ties with the Taliban andsupporttheUSeffortsinAfghanistanorfaceAmericanwrath.

Secretary of StateColinPowell phonedMusharraf the day after 9/11, around 1:30 p.m.,with astraightforwardmessage:“Youareeitherwithusoragainstus.”DeputySecretaryofStateRichardArmitage received ISIdirectorAhmed that samedayat10a.m.at theStateDepartmentandhewasevenmoreblatantwiththevisitingPakistanispymaster:PakistaniauthoritieshadtochoosebetweentheUnitedStatesandtheterrorists,andiftheychosethelatter,theyhadtobepreparedtobe“bombedbacktotheStoneAge.”1WhenGeneralAhmedreturned thenextday to theStateDepartmentforasecondmeetingwiththedeputysecretaryofstate,hewashandedalistofsevenspecificdemandsofcooperation.“Thisisnotnegotiable,”Armitagewarned.Thegeneral,knowntobesympathetictotheTaliban,quicklyreadthesheetofpaperandrepliedthatallthedemandswereacceptable.“Don’tyouwanttodiscussitwithyourpresident?”Armitageasked.“Iknowthepresident’smind,”respondedtheISI chief, who had phoned Musharraf the night before to convey Washington’s mood.2 Indeed,General Musharraf chose cooperation. Anything else would have almost certainly meant militaryactionbytheUnitedStatesandadeepeningUS-Indiaallianceintheregion.

On September 13, the American ambassador in Islamabad, Wendy Chamberlin, personallydelivered toMusharraf the same list of seven demands fromWashington regardingAl-Qaida, theTaliban,and“domesticexpressionsofsupportforterrorismagainsttheUnitedStates.”3AsGeneralAhmedhadanticipated,Musharrafacceptedthem.

ThiswasbynomeansthefirsttimetheUnitedStatestriedtoshapePakistan’spoliticallife.Infact,America has been a fundamental factor in Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs from the veryfoundingofthecountry.When,in2007,WashingtonputpressureonMusharrafandBenazirBhuttotoinduceapower-sharingarrangement, itwasonlyoneof the latestexpressionsof theUnitedStates’ubiquityinPakistan’spoliticallandscape.

PAKISTAN’SATTITUDETOWARDtheUnitedStateswasshapedsoonafterindependence.AlthoughWashingtonhadfavoredaunitedIndiaandwasunenthusiasticabouttheideaofPakistan,MuhammadAli Jinnah, Pakistan’s founder and first governor-general, felt very close to the United States. AsearlyasSeptember1947,JinnahhadtoldhiscabinetthatPakistanasademocracyhadtoalign“withtheUKandtheUSAratherthanwithRussia”andthat,furthermore,“communism[did]notflourishinthesoilofIslam.”4

AfterJinnah’suntimelydeathonSeptember11,1948,hissuccessorLiaquatAliKhanfollowedthesame foreign policy line of alignment with Washington. In a meeting with US secretary of stateGeorgeMarshallinOctober1948,duringtheUnitedNationsGeneralAssembly,Liaquatassuredhisinterlocutorthat“communism[was]againstIslam”5andurgedWashingtontodelivereconomicaidtothenewnationasitwasdoingacrossEuropeafterWorldWarII.

In1950,PrimeMinisterLiaquatbackedtheAmericandecisionto invokeUNcollectivesecurityactionagainsttheNorthKoreaninvasion.PakistanlobbiedtheUSpositionwithMiddleEasternandSouthAsian countries, but it stopped short of sending troops toKorea, asLiaquat felt his countryneededasecurityguaranteeagainstIndia.WashingtonviewedSouthAsiaasaregionmarginaltotheintensifying ColdWar, except for specific areas of conflict such as Afghanistan and Kashmir. Incontrast,fromthePakistaniside,thetopprioritywasnottheColdWarorcommunismbutthedisputewithIndiaingeneralandspecificallyoverKashmir.

Following the murder of Liaquat, the succeeding leaders continued to voice Pakistan’sendorsementof theanticommunistcauseandwillingness to join theso-calledfreeworld’ssecuritysystem. “Our army can be your army if you want us,”6 said General Ayub Khan to a high StateDepartmentofficialduringavisittoWashingtonDCinSeptember1953.

PresidentDwightEisenhowerandhissecretaryofstate,JohnFosterDulles,wereunderstandablysympathetictoKarachi’sforeignpolicypostures.DullesdislikedIndia’snonalignmentandviewedawell-armedPakistani armyas a stronghold against theSoviet threat.VicePresidentRichardNixonenthusiasticallysupportedtheideaofhelpingPakistanas,fromhisvisitstoNewDelhiandKarachi,hehademergedwithnegativeperceptionsofIndiaandpositiveonesofPakistan.InabriefingtotheNationalSecurityCouncilafteratriptoAsiain1953,NixondeclaredthatPakistanwas“acountryIwouldliketodoeverythingfor.”7

Notsurprisingly,theUnitedStatesunderEisenhowerdecidedtoarmPakistanaspartofaschemeto defend theMiddle East and SouthAsia against the Soviets. OnMay 19, 1954, Pakistan and theUnited States signed aMutual DefenseAssistanceAgreement that provided the foundation for theprovisionofmilitaryaid.Pakistan’salignmentwiththeWestwassharplycriticizedbyThirdWorldnonalignedcountries,butKarachi felt it had struckagooddealwithWashington. In1955Pakistanjoined the seven-country Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), a largely politicalorganizationmodeledafterNATObutlackingitsautomaticmilitarymechanismagainstaggression.Later,PakistanjoinedtheBaghdadPactanditssuccessorCENTO(theCentralTreatyOrganization).Themain security reason Pakistan joined these pacts was to strengthen its hand in requesting USmilitaryassistanceandtoclaim,asGeneralAyubKhandid,thatPakistanhadbecomeWashington’s“mostalliedallyinAsia.”8

TheSovietendorsementofNewDelhi’spostureonKashmir,accompaniedbyasizablepackageofeconomicandmilitaryaidtoAfghanistaninlate1955,furtherconvincedPakistanisthatalignmentwiththeUnitedStateswasvital.PakistanfeltconfidentofWashington’sfriendshipasitleanedtowardfreeenterprisepolicies,whileIndiaoptedforastate-orientedapproachtoeconomicdevelopment.

Pakistan’sinternalinstabilityledWashingtontooccasionallywarnthecountry’sleadersabouttheneedtosticktothedemocraticpoliticalprocesses.ButinaColdWarcontext,theUnitedStatesvalueddisciplinedandefficientleadershipsuchasthatprovidedbyGeneralAyubKhan,whotookoverinabloodlesscoupinlate1958.AUS-Pakistanbilateralsecurityagreementwassignedin1959asfurtherproofof theongoingcooperationbetweenthetwocountries.Duringhissecondterm,inDecember1959,EisenhowerbecamethefirstAmericanpresidenttovisitPakistan.

In1959PakistanagreedtogranttheUSAirForceaten-yearleasetoestablishacommunicationsfacilityatBadaber,nearPeshawar,thecapitaloftheNorth-WestFrontierProvince,asacoverforamajorinterceptoperationrunbytheNationalSecurityAgency.Atthesametime,theCIAwasgrantedpermissiontoflyU-2spyplanesfromPeshawarovertheSovietUnion.

ThedowningofaUSspyplaneoverRussia in1960and thecaptureof itspilot,GaryPowers,demonstratedtothePakistanisthecostsofaligningwithWashington,asthecountrybecameopenlyentangledintheEast-Westconflict.WithinAyub’scabinet,ayoungministerfromSindhProvincebythe name of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto strongly advocated for a more independent relationship with theUnitedStatesandforimprovedtieswiththeSovietUnionandChina.

AyubwasapragmatistwhosidedwithWashingtonsolongastheAmericanadministration,thenpresided over by JohnKennedy,would not alignwith India’s positions or provide itwithmilitaryassistance.When Bhutto became foreign minister, the US government considered him to be pro-Chineseandanti-American.

WhenBhuttoattendedtheKennedyfuneralinWashingtononNovember25,1963,hehadabriefencounterwith President Lyndon Johnson inwhich the foreignminister announced that he had animportant personal message from Ayub. Johnson inquired what the message was, but Bhuttorespondedhedidn’thaveitwithhimandwouldneedanadditionalmeetingtodeliverit.Tiedupwithinterviewswithmorethanahundredheadsofstateorhighofficialswhohadattendedthefuneral,thepresidentwas irritated by the request butmade time for ameeting at theOvalOffice.Bhutto thendeliveredamessagefromAyubcontainingnothingofsuchsubstanceastojustifyaspecialinterview.Afterafewpleasantries,Bhuttoassumeditwastimetoleaveandgotup.AnangryJohnsoninstructedBhutto to sit downand lecturedhimon thegrowingbilateral tensions.Bhutto attempted to explainPakistan’sintensefeelingsregardingIndia,butJohnsoncuthimoffandwarnedthatproblemswouldarise ifPakistandeepened its linkswithChina. Johnson added that theUnitedStateswas “indeed afriend of Pakistan andwould continue to be one if Pakistanwould let [it].”9Bhutto left theWhiteHouse visibly shaken and upset. From there on, US-Pakistani relations soured further as PakistanprotestedaUSarmsdealwithIndiaandrefusedtoaccommodateAmericanrequestsforassistanceintheVietnamWareffort,which,intheeyesofPresidentJohnson,wasequivalenttoPakistanignoringits alliance obligations with Washington. The Pakistan-US alliance had become, in Dennis Kux’swords,a“nationalaffair.”10

THEPOSITIVERELATIONSHIPbetweenPakistanandtheUnitedStateswasrenewedwithRichardNixon in the White House and Yahya Khan, who had fought in World War II, as the ruler ofIslamabad. In the summerof1969,PresidentNixonbecame the secondAmericanpresident tovisitPakistan.NixonexpressedhisintentiontorestorearelationshipoffriendshipwithPakistan,basedonmutualinterests.Moreimportantly,NixontrustedYahyainfacilitatingasecretdialogueprocesswithChina thatwouldevolve into thehistoricopeningofrelationsbetween theUnitedStatesandChina,inauguratedbyNixon’svisittoBeijinginFebruary1972.

NixonandKissingerfeltadebtofgratitudetowardPakistan.BothleadersalsopreferredPakistan

to India. “The Indians are no goddamngood,” saidNixon toKissinger as theydiscussed the 1971Pakistan-India war over East Pakistan’s secession. Kissinger agreed: “Those sons-of-bitches havenever lifted a finger for us.”11 Unlike Indira Gandhi—whom Nixon personally disliked—theybelievedYahyaKhantobeatrustworthysoldier.

DeclassifieddocumentsfromtheUSNationalArchivesandthePresidentialLibrarysystemshowthat theWhiteHousehadordereda“tilt towardsPakistan,”althoughNixonhad toldcongressionalleadersthattheUnitedStateswasneutralintheconflict.BeyondNixon’sinstructiontoruleoutputtingpublic pressure on Pakistan, the tilt included secretly providing fighter planes to Pakistan throughthird parties, including F-5 fighter aircraft, which were originally slated for Libya but flown toPakistan via Iran. It also involved the transfer of F-104s through Jordan and sending the nuclear-poweredUSSEnterprisetotheBayofBengalasawarningtoIndia.

After theEastPakistan conflictwasover,BhuttometwithPresidentNixon at theWhiteHouse.BhuttotoldNixonthatPakistanwas“completelyinthedebtoftheUnitedStates”andexpressedthathis days of anti-Americanism were over. Nixon promised to do everything possible to helpPakistan.12

On December 20, 1971, General Yahya Khan, having been militarily humiliated by India andhavinglostEastPakistantoindependence,resignedanddesignatedBhuttoasPakistan’snewpresidentandchiefmartiallawadministrator.Bhuttohadwonthe1970electionsinWestPakistan,andnowhehadwonthecountry.Thevictortookchargeofashakenanddiminishednation.

PresidentGeraldFord,whosucceededNixonafterhisresignation,singledoutthenuclearissueasthe key bilateral difference. Bhutto decided that Pakistan had to press ahead with its own nuclearprogramafterIndiashooktheworldonMay8,1974,bydetonatinganundergroundnuclearbomb.Kissinger,who stayed on as secretary of state, attempted to convinceBhutto to accept amuscularconventional arms package, includingA-7 attack bombers, in exchange for giving up the nuclearroad.ButBhuttorefusedtoeithercancelorpostponethenuclearproject,whichheputinthehandsofA.Q.Khan13inlate1975.

The election of Jimmy Carter in 1976 changed the entire tone of the bilateral relationship.Abruptly, the cooperative, generally supportive, businesslike relationshipwasover.Kissinger,withwhomBhuttohadforgedpersonalties,wasnowoutofthepicture.AndBhutto’sgrowingdomesticproblemshadanimpactonthenewadministrationinWashington.

The first signal ofWashington’s new attitude came in April 1977, when the State DepartmentannouncedthatitwasblockingtheexportofteargastoPakistanonthegroundsthatsuchasalewouldindicate US support for a “repressive regime.” Intercepted telephone conversations betweenAmericandiplomatsinwhichcodedreferencewasmadetoasourcesayingthat“thepartyisover”14ledBhuttotoaccusetheUnitedStatesofplottingtoousthimfrompower.Bhuttolaunchedanofficialprotest,whichresultedinadenialofthechargesbyWashington.

OnJuly5,1977,whenGeneralZiaul-HaqremovedBhuttoandimposedmartiallaw,USrelationswithPakistanonlyworsened.ZulfikarAliBhuttowashangedon themorningofApril 4, 1979, inRawalpindi. Soon thereafter, theUnited States suspended aid to Pakistan. In 1977 theUnited StatesadoptedtheGlennAmendmenttotheForeignAssistanceAct,whichbarredUSaidtocountriesthathad not signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and that imported nuclear fuel–reprocessingtechnology.TechnicallythesuspensionofaidcamefromGlennAmendmentviolations,but many believed that the timing of the sanctions had to do with Zia’s indifference to PresidentCarter ’sandotherworldleaders’repeatedclemencyappealsforBhutto’slife.

BilateraltiesreachedanewlowwiththeNovember1979burningoftheUSembassyinIslamabadafterrumorsthattheUnitedStateshadbeeninvolvedintheseizureoftheGrandMosqueinMecca.ButthingschangedonChristmasEve1979,whentheSovietUnioninvadedAfghanistantoinstallanunconditionalcommunistregimeinKabul.

AFTERTHESOVIETarmyinvasionofAfghanistan,CartercalledGeneralZia,reaffirmedthe1959bilateral security agreement against communist aggression and offered further security assistance.ThespecificsoftheassistancepackagetoPakistanaddeduptoonly$400million,afiguredismissedbyZia as “peanuts,” an apparent reference toCarter ’spreviousoccupationas apeanut farmer thatirritatedtheAmericanpresident.

Atalessvisiblelevel,cooperationbegantomovemuchmoreswiftly.FourdaysaftertheSovietinvasion,PresidentCarterapprovedabroadcovertactionprogrammanagedbytheCIAtosupportAfghan resistance fighters. ZbigniewBrzezinski, theUS national security adviser, became the keyplayerbehindtheeffort.TheUnitedStatesputitsdétentewiththeSovietUniononholdandbegantosupportPakistanasafrontlinestate,despitebeingadictatorialregime.

President Carter invited General Zia to theWhite House in October 1980, demonstrating thatPakistan,thankstotheSovietinterventioninAfghanistan,hadshiftedfrominternationalpariahtokeyWesternally.

Ziaul-Haqplaced the ISIunder the leadershipofLieutenantGeneralAkhtarAbdurRahmanoncenterstageintheentireAfghanistanoperation.ZiaalsophonedtheSaudiArabiankingtosetupadirect link between the ISI’s General Akhtar and Prince Turki bin Faisal, the head of Saudiintelligence.15 In addition,SaudiArabiamatched the fundsprovidedby theCIA to themujahideenthroughPakistan.Strictlyspeaking,PakistanwasworkingwithAfghanIslamistsincovertoperationsinsideAfghanistanwellbeforetheagreementwithWashington.Infact,itwasZulfikarAliBhuttowhochargedtheheadofPakistan’sparamilitaryFrontierCorps,MajorGeneralNaseerullahBabar,withthedutyoftrainingconservativeIslamiststohithard-lineleftistnationalists.TheIslamistsactivatedbyBhuttoandGeneralBabarincludedGulbuddinHekmatyar,BurhanuddinRabbani,andAhmadShahMassoud, who later became prominent commanders in the resistance against the Soviets. GeneralBabarwouldbecome,in1994,interiorministerinthegovernmentofBenazirBhutto.

WiththeascendancyofRonaldReagantothepresidency,theAmerican-PakistanicovertoperationinAfghanistangrewconsiderably.AdirectlinkwasestablishedbetweenGeneralAkhtaroftheISIandCIAdirectorWilliamCasey.Anagreementwas reached forapackageofarmsand suppliesworth$3.2 billion over five years, to be handled and distributed exclusively by the ISI. Pakistan’sintelligence would discipline, train, and coordinate the disparate mujahideen groups. In hischaracteristic fashion, “Zia maintained the façade of negotiations with the Soviets for a peacefulsettlement”16andwentthroughthemotionsofUNtalksinGeneva.

Washington and Islamabad agreed that only the ISIwould deal directlywith theAfghan rebels.The CIA would train Pakistanis in the use of new military hardware, and the ISI, in turn, wouldinstructtheAfghans.TalibanambassadortoPakistanAbdulSalamZaeefnarratedinhismemoir,MyLifewiththeTaliban,thattheISIbegantorunaspecialweaponstrainingprogramintheearly1980sforthemujahideen,inwhichhetookpart.17Apro-Taliban lobbywassetup inPakistanrunbyISIretiredofficersandbyactivemembersof thearmy.Themujahideenestablishedoffices inPakistanunderthesupervisionoftheISI.

General Zia allowed only seven Afghan exiled political parties to operate from Pakistani

territory,inPeshawar,andtoreceiveCIAaid.AccordingtoAhmedRashid,“Allsevenwerereligion-based, as Zia forbadeAfghan nationalist, democratic, or secular left-wing parties to operate fromPakistan.He insisted that the parties speak of thewar as a jihad and not as a nationalist liberationmovement.”18TheISIfavoredoneofthemostextremegroups,ledbyHekmatyar,avehementlyanti-AmericanIslamist.

The Reagan-Zia partnership downplayed controversial issues in the bilateral relationship. ThenuclearcontroversywouldnotbecomethecentralfocusofUS-PakistanitiessolongasIslamabaddidnotdetonateabomb.Moreover,asassuredbySecretaryofStateAlexanderHaig,humanrightsanddemocracy—unlike during the Carter administration—would now be viewed as an “internalproblem”ofthePakistanis.

In December 1982, General Zia traveled to the United States on a state visit that reflected therenewed friendship between the two countries. Pakistan was receiving $600 million annually inmilitary and economic aid, and Saudi Arabia was contributing matching amounts to the Afghanresistance.Inthefollowingyears,highUSofficialsroutinelyvisitedIslamabadandmadesidetripstoPeshawartopubliclymeetwithAfghanrefugeesandtriballeaders.

In October 1986, President Reagan certified for the first time, under the so-called PresslerAmendment, thatPakistandidnotpossess anucleardevice.ButnuclearprogramchiefA.Q.Khanasserted the opposite in an interview, causing alarm in Washington. Khan said the country hadachievednuclear capabilitydespite officialPakistani denials.Thingswerenotmade any easier forIslamabadwhen,inJuly1987,aCanadiancitizenofPakistanioriginwasarrestedinPhiladelphiaforillegallyattemptingtoexportmaragingsteelusedtomakeatomicbombcasings.TheNewYorkTimespublishedaneditorialentitled“PunishPakistan’sPerfidyontheBomb.”19Despitetheuproaroverthenuclear issue,PresidentReaganusedhiswaiverauthority, citingnational interest fornot imposingsanctionsagainstPakistan.

InAfghanistan, the Sovietsweremaking plans to leave the country.Themujahideen hadmadesignificantprogressintheirfightingaftertheyhadobtainedUS-madeStingermissiles,thankslargelyto the lobbying of Congressman CharlieWilson and a group of Pakistani and Afghan resistancesupporters,whohadconvincedReagantoprovidethem,despitetheobjectionsofthePentagon,whichfeared theStingerscouldfall into thehandsof terrorists.TheStingersbroughtdowntheuntil-thenalmost invincible Soviet helicopters and changed the course of the war. On April 14, 1988, theGeneva Accords for the withdrawal of Soviet troops were signed by high officials of the UnitedStates,theSovietUnion,Pakistan,andAfghanistan.

TheUnitedStates had secured itsmainobjectiveof getting theSoviets out ofAfghanistan.ButGeneralZiaheldhigheraspirations:hewantedtoshapeandcontrolthenatureofthegovernmentinKabul.Infact,ZiahaddelayedthesigningoftheGenevaAccordssothathecouldmaximizetheflowofmilitaryhardwaretothemujahideen,giventhatafterthesigning,neitherPakistannortheSovietUnioncouldsendmorearmstoAfghanistan.Zia’sdeathunsettledthisobjectiveofgaining“strategicdepth”inAfghanistantocounterIndiaandtoensureafundamentalistIslamicregimeinKabul.

BENAZIR BHUTTO RETURNED to Pakistan in 1986 to fight for democracy. To give a civilianvarnish to his dictatorship, Zia named Muhammad Khan Junejo as prime minister. When PrimeMinister Junejo began to assert himself in his post, however, even inviting Benazir Bhutto to ameetingtodiscusstheGenevaAccords,GeneralZiasackedhim.

AfterZia’sdeathinanAugust1988planecrash,electionswereheldinNovember.BenazirbeatZialoyalistandbusinessmanNawazSharifdespitetheISI’sactivesupport.TheAmericangovernment

had advocated for fair elections, and after Benazir ’s win,Washington pressured the military intolettingherassumeofficeasprimeminister.

AlthoughBenazir ’selectionasprimeministerhadahugelypositivepoliticalimpactamongbothRepublicansandDemocrats in theUSCongress, shehad to respond toseriousquestionsabouthercountry’snuclearactivitywhenshevisitedWashingtontomeetwithPresidentGeorgeH.W.Bush.Inan address to a joint session ofCongress, she declared, “We do not possess, nor dowe intend tomake,anucleardevice.Thisisourpolicy.”20USofficialsdoubtedthatshewaspartof thenucleardecision-makingprocess,butsheclaimedshehadforcedherwayintotheloop,creatingatriumviratealongwiththeothertwokeymembersofthegovernment,PresidentGhulamIshaqKhanandGeneralBeg. In fact, itwas thanks to aCIA briefing thatBenazir had acquired enough information on thenuclearprograminhercountrytoassertherselfasarelevantplayerinthegoverningtroika.21

BenazirsurroundedherselfwithAmericanadvisers,suchasPeterGalbraith,hercollegefriend,formerstafferforSenatorClaibornePell,andlaterambassadortoCroatia;MarkSiegel,Washingtonlobbyist; and Senator Daniel PatrickMoynihan. Their access to the primeminister was fluid—orexcessive,accordingtothePakistaniambassadortotheUnitedStates,whowrote,“Iwasastoundedtonote the accessibility accorded to theAmericans as they attendedmeetings in the primeminister ’sofficeandparticipatedinthepreparationofbriefs....Evenmattersassensitiveasthenuclearissuewereraisedinthediscussions.”22

OnNovember18,1988,beforeleavingtheWhiteHouse,PresidentReaganhadsignedthelatestcertificationunder thePresslerAmendment thatPakistandidnotpossessanuclearweapon.Hehaddone so after intense debate among the various branches of government.23 Benazir Bhutto beganhearingheightenedworriesaboutPakistan’snuclearprogramfromherAmericaninterlocutors.

After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, theMohammad Najibullah communistregime was able to resist the mujahideen for quite some time. Soviet foreign minister EduardShevardnadze traveled to Islamabad in themidstof theRedArmy’sdeparture todiscussapoliticalcompromisewithBenazir.Althoughsympathetic to the idea,sheconfessed that the issuewas in thehandsof hard-liners in the ISIwhoopposed any settlement and assuredhim thatNajibullahwouldsoonfall.ButKabuldidnotcrumbleuntilmuchlater.

AfghancommanderHekmatyar, solidlybackedby the ISI, refusedany typeofcompromiseandobstinatelydemandedthepresidencyofAfghanistan.Ethnicrivalriesreemerged,andsoonenough,abrutalcivilwareruptedamongthevariousfactionsofthemujahideen.TheTaliban—youngPashtunrefugeesindoctrinatedinmadrassasinPakistan’sBalochistanProvincewhohadmultipliedundertheZiaul-Haqregime—emergedasadirectconsequenceoftherapiddisintegrationofthecountryandthereemergingruleofwarlords.

ButasBushbeganhispresidentialterminJanuary1989,theUnitedStateshadachieveditsgoalinAfghanistan. The Soviets had withdrawn, and two years later, the Soviet Union ceased to exist.Benazir ’sstarpower,alongwithintelligencereports thatPakistanhadstoppedproducingweapons-grade uranium andWashington’s desire to bolster the country’s restored democracy, led Bush togranttherequiredcertificationandtoconfirmthattheUnitedStateswouldsellPakistanF-16fighterjetsandwouldcontinuemilitaryandeconomicaidtothetuneof$600millionayear.TheAmerican-Pakistanirelationshipwasbacktonormal.

Nevertheless,RobertOakley, theAmerican ambassador in Islamabadwhohad a fluid dialoguewithBenazir,warnedtheprimeministerthatPakistanwasabouttocommitpoliticalsuicideunlessitrolledbackitsnuclearcapability.Sureenough,inOctober1990Bushrefusedtoissueacertification

underthePresslerAmendment.Despite the warnings, Pakistani officials did not believe that the United States would actually

implementthethreattocutaid.Butwithoutthecertification,purchasedF-16fighterswerenotgivenanexportlicense,andsomefrigatesleasedtothePakistaninavyonano-costbasishadtobereturnedtotheUSNavy.GeneralBegvoicedawidespreadPakistaniopinion:theAfghanwarwasoverandtheSovietshadleft;nowtheUnitedStatesdidnothavetopretendanylongerthatthenuclearissuedidnotexist.

BenazirBhuttowasdismissedasprimeministerbyPresidentGhulamIshaqandGeneralBeginNovember 1990, which tarnished Pakistan’s image in the eyes of many influential Americanlegislators.ThecaretakergovernmentinIslamabadwascarefultosupporttheUSmilitarybuildupinSaudiArabiafollowingSaddamHussein’sinvasionofKuwaitinAugust1990thatwouldleadtotheGulfWar.

THETERRORISMANDnuclearissuessurfacedagainwhenNawazSharifreplacedBenazirBhuttoas primeminister. The CIAwarned the ISI of dire consequences if it continued to train and sendIslamicextremists tocombat Indians inKashmir, includingArabveteransof theAfghanresistance.SharifatleasthadtocrackdownontheArabradicalsinPakistan.

PrimeMinisterSharifnamedLieutenantGeneralJavedNasirasISIdirectorgeneral.Areligiousfundamentalistsupporter,NasirexpandedISI’sactivitiesworldwide,supportingChineseMuslimsinXinjiang Province—instigating a protest from Beijing. Nasir also aided rebel Muslims in thePhilippinesandotherradicalreligiousoutfitsinCentralAsia.TheUSStateDepartmentthusplacedPakistan on its terrorist stateswatch list, and inApril 1993, theWhiteHouse demanded that JavedNasirberemovedasheadoftheISI.Sharifreadilycomplied.

BilateralrelationsimprovedaftervotersreturnedBenazirtothepostofprimeministerin1993,with President Clinton in the White House. Following a policy initiated during the Bushadministration, Clinton gave up on the idea of pushing for a rollback of the Pakistani nuclearprogramandinsteadsettledforafreeze.

Benazir won positive points in Washington when, in early 1995, Pakistan arrested and thenextradited Ramzi Yousef in an operation that incorporated American security officers. Yousef, anIslamicmilitantfearedbyBhutto,hadorganizedassassinationattemptsagainstherandstoodaccusedofbeingthemastermindofthe1993terroristbombingoftheWorldTradeCenterinNewYorkthatkilledsixpeopleandinjuredhundreds.DuringherApril1995visittoWashington,Bhuttowasoncemorefavorablyreceivedbythemediaandpoliticalelite.

When theAfghans, fed upwith thewarlords’ continued fighting and corruption,welcomed theTaliban,thePakistanigovernmentsawanewopportunitytoinfluenceeventsinAfghanistan.

Naseerullah Babar, Benazir Bhutto’s interior minister, ordered the ISI to provide logisticalsupportandtrainingfortheTaliban(whichmeans“students”)movementthatwasexpandingaroundKandaharinthesummerof1994.TheTalibandefeatedHekmatyar,theformerfavoriteoftheISI,andthePakistanisplaced theirbetson thePashtuns, the tribalsiblingsofPakistan’sPathans, tobeat theotherethnicgroupsandcapturetheAfghangovernment.KabulwastakenonSeptember26,1996.

Benazir Bhutto was dismissed, once again, as prime minister by a civilian president onaccusationsofmismanagementandchargesofcorruptionagainstherandhusbandAsifAliZardari.NawazSharif,whothenreturnedtothepostofprimeministeraftergainingaclearelectoralvictory,waskeentocooperatewithWashingtonontheterrorismissue.InJune1997,heallowedajointUS-PakistanipoliceoperationtocaptureMirAimalKansi,aPakistanichargedwiththe1993killingsof

twoCIAemployeesoutsidetheagency’sheadquartersinLangley,Virginia,andtotakeKansitotheUnitedStateswithouthavingtogothroughthecustomaryextraditionprocedure.

The nuclear issue took center stage when the Hindu nationalist government of Atal BihariVajpayee inNewDelhidetonatedseveralnucleardevicesonMay11,1998,surprisingPakistan, theUnitedStates,andtheworld.ClintonimposedsanctionsonIndia,cuttingoffallaidandvotingagainstIndia in international financial institutions, while he tried arduously to convince Pakistan not tofollowsuit,promising,instead,avigorousresumptionofeconomicandmilitaryaid.Butthepoliticalpressures facing Sharif were impossible to resist. On May 28, 1998, Pakistan detonated fiveundergroundnucleardevicesand,onMay31,anadditionalone.

TheUSgovernmentstronglysupportedIndian-PakistanitalksinLahoreinearly1999asawaytoreducetensionsandadvanceapeaceagenda.However,anotherISI-supportedinsurgentoperationinKashmir involving the occupation of the highland town of Kargil, beyond the Line of Control,eruptedintoanotherbilateralcrisis.NewDelhiemployedairpowerforthefirsttimeinKashmirandadvancedwithastrongcounterattack.

NawazSharif calledPresidentClinton and asked if he could come toWashington on July 4 todiscuss the dangerous standoff with India. Sharif requested that Clinton use his good offices toresolvethecrisisand,inaddition,mediatewiththeIndiansonKashmiritself.

Inhismemoir,ClintonwrotethathetoldNawazSharifthatalthoughitwasIndependenceDayintheUnitedStates,hewaswillingtoreceivethePakistaniprimeminister;butfirst,Sharifhadtoagreetowithdraw the forcescommandedbyGeneralPervezMusharrafbackacross theLineofControl,and second, the US president would not intervene in the Kashmir dispute.24 In Pakistan, GeneralMusharraf felt that if Sharif went to Washington under those conditions, it was equivalent tocapitulation. Sharif went to Washington anyway. Being a sharp politician, Clinton perceived thatSharifhadtraveledtoWashington“inordertousepressurefromtheUnitedStatestoprovidehimselfcoverfororderinghismilitarytodefusetheconflict.”25

PresidentClintonagreed tohelpSharif—not just togethimoutof anunstable situation,but toforcetheprimeministertocooperatemuchmoreinthefightagainstterrorism.AtthatsameJuly4meeting,theAmericanpresidentremindedSharifthathehadaskedhimonthreeoccasionsforhelpinapprehending Osama bin Laden. This time he told the prime minister that unless he was moreforthcoming, he would have to announce that Pakistan was, in effect, supporting terrorism inAfghanistan.

As relations between Sharif and Musharraf deteriorated, the prime minister sent his brotherShahbazShariftoWashingtonDCinSeptemberto,onceagain,requestUSsupporttocounterthreatscoming from the army due to the Pakistaniwithdrawal fromKargil.A couple of days later, aUSgovernment message to the Pakistani military read, “We hope there will be no return to days ofinterrupted democracy in Pakistan.”26 But as Clinton expected, Sharif did not last long and wasoverthrown by General Pervez Musharraf. The White House imposed additional sanctions onPakistan,legallyrequiredincaseofanoverthrowofademocraticallyelectedgovernment.

InAfghanistan, the Taliban regime had become internationally isolated due to its treatment ofwomenandchildren, its tolerance fordrug trafficking,and itsprovisionof safehaven for Islamicterrorists, includingOsamabinLaden.TheAmericanshadstrongevidencethat the terroristattacksontheUSembassies inKenyaandTanzania in1998,whichtookmore thantwohundredlives,hadbeenorganizedbybinLaden,nowlivinginAfghanistanunderTalibanprotection.

When American intelligence discovered that senior Al-Qaida recruiter Abu Zubaydah was

operating openly from a house in Peshawar and sending foreign recruits to Afghanistan, USambassadorWilliamMilamaskedMusharraftohandoverZubaydah,buttheISIrespondedthattheycould not find him, even though—the American ambassador asserted—“everyone knew where[Zubaydah]was.”27

When President Clinton visited Islamabad in March 2000, he did so for only five hours, incontrasttothefivedayshespentinIndia.ClintontoldMusharrafthathewaspreparedtohelpIndian-Pakistani talks on Kashmir and nonproliferation, but Islamabad had to rein in terrorist groups inKashmir,pressuretheTalibantohandoverbinLaden,andinitiatepeacetalks.Ontheotherkeyissueofdemocraticelections,Musharrafdeclinedtoprovideaconcretetimetable.

GeneralMusharrafdismissedtheAmericanstandonterrorism.“Theperceptionsaredifferentinthe United States and in Pakistan, in the West and what we understand is terrorism,” Musharrafdeclared shortly after Clinton’s brief visit. He added that “Pakistan’s strategic interests lay withsupportingtheAfghanPashtuns,”whomheassociatedsolelywiththeTaliban.28

Pakistan’sISIevenprotectedtheTalibanactingonPakistani territory, includingtheassassinsofAbdul Ahad Karzai—the father of Hamid Karzai—shot dead in 1999 as he came out of a Quettamosque. The Pakistani police never caught the assassins or the murderers of more than a dozenprominentAfghansopposedtotheTalibanlivinginPakistan.29HamidKarzaihimselfwastoldbytheISIin2001thathecouldnolongerstayinPakistanandthathisvisawouldnotberenewed.TheISI—asanalystAhmedRashidputit—“wasmerelyobligingtheTaliban.”30

THEGEORGEW.BUSHadministrationundertookadifferentapproachwiththeMusharrafregime.Though Al-Qaida had struck again in October 2000, when suicide bombers rammed a swift boatpackedwithexplosives into theUSSCole,anAmericandestroyeranchoredatAdenharbor,killingseventeen US sailors and wounding many others, Deputy Secretary Armitage declared thatWashingtondid“notwanttoseePakistanonlythroughthelensofOsamabinLaden”31anddidnotwishtowitnessPakistanfollowthepathofAfghanistanandbecomeafailedstate.But9/11changedall that, forcing theUS-Pakistani relationship tobecomeapartnership centeredon theTaliban–Al-Qaidathreatandthewaronterror.

InanticipationoftheUSattackagainsttheTaliban,binLadenescapedhishomeinKandahar,andsome of his top lieutenantsmoved out ofAfghanistan. To avoid putting boots on the ground, theAmericans coupled air bombings with support for the Afghan Northern Alliance forces led byAhmadShahMassoud.TheCIAhadnocontactsamongthePashtunsinthesouthandhadtorelyontheISI.

As theAmerican air strikes continued, ISI officers helpedAmerican colleagues locate TalibantargetsforUSbombers,whileatthesametime,“otherISIofficerswerepumpingfresharmamentstotheTaliban.”32MusharraftookthesecontradictorystepsbecauseanoverthrowoftheTalibanwouldnotonlyeliminateanallyof Islamabad in its“strategicdepth”policybutalsopotentially lead toapro-IndianregimeinKabul.

Kabul fell in mid-November 2001 to Northern Alliance troops. The Taliban, after looting thecapital, fled toward the south. That was ISI territory, and US authorities instructed the CIA to donothingwithoutconsultingtheISI.Finally,theTalibanweresurroundedbyNorthernAllianceforces,andinthecityofKunduz,hundredsofISIofficerswhohadfoughtalongwiththeTalibanwerecaughtin the cross fire, unable to escape.Musharraf phonedPresidentBush and requested a pause in thebombingand theopeningofacorridorso thatPakistaniaircraftcouldevacuatehisofficersoutof

Kunduz. Vice President Dick Cheney took charge, and both he and Bush said yes to Musharraf,approving a top-secret evacuation operation without the knowledge of Secretary of State ColinPowell.ReportsindicatedthatalongwiththeISIofficers,manyTalibanandAl-Qaidaleadersescapedin the airlift operation.33 Learned observers estimate that more foreign terrorists escaped fromKunduzthanthesixhundredorsopreviouslyreported,includingOsamabinLaden,whoslippedoutlaterfromToraBora,escortedbyPashtunguidesfromthePakistanisideoftheborder,torelocateinPakistan’sSouthandNorthWaziristan.

OnDecember13,2001,HamidKarzaiboardedaUSmilitaryplaneinKandaharboundforKabultotakeoveraspresident.HehadjustdeclinedanofferfromMusharraftotravelviaIslamabad.ForPakistan, the configuration of the new government inKabulwas a disaster. Islamabadwould shunKarzaiandcontinuetohelptheescapingTaliban.Incontrast,IndiastronglysupportedKarzai,setupasizablediplomaticpresenceinKabul,andestablishedcooperationprograms.

Musharrafbegantoplayadelicatedoublegame.HehelpedtheAmericanwareffort,buthedidnotabandon theTaliban.World realityhadchanged,buthecouldnotoverlookdomesticpressuresand Pakistan’s long-term interests in Kabul. US authorities detected Pakistan’s assistance to theTaliban,but,initially,theywereunsureofhowhighupitwentinIslamabad.

In early 2002, India-Pakistan tensions rose to a dangerous level in the wake of bombings inKashmir and an attack by Pakistani-based militants against the Indian Parliament. Bush gave anultimatum toMusharraf to crackdownon terror andmakeanunequivocalpublic statementon thesubject.MusharrafdeliveredaspeechonJanuary12—inwhichAmericandiplomatsinIslamabadhadsignificantinput—whereforthefirsttimehespokeagainstjihadandannouncedthebanningoffiveextremistgroups,followedbythearrestsofhundredsofmilitants.

Thenuclearissuecamebackonthebilateralagendainnewform—thistimelinkedtoterrorism,as theCIA asked the ISI to arrest two retiredPakistani nuclear scientists (whowere alsoAl-Qaidamilitants)whohadbeen in touchwithOsamabinLadenaround9/11aswellaswithactivenuclearscientists.TheCIA’schief,GeorgeTenet,secretlytraveledtoIslamabadtoaskthatMusharrafallowtheCIAto interrogate thescientistsand,moreover, to request that thegeneralconductanextensivepurgeofISIofficerssuspectedofbeingclosetoterrorists.

TheMusharrafgovernmentimplementedacleverstrategyofcapturingescapingAl-QaidaleaderstohandthemoverandsatisfytheAmericans.AbuZubaydah,atopAl-Qaidaleader,wascapturedinFaisalabad;then,Ramzibinal-Shibh,oneoftheleadersoftheHamburgcellthatplanned9/11,wascaughtinKarachi.CheneyarguedwithintheBushadministrationthatthesecoupsdemonstratedthatMusharraf should not be criticized in other areas, such as the restoration of democratic rule. Theadministrationdidnot consider the returnof civilianpoliticians likeBhutto tobe an indispensablepriority.

InFebruary2002,MusharrafvisitedPresidentBushat theWhiteHouse—aneventcharacterizedbyabundanthandshakes,smiles,posedphotographs,andcompliments.Bush,inlinewithhispersonalapproachtodiplomacy,declared,“When[Musharraf]looksmeintheeyeandsaystherewon’tbeaTaliban and won’t be Al-Qaida, I believe him, you know?”34 Bush had called the general “mybuddy,”andduringthisWhiteHousevisit,hestatedthathewasproudtocallMusharrafafriend.TheAmerican president also applauded what he portrayed as Musharraf’s vision of “Pakistan as aprogressive,modernanddemocraticIslamicsociety.”35

Thevisitwaspositive forMusharraf.Althoughhedidnotget the trade concessionshe sought,Bushannouncedapackageof increasedeconomicandmilitaryaid.Musharraf’swarmreceptionin

Washingtonhelpedhimto“demonstratetohishomeaudiencethathisdecisiontosidewiththeUnitedStateshadpaidoff.”36

But the visit did not completely distract from the terrorist problem. Musharraf’s sojourn toWashington coincidedwith the disappearance ofDaniel Pearl, theAmerican reporter for theWallStreet Journal, which ended in his gruesome murder by terrorist Ahmed Omar Sheikh. Whendiscovered,OmarSheikhgavehimselfuptoaformerISIofficer,BrigadierGeneralIjazShah,whowashomesecretaryofPunjabProvinceatthetime.ThepolicewereinformedofSheikh’ssurrenderonefullweekafterhewasunderthecareoftheformerISIofficer.37IslamabadrefusedWashington’srequesttoextraditeOmarSheikhtotheUnitedStates.

Not long after, toward the end of that same year, the Bush-Musharraf honeymoon was facingtrouble. American intelligence had detected “the world’s largest concentration of Al Qaidaoperatives” in Pakistan and Afghanistan and discovered that Al-Qaida operatives were finding“refugeinPakistanandstartingtoregroupandmovebackintoAfghanistan.”38Moreover,NationalSecurity Adviser Condoleezza Rice took a public swipe atMusharraf during his third visit to theUnitedStatesinOctober2002,declaringthattheWhiteHouseobjectedtosomeactionstakenbythegeneral, including his twenty-nine arbitrary amendments to the constitution; she warned that theUnitedStateswouldnot“compromise in termsofdemocraticprinciples”39andwouldnotentirelylooktheotherwayonhumanrights.Musharrafcontinuedtopursueadoublepolicyofcooperationandconflictwith theUnitedStates.MoreAl-Qaida leaderswere captured, includingKhalidSheikhMohammed.But theAmericansdetectedaparallelandclandestineISInetworkbeingconstitutedbyretired intelligence officials and former trainers of the Taliban, who set up offices in Peshawar,Quetta,andotherPakistanicitiestoruntrainingcampsfortheTalibanwitharmsandfundscomingfrom the Gulf countries.40 ISI’s Section S, in charge of external operations, was providing theAfghan insurgentswith sanctuary,money, and logistical support.Moreover, ISI agentsmaintainedregular contact with fugitive Mullah Omar, Jalaluddin Haqqani, and other militants. In addition,Musharraf had legitimized extremists by allowing banned groups to organize conferences anddenying the Al-Qaida links with the Jamaat-e-Islami party—which had bitterly opposed andunderminedBenazirBhutto’sgovernment.

Meanwhile,PresidentKarzaicomplainedthatnoseniorAmericanwouldcriticizeMusharrafforallowing the Taliban to operate freely in Pakistan. On a visit to Islamabad, Karzai had givenMusharrafalistofTalibancommanderssupposedlylivingopenlyinQuetta.41ButMusharraffeltnosympathy for theKarzai regime and its growing friendshipwith India.Meanwhile, theAmericansweremoreworriedaboutAl-QaidathanabouttheTaliban.

Musharraf’s double game angered both sides. The Taliban and Al-Qaida felt betrayed by thearrestsandbanningofextremistreligiouspartiesandreactedwithviolenceagainst theirprotectorsandcreators,attackingthePakistaniarmyandevenattemptingtokillMusharraf.

GeneralMusharrafwasthetargetoftwoassassinationattemptsinDecember2003.Afterthefirstattack,onDecember14,heorderedLieutenantGeneralAshfaqParvezKayani,atthetimeRawalpindicorpscommander, to lead the investigation.AnexplosivechargeactivatedbyacellphonecallhadnarrowlymissedGeneralMusharraf’sthree-tonMercedesasitcrossedabridgeinRawalpindi,butithadleftvaluableforensicleads.Diligentinvestigatorsfoundasmallpieceofacellphonekeypadthateventually ledto theculprits.After thesecondassassinationattempt, the investigatorssealedoff thearea of the attack, and immediately ISI, MI, and police personnel were on the scene collecting

forensicevidence.Theydiscoveredtheblown-offfaceofanindividual,ahalf-burnedIDcard,andtheremains of a cell phone on the roof of a nearby building.According toMusharraf, “ameticuloussearchoftheareahelpedtofindtheSIMcard.Surprisinglyitwasintact.”42Thesecluesandfurtherinvestigationledtothearrestof theattackers.ThesethoroughinvestigationsstoodinstarkcontrastwithwhathappenedafterBenazirBhutto’sassassination.

TheWhiteHouse did not like the ambivalent Pakistani attitude in thewar on terror, but itwaspatient,believingthatpushingMusharraftoohardwouldbecounterproductive.LedbyVicePresidentDickCheney,theUSgovernmentbelievedthatMusharrafwasthebestoptionavailableinthestrategyto fight Al-Qaida. In 2004, demonstrating that theWhite House still had faith inMusharraf, Bushconferredthestatusof“non-NATOally”onPakistanandapproveda$700millionaidpackage.

TheUSgovernmentbecameincreasinglyimpatientwiththelackofPakistaniprogressinthefightagainstthemilitantsandlaunchedepisodicmissilestrikesagainstAl-QaidatargetsinNorthandSouthWaziristan.AcontroversialaccordsignedinSeptember2006byIslamabadandagroupofPakistaniTalibanleadersinNorthWaziristan—whichsoughttostopallattacksonAmericanandAfghanforcesinAfghanistanandon thePakistaniarmyinreturnfor Islamabad’swithdrawalof itsgarrisonsandcheckpointsandthereleaseofprisonersandcapturedequipment—producedacessationofattacksonAmericantroopsinAfghanistan.TheBushadministration,whichwelcomedthedealatfirst,declareditafailurethreemonthsafteritssigningwhenitbecameclearthatthetribalareaswereincreasinglythepointoforiginofAl-Qaidaterroristplotsaroundtheworld.

Washington’sdispleasurewithMusharraf also included thediscovery thatA.Q.KhanhadbeenengagedinnuclearproliferationactivitieswithNorthKorea,Libya,andIran.A.Q.Khanconfessedpubliclyandwasplacedunderhousearrest.BushdidnotwanttopushthecaseanyfurthersoasnottoprovokeanationalistreactionthatcouldendangerIslamabad’ssupportinthewaronterror.43

IN2007,ASMusharraf’sPakistan facedgrowing instabilityandpolitical strainwithinandwithout,the United States came to see the presence of Benazir Bhutto as more and more important.Musharraf’sdismissalofChiefJustice IftikharMuhammadChaudhryhadgeneratedpublicdebates,rallies,andstreetdemonstrationscallingforhisreinstatement.Thisoppositionsoonbecameknownas the “Lawyers’ movement,” growing over the course of the year into one of the largest massmovements in Pakistan’s history. It galvanized a broad range of sentiments opposed to continuedmilitary rule. In parallel, there was a steep increase in extremist violence by radical Islamists,especially after the government’s attack on pro-Taliban militants and their supporters who hadoccupiedtheRedMosque,intheheartofIslamabad,whichledtoaweeklongbattle.Officialfiguresindicate that forty-four suicide bombings took place in 2007, killing 614 people—a dramatic risefromeightsuchincidentsin2006.

Preparing for new parliamentary elections and the electoral college vote for the presidency,Pakistan’stwomainoppositionpoliticalparties,BenazirBhutto’sPPPandthePML-N,putasidetheirlong-term rivalry andworked together todefine a common framework for a return todemocraticrule. This agreement, the Charter of Democracy, was signed inMay 2006 by Benazir Bhutto andNawazSharif,therespectiveleadersofthePPPandthePML-N.

Bhuttounderstoodthat ifsheweretoreturntoPakistantoleadthefightfordemocracyandforherownvindicationasapoliticalfigure,shewouldneedtoengageinadifficultrapprochementwithGeneralMusharraf.Fortunatelyforher,theUnitedStatesandtheUnitedKingdomwerelosingfaithinMusharraf.

TheideathatMusharrafwastheonlypersoncapableofholdingPakistantogetherandkeepingthe

armyinthefightagainstterroristsbegantoerode.First,hewasn’tbeingefficientinfightingterror.ExtremistactivitiesandnuclearproliferationweremakingPakistanthe“mostdangerousplaceintheworld,”asformersecretaryofstateMadeleineK.Albrightwouldcharacterizethecountrysometimelater.44 Dick Cheney grew more isolated in his defense of Musharraf as US army officerscomplained about the uneven playing field in Afghanistan, given the Pakistani-permitted Talibansanctuariesinthetribalregions.Second,thegeneral’slackofdemocraticlegitimacywasbecomingalargerdomesticproblem.

Washingtonbelievedthatapoliticaladjustmentwasneeded.“MusharrafwasonborrowedtimeinPakistan,” wrote the then US secretary of state Condoleezza Rice in her memoir. The answer,according to Rice, “lay in forging an alliance between the two strongest political forces in thecountry: Musharraf and former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto.” 45 Musharraf had to keep themilitaryinline,butBenazirBhuttohadtobebroughtonboardtoprovidedemocraticlegitimacytoabroader coalition government and a more committed stand on terrorism with wider domesticpoliticalbacking.

BenazirBhuttodescendingfromaplaneatKarachiairportandwavingtosupportersuponarrivalbackinherhomelandonOctober18,2007,followingyearsofself-imposedexile,accompaniedbyadvisersandleadingmembersofherparty.TheUSandUKgovernments

werekeyfacilitatorsofherreturntoPakistan.

6

TheUS-BrokeredReturnofBhuttotoHerHomeland

ONJUNE 20, 2004, Benazir Bhuttowas attending a dinner in Blackburn, England, a Lancashiretownwith a significant Pakistani population historically sympathetic toBhutto.Her hostwasSalasKiani,aBritishPakistaniwhohadservedasthetown’smayor.Duringthemeal,Kianireceivedacallon his mobile phone and handed it to a surprised Benazir: “It’s Jack—for you,” said Kianimischievously.ForeignSecretary JackStraw, anMP forBlackburn,wason the line; years earlier,Straw, then home secretary, had refused to receive Bhutto after she had been deposed as primeminister,butnowheinvitedhertovisithimattheForeignOffice.ThiswasthefirstcommunicationthePPPleaderhadhadwithaBritishministerinmorethanadecade.1

Onemorningthefollowingmonth,BhuttowasbroughtintotheForeignOfficethroughadiscreetsideentrance.ThelasttimeshehadmetwithatopBritishofficialhadbeenin1995whenTonyBlair,afriendofBhutto’ssincetheirtimeatOxford,hadattendedadinnerhostedbyherandhusbandAsifAliZardari at theSavoy.At theencounterwithStraw,which lastedonehour, the foreign secretaryassuredBenazirthatLondonfavoreddemocracyforPakistan,buthestressedthatMusharrafhadtobepart of the picture. From then on, the UK government through the British high commissioner inIslamabad,MarkLyallGrant,begantoconveymessagestoBenazirfromMusharrafabouttheinitialterms of a negotiation: Musharraf would not retire from the army until after his parliamentaryelectionaspresident,andBenazirwouldbenefitfromalegalrulingwithdrawingallcorruptioncasespendingagainstherandotheroppositionpoliticians.

Mutualdistrustanddisagreementhadimpededconcreteprogressinpastconversations.In2002,accordingtoBenazir,ISIofficialshadproposedbyphonethatiftheformerprimeministerstayedoutofpoliticsfortenyears,theywouldreleaseherhusbandfromjail.Butthistime,Musharrafofferedtoreleaseherhusbandasagestureofgoodwill,whichhedidinNovember2004.

New talks between Bhutto and Straw followed at the Foreign Office in 2005, where Londonexpressed apprehension about chaos in Pakistan and championed the need to ensure a smooth,sustainabletransitiontodemocracy.StrawwasnowworkingwithUSsecretaryofstateCondoleezzaRice,whobelievedthatWashingtonhadtoplayamoreactiveroletoenableastablepost-MusharrafscenarioinPakistan.

Atthetime,theWhiteHousestillbelievedthatMusharrafwasthebesthopeforstoppingIslamicextremistsinPakistan.VicePresidentDickCheney,inparticular,wasnotwillingtobreakthe“Mush-Bush axis,” as Pakistani journalists called the bilateral relationship.Yet despite Cheney’s trust, thegeneralwasnotstoppingthemilitants.SomeinWashingtonsuspectedMusharrafwastryingtopleaseeveryone, including the militants and their religious supporters. The US administration grewinterested in opening channels for an eventual political agreement between the two leaders.Bhutto

couldprovideherpoliticalpartybaseanddemocraticcredentialsaswellasclosenesstotheWest.TheWhite House also knew that Bhutto could not return to Pakistan unless Musharraf eliminated thejudicialchargespendingagainsther.

SomeofMusharraf’sclosestadvisersalsoencouragedhimtoopenchannelswithBhutto,thinkingsuchanalliancecouldshoreuppoliticalsupportforhisnextpresidentialterm.Adiscreetprocesswassetinmotion.BenazirwasthefirsttoreachouttotheMusharrafgovernmentthroughsecurityadviserRehmanMalik.Atleastfivemeetingsfollowedin2005and2006betweenherandMusharraf’steam,which included Tariq Aziz, former secretary of the National Security Council; General AshfaqParvezKayani, then director general of the ISI; and, in latermeetings, LieutenantGeneralHamidJaved,Musharraf’schiefofstaff.BhuttoandMusharrafnevermetface-to-faceduringthatperiod.

The governments of the United Kingdom and the United States actively facilitated the talksbetween the two leaders. Both governments prioritized a continued leadership role for GeneralMusharraf,astheybelievedthiswasvitalfortheongoingwaronterror.WashingtonwasparticularlyinterestedinachievingadegreeofpoliticalstabilityinPakistanthatwouldenablethegovernmenttomore effectively confront domesticmilitancy.At the same time,Washington and London believedbotheffortscouldbestrengthenedwithacrediblecivilianpartner.SinceMusharrafandNawazSharif,inexileinSaudiArabia,dislikedeachotherintensely,Bhuttowastheonlyoption.Itwashopedthatthetalkscouldyieldsomeformulaforapower-sharingdeal.

While these meetings were important for identifying areas of common interest, they did notproduceanyconcreteagreements.Littleprogresswasmade.InAugust2006,whileBhuttowasinNewYork,GeneralMusharrafphonedtoaskforhersupportforabillpromotingwomen’srights.Healsostressedthatmoderateforcesshouldworktogether.Benaziragreed.ButBenazirinsistedonadetailedroadmaptodemocracy.MusharrafwantedBenazir tooptoutofthenextgeneralelection.Withthefailureofeachroundoftalks,relationsbetweenthetwocampssoured.

TOBREAKTHEstalemate, adirectmeetingbetweenBhuttoandMusharrafwasarranged, and thetwometsecretlyonJanuary24,2007, inAbuDhabi.Benazirwas flownbyhelicopter to thegreengardensof thepalaceofSheikhZayedbinSultanAlNahyan,wherea longandpositivediscussiontook place. According to Benazir, Musharraf agreed to retire from the army before the nationalelectionsandoffered, as a confidence-buildingmeasure, to terminate the judicial casesagainstherandherhusbandAsif. In turn,Bhuttoagreednot to return toPakistanbeforeDecember31,2007.2MusharraftoldBenazirthatforherownsecuritysheshouldnotcomebackuntilaftertheelections,scheduledforJanuary8,2008,becausemilitantswerelikelytoattackher.Benazir,alongwithafewclose advisers, including Rehman Malik and Makhdoom Amin Fahim, would follow up withMusharraf’steaminthecomingmonths.

FormersecretaryofstateCondoleezzaRicewroteinhermemoirNoHigherHonorthattheUnitedStates was actively involved in the negotiations between Musharraf and Bhutto, with particularintensityduring the spring and summerof2007.As early as2006, according to an ISI source, theUnited States believed thatMusharraf was becoming an increasing political liability and began toadvisehimtotakeacourseofpoliticalreconciliationwithBhutto.

RichardBoucher, the assistant secretary for South andCentralAsian affairs, became the pointmanfortheUSmediationeffort,asstatedbyformersecretaryRiceinhermemoirandconfirmedbyourUNcommission.Bouchershuttledbackandforthbetweenthetwoleadersandtheirtopadvisers,meetingtheminLondonorDubai.

Inearly2007,PresidentGeorgeW.Bushmadehis firstpubliccriticismofMusharraf,warning

that he had to bemore aggressive in pursuing the terrorists. Secretary Rice intensified her directengagementwiththetwosides,attemptingtobridgethedifferences.

After his January 2007 meeting with Bhutto, General Musharraf began informing his closepolitical allies, including PML-Q leadership, about the process. Many of them expressed deepreservations.TheyarguedagainstseekingBhutto’sPPPsupportforMusharraf’sreelection,confidentthattheycouldwinthepresidencyandparliamentaryelectionsaloneandconcernedthatabroadenedalliance would diminish their power. Similarly, few in the PPP senior leadership believed that analliance with Musharraf would benefit the party. Suspicion lingered particularly when Musharrafmadeananomalousproposal:ifBenazirstayedawayfromPakistanduringtheelection,“Musharrafwould adjust thevote” to give thePPPmore seats than theymight otherwiseget.3 In otherwords,Musharrafwassuggestinghemightrigtheelection,byconsensus.

DespitethedoubtsinthePPPcamp,Benazirwasopentoadeal.Accordingtoclosefriendsandadvisers,Benazirhadmaturedpoliticallysinceshewasprimeministerinthelate’90s;shewaslessimpatient, more thoughtful and focused, and knew that politics required vision, pragmatism, andleadership,evenagainstthetideofpublicopinionandherownparty.

Thatspring,BenazirspokepubliclyaboutherdispositiontocraftanagreementwithMusharraf.She told theSundayTimes inApril 2007, “Iwant a dealwithPresidentMusharraf, but itwould beprematuretosayoneisimminent.”4Tocreateafavorableatmosphereforthedeal,BenazirpraisedMusharraf forprotectingminorities andwomen, although sheblamed thegeneral for thegrowinginfluence of the Taliban inWaziristan that had forcedMusharraf to negotiate a peace accordwiththem. In that interview, she vowed to return to Pakistan despite “the danger of assassination byIslamists,”whomsheaccusedofbringingtheTalibantoIslamabad.

BenazirandGeneralMusharrafmetagainface-to-faceinAbuDhabiinJuly2007,inthewakeofMusharraf’s confrontationwith the chief justice of theSupremeCourt and theRedMosque armedconflict.Thegeneralraisedtheissueofreducingtheageofretirementformembersofthesuperiorjudiciary, towhichBenazir respondednegatively.Musharraf asserted that the judicial cases againstherandhusbandAsifcouldnotbedismissed.BenazirthenaskedthatMusharrafatleastliftthebanontwice-elected primeministers, andMusharraf agreed.Again,Musharraf insisted that she not comebackuntilaftertheelections;hesaidtheintelligenceagencieswereinterceptingagrowingnumberofsecurity threats on the hundreds of phone lines theymonitored. Benazir took seriously the threatsconveyed by the government, but believedMusharraf used them as a ploy to keep her away fromcampaigning in Pakistan, particularly in view that her desperate calls for security assistance torespondtothosethreatswentunheard.

Asrecountedtothecommissionbyinterlocutorsfromallparties,Bhuttolaidoutseveralissuesofconcern in the negotiations. The most important of these were the following: (1) her return toPakistan to participate in politics; (2) free and fair elections in 2007; (3)Musharraf’s resignationfromthearmy;(4)amnestyinthecriminalcasesagainstherandherhusband;and(5)theeliminationofthebanonthirdtermsforformerprimeministers,whichwasimpedingherfromholdingofficeagain.ThesamesourcesindicatedthatMusharraf’schiefgoalsweretoensurehiscontinuityinpowerbyaccommodatingUSandotherinternationaldesireforBhutto’sreturn.

MEDIACOVERAGEOF theprocess led toageneralizedperception that theywould likelygoverntogether after the elections, with Musharraf continuing as president and Bhutto serving as primeminister.Anumberof sources interviewedby thecommissionconfirmed that thisoptionhadbeenunderdiscussion,butmanysaidthattheoutcomedependedontheresultsofthegeneralelections.At

somepoint,Benazirsuggested toMusharraf that if shebecameprimeminister,hecould remainaspresidentandoccupythepostsofministerofdefenseandministerofforeignaffairs,butMusharrafdismissedtheideaas“unconstitutional.”

AsignificantproblemwasthatthePML-QleadershiphadalsobeenassuredbyMusharrafthatiftheywon theelections, their leaderChaudhryPervaizElahiwouldbecomethenextprimeminister.Otheroptions,suchasBhuttobecomingSenatechairperson,hadalsobeenraised.Thespecifictermsof a power-sharing agreement betweenBhutto andMusharrafwere fluid and never unequivocallyfinalized.

InAugustandSeptember2007,therewereintensebehind-the-scenesdiscussionsbetweenBhuttoandMusharraf and their respective teamswithUS facilitation. Inher three-weekvisit to theUnitedStates inAugust,BenazirmetwithherPPPleadershipinNewYorktoprepareadocumentonwhattheyexpected fromMusharraf’sside,andagainmetwithAssistantSecretaryBoucherandwithherfriendZalmayKhalilzad,theformerUSambassadortoAfghanistan.TheseconversationsconvincedherthatWashingtonwouldputseriouspressureonMusharraftoagreetoadeal.

BothBhuttoandMusharrafsharedanincreasingsenseofurgencybuthaddifferentpriorities.ForBhutto, themostpressingconcernwas thecreationofa legalmechanismtoeliminateoldcriminalcorruptionchargesleveledagainstherandherhusband;forMusharraf,themostimmediateissuewasensuringPPPsupportforhisreelectionaspresident.AfterothermeetingsinLondonandIslamabadandmanylast-minutediscussions,compromiseagreementsonbothcoreissueswerereachedinthefirstweekofOctober,lessthantwoweeksbeforeBhutto’sannouncedreturn.

Thetentativedeal,accordingtoformersecretaryRice,whohadspokenandnegotiatedwithbothparties on October 3, 2007, was “not firm but detailed enough that Bhutto would be permitted toreturntoPakistantostandintheparliamentaryelectionsthatwouldbeheldbymid-January.”5RiceaddedthatthedealhadbeencomplicatedbyrumorsthatMusharrafwouldtakeoffhisuniformonlyaftertheelectionsandthat,therefore,hewouldstandforelectionsasarmychief.RicerecountedthatBenazirthoughtthattherewasa“U.S.guarantee”thathewoulddoso.6

Negotiationsontheissueoftheoldcriminalcaseswereturnedovertohigh-levelrepresentativesofthePML-QandPPP,whometatleasttwiceinSeptemberatanISIsafehouseinIslamabad.Duringthese and later meetings, they drafted what would become the National Reconciliation Ordinance(NRO),whichprovidedavirtualamnestyforpoliticalfigures“foundtohavebeenfalselyinvolvedforpoliticalreasonsorthroughpoliticalvictimizationincases”broughtagainstthembetween1986andOctober1999.OnOctober5,2007,MusharrafsignedtheNRO.OnOctober6,hewasreelectedpresidentbytheelectoralcollege,composedofthemembersofthesittingParliamentandProvincialAssemblies. Bhutto had agreed that although the PPPmembers would abstain from the vote, theywould stay in the session, thus allowing for the required quorum after other opposition partymembers refused toparticipateandwithdrew.Thisenabled thePML-Qvote in favorofMusharraf,equivalentto57percentofthetotalnumberofMPs,tocarrytheday.

Accordingtoseveralsources,MusharrafwasunabletoconvincethePML-Qtoagreetosupporttheliftingofthebanonthirdterms.Partyleadersweredeeplyopposedtothemeasure,astheyfeareditwould ultimately diminish their power, facilitateNawaz Sharif’s return, and give a boost in theelections to both Bhutto and Sharif. Thus, there was never any agreement to create the legalpossibilityofathirdtermforBhutto.

ThissituationmadeitallthemoreimportanttoBhuttothattheelectionsbeconductedinafreeandfair manner. In addition to the history of ISI vote rigging in previous elections, there were well-

documented problems with the 2007 voter lists, which had to be redone at midyear, along withthousandsofcomplaints fromPPPandPML-Nactivists thatPML-Qauthoritieswerepreparing thegroundforlocalrigging.Infact,aftertheJulymeetingbetweenBenazirandMusharrafinAbuDhabi,she had secretly sent an aide to Islamabad to review the work of the firm hired to create a newelectoral list. The aide’s site visits for this purpose were facilitated directly by ISI chief GeneralKayaniandotherISIofficers.GeneralKayanihadassuredBhutto’speoplethatin2007therewouldbeno rigging.ForBenazir tobecomeprimeminister, thePPPwouldhave towin theelectionswithasufficientmajority andbuild the needed alliances to ensure that, in a newNationalAssembly, theycouldpass legislationallowinga third term.Thisplacedadditionalpressureonher,notonly tobevigilantonpotentialriggingbutalsotocarryoutavigorouspubliccampaigntowinvotesforherselfandherpartymorebroadly.

GeneralMusharrafbecameveryunhappywhenBhuttoannouncedapre-electionreturndate.Noagreementwaseverreachedonthisissue,oronacompletedeal,asMusharrafsaidinaninterviewwehadwithhiminOctober2009.ThegeneraldidnotwantBenazirtoreturntoPakistanuntilaftertheelectioncampaignwasover.“ComeonDecember31stand thenwecancelebrate theNewYeartogether,” Musharraf had allegedly told Bhutto in one of their last conversations. “Two hundredpercent she was not supposed to come back when she did,” Musharraf responded to one of myquestions. But Bhutto knew she needed to campaign for herself and the PPP for the January 8elections.ShepickedOctober18asthedayofherhomecoming.

AftersheannouncedthedateshewouldreturntoPakistan,Bhuttobegan,aroundSeptember2007,to raise concerns regarding personal security, especially in her communications with Americanofficials.USgovernmentrepresentativestoldthecommissionthattheyprovidedadvicetoBhuttoonhiringPakistaniprivatesecurityfirmsusedbydiplomaticmissionsandspokeatleastoncewiththeMusharrafcampabouthersecurityarrangements.Thesameofficialsnoted,however,thattheUnitedStates had not accepted any responsibility for Bhutto’s security in Pakistan. A cable—revealed byWikiLeaks—from the US embassy in Islamabad to Washington, dated October 27 and signed byAmbassador Anne W. Patterson, stated that, indeed, the embassy provided names of securitycontractorswithknowledgeoftheindigenousenvironmentandpoliticalculturetoBenazir ’sadvisers.It further related that, on the sameday, the ambassadorhadmetwithMusharraf’snational securityadviserTariqAziztoreiterate“thegovernment’sresponsibilityforBhutto’ssecurity.”7

Upon being contacted by some ofBenazir ’sAmerican advisers, representatives of the securityfirmBlackwaterflewtoDubaitoofferherseveralsecurityoptions,costinganaverageof$400,000monthly.SinceMusharrafhadopposedtheideaofforeignsecurityforcesaccompanyingBenazironher return to Pakistan, Blackwater intended toworkwith affiliated contractors in the country. ButBenazirrejectedthisoption.8SourcesclosetohertoldourcommissionthatshepreferredtheUnitedStatestourgeMusharraftoprovideherwithallnecessarysecurity.Ahigh-placedsourceintheUSgovernmentIconsultedassuredmethatBenazirwasupsetthattheUnitedStateshadbeenunwillingorunable to persuade Musharraf from denying her the use of armed security on the basis of legalimpediments.

According to senior journalist and writer Ron Suskind, who accompanied Benazir Bhutto toseveralmeetingsbeforeandafterherreturntoPakistan,shewassoconcernedabouthersecuritythatshe went to the US Congress to speak with key members like Senator John Kerry to requestassistance.Kerry offered to speak to the StateDepartment,which had already received assurancesfromMusharrafthathewouldprovideBhuttoenoughsecurity.Butknowingtherealitiesofpowerin

Washington, she insisted to her US interlocutors that Vice President Cheney be the one to callMusharraf to hold him responsible for her security. Cheney “is the only one thatMusharraf willrespect,”9shecommented.ButCheneyhadonlyreluctantlygonealongwiththeStateDepartment–ledplantopressureBenazirintoapoliticalcohabitationarrangementwiththegeneral,andeventhenhefelttheonlypurposeshouldbetolendlegitimacyandsupporttoMusharrafintheconfrontationwithmilitants,whichhefeltwastoppriority.CheneywantedtoreserveputtingpressureonMusharrafforwhentheyneededleveragetoreinforceIslamabad’sfightagainstterrorism.

Benazir ’s security concerns soon heightened in light of intelligence, communicated to her byUnited Arab Emirates officials but already known to the ISI, that extremists were planning toassassinateher.WithMusharraf’sgovernmenthavingrejectedtheideaofforeignsecuritypersonnel,thegeneralnominatedtwopotentialchiefprotectionofficers,bothfromthepolice,andBenazirchoseMajorImtiaz,whohadworkedwithherwhenshewasprimeminister.Benaziralsopickedherowndrivers.SecurityadviserRehmanMalikorderedaspeciallyarmoredToyotaLandCruiserwithaB6levelofprotection.Guarddogswereboughtforherresidence,but,astheywerenotproperlytrained,weremore amenace than a help and would indiscriminately attack anyone. According to severalpeople close to Benazir whomwe interviewed during the course of our investigation, she felt letdownbytheUnitedStatesfornotpushingMusharraftoimprovehersecurity;shealsobelievedthattheUnited States and theUnitedKingdom should have guaranteed her security, as her returnwasorganizedinclosecoordinationwiththeUKandUSgovernments.

WashingtonandLondonwerethekeyexternalplayersadvocatingBhutto’sreturntoPakistan,buttheywerenotwilling toassume responsibility forher security. InSeptember2007Benazir sent anemailtoUKForeignSecretaryDavidMillibandnamingthethreeindividualsidentifiedinherlettertoMusharrafthatshefearedwouldtrytodoherharm.ShehopedthatMillibandwouldusehisinfluencewithMusharraf to remove those individuals from powerful positions fromwhich they could plotagainsther.10DuringourinvestigationweheldaconstructivemeetingwithofficialsoftheForeignOffice in London, when we asked about what measures the UK government had taken to ensureBenazir ’s safe return toPakistan.Wewerepromiseddetailedanswersbutwenever received them,despiterepeatedremindersonourpart.

AFTERTHETERRORIST attack in Karachi that killed dozens of her supporters andmarred herreturntoPakistan,amutual“trustdeficit”developedbetweenBenazirandMusharraf.Althoughtheymanaged to reestablish some discussions, their relationship essentially disintegratedwhenGeneralMusharraf decided to declare emergency rule on November 3, 2007, suspend the constitution,promulgateaseriesofmeasuresthatamountedtomartiallaw,andagainsackChiefJusticeChaudhry,togetherwithanumberofotherhighcourtjustices.Thechiefjusticeandtwo-thirdsofthecountry’sseniorjudgeswereputunderhousearrest.Musharrafexplainedthedecisionasnecessarytocontainthe mounting extremist violence. But a former official of the Musharraf government told ourcommissionthatthegeneralhadconsidereddeclaringanemergencyandsuspendingtheconstitutiontwomonthsearlierand that theWhiteHouse,uponlearningof theplan,stronglyadvisedagainst itandconvincedMusharraftobacktrack.Now,inNovember,hewasactingpreemptively.HesuspectedthattheSupremeCourtwouldrulenegativelyonthelegalityofhisrecentreelectionaspresidentandhiseligibilitytoholddualpostsaspresidentandchiefofarmystaff.

ThePPPandPML-Nlaunchedpoliticalprotests throughthecountryagainst theemergencyrulemeasuresandagainstmilitaryrule.Bhuttoannouncedtheholdingofa“longmarch”fromLahoretoIslamabad. Violent clashes between police and protesters broke out in several cities. American

diplomatsaskedBhuttotorestrainhercriticismsofMusharraf.InNovemberalone,thegovernmentacknowledgedthearrestofsomefivethousandprotesters;PPPandPML-Ncandidateswereamongthem.Some in thePML-Qbegan to call for a postponement of the elections, adding an additionaldegreeofuncertaintytothesituation.

OnNovember9,Bhuttowasbrieflyplacedunderhousearrest.Thenextday,beforedomesticandinternationalmedia, shebroke tieswithGeneralMusharraf, denouncinghis actions, calling for anendtothemilitarygovernment,andannouncingthatanydealwithhimwasoff.

Two motivations drove this decision. The first was simply to demonstrate her strong dissenttowardthedeclarationofemergency.Thesecondwasmoresophisticated.Sheincreasinglyrealizedthat governing together with Musharraf would expose her to the growing public ire against hisgovernment. She feared that an ongoing political relationship with the general would weaken herpolitically,diminishherlegitimacy,andlessenpossibilitiesforasolidPPPelectoralvictory.

USSenatorJoeBiden,thenchairmanoftheSenateForeignRelationsCommittee,calledBenazirtoassureherthattheUnitedStatesstronglyfavoredliftingtheemergencyruleandsettingadateforelections.InSeptember,DeputySecretaryofStateJohnD.NegropontedeliveredthatsamemessagedirectlytoMusharrafinIslamabad.11OnNovember16,2007,NegropontephonedBenazirtopressinfavorofresumingdialoguewithMusharraftoputthedemocratictransitionbackontrack.

BenazircomplainedtojournalistandwriterAhmedRashidthatVicePresidentCheneywasputtingall thepressureonher to“conform,”whilenosimilarpressurewasbeingplacedonMusharraf toshowflexibilitytoachieveabargain.12PresidentBush,accordingtoCondoleezzaRice,didn’twant“anyone pulling the rug” out from underMusharraf.13 InCheney’s view,Musharraf needed to bedefended as an essential player in the war against terror. Aware of her limited leverage with herAmericanpatrons,BenazirtoneddownhercriticismsofMusharraf,althoughthegeneralcontinuedmakingabrasivecommentsabouther.

BenazirwasconcernedthatMusharrafcouldmanipulatethedialogueprocesswithoutmakinganyconcessionsandthattheISIwaspreparingtorigtheelections—astheUSembassyinIslamabadwasalready reporting to Washington. She eventually reestablished communication with Musharrafthrough intermediaries but turnedmore of her energy toward the campaign and strengthening herrelationshipwithNawazSharif,whohadbeendeposedasprimeministerbyGeneralMusharraf in1999, andSharif’s PML-Nparty.OnNovember 25, Sharifwas allowed to return toPakistan fromSaudi Arabia, following a failed attempt in September when he was detained at the airport anddeportedforviolatingthetermsoftheagreementthathadsenthimintoexiletenyearsearlier.ThePPPandthePML-Ncontinuedtodiscussstrategiesfortheelectionsandinsomedistrictsdecidedtorunasinglecandidate.

The government confirmed that elections would go ahead on January 8, 2008, andMusharraffinallyretiredasarmychief.HeannouncedtheliftingofemergencyrulemeasuresonDecember16.Bhuttowasassassinatedelevendayslater.Bythetimeofhermurder,thepossibilityofrehabilitatingtherelationshipbetweenthetwohadclearlywaned.NeitherBhuttonorMusharrafbelievedthateitherofthemstillneededthesupportoftheothertoachievetheirultimatepoliticalgoals.

AsurvivorstandsamidthecarnageofdeadandwoundedimmediatelyfollowingthebombandgunfireattackthatkilledBenazirBhuttoatLiaquatBagh,Rawalpindi,onDecember27,2007,followinganelectoralrally.

7

TheAssassination

THENIGHTBEFORE her assassination, Benazir Bhutto arrived in Islamabad to stay at ZardariHouse,herfamily’sresidenceinthecapital,aftertravelingbycarfromthecityofPeshawar.Benazirwas tired, but thedirector general of the ISI,MajorGeneralNadeemTaj, had requested anurgentconversationwithher.TheformerprimeministerdecidedthatshewouldsleepforacoupleofhoursandthenreceivetheISIchiefatherhouse,intheearlyhoursofDecember27.Themeetingtookplacearound 1:30 a.m. Security adviser Rehman Malik accompanied Benazir during part of theconversation.

Major General Taj told Bhutto that the intelligence agency was concerned about a possibleterroristattackagainstherandurgedBhuttotolimitherpublicexposureandkeepalowprofileatthecampaignrallyatLiaquatBaghlaterthatday.IntelligenceofficersfromSaudiArabiaandtheUnitedArabEmirateshadarrivedbyprivateplaneinPakistan thedaybefore,GeneralTajsaid, toconveycredibleinformationaboutapossibleattack,whichcoincidedwiththerevelationofISIintelligenceregarding a terrorist cell in Mardan that might attack her in Rawalpindi. Using communication-interception technology, the ISI had been tracking three separate Pakistani Taliban cells that weresupposedlyplanning toattackBenazir, and theagencyalreadyknewabout the informationcomingfromtheforeignintelligencecounterparts.AccordingtotheISIinformation,theterroristsinvolvedintheoperationhadbeeninstructedtoshavetheirbeardsandchangetheirtraditionalstyleofclothingsoasnottoattractattention.

BenazirdidnotlendmuchcredencetothethreatsandtoldtheISIdirectorgeneralthatevidentlythegovernmentandtheISIdidnotwanther“todopolitics.”Instead,shearguedthat theISIshouldensurethatshewouldhaveproperprotectionandthatherrallywouldbesafe.Sheagreed,though,tominimizeherexposureatthepublicevent.

MuchoftheconversationwithNadeemTajwasaboutthecomingelections.BenazirsaidthatshehopedtheISIwouldnotrigtheelectionsagainsther.TajrespondedthatGeneralKayani’spolicywasthattheISI,fromnowon,wasgoingtostayoutofpolitics.

On that morning of December 27, Benazir Bhutto got up around 8:30 a.m. and had breakfastaround9:00.Aboutanhourandahalflater,Bhuttoleft,accompaniedbyAminFahimandaformerPPP senator, tomeetAfghanpresidentHamidKarzai at a fourth-floor suite in the capital’sSerenaHotel.Shereturnedabout1:30p.m.totheZardariHouse,whereshehadalightlunchandwentoverherspeechfortheLiaquatBaghrallywithafewcloseadvisers.WitnessesrecalledthatshewasupbeatbecauseherdialoguewithPresidentKarzaihadbeenpositive.BhuttowasconfidentthatshewouldbeabletoimprovetherelationshipbetweenIslamabadandKabulandthattogethertheycouldbringtheunstablesituationinthetribalareasundercontrol.AccordingtoKarzai,shehadalsocriticizedtheISI

fortryingtoundermineher.1TheAfghanpresident,whohadnotmetBenazirpersonallyuntilthen,was very impressed by the woman’s courage; she seemed “too courageous for her own good,”Karzaitoldaseniorjournalist.2

Before leaving the Zardari House at around 2:00 p.m., she askedBrigadierAman, her privatesecretary, to slot two appointments for the rest of the day: one in the afternoon, with a EuropeanUnionelectionobservationmission,and theother thatevening,withUSSenatorArlenSpecterandUSCongressmanPatrickKennedy.

BenazirdepartedforLiaquatBaghinaconvoyofvehicles.TheconvoywasmadeupofablackToyota Land Cruiser occupied by PPP security head Tauqir Kaira, followed by Bhutto’s whitearmoredLandCruiserandtwoofKaira’svehiclesoneithersideofhervehicle.ThelattertwowereaMercedes-Benzvanontherightandafour-doordouble-cabvehicleontheleft.ImmediatelybehindthosevehiclesweretwoToyotaVigopickuptrucksfromtheZardariHouse,positionedsidebyside.BehindtheseVigoswasablackMercedes-Benz,fromtheZardariHouse,whichwasbulletproofandservedasthebackupvehicleforBhutto.

SecuritychiefTauqirKairawas inside the leadvehiclewithhismen. Joining the formerprimeministerinhervehiclewereJaved-ur-Rehman,thedriver,whowasseatedinthefrontleftseat;seniorsuperintendentofpoliceMajor(ret.)ImtiazHussain,seatedinthefrontrightseat;MakhdoomAminFahim,seniorPPPmember,seatedinthesecondrowontheleft;Benazir,seatedinthesecondrowinthecenter;andNaheedKhan,seniorpartymemberandBhutto’spoliticalsecretary,positionedinthesecond row on the right. In the back of the vehicle seated on two benches facing each otherwereSenatorSafdarAbbasi,aseniorpartymember,ontherightbench;bodyguardKhalidShahenshah,ontheleftbench;andRazaqMirani,personalattendantoftheformerprimeminister,ontherightbenchtotheleftofSenatorAbbasi.Kaira’stwovehiclesoneithersideofBhutto’sLandCruisercarriedhismen.

Chaudhry Aslam’s PPP unarmed security team rode in the Vigo pick-up trucks. The blackMercedes-Benzcarried thedriver,PPPofficialFaratullahBabar, seated in the frontpassenger seat,and, in the rear passenger seat from left to right, PPP officials Babar Awan, RehmanMalik, andGeneral(ret.)TauqirZia.

Benazir ’s caravan reached Faizabad Junction at about 2:15 p.m.,where theRawalpindiDistrictPoliceweretoassumeresponsibilityfortheconvoy’ssecurity.Thepolicesecurityplancalledforanescortcomposedofatrafficpolice“pilot”jeep,aregularpolicejeepleadingtheconvoy,andthreeEliteForceToyotapickuptrucksprotectingBhutto’sLandCruiseron threesides.According to thepassengersinhervehicle,however,therewasonlyonetrafficpolicevehicle.

Atabout2:56p.m.,Bhutto’sconvoyturnedrightat theMurreeRoad–LiaquatRoadjunctionandheaded to the inner securitygate into theVIPparkingareaatLiaquatBagh.Noone in the securityteamattemptedtostopBhuttofromstandingthroughtheroofescapehatchofherLandCruiserandwavingatthelargecrowdaroundthevehiclewhileitmovedslowlyonLiaquatRoad.

VideofootageandpicturesshowthatwhileBhutto’scardrovedownmuchofLiaquatRoad,itwasflanked only by her private security vehicles. No Elite Force vehicle was accompanying Bhutto’sLandCruiser.InspectorAzmatDogar,theEliteForce’scommander,wasinthecrowdsomedistancefromBhutto’svehicle.Theassertionbythepolicethattheyhadprovidedadefensiveboxformationaroundherasshearrivedattherallyisfalse,andtheEliteForceunitdidnotexecutetheirdutiesasspecified in the security deployment. In short, the full escort as described by the police was notpresent.

Around3:16p.m.,Bhutto’scaravanhadtostopforaboutfivetosixminutesattheinnergateoftheparkingareatowaitforthatgatetobeopened,duringwhichtimesheremainedstandingthroughtheescapehatch,totallyunprotected.AccordingtothePPP,thedelayinopeningthegatewasbecausethepolicedidnothavethekeytoit.Thepolice,however,saidthattheydidnotwanttoallowthelargecrowdfollowingBhuttotogetintotheVIPparkingarea.Altogether,Bhuttostoodthroughtheescapehatch for the approximately twentyminutes it took to drive from theMurree Road–Liaquat Roadjunction to the gate of the parking area. Hence, Rawalpindi District Police’s claim that they weresurprisedwhenBhuttoemergedfromtheescapehatchonherwayoutofLiaquatBaghseemstobeuntrue.

Oncetheconvoywentpasttheinnergate,around3:23p.m.,itparkedintheVIPparkingareatotherearofthestage.InsidetheVIPparkingareawereatleastthreevehicles:BenazirBhutto’swhiteLandCruiser,Kaira’sleadvehicle,andtheblackbulletproofMercedes-Benzcar.Temporarywoodenstairshadbeenbuilttoaccessthestagefromtherear,directlyfromtheparkingarea.Afterexitinghervehicle,Bhuttoclimbedthestairstothestage,wavedtothecrowd,andtookherseat.

Manynationalpartyleaders,securityguards,andaideswereonthestagesurroundingBhuttoinwhatappearedtobeanimprovisedsetup.AlsojoiningheronthestagewerealloftheparliamentarycandidatesfromRawalpindiDistrict.Benazir ’svoicewashoarsefromdaysofcampaignrallies,andshehadaslightcold.Asusual,shecoveredherblackhairwithawhitedupatta.Uponherarrival,afewpartyleaderswarmedupthecrowd,soitwasalreadylateafternoonwhenBhuttofinallyspoke.

WhileBenazir listened to theopeningspeeches,SherryRehman,3a topmediaadviserandPPPleader, leanedover towhisper inBhutto’sear thatseveralNawazSharifelectionworkershadbeenkilledinagunfightatarallyelsewhereinRawalpindi.BenaziraskedtoberemindedtocallNawaztoofferhercondolences.Meanwhile,attherearofthestage,asthepolicetriedtopreventpeoplefromclimbingtothecrowdedstage,ascufflebrokeoutbetweenpolicemenandsomeyoungPPPactivists.Thiscreatedanairof tensionbetweenPPPworkersandthepoliceofficerspostedin thatarea.Thepolice stated that the dispute was minor and was settled immediately, whereas some local PPPrepresentativesclaimeditwasserious.Apparently,thepolicemenfeltinsultedandfromthenontheybecamemorepassiveintheirsecurityduty.

Thousandsofpeopleattendedthepublicgathering.Thecrowdwasenthusiastic,andPPPleadersandactivistsconsideredtheeventtohavebeenagreatsuccess.Benazirgavearousingspeech,oneofthebestofhercampaign,accordingtoobservers,andtheydescribedherashavingbeenradiantthatday.Sheissuedanimpassionedcalltoendmilitaryruleandtodefeatextremists.“Thecountryisindanger,”shesaid,vowingtosaveitwiththepowerofthepeople.

The rally concluded at about 5:10 p.m., after which Bhutto descended the wooden stairs andenteredherLandCruiser.TheoccupantsoftheLandCruiserandtheirpositionsinthevehiclewerethesameasduringthetripintothepark.IntheblackMercedes-Benzcar,thepassengerswerealsothesame.

STRANGELYFORAback-upvehicle,theblackbulletproofMercedes-Benzwasthefirsttoleavetheparkingarea.ItneverbecameclearhowmuchdistancetherewasbetweenthisvehicleandtherestofBhutto’sconvoyatthemomentoftheblast.Plausiblereportsrangefrom100to250meters.Someinthecar toldourcommission that theywerecloseenoughto theformerprimeminister ’svehicle tofeeltheimpactoftheblast.WitnessesatthesiteoftheblaststatedthattheMercedes-BenzleftLiaquatBaghsoquicklythatitwasnowheretobeseenwhentheblastoccurred.Infact,thecommissiondidnotseethisvehicleinthemanyvideoimagesoftheexitareaitreviewed.Whatismoresurprisingis

thateven thoughsomeoccupantsof thecaracknowledged that theyfelt the impactof theblast,andalthoughthiswasthealternativevehicleincaseofanyemergency,theMercedestraveledallthewayto the ZardariHouse, a drive of twenty to thirtyminutes, before the occupants became aware thatBhuttohadbeeninjuredintheblast.Theydidn’tevenstopatasafedistancefollowingtheexplosiontocheckonhercondition,theconditionofhervehicle,andwhetherthebackupvehiclewasneeded.

Kaira’ssecuritycarwasthenexttoleavetheinnerparkingareaaftertheMercedes-Benzcar,withBenazir ’s vehicle right behind it, followed by another of Kaira’s vehicles. The two Vigo pickuptrucksthenjoinedtheconvoyfromtheouterparkingarealocatedbetweentheinnerandoutergates.

At 5:12 p.m., Bhutto’s Land Cruiser exited from the outer gate. Crowds of people who werealreadyonLiaquatRoaddrewcloser to thevehicleas itbegan to turnrightonto the thoroughfare.The police claimed that they had not allowed anyone to leave the park before the departure ofBhutto’scaravan,butvideoandotherevidencesuggestthatpeopleswirledoutofthegates,swellingthecrowdaround theLandCruiser. Just as it hadhappenedduringher arrival at thepark,Benaziremerged through the escape hatch of the vehicle and started waving to her supporters.When thevehicleapproachedthecentralroaddivider,itslowedfurtherwhilenosingitswaythroughacrowdcarryingbannersandelectoralcampaignsigns.

Bhutto’ssecuritypeoplewereworriedthatthecrowdwasslowingdowntheconvoy.MajorImtiaz,sitting in the front seat of the Land Rover, wanted to call City Police Officer (CPO) Saud Aziz,Rawalpindi’spolicechief,bycellphone,buthedidnothavethepolicechief’sdirectnumber.Instead,hecalledSaudAziz’soperatorandtheoperatoratthepolicestationinMultan,anothertowninPunjabProvince,whereMajorImtiazhadrecentlyserved.SuchimprovisationbyMajorImtiazevidencedalackofprofessionalism.

There were discrepancies about the nature of the crowd that surrounded the Land Cruiser.Passengers in theLandCruiser and some localPPPmembers recalled that theyweremostly partyactivists, and theydidnot seeany strangemovementsamong them.TheRawalpindiDistrictPoliceandotherPPPmembers,however,believedthatagroupofpeoplehaddeliberatelystoodinfrontoftheLandCruiser toprevent it frommoving.Regardlessof the accuracyof either account, the factremainsthatthepolicedidnotmanagethecrowdoutsideofLiaquatBagh.Thus,theattackerwasabletogetmuchclosertoBhutto’svehiclethanmightordinarilyhavebeenpossible.

TheRawalpindi police and some PPPworkers dispute the exact exit route agreed forBhutto’sconvoy.TheRawalpindiDistrictPoliceandDistrictCoordinatingOfficer (DCO)Muhammad IrfanElahi, thehighest-rankingcivilianbureaucrat inRawalpindi, asserted that theplanned route for theconvoywastherightturnontoLiaquatRoadandtheleftontoMurreeRoad,retracingtheconvoy’sentryroute.Onlyincaseofanemergencywastheconvoytomakealeftturnafterexitingtheoutergate(adecisiontotaketheemergencyroutehadtobemadebytheseniorpoliceofficerinchargeofsecurityon the scene).But localPPPworkerswhowereat thepreparatorymeetingwith thepolicedisagree.They claim that the original planwas tomake a left turn ontoLiaquatRoad and that themeeting minutes provided by DCO Elahi were inaccurate. In any case, photographs show twostationarypolicevehiclesonLiaquatRoadblockingtheleftlanefromwheretheleftturnwouldhavebeenmade.Consequently,inanemergencyitwouldhavebeenimpossibleforBhutto’sconvoytousetheescaperoute,unlessthosepolicevehicleshadbeenquicklymoved.WelearnedthatthesevehicleswereofficialvehiclesofseniorRawalpindipoliceofficers.Attheveryleast,itwasirresponsibleforthesevehiclestohavebeenparkedinsuchawayastoblocktheemergencyexitroute.

TheRawalpindipolicestatedthatvehiclesfromtheEliteForceunitwerewaitingrightoutsidetheouter gate to escortBenazirBhutto’s convoy and that theywere about to go into a protective box

formation when the attack happened. However, forming the box at that point would have beenimpracticable, given the narrowwidth ofLiaquatRoad and the numerous peoplewho had alreadystartedtosurroundBenazir ’svehicle.Moreover,videofootageshowsscarceuniformedpoliceonthescene available to push back the crowd to create space for the box formation.Musharraf claimedthere were four police vehicles with thirty police officers flanking Bhutto’s vehicle, plus onethousandpolicemendeployedattherally.4Butvideoandphotographstakenshortlybeforetheblast,aswellascommissioninterviews,indicatethattheEliteForceunitwasnotinplaceeitherattheentryorattheexitoftheconvoy,thusfailingmanifestlyinitsdutytoaffordprotection.

Havingexitedtheoutergate,theLandCruiserstartedtomakearightturnontoLiaquatRoad.AsitcrepttowardthecentraldivideronLiaquatRoad,thecrowdbeganchantingpoliticalslogans.It’snotclearifBhuttomadethedecisiontostanduponherownorwasurgedtodoso.Beforeshestoodup,Benazir asked Naheed Khan to make a phone call to Nawaz Sharif, PML-N leader, to conveycondolencesforthedeathsofsomeofhissupporterswhohadbeenshotduringaPML-Nrallyearlierthat day, also in Rawalpindi. The press had informed that the shooting incident occurred betweensupportersofthePML-NandthoseofthePML-Q.

WhileKhanwas trying to reachSharif,Benazir, seeing theenthusiasticcrowd,stoppedherandaskedSenatorAbbasi,whowas sitting in one of the rear seats, to chant slogans to respond to themultitude using the vehicle’s loudspeaker. Bhutto then stood on the seat and appeared through theescapehatch,herheadandshouldersexposed.5

Benazirwavedtothepeople.ThevehiclecontinuedtomoveslowlyintoitsrightturnontoLiaquatRoad.At thispoint,amanwearingdarkglassesappeared in thecrowdon the leftsideof theLandCruiser.Around5:14p.m.,whilethevehiclecontinuedintoitsslowrightturn,themanpulledoutapistoland,fromadistanceofapproximatelytwotothreemeters,firedthreeshotsatBhutto.ScotlandYarddetermined,byanalyzingvideo,thatthethreeshotswerefiredinlessthanonesecond.

Video footage taken fromaback angle showsBhutto’sdupatta and hair flick upward after thesecond shot.However, there is no evidence of a link between the second shot and thatmovement.After the third shot, she started to descend into the vehicle. The gunman lowered the gun, lookeddown,andthendetonatedtheexplosivesattachedtohisbody.

Whenthegunmanactivatedhissuicidevest,hewasnear theleftrearcornerof thevehicle,andvideofootageshowsthattheLandCruiserwasstillmakingtherightturn.TheScotlandYardteam’sanalysisshowsthatittook1.6secondsfromthetimeofthefirstshottothedetonationofthebomb.

NaheedKhan,whohadbeensittingtoBenazir ’sright, recalledthat immediatelyaftersheheardthe three gunshots,Bhutto fell down into the vehicle, the right side of her head coming to rest onKhan’slap.TherightsideofBhutto’sheadwasbleedingprofusely,andbloodwastricklingoutofherear.Shewasnotmoving.MakhdoomAminFahim,whosattoBenazir ’sleft,rememberedthatBhuttofellheavilyandshowednosignoflifeafterthat.AccordingtoScotlandYard’sanalysis,theflashoftheblastappearedjustovertwo-thirdsofasecondafterBhuttodisappearedfromview.Nooneelseinhervehiclewasseriouslyinjured.

Inthewakeoftheblast,thescenewasoneofshock,fear,andconfusion;therewaslittle,ifany,policecontrol.Thesitewasfilledwithbloodandsmoke.Thebomb,wrappedwithballbearings,hadkilledorinjureddozensofpeople.Thecrimescenewasnotimmediatelyclearedandcordonedoff.

Senator Abbasi told the driver to head to the hospital, initially having in mind a hospital inIslamabad.ThedistricthospitalhadBenazirBhutto’sbloodtypereadyincaseofanemergencyandwas quite near the crime scene. However, the driver headed to the Rawalpindi General Hospital

(RGH),asnooneinstructedhimotherwise.Althoughallfourofitstireswerepuncturedbytheblast,the Land Cruiser managed to drive along Liaquat Road for approximately three hundred meterstoward the junctionwithMurreeRoadwhere it turned left.TheLandCruisermovedalongMurreeRoadonthemetalrimsofthewheels,butthedrivermanagedtokeepthevehiclemovingforseveralkilometers.TheLandCruisermadeaU-turnattheRehmanabadjunction,locatedapproximatelyfourkilometersfromtheLiaquatRoad–MurreeRoadjunction,inordertogettotheothersideoftheroadwhereRGHwaslocated.

At this point, there was only one traffic police vehicle ahead of the Land Cruiser. No othervehicleswerevisible—neitherthebulletproofblackMercedes-BenznoranyEliteForceunitvehicles.Therewasnoambulanceavailableeither.TheheadoftheElitecommandounitdeclaredthattwoElitevehiclesattemptedtofollowBhutto’sLandCruiser,butthattheycouldn’tmovebecauseoftheinjuredand dead people in front of the two vehicles. Following theU-turn, the LandCruiser stalled. Thegroup had to wait for some time on Murree Road until a private vehicle that was following,belongingtoPPPleaderSherryRehman,arrivedandtransportedBhuttotothehospital.Ittookaboutthirty-fourminutesforBenazirandhercompanionstoreachRGH.

SoonaftertheblastoutsideLiaquatBagh,chiefpoliceofficerSaudAzizleftthecrimesceneforthehospital.PolicemanYaseenFarooqfollowedsoonthereafter,whilethemostseniorpoliceofficialremainingatthecrimescenewasthedeputypolicechiefKhurramShahzad.

ThealternatebulletproofblackMercedesdrovetotheZardariHouse,whereitarrivedabouthalfanhourafter theattack.SecurityadviserRehmanMalikphonedhisbrother-in-law,who toldMalikthatBenazirhadduckedintohervehicleandhethoughtshewasunharmed.But,asthebackupvehicle,theMercedes-BenzcarwouldhavebeenanessentialelementofBhutto’sconvoyonthereturntrip,even if the occupants of that car had ascertained that she had been unscathed in the attack. TheMercedespassengersmadeastopbeforearrivingattheZardariHousetoaskapolicemanforfurtherinformation.Over the police radio,Malik and the others in theMercedes learned thatBenazir hadbeeninjuredandpossiblytakentoahospital.Despitethatalarminginformation,theycontinuedontotheZardariHouse.PerhapstheMercedespassengerswereworriedthatasecondbombmightgooff,ashadhappenedinotherterroristattacks.

ATRAWALPINDIGENERALHospital(laterrenamedBenazirBhuttoHospital),BhuttowasreceivedbymedicalpersonnelfromtheAccidentandEmergencyDepartment.Itwasaround5:40p.m.Intheresuscitation room, she was treated by Dr. Saeeda Yasmin. Hospital staff were also busy treatingvictimsoftheshootingattheNawazSharifrallyearlierthatday.

Bhuttowaspale,unconscious,andnotbreathing.Therewasawoundtotherightofherheadfromwhich blood was trickling and whitish matter was visible. Her clothes were soaked in blood. Dr.Saeedaimmediatelybeganeffortstoresuscitateher.Dr.AurangzebKhan,theseniorregistrar,joinedDr.Saeeda to assist.Both doctors said that theydid not observe anyother injury.As therewas noimprovement in Bhutto’s condition, the doctors moved her to the operating room located on thesecondfloortocontinueresuscitationefforts,aidedbyothermedicalpersonnel.

At around 5:50 p.m., Professor Mohammed Mussadiq Khan, the hospital’s senior physician,arrivedandtookcharge.MussadiqKhanisthesonofthedoctorwho,atthesamehospital,attempted—unsuccessfully—tosavethelifeofPrimeMinisterLiaquatAliKhanfifty-sixyearsearlier,gunneddownatthesameparkwhereBenazirhadbeenattacked.Thedoctorsstillhadnotdetectedapulse.At5:57 p.m., Professor Mussadiq Khan opened Benazir Bhutto’s chest and carried out open-heartmassage,withoutprogress.

At6:16p.m.,MussadiqKhanstoppedresuscitationeffortsanddeclaredtheformerprimeministerdead.Heorderedallofthementoleavetheroomsothatthefemaledoctorsandnursescouldcleanthebody.Strictlymedicalpersonnelhadbeenintheoperatingroomuntilthen.

Dr.QudsiyaAnjumQureshi cleanedBhutto’shead,neck, andupperbodyandcheckedBhutto’sbodyforfurtherinjury.Shesawnowoundsotherthantheonetotherightsideofherheadandthethoracotomywound.Bhuttowasthendressedinhospitalclothingandherclothesgiventohermaid.Thedoctorsstatedthattheyhadnotseenherdupatta,whichremainsmissingtothisday.

On three different occasions, Professor Mussadiq Khan asked Police Chief Saud Aziz forpermission to conduct an autopsy onBenazir Bhutto, butAziz denied each request. At the secondrequest,Azizisreportedtohavesarcasticallyaskedtheprofessorwhetheracriminalcomplainthadbeenfiledyet,amatterinthechiefofpolice’sareaofcompetence,notthatofthedoctor.Rawalpindi’stop civilian authority, DCO Muhammad Irfan Elahi, had arrived at the hospital and was presentoutside the operating room. Elahi supported SaudAziz’s denial of permission for an autopsy.Allauthorities present justified the refusal to allow an autopsy on the grounds that theywanted to getpermissionfromBenazir ’sfamily.

Pakistani lawdictates that in thecaseofanunnaturaldeath, thepolicemusthaveapostmortemexamination report as part of their investigation. This requirement places the responsibility forinitiatinganexaminationonthepolice,notthehospitalauthorities.Infact,hospitalofficialsmustgeta request from the police before proceeding.Only a districtmagistratemaywaive the need for apostmortem examination. If the family of a deceased person declines to have a postmortemexaminationcarriedout,itmustappealtoajudgeforanorderwaivingtherequirement.

TherearesensitivitiesinvolvedinconductingapostmortemexaminationonawomaninPakistanitradition.However, due to the forensic importanceof this typeof examination, thepolice can takestepstoovercomeanyreligiousorculturalobjections.

BenazirBhutto’sbodyremainedintheoperatingroomuntilitwasplacedinawoodencoffinandremovedfromthehospitalatabout10:35p.m.,afterwhichitwastransportedtothenearbyChaklalaAirBase.Around1:00a.m.onDecember28,atChaklalaAirBase,theremainswereentrustedtoherhusband,AsifAliZardari,whohadjustflowninfromDubaiandsignedanacknowledgmentnote.

PoliceChiefSaudAzizdenied toourcommission that thedoctorshad repeatedly requestedhispermissionforapostmortemexaminationandtoldusthatbecauseofBenazirBhutto’simportance,hecouldnotjusthaveanautopsyperformedwithoutfirstseekingherfamily’sconsent.HefirstsoughttheapprovalofthepresidentofthePPP,MakhdoomAminFahim,foranexamination.FahimtoldhimthathecouldnotgivesuchapprovalandaskedhimtowaitforAsifAliZardari,whowasonhiswaytoPakistanfromDubai.WhenZardariarrivedatChaklalaAirBase,therequestforpermissionwasmadetohim,andhedeclined.

ThecommissionfounditremarkablethatBhutto’sremainsweremovedtoChaklalaAirBaseinRawalpindi before Zardari’s arrival fromDubai. The note signed by Zardari accepting his wife’sremainsisdate-stamped1:10a.m.onDecember28,butasmentioned,thebodywasremovedfromthehospital around 10:35 p.m. the night before. If the police were genuinely waiting for Zardari’spermissionbeforerequestingapostmortemexamination,theyshouldhavekeptBhutto’sbodyatthehospital.Instead,theymovedherremainstotheairbase,therebyrenderingsuchanexaminationmoredifficult.Whenquestionedaboutthis,seniorPunjabofficialsstatedthattheplanwastocarryouttheexaminationatthebase,whichalsohadmedicalfacilities.However,Bhutto’scoffinwasnottakentothemedicalfacilitiesbutinsteadwasplacedinaregularroomatthebase.

RawalpindipolicechiefSaudAzizsentseveralmemostohissuperiorsregardingtheabsenceofa

postmortemexamination.ThememosandasubsequentletterbyPunjabauthoritiesplacetheblameonZardari’srefusaltoapproveanautopsy,alsoportrayingthatrefusalinmisleadingterms.TheletterisclearlyintendedtohideAziz’sfundamentalomissiontocarryouthislegalobligationregardingtheautopsy. Zardari was confronted with an impossible situation, one that almost compelled him torefusetherequestforanautopsy,giventhatthebodyhadbeenplacedinacoffinandthatnoautopsyhadbeencarriedoutalthoughfivehourshadpassedsinceBhuttohadbeendeclareddead.Therewasaclear intent to shift responsibilities and perpetrate a cover-up of the true reasons behind notconducting a postmortem examination. Such preconceived efforts and justifications indicated thatAzizdidnotactindependentlyonthismatter.

Consideringthathecouldnotobtainpoliceconsenttocarryoutanautopsy,ProfessorMussadiqKhancalledinX-raytechnicianGhafoorJadd,whotooktwoX-raysofBhutto’sskullwithaportableX-raymachine.HedidthiswithoutnotifyingorseekingtheapprovalofSaudAziz.

ISI Rawalpindi detachment commander, Colonel Jehangir Akhtar, was present at the hospitalthroughmuchof the evening.At one point, the ISI deputy director general,MajorGeneralNusratNaeem,contactedProfessorMussadiqKhanbycallingColonel Jehangir ’s cellphone.Whenaskedabout this by the commission, Naeem initially denied making any calls to the hospital; but whenpressed further, he acknowledged that he had indeed phoned the hospital to hear directly fromProfessorMussadiqKhanthatBhuttohaddied.Hedidthisbeforereportingtohissuperiors.

Bhutto’sdeathcertificatewascompletedandsignedbytheseniorregistrar,Dr.Aurangzeb,whorecordedthecauseofdeathas“Tobedeterminedonautopsy.”

MANYPPPMEMBERSassertedpubliclyandinprivateshortlyaftertheassassinationthatBhuttohadbeenshot.SomePPPmemberstoldusthatatleastoneofthedoctorshadinitiallystatedthatBhuttohadsufferedgunshotinjuries,implyingthatthedoctorsmusthavedeliberatelyalteredtheirfindingssubsequently.Thecommissionwasunable to findanybasis to support thisview,howeverhonestlyheld. Rather, some doctors did indeed acknowledge that they considered the existence of gunshotinjuriesearlyintheireffortstoresuscitateBhuttobutruledthatoutintheirfinalassessment.ThereisonedoctorwhoarrivedduringtheeveningatRGHwhocontinuestoassertthattherewasagunshotwound.Hewasnot,however,anexaminingdoctoranddidnotbasehisviewsondirectobservationofagunshotinjury.

ThecommissionalsointerviewedsomePPPsupporterswhohadbeeninjuredintheblast.Nonehadreceivedbulletwounds,aspreviouslyreportedinsomemediareports.Accordingtothepolice,over twenty-five peoplewere also interviewed in the immediate aftermath of the attack, and nonereceivedbulletwounds.Theywereinsteadinjuredbyballbearings.

Duringthecourseoftheinvestigation,thecommissionwasnotprovidedwithanycredible,newinformation showing that Benazir Bhutto had received bullet wounds. Senior PPP official SherryRehman,whohadearlierpubliclyassertedthatshehadseenBhutto’sgunshotinjuries,retractedthatstatementwheninterviewedbythecommission.Infact,shehadnotseenBhutto’sheadwoundandhadbeenadvisedtotellthemediathatshehadseenbulletwounds.AlthoughBenazirBhutto’sfollowersmay have justifiably assumed that the former prime minister had been shot in the confusionsurroundingtheattack,thecontinuedassertionthatshehadbeenshot,withoutevidence,aswellastheassertionofuntrueeyewitnessaccounts,wasandremainsmisleading.

On the afternoon of December 28, in Sindh Province, Benazir Bhutto was laid to rest in herfamily’smausoleumatGarhiKhudaBaksh inLarkana.Herdeathwasfollowedbyenormousgriefandangeramonghersupporters.AsriotsspreadacrossPakistan,policeconfirmedthatthirty-eight

peoplehaddiedinclashes,fifty-threehadsufferedinjuriesandthatmorethanseventyvehicleshadbeensetonfirebyprotestersinKarachialone.TheyalsoreportedthatBhuttosupportershadraidedapolicestationinPeshawar,resultingingunfireinjuriestoseveralpoliceofficers;thatatrainhadbeenseton fire in the townofTandoJam;and that therehadbeennumerousattacksonbanks,state-rungrocerystoresandelectionofficesbelongingtoMusharraf’sparty.Manybelievedthatageneration’shopesofbuildingastabledemocracyinPakistanhaddiedwithBenazirBhutto.

HeraldoMuñoz(theauthorandheadoftheUNCommissionofInquiry)andCommissionerPeterFitzgerald(left)meetingwithInteriorMinisterRehmanMalik,formerBenazirBhuttosecurityadviserandleadgovernmentpointpersonduringtheinvestigation.

8

Whodunit?

ONTHEEVENINGofDecember28, thedayafter theassassinationofBenazirBhutto,BrigadierGeneral (ret.) Javed IqbalCheema, spokesperson for theMinistry of the Interior, gave a televisedpressconferencetosetoutthecauseofherdeathaswellastonamethoseresponsiblefortheattack.HeannouncedthatBhuttohaddiedfromaheadinjurysustainedwhenhittingherheadontheleverofthespeciallydesignedescapehatchofthevehicleandthatBaitullahMehsud,inassociationwithAl-Qaida,wasresponsiblefortheattack.Asevidence,hepresentedaninterceptedtelephoneconversationinPashtobetweenMehsudandoneMaulviSahib,inwhichMehsudwasheardcongratulatingMaulvion“aspectacularjob.”1

General Musharraf had decided to authorize the press conference during a meeting on themorning of December 28 at a facility in the general headquarters known as Camp House. Thatmeeting,atwhichMusharrafwasbriefedontheinterceptandonmedicalevidence,wasattendedbythe directors general of the ISI, MI, and IB. Brigadier Cheema was summoned to a subsequentmeetingattheISIheadquarters,wherehewasinstructedbythedirectorgeneraloftheISItoholdthepressconference.TheISIprovidedtheinformationthespokespersonwastorelay.2Inattendanceatthis second meeting, in addition to Brigadier Cheema, were Interior Secretary Kamal Shah, thedirectorgeneraloftheISI,thedirectorgeneraloftheIB,thedeputydirectoroftheISI,andanotherISIbrigadiergeneral.

Accordingtothegovernmenttheevidenceforthecauseofdeathwasclear:Videofootageshowedthat the shooter ’s bullets did not hit Bhutto. Through Brigadier General Cheema, the governmentconcludedthatshemusthavehitherheadontheleverofthevehicle’sescapehatch—or“sunroof,”asmistakenlydescribedinnewsreports.

ThepressconferencewasmetwithwidespreadpublicoutrageandmediaskepticisminPakistan.ThePPPandothersaccusedthegovernmentofacover-up.

Manyexpresseddoubtsaboutthesuddenandtimelyappearanceofthetelephoneinterceptaswellas the speed with which its contents were analyzed and interpreted. One senior policeman weinterviewed during our investigation declared about the phone intercept, “In 24 years of service, Ihave never seen such spontaneous appearance of evidence.”Many also challenged the version thatBhutto had not been shot and questioned how quickly that purported analysis had been done.Numerous senior PPP officials believed the government was clearly suggesting, in an effort todemeanBenazirBhutto,thatshehadcausedherowndeathbyemergingfromhervehicletosalutethecrowd.

Themorningfollowingtheassassination,thedoctorswhotreatedBenazirBhuttowereconvenedatthehospitalbyDCOMuhammadIrfanElahi,themaincivilianbureaucratinthedistrictunderthe

authority of Punjab Province. Elahi demanded that the doctors submit a report concerning thetreatment given to Bhutto. He told the doctors to bring the original to him directly and furtherinstructedthemtoretainneitherhardcopiesnorelectroniccopiesofthereport.Arequestforsuchareport had never been made before this incident, nor has there been one since. The report waspreparedandsubmittedtoDCOElahi.OntheafternoonofDecember28,ProfessorMussadiqKhangaveabriefpressconferencefollowingordersgivenbyElahi,whoreceivedhis instructionsfromthehomesecretaryofPunjabProvince.

When a terrorist offense has been committed, Pakistan’s Anti-terrorism Act requires theestablishmentofajointinvestigationteam(JIT).Thistypeofinvestigationallowsvariousagencies—whetherlawenforcementorintelligence—toworktogether.Interrorismcases,eithertheprovincialpoliceor the federal government can initiate a JIT.Whenaprovince initiates a JIT, theprovincialgovernment takes the lead in selecting the team members. Due to the expertise of the SpecialInvestigationGroupoftheFederalInvestigationAgency(FIA),theFIAgenerallyassignssomeofitsofficersfromthatsectiontoJITs.

On December 28, the authorities of Punjab Province established a JIT, headed by AdditionalInspectorGeneral(AIG)AbdulMajeed.InadditiontopoliceofficialsfromPunjab,theinvestigativegroupincludedthreeseniormembersoftheFIA,includinganexplosivesexpert,aseniorCriminalInvestigationDepartmentpoliceofficerattherankofdeputyinspectorgeneral,anexpertonforensicphotography,andninemiddle-rankedpoliceofficers.Atthetimethejointinvestigationteamwassetup,Majeedwasoutofthecountry,soforthefirstthreedays,theJITwasledbythenextmostseniorpoliceofficerontheteam.

OntheeveningofDecember28,membersofthegroupwenttoPoliceLines—anadministrativecenterof theRawalpindiDistrictPolice that includesbarracksandother facilities—where theymetpolicechiefSaudAziz.Insteadofproceedingdirectlytothecrimesite,SaudAzizservedteafortheinvestigators in a conference room.While the JITmemberswere still in the conference room, thetelevisionairedthepressconferencegivenbyBrigadierCheema.ThepolicechiefrhetoricallyaskedtheJITmemberswhattheyintendedtoinvestigate,sincetheperpetratorhadbeenalreadyidentifiedbythegovernment.WhentheJITmemberspressedhimtovisit thecrimescene,SaudAzizrespondedthatsinceitwasalreadydark,hewouldarrangeforavisittothescenethenextmorning.

Thefollowingday, the investigators returned toPoliceLines,where theywereable toexamineBhutto’svehicle.TheysoondiscoveredthattherewasnobloodortissueontheescapehatchleverthatwouldbeconsistentwiththegapinginjurytoBhutto’shead,suggestingstronglythatshehadnothitherheadonthelever.

Following that inspection, rather than taking the investigators directly to the crime scene,CPOSaud Aziz hosted a luncheon that extended into the late afternoon, at the end of which he againsuggestedthatitwouldbedarkbythetimetheteamarrivedatthecrimescene.Itwasonlyataround5:00 p.m. that the JIT investigators were taken to the crime scene at Liaquat Bagh. In short, theinvestigatorswerenotabletoconducton-siteinvestigationsuntiltwofulldaysaftertheassassination.Onceatthescene,afterAziz’sdelayingtactics,theinvestigatorsrealizedthatithadbeenhoseddown.

Ontheeveningofthetwenty-seventh,SaudAzizhadleftthecrimesceneforRawalpindiGeneralHospital, butDeputyPoliceChiefKhurramShahzad, themost seniorRawalpindi policeofficial inchargeatthecrimescene,continuedtotakeinstructionsfromAzizbytelephone.Despitethefactthatthecrimescenewasnotimmediatelysealed,thepolicewereabletocollectsomeevidence.Officersfromseveralintelligenceagencieswerealsopresentandcollectedevidenceusing,asoneRawalpindipoliceofficertoldus,betterevidence-collectionequipmentthanthepolice.Withinonehourandforty

minutes of the blast, however, Khurram ordered the fire and rescue officials present to wash thecrime scene down with fire hoses. He told the commission that the police had collected all theavailable evidence by then. Police records show that only twenty-three pieces of evidence werecollected, in a case where one would normally have expected thousands. The evidence includedmostlyhumanbodyparts,twopistols,spentcartridges,andBhutto’sdamagedvehicle.

KhurramandotherseniorRawalpindipoliceofficersjustifiedhosingdownthecrimesceneasanecessary “crowd control measure.” They claimed that PPP supporters at the scene were highlyagitatedwhentheylearnedthatBenazirhaddiedandthatsomeofthemcouldhavebecomedisruptive.ThepolicemenaddedthatBhuttosupportersweresmearingbloodonthemselvesandthat,therefore,the police needed to wash away the blood as a public order measure. But after being furtherinterrogated by us, Khurram admitted that he saw only one person involved in such desperatebehavior.

Evenpoliceofficials familiarwith the casedisputed the assertion that therewas apublicorderprobleminRawalpindi.Theyfurtherdisagreedthatthepresenceofanunrulycrowdwouldpreventtheestablishmentofpolicebarricadesaroundthecrimesceneandjustifyhosingitdown.Infact,atRawalpindiGeneralHospital,wheremany grieving PPP supporters later gathered, the disturbancewasminimal.

Beforeissuingtheordertohosedownthescene,Khurramcalledhissuperior,SaudAziz,toseekpermission, which was granted. Sources, including police officials familiar with the case, havedoubtedKhurram’sclaimthatthehosingwashisdecision.InPakistan,power-politicsconsiderationscondition all public institutions, evenmore sowhen there is a high-profile political case,makingpoliceofficersparticularlysensitivetosuperiororders.

Police officials declared that hosing down a crime scene is extraordinarily and fundamentallyinconsistentwithPakistanipolicepractice.WiththeexceptionofsomeRawalpindipolicemen,nearlyall seniorPakistanipoliceofficialswe interviewedcriticized themanner inwhich thiscrimescenewasmanaged.Oneseniorpolicemantoldusthathosingdownthecrimesceneamountedto“criminalnegligence.”

IamconvincedthatPoliceChiefSaudAzizdidnotactindependentlyindecidingtohosedownthecrimescene.Onesource, speakingon thebasisofanonymity, toldus thatAzizhad receivedacallfromthearmyheadquartersinstructinghimtoorderthecleanupofthecrimescene.Anothersource,alsospeakingonthebasisofanonymity,saidthatAzizwasorderedtohosedownthescenebyMajorGeneralNadeem IjazAhmed, then director general of theMI. In this case, as onmany occasionsduring the commission’s inquiry, individuals, including government officials, expressed fear orhesitation to speak openly aboutwho could have ordered the hosing down of the scene. The onlyprecedentsforhosingdownacrimesceneinvolvedmilitarytargets.Somepoliceofficialssawthisasfurtherindicationthatthemilitarywasinvolved.

ThecontroversysurroundingthewashingdownofthecrimescenewassointensethatthechiefministerofPunjabsetupacommitteeofinquiry,composedofthreeseniorPunjabofficials,tolookinto thematter.ThePunjab committee possessed a limitedmandate: inquire into the circumstancesleadingtothewashingdownofthescene,determinewhetheritwasdoneinbadfaith,anddeterminewhetheritposedanydifficultyinreachingaconclusiononthecauseofdeath.

The committee started its investigation onFebruary 14, 2008, and concluded itswork the verynextday.ItacceptedtheRawalpindipoliceexplanationthatthedecisiontowashthecrimescenewasimplemented byKhurram, the police officer at the scene,with permission fromSaudAziz on thegroundsofpublicorder.Itfurtherfoundthatthedecisionwasnotmadeinbadfaithandthathosing

downthecrimescenedidnotnegativelyaffecttheconclusionastothecauseofdeath.The Punjab committee investigation was clearly a whitewash of the actions of the Rawalpindi

policeinfailingtomanagethecrimesceneanddestroyingevidence.Beyondthehosingdownofthecrimescene,thereweremoreseriousquestionsregardingthepreservationofevidence.

Bhutto’s Land Cruiser was initially taken to the city police station after midnight early onDecember28and then taken toPoliceLines. In theearlyhoursofDecember28,PoliceChiefAzizwenttoPoliceLines,togetherwiththeISIofficerswhohadfirstconductedaforensicexaminationofthevehicle.An investigatingpoliceofficer,on theordersofSaudAziz, removedBenazirBhutto’sshoesandtookthembackto thecitypolicestation.Sometimelater,anorderwentout toreturn theshoes to the car. Evidently, such actions interfered with the integrity of the evidence. The samepolicemanwhowasorderedtoremovetheshoesfromthevehicletestifiedthathesawbrainmatteronawindowandon thecar ’sseat.Moreover,while thevehiclewasparkedatPoliceLines, itwasnotproperlypreserved.ThecommissionwastoldthatduringavisitbysomeJITmembers,peoplewerecleaningtheLandCruiser,eventhoughinvestigationswerestillongoing.Whentheinvestigativeteamcarriedoutitsphysicalexaminationofthevehicle,theydidnotfindanyhair,blood,orothermatteronthelipoftheescapehatch.ForensicanalysesofswabsofthelipoftheescapehatchlatercarriedoutbytheJITandScotlandYardalsofoundnothing.Suchinterferencewouldnaturallyhavedamagedanyevidencepresent.

Oncetheinvestigatorsarrivedatthescene,theyreadilysawthatithadbeenhoseddown.Despitethelatehouroftheirarrival,theyspentsevenhoursthere.Theyfollowedthewatercurrent,wadingthroughthedrainagesewerandcollectingevidencefromthedebris.Theywereabletorecoveronebullet casing from thedrainagesewer, laterestablished through forensicexamination tohavebeenfiredfromthepistolbearingthebomber ’sDNA.Thedetectivesleftthescenearoundmidnight.TheRawalpindipoliceprovidedsecurityforthem,cordoningofftheroadwhiletheywerethere.Thenextday, the teamreturned tocontinue the search.Upon their request, the scene remainedcordonedoffand the road closed. They eventually recovered other evidence in the course of their crime sceneexamination,includingapieceofthesuicidebomber ’sskullfromatoponeofthebuildingsnearthesite.

OnDecember31,InspectorGeneralMajeedresumedthecommandoftheJIT.Thischangeshiftedthe internal dynamics of the investigating team.Majeed sidelined the senior andmore experiencedofficerswhohadstartedtheinvestigationanddealtdirectlywiththemost juniorinvestigators.TwoseniorofficersinvitedtojointheJITfromtheSindhpolicedecidedtoreturntotheirprovinceafteronlytwodaysunderthenewleadership.MuchoftheworkcarriedoutbytheJITfromthispointonwas shaped by information Majeed received from the intelligence agencies, which retained solecontroloverthesharingofinformationwiththepolice,providingitonaselectivebasis.

It ismy belief that the police deliberately botched the investigation intoBhutto’s assassination.Some police officials did not execute their professional duties as vigorously as they should have,perhaps fearing the involvement in the crime of powerful actors or intelligence agents. At aminimum, theRawalpindipolice, aswell as thePunjabadministrationand the federalgovernment,failedtotakethenecessarymeasurestoprotecttheformerprimeminister,thoughknowingthatshefacedfreshandurgentsecurityrisks.

ONACLOUDYLondondayat thebeginningofSeptember2009,my fellowcommissionersand Iwalked into the ScotlandYard headquarters building for a full day ofmeetings.Wewere there toworkwith the detectiveswho had participated in a forensic inquiry shortly after Benazir Bhutto’s

assassination. The Musharraf government had been forced by an outraged public to agree to anoutside investigation to ascertain the cause of death. Musharraf and UK prime minister GordonBrowndecidedthata teamofforensicexpertsanddetectivesfromtheMetropolitanPoliceCounterTerrorism Command (SO15) would carry out a limited inquiry to assist the Pakistani policeinvestigationintoBhutto’sassassination.

TheteamofScotlandYardexpertsandinvestigatorsarrivedinPakistanonJanuary4,2008,andspenttwoandahalfweekscarryingouttheirinvestigation.Theteamconcludedthatalthoughitwasnot possible to “categorically . . . exclude the possibility of there being a gunshotwound . . . theavailableevidencesuggested therewasnogunshot injury.”3TheLondonmetropolitanpolice teamalsofoundthatBenazirBhuttohaddiedofasevereheadinjurycausedbyimpactontheescapehatchlipasadirect resultof theblastand that thesame individualboth fired theshotsanddetonated theexplosives.GiventhenarrowfocusoftheScotlandYardinquiry,suchaconclusionwasunsurprising.Dr.NathanielCary,thepathologistappointedbyScotlandYard,confirmedthattheforceoftheblastcausedBhutto’sfatalinjuryandthatsaidinjurywasindeedaresultofstrikingherheadonthelipoftheescapehatchopeningratherthanonthelatch,asannouncedbytheMinistryoftheInteriorinthepressconferenceonDecember28,2007.

OurcommissionaskedtheNetherlandsForensicInstitute(NFI) toconductareviewofScotlandYard’sinvestigationofthecauseandmannerofBhutto’sdeath.TheNFIanalyzedtheScotlandYardreportandconcludedthattherewerenosignificantinconsistenciesinitsinvestigation.

The scientific analysis of the suicide bomber ’s remains—graphic pictures ofwhichwe saw atScotlandYard—establishedthathewasateenagemale,youngerthansixteenyearsofage.AccordingtothePakistaniinvestigations,thisyoungmanwasnamedBilal—andalsoknownasSaeed—andwasfromSouthWaziristan.Butbeyondtheactualidentityofthesuicidebomber,greatmysteryremainedabouthisbackgroundandwhomhewasworkingfor.

According to theMusharraf government,Bilal had acted on the orders ofBaitullahMehsud, aTalibancommander fromSouthWaziristan4andveteranof theanti-Soviet jihadof the1980s.Thisassertion, that BaitullahMehsudwas behind the assassination ofBenazir Bhutto,was premature atbest.Suchahastyannouncementprejudicedthepoliceinvestigations,whichhadnotyetbegunatthetimeofthepressconferenceinwhichMehsudwasnamedthemastermindoftheattack.

The communication intercepted by the ISI implicating Mehsud is purported to have been atelephoneconversationbetweenEmirSahib(saidtobeBaitullahMehsud)andMaulviSahib.Init,thetwo speakers congratulate each other on an event that government spokesman Brigadier Cheemaassertedwastheassassination.MembersoftheISIstatedthattheyalreadyhadthevoicesignatureofBaitullahMehsudandwereinapositiontoidentifyhisvoiceontheintercept.TheconversationdidnotmentionBhuttobyname.Thecommissiondidnothaveaccess to theactual recording—onlyatranscriptofit—andcouldnotevaluatetheauthenticityofthepurportedintercept.

ItisnotclearhoworwhentheinterceptfromtheISIwasrecorded.AformerseniorISIofficialtoldourcommissionthattheISIhadbeentrackingBaitullahMehsud’scommunicationscloselyandwas, therefore,poised to intercept thecall.Healsoasserted that the ISIhadbeen trackingTaliban-linkedterroristcellsthatwerecloselypursuingBhutto,targetingherataseriesofsuccessivepublicgatherings.AccordingtothisISIofficial,itwasoneofthesecellsthatexecutedtheassassinationofBenazirBhuttoinRawalpindi.

The original JIT constituted on December 28 under the Anti-terrorism Act to look into theassassinationarrestedfiveindividuals:AitzazShah,SherZaman,HusnainGul,MuhammadRafaqat,

andRasheedAhmed.Inaddition,theJITchargedNasrullahAbdullah,BaitullahMehsud,andMaulviSahibas“proclaimedoffenders.”5

The accused were alleged to have served as handlers and logistics supporters of the suicidebomber,oraspersonswhowereknowledgeableabouttheplanstoassassinateBhuttobuthadfailedtoreport such plans to the police. The charges against them included aiding and abetting terrorism,murder,andconcealinginformationaboutthecommissionofacrime.

Investigations focusedon thealleged roleof these low-level individuals.Little tono focuswasplaced on investigating those further up the hierarchy in the planning and execution of theassassination.Surprisingly,theJITdidnothingtobuildacaseagainstMehsud,treatingthecontentsoftheinterceptpresentedpubliclybyBrigadierCheemaasdeterminativeofhisculpability.

The media reported that Baitullah Mehsud denied responsibility for the assassination. SenatorSaleh Shah Qureshi from South Waziristan told our commission that Mehsud had categoricallydenied any involvement in the Karachi assassination attempt of October 18 and the subsequentassassination of Bhutto on December 27, throwing into question the authenticity of the telephoneintercept.TheJITtooknostepstoinvestigatetheveracityofanysuchdenial.Rather,someMusharrafgovernment officials simply asserted that such denials coming from a terrorist could have nocredibility. Interestingly, specialized observers told our commission that at the time, the PakistaniTalibanhadnotdemonstratedthecapacitytoperpetrateanoperationoutsidethetribalareas,suchastheonethatcostthelifeofBenazirBhutto.

BaitullahMehsudand thePakistaniTalibanwere,undoubtedly, a clear threat toBenazirBhutto.JustbeforeherreturntoPakistaninOctober2007,anewsarticlestatedthatMehsudhadthreatenedtowelcomeBhuttowithawaveof suicidebombers.6The report identifiedSenatorSalehShahas thesource, but he denied the news version emphatically. On December 29, 2007, Mehsud, through aspokesmaninSouthWaziristan,deniedhisinvolvementinBenazir ’sassassination:“NeitherBaitullahMehsud nor any of his associateswere involved . . . because raising your hand againstwomen isagainstourtribalvaluesandcustoms.Onlythosepeoplewhostoodtogainpoliticallyareinvolved...Itisaconspiracybygovernment,militaryandintelligenceagencies,”7saidMehsud’sspokesman.

However, Baitullah Mehsud had more than a reasonable motive for killing Bhutto. He wasconvincedthatBenazir ’simpendingreturntoPakistanwaspartofapower-sharingdealwithGeneralMusharrafthatwouldstrengthenthealready-solidpro-AmericanismofthePakistanigovernmentandthusunderminethePakistaniTaliban’spowerinSouthWaziristan.MehsudwasalsocertainthathersecularismandmoderationwouldhinderthePakistaniTaliban’sabilitytospreadIslamicradicalism,asidefromthefactshewasawomanandconsideredaShia.

ThePakistaniTaliban is an agglomerationofPashtunmilitant Islamist groups operating in thetribal areas.Theyare closelyalignedwith theAfghanTalibanandwithAl-Qaida.Severalof thesegroups banded together in late 2007 to form the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) under BaitullahMehsud’s leadership.Baitullah’s growingpowerwas so significant that theMusharraf governmentsignedapeacedealwithhiminFebruary2005,whichhedeclarednullinAugust2007.InMarch2009theUSgovernmentoffereda$5millionrewardforinformationonMehsud,describedasakeyAl-Qaidafacilitator.8

Al-Qaida claimed responsibility for the murder of Benazir Bhutto through a statement bycommanderAbual-Yazid,whostated thatAl-Qaida’ssecond-in-command,Aymanal-Zawahiri,hadordered the killing. “We terminated themost preciousAmerican assetwhich vowed to defeat [the]mujahedeen,”9 declared al-Yazid, a claim he repeated by phone to the online publication Asia

Times.10During a conversation on February 24, 2010, then prime minister Gilani told my colleague

commissionersandmeaboutameetinghehadwithPresidentGeorgeW.BushattheWhiteHouseinmid-2008,wherethesubjectofBhutto’smurderwasaddressed.

“As soon as I entered the Oval Office,” said Gilani, “Bush shot, ‘How come you are lettingBaitullah Mehsud be interviewed on Pakistani TV? Don’t you know that he’s the one who killedBenazirBhutto?’”

“Thenwhyhaven’tyoutakenhimoutwithyourdrones?”Gilaniresponded.Indeed,theUSgovernmentseemedtobelievethatMehsudwasresponsible.Thendirectorofthe

USCIAMichaelHaydenadvancedinaWashingtonPost interviewonJanuary18,2008, thatBhuttohad been killed by fighters allied with Baitullah Mehsud, with support from Al-Qaida’s terroristnetwork.11TheUSgovernmentdidnotpermitourcommissiontomeetwithUSintelligenceofficialstoascertainthebasisforHayden’sassertion.Inanycase,BushandtheUSmilitaryhadtheireyeonMehsud. In September 2009, a US Predator drone strike killed Mehsud and his wife in SouthWaziristan.

BENAZIRBHUTTOKNEWtherewerepotentialassassinswaitingforher,butshedidnotsuspectjustonesinglefigureorgroup.BaitullahMehsud’sPakistaniTalibanwasnotthesoleradicalgroupthathadamotivetokillher.ShehadreceivedinformationbeforeherreturntoPakistanonOctober18,2007,thattherewerethreeothersuicidebombersquadsinadditiontoMehsud’sthatwouldattempttokillher:asquadlinkedtoHamzabinLaden,asonofOsamabinLaden;onemadeupofRedMosquemilitants; and another from a Karachi-based militant group. But she was convinced that theseterroristswouldnotactalone.Shefearedthemilitantscouldbeactivatedbytheirhandlers,highupinthe structures of Pakistani power—specifically by militant sympathizers within the Musharrafgovernment.

ThevariousjihadiorganizationsinPakistanareSunnigroupsbasedlargelyinPunjab.MembersofthesegroupsaidedtheTalibaneffortinAfghanistanatthebehestoftheISIandlatercultivatedtieswithAl-QaidaandPakistaniTalibangroups.AcommoncharacteristicofthesejihadigroupsistheiradherencetotheDeobandiSunnisectofIslamandtheirstronganti-Shiabias.

TheLashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), orArmyof theRighteous, has become, in the opinion of experts,more dangerous than Al-Qaida.12 Despite the fact that the LeT, its charitable front organizationJamaat-ud-Dawa, and its main leaders have been included on a sanctions list by the UN SecurityCouncil,thegroupoperatesrelativelyfreelyinPakistan.

AlsooperatinginPakistanisthecrimefamilyknownasthe“Haqqaninetwork,”AfghanmembersoftheZadrantribebasedinthetownofMiranshahinPakistan’stribalarea,wheretheyhavesetupaminiempirewithfrontcompaniesthroughoutPakistan.RaisingmoneyfromwealthydonorsinGulfStates, in addition to extortion, smuggling, andkidnappings, thenetworkof about fifteen thousandfightersisledbyformermujahideencommanderJalaluddinHaqqaniandhistwosonsBadruddinandSirajuddin,bothconsideredmorecommittedIslamiststhantheirfather.13

TheHaqqanisareclosetotheISI,whichconsidersthemstrategicalliesinanyeventualwarwithIndia,Pakistan’slong-termandprincipalfoe.TheISIhasrecognizedtiestotheHaqqanisbutspecifiesthat thenetworkhas threecomponentsand that theISIdoesnotmaintaincontactswith the“militantwing.”14TheHaqqanisenjoyfreedomofmovementinPakistanandhavebeenspottedinplainsightatdifferentpublicevents.Butbeyondthefact that theyareanassetof the intelligenceagencies, the

Haqqanis have their own agenda, have close ties toAl-Qaida, and support thePakistaniTaliban intheirconfrontationwiththePakistanimilitary.

In September 2012, after much reflection, Washington designated the Haqqani network as aterrorist organization to impose sanctions on the group and its material supporters. Meanwhile,several individuals in the network had already been designated as terrorists, and more than fiftymembers of the Haqqani extended family, including one of Jalaluddin’s sons, had been killed byAmericandronestrikes.Ironically,inthe’80s,theHaqqaniswereUSalliesintheanti-SovietwarinAfghanistan.ThefamousUScongressmanCharlieWilson,whomadethemujahideenhiscause,evencalledtheelderHaqqani“goodnesspersonified.”15

Giventhisbackground,itisnotsurprisingthatsuchradicalgroupsposedarealthreattoBenazirBhutto.Bhuttowas not only amodern politician and the leader of amajor secular party; she alsorejectedtheextremistversionofIslamespousedbythesegroups.Inaddition,shewassupportiveofthepriorityplacedbyWashingtononthefightagainstterrorism,anditwaspublicknowledgethattheUnitedKingdomand theUnitedStateswereaidingher return toPakistan.AndnotwithstandingherdifferenceswithGeneralMusharraf,shehadsupportedhiscrackdownonmilitants,despiterepeatedlycastigatingMusharraffordoingahalfheartedjobontheterrorfrontandforseekingdealswiththeTaliban.“GeneralMusharraf’steamhasreliedontheprinciplethattocatchathiefyousendathief,”she toldaveteran journalist.16Bhutto’sgenderwasalsoan issue for the religiousextremists,whobelievedthatawomanshouldnotleadanIslamiccountry.Lastly,somemilitantsperceivedherasaShiabecausehermotherandhusbandareShia.ButthreatstoBhuttocamefromsourceswellbeyondBaitullahMehsudandthemilitantgroupsthatwantedtoseeherdead.Benazirdeeplydistrusted,andevenfeared,theso-calledEstablishment.

“THEESTABLISHMENT”isthetermusedinPakistantorefertothosewhoexercisedefactopower:thepowersthatbe.Itincludesthemilitaryhighcommandandtheintelligenceagencies,togetherwiththe top leadershipofcertainpoliticalparties,high-levelmembersof thebureaucracy,andbusinessindividualswhoarealliedwith them.Themilitaryhighcommandandintelligenceagenciesare thecoreandmostinfluentialcomponentsoftheEstablishment.

Through her writing and public statements, Bhutto had denounced key elements of theEstablishment,whosetacticsandreachsheknewwell.She,andmanyothers,heldthemilitaryandtheintelligence agencies responsible for a numberof “dirty” campaigns against herwhen she ran foroffice in the 1980s and 1990s, as well as for orchestrating the sacking of her governments. Shebelieved that the policies she stood for—a return to civilian rule and democracy, human rights,greater oversight on the nuclear program, negotiations with India, reconciliation with the non-Muslimworld,andconfrontationwithradicalIslamists—threatenedtheEstablishment’scontroloverPakistan.

Benazir ’sandherparty’smanifestofor2007calledforrestrictionsonthepowerofthemilitaryand intelligence agencies. She proposed bringing them under civilian, democratic oversight, withprovisionsfortransparencyandcontrolofthemilitarybudgetandspending.Shevowedpubliclytousereformstoridtheintelligenceagenciesofelementsdrivenbypoliticalorreligiousmotives.

Establishment actors threatened by her return to an active political life in Pakistan included, inparticular, thosewhomaintainsympatheticlinkswithradicalIslamists,especiallythemilitant jihadiandTalibangroups.TheISIcultivatedtheserelationships,initiallywithinthecontextoftheColdWarandtheanti-SovietwarinAfghanistaninthe1980sandlaterinsupportofKashmiriinsurgents.Afterthe Karachi bomb attack in October 2007, Benazir suggested a “larger conspiracy” involving

“elementsfromwithinthePakistaniintelligenceservice”17thathadcreatedandnurturedtheTalibanandthehigh-levelindividualsdispleasedwithherreturn.TwoEstablishmentfiguresthatparticularlyconcernedherwereLieutenantGeneral(ret.)HamidGulandBrigadier(ret.)IjazShah.ShewentsofarastonameGulandShahoutrightinherOctober16lettertoGeneralMusharraf.

Gulwasdirectorgeneralof theMIunderZiaul-Haqand thendirectorgeneralof the ISIwhenBenazir was prime minister in 1988–1990. Although he was retired, Bhutto believed he stillmaintainedactivetieswiththejihadists.Gul,portrayedbyananalystasa“loudlyreligiousman...whousedtodrinkinmoderation,”18refusedtobeinterviewedbyourcommission.WhenaskedbyanAustralianreporterabout theallegationsregardinghis involvement inaconspiracyagainstBhutto,Guldeflectedblame—atypicalploybyintelligenceagents—pointingtotheUnitedStates:“OnethingIdoknowisthat[Bhutto]brokethepledgeshemadetotheAmericans.I’veheardthataspartoftheAmerican annoyance with her Cheney withdrew an agreement to provide her with 25 Blackwaterpeopletoprotecther,”19Guldeclared.

BrigadierIjazShah,directorgeneraloftheIBin2007andaformerISIofficer,wasamemberofGeneralMusharraf’sinnercircle.WhenOmarSaeedSheikh,theprincipalindividualaccusedintheDanielPearlmurdercase,wascorneredin2002,herequestedtosurrendertoBrigadierShah.SomebelievethiswasbecauseofBrigadierShah’sreportedintelligenceconnectionswithSheikh.BrigadierShahvigorouslydeniedthisandtoldthecommissionthatthesurrenderwasfacilitatedthroughfamilytiesintheirhomecommunity.In2007conservativeUScolumnistRobertNovakcalledShahthemanwhohad“orchestratedfortwoyearstheeffortstokeepBhuttoout[ofPakistan].”20

MilitantsofparticularconcerntoBhuttoincludedQariSaifullahAkhtar,oneof thefoundersofthe extremist Harakat-ul Jihad Islami (HUJI), whom she accused of involvement in a failed coupattemptagainstherin1995,duringhersecondterm.Akhtar,whowaslivinginPakistanwhenBhuttoreturned from exile, was reportedly one of the ISI’s main contacts with the Taliban regime inAfghanistan and is believed to have cultivated ties with Osama bin Laden. Benazir believed thatAkhtarwasconnectedtotheKarachiattackagainstherinOctober2007.

Akhtar had joined hands with Major General Zaheer ul-Islam Abbasi, a former intelligenceofficer,notonlyinanattemptedcoupagainstBenazirBhuttoin1995butalsoinanattempttoremovethe army leadership.AfterAkhtar spent fivemonths in jail, hewas released fromdetention.Yearslater,arrestedintheUnitedArabEmiratesforplottingtomurderMusharraf,hewashandedovertoPakistan;butafterbeingheldinjailforacoupleofyears,hewasquietlyreleasedbythegovernmentaftertheSupremeCourtinquiredastohiswhereabouts.Arrestedagainin2008afterBenazirBhutto’smurderand theposthumouspublicationofherbookReconciliation, inwhich she identifiedhimasone of the individuals she feared, Akhtar was held only briefly and then let go without charge.Interestingly,theofficialJITreportontheKarachiterroristattackagainstBenazirmentionsAkhtar ’strajectory, but details of his activities stop in August 2007, before the attacks in Karachi and inRawalpindi, only resuming in January 2008, after Bhutto’s assassination—someone had actuallydoctoredthereport.Itwasapoorlyexecutedforgery,astheeditedpageisinonefontandtherestinanother.InAugust2010,injuredinadroneattack,Akhtarwasarrested,giventreatmentinPeshawar,movedtoLahore,andfreed.PunjabhomeministerRanaSanaullah,theauthoritywhofreedAkhtar,declaredthatQariSaifullahAkhtarcouldnotbeconsideredaterrorist.21

But itwasn’t themilitants thatconcernedBhuttosomuchas theirnetworksofconnectionswithsomeauthoritiesandtheintelligenceagencies.Sheandmanyothersbelievedthattheauthoritiescouldactivate these connections to harm her. Benazir had noted that although Baitullah Mehsud had

threatened tosendsuicidebombersagainsther, therealdanger tohercamefromextremistswithinPakistan’s military establishment. “I’m worried about the threat within the government,” she haddeclared in anOctober 2007 interviewwithTheGuardian. “People likeBaitullahMehsud are justpawns.”22

A MAJOR SOURCE of suspicion was the Pakistani intelligence agency. The ISI is no ordinaryintelligenceservice.Beyondtheusualdutiesofgatheringinformationandconductingoperationsfornational securityobjectives, the ISI throughout thehistoryofPakistanhas formedpoliticalparties,madepaymentsforpoliticalcampaigns,riggedelections,andregularlyinterferedinnationalpolitics,contributingtothedismissalofdemocraticgovernments.Oftentimes,theISIhasbeencriticizedforundertakingtasksthatthepoliceshouldbeperforming.

Experts affirm that most ISI military officers would rather conduct intelligence gathering andnational security projects than get involved in politics. Many professional military officers alsoprefertocommandtroopsratherthanserveintheISI.Despitethedistancethatsomemilitaryofficerskeep from the ISI, the agency follows the army line of high command and is headed by a seniorgeneral; additionally, amajority of its officers are seconded regulars. The army, in turn, is a keyinstitutionof thePakistanistatedrivenbyan ideologyofnationalism,anethosofservice,honesty,anddiscipline.23Partof theproblemis that repeatedly,Pakistanigovernments,whetherdemocraticornot,havetendedtomanipulateandpoliticizetheintelligenceagencies.24ButthebottomlineisthatPakistanhassufferedfromanimbalancebetweenmilitaryandcivilianpower.

TheISIcommandsrespectandfearamongPakistanisandforeignersfamiliarwithPakistan.TheISI has a “cell” devoted to domestic affairs that maintains a database and gathers intelligence onindividuals that could be considered dangerous to national security. According to an ISI source,Benazir ’s movements were closely monitored by the ISI and her “residences and offices werebugged.”25LieutenantGeneral(ret.)AsadDurrani,inanarticleentitled“ISI:AnExceptionalSecretService,” concurredwith the view that the ISI is considered by some experts to be the “best of itskind.”26But evenDurrani, a former ISI director general, conceded that one of the ISI’s principal“ailments”is“itsbeingpredominantlyamilitaryorganization,”given“theArmy’sexceptionalroleinPakistanipolitics.”27

When the Bhutto commission requested to interview the head of the ISI, Lieutenant GeneralAhmedShujaPasha,andarmychiefGeneralAshfaqParvezKayani,weweregivenarobust“No.”Infact, although our request had been made confidentially, Rehman Malik, minister of the interior,responded publicly thatwewould “not be allowed access to themilitary officials or [intelligence]agency.”28 Pakistanimedia reported thatMinisterMalik had affirmed that the Pakistani army had“nothingtodowiththeBenazirassassinationcase.”29

WelladvisedbyafriendlyPakistaniofficial,IwrotedirectlytoGeneralKayani.AfteranumberofinformalconversationsinwhichIconveyedthewarningthatthecommissionerswouldnotreturnto Pakistan if we were not given access to the ISI director general and the army chief, we weregrantedtheinterviewsrequested.

On the morning of February 24, 2010, we were conducted under heavy security to the well-guardedbuildingoftheISIinIslamabad.Wewaitedforquitesometimebeforebeinggiventhegreenlight to pass each security checkpoint leading to the entrance of the building, a grand hall thatremindedvisitorsofthepowerhousedinside.

GeneralPasha,theheadoftheISIatthetime,isashort,stocky,pleasant,andsophisticatedmanwhoreceiveduswithcordialitybecause—asheaffirmed—hewasfollowingorders fromthearmychief. Pasha expressed that the ISI is “better than any rival.” He clarified that the ISI “is not aninvestigating agency” and that any investigative work it does aims at collecting or corroboratinginformation.InthecaseofBenazir ’sassassination,Pashaadmitted,theISIdidprovideinformationtotheJIT.“Ourboysareverygoodatcertainthings,”GeneralPashaobservedwithundisguisedpride.HeaddedthattheISIhadpassedinformationregardingthreatsdirectlytoBenazirandtheMinistryoftheInterior.

AformerintelligenceofficialtoldthecommissionthattheISIhadconducteditsowninvestigationof the Karachi attack and had successfully identified and detained four men who had providedlogistical support. None of the police or other civilian officials interviewed by the commissionregardingKarachireportedanyknowledgeofsuchdetentions.ThesamesourcetoldusthatISIagentscoveringBhutto’smeetinginLiaquatBaghonDecember27werethefirstonestosecurehervehicleandtakephotosofitaftertheblast,amongotheractions.

Members of the JITwho investigated Bhutto’s assassination admitted that virtually all of theirmostimportantinformation,includingthatwhichledtotheidentificationandarrestofthosesuspectsnowinprison,camefromintelligenceagencies.Moreover,resourcestobuildinvestigativecapacity,especially in terrorism cases, have gone to the intelligence agencies, while police resources andcapacitylag.Indeed,intheaftermathoftheattemptsonGeneralMusharraf’slife,thecapacityoftheISIwasstrengthenedtoallowittoengagemoreeffectivelyinsuchinvestigations.

TheheadoftheISIreiteratedaviewwehadheardoften:BenazirhadreturnedtoPakistanagainsteveryone’sadvice.Shewasatarget,GeneralPashastated,becausetheTaliban“believedshehadbeenbrought back by the Americans.” However, the ISI had no evidence that Baitullah Mehsud hadcommittedtheassassination.WithregardtoourquestionsabouttheroleoftheISIinpolitics,Pashawas less thancandidwhenheasserted that the“misconception”about the ISI’s influence inpoliticswas due to the fact that “in the past, political leadersmade extensive use of [the] ISI for politicaltasks.”Weallsmiledasheaffirmed:“TheISI isno longer involvedinpoliticalactivities.Thishaschangednow.”

ThemeetingwitharmychiefAshfaqParvezKayaniwasunusual.Heagreedtomeetwithmealoneas chairman of the Bhutto inquiry commission, at the Army House in Rawalpindi, at night onThursday,February25,withnoconvoyofsecurityvehiclesaccompanyingme.Ihadtorideinanon-bulletproofvanandwasallowedonlyonearmedUNpolicemanasanescort.Ineverknewwhosetthoseconditions,butIacceptedthem,overthestrongprotestofoursecurityteam.

GeneralKayaniisaserious-lookingmilitaryman,relativelytall,clean-shaven,withnaturaldarkcircles under his eyes. Born in Rawalpindi in 1952, he is known as a professional soldier of anindependentmind;hehadbeenelevatedtothetopmilitarypostafterservingasdirectorgeneraloftheISIfrom2004to2007,anunprecedentedmoveforanarmychief.Kayanihadbeennameddirectorgeneral of the ISI after leading a successful investigation on the perpetrators of an assassinationattempt againstMusharraf,whobecame impressedwith theyounggeneral then in chargeof theXCorps.Fromthenon,theISIstrengtheneditscriminalinvestigativecapacity.Interestingly,KayanihadservedasBenazirBhutto’sdeputymilitarysecretaryinthe1980s,afactthatmightpartlyexplainhispresenceduringthesecrettalksbetweenMusharrafandBhuttointheEmirates.

Following the traditionofhispredecessors,Kayanihasbeen involved inkeypoliticalepisodesfrom an institutional standpoint. In 2009 he personally interceded to persuadePresidentZardari toreinstateChiefSupremeCourtJusticeIftikharMuhammadChaudhry,firedin2007byMusharraf,and

toendfederalruleinPunjab,thusyieldingtooppositiondemandsandsolvingaloomingcrisis.30In2009Kayaniwas theonlyPakistaniwhomade it toTime’s2009 listof theworld’smost influentialpeople.31

Thegeneralreceivedmeinalargeandcomfortablesittingareainareceptionhallofhisarmyresidence. A discrete notetaker accompanied him.We beganwith small talk about the renovationsmadetothemansion.Hewasdressedincivilianclothesandchain-smokedcigarettes.Theinterviewgot off to a bad start when I asked about the negotiations preceding Benazir ’s return to Pakistan.“Whyareyouaskingmethis?”hesaid.Ibecameannoyedandrespondedthatthereasonwassimple:hehadbeenpresentduringtheconversationsbetweenMusharrafandBhuttowhileoccupyingthepostofISIchief.MyfeelingwasthatbothheandIcouldbewastingourtime.KayaninextexpressedtheviewthatBenazirshouldhavereturnedbytheendoftheyearaccordingtowhathadbeendiscussedwithMusharraf.Heassuredmetherehadbeen“adeal”thatinvolvedherbecomingprimeminister,Musharrafremainingaspresident,andalljudicialchargesagainstherbeingdropped.

GeneralKayani considered theperformanceof theRawalpindipolice after the assassinationofBenazirBhuttotohavebeen“amateur.”“If in24hoursyoudon’tcompletelysecurethescene, thenyoulosethethreadstosolveacase,”hesaid.IrecalledthatKayanihaddoneexactlythatinthesecondbombattackagainstMusharrafonDecember25,2003.

AlthoughtheTalibanhatedBenazir,KayaniindicatedthathewasnotsurethatBaitullahMehsudhadorganizedtheassassination.HebelievedtheMusharrafgovernment’spressconferencethathadidentifiedMehsudastheculpritandofferedthecauseofherdeaththedayfollowingthekillinghadbeen“premature.”“Itshouldnothavebeendone,”hesaid.Onecannotconcludeculpabilitysolelyonaphoneintercept,henoted,referringtoBrigadierCheema’spressconference.Interestingly,GeneralKayanispokefondlyofBenazirBhutto.“Shehadgrownasapolitician.Shehadmaturedpolitically,”hereflected,betweenthetimehehadservedinhergovernmentandthetimewhenhemetheragaininDubaiforthesecretBhutto-Musharrafconversations.

ItwasrainingwhenIlefttheArmyHouseinRawalpinditoreturntooursafehouseinIslamabad.Upon arrival, I transmitted the contents of my conversation with Kayani to my colleaguecommissionersandstaff.Tooursurprise,earlythenextmorningDawnnewspaperhadaheadlinethatread, “U.N. Probe Team Chief Meets Kayani.” The news report defined my conversation as “acourtesycall todiscusstheprogressmadeintheinvestigation,”citingagovernmentsource.32ThearticlealsorevealedthatwehadmetearlierwiththeheadoftheISI,GeneralPasha.Additionally,itstatedthatthesecurityestablishmenthadcontactedthegovernmenttoexpressitswillingnesstomeetthe commission, as it did not have “anything to hide,” and to avoid any perception of “non-cooperation.” Several other media outlets carried the story of our meeting with the ISI directorgeneralandthearmychief.

ThepublicexposureofthesemeetingsfedsuspicionsheldbysomeobserversofPakistanabouttheinvolvementoftheISI,oratleastofsomeretiredofficersorroguemembersoftheagency,intheassassinationofBenazir.Suchconjectureswerenotunfounded.SourceswithintheUnitedKingdom’sMI5 had told a newspaper that “factions within the Pakistan intelligence service might have beenbehindtheassassinationofthecountry’soppositionleaderBenazirBhutto.”33

Benazir hadmentioned toAfghan presidentHamidKarzai, when theymet themorning of herassassination, that she was “very concerned about the ISI and the role they were playing inunderminingher.”34ShortlybeforeherreturntoPakistanin2007,shehadalsotoldaseniorreporterthatthesecurityapparatusneededtobereformed:“Unlessthatisdone,itisgoingtobeverydifficult

forus todismantle the terroristnetworksand themilitantnetworks,and today theyarea threatnotonlytoothercountriesbuttotheunityandsurvivalofPakistan.”35Theformerprimeministerhadhad amajor run-inwith the ISI back in the late 1980swhen she attempted to take control of it byremovingGeneralHamidGulandreplacinghimwithretiredgeneralShamsurRahmanKallu.ThisbackfiredwhenthechiefofarmystafftransferredtheISI’sdutiestotheMI,thenheadedbyBrigadierAsadDurrani,GeneralGul’sdeputy.AfterBenazirwasdismissedasprimeministerinAugust1990,DurranibecamedirectorgeneraloftheISI.

Longunchallenged,theISIfacedaflurryofcourtactionsin2012.Onecourtcase,datingbackto1996, implicated the ISI in the distribution of $6.5 million throughMehran Bank to a right-wingpolitical alliance in an effort to defeat Bhutto, the incumbent, in the 1990 election. The so-calledMehrangate languished in the Pakistani courts for years until it was refloated by the SupremeCourt.36 Furthermore, after her second government was dismissed in November 1996, BenazirchargedthatOsamabinLadenhadcontributed$10milliontotheISItohelpintheoverthrowofherfirstgovernmentand that thearmyhad terminatedhersecondgovernment followingherpledge tocrackdownonterroristsandradicalIslamicgroups.

TheISIhascontinuedtoplayasignificantpoliticalrole in theyearsfollowingBenazir ’sdeath.After the bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul on July 7, 2008, which killed forty people,includingtheIndianmilitaryattaché,bothNewDelhiandWashingtonaccusedtheISIofcomplicity.AdmiralMullenandCIAdeputydirectorStephenKappestraveledtoIslamabadlessthanaweeklatertopresent evidencebeforeGeneralKayani that linked the ISIwith theTaliban forcesof JalaluddinHaqqani in theperpetratingof thebombing.TheCIAcutoffmost intelligencesharingwith theISI,demandingthattheISIbecleanedupandreformed.

AformermilitantcommanderrevealedinaninterviewinJuly2011thattheISIandthePakistanimilitary continue to cultivate and support radical groups. “There are two bodies running theseaffairs,”theformercommanderdeclared:“mullahsandretiredgenerals.”37Thechargethat theISIwasplaguedby“rogueelements”thatactivelybackedradicalIslamistsisnotanewone,accordingtoformerISIchiefAsadDurrani:“Twicethesevilificationcampaignsled,underAmericanpressure,tomajorpurgesofISI’srankandfile.”38

The pervasive presence of the ISI and other intelligence agencies in diverse spheres of life inPakistan, its historical associationwith Islamist groups that engage in violence, its involvement inpastelections inwhichit influencedoutcomes, itssystemicpracticeofunauthorizedwiretappingofnotonlysuspectedterroristsandothercriminalsbutalsopoliticians,journalists,socialactivists,andevengovernmentofficialsevidentlyhaveunderminedtheruleoflawanddistortedcivilian-militaryrelations.

These considerations have lent support to the suspicion in Pakistani society, and in theinternational community, that the ISI, in some shape or form, could have been involved in theassassinationofBenazirBhutto.

WEWILLPROBABLYneverknowwithfullcertaintywhokilledBenazirBhutto,whowasbehindtheplanningoftheassassination,orwhoorganizedandfundedtheexecutionofthemurder.Thelistofpeople and groups that considered Bhutto a hated enemy is long. There are pieces of themurderpuzzlebutpainfullyfewelementstoputthemalltogether.

SomeofthewildertheoriesimaginethatBhuttofamilymembers,includingherhusband,AsifAliZardari, or security aides, like Shashenshah, were the killers. But these persons were so close to

Bhuttothattheywouldhavehadnumerousandmuchmorepropitiousandlessuncertainoccasionstoperpetrate such hypothetical assassination.Zardariwas inDubai at the time of themurder; hewasunabletocontrolactionsatthesiteoftheattackandcouldnothavebeenresponsible,forexample,forordering thehosingdownof thecrimescene.Mostof thesehypotheseshavenobasis inevidence;somedonomorethannameindividualsbelievedtohavebenefitedinsomewayfromBhutto’sdeath.

No one believes that the sixteen-year-old suicide bomber who attacked Benazir in Rawalpindiactedalone.Theboywasthedirectperpetrator,butbehindhimtherewereorganizersandenablersoftheassassination.Al-QaidahadlongtargetedBenazirandwantedherdead;butitwouldn’thaveactedwithoutPakistanisupport.ItseemshighlyplausibletomethatthePakistaniTaliban,includingoneofitstopleaders,BaitullahMehsud,wasamongtheplotters.TheyhatedBenazirforthemerefactthatshewasawomaninpolitics,andtheydespisedherforherdemocraticvalues,forheroppositiontoterrorism,forher“modernWestern”upbringingandviews,and, in theeyesof themoresectarian,forsupposedlybeingaShialikeherIranianmother.

Butbeyondthesecleardirectculpritsandsuspects,therearetoomanylooseends.Severalhigh-ranking police officers were at least criminally negligent and their irresponsible behavior seemsattributable to forces above them. It is possible that some rogue elements or fringe agents of theintelligencecommunitymayhavebeeninvolvedorhaveprovidedlogisticalsupporttotheassassins,butthereisnoproof.

AlthoughinherlettersenttoGeneralMusharrafonOctober16,2007,Benaziridentifiedpeoplewhomsheconsideredathreattohersecurity(formerISIdirectorgeneralHamidGul;theheadoftheIB retiredBrigadier Ijaz Shah; and the then chiefminister of Punjab Province Pervaiz Elahi, plusformerSindhchiefministerArbabGhulamRahim,namedlater—allofwhomclearlywantedheroutofthepoliticallandscape),theUNcommissiondidnotuncoverevidencelinkingthemunequivocallytohermurder.However,thepoliceneverinterrogatedtheindividualsmentionedinBenazir ’sletter,norwere the individuals invited tomeetwith the investigators on a voluntary basis.One of them,Hamid Gul, told a reporter that he was rather surprised that the investigators had not questionedhim.39

Alas, there is no “smoking gun.”Thereweremany individuals and organizations interested inseeingBenazireliminated.BhuttohademergedasathreatforGeneralMusharrafasshereturnedtoPakistantochallengehisholdonpower,makingaccusationsaboutelectionriggingandcampaigningindefianceofmartial law.Bhuttohadsentane-mail tojournalistWolfBlitzer—throughherfriendMarkSiegel—thatwas tobe releasedonly if shewerekilled,whichaffirmed that shewould“holdMusharraf responsible” for her death because she had been “made to feel insecure by his[Musharraf’s]minions.”40

ThereisevidencethatMusharrafwasincreasinglyangryatBenazirforcriticizinghisregimesoseverelyafterhavingengagedinnegotiationstosecureadealwithhim.Inaninterviewgivenonlydaysbeforeherdeath,MusharrafevidencedhisacrimonytowardBhutto,complainingthat,althoughthere were “many things” he had negotiated with her, those agreements “[had] been violated.”Seeming to resent the US and UK pressure to accept Benazir as an ally, Musharraf stated withundisguisedsarcasm:“ItappearsintheWestthatifapersonspeaksgoodEnglish,it’sverygood.Apersonwhodoesn’tknowgoodEnglishisquiteunpopularintheWest.Andifheorshehappenstobegood-looking,thenit’sbetter.”41SomeinMusharraf’sregimemayhavefelt thatBenazirnotonlyhad renegedonherpromisesbutalsowouldcause trouble, threaten theirholdonpower,andevenaffectthe“nationalinterest.”Butthisdoesnotconstituteproofofculpability.

GeneralMusharraf certainlybears political andmoral responsibility in the assassination, as hedidnotprovide thesecurity thatBenazirhadsourgently requestedandwasentitled to receiveasaformerprimeminister, especiallyconsidering that shehadbeen the targetofa failedassassinationattempt inKarachion theeveningofherhomecomingonOctober18.Moreover,after theKarachiattack,onOctober23, seniorPPP leaderSenatorFarooqNaek receivedahandwritten letterpostedfromRawalpindibyapersonclaimingtobethe“headofateamofsuicidebombersandfriendofAlQaida”and threatening toassassinateBenazirBhutto.Naeknotified theSupremeCourt,urging thatthethreatbepassedontothegovernmentsoastoimproveBhutto’ssecurity;butaccordingtoNaek,thegovernmentfailedtotakepropermeasures.42

Duringourinvestigation,wediscoveredanInteriorMinistryletter,datedOctober22,2007,whichinstructedallprovincialgovernments toprovide stringentVVIP-level security toShaukatAzizandChaudhryShujatHussainasformerprimeministers.Theannextotheletterlistedspecificmeasuresofprotection tobe implementedby theprovincialauthorities.OurCommissionof Inquiryfound itdiscriminatoryandinexcusablethattheOctober22directiveforex–primeministersAzizandHussaindid not include a similar clear instruction for the protection of Benazir Bhutto, particularlyconsideringthatshehadbeenattackedinKarachijustfourdayspriortotheissuanceoftheletterinquestion.

ThefederalgovernmentunderMusharraf,althoughfullyawareofandtrackingtheseriousthreatsagainstBenazir,didlittlemorethanpassonthosethreatstoherandnotifyprovincialauthorities.TheBhuttoteam’srequestsforjammersweremetattimes,buthersecurityadvisersoftencomplainedthattheydidnotworkproperly.ProvincialgovernmentsprovidedBhuttowithsomesecuritysupportbutonlyafterinfluentialpoliticiansinherpartymadespecificandrepeatedrequests.

AweekbeforeBenazir ’s return toPakistanonOctober18,2007, threeUSsenators, ledbyJoeBiden,thenchairmanoftheSenateForeignRelationsCommittee,wrotetoMusharrafurginghimtoprovideherwith“thefulllevelofsecuritysupportaffordedtoanyformerprimeminister[including]bomb-proof vehicles and jamming equipment.” After Bhutto’s assassination Biden declared: “ThefailuretoprotectMs.Bhuttoraisesalotofhardquestionsforthegovernmentandsecurityservicesthatmustbeanswered.”43

“I’llonlyprotectyouifyouarenicetome,”MusharrafallegedlytoldBhuttobeforeshereturnedto Pakistan from her self-imposed exile, according to Ambassador Husain Haqqani.44 Thisconversation—reported in greater detail byRonSuskind in his bookTheWay of theWorld—tookplaceover thephone from theofficeofCongressmanTomLantos,whileBenazirwasvisiting theCapitol.WhensheaskedMusharraf ifUSofficialshad talked tohimabouther security,he replieddismissively that the Americans “could call all they want” about the issue, adding, “You shouldunderstandsomething.Yoursecurityisbasedonthestateofourrelationship.”45

InPakistanipolitics,everythingthatworksistheresultofadealthathasbeencut.Theintelligenceagenciesandmilitantgroups,forexample,havebeencuttingsuccessfuldealsinPakistanfordecades.Musharraf andBhutto had negotiated an inconclusive deal for her return that both parties felt hadbeenviolatedbytheother.Benazir ’ssecuritywasasortofaddendumtothelargeragreementthatwasnevernegotiated.

The political fingerprints on this case brings to mind the quote “Will no one rid me of thistroublesome priest?” which Henry II, king of England, supposedly shouted in frustration at theconduct of the archbishop of Canterbury Thomas Becket, who was subsequently killed by fourknightswhooverheardtheirkingandunderstoodthathewantedBecketdead.InBenazir ’scase,there

wasmorethanasinglepowerfigurewhowishedtoberidofthat“troublesome”woman.Benazir ’smurderremindsmeoftheSpanishplayFuenteOvejuna,inwhichthehatedrulerofthe

villageFuenteOvejunaiskilledandthemagistratewhoinvestigatesthecrimecannotfindtheculprit.Duringtheinvestigation,everyvillagerinterrogateddeclaresthatFuenteOvejunadidit.InBenazir ’scase too, it would seem that the village assassinated her: Al-Qaida gave the order; the PakistaniTalibanexecutedtheattack,possiblybackedoratleastencouragedbyelementsoftheEstablishment;theMusharraf government facilitated the crime by not providing herwith adequate security; localseniorpolicemenattemptedacover-up;Benazir ’sleadsecurityteamfailedtoproperlysafeguardher;andmostPakistanipolitical actorswould rather turn thepage thancontinue investigatingwhowasbehindherassassination.

PROBABLY NO GOVERNMENT will be able or willing to fully disentangle the truth from thecomplexwebofimplicationinBenazirBhutto’sassassination.Inasense,PakistaniambassadortotheUNAbdullahHaroonwasrightwhenhewasquotedassayingthatPakistanwasunlikelytotakestepstoaddressthesecurityandjudicialfailuresdetailedinthecommission’sreportandthatthecountry’shistory showed that “nothing is ever taken to conclusion.” 46 Itmaywell be thatBenazirBhutto’sassassinationwillbeanotherunresolvedcaseinthelonghistoryofimpunityinPakistanandthatthecontroversysurroundingherassassinationwillendureasmuchashermemory.

TheauthordeliveringthefinalreportontheassassinationofBenazirBhuttotoUNSecretary-GeneralBanKi-moononApril15,2010.Secretary-GeneralBanthenhandedoverthereporttothepermanentrepresentativeofPakistantotheUnitedNations,Ambassador

AbdullahHussainHaroon.

9

TheInvestigation’sRepercussions

INEARLYMAY2010,mywife,Pamela,andIwerewaitingforasubway trainatEastFifty-NinthStreetandLexingtonAvenueinNewYorkCity.Amongthecrowdwasamanwhopacedupanddowntheplatform,lookingatmeinquisitively.HeseemedSouthAmerican,Ithought.Attimes,compatriotsonvacationinthecityhaverecognizedmeasaformerChileanauthority.Butthismandidnotlooklikeatourist.Eventuallyheapproachedme.

“AreyouAmbassadorMuñozofChile?”heasked.“Yes,Iam,”Ireplied.“I’mPakistani.YouarethemostwantedpersoninPakistan,”themansaid.Iwasshocked.ThiswasasituationIneverexpectedtoencounterintheManhattansubway.“Iammostwantedinapositiveornegativesense?”Imanagedtoask.“Positively,”heanswered.“IsometimescontributetoanelectronicmediaoutletinPakistan,soI

knowwhoyouare.I’veseenyouonTVandothermediathesedays.YoumadeagreatcontributiontoestablishthetruthonBenazir ’sdeath.But,”hecontinued,“nothingwillhappen.Yourcontributionwillbewastedandlost.”

IthankedthePakistani,andmywifeandImovedtowardthetrainasitapproachedthestation.I had delivered the report formally to Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon at a brief ceremony,

accompaniedbycolleaguecommissionerMarzukiDarusman.Ourothercolleague,PeterFitzgerald,had not been able to travel from Ireland. The secretary-general handed the report to the Pakistaniambassador to theUN,AbdullahHaroon, who received it on behalf of his government. After theceremony,Marzuki and I gave a press conference, broadcast live on the Internet, to a pressroompackedwithaboutonehundredjournalistsfromaroundtheworld.

EffortsbythegovernmentofPakistanandotherinterestedpartiestogainadvanceaccesstoourreporthadbeendenied,aswehadkept itunder tightcontroluntil itwasdeliveredto thesecretary-general.

US and other Western media portrayed the report in a positive light. TheGuardian quoted aspokesperson of Human Rights Watch who expressed hope that the report would “contribute tohalting the impunity with which Pakistan’s intelligence agencies and non-state actors perpetrateabuses, includingpolitical assassination,” adding that regardingBenazirBhutto’s assassination, thereport“istheclosestwe’llget”1tothetruth.AccordingtotheGuardian,theUNreporthadbecomea“watershedinmoribundeffortstosolvethemysteryofBhutto’sdeath.”2TheNewYorkTimesassertedthatalthoughthereportdidnotuncoverwhokilledBenazir,it“didputitsfingeronwhatremainsthemosttroublingpartofPakistan’sreality,thedominanceofitsmilitaryandintelligenceservicesovercivilianleaders.”Thearticleaddedthat“someinPakistanexpresseddelight”atthefindings,saying

the exposure “would force an uncomfortable conversation in Pakistan.”3 The Economistcharacterized our document as “a high-powered U.N. report,” adding that it had “highlighted thedebilitatingeffectonPakistan’sinstitutionsofitspervasivespellsofmilitaryrule.”4

In Pakistan, the reactions to the report got entangled with domestic politics. The evaluationsdependedonwhether thecommentatorswerepro-governmentorof theopposition;punditscherry-pickedportionsofthereporttoeitherblastMusharraforZardariandothergovernmentofficialsorsimplytodisparagethecommissioners,particularlymeaschairmanoftheCommissionofInquiry.Most editorials and columnists praised the report as a serious contribution toward establishing thetruthand forhaving raisedpertinentquestionsabout issuesofgovernance, civil-military relations,and thestateof thepoliticaland judicial institutionsof thecountry.Manycommentsunderlined theobvious:thatthecommissionhadfailedtoidentifytheculpritsofBhutto’smurder—aresponsibilitybeyondourmandate.

Someparticularlynegativecommentsseemedtaintedbyspinfromintelligenceagencies—liketheunfoundedassertionthatthecommissionhadcostPakistan$100million.Formerdirectorgeneralofthe ISIHamidGul—who refused to be interviewed by the commission—following a conventionalspy’s script, attempted to deflect attention to others by characterizing the document as a “saveZardari”report.GulaffirmedthathedidnotbelievethatAl-QaidaandtheTalibanwereinvolvedinthemurderandinsinuatedaUSresponsibilitybyindicatingthattherewasnomentioninthereportof“theUnitedStatesandBlackwater,despitethefactthatBenazirBhuttohaddeviatedfromtheAmericanagendabeforeherassassination.”5

A spokesperson forGeneral PervezMusharraf called theUN report “a pack of lies” based onrumors,enigmaticallynotingthatMusharrafbelievedhehad“onefinalbulletinhispistolwhichhewilluseforhisdefenseinthecase.”ThespokespersonblamedBenazirBhuttoforherassassination,for having “exposed herself to the attacker,” and criticized me personally by saying I was “noSherlockHolmes.”6

One writer denounced me by pointing out that during the 1973 military coup against thegovernmentofPresidentSalvadorAllende,Ihadhandledexplosivesandotherweaponsinayouthfulattemptatresistance.7(IwroteaboutthisinmybookTheDictator’sShadow.)How,askedtheessayist,couldaterroristbeinchargeofinvestigatingaterroristbombing?Butanotherblogger,mentioningmysamebackgroundofresistanceagainstadictatorship,defendedthereport.8

The reaction of the Pakistani authorities was hesitant and unclear. They seemed genuinelysurprisedbythedetailedanalysis,evidence,andrecommendationsofthereportthatemanatedfromthe250interviewswehadconducted;thereviewofhundredsofdocuments,videos,photographs,andother documentarymaterials; and themeetingswithPakistani officials, private citizens, diplomats,andpeoplewithknowledgerelevanttoourinvestigation.

Oneofthegovernment’sfirstreactionscamefromFarhatullahBabar,spokespersonforPresidentZardari, who stated that the PPP welcomed the report and announced that persons, including ex-president Pervez Musharraf, named “for negligence or complicity in the conspiracy” would be“investigatedandcasesalsobroughtagainsttheminlightoflegalopinion.”9

AspecialmeetingonaSaturdaynightatthepresident’sresidencetodiscussthereport—steeredbyZardarihimselfandinthepresenceofPrimeMinisterGilani—“acceptedthereportfindingsandobservations” and also “thanked the U.N. Commission of Inquiry for its efforts.”10 FarahnazIspahani,aZardariaide,statedthatthereportwould“pavethewayforaproperpoliceinvestigation

and possible penal procedures.”11 Ambassador Abdullah Hussain Haroon, Pakistan’s permanentrepresentativetotheUN,describedthereportas“averycleanfactualpicturethatwaswellconceived,wellwrittenandwellintentioned.”Headdedthatitgave“thesolidfoundationandthebackingoftheinternationalcommunityforthecriminalmatternowtoberaisedandtakentoitsfinalconclusion.”12

PresidentZardarideclaredthattheUNreporthadconfirmedtheapprehensionsofthePPPabouttheassassinationofBenazirBhutto.13Lateron,Zardariaddedthat thereporthad“strengthenedthehands of the government to vigorously pursue the investigations and to bring the culprits tojustice.”14

Despite the positive reactions to the report from governmental sources, rumors indicated thattherewasdissatisfactioninsomeofficialquarters.Twomonthsafterthereporthadbeenreleased,thePakistanigovernment,throughtheforeignminister,sentanofficialnotetoUNsecretary-generalBanKi-moon,onJune14,2010,complainingthatthecommissionshouldhaveextendeditsworktoaccessintelligencefromthird-partystates,objectingthatthereportlacked“sourceattribution”andexhibited“undueconfidentiality”regardingthenamesofpersonsinterviewedandsourcesofinformationandraising methodological questions about the inquiry. The letter expressed dissatisfaction at the“disproportionatespace”dedicatedinthereporttoPakistan’sarmy,theintelligenceagencies,andtheEstablishment.

The June 14 letter questioning thework of theCommission of Inquirywas soon leaked to thePakistanimedia.15UNsecretary-generalBanKi-moonrespondedbyfullyendorsingtheworkofthecommission.ThroughhisspokespersonFarhanHaq,thesecretary-generalaffirmedthat“thereportpainstakinglysetsout thefactsregardingtheassassinationandprovidesanextensivedescriptionofthecircumstancesaroundthecrime.”Thedeclarationbythespokespersonwentontostatethat“thesecretary-general has full confidence in the Commission’s judgment. He believes that the reportproducedbytheCommissionspeaksforitselfandcanbehelpfultoanysubsequentinvestigation.TheworkoftheCommissioniscomplete.Thesecretary-generalstandsbythereport.”16

The secretary-general’s solid backing of our work placed the Pakistani government in anawkwardposition.Accordingtopressstories,IslamabadinstructedAmbassadorAbdullahHaroon“tourgetheworldbodytotonedownitsreplyoverForeignMinisterShahMehmoodQureshi’sletterinwhichhehadcriticizedtheU.N.InquiryCommission.”ThePakistanigovernment,accordingtoonesource,feared“atoughresponsefromU.N.Secretary-GeneralBanKi-moon.”17Onepressversionerroneouslyattributedtometheauthorshipofthesecretary-general’sletter,“keptsecret,”accordingto the news agency, by the Pakistani government and described as “stronglyworded.”18 In fact, Ilearnedabouttheexistenceofsaidletterthroughthemedia.

Afewmonthslater,Dawnnewspaperrevealedthatthegovernment’sobjectionstothereporthadbeendrivenbythearmy,whichhadpreparedareplypresentedtotheprimeministerandchanneledthroughtheforeignminister.“Major-GeneralAtharAbbasacknowledgedthatthemilitaryhadsomereservations on the report because it went beyond the mandate of the U.N. Commission,” it wasreported.19AnothernewsstoryindicatedthatIslamabadwasdisgruntledatthefinger-pointingatthesecurityservicesandattheroleofleaderslikeRehmanMalikandBabarAwan.

The backdrop to such surprising developmentswas that a fewweeks before the release of thereport,theIslamabadgovernment,drivenbyMinisteroftheInteriorRehmanMalik,hadrequestedanextensionof thecommission’smandateso that itcouldgather intelligenceon themurderallegedlyheldbyfriendlyneighboringcountries.Themovewas,inouropinion,anefforttocreateexcusesto

attackthereportincasethecommissionchosenottofollowtheadvicetoconsultthoseintelligencesources.

Themandateof the commissionhadbeenalreadyextendedonce.After adeteriorating securitysituationinPakistancausedustocancelavisittothecountryinNovember2009,Secretary-GeneralBanKi-moonauthorizedanextensionbeyondtheplannedDecember31,2009,conclusion.Secretary-GeneralBangaveusanotherthreemonths,uptoMarch31,2010.ThisnewandunsolicitedextensionsuggestedbythegovernmentofPakistanwasatbestadelayingtacticandatworstapoliticalplay.

OnMarch29at5:30p.m.,NewYorktime,IreceivedaphonecallfromMinisterRehmanMalikinformingmethatPresidentZardarihadsignedaletteraskingthesecretary-generalforanextensionof the mandate, even though we had communicated to Islamabad that such an extension wasunnecessary,aswehadalltheinformationwerequired;thereportwasfinished,exceptforsomefinaleditorialtouches.Maliktoldmethatactually,theZardariletterwouldbereplacedbyaletterfromhimasministeroftheinteriortomeaschairmanofthecommissionrequestingthatIconveytherequestinquestiontoSecretary-GeneralBan.

MalikstressedthattherewasimportantinformationtobeobtainedfromAfghanpresidentHamidKarzairegardingthethreatstoBenazirBhutto.Atthesametime,heinformedmethattheIslamabadgovernmentwassendingagentstointerviewtheheadofAfghanintelligenceonthematter.“ThereisanEgyptianinvolved,”Maliktoldme.

I reminded Minister Malik that our inquiry was into the facts and circumstances of theassassination and that identifying culprits was beyond our mandate. I asked again why thisinformation hadn’t been communicated to us before, since evidently the government must haveknown about this intelligence from “brotherly countries.” Malik insisted on the importance ofinterviewing President Karzai, the United Arab Emirates intelligence authorities, and, he added,CondoleezzaRice.IlethimknowthatformersecretaryRicehaddeclinedtospeaktothecommissionandthat,inanycase,wehadinterviewedherkeyassistantRichardBoucher.

Malikaskedforanextensionoftendays,insteadoftheonemonthrequestedintheZardariletterandthenine-monthextensionMalikhadoriginallysuggested.

Thefollowingday,PakistaniambassadorAbdullahHarooncontactedmeat9:25a.m. to tellmethat hehad “instructions” to deliver the letter signedbyPresidentZardari to the secretary-general.Personally, he confessed, he felt ourworkwas done and that the extensionwas unnecessary. Thatsameday, the secretary-general issueda statementaccepting“anurgent requestby thePresidentofPakistan to delay the presentation of the report” until April 15, 2010. The statement added, “TheCommissionhasinformedthesecretary-generalthat,asoftoday,allrelevantfactsandcircumstanceshavebeenexplored,andthereportiscompleteandreadytobedelivered.”20Thiswasamostunusualandawkwardsituation.Thesecretary-generalagreedtodelaythereleaseofareportthatwasalreadycompleted,forwhatPakistanconsideredwasnecessaryadditionaltimeforinformationgatheringthatwasdeemedunnecessarybythecommissioners.

As we expected, the Pakistani press reported that the extension had been requested so that thereportcouldgain“morecredibility”byincludinginputsfromAfghanistan,theUnitedArabEmiratesandSaudiArabiaaboutthedeaththreatsBenazirBhuttowasfacingasshereturnedtoPakistanfromhervoluntaryexilein2007.21Onearticlesuggested that thepurposeof thedelaywas“toavert thepossiblecriticismsomekeypositionholderswithinPakistan’scorridorsofpowerarelikelytofaceinthewakeofthepublicationoftheU.N.Commissionfindings,bykeepingtheissuelingering.”22

Abundant news reports from US and international media speculated about the contents of the

report, but the commission had avoided leaks assiduously. Mark Siegel, acting on behalf of theZardarigovernment,phonedoneofourteammemberstoaskifthePakistanipresidentcouldseethereportbeforeitwasreleased.Withduecourtesy,weturnedhimdown.Infact,Secretary-GeneralBanKi-moon and his executive team learned of the contents of the commission’s report only on themorningofApril15whenwedeliveredittohimduringabriefceremonyinhisoffice.

Coincidingwith thepostponementof thedeliveryofour report, the residentcoordinatorof theUnitedNationssysteminPakistanannouncedhehaddecidedtoorder theclosingofallUNofficesthroughoutthecountryforthreedaysanddirectedstaff“toavoidtravellingorexposingthemselvesin public during this period,”23 as a security measure. Local newspapers widely covered therepresentative’sdecisionandthepoliceinformedthatthenecessaryarrangementswerebeingmade.We also learned that the UN representative had stated that the substance of our report would bedamagingtotheorganization’sroleinPakistan,eventhoughheknewnothingaboutitscontents.Myfellow commissioners and I were irate, and we communicated our distress to the proper UNauthoritiesinNewYork.

AfewdaysbeforethePakistanigovernment’srequesttoextendthemandateofthecommission,Ihadwritten a letter on behalf of the commissioners toMinisterMalik reminding him thatwe had“repeatedly attempted to securedirect interviewswith the competent authoritiesof theUnitedArabEmirates (UAE), SaudiArabia andAfghanistan to ascertain information that they conveyed toMs.Bhutto regarding threats on her life.” But, we reminded Malik, those requests had not beenaccommodated. However, since the Pakistani government had detailed information on the deaththreats, we requested confirmation of the data we had gathered about them.We never received aresponsetothatletter.

USsourcesconfirmedtothecommissionthatmuchoftheinformationondeath-threatwarningscommunicatedbyfriendlycountries,particularlytheUAE,actuallyhadoriginatedfromthePakistanigovernment.After9/11,theISIandtheCIAhaddeveloped“ProjectZ,”amassivedatabaseprojecttotrackterroristgroups,whichincludedsoftwaretointerceptcommunications.Suchworkhaddetectedmilitantcells thatwerefollowingBenazir.Considering that theformerprimeministerdidnot trusttheMusharrafgovernment,conveyinginformationfromforeignsourcesseemedmorecredible.24

OurcommissionwastoldbypresentandformerseniorofficialsoftheISIthattheyhadreceivedintelligenceregardingthreatstoBhuttofromrepresentativesofthegovernmentsofSaudiArabiaandthe United Arab Emirates. UAE officials confirmed to the commission that government-to-governmentinformationsharinghadoccurred.TheISIofficialstoldusthatonatleasttwooccasions,representatives from both countries flew to Pakistan to provide this and other information, whichgenerallycoincidedwiththeirown.

MinisterRehmanMaliktoldthecommissionthathehadreceivedinformationfroma“brotherlycountry”aboutanothersignificantthreataimedatBhuttoandhimself.Malikdidnotspecifythedetailsof the threat,despiteour request.Almost twoyearsafterour reportwas issued, thePakistanipressrevealedthataletterhadbeensentbytheISItothensecretaryoftheinteriorKamalShahseventeendays beforeBhutto’s assassination,warning that “a few extremist groups related toAl-Qaida havemadesomeplantoassassinateMrs.BenazirBhuttoandheradviserRehmanMalikon21December,2007.”Thebriefmessage,transmittedlatertoMalik,endedsaying,“Theexactplanofexecutionnotknown.”25

Our communications with the authorities in Afghanistan and the UAE did not yield any newinformation relevant to the report. An interview by a member of our team with intelligence

authoritiesfromtheUAEinDubaiinMarch2010didnotproduceanythingdifferentfromwhatwealreadyknew.AndweweretoldrepeatedlybyKabulauthorities,throughtheAfghanMissiontotheUN,thattheofficialspresentduringtheconversationbetweenPresidentKarzaiandBenazirBhuttoonthemorningofherassassinationdidnotpossessanyspecificinformationtosharewithus.Infact,anews story in Dawn affirmed that the Pakistani agents conducting the so-called second FIAinvestigation intoBenazir ’smurder had contacted theAfghangovernment about the threats onherlife but that theAfghan foreignministry had declared that “it had no recordwhich suggested thatPresidentKarzaihadinformedBenaziraboutapossiblethreattoherlife.”26Interestingly,thesameDawnstoryreportedthatduringtheirinquiry,theFIAinvestigatorshadbeenunabletointerviewhighmilitaryofficersandthatwhentheyhadtriedtocontactGeneralMusharraf,InteriorMinisterRehmanMalik had stopped them, explaining that the government “had somekind of deal”with the formerruler.27

THECOMMISSION’SREPORTdidhavesomesignificantpoliticalandjudicialrepercussions.Fourdaysafter the releaseof the report, thePakistanigovernmentwent intoactionand suspendedeightofficialswhohadbeenresponsibleforBhutto’ssecurityatLiaquatBagh,includingRawalpindipolicechief Saud Aziz. Presidential spokesperson Farhatullah Babar announced the suspension of theofficials and their inclusion on an exit control list barring them from leaving the country.Retiredbrigadier Javed IqbalCheema’scontractasdirectorgeneral forcivildefensewascanceled,andhewasalsoplacedontheexitcontrol list.Afewdayslater,onApril24, thegovernmentconstitutedathree-memberfact-findingcommitteeledbyCabinetSecretaryAbdulRauftoinvestigatetheissueofthewashingof thecrimescenewhereBhuttohadbeenassassinated. Inparallel, theFIAofPakistanalso began an inquiry. But less than a month later, the three-member committee cleared thoseidentifiedinthereportasresponsibleforhosingdownthecrimescene—adecisionthatthePakistanipresscalleda“trashingoftheU.N.report.”28

TheRawalpindi police officials defended theirwashing of the crime scenewith some peculiararguments. “Nobody has asked the question: what evidence was lost by washing the scene?” saidPoliceChiefSaudAziz.“Weassembledtwenty-threepieces,”hereasoned,meaningthat“nothingwaslostbywashingofthecrimesite.”29

Minister Rehman Malik, during an interview outside the Lahore High Court shortly after thereleaseofourreport,declared that“therealkillersof formerPrimeMinisterBenazirBhuttowerenot exposed in the report issued by the United Nations Inquiry Commission.”30 It was a rathersurprisingstatementcomingfromthecommission’scontactpersoninthePakistanigovernmentwhoknewverywellthatthecommission’srolewasnottoexposeanyculpritsofthecrime.Inmid-2011Malik affirmed that Osama bin Laden was involved in the murder of the former prime minister,withoutelaboratinganyfurther.31Later,inDecember2012,MinisterMalikannouncedthathewouldrevealBenazirBhutto’skillersinaforthcomingbook.32

PresidentZardariseemed tosuggest thatTalibanorAl-Qaida terroristsalongwithmembersoftheEstablishmenthadperpetratedthemurderofhiswifewhen,addressingajirgaattheGovernor ’sHouseinPeshawar,heassertedthat“thosewhoweregrantedrefuge30yearsago”hadkilledBhutto,addingthatpeopleintheprovincesneededto“checkthattheirneighborswerenotillegalforeignersorwereinvolvedinunlawfulactivities.”33

In a surprising development, Pakistan’s federal defense production minister resigned after a

controversy erupted when he accused the army of killing several high-profile Pakistani figures,includingBenazirBhutto.AbdulQayyumKhan Jatoi stated during a televised press conference inQuetta, “We provided the army with uniforms and boots not so that they kill their own fellowcountrymen, kill Nawab Sahib Bugti and Benazir Bhutto.”34 Nothing much came of Jatoi’sdenunciationsafterhisdismissal,ashedidnotprovideanydetailsforhisbroadaccusations.

An antiterrorist court in Rawalpindi took the UN report seriously and conducted detailedinterrogationsofthepoliceofficersinchargeofBhutto’sprotection.ProsecutorChaudhryZulfikarAli told the media that former police chief Saud Aziz and former deputy police chief KhurramShahzad had named fourMI and ISI officials of major and colonel rank levels who had been incontactwiththemafterBhutto’smurder.35ThetwoformerpoliceofficerswerearrestedinDecember2010bytheFIAaftertheantiterroristcourtrevokedtheirbail.TheprosecutorexplainedthatAzizandShahzad “were responsible forBhutto’s security. They ordered the crime scene to be hosed downdespiteresistancefromotherofficials.”36Theprosecutoraddedthatitwasthepoliceofficers’“dutytocarryoutthepost-mortem”examinationoftheformerprimeminister.37

Shortlythereafter,inFebruary2011,thesameRawalpindicourtissuedasubpoenaforthearrestof former president Musharraf, then living in voluntary exile in London, for failing to provideadequate security to Bhutto before and during the rally and for not having passed to competentauthorities the informationavailableaboutTalibanplans toassassinateher.ProsecutorZulfikarAliaddedthatformerpoliceofficersAzizandShahzadhaddeclaredthattheyhadremovedthesecuritydetailforBenazirBhutto,justbeforeshedepartedthevenuewhereshewasspeaking,ontheordersofMusharraf.38 Prosecutor ZulfikarAli revealed that the court had tried to contactMusharraf at hisLondon address and that a list of questions had been sent to him several months ago, but he hadrefusedtoanswerthequeries.

AddingtothemysterysurroundingtheBhuttocase,stateprosecutorZulfikarAliwasassassinatedonMay3,2013,bygunmenwhoriddledhisvehiclewithbulletsashedrovetoworktoahearingontheBhuttocase.ZulfikarAliwashitbythirteenbulletsbyunknownassailants.Somesecurityexpertsdeclaredthattheprosecutorwas“amarkedmanbecausehehadbeenprosecutingmilitantswhowerejailedinconnectionwithBhutto’sdeath”39andotherterrorismtrials.

Regarding the arrestwarrant issuedby the court againstGeneralMusharraf, his spokesperson,FawadChaudhry,characterizeditas“totallyridiculous.”Hethenadded,“Howcanthepresidentofacountrybemaderesponsibleforthenon-provisionofsecurity?It’stotallyridiculous.Youcannotpincriminalresponsibilityonapresidentforthat.”40ChaudhryhadconvenientlyignoredMusharraf’ssternwarningtoBhutto:“Yoursecurityisbasedonthestateofourrelationship.”

In parallel, rumors abounded in Pakistan that more suspects in the Bhutto crime were beingarrested. InteriorMinisterRehmanMalik admitted thatmore suspects involved in the assassinationhadindeedbeenarrested.TheMinistryoftheInteriorhadsupposedlyidentifiedninecoconspiratorsofwhichfivewerestillalive.Thefiveweretheoneswhoallegedlyhiredthekillersandgavethemshelterandlogisticalsupport.Theassassinationplotwashatchedintheformalresidenceofanarmybrigadier,accordingtotheofficialinvestigationreport.41

In November 2011, the antiterrorist court charged former police chief Saud Aziz and formerdeputy police chief Khurram Shahzad, along with five militants believed to be members of thePakistaniTaliban,withcriminalconspiracyandmurder.Ofthefivemilitants,underarrestsince2007,twoofthemadmittedtohelpinginthesuicidebombing.AzizandShahzadreturnedtojailafterthey

hadbeenfreedonbailfollowingtheirinitialarrestinDecember2010.42Meanwhile,inAugust2011,SpecialJudgeShahidRafiqueoftheantiterroristcourtconductingthe

Bhutto case ordered Pakistani authorities to seize all of PervezMusharraf’s assets, following hisfailure to appear before the court. Musharraf’s property details provided by the court to the FIAincludedafarmhouse,aplotofland,anddepositsinsixdifferentbanks.

InFebruary2012,MinisterMalikpresented,duringabriefingtotheSindhAssembly,themuch-awaited“final investigationreport”of theofficial inquiry intoBhutto’sassassination,conductedbytheFIA.Usingaudioandvideofootage,MinisterMalikrevealed that twenty-seven terroristgroupswereresponsibleforhavingexecutedthemurder,includingBaitullahMehsud,theHaqqaninetwork,andthebannedTehrik-i-TalibanPakistan.Malikadmittedthattheplannersofthecrimewerestillatlargeandthatmoretimewasneededtocollectfurtherevidence.Headdedthatthirteensuspectswerebeing prosecuted; he also accused former president Pervez Musharraf of not providing adequatesecuritytoBenazirBhuttoandannouncedthatarequestwouldbemadetoInterpolforhisarrest.43The report also accused police officers Saud Aziz and Khurram Shahzad of being part of theconspiracytokillBhutto.44

Musharraf canceled plans to return to Pakistan in January 2012 to campaign for upcomingparliamentaryelectionsafterhewaswarnedhewouldfaceimmediatearrest.Monthslater,MusharrafshruggedoffPakistan’scall forInterpol toarresthim,reiteratingthathewouldreturn“ofhisownaccord” and criticized the current government, cautioning that “people are again running to themilitary to save the country.”45 Musharraf finally arrived back in Pakistan on March 24, 2013,greetedbywhatanewspaperdescribedas“threatsandsmallcrowds.”46Localmediaindicatedthatbarely days after his return to Pakistan GeneralMusharraf was facing “one petition after anotherbeingmoved against him in the SupremeCourt”47 and other tribunals, including over theBhuttocase. In fact, in lateApril2013, theRawalpindianti-terrorismcourtplacedMusharrafona judicialremandforchargesoffailingtoprovideadequatesecuritytoBhuttopriortoherassassination.

OnthefifthanniversaryofBenazirBhutto’smurder,Dawnnewspapersummarizedawidespreadsense of frustrationwith the judicial investigations into the assassination: “Repeated and unendinginvestigations,indifferentlawyers,achaoticjudicialsystemandagovernmentthatreallydidn’tcare,have all ensured that Benazir Bhutto’s trial is going nowhere.” 48 The fifth anniversary of theassassinationwasmarked,instead,bythelaunchingofthepoliticalcareerofBilawalBhuttoZardari,sonoftheformerprimeministerandofPresidentZardari,andchairmanofthePPP,whodeliveredhis first major public speech before two hundred thousand people gathered at the Bhutto familymausoleum.“Wearemessengersofpeaceandstandbydemocracy,andweareafraidneitherofanyterroristnoranydictator,”49 saidBilawal,whohad just completedhisOxford education andwasnowthefourthgenerationofhisfamilytoenterpolitics.

EPILOGUE

ReflectionsonBhutto,binLaden,andPakistan’sTiestotheUnitedStates

INMID-AUGUST1996, theCIAgained intelligence thatOsamabinLaden andhis top lieutenantswere planning a meeting in one of his Afghanistan camps on August 20. President Bill Clinton’sadministration had been tracking bin Laden and saw this as an opportunity to retaliate for thebombings against the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. But launching air strikes against binLadeninvolvedflyingoverPakistaniairspace.

ClintonknewthattheISIusedsomeofthesamecampsthatbinLadenandAl-QaidadidtotraintheTaliban and insurgentswho fought inKashmir. If theWhiteHouse informed Pakistani authoritiesabouttheplannedattacksinadvance,theintelligenceservicessurelywouldwarntheTalibanorevenAl-Qaida, Clinton reasoned. If the US government didn’t tell Islamabad, it could cause bilateraltension and, moreover, the Pakistanis could mistakenly assume that the flying missiles had beenlaunchedatthembyIndiaandretaliate—conceivablyevenwithnuclearweapons.

PresidentClintoninstructedthevicechairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaff,GeneralJoeRalston,tohavedinnerwiththetopPakistanimilitarycommanderattheprecisetimeofthescheduledraidssoastotellhimabouttheoperationonlyminutesbeforethemissilesenteredPakistaniairspace,“toolatetoalerttheTalibanorAlQaida,butintimetoavoidhavingthemshotdownorsparkingacounterattackonIndia.”1TheoperationwentthroughwellenoughasfarasPakistanwasconcerned,butbinLadenescaped.

GettingOsamabinLadenbecameasecuritypriorityforClinton.InJuly1999,withthesupportofthen primeministerNawazSharif, theCIA began to train sixty Pakistani troops as commandos topenetrateAfghanistaninsearchofbinLaden.Thepresidentwasskepticalabout theprojectbecauseevenwithSharif’scooperation,thePakistanimilitaryandtheISIwerefullofTalibanandAl-Qaidasympathizerswho could foil the operation. But Clinton thought it wasworth trying.WhenNawazSharifwas overthrown in amilitary coup byGeneral PervezMusharraf onOctober 12, 1999, theprojecttosendthePakistanicommandosintoAfghanistantocaptureorkillbinLadenwasaborted.2

Washington had been growing increasingly impatient and frustrated with the Pakistani army’sreluctance to capture Osama bin Laden and other Al-Qaida leaders known to reside in Pakistaniterritory. Mullah Omar, the Afghan Taliban commander, had been living in Quetta since 2002,accommodatedbytheISIinsafehousesrunbytheJamiatUlema-e-Islamparty,whichhadcometopower in theQuetta provincial government.Abu Zubaydah, a seniorAl-Qaida recruiter, had beenlivingopenlyinPeshawarsince1997,runningaguesthouseknownastheHouseofMartyrsbeforehe

was captured near Lahore on March 28, 2002. The Clinton administration had repeatedly askedPresidentMusharraf toextraditeZubaydah,but theISIdeniedknowinghiswhereabouts,despite thefact that he had worked for the ISI before 9/11.3 Much later, during the George W. Bushadministration, US ambassador to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad expressed frustration with suchsituations and complained: “[MullahAkhtar]Usmani, who is one of the Taliban leaders, spoke toPakistan’sGeoTVata timewhen thePakistani intelligenceserviceclaimed that theydidnotknowwhere[hewas].”4Inanotherincident,inJune2011,thePakistaniarmydeniedthatitssecurityforceshadtippedoffinsurgentsatbomb-makingfactoriesinthetribalbeltaftertheUnitedStateshadsharedsatelliteinformationwithPakistan.AccordingtoUSsources,withintwenty-fourhoursofsharingtheinformation,themilitantsclearedoutthebomb-makingsites.5

PresidentGeorgeW.Bush trustedhis friendGeneralMusharraf tohuntandcaptureOsamabinLaden. During a White House visit by Musharraf in September 2006, Bush declared: “When thePresident[Musharraf]looksmeintheeyeandsays...‘ifwefind—whenwefindUsamabinLaden,hewill be brought to justice’ I believe him.Andwe’ll let the tactics speak for themselves after ithappens.”6

Asignofchange inUS tolerance towardPakistani leaksoccurredonSeptember3,2008,whenhelicopters transportingUSNavy SEALs landed nearAngurAdda in SouthWaziristan on a first-ever-acknowledgedgroundattackonPakistanisoil.Theoperationkilledtwenty-fivemilitants.7Afewdayslater,onSeptember19,thechiefofarmystaffGeneralKayaniflewtomeetUSchairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaffMikeMullenaboard theaircraft carrierUSSAbrahamLincoln,whereKayanitold his US counterpart that dire consequences would follow another such invasion of Pakistaniterritory.

TheBarackObamaadministrationhadtoweightheseconcernsbeforelaunchingfurtherattacks.There were plenty of targets to go after, but it had to consider the impact within Pakistan—thepotential for an anti-American reaction by the public, the political elite, and particularly the army.Thenagain,unilateralattackshadproveneffectiveasadeterrenttojihadiststhreateningUStroopsinAfghanistanorplanningterroristoperationsagainstAmericaninterestsworldwide,includingonUSsoil.

BythetimeOsamabinLadenwaskilledonSunday,May1,2011,inhisresidenceinAbbottabad,hometoPakistani’s leadingmilitaryacademyandanuclear-weaponssite, the terroristchiefwas inhissixthyearof residence in thecity’sBilalTownneighborhood,amiddle-classsector less thanamilefromtheentrancetotheacademy.MostUSPredatordronestrikesseekingtokillbinLadenandhisAl-QaidaaidesconcentratedinthePakistani’stribalregions,sometwohundredmilesawaytothewest.

Already during the 2008 presidential election debates, Barack Obama had expressed hisdetermination to pursueOsamabinLaden intoPakistan if Islamabadwas “unable or unwilling” toeliminatehimandotherAl-Qaida leaders.Afterhiselection,PresidentObamaintensified theCIA’sclassified drone program: during his first year in office, there were more missile strikes insidePakistanthaninallofPresidentBush’syearsinofficecombined.

After theWhiteHousereceivedsolid intelligence thatbinLadenwas living in thecompoundatAbbottabad,andafterPresidentObamahadtakenthedecisiontoauthorizetheNavySEALoperation—against the advice of his top national security team—he faced a similar dilemma to the onePresidentClintonhad confronted in 1996whenhedecided to firemissiles at anOsamabinLadencampoverPakistaniairspace:whethertoinformthePakistanisinadvanceabouttheimpendingattack,

soasnottodamageanalready-tensebilateralrelationship,ortokeepthemoutofthelooptoensurethatbinLadenwouldnotbewarnedbyPakistaniintelligencetoevacuate.

According to a report,8 early in the process PresidentObama ruled out a joint operationwithPakistan.DidbinLadenhaveprotectors in the intelligence establishment or higher up in the armyhierarchy?The tight circle aroundObamadidnotknow theanswer,whichpromptedadecision tomaintain full secrecy. In the end, onlywhen theUS helicopters had escapedPakistani airspace didObamaauthorizeAdmiralMikeMullen,thechairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaff,tophoneGeneralKayani,Pakistan’schiefofarmystaff,thenextdayaround3:00a.m.localtimetotellhimabouttheraid.

SEALteamshadsurreptitiouslyenteredPakistanontento twelvepreviousoccasionsbefore thebinLadenoperation.MostofthoseattacksbySEALsfromtheNavalSpecialWarfareDevelopmentGroup and by Green Berets were forays into North and South Waziristan, including the widelyreportedraidatAngurAddainSeptember2008.AbbottabadwasthefarthestthespecialUSteamhadventuredintoPakistaniterritory.9

GeneralKayani reportedlywas stunned.Did the Pakistanis know that bin Ladenwas hiding inAbbottabad, meaning that the military leadership was complicit in harboring him? Or did thePakistanissimplynotknowthattheUnitedStates’mostwantedmanwaslivingforsixyearsintheirterritory along with his wives, children, and aides? No firm evidence suggests that the Pakistanimilitaryand intelligenceestablishmentknewofbinLaden’swhereabouts.Myguess is that thiswasmorethananintelligencefailureonthepartofthePakistanis;theysimplydidnotlookhardenoughforbinLaden.Butinreality,nomatterhowtheydealtwiththeAl-Qaidaleader,theywereboundtoloseinsomeway:iftheykepthislocationsecretfromtheAmericans,itwouldhaveendangeredthebilateralrelationshiponacritical issuefor theUSgovernmentandpeople,but if theylocatedhim,arrested him, and handed him over to the US government, it would have provoked the ire ofsignificantsectorsofthePakistanipopulationandthe“Muslimstreet.”

ItcannotberuledoutthattheSectionS,whichworkscloselywithTalibanandAl-Qaidamilitants,or other elements of the ISI,might have known about bin Laden’swhereabouts. It is possible thathigh-level intelligence authorities and army chiefs turned a blind eye. Knowing too much aboutthornyissuescanbeaproblem.What isclear is thatbinLadenhadsomekindofPakistanisupportstructurethatallowedhimtospendnineyearsontheruninPakistanafter9/11,changinghousesuptoseven times in Swat, Haripur, and Abbottabad, and possibly even undergoing a kidney transplantoperationin2002.GivenbinLaden’sparanoiaregardingsecuritymatters,itisunlikelythathewouldhave put his personal safety in the hands of the Pakistanimilitary, despite some indications that atsomepoint,heandhisaidesdiscussedcuttingadealwithPakistaniofficialsthatinvolvedAl-Qaidarefrainingfromattackingtargetswithinthecountryinexchangeforprotection.10

InJuly2013,AlJazeerarevealedonitswebsitea336-pagereportoftheAbbottabadCommissionthat concluded thatOsamabinLaden’snine-year-long stay inPakistan and theMay2011USNavySEALs raid in which he was killed, were undetected due to “gross incompetence” of the stateinstitutions,including,particularly,theISI.Thefive-membercommissionledbyJusticeJavedIqbalassertedinitsreportthat“culpablenegligenceandincompetenceatalmostalllevelsofgovernmentcanmoreorlessbeconclusivelyestablished.”11

Pakistanis very likely want to forget about the bin Laden raid episode, as well as the officialcommission of inquiry, led by a SupremeCourt judge, thatwas set up to look into the operation.That’swhyonthenightofFebruary25,2012,authoritiesinAbbottabadsentbulldozerstocompletely

demolish bin Laden’s house, as if to erase it from collectivememory. Pakistanimilitary officialsarrestedatleastfivePakistanisforassistingtheCIAinthebinLadenraid,includingphysicianShakilAfridi,whohadrunafakevaccinationprogramasarusetogainDNAevidencefromthebinLadenfamily—whichhedidnotget.Thedoctor ’simprisonmentangeredUSauthorities.12

ButtheUSgovernmentalsohadreasontoputthebinLadenraidbehindit,especiallyregardingtheissueofthehypotheticalsupportthattheAl-Qaidaleadermighthavereceivedfromthesecurityestablishment.Washington’srelationswithIslamabadaretoocrucialtoriskanall-outbreak,evenifPakistani officials didknowabout binLaden’swhereabouts.Neither theUnitedStates norPakistancanaffordacompletebreakdownofbilateralrelations.

BothBenazir ’s andOsama’s killings reveal the profoundmistrust and contradictions that havecharacterizedUS-Pakistantiesinrecenthistory.TheUSgovernmentcouldnotrevealthebinLadenoperation to itsPakistanicounterpartbecauseIslamabad,guarding itsowninterests,hasplayedandwillcontinuetoplayadoublegameofcooperationwithWashingtonandsupportoftheTaliban.Attimes,thePakistanarmyandtheISIwillcaptureorevenkillsomeTalibanorAl-QaidaoperativesforconcretesecurityreasonsortosatisfyAmericanpressures,butitpreservesandprotectstheTalibanbecauseitisaforcebywhichtogainstrategicdepthinAfghanistanandadefensemechanismagainstIndia.ThePakistanigovernmentwillprobablyfreefromjailand/orsparethe“goodTaliban”whodonot turn their guns on the Pakistani state and are willing to engage in peace talks, and target foreliminationthosewhofightthearmyandwhocouldbecomeathreattonationalsecurityinthelongrun.

After all, Pakistanis know well that the Americans embraced jihadists, like Osama bin Laden,whenWashington’sprioritywas todefeat theSoviets inAfghanistan.Likewise, thePakistanishavefashionedtheirownrelationshipwiththejihadists.After9/11,theUSgovernmentwantedBenazirinpowertofavordemocraticreformsandsecularism,butbecauseoftheso-calledwaronterror,italsoneededGeneralMusharrafandtheISI.WashingtonwantedchangeinPakistanbutenoughstabilitytoreinintheTalibanandAl-QaidaandtoensurethesafecontrolofPakistan’snucleararsenal.

The United States and Pakistan are condemned to live with each other. The severe blows thatassailedthepartnershipduringitsannushorribilis—2011—underscoredtheenduranceofthebilateralrelationship.

After the Navy SEAL team killed bin Laden in Abbottabad in May, Parliament and the pressheapedwitheringcriticismontheUnitedStatesandonGeneralKayanifortheviolationofPakistanisovereignty.Butthiswasnotthefirstsuchincidentthatyear,as2011hadstartedinauspiciouslywhenon January 27, Raymond Davis, a CIA operative involved in a covert operation to penetrate theLashkar-e-Taiba militant group, killed two men during what he claimed was a robbery attempt,leadingtohisarrestbythePakistanipolice.Heavynegotiationsresultedinhisreleaseafteraperiodofdetention,butWashingtonwasforcedtocutasubstantialpartofitsSpecialOperationsForcesonPakistanisoilandwithdrawallCIAcontractors.13

BeforetheraidonbinLaden’shideout,aWhiteHousereporthadcriticizedPakistan’seffortstodefeatAl-Qaidaandassociatedmilitants“despitetheunprecedentedandsustaineddeploymentofover147,000forcesandthedeathsof2,575Pakistanitroopssince2001.”ThereportheldthatPakistan’spoor planning for the “hold and build” stages of itsmilitary operationswas enablingmilitants toreturntoareasfromwhichtheyhadbeendriven.14AvisitbySenatorJohnKerrytoIslamabadafewdaysafterthebinLadenraidcooledtempersforawhileinearlysummer,untilreneweddroneattacksrekindled the anti-American clamor. Relations entered crisismode once again in Septemberwhen

Haqqanimilitantsmarkedthetenthanniversaryof9/11byattackingAmericansoldierswithatruckbombinAfghanistan’sWardakProvince,woundingseventy-sevenUStroops,andlaunchingatwenty-hourrocket-propelledgrenadeattackon theUSembassy inKabul.Twodays later,onCapitolHill,Admiral MikeMullen, the outgoing chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—who had cultivated apersonalrelationshipwithGeneralKayani—toldUScongressmenthattheHaqqaninetwork“actsasaveritablearmofPakistan’sInter-ServicesIntelligenceagency,”15thuslinkingtheISItotheHaqqaniattackontheUSembassyinKabul.

Mullen’sdeclarationscausedgreatalarminIslamabad,assomefearedanall-outUSinvasionofPakistan and/or an American attempt to capture its prized nuclear arsenal. Military leaders andpoliticiansrepresentingthirty-twopoliticalpartiesgatheredattheresidenceofPrimeMinisterYousufRazaGilanionSeptember29todiscussMullen’scharges.Thepoliticalleadersissuedathirteen-pointdeclarationaffirmingthatAdmiralMullen’sstatementswere“withoutsubstanceandderogatorytoapartnershipapproach.”16

Aweeklater,PresidentObama,ataWashingtonpressconference,warned that theUnitedStateswouldnot“feelcomfortablewitha long-termstrategic relationshipwithPakistan ifwedon’t thinkthat they’remindful of our interests aswell.”17Twoweeks afterObama’s statement, Secretary ofStateHillaryRodhamClinton,leadingahigh-levelUSdelegationtoIslamabad,toldPakistaniprimeministerGilaniandmilitaryauthorities that theUnitedStateswouldactunilaterally, ifnecessary, toattackmilitantforcesthatusePakistaniterritoryasahaventolaunchoperationstokillAmericans.

The controversy known as “memogate” shook bilateral relations when it was revealed thatsupposedly,thePakistaniambassadortotheUnitedStatesat thetime,HusainHaqqani,hadcolludedwith Pakistani American businessmanMansoor Ijaz to draft amemo to then Joint Chiefs of StaffchairmanMikeMullen.ThememoofferedtoreformtheISIbyeliminatingitsSectionSchargedwithmaintainingtieswithmilitants,inexchangeforUSsupporttopreventapurportedmilitarycoup.18

Theunsignedmemo,accordingtobusinessmanIjaz,hadbeendraftedontheordersofPresidentZardariinthewakeoftheUSraidonbinLaden,whichhaddemoralizedthearmyandembarrassedZardari’s weakened government. Ambassador Haqqani denied having written the memo, and theZardarigovernmentbackedhimup.Pressuredbythearmy,aPakistaniSupremeCourtthree-membercommission was set up to investigate the matter. In June 2012, the commission concluded thatAmbassadorHaqqaniwasbehind the controversialmemoand found that hewas “not loyal” to thePakistani state, having sought to undermine the country’s nuclear assets, armed forces, andintelligenceagency.19Theambassador,whohadresignedandreturnedtohispreviouspositionasaprofessoratBostonUniversity,respondedthattheSupremeCourtwaspoliticallymotivatedandhadabuseditsauthority.

Inthemeantime,allegationsfromdiplomaticcablesmadepublicbyWikiLeaksresurfaced,citingVice President Joe Biden and then US ambassador to Islamabad Anne Patterson, announcing thatZardarifeltthattheheadoftheISIandGeneralKayanicouldremovehimfromofficeatanytimeandthat Kayani himself, in a conversation with Patterson, had admitted that he “might, howeverreluctantly,”pressurePresidentZardaritoresignandpresumablyleavePakistan.20ThecouprumorsledPrimeMinisterGilani topubliclydenounce“conspiracies thatarebeinghatched topackup theelectedgovernment,”and,stoppingshortofaccusingthearmedforcesofplottingatakeover,warnedthatthemilitary“cannotbeastatewithinastate.”21Thefollowingday,armychiefGeneralKayanirespondedthatthe“armywillcontinuetosupportthedemocraticprocessinthecountry”andlabeled

talksofacoupas“abogeytodivertthefocusfromtherealissues.”22ToendanalreadybadyearforUS-Pakistanities,onNovember26,NATOaircraftkilledtwenty-

fourPakistanisoldiersinstrikesagainsttwomilitarypostsinSalala,onthenorthwesternborderwithAfghanistan,inwhatPakistanportrayedas“unprovokedactsofblatantaggression.”Thegovernmentin Islamabad reactedbyordering theCIA to remove thedroneoperationsatShamsiAirBaseand,more importantly, closing down the two main NATO supply routes into Afghanistan.23 InWashington, suggestions for President Obama to offer a formal apology were turned down, as,particularly during an election year in the United States, the condolences given were deemedsufficientuntiltheincidentwasfullyinvestigated.

Thispatternofmutualdistrust,blame,andangerhasundermined thebilateral relationship, andgettingbacktonormalhasdemandedevergreaterefforts.Butthetwocountriesneedeachother.

TheUnitedStatesneedsPakistantofacilitatepeacetalkswiththeTalibanaspartoftheAmericanexit strategy fromAfghanistan. Thus, in themidst of the bilateral confrontation over theHaqqaniattack on the US embassy in Kabul, the Obama administration was relying on the same Pakistaniintelligence services that support the Haqqani network to help start reconciliation talks aimed atending thewar inAfghanistan. In January 2012, Taliban negotiators declared that they had begunmeetingwithUSofficialsinQatar,withthesupportofthePakistanigovernment.SecretaryofStateHillary Clinton characterized the new approach as “fight, talk, build,” combining the push forreconciliationwiththecontinuationofdroneattacks.24

Pakistanwillmind its own interests in the reconciliation talks, promoting separate agreementswiththeAfghangovernmentsoastoadvanceitsowninterestsinAfghanistanafterAmericanforceswithdraw.ForIslamabad,therecannotbeapeacedealwiththeTalibanwithouttheirexplicitsupport.

FollowingtheSalalaairstrikes,thenewlyformedDefenseofPakistanCouncil(DPC),gatheringabout forty Islamistgroups,began toorganizeralliesopposing thereopeningof theNATOsupplylinesanddecryingPakistan’sstrengtheningoftieswiththeUnitedStatesandIndia.Interestingly,theDPC’schiefcoordinatorisHamidGul,theformerISIchiefidentifiedbyBenazirBhuttoasasuspectin case she were to be assassinated, a fact that raised suspicions about the involvement of theintelligenceestablishmentinthisnewradicalgroup.25

TheUSdefensesecretaryLeonPanetta,speakinginNewDelhiinJune2012ataconferenceonIndo-US defense relations,warned thatWashingtonwas reaching “the limits of our patience”withPakistanregardingsafehavens thatallow“terrorists touse theircountryasasafetynet inorder toconducttheirattacksonourforces.”26Ataboutthesametime,theCIAannouncedthatadronestrikeinPakistan’stribalbelthadkilledAl-Qaida’sdeputyleader,AbuYahyaal-Libi.

TheSalalaimpassewasresolvedbyanotherdemonstrationofreluctantpragmatismbybothsides:OnJuly3,2012,SecretaryofStateClintonpresentedacarefullywordeddeclaration—whichavoidedthewordapology—regretting the incidentsofNovember2011that left twenty-fourPakistani troopsdead,offeringcondolences to the familiesof the soldiersandexpressing,alongwithherPakistanicolleagueForeignMinisterHinaRabbaniKhar, that “weare sorry for losses sufferedbybothourcountries in this fight against terrorism.” At the same time, the two countries announced thereopeningofthegroundsupplyroutesintoAfghanistanwithoutlevyinganyadditionaltransitfees.27

PAKISTAN’S STRATEGIC POSTURE views the militant groups that the United States wantsdestroyedasproxies in thebitter rivalrywith its larger andmorepowerfulneighbor, India.WhileWashington seeks to defeat Al-Qaida and its Islamic militant associates, Pakistani leaders take a

longerviewtoward theirowninterests,whichmeansaccepting tacticalcooperationwith theUnitedStateswithoutlosingsightofthegoalofgainingstrategicdepthinAfghanistananddefendingtheircountryagainstIndia.

Pakistan has noted with great concern the expansion of India’s presence in Afghanistan,particularly after the May 2011 visit by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh when he promised toincreaseIndia’saidtoKabulfrom$1.5to$2billion.PresidentHamidKarzai’sfollowingvisittoNewDelhi inSeptember2011unsettledIslamabadfurther,especiallywhenitwasannouncedthat thetwocountries had reached an agreement for India to train Afghan army officers after NATO leftAfghanistan.Reportedly, thePakistaniswereangryat theUnitedStates fornothaving impeded thistrainingaccord.28

TheUS tilt toward India, reflected in President BarackObama’sNovember 2010 visit to NewDelhi, and not Islamabad, disappointed Pakistan, as did Obama’s endorsement of India’s bid forpermanentmembership on theUN Security Council. Pakistan had already considered the Indo-UScivilnuclearagreementof2005tohavefundamentallyalteredthestrategicbalanceinSouthAsia,andthe relaxationofUSexport restrictionson Indian space agencies, followingObama’svisit toNewDelhi,onlyconfirmedthestatusquo.

Considering Indian superiority in conventional forces, Pakistan has invested more heavily innuclearweapons.ThecountryhasmorenuclearweaponsthanIndia—havingovertakenGreatBritainas the world’s fifth-largest nuclear weapons power—and its inventories of weapons-usable fissilematerials are larger than those of New Delhi.29 The nuclear rivalry was once more noted inPakistan’s successful test launch of an improved intermediate-range ballistic missile capable ofcarryinganuclearwarhead,sixdaysafterIndiatestfireditsAgni-Vintercontinentalballisticmissile,which has a range of over five thousand kilometers, making it capable of reaching Beijing andShanghai.

Pakistan sees abetter ally inChina than in theUnitedStates.After thebinLaden raid,PakistanturnedtoChinatoregainleveragewiththeUnitedStates.Duringafour-dayvisit toBeijing,PrimeMinisterYousufRazaGilaniconcludedacoproductionagreement to immediatelyprovidePakistanwithfiftyJF-17Thunderfighterjets,whichwouldbefollowedbymorefighteraircraftwithstealthtechnology.Aspartof thathigh-levelvisit,DefenseMinisterChaudhryAhmedMukhtarannouncedthatIslamabadhadaskedtheChineseto“pleasebuildanavalbaseatGwadar,”adeepwaterportintheArabianSea,westofKarachi,theconstructionofwhichChinahadinvestedheavilyin.30ChinaandPakistandosharestrategicinterestsregardingIndia,andBeijingalsoneedsIslamabadasacheckonties between Islamist separatists from theXinjiang region and Pakistani jihadists. However, ChinacouldhardlyoffsetPakistan’srelationshipwiththeUnitedStates.

Pakistanwould certainly like to reducewhatmany regard as an overdependence on theUnitedStates.ForPakistan,thehistoryofbilateraltiesisoneofbetrayalbyWashingtondatingbacktothe1960swhen,afterremainingclosefriendswithPakistanforadecade,theUnitedStatesstayedneutralwhenPakistanwenttowarwithIndiain1965.PakistanisrememberwellthattheUnitedStatesusedthejihadistsagainsttheSovietUnioninAfghanistan,andasPresidentZardariwroteinaWashingtonPostop-edpiece,“oncetheSovietsweredefeated, theAmericans tookthenextbusoutof town, leavingbehind a political vacuum that ultimately led to the Talibanization of Afghanistan, the birth of AlQaidaandthecurrentjihadistinsurrectioninPakistan.”31

ThesesamethemesemergedinaconversationIhadin2010withahighPakistaniofficialduringadinner in Islamabad,whenheaskedmewhathadhappened toChileandictatorAugustoPinochet.

AfterItoldmyinterlocutorthatthedictatorhaddiedin2006,hesaid,“HereinPakistanwehaveourownPinochetscreatedbytheUnitedStateswhoarekillingourpeople,likeMullahOmar,HakimullahMehsud,andBaitullah.”

“Well,PinochetendedupbecomingaproblemfortheAmericans,”Iinterjected.“TheAmericansalwaysseekshort-termgainsandendupreapinglong-termhateandcrisis,”he

responded.IaskedhowheviewedtheBarackObamaadministration.“Ifwedon’tmoveagainsttheTaliban,wecouldforgodemocracyandthearmywillruledirectly.

Idon’tthinkPresidentObamawillignorethedangerstoourruleoflaw.Hedoesn’thaveachoice.HehastomindPakistan,becauseterrorismandnucleararmsarethenewColdWar.”

MUTUAL DISTRUST BETWEEN the United States and Pakistan will likely continue, althoughimprovements can occur. So long as Pakistan pursues its national interests—and it is perfectlylegitimatethatitwoulddoso—itsintelligenceagencieswillpragmaticallypreservetieswithIslamistextremists, just as once theUnitedStates found it expedient to allywithpeople likebinLaden andotherjihadistsagainsttheSovietUnion.Pakistan’sprudenceisjustifiedwhenitisaskedbytheUnitedStatestokillPakistaniTalibanmilitantsand,atthesametime,useitsinfluencetobringthemtothebargainingtable.

Itwouldnotbesurprising thatboth theUnitedStatesandPakistanwillcontinue their respective“double-dealings.”Pakistanwon’tstopgivingsanctuarytotheTalibananddealingwithmilitants,butat the same time, it cannot afford to abandon its alliance with Washington and the sizable aid itbrings.32Washington,inturn,willprodIslamabadtogoaftertheextremiststhatkillUStroopsandwill attack the Taliban and Al-Qaida with drones or SEAL teams if necessary, notwithstandingPakistanigovernmentopposition.TheUnitedStateswilllikelypreservenormalintelligencetieswiththe ISI to limit thedangerof further instabilityand topursue itsgoalofkeepingPakistaninuclearweaponsfromfallingintoTalibanorAl-Qaidahands.

WikiLeaks’ cache of US State Department cables released in late 2010 showed the mutualcomplicity betweenWashington and Islamabad on sensitive issues like the drone attacks.One suchcablerevealedthatthenprimeministerGilanigaveapprovaltotheUSdronecampaigninPakistan’stribalarea,suggesting that Islamabadwouldprotestpubliclybut then ignore theproblem.33ANewYork Times investigation found that secret negotiations had yielded a deal as far back as 2004 bywhich theCIAwould kill enemies of Pakistan’s armywith drone attacks, and the ISIwould allowregular CIA drone flights over the tribal areas to strike at US enemies.Washington would neveracknowledgetargetedmissilekillingsandIslamabadwouldeitherassumecreditorremainsilentonthe specific hits.34Musharraf did not think itwould be too difficult to hide the deal: “InPakistan,thingsfalloutoftheskyallthetime,”35heallegedlytoldaCIAofficer.Butby2013,droneattackshadbecomehighlycontroversial,mobilizingoppositionPakistanipoliticianandformercricketstarImranKhanandAmericanactivistsinpeacemarchesinthetribalregionstodemandanendtodronestrikes, and generating criticism from former US ambassador to Pakistan CameronMunter abouttheir excessive use. In theUnited States, public debate and criticismmounted regarding the dronestrikes policy, while a United Nations special rapporteur on human rights and counterterrorismcommented that the use ofU.S drones is a “violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty” and breaks down“tribalstructures.”36

There have been unintended consequences of the bilateral double games. Pakistan used to be a

countryof sophisticated and secular elites admiredby theWest, but now it is growinglypolarizedbetween thosewhoenvisionamodern,pluralist societyand thosewhoadhere to the intolerantandconservative version of Islamism. More and more Pakistanis have become anti-American anddetractors of the West. In 2012 a survey by the Pew Research Center showed that anti-AmericansentimentrunsdeepinPakistan:74percentofrespondentsconsideredtheUnitedStatesanenemy—upfrom69percent in2011and64percent in2008.37ThebilateralclimatewitnessedanimprovementwithSenatorJohnKerryastheUSsecretaryofstateofthesecondObamaadministration,asKerryhasbeenbehindthenormalizationofpreviouslyheld-upPentagonreimbursementstoPakistanforthestationingoftroopsontheborderwithAfghanistan,hasfrequentlyservedasanunofficialenvoytoPakistan,andisconsideredbyIslamabadtobesympathetictoitsconcerns.

Pakistanisareincreasinglydividedbetweenurbanandrural,theeducatedandtheilliterate,andbycompeting religious identities that erode the common idea of their nation. Most Pakistanis rejectterrorism and Islamic extremism, but assigning the blame for the deaths of 4,447 persons in 476majorterroristattacksin2011becomesblurredasjihadistideologyhaspenetratedPakistanisociety.TherearemanywhofaultthearroganceofAmericanpowerorfaultthelackofeconomicandsocialprogressderivedfromWashington’smillions.Inthemeantime,Pakistanislesssecurethanitwasadecade ago, andmany believe that it—notAfghanistan—has become themain battleground of theconfrontationbetweentheglobaljihadandcounterterrorism.

Benazir Bhutto would have probably had difficulties in selling reconciliation and a pluralistsociety in such a context. Two senior politicians, Punjab governor Salman Taseer andMinoritiesMinisterShahbazBhatti,wereassassinatedin2011astheycalledforamendmentstothecontroversialblasphemylaw.38GovernorTaseerwasassassinatedbyhisEliteForcebodyguardwhodeclaredhehadmurderedthegovernorbecauseTaseerhadcriticizedtheblasphemylawinacaseinvolvinganaccusedChristianwoman.

AcontroversyinSeptember2012involvingthearrestofaChristiangirlinaslumontheoutskirtsof Islamabad,accusedbyan Islamicclericof supposedlyburningpagesofa religious textused toteachtheKorantochildren,causedChristianresidentstofleefromacommunitythat,untilthen,hadlived peacefully beside aMuslim majority. The case experienced an about-face when theMuslimclericwasarrestedforplantingevidencetoincriminatethegirl,whowassubsequentlyreleasedandthechargesagainstherweredropped.Shortlythereafter,theshootingofschoolgirlMalalaYousafzaiby Taliban gunmen for advocating access to education for girls in her Swat Valley residencegenerated a wave of protests and outrage in Pakistan and throughout the world. In 2013 Malalarecuperatedfromherheadwoundsaftersurgery inBritain,shegaveamovingspeechaboutgirls’educationandwomen’sempowermentattheUNGeneralAssembly,andafundsetupinhernametobenefit girls’ education in Pakistan and Afghanistan had gathered significant resources. In themeantime, the Taliban has extended its reach of power and influence well beyond the country’sfrontierregion,asdemonstratedinitsreportedgrowingpresenceinlargecitiessuchasKarachi.39

Domestic political instability has been aggravated by the growing confrontation betweenPakistan’s Supreme Court and the elected civilian government of President Zardari. The SupremeCourthasengaged in judicialactivismdictating thepriceof sugarand fuel,directing the traffic inKarachi, and, more significantly, reviving a thirteen-year-old inquiry into accusations of electionriggingbytheISIthataimedatoustingBenazirBhuttoinfavorofNawazSharif.

TheSupremeCourtforcedoutPrimeMinisterYousufRazaGilaniforrefusingitsordertosendawrittenrequesttoSwissauthoritiesaskingthattheyreopenacorruptionprobeagainstZardaridating

back to the 1990s. The court continued its assault on the Zardari government by blocking thenominationofMakhdoomShahabuddin, hours after hehadbeen chosen as thenominee to replaceGilaniasprimeminister.PresidentZardarithennominatedRajaPervezAshraf,aformerministerofwaterandpower,asprimeminister,winningtheapprovalofParliament.TheSupremeCourtreissuedthenewprimeministertheordertowritealettertotheSwissauthoritiesrequestingthattheyreopenthegraftcaseagainstZardari,whichheeventuallydidinadraftapprovedconsensuallybythecourtandthegovernment.

Theescalatingconfrontationsbetweenthejudiciaryandthecivilianauthoritieshaveexacerbatedconcernsabout thefateofPakistanidemocracy.Manyhavesidedwith the judges in theircampaignagainstcorruptionandinfavoroftheruleoflaw.ButcriticsarguethattheSupremeCourtactsonlyrapidly and effectively against the government, that it is slowwhen cases affect the opposition oraccusedterrorists,andthatitisallrhetoricandlittleactionwhenitcomestosituationsimpactingthemilitary.40

COULDBENAZIRBHUTTOhavechangedthisstateofaffairs?VerylikelyshewouldhavesoughttodiminishtensionswithIndia,41reinintheISI,protecttherightsofsecularminorities,andadvocatepeace talks with the Talibanmuch earlier than what is now recognized as necessary. Perhaps shewouldhavemovedgraduallytostrengthencivilianinstitutions,reducingthearmy’sroleinpolitics.

Inher twostints asprimeminister,Benazir exhibitedmajorpolitical faults.Shewaspoliticallynaive at times, arrogant, and power hungry; she compromised rule-of-law principles and values,caredmoreabouttheformratherthanthesubstanceofgoverning,andwasundoubtedlyinvolvedincorruptionscandals.Suchadisappointingtrackrecordmadesomeobserversskepticalaboutwhatshecouldhaveaccomplishedforhercountry.Butinrecenttimes,shehadevolved,accordingtoabundantwitnesses.Shehadbecomemorehumble,politicallymature,andwillingtodothehardworkinvolvedinthedemocraticreconstructionofhercountry.

BenazirBhuttomighthaveplacedastrongfocusonakeyissueforPakistan’spresentandfuture:socioeconomic development. Knowing the United States as few politicians do, she would havelobbiednotonlyforeconomicandmilitaryaidbutalsoforeasingtradebarriersforPakistanigoodsandservices, thuscreating jobsanda largermiddleclass,and incorporatingmorewomen into thejobmarket. Creating conditions for the return or reengagement of many highly trained Pakistaniprofessionalswholiveabroadwouldhavebeenherconcern.

Trade, not just aid, seems to be key for a more economically independent and prosperousPakistan.Butworseningsecurityconditionsinthecountryhavedrivensomeindustries,liketextiles,tomoveoperations toBangladesh,wherewagesare lowerandexportsenjoypreferentialaccess totheEuropeanUnionmarket,unlikewhatoccurswithgoodsoriginatinginPakistan.

Thesedays,Pakistanfacesaneconomicmeltdown,withcripplinginflation,highunemployment,andanenergycrisisthatresultsinpoweroutagesthatcanlastuptosixteenhoursatatime.42Onlyabout half of the population has access to electricity, but even this segment experiences frequentblackoutsandshortages.Pakistan’sgrowingurbanizationandindustrializationdemandmoreenergy,buttheproductioncapacityofenergyremainsweakanditsdistributionsystemoutmoded.Despitethefact that the country has considerable energy resources, including gas, nuclear, coal, wind, andhydropower,andthatitexportedelectricitytoIndiainthepast,itdependsheavilyonenergyimportsandisprojectedtoundergoasevenfoldincreaseinitsenergydemandby2030.43

Although progress has beenmade in increasing net primary school enrollment rates and even

though literacy rates are rising fast, at least amongmen, schoolingdisparities are severe, rangingfrom2.4yearsofschoolingforthepoorest incomequintile to8.9yearsfortherichest.Itsunder-5mortality rate isoneof thehighest inAsiaandmalnutrition remainsatcritical levels.Agriculturalproduction has been dropping steadily over the years, and the country is now importingwheat, asruralpovertyhasincreased.RemittancesfromthemillionsofPakistanislivingandworkingabroadhave alleviated a situation of economic hardship that is causing rising levels of frustration andtension.

Pakistanisarichcountry,but33percentofitspeoplelivebelowthepovertyline,44whilethetax-to-GDP ratio is a low10percent, compared to the15percent average fordevelopingnations.Taxavoidance,morethantaxevasion,isamajoradditionalproblem,asfewerthanonemillionPakistanisvoluntarilyfileincometax,aratethatisamongthelowestintheworld.Outofthe39.1millionpeopleemployed, only 2.14million pay taxes, and almost none of these taxes are generated in the high-incomebracket,thusrequiringtheextensionofthenarrowtaxationbasethataffectstheelite.45InaninterviewwiththeFinancialTimes,Pakistan’swealthiestperson,MianMuhammadMansha,admittedthat people like him “should paymore taxes.” 46 A 2013 report of the international developmentselect committee of the UK House of Commons stated that “any increase in the UK’s officialdevelopmentassistancetoPakistanmustbeconditionalonPakistanincreasingitstaxcollectionandwideningthetaxbase.”47ThereportfurtherpointedoutthatseventypercentofthemembersofthePakistaniparliamentdonotfileataxreturn.

BenazirBhuttowanteddevelopmentchangeinhercountry,amorebalancedequationinthetiesbetweenthecivilianandmilitaryelite,andastrengtheningofthepoliticalinstitutionsofdemocracy.ShewantedtoovercometheColdWarmentalitythatassignedtoomanyresourcestosecurityforahypotheticalconfrontationwithPakistan’srisingIndianneighbor.ShewouldhaveprobablyappealedtotheUnitedStatestoseeksomeregionalunderstandingtobringPakistan,India,andChinatogetheronnuclearmatters,tomakesomesignificantheadwaywithIndiaregardingtheKashmirissue,andtostabilizePakistan’spoorlydemarcatedborderwithAfghanistan.

Bhutto would have probably made a good case inWashington that the main challenge in theregion is Pakistan, not Afghanistan, and that such a recognition would require stabilization andsocioeconomic development, as much as shared responsibilities to confront the extremist threat.Equallyimportant,shemighthaveurgedtheimplementationofreformsintaxation,landdistribution,education,and ruleof law,alongside theprovisionofmassive investments in infrastructure,water,energy, agriculture, trade, job creation, and combating poverty and inequality. She would haveprobably convinced theUnitedStates that such a hefty challengewould require time, patience, andsustained support. Benazir Bhutto wanted to prove wrong those who asserted that Pakistan wascondemnedtoremaina“failedstate.”Sheaspiredtomakesustainabledemocracyareality.

WhenNawazSharifwasinauguratedasthecountry’snewprimeministerinJune2013,followinghisPML-NpartyvictoryintheparliamentaryelectionsheldinMayofthatyear,Pakistanwitnessedforthefirsttimeacivilianelectedgovernment—thatofthePPP—completingitsfive-yeartermandhanding over power to another democratically elected government. In another first, the electionprocess was organized and overseen by a democratically designated caretaker government thatceased its functionswhenSharif assumedoffice.Further,MamnoonHussain, acloseallyofprimeministerNawazSharif,wassubsequentlyelectedpresidentofPakistanbylegislatorsofbothhousesofthenationalparliamentandfourprovincialassemblies,replacingAsifAliZardari.

The Taliban threats of violence and the attacks during the campaign that left more than one

hundredpeopledeaddidnotdetervoters.TurnoutintheMay2013electionswasabout60percent,aheftyincreasefromthe44percentregisteredin2008.First-timevoterscomprised34percentofallregisteredvoters.EuropeanUnionelectionobserversstatedthatat90percentofthepollingstationsmonitored,theconductoftheelectionwassatisfactoryorgood.Theelectoralrollshadbeencleanedof“ghostvoters”thatinthepasthadenabledvoterigging.ThisiswhatBenazirwishedtoseeinhercountry. Her assassination may have marked a turning point toward a far-reaching demand fortangible strides in democratic governance and the repudiation of violence, terrorism, anddevelopmentstagnation.

Sharif,attimesapoliticalrivalbutalsoanallyofBhuttointherecuperationofdemocracy,waselectedwithastrongmandatetomendhiscountry’sbrokeneconomyandtoconfrontotherdauntingdomesticandexternalchallenges,includinganewrelationshipwiththeUnitedStates.Benazirpavedthewaywithherpoliticalmessagethatadvocatedthepromotionofaneconomicallyandpoliticallystableandenlargingmiddleclass,whichshesawasfundamentaltosustaindemocracyinPakistan.Inher posthumously published book,Reconciliation, she proposed a “Marshall Plan” to improve thelivesofpeople inPakistan andotherMuslimnations, arguing that if theWestpursued the roadofdevelopment, itwould reapmoral andpragmaticgains, just as theUS image improved inopinionpolls following the sizableAmerican relief to thevictimsofPakistan’s2005earthquake thatkilledalmostninetythousandpeople.“EconomicreconstructioncanhelpturntheMuslimstreetaround,”48arguedBenazirBhutto,andthisisprobablythesurestwaytoachievethedreamsshehadforPakistanthatvanishedonthatfatefuleveningofDecember27,2007,atLiaquatBaghinRawalpindi.

Notes

Preface

1AliSethi,“LahoreMurderMystery,”NewYorkTimes,March4,2009.

2See“Letterdated2February2009fromtheSecretary-GeneraltothePresidentoftheSecurityCouncil,”UNSecurityCouncil,S/2009/67,February3,2009.

3“Letterdated3February2009fromthePresidentoftheSecurityCounciltotheSecretary-General,”UNSecurityCouncil,S/2009/68,February3,2009.

4SeeBillVarner,“Bhutto’sDeathtoBeProbedforUNbyChile’sMunoz,EnvoySays,”Bloomberg.com,February3,2009.

5BenazirBhuttoquotedbyIanJack,“BenazirBhutto,”VanityFair,May1986,www.vanityfair.com/culture/features/1986/05/Bhutto-198605.

6WilliamDalrymple,“Pakistan’sflawedandfeudalprincess,”Guardian,Saturday,December29,2007.

7See,forexample,“VictimoftheSystem,”Hindu,April23,2010.

1:AMurderForetold

1See“AConversationwithBenazirBhutto,”transcript,CouncilonForeignRelations,NewYork,August15,2007,2–3.

2Ibid.,5.

3Ibid.,7.

4Ibid.,4.

5BenazirBhutto,“WhenIReturntoPakistan,”WashingtonPost,September20,2007.

6BenazirBhutto,accordingtoepisodenarratedtotheauthorbyCherylBenard,May2013.

7SeeBenazirBhutto,Reconciliation:Islam,DemocracyandtheWest(NewYork:HarperPerennial,2008),219–220.

8See“Afterbombing,Bhuttoassailsofficials’ties,”NewYorkTimes,October20,2007.

9SeeHaroonSiddique,“DetectiveWithdrawsfromBhuttoAttackInvestigation,”Guardian,October24,2007.

10Musharrafquotedby“Musharraf,Benazirvowtofightextremism,”Zeenews.com,October20,2007,http://zeenews.india.com/print.aspx?nid=402390.

11Thewordbaghmeans“garden”andisusedtypicallyinSouthandSoutheastAsiancountries.ThewordbaghiscommontoPersian,Urdu,andotherlanguagesandreferstoanenclosedareawithtrees,shrubs,flowers,andothervegetation.

12LauraKing,“InPakistan,ItWasaRallyLikeManyOthers,”LosAngelesTimes,December28,2007.

13SalmanMasoodandCarlottaGall,“BhuttoAssassinationIgnitesDisarray,”NewYorkTimes,December28,2007.

14SeeM.YlyasKhan,“Bhuttomurder:Keyquestions,”BBCNews,February8,2008.

15See“BenazirBhuttokilledinattack,”BBCNews,December27,2007.

16FarooqNaekquotedby“Benaziraidesaysgovernmentexplanation‘packoflies’”Dawn,December29,2007.http://archives.dawn.com/2007/12/29/top6.htm.

17BahzadAlamKhan,“TelltaleImagesExposeFatalSecurityFlaws:Benazir ’sAssassination,”Dawn,December30,2007.

18MasoodandGall,“BhuttoAssassinationIgnitesDisarray.”

19IsambardWilkinson,RichardEdwards,andDavidBlair,“PakistanFacesHorrorofCivilWarafterBenazirBhuttoIsAssassinatedinSuicideAttack,”Telegraph,December27,2007.

20“BhuttoAttackerIdentified,ServantunderScanner,”RTTNews,January9,2008.

21SeeJobyWarrick,“CIAPlacesBlameforBhuttoAssassination,”WashingtonPost,January18,2008,A1.

22Ibid.

23SenatorSafdarAbbasiquotedbyBruceLoudon,“WhoKilledBenazir?,”AustralianMagazine,September19,2009.

24NaheedKhanquotedbyibid.

25AsifAliZardari,“TheDutyMyWifeLeftUs,”WashingtonPost,January5,2008.

2:AnEarlyHistoryofInstability

1SyedMuhammadZulqurnainZaidi,“TheAssassinationofthePrimeMinisterLiaquatAliKhan:TheFatefulJourney,”PakistanJournalofHistoryandCulture31,no.1(2010):71.

2SeeOwenBennet-Jones,“QuestionsConcerningtheMurderofBenazirBhutto,”LondonReviewofBooks34,no.23(December6,2012):10.

3SeeShahidSaeed,“MurderatCompanyBagh,”FridayTimes,Pakistan,March25,2011,26.

4Zaidi,“TheAssassinationofthePrimeMinisterLiaquatAliKhan,”85.

5OnJinnah’spoliticallifeandlegacy,seeStanleyWolpert,JinnahofPakistan(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1999).

6SeeJamsheedMarker,QuietDiplomacy:MemoirsofanAmbassadorofPakistan(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2010),116.

3:ViolenceintheFamilyandintheNation

1SeeBenazirBhutto,DaughterofDestiny:AnAutobiography(NewYork:HarperPerennial,2008),48.

2Ibid.,70.

3Ziaul-HaqquotedbyWilliamRichter,“ThePoliticalDynamicsofIslamicResurgenceinPakistan,”AsianSurvey19,no.6(June1979):555.

4ThepoisonedmangoestheoryinspiredthenovelbyMohammedHanif,ACaseofExplodingMangoes(London:JonathanCape,2008).

5SeeJamesBoneandZahidHussain,“AsPakistanComesFullCircle,aLightIsShoneonZiaul-Haq’sDeath,”Times,London,August16,2008.

6HamidGulquotedbyibid.

7SeeBarbaraCrossette,“WhoKilledZia,”WorldPolicyJournal(Fall2005):96.Crossettethoroughlyanalyzedthecase,includingdetailsfromalengthyinterviewwithformerambassadorDean,whosecareerwascutshortduetotheIsraeliinvolvementtheory,whichheadvocatedinternallyintheStateDepartment.

8VernonA.Walters,TheMightyandtheMeek:DispatchesfromtheFrontLineofDiplomacy(London:Little,BrownBookLimited,2001),197.

9Crossette,“WhoKilledZia,”95.

10SeeJanePerlezandVictoriaBurnett,“BenazirBhutto,54,LivedintheEyeofPakistanStorm,”NewYorkTimes,December28,2007.

11BenazirBhutto,DaughterofDestiny,357.

12Ibid.,285.

13AccordingtoFatimaBhutto,BenaziropposedblamingtheCIAandtheISIforShah’smurder.BenazirsupposedlywasbentoncooperatingwithWashingtonandavoidingconfrontationwiththeWest.SeeFatimaBhutto,SongsofBloodandSword:ADaughter’sMemoir(NewYork:NationBooks,2010),257–260.

14BenazirBhutto,DaughterofDestiny,405.

15BenazirBhuttoquotedbyRoryMcCarthy,“‘Ineveraskedforpower,’”Guardian,Wednesday,August14,2002.

16BenazirBhuttoquotedbyHassanAbbas,Pakistan’sDriftintoExtremism:Allah,theArmy,andAmerica’sWaronTerror(Armonk,NewYork:M.E.Sharpe,2005),142.

17BenazirBhutto,DaughterofDestiny,412.

18Ibid.,282–283.

19SeeFatimaBhutto,SongsofBloodandSword,208.

20Ibid.,312.

21BenazirofferedherbrotherparoleandhousearrestduringtheEidholiday,butMirMurtaza

refused,demandingthesameparoleforallpoliticalprisoners.

22RajaAnwar,TheTerroristPrince:TheLifeandDeathofMurtazaBhutto(London:Verso,1997),200.

23SeeTariqAli,“DaughteroftheWest,”LondonReviewofBooks29,no.24(December13,2007):13.

24Anwar,TheTerroristPrince,208.

25FatimaBhutto,SongsofBloodandSword,402–403.

26BenazirBhutto,DaughterofDestiny,421.

27OppositionleaderNawazSharifaccusedtheBenazirBhuttogovernmentofstateterrorismagainstitspoliticalopponents.See“BenazirBhuttoAccusedinBrother ’sDeath,”CNNWorld,September21,1996,http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9609/21/pakistan.bhutto/.

28SeeJohnF.Burns,“HouseofGraft:TracingtheBhuttoMillions—aSpecialReport,”NewYorkTimes,January9,1998.

29RoryMcCarthy,“‘Ineveraskedforpower.’”

30SeePeterR.Blood,“Pakistan-U.S.Relations,”CongressionalResearchService,TheLibraryofCongress,March10,2002,6.TheSupremeCourtjudgesfoundmanyindicationsthatthetrialagainstBhuttohadbeenrigged.

31PervezMusharraf,IntheLineofFire:AMemoir(NewYork:FreePress,2006),106.

32BenazirBhuttoquotedbyAhmedRashid,DescentintoChaos:TheUSandtheDisasterinPakistan,Afghanistan,andCentralAsia(London:PenguinBooks,2008),52.

33MusharrafquotedbyIkramSehgal,“Thepresidentwhoneverwas,”DefenceJournal,July2001.http://www.defencejournal.com/2001/july/president.htm.

4:OntheRoadtoIslamabad

1“BenazirMurder:UNProbeTeaminPakistan,”Hindu,February2,2010.http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/benazir-murder-un-probe-team-in-pakistan/article99249.ece.

2DeclanWalsh,“UNTeamArrivesinPakistanforInquiryintoBenazirBhutto’sDeath,”Guardian,July16,2009.

3Ali,“DaughteroftheWest,”3.

4MaqsoodTirmizi,“UNNottoNameCulpritsinBBMurderCase,”Nation,Pakistan,July18,2009,8.

5Aymanal-ZawahiriquotedbyScottStewart,“Pakistan:BitingtheHandthatFeedsYou,”Stratfor.comweekly,October7,2009,4.http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20091007_pakistan_biting_hand_feeds_you.

6See“BhuttoAssassination:UNWantstoQuizMusharraf,”Allvoices.com,November6,2009.http://www.allvoices.com/news/4562167-quiz-musharraf/s/41555399-benazir-murder-case.

5:TheUSGravitasinPakistaniAffairs

1SeeMusharraf,IntheLineofFire,201.

2DialoguequotedbyZahidHussain,“AGeneralturnaround,”Newsline,February14,2003.http://www.newslinemagazine.com/2003/02/a-general-turn-around/.

3ChamberlinquotedbyMusharraf,IntheLineofFire,205.

4MuhammadAliJinnahquotedbyDennisKux,DisenchantedAllies:TheUnitedStatesandPakistan,1947–2000(BaltimoreandLondon:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,2001),20.

5LiaquatAliKhanquotedbyibid.,3.

6AyubKhanquotedbyibid.,57.

7RichardNixonquotedbyibid.,61.

8MohammedAyubKhan,FriendsNotMasters(London:OxfordUniversityPress)citedinibid.,74.

9LyndonJohnsonquotedbyibid.,148.

10DennisKux,DisenchantedAllies,177.

11SeeMargaretMacmillan,NixonandMao:TheWeekthatChangedtheWorld(NewYork:RandomHouse,2007),221.

12Ibid.,224.

13AbdulQadeerKhan,ametallurgistbyprofession,hadbeenworkinginauranium-enrichmentfacilityintheNetherlandswhenheofferedhisservicestothegovernmentofPakistan,becomingthefatherofthecountry’snuclearweaponsprogram.WhentheUSgovernmentpresentedevidencetoMusharrafinSeptember2003thatA.Q.Khanwasinvolvedinnuclearproliferationactivities,thegovernmentputhimunderhousearrest.

14AdrianLevyandCatherineScott-Clark,Deception:Pakistan,theUnitedStates,andtheSecretTradeinNuclearWeapons(NewYork:Walker&Company,2007),48.

15SeeMarker,QuietDiplomacy,274.

16Ibid.,298.

17AbdulSalamZaeef,MyLifewiththeTaliban(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,2010),33.

18Rashid,DescentintoChaos,10.

19“PunishPakistan’sPerfidyontheBomb,”NewYorkTimes,July17,1987.

20BhuttoquotedbyKux,DisenchantedAllies,302.

21SeeHassanAbbas,Pakistan’sDriftintoExtremism,140.

22Marker,QuietDiplomacy,339.

23Seethedetaileddiscussiononthesubjectinibid.,340–41.

24BillClinton,MyLife(NewYork:AlfredA.Knopf,2004),864–65.

25Ibid.,865.

26SeeAbbas,Pakistan’sDriftintoExtremism,176.

27USambassadorWilliamMilamquotedbyRashid,DescentintoChaos,48.

28Ibid.,50.

29Seeibid.,4.

30Ibid.,3.Pakistan’sinfluencewiththeTalibaninKabulwassuchthatKarzaisaidthatoncehewascalledbythePakistaniForeignOfficetodiscussthemodalitiesofhimbecomingtheTaliban’senvoytotheUN.(Seeibid.,13–14.)

31RichardArmitage,quotedbyibid.,58.

32Ibid.,78.

33SeeSeymourHersh,“TheGetaway,”NewYorkTimes,November24,2001.

34GeorgeW.BushquotedbyJoshuaKurlantzick,“MusharrafforBrains,”NewRepublic,March26,2008.

35GeorgeW.Bush,PublicPapersofthePresidentoftheUnitedStates,2002,Book1,USGovernmentPrintingOffice,February13,2002,1.

36TeresitaC.Schaffer,“U.S.InfluenceonPakistan:CanPartnersHaveDivergentPriorities?”WashingtonQuarterly(Winter2002–03):179.

37SeeMarianePearl,AMightyHeart(NewYork:Scribner,2003),182.

38MushahidHussain,“Pakistan’sWashingtonEmbraceLoosens,”AsiaTimes,September14,2002.http://www.atimes.com/atimes/printN.html.

39CondoleezzaRicequotedbyibid.

40USintelligencedidnotdetecttheseactivitiesuntillate2005becausesurveillancesatellitecapability,covertcommandstrengthandotherassetsalongtheAfghan-Pakistaniborderdidnotexist,astheseresourceshadbeenshiftedtotheIraqwarsurge.SeeHeraldoMuñoz,ASolitaryWar:ADiplomat’sChronicleoftheIraqWarandItsLessons(Golden,Colorado:Fulcrum,2008),20-21.

41Rashid,DescentintoChaos,229.

42Musharraf,IntheLineofFire,250.

43In2005theWhiteHousehadsubscribedtoanagreementwithIndiatosellitnuclearfuelandreactorsforitsciviliannuclearprogram,whiledenyingasimilardealwithPakistan.

44SeeMadeleineK.Albrightquotedin“PakistanIsWorld’s‘MostDangerousCountry’Ex-USOfficialSays,”GlobalSecurityNewswire,February2,2009.

45CondoleezzaRice,NoHigherHonor:AMemoirofMyYearsinWashington(NewYork:CrownPublishers,2011),608.

6:TheUS-BrokeredReturnofBhuttotoHerHomeland

1SeeAdrianLevyandCathyScott-Clark,“ThePlottoBringBackBenazir,”Guardian,July20,

2007.Seealso“TheStorybehind‘Benazir-MusharrafContacts,’”Dawn,Pakistan,July22,2007.

2SeeBenazirBhutto,Reconciliation:Islam,DemocracyandtheWest(NewYork:HarperPerennial,2008),227–228.

3See“TheStorybehind‘Benazir-MusharrafContacts.’”

4SeeBenazirBhuttointerviewwithDeanNelson,“DefiantBhuttoplansreturn,”SundayTimes,April15,2007.

5Rice,NoHigherHonor,609.

6Ibid.,210.

7See“2007:PattersonUrgesTariqAziztoProvideforBenazir ’sSecurity,”Dawn,May22,2011.

8SeeRonSuskind,TheWayoftheWorld:AStoryofTruthandHopeinanAgeofExtremism(NewYork:HarperPerennial,2009),280–281.

9BenazirBhuttoquotedbyibid.,335.

10SeeSimonWalters,“Bhuttoemailnamedkillersweeksbeforeassassination,”DailyMail,Sunday,December30,2007.

11SeeRobinWrightandGlennKessler,“U.S.BrokeredBhutto’sReturntoPakistan,”WashingtonPost,December28,2007.

12Rashid,DescentintoChaos,377.

13Rice,NoHigherHonor,610–611.

7:TheAssassination

1SeeRashid,DescentintoChaos,378.

2HamidKarzaiquotedbySteveColl,“TimeBomb:ThedeathofBenazirBhuttoandtheunravelingofPakistan,NewYorker,January28,2008.http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/01/28/080128fa_fact_coll.

3SherryRehman,adistinguishedjournalist,wasthefederalministerforinformationandbroadcasting(2008–2009).PresidentAsifAliZardarinamedherPakistanambassadortotheUnitedStatesonNovember23,2011.

4SeeCarlottaGall,“MusharrafsaysBhuttotookexcessiverisks,”NewYorkTimes,January4,2008.

5Accordingtothevehicle’sdriver,itwasNaheedKhanwhotoldBenazirtowavetothecrowd,afterwhichBenaziraskedfortheescapehatchtobeopened.

8:Whodunit?

1See“Transcript:AllegedAlQaedaConversationregardingBhuttoKilling,”FoxNews,December28,2007.http://www.foxnews.com/story/2007/12/28/transcript-alleged-al-qaeda-conversation-regarding-bhutto-killing.ThefulltranscriptisalsofullyreproducedinLauraKing,“PakistanlaysblameonTaliban,”BaltimoreSun,December29,2007.

2See“ISIOfficialProvidedContentforBBMurderPressConference:Cheema,”Dawn,March15,2011.

3Seetheexecutivesummaryofthereportin“ScotlandYardreportintotheassassinationofBenazirBhuttorevealed,”CNN.compressrelease,February8,2008.

4See“Pakistan’sMostWanted:BaitullahMehsud,”Jane’s,February12,2008.

5AsecondJIT,ledbytheFederalInvestigativeAgency,wasconstitutedinOctober2009tofurtherinvestigateBhutto’sassassination.ThisinvestigationwasinitiatedbytheMinistryoftheInterioreighteenmonthsafterthePPPgovernmentpresidedoverbyAsifAliZardari,Bhutto’swidower,hadcomeintopowerinPakistan.

6“BaitullahMehsudsayshisbombersarewaitingforBenazirBhutto,”DailyTimes,Pakistan,October5,2007.

7Mehsud’sspokesmanquotedbyCarlotaGall,“LocalmilitantsinPakistanaddtoQaedathreat,”NewYorkTimes,December30,2007.See,also,“Ididn’tkillBenazirBhutto,”TimesNow,December30,2007,andJasonFarago“Al-QaedaallydenieshandinBhuttokilling,”Newser.com,December29,2007.http://www.newser.com/story/15191/al-qaeda-ally-denies-hand-in-bhutto-killing.html.

8ImranLalaniandQuratulainSiddiqui,“WhoisBaitullahMehsud?”,Dawn,Pakistan,March31,2009.

9“‘WeassassinatedAmerica’spreciousasset,’boaststopAlQaedacommander,”DailyMail,London,December29,2007.

10SyedSaleemShahzad,“AlQaedaclaimsBhuttokilling,”AsiaTimes,December27,2007.

11JobyWarrick,“CIAplacesblameforBhuttoAssassination,”WashingtonPost,January18,2008.

12SeeBruceRiedel,“MumbaiTerrorAttackGroupLashkareTayyibaNowMoreDangerousthanAlQaida,”DailyBeast,July1,2012.SeealsoJayshreeBajoria,“Lashkar-e-Taiba,”CouncilonForeignRelations,January14,2010.

13SeethereportbyMarkMazzetti,ScottShane,andAlissaRubin,“ABrutalAfghanClanBedevilstheU.S.:HaqqaniCrimeEmpire,anIslamistForceIsSeenasPakistan’sProxy,”NewYorkTimes,September25,2011,A1–A14.

14SeedeclarationsbyGeneralPashaquotedbySalmanMasood,“PakistaniPoliticiansRejectMullen’sCharges,”NewYorkTimes,September30,2011,A10.

15CharlieWilsonquotedinEmmaGraham-Harrison,“HaqqaninetworkisconsideredmostruthlessbranchofAfghaninsurgency,”Guardian,September7,2012.

16BenazirBhuttoquotedbySteveColl,“TimeBomb:ThedeathofBenazirandtheunravelingofPakistan.”

17SeeAmirMir,“‘YoucannameMusharrafasmyassassinifIamkilled’:Benazir”inSamiHussainPanher(ed.),ArticlesWrittentoPayTributetoMohtarmaBenazirBhutto,http://www.bhutto.org,2008.

18HassanAbbas,Pakistan’sDriftintoExtremism,134.

19GulquotedbyLoudon,“WhoKilledBenazir?,”4.

20RobertNovak,“RiggingPakistan’sElection?,”WashingtonPost,December3,2007,A17.

21SeeOwenBennet-Jones,“QuestionsConcerningtheMurderofBenazirBhutto,”LondonReviewofBooks,6–10.

22BenazirBhuttoquotedbyDeclanWalsh,“Bhutto’sreturnsparksassassinationfears,”Guardian,Sunday,October14,2007.

23SeeAnatolLieven,“UnderstandingPakistan’sMilitary,”ISN,SwissFederalInstituteofTechnology,Zurich,August12,2010,1.

24SeethedebateinAshleyJ.Tellis,FredericGrare,andRobertBoggs,ReformingPakistan’sIntelligenceAgencies,CarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeace(Washington,DC:FederalNewsService,March11,2009).

25SeeHassanAbbas,Pakistan’sDriftintoExtremism,255.

26LieutenantGeneralAsadDurrani,“ISI:AnExceptionalSecretService,”Canarytrap.in,August22,2011.http://www.canarytrap.in/2011/08/22/isi-an-exceptional-secret-service/.

27Ibid.,5.

28“UNCommissionNotAllowedAccesstoArmy:RehmanMalik,”Nation,Pakistan,January4,2010.

29“UNCommissionNotAllowedAccesstoArmy:Malik,”NewsInternational,Pakistan,January4,2010.

30PresidentZardariapparentlyresistedtherestorationofChaudhrybecausehefearedthepoliticalreopeningofcorruptionchargesagainsthimunderthechiefjudgeandbecauseheconsideredthejudgetooclosetotheopposition.SeeZahidHussainandMatthewRosenberg,“PakistanMilitaryChiefTriestoMediateStandoff,”WallStreetJournal,March14–15,2009,A5.

31In2010theonlyPakistaniinthesameTime’slistofonehundredmostinfluentialpeoplewasthedirectorgeneraloftheISI,GeneralAhmedPasha.

32SeeSyedIrfanRaza,“UNProbeTeamChiefmeetsKayani,”Dawn,February26,2010,1.

33RichardEliasandJeremyWatson,“BhuttomurderblamedonPakistanagents,”ScotlandonSunday,December30,2007.

34AhmedRashidreportedthisconversationinaninterviewhehadwithKarzai.SeeRashid,DescentintoChaos,378.

35BenazirBhuttoquotedbySteveColl,“TimeBomb,”NewYorker.

36SeeDeclanWalsh,“CourtChallengesPutUnusualSpotlightonPakistaniSpyAgency,”NewYorkTimes,February7,2012,A4–A8,andDeclanWalshandSalmonMasood,“TurmoilinPakistanasPrimeMinisterIsIndictedinContemptCharge,”NewYorkTimes,February14,2012,A4–A10.

37SeeCarlottaGall,“PakistaniMilitaryStillCultivatesMilitantGroups,aFormerFighterSays,”NewYorkTimes,July4,2011,A4.

38Durrani,“ISI:AnExceptionalSecretService,”3.

39SeeLoudon,“WhoKilledBenazir?,”4.

40“EmailtoBeUsedOnly‘ifIAmKilled,’”Dawn,Pakistan,Saturday,December29,2007,and“BhuttoSaidShe’dBlameMusharrafifKilled,”CNN.com,December28,2007.http://edition.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/asiapcf/12/27/bhutto.security/

41MusharrafquotedbyLallyWeymouthin“TwoLeaders,onaCollisionCourse,”interviewswithBenazirBhuttoandPervezMusharraf,NewsweekandTheDailyBeast,December14,2007.http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2007/12/14/two-leaders-on-a-collision-course.html.

42SeeShamim-ur-Rahman,“PPPLetterSeeksUNInvestigationCommission,”Dawn,January17,2008.

43SenatorBidenquotedinCarlottaGall,“LocalmilitantsinPakistanaddtoQaedathreat.”

44SeeChristinaLamb,“WhoMurderedBenazirBhutto?,”SundayTimes,London,May2,2010.

45SeeSuskind,TheWayoftheWorld,268.

46HaroonquotedbyBloombergcable,“PakistanUnlikelytoActonBhuttoReport,UNEnvoyHaroonSays,”Businessweek.com,April16,2010.http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-04-16/pakistan-unlikely-to-act-on-bhutto-report-un-envoy-haroon-says.html.

9:TheInvestigation’sRepercussions

1SeeSaeedShah,“BhuttoKillingConspiracyTheoristsFeelVindicatedbyHintsofStateInvolvement,”Guardian,April16,2010.

2DeclanWalsh,“PakistanPoliceOfficerstoBeArrestedoverDeathofBenazirBhutto,”Guardian,December5,2010.

3SabrinaTavernise,“UN’sBhuttoReportSaysWhatPakistanisAlreadyKnowaboutSpyAgencyandArmy,”NewYorkTimes,April17,2010.

4“BenazirBhutto’sAssassination:PakistaniMurderMystery,”Economist,April16,2010.

5HamidGulquotedbyMazharTufall,“HamidGulSaysItIs‘SaveZardariReport,’”NewsInternational,Pakistan,April17,2010.

6“MusharrafAideCallsUN’sBhuttoReportLies,”Dawn,April16,2010.

7SeeA.Kohar,“UNTeamHeadHeraldoMunozIsanOldSuicideBomber,”PakistaniSpectator,April19,2012.

8SeeYousefNazar,“DawnColumnist’sSpinonBB’sMurder,”StateofPakistan,May2,2010.

9BabarquotedinSaeedShahandEwenMacAskill,“PakistantolaunchnewinquiryintoBenazirBhuttomurderafterUNreport,”Guardian,April16,2010.

10SeeAsimYasim,“MusharrafIsBB’sKiller:PPP,”NewsInternational,April17,2010.

11“PakistanWelcomesUNReportonBhuttoAssassination,”Dawn,April16,2010.

12See“HaroonHailsUNReportonBenazirMurder,”Nation,Pakistan,April19,2010.

13PresidentZardariquotedbySyedIrfanRaza,“UNReportHasVindicatedPPP:Zardari,”Dawn,

April17,2010,1.

14“UNReportHasStrengthenedGovernmentHands,SaysZardari,”NewsInternational,May6,2010.

15See“PakObjectstoUN’sBenazirAssassinationReport,”OneIndiaNews,June23,2010.http://m.oneindia.in/news/2010/06/23/pakobjects-to-uns-benazir-assassinationreport.html.

16Seedeclarationsin“UNRejectsPakObjectionsoverCommission’sBenazirMurderReport,”Thaindian.com,July14,2010.http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/south-asia/un-rejects-pak-objections-over-commissions-benazir-murder-report_100395521.html.

17VariousPakistaninewspapersquotedin“Pak‘Jittery’overUNResponsetoQureshi’sObjectionsonBBMurderProbe,”Thaindian.com,July15,2010.http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/south-asia/pak-jittery-over-un-response-to-qureshis-objections-on-bb-murder-probe_100396111.html.

18See“BenazirBhuttoassassination:‘PakistankeepingUNletterunderwraps’,”Zeenews.com,December28,2012.http://zeenews.india.com/print.aspx?nid=819328.

19Dawnandothersquotedin“PakMilitaryForcedGovernmenttoRecordProtestwithUNonBenazirMurderReport,”Thaindian.com,December25,2010.http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/south-asia/pak-military-forced-govt-to-record-protest-with-un-on-benazir-murder-report_10047911.html.

20“StatementattributabletotheSpokespersonoftheSecretary-General,”NewYork,March30,2010.

21SeeForeignMinisterQureshiquotedbyMarianaBaabar,“UN,PakistanatoddsoverBenazirmurderreport,”NewsInternational,Friday,April2,2010.

22SeeSikanderShaheen,“Governmentseekingfurtherextension,”Nation,Pakistan,April6,2010,1.

23UNspokespersoninPakistanquotedby“UNdelaysBenazirmurderreportatZardari’srequest,”NewsInternational,Pakistan,March31,2010.

24MusharrafhadtoldBenazirononeoccasion,aftertheleaderofDubaihadcontactedhimaboutthethreatstoher,thatsheshouldbelievetheUAErulerifshedidn’ttrusthim.

25“ISI’sTopSecretLetterUnfoldsNewDimensionofBBMurderCase,”Dawn,December26,2011.Reportedly,whenMalikreceivedthisthreatinformation,hewroteathree-pagelettertoSecretaryKamalShahrequestingenhancedsecurityforBenazir.

26See“FormerPrimeMinisterBhutto’sAssassinationWasPartofaConspiracy:FIA,”Dawn,November16,2010,3.

27Ibid.,2.

28ShakeelAnjum,“FCCLiterallyTrashesUNReportonBBMurder,”NewsInternational,May8,2010,1,8.

29SaudAzizquotedby“PoliceOfficersDefendWashingtheBBCrimeScene,”NewsInternational,May5,2010.

30RehmanMalikquotedby“MalikSaysUNReportDidn’tExposeBBKillers,”NewsInternational,April28,2010,1.

31See“OsamaInvolvedinBenazirMurder:RehmanMalik,”NDTV.com,June22,2011.

32SeeAndrewBuncombe,“PakistaniInteriorMinister‘toRevealBenazirBhuttoKillersinBook,’”Independent,December4,2012.

33PresidentZardariquotedin“Thosegivenrefuge30yearsagokilledBB:Zardari,”NewsInternational,April28,2010,1.

34AbdulQayyumKhanJatoiquotedby“PakistaniMinisterResignsAfterCriticizingtheArmy,”WashingtonTimes,September26,2010.

35See“BBCase:ISIandMIOfficialstoBeGrilled,”NewsInternational,December23,2010.

36SeeWalsh,“PakistanPoliceOfficerstoBeArrested.”

37See“SaudAziz,KhurramShahzadArrestedinBenazirCase,”Dawn,December22,2010.

38“Pakistan:PervezMusharraf‘Accused’overBhuttoMurder,”BBCNews,February7,2011.

39QuotedbyMehreenZahra-Malik,“ProsecutorinBhuttoassassinationcaseshotdead:police,”Reuters,May3,2013.www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USBRE94205R20130503.AnAlQaidamilitantwasarrestedasoneoftheallegedattackers(see“AlQaedaActivistArrestedinMurderofBenezirBaseProseccutor,”Dawn,June14,2013).

40FawadChaudhryquotedby“MusharrafWillNotComplywithWarrant:Spokesman,”Dawn,February12,2011.

41SeeRaufKlasra,“BBAssassinationProbe:‘MurderPlotHatchedatBrigadier ’sHome,’”ExpressTribune,January14,2011.http://tribune.com.pk/story/97269/benazir-bhutto-assassination-probe-murder-plot-hatched-at-brigadiers-home/.

42See“BhuttoMurder:PakistanPoliceandTalibanCharge,”BBCNews,November5,2011.Also,“PakistanIndicts7inBhuttoAssassination,”NewYorkTimes,November5,2011.

43See“MalikSays27TerroristGroupsInvolvedinBenazir ’sMurder,”Dawn,February21,2012.Shortlythereafter,inmid-April,theSupremeCourtadvisedMinisterMaliktoquitpublicofficeinordertoconductanewtransparentandinfluence-freeinvestigationofthecrime,consideringthatthepreviousonehadnotincludedMinisterMalikasasuspect.

44ForasummaryoftheFIAreport,seeAsadKharal,“BenazirBhuttoAssassinationCase:JITCompleteReport,”ExpressTribune,February21,2012.http://tribune.com.pk/story/339661/benazir-bhutto-assassination-case-jit-complete-report/.

45MusharrafquotedbyAdamGabbatt,“PervezMusharrafVowstoReturnto‘Suffering’PakistanduringVisittoUS,”Guardian,July1,2012.

46SalmanMasood,“MusharrafgreetedinPakistanbythreatsandsmallcrowds,”NewYorkTimes,March24,2013.

47See“Musharraffacingpetitionsgalore,”Dawn,March28,2013.

48See“ATrialwithoutanEnd,”Dawn,December27,2012.AtthefifthanniversaryofBenazir ’s

murder,thefederalministerforinformationandbroadcastingsaidthatoneofBhutto’ssuspectedassassinshadjustbeenkilledinadronestrike,whilethe“remainingaccusedlanguishedinjail.”“Benazir ’sKillerDiedinDroneAttack:Kaira,”Dawn,December27,2012.

49BilawalBhuttoZardariquotedin“Bilawalanointedtorch-beareronBBanniversary,”Dawn,December28,2012.

Epilogue:ReflectionsonBhutto,binLaden,andPakistan’sTiestotheUnitedStates

1Clinton,MyLife,798.

2Ibid.,873.SeealsoBobWoodwardandThomasRicks,“CIATrainedPakistanistoNabTerroristsbutMilitaryCoupPutanEndto1999Plot,”WashingtonPost,October3,2001.

3Rashid,DescentintoChaos,224–225.USassistantsecretaryofstateKarlInderfurthhaddeliveredabluntmessagetothePakistanisaskingthemtohandoverZubaydah,buttonoavail.

4USambassadortoAfghanistanZalmayKhalilzadquotedinSethG.Jones,IntheGraveyardofEmpires:America’sWarinAfghanistan(NewYork:W.W.Norton,2010),265–266.

5See“PakistaniArmyDeniesSharingUSReportwithBombMakers,”NewYorkTimes,June18,2011,A8.

6PresidentGeorgeW.Bush,“ThePresident’sNewsConferencewithPresidentPervezMusharrafofPakistan,”TheWhiteHouse,September22,2006.

7Rashid,DescentintoChaos,407.

8SeeSpecialReport:PeterBergen,“TheLastdaysofOsamabinLaden,”andGrahamAllison,“Howitwentdown,”Time179,no.18(May7,2012):26–41.

9SeeNicholasSchmidle,“GettingBinLaden,”NewYorker,August8,2011.SeealsoMarcAmbinderandD.B.Grady,“TheStoryofHowU.S.SpecialForcesInfiltratedPakistan,”Atlantic,February16,2012.

10MarkMazzetti,“SignsthatBinLadenWeighedSeekingPakistaniProtection,”NewYorkTimes,May27,2011,A7.

11SeeBaqirSajjadSyed,“‘Culpablenegligence,incompetenceatalllevelsofgovernment’:report,”Dawn,July9,2013.

12Dr.Afridiwassentencedtothirty-threeyearsinprisonandafineequivalenttoabout$3,500.SeeIbrahimShinwariandJibranAhmed,“PakistaniDoctorJailedforHelpingCIAFindBinLaden,”Reuters.com,May23,2012.

13ThisincidentstrainedCIA-ISIrelationsfurtheras,initially,theCIAdeniedthatDaviswasanagencyemployee.SeeMarkMazzetti,“Pakistan’sPublicEnemy,”NewYorkTimesMagazine,April9,2013,30–41.

14SeeDavidSangerandEricSchmitt,“WhiteHouseAssailsPakistanEffortonMilitants,”NewYorkTimes,April6,2011,A6.Seealso“PakistanandUSinPatch-UpEfforts,”Dawn,April8,2011,2.

15AdmiralMullenquotedby“Haqqaninetworkisa‘veritablearm’ofISI:Mullen”,Dawn,September22,2011.

16SeeMasood,“PakistaniPoliticiansRejectMullen’sCharges,”A10.

17PresidentObamaquotedbyRickGladstone,“ObamaWarnsPakistanisonMilitants,”NewYorkTimes,October7,2011,A4.

18SeeMansoorIjaz,“ItIsTimetoTakeonPakistan’sRadicalJihadistSpies,”FinancialTimes,October11,2011,9.

19SeeShaiqHussain,“Ex-EnvoyHusainHaqqaniWasbehindMemoSeekingUSHelp,PakistaniProbeFinds,”WashingtonPost,June12,2012.

20SeeEricSchmidtandSalmanMasood,“PakistaniStrainsPromptLeadertoRaceHome,”NewYorkTimes,December19,2011,A5.

21SeeGilaniquotedbySalmanMasood,“PakistaniPremierWarnsofPlottingbyMilitary,”NewYorkTimes,December23,2011,A13.

22SeeKayaniquotedbySalmanMasoodandMatthewRosenbert,“AsRumorsBuzz,Pakistan’sMilitaryDeniesTalkofaCoup,”NewYorkTimes,December24,2011,A4.

23InSeptember2010,aftertwoPakistaniparamilitarysoldierswerekilledinasimilarborderclash,PakistanclosedthelandroutethroughitsterritorythatNATOusestosupplyitsforcesinAfghanistanformorethanaweek.

24SeeEricSchmittandDavidSanger,“USSeeksAidfromPakistaninPeaceEffort,”NewYorkTimes,October31,2011,A1,andAlissaRubin,“FormerTalibanOfficialsSayUSTalksStarted,”NewYorkTimes,January29,2012,A9.

25ArifRafiq,“TheEmergenceoftheDifa-e-PakistanIslamistCoalition,”CTCSentinel,CombatingTerrorismCenter,March22,2012.HafizSaeed,amainproponentoftheDPCandtheheadofabannedcharitylinkedtoLashkar-e-Taiba,issoughtbytheUnitedStates,whichoffereda$10millionrewardforinformationleadingtohisarrest(thePakistanigovernmentandtheoppositionstronglycriticizedtheannouncedreward).However,Saeedisnotinhiding,ashegaveapressconferenceinmid-2012tauntingUSauthoritiestocomeandgethim.SeeJoshuaKeating,“FivePeopleWhoAreNotinJailinPakistan,”ForeignPolicy,May23,2012.

26LeonPanettaquotedby“LeonPanetta:USOfficialsReachingtheLimitsofOurPatiencewithPakistan,”HuffingtonPost,June6,2012.http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/06/07/leon-paneta-pakistan-patience_n_1577118.htm.

27SeeByronTau,“ClintonApologizestoPakistan,AnnouncesSupplyRouteDeal,”Politico,July3,2012.http://www.politico.com/politico44/2012/07/clinton-apologizes-to-pakistan-announces-supply-route-127966.html.IthadbeendiscussedthatPakistanwasdemandinganincreaseintransittaxesfrom$250pertruckto$5,000pertruck,whichUSDefenseSecretaryPanettahaddescribedas“pricegouging.”

28JanePerlez,“TheFightoverHowtoEndaWar,”NewYorkTimes,October20,2011,A14.

29SeeYogeshJoshi,“UnderstandingPakistan’sNuclearRationale,”ISN,SwissFederalInstituteofTechnology,Zurich,May26,2011.

30SeeFarhanBokhariandKathrinHille,“PakistanSolicitsChinatoBuildNavalBaseatSouth-WesternPort,”FinancialTimes,May23,2011,1.SeealsoHarshV.Pant,“ChinaandPakistan,”

ISN,SwissFederalInstituteofTechnology,Zurich,June20,2011.

31AsifAliZardari,“TheFrontieragainstTerrorism,”WashingtonPost,June22,2009.

32TheKerry-Lugar-BermanAct,signedbyPresidentObamainOctober2009,promised$7.5billioninnonmilitaryaidoverfiveyears.ItrequiresthesecretaryofstatetocertifythatPakistaniscooperatinginthwartingnuclearproliferationandterrorisminAfghanistanandelsewhere.See“StateofVulnerability,”Economist,February13,2012.Since9/11,Pakistanhasreceivedmorethan$20billioninmilitaryanddevelopmentassistance,notcountingcovertfunds.

33SeePirZubairShah,“MyDroneWar,”ForeignPolicy,March–April2012,6.http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/27/my_drone_war.

34SeeMarkMazzetti,“Asecretdealondrones,sealedinblood,”NewYorkTimes,April7,2013,A1andA8.

35Musharrafcitedbyibid,A8.

36See“UNofficialsaysUSdronesbreachPakistan’ssovereignty,”NewYorkTimes,March16,2013,A5.

37SeeSalmanMasood,“NATOSupplyTrucksfromPakistanResumeTrektoAfghanistan,”NewYorkTimes,July5,2012,A4.SeealsoPewResearchCenter,“GlobalAttitudesProject:GlobalOpinionofObamaSlips,InternationalPoliciesFaulted,”Wednesday,June13,2012.

38ThePakistanPenalCodeforbidsblasphemyagainstanyrecognizedreligion,providingpenaltiesthatrangefromfinestodeath.PakistanprotectsIslamicauthority,giventhatIslamisthestatereligion,accordingtotheconstitution.Numerouspeopleaccusedofblasphemyhavegoneintohidingorhaveleftthecountryafterbeingsubjectedtoharassmentorattacks.ThecallsforreformofthecodetolimitabuseandrestrictionsonfreedomofexpressionhavebeenstronglyresistedbyIslamicpartiesandhavenotprogressed.Twitter,Facebook,andtheInternetingeneralaremonitoredbytheauthoritiesandinsomeinstanceshavebeenblockedforcontentsallegedlyoffensivetoMuslims.

39SeeDeclanWalshandZiaur-Rehman,“TalibanterrorizeKarachiasthenewgangintown,”NewYorkTimes,March29,2013,A1andA3.

40ThearmyalsoindirectlycriticizedChaudhrywhenarmychiefKayaniwarnedthat“noindividualorinstitutionhasthemonopolytodecidewhatisrightorwrongindefiningtheultimatenationalinterest,”towhichthejudgerepliedthatthecourt’sparamountauthoritywasenshrinedintheconstitution.(SeeSalmanMasood,“TopPakistaniGeneralsandJudgesTradeBarbs,”NewYorkTimes,November6,2012,A7.)TheimageofPakistan’sChiefJusticeChaudhrywassomewhattarnishedwhenhiscourtbrushedasideaccusationsfromabillionairewhotestifiedthathehadgivenChaudhry’sthirty-two-year-oldson$3.7millioninbribesandbankrolledluxuryvacationsinLondonandMonteCarloforthesonandhiswife.

41InSeptember2012,PakistanandIndiasignedavisaagreementeasingrestrictionsfortravelers,asignificantsteptowardnormalizingrelations.Moreover,bilateraltradebetweenthetwocountrieshasjumpedfrom$300millionin2004to$2.7billionin2011.SeeSalmanMasood,“IndiaandPakistanSignVisaAgreement,EasingTravel,”NewYorkTimes,September9,2012,A12.

42Ironically,inAugust2012,neighborandrivalIndiawasaffectedbyamajorpowerblackoutthatleft670millionpeoplewithoutelectricity.

43SeeRomanMuzaleosky,“EnhancingPakistan’sEnergySecurity,”ISN,SwissFederalInstituteofTechnologyZurich,July18,2011.

44The2012UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme(UNDP)HumanDevelopmentIndex(HDI)notedanimprovingtrendinthenation’sHDIvaluesince1980.However,PakistanranksamongthecountrieswithLowHumanDevelopment,occupyingthenumber146positionamong186countries.(SeeUNDP,TheRiseoftheSouth,HumanDevelopmentReport2013,NewYork,2013,143and150.)Povertyincidencedecreasedfrom34.5percentin2000–2001to22.3percentin2005–2006,thelatestyearforwhichofficialfiguresareavailable.(SeeExecutiveBoardoftheUNDP,theUNFPA,andtheUNOPS,“DraftCommonCountryProgramforPakistanandtheUNDPResultsandResourcesFramework,2013–2017,”DP/DCCP/PAK/1,July30,2012,3.)

45SeeSalmaSiddiqui,“SurvivaloftheRichest,”ISN,SwissFederalInstituteofTechnologyZurich,October6,2010.

46MianMuhammadMansha,interviewbyHennySender,“ThereIsaLotofAngerinPakistan,”FinancialTimes,August11–12,2012,3.

47“UKaidtoPakistanshouldstopunlesstaxesrise,MPssay,”Channel4.com,April4,2013.http://www.channel4.com/news/uk-aid-to-pakistan-should-stop-unless-taxes-rise-mps-say.

48BenazirBhutto,Reconciliation,306.

Acknowledgments

THISBOOKTOOKmorethantwoyearstowrite.Itbeganasaworkintendedtorevealthebehind-the-scenesstoryoftheUnitedNationscommissioninquiryintotheassassinationofBenazirBhutto,and it turned intoa larger storyabout theBhuttoclan,Pakistanipolitics,US-Pakistani ties, and thethreatstodemocracyposedbyextremismandthwarteddevelopment.

I owe a debt of gratitude to several peoplewho helpedme in the task of conceiving and thenwritingthisbook,whilelearningagreatdealintheprocess.

My literaryagentFredricaFriedmanencouragedme toenvisageamoreambitiousbook than Ihadplanned, andwiselyguidedme in theprocessofpreparinga soundproposal. I am immenselythankfultoTomMayer,senioreditoratW.W.Norton&Company,whogavemesubstantiveadvice,polishedmyfirstdraft,animatedmetodigdeeperintomanyissues,andwaspersonallysupportiveofmyresearchandwritingthroughouttheprocess.RyanHarrington,Tom’sassistantatW.W.Norton,attendedpatientlyandefficientlytothemanydetailsofthebook’sproduction.KristinRothablyeditedmymanuscript,polishinglanguageanddraftingstyle.

My friend and UN colleague Helen Clark, former prime minister of New Zealand andadministrator of the United Nations Development Programme, read the entire initial draft,encouraged me to complete the project, and provided me with valuable substantive and editorialsuggestions. I am also very appreciative to writer Ahmed Rashid, a noted authority on Pakistaniaffairs,andtomycommissioncolleaguePeterFitzgerald,bothofwhomreadthemanuscriptofthebookandgavemepraisefulcommentsandconcreteideas.RichardHaass,presidentoftheCouncilonForeignRelations, also read themanuscript and affordedme a thoughtful reflection and collegialencouragement.

IamparticularlythankfultoAmbassadorZalmayKhalilzad,formerUSenvoytoAfghanistanandesteemed colleague from the period we coincided at the United Nations as ambassadors of ourrespectivecountries.Zalandhiswife,Dr.CherylBenard,knewBenazirBhutto,andtheygrantedmevaluableinformationaboutherviewsandstateofmindbeforeshereturnedtoPakistanin2007;theyalsoreadthefullmanuscript,providingmewithdetailedcommentsonbothsubstanceandstyle.

Last but not least,mywifePamela, alwaysmy supporter and source of inspiration, backedmethroughouttheresearchandwritingprocessthatusedupmanyweekendsandvacationsand,attimes,helpedmewith researchanddraftingqueries.MydaughterPaloma,anacademic inherown right,regularlydemandedupdatesonmywritingprogressthatstimulatedmetopushahead.

Finally, I thank the people of Pakistan, whom I learned to appreciate and admire during theinteractionsIhadwiththeminPakistanandabroad.Theircountrydeservesthebest.

HERALDOMUÑOZNewYork,June2013

Index

Pagenumbersinitalicsrefertoillustrations.

Abbas,Athar,192Abbasi,Safdar,35,136,142–43Abbasi,Zaheerul-Islam,171Abbottabad,38,208–11Abdullah,Nasrullah,163AbrahamLincoln,USS,207AbuDhabi,120,122Afghanistan,21,60,87,111,113,115,179,195–97,205assassinsfrom,38–39India’sinvolvementin,217Sovietinvolvementin,51–52,55,91,95–99,101,169,212,219Talibancontrolof,103,106,171;seealsoTalibanUSinvolvementin,87–88,96–97,107–8,206–8,213,216–17,239n

Afridi,Shakil,211,249nAgenceFrancePresse,32–33Ahmadis,46Ahmed,Mahmood,87–88Ahmed,NadeemIjaz,158Ahmed,Rasheed,163AirForce,US,55,91Aitizazuddin,NawbazadaMirza,39Akbar,Said,38–39Akhtar,QariSaifullah,171–72Albright,MadeleineK.,114–15Ali,ChaudhryZulfikar,199–200Allende,Salvador,18AlliancefortheRestorationofDemocracy,70Al-Qaida,32,62,83,88,107,108–13,165–67,205–6,208–12,216–17,219,220B.Bhuttoassassinationinvolvementof,34,153,165–67,181,183,185,197,199,247n

AngurAdda,207,209Anwar,Raja,65ArabianSea,218Armitage,Richard,88,107Ashraf,RajaPervez,223

AsiaTimes,165Aslam,Chaudhry,136AwamiLeague,42–44Awan,Babar,136,192AyubKhan,Mohammad,40–44,90–92Aziz,Saud,82,140,144,146–48,159,198–202Aziz,Shaukat,183Aziz,Tariq,119

Babar,Faratullah,136,198Babar,Naseerullah,67,96–97,103Bachelet,Michelle,16bagh,232nBaghdadPact,90Bahawalpur,53–54BalochistanProvince,101Bangladesh,44,225BanKi-moon,15–17,35,186,188,191–95BBCNews,32Beg,MirzaAslam,56,60,100,102Benard,Cheryl,26BenazirBhuttoHospital,145Bhatti,Shahbaz,222Bhutto,BegumNusrat,48,50–51,53,57,168Bhutto,Benazir,22,48,116arrestsof,31,53,59,130assassinationof,seeBhutto,Benazir,assassinationofcorruptionallegedof,19,69,70,118,123–24,224CouncilonForeignRelationsspeechby,23–25democracyadvocacyof,19,24–25,27,53,63,115,119,125,138,169,228dismissedgovernmentsof,22,61–62,67,102,104,169,178,179,223earlylifeof,19,49–50FirstInformationReport(FIR)of,30marriageof,56militaryresponseto,22,59–60,61,63,99modernizationby,60,169,181Musharrafnegotiationswith,24–25,118–311986returntoPakistanby,27,531993attemptedassassinationof,62–63oppositionleadershipof,53,57,62,70,99,114Pakistani“Establishment”responseto,19,63,168–72,178,185,199primeministershipof,22,59–61,62,99–103ScotlandYardinvestigationof,142–43,160–62securityfearsof,19–20,25–27,31,122,126,134–35,166,168,171–72,178,182,184,196Sharifallianceof,70

2007electoralcampaignof,24–26,31–32,134,138,1692007Karachibombattackon,29–31,164,170–71,174,1822007returntoPakistanby,24–30,117–31,168,175,176–78,183–84,1952007securityprovisionsfor,28,122,126–28,132–33,135–45,174,182,183–85,195,198,200–202

Bhutto,Benazir,assassinationof,31–34,72,74–75,132,133–51accidentalwoundtheoryof,34,153–54Al-Qaidainvolvementin,34,153,165–67,181,183,185,197,199,247ncauseofdeathin,149–50,154–55,162InteriorMinistryreporton,76–77,153–54JointInvestigationTeamon,155–56,159–61,163–64,171–72,174–75,241nMusharraf’sconnectionsto,26–28,153–54,161,164,177,181–83,189–91,200–202,246nPakistanintelligenceagenciesin,154,159,162–63,173–75,200PakistanPeople’sPartyand,32–35,135–40,149–50,157policeinvolvementin,136–38,140–50,181,199–200postmortemexaminationin,146–49,200ScotlandYardinvestigationinto,135–40,142–43,149–50,157TalibanplotterBaitullahMehsudin,34,153,162–66,172,175,177,181,202UNCommissionofInquiryinto,15–17,20–21,72,73–85,149–50,152,158–61,165–66,173–75,177–78,181,183,186,188–203

Zardariand,147–48,180,190–91,193–95,199Bhutto,Fatima,66,234nBhutto,MirMurtaza,48,50–51,53,56–58,63–68deathof,66–68,235n

Bhutto,Rehana,57–58Bhutto,Sanam,48,57Bhutto,Shahnawaz,20,48,51,53,56–59deathof,58–59,234n

Bhutto,ZulfikarAli,18–20,32,40–47,48,52,57,59executionof,18,47,50,95Islamists’relationshipwith,45–46,96majoraccomplishmentsof,45–47Pakistanpresidencyof,44–47USrelationshipwith,46,91–93,94–95,117–31

Biden,Joe,130,183–84,214Bilal(Saeed),162BilawalHouse,29binFaisal,Turki,96binLaden,Hamza,166binLaden,Osama,60–61,87,105,106,108,109,166,171,179,199,205–6UStrackingof,205–12

Blackburn,117Blackwater,127,170,189Blair,Tony,117Blitzer,Wolf,182

Boucher,Richard,121,123,194Brown,Gordon,161Brzezinski,Zbigniew,96Bugti,NawabSahib,199Bush,GeorgeH.W.,100,101Bush,GeorgeW.,86,107,108–10,113,121,130,165–66,207–8

Carter,Jimmy,94–96Casey,William,97CentralTreatyOrganization(CENTO),41,90ChaklalaAirBase,147–48Chamberlin,Wendy,88CharterofDemocracy,114Chaudhry,Fawad,201Chaudhry,IftikharMuhammad,113–14,129,176,243nCheema,Javed,34,153–56,164,177,198Cheney,Dick,108–9,112–15,118,127–28,130–31,170Chile,15–16,18,21China:Pakistanrelationswith,41–42,44,102–3,218USdialoguewith,93

Christiancontroversy,222CIA,34,40,55,91,100,104,109,166,179,196,205–6,208,210,212,216,220–21,234n,249nAfghanistaninvolvementof,96–97,107–8,208

Clinton,Bill,103,104–5,106,205–8Clinton,HillaryRodham,213,216–17ColdWar,89–92,169,226Cole,USS,107CompanyBagh,36,37seealsoLiaquatBagh

Congress,US,55,127CouncilofWomenWorldLeaders,64Crossette,Barbara,55,234n

Darul-Ulummadrassa,52Darusman,Marzuki,20,82,84,188DaughterofDestiny(B.Bhutto),18Davis,Raymond,212,249nDawn,177–78,192,197–98,202–3DawnNewsTV,33–34Dean,JohnGunther,55,234nDefenseDepartment,US,99DefenseofPakistanCouncil(DPC),216,250nDeobandimovement,52,167Dictator’sShadow,The(Muñoz),190

Difa-e-PakistanIslamistCoalition(DPC),250nDogar,Azmat,136–37dronestrikes,166,172,208,213,216,220–21,248ndrugcartels,24Dulles,JohnFoster,90dupatta,60,146Durrani,Asad,59,173,178,179Durrani,MahmudAli,54

EastPakistan,42–44,93–94seealsoBangladesh

Economist,189Eisenhower,Dwight,90,91Elahi,ChaudhryPervaiz,30,123,154–55,181Elahi,MuhammadIrfan,141,146EliteForce,136–37,141–42,144Enterprise,USS,94

Fahim,MakhdoomAmin,120,134–35,143Farooq,Yaseen,144FBI,55FederalInvestigationAgency(FIA),155,197–98,200–202,241nFinancialTimes,226Fitzgerald,Peter,20,80,81,152Ford,Gerald,94ForeignAssistanceAct,GlennAmendmentto,95FrontierConstabulary,83FrontierCorps,96FuenteOvejuna,184–85

Galbraith,Peter,100Gandhi,Indira,44,93GarhiKhudaBaksh,150GenevaAccords,99Gilani,YousufRaza,78,165–66,190,213,215,218,220,223Goss,Porter,87Grant,MarkLyall,118GreenBerets,209Guardian,74–75,172,188Gul,Hamid,30,54–55,56,59,60,170,178,181,189,216Gul,Husnain,163GulfStates,167GulfWar,102Gwadar,218

Haass,Richard,23

Haig,Alexander,98Haq,Farhan,191–92Haq,Mahbubul-,42Haqqani,Husain,184,214Haqqani,Jalaluddin,111,167–68,179Haqqaninetwork,167–68,202,213,215–16Harakat-ulJihadIslami(HUJI),171Haroon,AbdullahHussain,75,185,186,188,191–92,194HarvardUniversity,19,49Hassan,Gul,45Hayat,Abbas,34Hayden,MichaelV.,34,166Hekmatyar,Gulbuddin,96,97,101,103Herridge,Roy,66–67HudoodOrdinances,51–52,167HumanRightsWatch,188Hussain,Abida,29Hussain,ChaudhryShujaat,30,183Hussein,Saddam,102

Ijaz,Mansoor,214Ijazul-Haq,Muhammad,55ImtiazHussain,Major,128,135,140Inderfurth,Karl,248nIndia:borderskirmisheswith,69,104–5embassybombingof,179andfoundingofBangladesh,44Kashmirtensionswith,39,69,91,104–6,2261965Pakistanwarwith,41–421971Pakistanwarwith,93nuclearpolicyof,44,104,217–18,239nPakistanitensionswith,39,41–42,99,108–9,167,179,211,217–19USarmsdealswith,92,216UStiltto,89,90,93,217–18

IntelligenceBureau(IB),25–26,30,71,170InternationalIslamicUniversity,52InternationalMonetaryFund,67Interpol,202Inter-ProvincialCouncilofCommonInterests,50Inter-ServicesIntelligence(ISI),26,62,63,71,88,172–75,197Afghaniinvolvementof,52,60,87,96–97,101,103,107–8,111,170,171,179,205–7,209,213B.Bhuttorapportwith,63,169,172,178courtcasesagainst,178–79fundamentalistsupportby,62,102–3,167,169–70,179–80,206–7,209,213–15,220

headstaffof,30–31,54–55,56,67,87,88,170,173–74,175–76,178,181,216Kashmirinvolvementby,104–5,205politicalinvolvementof,26,56,59–63,65,67,99,134,172–73,175–76,178–80,188,200,214,223

post-assassinationactivityof,149,154,159,162–63,173–75,200USrapportwith,106–8,109,196,211,220,249nseealsomilitaryservices,Pakistan

Islamabad,52,86,95,114RedMosqueviolencein,114,122,166“redzone”of,74,80

IslamicDemocraticAlliance,56IslamicJamhooriIttehad(ITI),62Islamistextremists,19,24,38–39,83,105–6,109–10,114,119,129,133,168,179,184seealsoAl-Qaida;jihadis;suicidebombers;Taliban;terroristorganizations

Ispahani,Farahnaz,191Israel,83

JaanNisaarBenazir,28–29,32Jadd,Ghafoor,149Jamaat-e-IslamiParty,52,111Jamaat-ud-Dawa,167JamiatUlema-e-IslamParty,206Jatoi,AbdulQayyumKhan,199Javed,Hamid,119jihadis,83,109,166–67,169–70,179,196,200,208,211–14,216–21,222–24,227Jinnah,MuhammadAli,39–40,52,89jirga,199Johnson,Lyndon,92–93Junagadh,20Junejo,MuhammedKhan,53,99

Kabul,103,108,179,213Kaira,Tauqir,135–37,139Kallu,ShamsurRahman,178Kansi,MirAimal,104Kappes,Stephen,179Karachi,28–31,40,66,129,164,170–71,174,182,223Kargil,104–5Kargiloffensive,69Karzai,AbdulAhad,107Karzai,Hamid,107,108,111–12,134–35,178,193–94,197,217,238nKashmir,39,69,91,102,104–6Jammuand,41terroristsin,106,109,170,205

Kasuri,AhmedRaza,46–47

Kayani,AshfaqParvez,112,119,125,134,173–74,175–78,179,207,209,213–15Kennedy,JohnF.,92Kennedy,Patrick,135Kennedy,Ted,27Kenya,106Kerry,John,127,212,221Kerry-Lugar-BermanAct,251nKGB,55KhalidSheikhMohammed,111Khalilzad,Zalmay,26,123,207Khan,AghaMohammadYahya,43–44,93–94Khan,A.Q.,94,98,113,237nKhan,Aurangzeb,145,149Khan,GhulamIshaq,22,55–56,61–62,100,102Khan,Imran,221Khan,MalikIftikharAli,69–70Khan,MuhammadMussadiq,34,145–46,149,155Khan,Naheed,35,135,142–43,240nKhan,NajafKhan,38Khan,Rahim,45Khan,Zamurd,33Khar,HinaRabbani,217Kiani,Salas,117Kissinger,Henry,43,93,94Korea,89Kunduz,108Kuwait,102

Lahore,16LahoreHighCourt,69,198–99Larkana,150Lashkar-e-Taiba(LeT),167,212,250nLawyers’movement,114Leghari,Farooq,67LiaquatAliKhan,31,36,37–38,89assassinationof,36,38–39

LiaquatBagh,31,32,36,38,72,80–82,132,133–39,156–60,174,198Libi,AbuYahyaal-,216LineofControl,104–5London,200

Majeed,Abdul,155,160Malik,Rehman,34,75–78,119,120,128,133,136,144–45,152,173,192–94,196–99,201–2,247nMalor,Ben,82Mansha,MianMuhammad,226

Marker,Jamsheed,43Marshall,George,89Massoud,AhmadShah,96,107Maudoodi,Maulana,52MehranBank,178–79Mehsud,Baitullah,34,153,162–66,172,175,177,181,202“memogate,”214MightyandtheMeek,The(Walters),55Milam,William,106MilitaryIntelligence(MI),26,30,60–61,71,158,170,178,200militaryservices,Pakistan,22,23–24,40,43–46,50–53,62–63,69,71,114,129–30,169,172–80,

191–92,199,206–9,211–15,220,223–24,226;seealsoInter-ServicesIntelligence;Musharraf,Pervez;Ziaul-Haq,Muhammad

Milliband,David,128Mirani,Razaq,136Miranshah,167Mirza,Iskander,40Mossad,55MovementfortheRestorationofDemocracy(MRD),52–53Moynihan,DanielPatrick,100MuhajirQuamiMovement,65Muhajirs,65,67MuhammadAliJinnahmausoleum,28–29mujahideen,55,96–99,101,162,165,167Mukhtar,ChaudhryAhmed,218Mullen,Michael,179,207–9,214Muñoz,Heraldo,UNassassinationcommissionledby,15–17,73–85,152,175–78,186,187–90,193–

96,219Munter,Cameron,221Musharraf,Pervez,78,86,105,141–42,165–66,168,170,181,183–85assassinationattemptsagainst,112,171,175,176–77B.Bhuttoassassinationcomplicityof,181–83,190,200–202B.Bhutto’sdifferenceswith,24–25,118–31,181–82,196B.Bhuttosecuritywarningsby,26–28,246ndictatorshipof,69–71,106emergencyruledeclaredby,31,69,129–31,206post-assassinationactivityof,153–54,161,164,177,182,202UNBhuttoAssassinationreportresponseby,189–90USrapportwith,87–89,106–14,118–31,206–7,211–12,220–21

“Mush-Bushaxis,”118MuslimBrotherhood,52MuslimLeague,56“Muslimstreet,”209–10,228MutualDefenseAssistanceAgreement,90MyLifewiththeTaliban(Zaeef),97

Naeem,Nusrat,149Naek,Farooq,32–33,182–83Nahyan,SheikhZayedbinSultanAl,120Najibullah,Mohammad,101Nambiar,Vijay,15Nasir,Javed,102–3NationalReconciliationOrdinance(NRO),Pakistan,124NationalSecurityAgency(NSA),U.S.,90–91NATO,215–17Negroponte,JohnD.,130NetherlandsForensicInstitute(NFI),162NewYorkTimes,32,33,55,68,98,188–89,220Nice,France,57–58Nixon,Richard,90,93NoHigherHonor(Rice),120NorthernAlliance,87,107–8Novak,Robert,170–71NuclearNonproliferationTreaty,95

Oakley,Robert,101–2Obama,Barack,207–9,213,215Omar,MullahMohammed,111,206OrganizationoftheIslamicConference(OIC),45OxfordUniversity,19,50

Pakistan:anti-Americansentimentin,218–19,221–22Anti-terrorismActof,155,163blasphemylawof,222China’sborderagreementwith,41ColdWarpressuresin,40–42,89–90corruptionin,20,68EighthConstitutionalAmendmentof,61–62,67,68electionirregularitiesin,125–26,131“Establishment”in,19,63,70–71,177–79,185,191ethnicnationalismin,39–40,65,67humanrightsin,95,98Indiantensionswith,39,41–42,99,108–9,167,179,211,217–19instabilityin,37–47,223–25intelligenceagenciesof,25–26,153,157,160–61,169–70,172,174–75,177–81,184,188–89,191–92,200,207,209,211,215–16;seealsoIntelligenceBureau;Inter-ServicesIntelligence;MilitaryIntelligence

InteriorMinistryof,34,38,74,76–78,153,183,193,197,201,241nJointInvestigationTeam(JIT)in,155–56,159–61,163–64,171–72,174–75,241nmediain,32–34,80,123,154,164,177–78,187–88,191–92,195,197–98,212,219

militaryin,22,23–24,39,43–46,50–53,62–63,69,71,114,129–30,169,172–80,191–92,199,206–9,211–12,214–15,220,223–24,226

1958martiallawin,23–24,401969martiallawin,431973constitution,451977coup,46nuclearpolicyof,44,55,59–60,94,98,100–102,104,106,109,113–14,169,208,213–14,218–20,226,237n

polarizationgrowingin,221–23policein,41,64,68–70,114;seealsoRawalpindipolicedepartmentsocioeconomicdevelopmentneededin,42,224–282005earthquakein,2282013electioncampaignin,227–28USMutualDefenseAssistanceAgreementwith,40–41

Pakistan,Islamizationof,51–52,62,165,168–69,216,221–22Z.Bhuttoresponseto,45–46Zia’spromotionof,51–52

PakistaniInternationalAirlines,64,69,84PakistanMuslimLeague,37,45PakistanMuslimLeague-Nawaz(PML-N),78,114,125,129–31,142,145,227PakistanMuslimLeague-Quaid(PML-Q),30,121,123,125,130,142PakistanPeople’sParty(PPP),27–29,31–33,35,42–43,46–47,50–51,56,63,65,78,114,121,124–

25,129–30,203,227assassinationdayactionsof,32–35,134–35,136–40,149–50,157B.Bhuttoaschairof,27,50–51,53,68,114electoralvictoriesof,56,62,78,227foundingof,42PML-Qnegotiationswith,121,123–24

Panetta,Leon,216,250nPasha,AhmedShuja,173,175,177,243nPasha,MustaphaKemal,18Pashtuns,101,103,106,108,153,165Pathans,103Patterson,AnneW.,126,214Pearl,Daniel,110,170Pell,Claiborne,27Peshawar,91,97,106,111,199,206PetrolineFZC,76PewResearchCenter,221Pinochet,Augusto,18,21,219Powell,Colin,87–88,108Powers,Gary,91PPP(ShaheedBhutto),65PresslerAmendment,98,100–101,102ProjectZ,196

Punjab,59,64,110,140,154–55,161,166,172,176,181inquirycommissionof,158–59

Quarterman,Mark,20,73Quetta,111–12,199,206Qureshi,QudsiyaAnjum,146Qureshi,SalehShah,164Qureshi,ShahMehmood,192

Rabbani,Burhanuddin,96RadcliffeCollege,19,49Rafaqat,Muhammad,163Rafique,Shahid,201Rahim,ArbabGhulam,181Rahman,AkhtarAbdur,96Rahman,Mujibur(SheikhMujib),42–44Ralston,Joe,205–6Ramadan,51Raphel,Arnold,53Rashid,Ahmed,97,107,130Rauf,Abdul,198Rawalpindi,31,37–38,47,72,74,112,132,138,142,157antiterroristcourtof,199–202

RawalpindiGeneralHospital,34,143–47,149–50,156–57,171Rawalpindipolicedepartment,38,80–82,136–38,140–50,155–61,177,181,199–200obstructionofjusticeby,155–59,161,185,198,200

Reagan,Ronald,administrationof,27,52,59,97–99,100Reconciliation(B.Bhutto),171,228Rehman,Javed-ur-,135Rehman,Sherry,35,138,144,150,240nRice,Condoleezza,111,115,118,120–21,124,194RTTNews,33–34

Saeed,Hafiz,250nSahib,Emir,163Sahib,Maulvi,153,163Salala,215–17Sanaullah,Rana,172SaudiArabia,52,70,96,98,102,119,133,195–96ScotlandYard,35,39,66assassinationinvestigationby,77,142–43,160–62

SEALs,U.S.Navy,207–9,212NavalSpecialWarfareDevelopmentGroupof,209

SEATO,40–41,90SectionS,210,214

Sen,Nirupam,17SenateIntelligenceCommittee,U.S.,87September11,2001,terroristattacksof,87,107,213Sethi,Ali,16Shah,Abdullah,65–66,68Shah,Aitzaz,163Shah,Ijaz,30,110,170–71,181Shah,Kamal,154,197Shahabuddin,Makhdoom,223Shahenshah,Khalid,33–34,136Shahzad,Khurram,144,156–59,201–2ShamsiAirBase,215Shariatlawcourts,51–52,53Sharif,Nawaz,25,56,62,64,76,99,114,119,131,138,142,206,235nISIbackingof,59,62,99,223prime-ministershipof,62,68–70,102–3,104–5,227–28

Sharif,Shahbaz,105Sheikh,AhmedOmar,110,170Shevardnadze,Eduard,101Shias,55,165,168,181Shibh,Ramzibinal-,109Siegel,Mark,27,100,182,195SimlaAgreement,44SindhAssembly,202SindhHouse,74,75,82,84SindhProvince,19–20,30,56,65,68,74,84,91,150,160,181Singh,Manmohan,217Solarz,Stephen,27SongsofBloodandSword(F.Bhutto),66SovietUnion,40–42,51–52,90,91Afghanistaninvolvementof,95–99,101,169,212,219Indiasupportby,91

Spain,68,76SpecialOperationsForces,212Specter,Arlen,135Starr,Gregory,83StateDepartment,U.S.,95,103,130,220Stingermissiles,98–99Straw,Jack,117–18suicidebombers,143,162,163,164,172SummaryofInvestigationandTrialConductedSoFarforUNFact-FindingCommission,77Sunnis,51,166–67SupremeCourt,Pakistan,53,62,64,69,122,171,179,202,210,214,247njudicialactivismof,223–24

Suskind,Ron,127,184

SwatValley,222–23Switzerland,68,223

Taj,Nadeem,133–34Taliban,52,101,103,109,165–66,171,205–7,209,211–12,215–16,219,238nAfghangovernmentof,87,97,106–8Pakistanbranchof,83,101,107,111–15,122,134,162,164–70,175,177,179,181,185,199,200–201,211,220,222–23,227

Pakistaniintelligenceinvolvementwith,52,87–88,109,111Tanzania,106Taseer,Salman,222TashkentAgreement,42Tehrik-i-TalibanPakistan(TTP),83,165,202Telegraph,33Tenet,George,109terroristorganizations,65,168,179,181,216Thatcher,Margaret,64Time,176ToraBora,108tribalareas,34,113,115,164–65,167,207–8,220–21Truman,HarryS.,36

UnitedArabEmirates,128,133,194–97,246nUnitedKingdom,114B.Bhuttosupportby,116,117–19,128–29,168ForeignOfficeof,117–18MetropolitanPoliceCounterTerrorismCommand(SO15)of,161–62MI5divisionof,178

UnitedNations,15–17,50Pakistanofficesof,195–96SafetyandSecurityDepartment(DSS),73–74,83,84sanctionslistof,167SecurityCouncil,16–17,42,44,167,217WorldFoodProgram(UNWFP),83,84

UnitedNationsBhuttoAssassinationCommissionofInquiry,15–17,20–21,72,73–85,149–50,152,158–61,165–66,173–75,177–78,181,183,186,188–89

Pakistanresponseto,189–203westernmediaresponseto,188–89,195

UnitedStates-Pakistanrelations,27,40–41,53–54,59–60,87–115,118–31Afghanpoliciesin,96–99,101,106–8,111–13,205–7,209,213,221armsdealsin,90,93–95,97,98,101–2,251nB.Bhuttoand,115,116,117–31,168Musharrafand,87–89,106–14,118–31,206–7,212,2211959bilateralsecurityagreementin,91,95tensionsin,207–22,239n,250n

Ziadictatorshipand,51–54Urdu,57,65Usmani,MullahAkhtar,207

Vajpayee,AtalBihari,104

Wahhabis,52WallStreetJournal,110Walters,Vernon,55waronterror,107,112–14,130–31,168,212,216WashingtonPost,25–27,34,35,166,219WayoftheWorld(Suskind),184Waziristan,108,113,122,162,164–66,207,209WestPakistan,42–43,94WikiLeaks,126,214,220Wilson,Charlie,98–99,168women’s,girls’rights,51–52,64,106,120,122,168,222–23

Xinjiang,102–3,218

Yasmin,Saeeda,145Yazid,Abual-,165Yousafzai,Malala,222–23Yousef,Ramzi,62,103

Zadrantribe,167Zaeef,AbdulSalam,97Zaman,Sher,163Zardari,AsifAli,15,19,30,34,35,56–57,62,65–66,68,147–48,168,180,240ncorruptionaccusationsagainst,19,61,64,67,68–70,104,123–24,223,243nimprisonmentof,68,118Pakistanpresidencyof,15,35,78–80,176,214–15,219,223,241n,243nUNBhuttoassassinationprobeand,79–80,190–91,193–95,199,214

Zardari,BilawalBhutto,203Zawahiri,Aymanal-,83,165Zia,Tauqir,136Ziaul-Haq,Muhammad,18,27,46,50–53,54,170Afghanpolicyof,51,95–99,101deathof,53–55,99dictatorshipof,18,27,30,46,50–53,57,58,63,95resistanceagainstdictatorshipof,51,52–53

Zubaydah,Abu,106,109,206–7,248n

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