George Bealer - The possibility of philosophical knowledge

7/27/2019 George Bealer - The possibility of philosophical knowledge

1/78

Ridgeview Publishing Company

The Philosophical Limits of Scientific EssentialismAuthor(s): George BealerSource: Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 1, Metaphysics (1987), pp. 289-365Published by: Ridgeview Publishing CompanyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2214149 .

Accessed: 22/09/2013 11:12

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Ridgeview Publishing Company is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to

Philosophical Perspectives.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 193.198.212.4 on Sun, 22 Sep 2013 11:12:16 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=rpchttp://www.jstor.org/stable/2214149?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/2214149?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=rpc


2/78

Philosophical erspectives, , Metaphysics, 987

THE PHILOSOPHICAL LIMITS OFSCIENTIFIC ESSENTIALISM1GeorgeBealerReed College

Part 1: The Autonomyof Philosophy1. Will cience Eclipse Philosophy?

Philosophersretypicallynterestedn suchquestionss thenatureofsubstance,mind, ntelligence, erception, nowledge,wisdom,truth,xplanation, ausation, reedom, urpose, oodness, uty,hevirtues,ove, ife, nd happiness.Typically, hey re not nterestedin suchquestions s the natureofwater,heat, emon, rthritis,rthedistinction etween beech and elm.These questionsbelongtoempiricalcience, ndphilosophersrenot, s philosophers,ypicallyinterestedhem. nbeing nterestedn suchthings s thenature fmind, ntelligence,hevirtues, nd life,philosophers o not wantto knowwhatthosethingsusthappento be, butratherwhatthosethingsmust be. It is notenoughthatthe virtue fpietyhappenedto be whatEuthyphroxhibited; philosopherwants o knowwhatpietymustbe. It is a requirementn a satisfactoryhilosophicaltheoryhat t houldholdnecessarily. philosopher ishes o knowwhatmind, ife, hevirtues, ndso fortheally re in a strongense:whattheyhave to be, not ustwhatthey happento be.Since the timeofPlato,philosophers ave nearly ll agreed that,at least n most ases,theanswer oa philosophical uestion houldbe a necessarynotcontingentruth. lato and AristotlenancientphilosophyndHumeandKant n modernphilosophy avetaught

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/78

290 / George Bealerus that experience alone cannot tell us whether given truth snecessary.Ofcourse,by relying n thetestimony f an authority,one can learnthat giventruth s necessary.Buthow, ultimately,do theoriginal uthoritiesearn t?By examining xperience, heoriginal uthorities an learn merely hat omethings so; they an-not earnthat t s necessarily o. As Kant says in the introductionto hisCritique f PureReason, "Experiencetellsus, indeed,whatis, but not that t mustnecessarily e so, and not otherwise."Noamount f experience waiving estimony)an ever reveal whethersomethinghat s so is necessary.According oPlato,Aristotle, ant,and most ther hilosophers,hiskind fmodalknowledge ltimatelydemands another ourcebeyond experience,namely, eason.Knowledge hat given ruths necessary emands hat heoriginalauthorities se reason. But does theirknowledgealwaysrelyonreason alone, without he use of ny empiricalvidenceor ustifica-tion?Kantseemsto think o: "If, hen, judgment s thoughtwithstrict niversality,hat s, in such a mannerthatno exception sallowed as possible, tis not derivedfrom xperience,butis validabsolutely priori." B4, my emphasis)This Kantianthesis s cer-tainly oo strong.An original uthorityould come to know thatgivenpropositionsnecessary s follows. irst,heperson ould usereason alone to know thatpropositionsfthat ype for xample,mathematical ropositions)re necessary ftrue.Second,theper-son coulduse experience for xample,counting,measuring,r us-inga computer) o discoverthatthepropositions true.Then, bycombining he first it ofa prioriknowledge nd the second bit ofa posteriori nowledge, heperson an infer hat he propositionsnecessary. o, contraryo Kant's hesis, his erson'sknowledge hatthe propositions necessarywould not be absolutely priori; tsjustifications at least partly mpirical.To avoid this ind f ounterexample,philosopher ight e temp-ted to modifyhestrongKantianthesis s follows: f t is possibletoknow that givenpropositionsnecessary, hen t spossibletoknowthis blosutely priori;no empirical vidence s needed. Forexample, f t s possibleto know that certainmathematical ro-position s necessary, hen t is possibleto knowthiswithout nyempirical vidence (counting,measuring, estimony, tc.); reasonalone suffices.It sreasonablethat hismodified hesis swhatKantreallywanted odefend.) he relevance f hemodifiedantianhesisforphilosophys plain. Philosophersmight rom ime to timerely



4/78

Limits f Scientific ssentialism 291on empirical science to reach their conclusions that variousphilosophical ruths re indeednecessary.However,such relianceon empirical cienceis inessentialfthemodified antian hesis sright. t is always possible to obtain our modal philosophicalknowledge bsolutely priori. f hemodified antian hesis s right,philosophys in principle ndependent f the empirical ciences.The modified antian hesis-and its corollary hatphilosophy sindependentfthe empirical ciences-has had nearlyuniversal c-ceptancein the history f philosophy.CertainAristotelians aveperhaps een dissenters.)n recent ears,however,hemodified an-tianthesishascomeunder evere attackfrom cientificssentialists(Matson, utnam, ripke,hoemaker, oyd,Devitt,nda greatmanyothers).2cientificssentialisms the doctrine hat here re truthsthat an be known o be necessary nly f mpirical vidence s us-ed; more briefly,here re essences that can be known onlywiththeaidofempiricalcience.For example, cientificssentialistsoldthat ertain ypes f natural-kinddentitiese.g.,thatwater= H20,thatheat= meankineticnergy,hat old= theelementwith tomicnumber 9) are necessaryf rue, ndtheyholdthat t simpossiblefor personto knowthat uchidentities re true without he aidof empiricalscience. So if scientific ssentialists re right, heknowledge hat uchidentities re necessary annotbe absolutelya priori,as the modifiedKantian thesis requires. Instead,thisknowledgemust lwaysbe (at east)partiallyposteriori;t s essen-tially posteriori.3Let us supposescientificssentialisms correct; hat s, et us sup-pose that here regenuine ounterexampleswater, eat,gold, tc.)to the modifiedKantian thesis.There is nevertheless naturalweakeningf his hesis hat reservesheviewthat mpiricalciencecannot eclipse philosophy:for (most of) the central truthsofphilosophy,f t s possibletoknowthese truthso be necessary,tispossible o knowthem o be necessary bsolutely priori,withouttheaid ofempirical cience. This is the thesis ftheautonomy fphilosophy.4 This thesis s vague; later on I will replace it withsomethingmoreprecise.)

Althoughcientificssentialismontradictshemodified antianthesis,tdoesnot ontradicthethesis fthe utonomyfphilosophy.For scientificssentialismsserts nly hat here re sometruthse.g.,that water = H20, etc.) that can be knownto be necessaryonlywith he aid ofempiricalcience. tdoes notassert hat ll knowable



5/78

292 / George Bealernecessary ruths an be knownto be necessaryonly with he aidofempirical cience. ndeed, should hink hatmost cientificssen-tialists ecognize thatthisradicalview is inconsistent itha fullyelaborated resentationf heir osition. rueenough, person ouldcome to know, say, that necessarilywater = H20 absolutelyposteriori, or xample, xclusively n the basis ofthe testimonyfothers.However, he chain of tesitmonyannotgo on forever; neofthe authoritiesmusthave come to know thatnecessarilywater= H20 by another route. Scientific ssentialists econstruct hisother oute long thefollowingines. Of ourse, here re variations,butnone of themaltersthe point t issue, namely, hat there resome truthshat an be known o be necessary bsolutely priori.)First, he authorityn questionuses reason alone to establish hatpropositionsfthetype n question-namely, ertain orts fnatural-kind dentities-arenecessary ftrue. Second thisperson uses ex-perience namely, arious aboratory xperiments)o establish hatthe specific ropositionnquestion s true.Then,by combining hefirst itofa priori knowledge nd the second bit ofa posterioriknowledge,heperson nfers hat hepropositionbout theessenceof water s necessary.As Kripke ays, "Philosophical nalysistellsus that hey i.e.,propositionsfthetype nquestion] annotbe con-tingently rue, so any empiricalknowledge of their truth sautomatically mpiricalknowledgethattheyare necessary.Thischaracterization pplies, in particular, o the cases of identitystatementsnd ofessence." P. 159,Naming ndNecessity, mphasisadded.)

Now consider the first it ofa priori knowledge,namely,theknowledgeof the philosophical roposition hat certaintypesofnatural-kinddentities re necessary if true. By performingphilosophical nalysisvery imilar o thatwhich ed to thisbit ofaprioriknowledge,we can obtain nother itof prioriknowledge,namely,thatphilosophical ropositionsike the originalone arethemselvesnecessary ftrue.So giventhat we can knowa priorithattheoriginalphilosophical ropositions true,we can know apriori hat t s necessary.The upshot s that heradicalgeneraliza-tion of scientific ssentialisms inconsistent:t least one of thephilosophical ropositions sedin thefullylaboratedpresentationof scientificssentialism an be known o be necessarywithoutheaid ofempirical cience. This ittle rguments not crucialto mylarger rgument or heautonomy fphilosophy; include tonly



6/78

Limits f Scientific ssentialism 293forheuristic urposes.)There s, however, lessradicalgeneralizationf cientificssen-tialismhathas enormous ppealtophilosophersndphilosophicallyinclined cientists.t sthatmost ofthe central ruths f philosophycannot be known o be necessary and, ndeed,cannotbe known)without he aid of empirical cience. That is, most philosophicalknowledgemust ely n empirical vidence.Accordingly,hethesisof he utonomyfphilosophy ouldbe false; hilosophy ouldhaveno significantndependencefrom mpirical cience.This doctrineis global scientificssentialism,nd it s contrastedwith ocal scien-tific ssentialism, hefarweaker doctrine hat ertain ruthsboutnaturalistictems water,heat, gold,etc.) cannot be known to benecessary bsolutely priori.(In fact, hilosophers aveadvocateda spectrumfdifferentosi-tionsbetweenglobaland ocal scientificssentialism. ilary utnamonce seemed nclinedoward heglobalposition.Most ontemporarymaterialisthilosophersfmindgowellbeyondocal scientificssen-tialism, or hey hinkmpiricalcience s theauthorityndetermin-ing heessences fmental ualitiesnd relationsuch s pain,percep-tion,knowledge, nd the ike. On this core,at least,Kripke endsmoretoward ocal scientificssentialism,orhethinks hat ainhasno material ssence and,therefore,hat ainhas nomaterial ssencethatonlythe empirical ciences could discover.)Global scientific essentialism impinges upon traditionalphilosophicalnquirynotonly n specific heoreticalssues. t alsosignificantlyffects raditionalhilosophicalmethod.Forexample,in the course of philosophical ialecticone would often dvancehypotheticalxamples usually ounterexamples).ne's a priori n-tuition hat heexample spossible i.e.,notnecessarily ot hecase)would usually ufficeo establish hat t spossible.However,globalscientificssentialismnvalidates his raditionalrocedure. orex-ample,supposethat n an argumentnmetaphysicsorphilosophyofbiology)youproposethehypotheticalxampleof ife ormsi.e.,livingbeings)whose bodies are composednot ofhydrocarbonsutofsomethinglse. With he adventofscientificssentialism, ourexample might ow be dismissed s follows: You are not ustifiedinaccepting hat xampleas genuinely ossible.Forall you know,you are mistaking mere epistemicpossibility or a genuinemetaphysicalossibility.nly genuinemetaphysicalossibility illwinyourpoint n thismetaphysical ialectic.But to determinehat



7/78

294 / George Bealeryourexample s metaphysicallyossibleyou must irst onsult m-pirical science (specifically, iology),forempirical cience mightreveal thatyour example is not really possible." (According oKripke's xplication fthe notion fepistemic ossibility,5henwehave an intuitionf mere pistemic ossibilityhat ife orms ouldhave nonhydrocarbon odies, this mountsto the followingntui-tion: hat t s metaphysicallyossible hat omeone n qualitativelythe ame epistemic ituations we are n could assert omethingrueby saying, Thereare life orms hathave nonhydrocarbonodies."Now the point s supposedto be that his pistemic ntuitionellsusnothing bout ife,for hepersonutteringhe word life'might otmean ife t all but omethinglse instead.However, n your riginalmetaphysical ialectic,ife swhatyouwere interestedn.) Notice,however, hat hisway ofdismissingandidate ypotheticalxamplescan be attemptedt virtually veryturn n philosophical nquiry.Thus, fglobal scientific ssentialismwere true, massiverevolu-tion n philosophicalmethodwould be in order.So will cience clipsephilosophy?hold hat lobal cientificssen-tialism s demonstrablyalseand thattheautonomy fphilosophyis not threatened yscientificssentialism.Myreason for hinkingthis sbroadly transcendental":ocal scientificssentialismctuallyimplies he hesis f he utonomyfphilosophy.nthe diom fKant,theautonomy fphilosophys one ofthe "conditionsf hepossibil-ity"oflocal scientific ssentialism.The arguments or hese bold claims comprise good part of abook,which s nowunderway.n thepresentpaper my purpose s

to present heargumentsn broad outline. Beforecomingto thearguments roper,will ntroduceomehandy erminologyndgivesome examplesthathelpto motivate he view intuitively.2. Category nd ContentConcepts

For convenience f exposition will freely se the diomof con-cepts;at mostpointswe could paraphrase way talkofconcepts.For example, rather han sayingthat believe thatthe concept ofa compositionaltuffpplies oa certaintemna givenhypotheticalcase, we couldsay simply hat believe that theitem n the caseis a compositionaltuff. nd rather hansayingthat possesstheconceptofbeing F, we couldsay that stand n some basic inten-tionalrelationbelief, esire,decision,memory, erception, tc.)to



8/78

Limits fScientific ssentialism 295thepropositionhat ..F... i.e.,to some propositionnvolvinghecon-cept ofbeing F).Now to state my "transcendental"rgument, will find t conve-nientto restatemy claim in a slightlymore technicalvocabulary.For the purposesat hand, we may divideour concepts nto threegeneral ypes:naturalisticoncepts, ategory oncepts, nd contentconcepts. Atthe nitial tageofour nvestigation,hesethree ypesshould be viewed as "dummy ypes":no precisedefinitionf themneed be ventured, nd the boundariesbetween them maybe leftdeliberately ague.Nevertheless,hey an be characterized o someextent.)Naturalisticoncepts re intended o be those conceptsforwhich ocal scientificssentialism olds; hey nclude, or xample,theconceptsof water,heat,gold, emon, rthritis,eech, elm,andso forth. ategory ndcontent oncepts re intended o nclude heconcepts in termsof which (most of) the central questionsofphilosophy re formulated.xamplesof category oncepts re theconcepts f tuff,ompositionaltuff,unctionaltuff,ubstance,uali-ty, uantity,ction, rtificial,atural, ause, reason,person, tc.Ex-amplesofcontent oncepts re familiar henomenal ualitiespain,itchiness, ingling-sensation,tc.)and basic mental elationsknow-ing, perceiving, eciding, oving, tc.).In this diommyclaimmaybe stated s follows.f cientificssen-tialisms trueof variousnecessities nvolving aturalisticoncepts,then tcannotholdfor ecessitiesnvolving xclusively ategoryndcontent oncepts.That s, f ocal scientificssentialismstrue, henknowablenecessitiesnvolvingxclusively ategorynd content on-ceptsare knowable bsolutely priori.Given hatmost f)the cen-tralquestions fphilosophyre formulatedxclusivelyn terms fcategory nd content oncepts this f courseneeds to be shown),it follows hat,f ocal scientificssentialismstrue, o is thethesisof the autonomy fphilosophy.fa philosophical roposition anbe known to be necessary, t is possibleforthisknowledgeto beobtained bsolutely priori; mpirical cience s inprinciple everneeded.Before oming o my"transcendental"rgument,willgivea fewexamplesto motivate urposition. he argument oes notrideontheseexamples.But think hey how that omethingmportantsmissing rom hepicture cientificssentialists aveprovided o far,andthey uggest hatwhat smissings a satisfactoryhilosophicaltheory f ourcategory nd content oncepts.



9/78

296 / GeorgeBealerLetus recallPutnam'swin-Earthrgument. urchemistsxaminesamplesofwaterhereon Earth nd discover hat ll suchsamplesare composedofH20. Fromthis hey onclude correctly, e maysuppose)that ll and only amplesofwaterhere on Earth re com-posed of H20. Our astronautsvisitingon twin Earthdiscoversamples of a stuffmacroscopicallyndistinguishableromwater;however, hesesamplesare composedofXYZ,notH20. The ques-tion s whetherhe amples ntwin arth rereally amples fwateror of omethinglse. The scientificssentialists'ntuitions that heyare justnot samplesofwater.Generalizingromxamples ikethis,scientificssentialistsonclude hat, ecessarily,llandonly amplesof waterare composedofH20. Thisconclusion, orepeat, s basedon the intuition hat,althoughthe samples on twin Eartharemacroscopicallyikesamplesof water, heydo not, strictlypeak-ing, countas samplesof waterbecause theyare not composedof

H20.Now I wishto consider n analogousexample nvolving ngland,which, s youknow, s wellknownfor ts cuisine.Supposethat, ta certain ime, heonlyfood n Englandwas mutton tew,6 nd allmutton tew n Englandwas food.Asyouknow,muttontew s com-posed of boiledmutton, oiledpotatoes, nd boiledturnips:MPT.Nowvoyagersfrom ngland raveled o twinEnglanddownsouth,where theydiscoveredfettucini,eal scallopini, nd even bread,which re composedof thingsike wheat,cream,garlic, nd so on;not MPT at all. Should they phone home and say, "Lots oftasty,nutritoushings o eat here;but sorry, o food"?Because after ll,no MPT. Ofcoursenot.But why sthis ase differentrom hetwin-Earth case?The answermustbe somethingike this.Unlikewater,which sa compositionaltuff,ood s a functionaltuff.7n thetwin-Earthcase we knowthatwater s a compositionaltuff.hisknowledgetogetherwith urgeneral ategorialntuitionsboutcompositionalstuffs eterminesur ntuitionhat,f ll andonly amplesofwateron Earth re composedofH20 and, fH20 differsromXYZ, thenthesamplesofXYZ on twinEarth re notsamplesofwater. n thetwin-Englandase we know thatfood sa functionaltuff.ood hasa function;ood s for ating. Orperhapsfood s fornutritiousatingor justfornutrition.he question s verysubtle nd complex,butwe need not settle there.)To studywhat food s,one does not n-vestigate tscomposition irectly;nsteadone investigatests func-



10/78

Limits fScientific ssentialism 297tion. Of course, to study atingand/or nutritionne might ven-tuallywant to go to a chemist o determine ow thisfunction anbe fulfilledn specialcases.) It sfor his eason hat hetwin-Englandexample,unlike he twin-Earthxample,does not ead one to con-clude that, ecessarily,lland onlyfood s composed fmutton tew(MPT) whereas n the case ofwaterthe discovery hat ll and onlywateron Earth s composedofH20 does lead one toconclude hat,necessarily, ll and only water s H20. In the twin-Englandxam-ple,fettucini,callopini, read, nd so forth ulfillhefunctionffood;therefore,ven f heir omposition iffersrom hat fmuttontew,theycountas food. The difference,herefore,urns n knowledgeofcategories, pecifically,hatwater s a compositional tuffnd, bycontrast, ood s a functionaltuff.Onecanmakethe amepoint oncerningoodwith more eriousexample.For example, upposeourchemists iscover hat ll andonly samplesoffoodofthe kindswe eat are composedofcertaincomplexhydrocarbonsith arious race lements,ndsupposeourspace cadetstravel otwinEarth nd find omestuffs,otcompos-ed ofthosechemicalsCl,...,Cn, ut insteadcomposedof alternatechemicalsKl,...,Km.uppose,finally,hat hese stuffsctuallyhavegreatnutritionalalue and that hey aste verygood and are verydigestable.We would notphone home and say," No food here."There is no doubtthat hese stuffs ould be food.They ustwouldbe differentinds of foodthanthosewe have on Earth.However,XYZ is not a differentind ofwater; t is not water at all. The ex-planation sthat ood sa functionaltuff:hevarious win-earthtuffshavetherelevant unction.ycontrast, ater s a compositionaltuff:water s H20; XYZ is something lse.8Now, examples ike this an be multipliedndefinitely.onsiderfuel. There was a time when the onlyavailable fuelswere solidrapidly oxidizable hydrocarbons. ut thisfactdid not lead ourancestors to discount petroleum as fuel when this liquid wasdiscovered and burned, nor did it preventtwentieth enturytechnologistsrom ounting lutonium s fuel venthought s notrapidly xidizable. The explanation s thatfuel,unlikewater, s afunctionaltuff;t is forsomething. he reason we count wood,petroleum,ndplutoniums kinds ffuel stheyhave orare essen-tially uitedto achieving) hisfunction.Airand earthmight e similar.What have to say about air andearthhereis speculative;myother, ess speculative omments o



11/78

298 / George Bealernotdepend on it n any way.) The air on Earth s primarily itrogen,carbondioxide, ndoxygen.On twin arth, ycontrast,he ir mightbe composed of somethingdifferent. lthoughtwin Earthlingsbreathethe air (and fly irplanes n it),our astronauts ell us, "Donot breathe he air herebecause it s toxic to us." If his s right, irwould seem notto be a straightforwardompositional tuff.nstead,whether omething s airwould have to do with ts having n ap-propriate ole n a suitablekindof environmentalystem a planetorotherproto-ecosystem).f o, airwould seem to be a kindof en-vironmentalproto-ecological)tuff.t has a certainrole in an en-vironmentalystems a whole.Now f ir s ikethis, ertainlyarthis too:clay, oam, andy oam, and,humus, nd so forthreallkindsofearth ven though hey re quitedifferentompositionally.n thiscase, one wonderswhetherwater'reallydenoteda compositionalstuffll along; conceivably,water'has undergone kindof mean-ing hiftrom term or n environmentalr functionaltuffo termfor compositionaltuff.f herehasbeena meaning hift,hatwouldviolateoneofthedoctrines spoused byscientificssentialists.Seethe next section forwhat is meantby a meaning hift nd why tviolates cientificssentialist octrine.) owever, ight owatleast,we are inclined otreat water' s a compositional-stufferm.Accor-dingly,f t s true hat ll and only amplesof water here on Earthare composedofH20,we would,using win-Eartheasoning,eementitledoconcludethat,necessarily,ll and only amplesofwaterare samplesofH20.Here s another xample, ne thathas particular hilosophicalm-portance, amely, heconcept fperson.Ourdoppelgangersn twinEarththe winEarthlings)ertainlyrepersons.However, hey renothomo apiens ccordingo scientificssentialistoctrine,or heylack both hegeneticsndevolutionaryrigins fhomo apiens.Thisseems to show that theconceptofperson s not theconceptof abiological pecies. Rather,t s a moral-intellectualotion.Further-more,unlike ndividualmembers fhomosapiens,persons n twinEarth re notcomposedmostly fwater; hey recomposedmostlyof XYZ. Personcertainlys notanykindofcompositional otion.

For a final xample,consider ife.All living hings n Eartharecomposed mostly fH20 pluscertainmacromoleculesomposedofvarious mino cids.Thiswould not ead us toconclude hat hebe-ingson twinEarthmacroscopicallyike theliving eingson Earthwere not live.Surely, heywouldbe alive. suspect hat,fwesurvey



12/78

Limits fScientific ssentialism 299an appropriately ide variety fexamples,we woulddiscover hatthenotion f ife s a certainkind fAristotelianroto-psychologicalnotion.Now an importantualifications in order. nsuggesting hat ifeis perhapsa proto-psychologicalotionor thatperson s a moral-intellectual otion, might fcoursebe makingmistakes.However,at thispoint here s no need to be correct r certain boutthesephilosophical atters. fterll, gnorance boutthesematters ould,on the view I will be defending, e only one more nstance f theparadox of nalysis.Knowledge boutthesematters rises t theendof theanalytical ndeavor; t need notbe present t thebeginning.The above examples suggest hatthe intuitionshatdrive scien-tific ssentialism re indexedto various categories.On thisview,knowledge f ategory oncepts nd thenecessaryndsufficienton-ditions or n item'sfalling nder category onceptmustbe mat-tersthat an be investigatedntecedently o theresearches f em-pirical cientists.his uggests hat urquestions oncerningategoryconceptscan be exploreda priori n a wholly raditionalway in-dependentlyfempirical cience. This,at least, s the sortofthingthatwill follow s a corollary rommy "transcendental"rgumentthat ocal scientificssentialismmplies heautonomy fphilosophy.We now move on to outlinetheargument.3. Two Epistemological roblemsforScientific ssentialism:ntui-tionsand Determinateness

I have said that he rgumentsbroadly transcendental."hegoalistolaybare theconditions or satisfactorycientificssentialism.(Hereafterreserve hetermscientificssentialism'orefer o ocalscientificssentialism; hen dealwithglobal cientificssentialism,I will always say so explicitly.)Whenwe thinkof earlymodernepistemology, e mayisolate two centralproblems: heoriginofideas andtheground fknowledge ftruths. cientificssentialistsinherit version f ach oftheseproblems. heyneeda wayof olv-ingboth of themsimultaneously ithout ontradiction.On thesurface t least,the twoproblems re independent: necan be a rationalist n one of them nd an empiricistn theother,or an empiricistn one and a rationalist n the other.Locke,forexample, gave an empiricistnswer othequestionoftheorigin fideasbut moderate ationalistnswer o thequestion f heground



13/78

300 / George Bealerof our knowledge ftruths. or even thoughhe attackedthe doc-trine f nnate deas anddefended hethesis hat ll ideas are deriv-ed from experience, he held that there was purely rationaldemonstrative nowledgeof some truths;ndeed,he made use ofwhat he thoughtwas absolutely prioriknowledge n hisfamouscosmologicaldemonstrationf the existenceof God.I have said that cientificssentialistsnherit version f each ofthese problems, heorigin f deas and the ground f knowledge ftruths. he goal ofmy"transcendental"rgument s to show thatthey annot olve thembothwithout ontradictionnless hey dopta certainepistemological heorythat impliesthe thesis of theautonomyofphilosophy.Considerfirst he ground f our knowledgeof truths. ccordingto the modifiedKantian thesis, f a truth an be known to benecessary, hatknowledge an be absolutely priori,tnever mustbe a posteriori. mpiricalvidence s neverneeded norder o knowof a given necessary ruth hat t is necessary.According o scien-tificssentialism, owever, here re variousnecessary ruths,ame-ly, those concerning aturalisticecessities, hatcan be knowntobe necessary only if empiricalevidence is used. That is, ourknowledge hat ertain aturalisticecessities renecessarysessen-tially posteriori;t cannotbe absolutely priori.The problem sthis: mpirical vidence uston itsowncannot ustifyhe conclusionthata giventruths necessary. omething lse is needed in orderto justifyhismodal step.9In ourearlier econstructionf how scientificssentialists ridgethe modalstep,we saw that bsolutely prioriknowledge f a cer-taingeneralphilosophical ropositions invoked. In ourexamplethephilosophical roposition as that ertain ypes fnatural-kindidentities re necessary f rue.)Butwhatpreciselys theground fthe scientific ssentialist'sknowledge of this sort of generalphilosophical proposition?The answer is that ultimately hisknowledge s justified y ntuition. ripke ells us: "I thinkt[intu-tion] s very heavyevidence in favorofanything,myself. reallydon'tknow, na way,whatmoreconclusive videnceone canhaveabout anything."'0For our purposes,we may identifyntuitionswithnoninferentialeliefs egardingheapplicabilityf a conceptto a hypotheticalase."I Or if ntuitionsre notstrictlydentical osuchbeliefs, hey re mental tateshaving strongmodaltie withthem.)



14/78

Limits f Scientific ssentialism 301Here are somewell-knownxamplesof ntuitionssed in scien-tific ssentialistrguments.he Kripkeanntuitionshat twas possi-ble forAristotleot o teachAlexander; hattwas possible orGodel(versusSchmidt) ot to discover he ncompletenessheorem; hatit s possiblethatheat shouldnotproduceS ["sensations fheat"];that fgold is in fact heelementwith tomicnumber79, then nanother ossibleworld, f omething ere macroscopicallyikegoldbutdid not have atomicnumber79, it wouldnot be gold;and soforth. ndthe Putnamian win-Earthntuitionshat, f ll and onlysamplesofwateron Earthwere composedofH20 and if herewerea twin Earth containing samples of XYZ (* H20) that aremacroscopicallyust ike water, henthese samplesofXYZ wouldnot be water;and so forth.Now forthe problem. fscientificssentialists se intuitionsobridgethemodal step,whatgivestheseintuitions ny evidentialweight? cientificssentialists ust ind satisfactorynswer othisquestion hat s consistent ith heir enial ofthe modified antian

thesis.Somescientificssentialistsouldgiveus to believe hemodal tepcan be bridgedwithoutelyingn intuitionss evidence.They eemto thinkhat he modal stepcanbe bridgedwith ogicalone (name-ly,Leibniz's awplusmodal ogic)or with combinationf ogic nda theory f anguage namely, hedirect eference heory fnames,the theory hatnames are rigiddesignators'2 avingno Fregeansense).However, t seasyto showthat his ccount uston itsownis deficient n two counts.First, ogicplusthe theory hatnamesare rigiddesignators othavingFregeansensesdoes notby itselfbridge hemodal tep t ssue.A much icherogico-linguisticheoryis needed: pecifically,theoryo the ffecthat,n additiononames,certain escriptionsrerigid esignators.orexample,descriptionssuchas 'thecompoundwhose consitituent olecules re constitutedoftwohydrogenonsandoneoxygen on', theelementwith tomicnumber 9', mean kinetic nergy', nd so forth.Suchdescriptionsare quiteunlike henonrigid escriptionsthenumber f planets','thecompositionaltuffredominantlyilling akeTahoe', etc.Butwhy?) econd, heprinciplesf ogico-linguisticheoryhat re need-ed to justify he modal step are themselvescontroversial nd,therefore,re in need ofa justificationftheir wn.What ustifiesthese ogico-linguisticrinciples?he data used to ustifyheseprin-ciplesare,once again, ntuitionsfor xample, he sortof ntuitions



15/78

302 /GeorgeBealerKripke ppeals to inNaming ndNecessity nd the ort f ntuitionsthatPutnamppealsto n "TheMeaning f Meaning"').n controver-sial areas of ogic and linguistic heory he use of ntuitionss datais crucial. I argueforthisassessment n detail ater.)Because scientific ssentialistsmustultimately se intuitions ojustifyhemodalstep,they re obliged to have (an overall theorythat sconsistent ith) satisfactoryheory fwhy ntuitionshouldhave any evidentialweight.Thisdemand s dramatizedwhen weremember hat ritics fscientificssentialisme.g.,neo-Humeans,Quineans, and skeptics)mighthold thatmodalintuitionsre merebeliefs aving oevidential eightwhatsoever. fterll, ome beliefsthatpop intoa person'smind e.g., a gambler'shunches)have noevidentialweight nd shouldsimply e disregarded n theoreticalreasoning.Whatdistinguishesntuitions romuch beliefs? or ex-ample,Kripke's ntuitionhat twas possible orAristotle ottoteachAlexander s utterly rucialto his rgument or heconclusion hatthename Aristotle'oes notexpress, s a descriptiveense, hepro-perty fbeing heteacher fAlexander.Withouthe ntuitionripkewouldhave no argument. utwhy hould hemerebelief hat twaspossibleforAristotle otto teach Alexanderprovide nyevidentialsupport or hepropositionhat treallywas possibleforAristotlenotto teachAlexander?Why s it egitimateouse that roposition-as opposedto a propositionbout given lotmachine hat gamblermight appentofancy-infurtherheoretical easoning? imilarly,Putnam's win-Earthtyle ntuitionsre utterly rucialto hisargu-ment hat,fwater= H20, thennecessarilywater= H20. Withoutthese ntuitions utnamwould have no argument. utwhyshoulda merebelief-that,f ll and only amplesofwater on EarthwerecomposedofH20 and if herewere a twin arth ontainingamplesofXYZ (* H20) that re macroscopicallyust ikewater, hen hesesamples fXYZwouldnotbewater-provide nyevidentialupport?Why s it egitimateo use thisbelief-as opposedtoyourhunchesat therace track-in furtherheoretical easoning?There are versionsofrationalism, hich we will reviewbelow,thatprovide coherent xplanation fwhy ntuitionsas opposedto hunches)have evidentialweight.Butscientificssentialism ascalled rationalismntoquestion; ndeed, tsdenial of the modifiedKantian thesis n connectionwithnaturalistic ecessities s tanta-mount o a rejection f all thefamiliar nrestrictedersions fra-tionalism. onsequently, newtheory fwhatgives ntuitionsheir



16/78

Limits f Scientific ssentialism 303evidentialweight s neededif cientificssentialistsre going o beable to explain why the modal step in their rgument s justified.One such"theory"sthefollowing: he ntuitionshat upport cien-tific ssentialism ay egitimatelye used as evidence; nti-scientific-essentialistntuitions aynot egitimatelye used as evidence. Butthis theory"wouldbe unacceptablyd hoc. If n acceptabletheorycannotbe found, e must ake eriouslyhe keptical mpiricisthesisthat intuitionshave no evidential weight, that their use inphilosophical rgumentssmerely hangover rom he good-old a-tionalist ays. f hiswere so, then he rguments ivenbyscientificessentialists ould notbe justified,nd scientificssentialism ouldhave to be abandoned.Therefore, here s a crying emand fornew theory fwhyintuitionshould have any evidentialweight.I will argue that he eadingtraditional heories-unrestricteda-tionalism,nrestrictedlatonism,mpiricism,ndcoherentism-areinconsistent ith cientificssentialismr else theyfail o explaintheevidential tatus f ntuitions. yconclusionsthat heonly c-ceptable theory f the evidential tatusof ntuitions hat s consis-tentwith local)scientificssentialisms a two-tierheory, ne thatsegregates ategoryndcontent oncepts rom aturalisticoncepts.This theory ncorporates form frationalist xplanationof theevidential tatus f ntuitionsoncerningheapplicabilityfcategoryand content onceptsto hypotheticalases thatare specified x-clusivelynterms f ategorynd contentoncepts. his ircumscrib-ed rationalistxplanation s consistentwith cientific ssentialism.At the sametime,tcan be usedtoexplainwhy cientificssentialistintuitions bout the applicabilityof naturalisticconcepts tohypotheticalases have evidentialtatus. hese intuitionsre deter-minedbytraditionalationalistntuitionsegarding elevant ategoryand content oncepts ogether ith urknowledge fthecategoriesofthenaturalistictems nvolved.Whatgivesthe naturalisticntui-tionstheir vidential tatus s that hey re determinedn thiswayby categorynd contentntuitions,ntuitions hose evidential tatuscan be explained independentlyy the circumscribedationalisttheorywithout ontradictingcientific ssentialism.This explana-tion will be set forthmorefully ater.)Consideran example, say, Putnam's win-earthntuitionboutwater: f ll and only amplesofwateron Earthwere composedofH20, thenmacroscopicallyimilar amplesofXYZ * H20) on twinEarthwouldnotbe samplesof water. This naturalisticntuitions



17/78

304/ George ealerjust neof nfinitelyany nstancesf hefollowingationalistn-tuitionegardinghecategoryoncept f compositionaltuff:fparadigmamples f compositionaltuff ave certainomplexcomposition,hen temsackinghat ompositionould ot ualifyas samples f he ompositionaltuff.he specificutnamianntui-tion boutwater s determinedythis ort fcategorialntuitiontogether ith urknowledgehatwater s a compositionaltuff.However,iven he ircumscribedationalistheory,he ategorialintuitionasevidential eight,ndthis xplainswhy he pecificnaturalisticntuitionas evidential eight.(This wo-tierheorylsoexplainswo ther inds fphenomena.First,texplainswhy ur pparentnti-scientific-essentialistntui-tions annot eally e about enuinemetaphysicalossibilities,utinsteadmust e aboutmere pistemicossibilities:edo not eallyhave ntuitionsbout uchmetaphysicalossibilitiesecause he or-respondingategorynd contentrincipleshatwould e neededto determineuch ntuitionsre hemselvesnintuitive.econd, ithmuch he ame echniques,he wo-tierheoryxplainshepatternsinour ntuitionsbout uchmatterss food, uel, erson,ife,ndsoforth,hich ediscussedn he reviousection. hese wokindsofphenomenaemain nexplained ysteriesn all otherheoriesof ntuition.hese mattersre discussedn somedetail ater.)The wo-tierheoryhus rovidesnexplanation-indeed,he nlyexplanation-of hy he pro-scientific-essentialistntuitionsaveevidentialtatus,n explanationhat oesnot ontradicthe cien-tificssentialists'enial fthemodifiedantianhesis. erethenis onecomponentf ur transcendental"rgument.conditionnthe ustificationf he cientificssentialists'odal tep s that histwo-tierheoryf he videntialtatusf ntuitionse true. n thistheory,he concepts omprisingne of the two tiers-namely,categorynd ontentoncepts-areusceptibleo raditionalprioriphilosophicalnvestigation.We comenow to thesecond entral roblemfearlymodernepistemology,heoriginf deas.Theearlymodern iewwas thatcertaindeas regottenromxperiencerarepossessednnatelyand, hen, ymeans fwhatwemightall"Lockean perations,"a personombineshesegiven"deas oobtainllotherdeas.Thereis a continuityfthoughtromhis arlymodern iewtothat fRussellandprobablyrege). ll hese hilosopherseld hat per-son has various iven oncepts-givenithernexperiencerby



18/78

Limits f Scientific ssentialism 305reason-and these givenconcepts re combined omehow say, byvarious ogical operations) o form omplex descriptive oncepts.Everyconcept s either givenconceptor a complex descriptiveconceptformedrom hegiven oncepts.On this pproach, onceptsgiven nexperience re concepts fphenomenal ualities ndbasicmental elations; hey herefore ouldbe casesofcontent oncepts.And theconceptsgivenby reason would be cases ofcategory on-cepts.As a result, aturalisticoncepts-for xample,theconceptsofwater,heat,gold, emon, rthritis,eech,elm-would have to becomplexdescriptiveoncepts ormedromategoryndcontenton-cepts. But nthiscase, a person n commandof any of these com-plex descriptive onceptswould be in a position o analyze themabsolutely priori, nd, nturn,heperson houldbe able to defineall the ssociatednaturalistictems-water, eat,gold, nd so forth-absolutely priori. ut his utcome ontradictsocal) cientificssen-tialism, hich epudiateshemodified antian hesis.This s thepointcontactbetween herepudiationf he modified antian hesis ndtherepudiation fthe descriptivistheory fnames.)To avoid thisproblem, cientificssentialists eed tofindn alter-natetheoryfwhat t akes opossess naturalisticoncept. o meetthisdemand, hey urn o thecausaltheory.I use the termiberally:historical-explanation heories and baptism-cum-naming-chaintheories re to be counted as versionsof thecausal theory.) histheoryprovides n alternate xplanation f theorigin f at leastsome of)our deas: topossessa concept oftheright ort) personneed onlybe properly ituatednthe world; n particular, heper-son needonly earappropriateausal historical,ocio-linguistic)ela-tions o temsn theworld. hestrategyfour "transcendental"rgu-mentwill be this.We willsuppose that ome versionofthe causaltheorysright or ariousnaturalisticoncepts, nd wewillthen ryto determine heconditions equired n order for t to be right nat least hose ases neededfor he ruth f ocalscientificssentialism.If, s scientificssentialists, e weretothrow ut part f)the tradi-tionaltheory nd to adoptinstead version of thecausal theory,whatwouldbe requiredn orderfor he new view tobe satisfactoryfor urpurposes?Our answerwillbe this.Onanycausal theoryhatis satisfactoryor urpurposes, personwith naturalisticonceptmustpossessbackground ategory nd content oncepts, onceptswhose possessionmust e explained ndependently y a traditionaltheoryhat nsureshat hese onceptsmaybeinvestigatedbsolutely



19/78

306 / George Bealera priori.Beforewe go any further,n important ointof clarifications inorder. n the present ontext,when we speak of a theory explana-tion, ccount)ofwhat t s topossess a concept,we mean a theorythat pecifies he general conditions hat, s a matter f ogical ormetaphysical ecessity, re necessary nd/or ufficientor ossess-ing the concept.We do not mean a theory hatgives a causal ex-planation fwhy nthe courseofone's life ne hascome to possessa certain oncept.Thus, we are seeking"formal auses" not "effi-cient auses." t sespecially mportantokeepthis istinctionn mindwhen we speak ofthe causal theory r the historical-explanationtheory, or here sa temptationothinkhat uch a theorysgivingan efficient-causalxplanationperhapsnthedeductive-nomologicalformat) f a specificmentaloccurrence.On the contrary, uch atheory ims toprovide general tatement fconditions hat re,as a logicalormetaphysical ecessity, ecessary nd/or ufficientfor hepossessionof a concept. t ustso happensthat hesecondi-tions nvolve ausal historical,ocio-linguistic)eatures.The causaltheory fperceptions a helpful nalogy.Thistheory ims topro-vide conditions hat re necessary nd/or ufficientor omeonexperceiving hatA; thekeyconditions thatthe fact hatA shouldcause ittoappeartox thatA. This s a causaltheory imply ecausethe notionofcausation figuresnto thiscondition.)Now f cientificssentialismsright, primary equirementsthatthe relevantnaturalisticonceptsbe determinate,hat urrelevantnaturalisticonceptsbe possessed determinately. o see what thisrequirementomesto,consider n exampleof ndeterminateness.Suppose I say, "What s theweightofthat hip?"Do I meanwithorwithouthemast, hedeckfittings,he ails, he ngine, hereserveengine, heradarequipment,he stateroom urnishings,hegalleystove? Do I mean down to theton,pound, ounce, gram,or what?Well, ustdo nothave an answer hese uestions.When said, Whatis theweight f that hip?" didnot ask a determinate uestion.Apluralityfquestionshave equal claimtobeingwhat asked,andthere eemstobe no fact fthematter s towhichone I didask.13Consider nother xample. Supposethatyouintroduce new term'multigon'imply y applyingttovarious losedplane figures av-ingseveral sides. You have neverconsciously nd explicitlyon-sidered the question of whethertrianglesand rectanglesaremultigons.Whensomeone asksyouthis uestion,youdo notknow



20/78

Limits f Scientific ssentialism 307whatto answer.You haveno inclinationo favor ne answeror theother even though ou have all thepertinentmpiricalnformation,you are fully ttentive, nd you are more than ntelligentnoughto dentifylementary eometricigures). ourtermmultigon' ightmean closedplane figure ithmore hanfour ides, r tmight implymeanclosed plane figure.In mydictionaryach ofthese s enteredas a meaning f polygon'.) ach has equal claimto being he mean-ingofyour newly ntroduced erm multigon'. utthere eems tobe no fact fthe matter egardingwhichone it s. Rather, t seemsthat you have no determinate oncept.As I have said, if scientific ssentialism s right, he relevantnaturalistic onceptsmustbe determinate;twillnot do for hemto be indeterminate. o see why, recall the once-popularogical-positivistheory f scientificefinitions."ccordingothis heory,when scientists ffer "scientificefinition"e.g., thatwater= H20,thatheat= meankineticnergy, hat old= theelementwith tomicnumber 79, etc.), theyare merely tipulating new concept or"precisifying" previouslyndeterminateoncept.Eitherway, the"scientificefinition"roduces mere"meaning hift";tdoes notreport genuine mpirical iscovery. onsider hewell-worn xam-pleof he ermfish'. n thisogical-positivistiew, fish' nce iterallyappliedtowhales,but cientistsealized hat twouldbe moreusefulto have a term hat xcluded thesefish-like ammals.They accor-dingly edefinedfish' o that hereaftertexpressed conceptwiththisnew,circumscribedxtension.Or,on a commonvariant fthisview, fish' reviously id notexpress singledeterminateonceptat all,and the "scientificefinition"ad theeffectffinallyinglingout,from pluralityfcandidate concepts, particularoncept sthedeterminatemeaning f theterm.According oscientificssen-tialists, y contrast, henscientistsivea "scientificefinition,"heyare not redefining r precisifying. ightfromthe start, t wasnecessary hatwhaleswere not fish.Biologistsmade an empiricaldiscovery bout the essence ofthe naturalkindfish; heymade anempirical iscoverybout the essencea singledeterminateit"thatwas under nvestigationll along.The reasonthat scientific ssentialisms inconsistent iththese"meaning-shift"heories s this.On either he redefinitioniew ortheprecisificationiew, "scientificefinition"sa form f tipulativedefinition.ccordingly,hepersondoing hestipulatings in a posi-tionto knowa priorithatwhat is said is true e.g.,that water =



21/78

308 /George BealerH20, that heat = mean keneticenergy, hat gold = the elementwith atomic number79, etc.).14t would be just be a case of old-fashioned nalytic prioriknowledge. utthis ontradictshe scien-tific ssentialistoctrinehatwhat s said n such ases must e essen-tially posteriori.f twere not ssentially posteriori, hemodifiedKantian hesiswould be true; nturn, cientificssentialismwouldbe false.(To geta better icture fwhat s goingon here, onsiderKripke'smeter-stickxample. The termmeter'was introduced y a personwho stipulated hatone meterwas the ength f certain tick.Ac-cording oKripke,tthemoment f he tipulationhepersonknowsa priori hat ne meter s the ength f hat tick, nd this s so despitethe fact hat heproposition hat ne meters the ength fthat tickis contingent. ow ifthe "meaning-shift"iew were correct, henour scientistswould have stipulated, otdiscovered, hatwater=H20, thatheat = mean keneticenergy, hatgold = the elementwith tomicnumber 9, nd so forth. ccordingly,hese hings ouldbe known priori y the cientistmakinghe tipulation.his prioriknowledgewoulddifferrom he kind n themeter-stickxampleinasmuch s what is knownbythescientist s necessary,not con-tingent. he upshotwould be that all thesupposedly posteriorinecessities ssociatedwith cientificssentialismwould turn ut tobe knowablea priori, nd thusthemodified antianthesiswouldbe rightfter ll. To avoid this utcome, cientificssentialistsmustthereforeeject "meaning-shift"heories.)Summing p, thesecondpartof our"transcendental"rgumentconcerns heneed togive nontraditional,ausalexplanation f hedeterminatenessf our naturalisticoncepts.When cientificssen-tialists ry oworkout such a theoryn detail, heyare, I willtrytoshow,unableto accountfor eterminatenessy purely ausal orpurely externalist')mechanisms. he reason s that he formationof newnaturalisticoncept or heformationf new de rethoughtor the introductionf a new name) runs nto a fatalproblemofunderdeterminationambiguity)fexclusively ausal resources reinvoked.Whena person ppearsto form newnaturalisticoncept(orto form de re thoughtf new naturalistictem rtointroducea name for he tem), heactwillalwaysbe underdeterminedam-biguous) fexclusively ausal or "externalist" esources re involv-ed. The thought r reference s determinate nly if the personemploysbackground ategory nd content oncepts. o justas in



22/78

Limits fScientificssentialism309the ase of heproblemf he videntialtatus four ntuitions,ointhe ase of heproblemf hedeterminatenessfourconcepts,scientificssentialistsillbe forced oadopt two-tierheoryhatseparates aturalisticonceptsromackgroundategoryndcon-tent oncepts.To explain hedeterminatenessftheconcepts ccupyinghelower ier, amely,henaturalisticoncepts,cientificssentialistsmustupplementhepurelyausal heory ithnotherheoryhatemphasizesur ategorynd contentoncepts. ut hen heques-tion rises, ow rewe toexplain he eterminateossessionf hesecategoryndcontentoncepts?nattemptousea causal heoryto explain hedeterminateossessionf hose oncepts ould eadto a viciousxplanatoryegress:he xplanationouldhave o n-voke ntecedentlyossessedategoryndcontentoncepts hosepossession ould nturn e inneed ofexplanation,nd so on adinfinitum.noncircularonditionorwhatt akes opossess con-ceptdeterminatelyould hus ever e stated.tfollowshat omeothermodel, esides he ausalmodel,will at east tsome tage)be needed oexplain hedeterminateossession f at east omeof) urcategoryndcontentoncepts.15will rgue hat heonlysatisfactoryodelsa traditional,oncausal nethatmeshes xact-lywith he wo-tierheoryf he videntialtatus f ntuitionhatisalready eeded y cientificssentialists.therwise,herewouldbenosatisfactoryxplanationf hedeterminateossessionfournaturalisticonceptsnd therewouldbe no explanationf theevidentialtatusof the scientificssentialists'ntuitionsboutnaturalistictems. cientificssentialistsouldbe unable osolvethe twofundamentalpistemologicalroblemsonfrontingheirtheory.Theoverall onclusionill e this. heremust e an autonomouslevelofcategorynd contentoncepts, eterminateossession fwhichmustbe explainedn a traditional,oncausalway andtheoreticalnowledgefwhichmay eobtainedbsolutelypriori.Only hen an scientificssentialistsaveboth satisfactoryausaltheoryf hedeterminatenessfournaturalisticonceptsnd alsoa satisfactoryxplanationfwhatgives ntuitionsheir videntialweightnd,n urn,fwhatusitifeshemodal tepn he rgumentsfor ssentiallyposterioriecessities.owever,most f) he en-tral uestionsfphilosophyreformulatedxclusivelynterms fcategoryndcontentoncepts.twill ollow,herefore,hatnsofar



23/78


24/78

Limits fScientificssentialism311y. Thisprinciple ollows rom eibniz's aw togetherwith he princi-ple ofthereflexivityf dentitynd thenecessitationulefrom uan-tifiedmodal logic.16However,there re a number fprimafaciecounterexampleso Leibniz's aw, such as theshipofTheseus. Attimetl, the shipis wood,. Over time,however,woodl is slowlyreplaced by a new quantity f wood, wood2. At timet2, he ship swood2.But,manifestly,ood1 s not wood2.However,Leibniz's awimplies hat, f at t1 he shipis wood1 and at t2the shipis wood2,thenwood1 swood2.Because theconsequentsmanifestlyalse,wehave a prima facie counterexample o Leibniz's aw.One approach s justtoconclude thatLeibniz's aw, infact, oesnot hold n tsunqualified orm. nother pproachwouldsave Leib-niz's aw from andidate ounterexamples uch as thisby multiply-ingthe enses of is': notonly sthere n is'of dentity,ut lso thereis an 'is' of constitution.orrelatively, ne multiplies he objectsfloating here n thewater. Not only s there he ship,butalso thewood. These two temshave exactly he samesize, shape, ocation,andweight. ftheshipweighstentons, henwhen Hercules iftst,he isactually iftingwoten-tontems imultaneously. ndthere remanymore temsfloating herebesidestheship nd the wood: forexample,thecollectionor quantity)fmolecules, hecollection fatoms, nd thecollection fsubatomic articles.Moreover, esidesship-of-Theseustyle dentity uzzles,there re otherproblems orLeibniz's aw; for xample, dentity uzzles nvolving ffice-holders.To solve theseproblems ne mustmultiplyhe senses of is' evenfurther,ositing ext n is'offunctionrrole, nd, nturn,ne mustmultiplyntities ven further.Arethere eally omanyentities?t s notobvious that avingun-qualified eibniz's awyields hebest ogico-linguisticheory. ollow-ing an idea of Paul Grice, George Myrohas constructed veryelegant, igorouslyormulatedime-relativizedogic hatmight ielda simpler verall heory.17Afterll, nearly veryone lreadyholdsthatmost tatements ust e time-relativized;nly hen anwe con-sistently ssert,for xample,that heship s red at t1 nd not redat t2.A fully ime-relativizedogic is simply ne in whichthis sgeneralized o all statements,ncludingdentitytatements.General-ity,youwillrecall, sa theoretical irtue.) hisgeneralization pensup thepossibility hat, ustas theshipcan be red at t but notredat t2, o theshipcan be identical o the wood at t1butnot denticalto it at t2. n thisway,such a logic permits ne togive up Leibniz's



25/78

312 / GeorgeBealerlaw in tsunqualifedorm nd,thus, o avoidtheontologicalndlinguisticomplicationseeded o avethe awfromhe rima aciecounterexamples.Nevertheless,necan keepLeibniz'saw in anunproblematicime-relativizedorm.) ow ust s there s a time-relativeogic, here s a correspondingworld"-relativeogic.18nthis ogic one finds he prospect f contingent,s opposed tonecessary,dentities.or example, onsider "possibleworld" nwhich o woodwasreplacedn he hip fTheseus uringhe nter-valbetween,andt2. hen n thatpossible orld" he hip,whichwas denticalowood, ttl,wouldtill avebeen denticalowood,at t2. o theres a "possible orld"nwhichhe hipwould e iden-tical owood, tt2.However,nthe ctual world"he hip s den-tical o wood2 tt2. tfollowshat he dentityf he hip o wood2at t2 s relative o this world." ence, his dentitys only on-tingent.ince n "world"-relativeogic ontingentdentitiesreper-mitted,heprinciplefthenecessityf denticals ouldnothold.So therelativizedheory ouldgo.Now hepoint ere snot o deny r evento challenge eibniz'slaw. The point s to show heneed for ustifyingt overthetime-relativizedr "world"-relativizedheory.uthow anthatustifica-tion e given? o saveLeibniz'saw from hewealth fcandidatecounterexamples,neneeds ocomplicatene's ntologyndone'slogico-linguistichoery. owever,here re other heorieshat lsohandle hose xamples. owdoesoneadjudicate etweenhe om-peting heories-thelassical eibnizianheorynd the ompetingtime-relativizedr"world"-relativizedheory?here sno alternative

but ocomparehemswhole heories. ut heoriesfwhat?Whatdataorevidence re these heoriesesignedosystematizend toexplain?hedata re ust ur ntuitionsoncerninghevarious ele-vant xamples. o adjudicateetween he wo heories,ne mustgather ogether wholebodyof ntuitionsoncerninghese x-amples, nd thenone mustdetermine hich f thecompetingtheories est ystematizesndexplainshem.So, f heway cientificssentialistsustifyhemodal tep sto n-vokeLeibniz'saw-and, nturn,heprinciplefthenecessityfidenticals-theyustustifyhese rinciples.ut heonlywaywehave of ustifyingheseprincipless to construct theoryhatsystematizeshebody four ntuitionsegardingherelevant x-amples. hus, t bottomhe ustificationf themodal tepwouldrely n ntuitions.onsequently,cientificssentialistsrerequired



26/78

The Philosophical imits f Scientific ssentialism 313to have an epistemologicalheory hat xplainswhy uch ntuitionsshouldhave any evidentialweight.Besides theprinciple f henecessity f denticals, hetheory hatnames are rigid esignatorss also often sed nthe ttempto ustifythe modal step. But what ustifies he theory hat names are rigiddesignators?he arguments or his heoryre plainly ntuitive,orexample,theargument gainst hetheory,ttributedoFrege,thatnames are synonymouso definite escriptions. utthis rgumentmakes liberaluse of intuitions egardinghypothetical ases: thepossibilityhatAristotle id notteachAlexander, hepossibilityhatGodel did notdiscover he ncompletenessheorem,hepossibilitythatwater s not theliquid fillinghe rivers nd lakes,thatheat isnot thecause ofS [i.e.,"sensations-of-heat"],nd so forth. utwhatis itthatmakes thesepossibilitesvident? heanswer s thatwe findthem ntuitive. utwhat s it thatgives an intuition ny evidentialweight?f herigid-designatorheory f names susedto ustifyhemodal step,thescientificssentialist nce again needs a theory fwhat t s thatgivesthe upportingntuitionsheir videntialweight.Some peoplemight hallengeour conclusion y holding hat heMill-Kripke-Putnamheoryhatnames re not ynonymouso definitedescriptionss really ustan ordinarympirical heory, amely, nempiricalheoryf anguage.Accordingo this iew, cientificssen-tialists o notrelyon intuitionss evidence,for xample,the ntui-tion hat twas possibleforAristotle ottoteachAlexander.Rather,scientificessentialistsmerely invoke commonplace empiricalknowledge bout our native anguage,for xample, heknowledgethat hestringItwas possibleforAristotle ot toteachAlexander'is a true entence n ournative anguage or the knowledge hat hestringAristotle id not each Alexander' s a possibly rue entencein our native language).19- ow it is true that this linguisticknowledge spartly mpirical; t is based inpart on ourempiricalknowledge of the syntaxand semanticsof our nativelanguage.Specifically,ursyntactic nowledge hat he tringItwaspossibleforAristotle ot to teach Alexander' s a sentencein our nativelanguage.Plusour semantical nowledge hat nour native anguage'Itwas possibleforAristotle ot to teach Alexander' s true f andonly f twas possibleforAristotle ot to teach Alexander.20Thissemanticalknowledgederives from the underlying emanticalknowledgethat n our native anguage possible'meanspossible,'Aristotle'means Aristotle,not'means not, teach' means teach,



27/78

314/George ealer'Alexander' eansAlexander,nd our emanticalnowledgehatthe ruthonditionsf whole entenceredeterminedycertaincompositionalules nd hemeaningsf he onstituentxpressionsof he entence.) uthowdoesempiricalinguisticnowledgef hisbiconditionalelpus to get o knowledgef he eft and ide, hatis, to knowledgehatIt was possible orAristotle ot to teachAlexander's a trueentencenournativeanguage?Wefirsteedto have knowledge fthe right and ide,namely,heextralinguisticknowledgehattwas possible orAristotleot oteachAlexander.So we arerightackwherewestarted;he deaofrelyingn em-piricalinguisticnowledge as ust run-around.ntecedentx-tralinguisticnowledgehat twas possible or ristotleot o teachAlexanders requiredn order to get theempirical inguisticknowledgehatItwaspossible or ristotleot oteachAlexander'is a true entencenournative anguage. owdo weget his nte-cedentextralinguisticnowledge? ltimately,itherwe or theauthoritiesponwhomwe relymust se intuitionss evidence.Thosewhodisagree ith his onclusion ave ninflatediewofwhatknowledgef thesyntax nd semantics f our languageamountso.Considernanalogy. owdo we know hat he trings'Stockmarketsrashedn1929' nd The quare oot f wo s rra-tional' retrue entencesnour nativeanguage? o be sure, hisknowledges based npart n empirical nowledgef the yntaxand emanticsf urnativeanguage:Stockmarketsrashedn 1929'is a true entencenournativeanguagef ndonlyf tockmarketscrashedn1929;The quare oot f wo s rrational'sa trueentence

inournativeanguagef ndonlyf he quare oot f wo sirra-tional.Knowledgef hese iconditionalserives romheunderly-ing emanticalnowledgehatstock'means tock,markets' eansmarkets,crashed'means rashed,nd oforth,lus he emanticalknowledgehat he ruthonditionsf whole entencere deter-mined ycertainompositionalules nd themeaningsf he on-stituentxpressionsf he entence.)ut ne'sknowledgef hesebiconditionalss hardly ufficient.ne must n additionhaveknowledgeftheright and ides.That s,one must avetheex-tralinguisticnowledgehat tockmarketsrashedn 1929 ndthatthe quare oot ftwo s irrational.ntheformerase,this xtral-inguistic nowledge s a posterori;n the latter,t is a priori.Andthis prioriknowledges arrived t bya proof romxioms fnumberheory esting ltimatelyn intuitions.y analogy, ur



28/78

Limits fScientificssentialism315knowledgehat he tringItwas possible orAristotleot o teachAlexander'sa true entencenournativeanguage ests artly nourempirical nowledgef he yntax nd emanticsf urnativelanguage. ut his mpiricalinguisticnowledge oes not uffice;extralinguisticnowledge-namely,hat twas possible orAristo-tlenot oteachAlexander-is lsorequired.nd his xtralinguisticknowledgesbasedonintuition.A thirdoint here ntuitionsreused n ustifyinghemodal tepis this. ven f ne takes heprinciplefnecessityf denticalsndthe igid-designatorheoryfnames obe evident,hose wo heoriesdo not y hemselvesustifyhemodal tep eedednorderoreachscientificallynterestingecessititesoncerningatural inds. orexample,onsiderhe ollowingrgument:aters denticaloH20;therefore,ecessarilyater s denticaloH20.Notice hatH20' snot a nameat all,but rather description.21Orat least tis adisguised escription,hortforsomethingike the compoundmolecules fwhich onsist ftwohydrogenons nd oneoxygenion'. fyoudoubt his,hen hroughouthepresent aragraphustreplace the term H20' with he description just mentioned.)Because H20' s a descriptionatherhan name, eibniz'sawplusthe heoryhat ames rerigid esignatorso noticensehe boveargument.o dramatizehis, otice hat hismodal rgumentasthe ame forms thefollowing:aters identicalo thecompondpredominantlyillingakeTahoe; therefore,ecessarily,ater sidentical o thecompound redominantlyillingake Tahoe. IfLeibniz'saw andthe igid-designatorheoryfnames icensedheearlierrgument,heywould lso icense he atterrgument.utthe atterrgumentsplainlynvalid. o itwillnotdotohold hatLeibniz'saw and the igid-designatorheoryfnames icensesheearlierrgument.omefurtherogico-linguisticrinciplesneeded,one that istinguishesetween escriptionsikeH20' nddescrip-tions ike thecompound redominantlyillingakeTahoe'.Themissingrinciplevidentlys that he ormerrerigid escrip-tionswhereas he atter re not. A rigid escriptions one thatdesignateshe ame temnevery possible orld"nwhichhe temexists.) owever,he igid-designatorheoryfnames ells snothingabout his.Descripitionsre notnames. o howdo we know hatdescriptionsikeH20'arerigidnddescriptionsike the ompoundpredominantlyillingakeTahoe' renot? vidently,cientificssen-tialistseed theoryccordingowhich he ormerescriptionsden-



29/78

316/ George ealertifyhe ssence f temswhereas he atter onot.However,heformulationnd ustificationf his heory ill equire traditionalinvestigationnmetaphysics.hisnvestigationillmake iberalseof ntuitionss evidence or hetheoreticalonclusionhatH20'andkindredxpressionsrerigid escriptionsecause heydentifythe ssences f he temshey enote. o, once gain, he ustifica-tion fthemodal tep s at bottomependentntheuse of ntui-tions s evidence.There sa wayof ryingat east or while) oavoid he onclu-sionthatntuitionsre needed oshow hat hepropertyfbeingH20 is essentialo waterwhereas hepropertyfbeing he om-pound redominantlyillingake Tahoe s not.Namely,necouldadopt he ollowingxtremelytronghilosophicalhesis bout urescientificheories:fT is a pure cientificheoryas opposed o anapplied cientificheory)nd fT istrue, hen isnecessary.hetruepropositionhatwater= H20 is a purescientificheory;however, he true propositionhat water = the compoundpredominantlyillingakeTahoe sonlyn appliedcientificheory.Consequently,romhe tronghilosophicalhesis,necan nferhattheformerropositionsnecessaryf rue, ut necannotnferhisin the case of the latterproposition.n thisway,the strongphilosophicalhesisufficesobridgehemodal tepn he cientificessentialists'rgument.owever,nvokinghis hesis ardlyllowsscientificssentialistso avoidrelyingn intuitionss evidencenthe ong un.Afterll, his hesissreallyust very trongersionof cientificssentialism.ndeed,nour arlier econstructionf hescientificssentialists'rgument,his tronghesis ould ustbesubstitutedorheweakermodal hesis hat ertainypesfnatural-kind dentitiesre necessaryf rue. o therealquestionacingd-vocates f he tronghesiss how o ustifyt.But heresevidentlynowayto do so except yconsultingntuitionsbout ndividualhypotheticalases,includingn particularhe standardort ofhypotheticalases nvoked yscientificssentialists.Inadditiono theproblemfustifyinghe tronghesis,here salso theproblem fdeterminingn individualaseswhethernhypothesisspurelycientificnthe ense nvokednthis hesis. nydescriptivedentitytatementhat spurelycientificn this ensewill neffectingle ut nessence. hisfactwould laceanextra-ordinaryurdennevery ure cientist,burdenhatmightorcescientists,s a matterfdaily ractice,ogowellbeyondmpirical



30/78

LimitsfScientificssentialism317investigationsndtoengagen priori hilosophicalnvestigationsof ssence.Accordingly,he tronghesismightadicallylter m-piricistonceptionsfscience: ciencemighte dependentponphilosophyalthoughhilosophy ouldnotbe dependentponscience).The inescapable onclusions that cientificssentialists ustultimatelyse ntuitionssevidenceo ustifyhemodal tepntheirarguments.utwhy s oneeverentitledo use ntutionso ustifya theoreticalonclusion?fterll,a personouldhave llsorts fcrazynoninferentialeliefshat ouldnot egitimatelye usedtojustifyheoreticalonclusions. hatmakesour intuitionsbouthypotheticalasesdifferent?erhaps,ust s with unches,hesen-tuitionsarry o evidential eight.This, f ourse,s what adicalQuineansnd kepticsold.Why hould enot eQuineansr kep-tics?)f hiswere o, scientificssentialismouldnotbe ustified.oplainlycientificssentialistseed n epistemologicalheoryhat x-plainswhyntuitionsave evidentialtatus.My trategyill e to xamine riticallyour romisingraditionaltheories f intuition:ationalism,mpiricism,oherentism,ndPlatonism.This urveymust or easons f pacebebrieferhanonewouldwish. hope hathemainines f rgumentanbemadeclear.)My onclusionsthat he atterhree heoriesail nless heypresupposeationalism.ut hat illeaveuswith problem,amely,that ull ationalisms nconsistentithcientificssentialism.herewillbe only nesatisfactoryayout.Namely,he wo-tierheorythat eparatesategoryndcontentonceptsromaturalisticon-

cepts.The theoryf ntuitionhatwill erve cientificssentialistswill e a circumscribedationalistheoryhat olds or ategoryndcontentonceptsnd special ormfderived heoryhat olds ornaturalisticoncepts.Butnowforhe urveyf he romisingraditionalheoriesfwhyintuitionsave evidential eight.5. RationalismWebeginwith nexample.upposehat sincere,ormal,tten-tivepersonntroduceshe newtermmultigon'y applyingttovarious losedplanefiguresavingeveral ides. uppose hatweknow hat he oncept eexpresses ithhis ew erms eitherheconceptfbeing closedplanefigurer themore estrictiveon-



31/78

318 /George ealerceptofbeing closedplanefigure ithmore hanfourides. AsI mentionedarlier, hese wo onceptsre istednthedictionaryas alternate eaningsf hecommon ounpolygon'.) utwe donotknowwhich f hese woconceptss his oncept fmultigon.Whatdetermineshe nswer?What srequiredorhis oncept fmultigonobe that f closed lane igureatherhan hat f closedplanefigure ithmore han ourides?ntuitively,hematterouldbe settled y how the person pplieshisconcept o decisivehypotheticalases.Suppose hat, pon ttentivelyonsideringhecase nnormalognitiveircumstances,he ersononfidentlyakesthenoninferentialudgmenthatt spossible or three-sidedlos-ed planefigureobe a multigon.hen,ntuitively,isconcept fmultigons that f closed lanefigureatherhan hat f closedplanefigureavingmore han our ides. f hisnormal,ttentiveperson onfidentlyudges that three-sidedigure ould be amultigon,ow ouldhis oncepte that f closed lane igure ithmore han our ides? hismakesnosense.Orsuppose hat, ponattentivelyonsideringhe ase n normalognitiveircumstances,theperson onfidentlyakes henoninferentialudgmenthat,fa figure ere hree-sidedrfour-sided,twouldnotbe a multigon.Then,ntuitively,heperson'soncept fmultigonsthat f clos-edplane igureithmore han ourides. hiswould ettleur ues-tion. or f nnormalognitiveircumstanceshis ormal,ttentivepersonsconfidentbout his xtremelyimpleuestion,ow ouldhebe mistakenassuminghat ereally ossesseshe oncepteter-minately)?ntuitively,ecannot.f hisssessmentsright,he nswertoour uestiononcerninghichf he wo onceptsstheperson'sconcept esidesntheperson's apacitynnormal ognitiveir-cumstanceso udge orrectlyhedecisive ypotheticalases.Thepersonpossesses heconcept eterminatelynly fhe has thiscognitiveapacity.This ort f nsightperhaps ualifiednonewayoranother)ro-vides hekey otherationalistheoryf he videntialtatusf n-tuitions.ccordingorationalists,f noninferentialudgments ofa type hat, y tsnature,annot owrong,hen tmayegitimatelybe used n the ustificationf otherudgments.f,by tsnature,type fudgmentas his ind f trongmodal ie othe ruth,henjudgmentsf hat ypeount s evidenceordata).On the ationalisttheory,owever,person's oninferentialudgmentsbout he p-plicabilityf onceptsoelementaryypotheticalasesdo indeed



32/78

LimitsfScientificssentialism319havethis ind f trongmodal ie o the ruth.ndeed, necessaryconditionf having heconceptsthat heperson's oninferentialjudgmentsbout theapplicabilityftheconcept o elementaryhypotheticalasesmust etrueat eastwhen elevantuxilaryon-ditionsre met). ut n ntuitions eitherdenticalo or at east n-timatelyoundup with) noninferentialudgmentbout he ap-plicabilityf concept oa hypotheticalase. Itfollows,herefore,thatntuitionsount s evidence.This nbroad utlineswhat meanby rationalistheoryf heevidentialtatus f ntuitions.lthoughtplainly eeds obe qualifiedinvarious ays, his ype f heoryoes have onsiderablentuitiveappeal.Naturally,herere several istinguishableersions fthetheory,omeofwhich rereminiscentfone mportantistoricalfigurer another. or llustrativeurposes willnow ay out n abitmoredetail hemoderateationalistersion. he argerineofour rgumentouldnotbe lostby kippingheadto thenext ec-tion t this oint.As I have ndicated,he ationalistheory f he videntialtatusof ntuitionss a kind ftruth-basedheory. ccordingoa truth-based heoryf vidence,ertainypesfbeliefsy heirature avea strong odal ie o he ruthi.e., ecessarily,heyre lways rue,mostlyrue, robablyrue, r normallyrue). he dea s that hisstrongmodal ieto the ruthmakes eliefsfthis ype nes thatperson ouldnotfail o be justifiednusingnsubsequenteason-ing.Accordingly,uch beliefswould count s evidence.On amoderateruth-basedheory, propositionsevidencedata)for

personf heperson elieves hepropositiononinferentiallynd,necessarily, ost f theperson's oninferentialeliefsnproposi-tions fthat ype re true.We will all he ollowinghemoderateationalisthesis:ecessari-ly,most f person's oninferentialeliefsbout he pplicabilityof conceptoelementaryypotheticalasesare true.22rom histhesis ndthemoderateruth-basedheoryf vidence,tfollowsthat person'soninferentialeliefsbout he pplicabilityf con-cept oelementaryypotheticalases ounts evidence or heper-son.But ntuitionsat east he ntuitionssed n ustifyingcientificessentialism)re noninferentialeliefsbout he pplicabilityf on-cepts ohypotheticalases. Or f ntuitionsrenot trictlydenticaltosuchnoninferentialeliefs,he ontentsf ne's ntuitionsever-thelessmustby and largecoincidewith he contents f such



33/78

320/ George ealernoninferentialeliefs.)tfollows,herefore,hat person'sntuitionsabout he pplicabilityf concept o lementaryypotheticalasescount sevidence orhe erson. his,hen,s a moderateationalistexplanationfwhy hese ntuitionsaveevidential eight.This xplanationfwhyntuitionsave videntialeightependson themoderateationalisthesisthe hesishat, ecessarily, ostof person's oninferentialeliefsbout he pplicabilityf con-cept oelementaryypotheticalases retrue). his hesissrelatedto a version ftheprinciplefcharity,heprinciplehat n nter-pretinghe peech nd ction fothers emustssume at east tthe utset)hatmost f heireliefsre rue. owever,he ationalistthesiss farmore autious.tdoesnotrequire hatmost f per-son'sbeliefs-includingmpiricaleliefs-be rue. ather,t equiresonly hatmost f person's eliefsbout he pplicabilityfhis on-cepts ohypotheticalases be true. he reason or his autionsthat tseems nprincipleossible or person ot ohavemostlytrue mpiricaleliefs.For xample, personouldhave vast r-ray f uperstitousndquack-scientificeliefs.r personould esubjected to systematicrickery-perceputalllusions, rugs,hyponosis,rainwashing.ndmany hilosophersold hat per-son could ufferromneofthe raditionalkepticalossibilities-the-brain-in-the-vat,ystematicallucination,rdream.)Moderaterationalistsvoid his roblemyrequiringnly hatmost f per-son's beliefs bouttheapplicabilityf a concept o elementaryhypotheticalasesmust e true. eliefs f his pecial ype refarsafer,or hey oldno matter hat ontingentituationhepersonortheworldsactuallyn. ndeed,hese eliefsreas weak spossi-ble: heyoncernnlywhetherconceptpplieso situationhoseauxilaryeaturesre built ightnto he ase.Therefore,heres nodependencyn theperson'suxilarympiricalnformation.heseare thebeliefshatnynormalersonwouldhave f heperson ru-lyhasthe oncept.f personeems o us not omakemostlyruejudgmentsbout theapplicabiltyf theconcept o elementaryhypotheticalases,thatwould ndicate, ot thattheperson smistaken,utratherhat heperson oes notreally avethe on-cepttobeginwith. r so moderate ationalistsouldhold.Thisbringss to themoderate ationalistheoryfwhat t s topossess concept eterminately,theoryhatyields he abovemoderate ationalisthesis s an inmmediateonsequence. avinga determinateonceptsnot ikehaving stampnyour orehead



34/78

Limits fScientificssentialism321orhavingan nscriptionf) predicatenthe belief ox" nyourbrain.The rationalistiew ofdeterminateoncept ossessionsbroadly antian:t s notpossible or here o be a disconnected"piece f mind"e.g., disconnectedossessionf concept ithoutanassociatedapacityorpplyinghe oncept orrectlyoelemen-tary ypotheticalases).Adisconnectedieceof mind s nomorepossiblehan disconnectediece f pace; ike pace, mindomesas an integrated,ynthesizedhole.Accordingo moderate a-tionalists,aving determinateoncept equires aving mentalcapacity-broadlykin vividmaginationrperfectitch-exceptthat t sa cognitiveapacity.pecifically,avingdeterminateon-cept equiresaving cognitiveapacityor ecessarilyaking ost-ly true udgmentsegardingheapplicabilityf theconcept oelementaryypotheticalases that hepersonmight onsider.Letus bemore recise.uppose hat person assome onceptkbutwe donotknowwhich onceptt s.Letc be somefamiliarconcept.For xample, mighte the onceptfbeing multigon,whichwe discussedt the utset f his ection,ndc mighte theconcept fbeing closedplanefigurertheconcept fbeingclosed lanefigure ithmore han ourides.)What srequiredortheperson'soncept s tobe this amiliaroncept? Themoderaterationalistapacity heoryrovides necessaryondition.etthepropositionhat..k... e anelementaryypotheticalase.Supposethat hepersonwere arefullyo sort ropositionsf his ormntotwo lasses,hosehebelieves o be true nd thosehe believes otto be true. hen heperson'soncept would e c onlyfmost fthepropositionshat..c... ssociated ith hefirstlassarereallytrue ndmost f he ropositionshat..c... rereally ot ruewherethepropositionhat..c... s ust ike hepropositionhat ..k... x-ceptthat takesk'splace).23Summingp,themoderateationalistapacity heoryfwhat srequiredor person opossess concept eterminatelyasthemoderateationalisthesiss an mmediateonsequence.ut,s wesawearlier,his hesis ields moderateationalistxplanationfwhyntuitionsave videntialtatus.hus,f orrect, oderatea-tionalism ouldbe able to solve our firstroblem, amely,heevidentialtatus f ntuitions,ust ygiving(partial)olutionooursecond roblem,amely,he roblemfdeterminateoncept osses-sion. tmust e acknowledgedhat, espitetseventual eed forsignificantualifications,oderateationalismseconomicalnd t



35/78

322 / GeorgeBealerleast nitiallylausible.Now believe hat llrationalistsould e wise omodify oderaterationalismnvariousways.A preferrableosition ould e eitherdialecticalationalismrholistic ationalism.orpresent urposestheres no need o pell ut hese ositions. ne dvantage f hemis that hey utrationalistsna position o state conditionhat,on their iew t east,would e not nly ecessaryut ufficientorthedeterminateossessionf concept. nthis pproach personpossesses concept eterminatelyf ndonlyf he erson ossessescertainntellectualapacities:pecifically,he apacityn ognitive-ly deal ircumstanceso pplyhe oncept orrectlyomost lemen-tary yppotheticalases ndtocorrectlyubjecthe oncept omostelementaryogicalmanipulations.ognitivelydeal circumstancesare those chieved t the nd versushebeginning)fphilosophicaldialectic r t the ndof he heoreticalystematizationf ne's n-tuitions, here hroughouthe process f dialecticr theoreticalsystematizationhere ssufficientistinctness,larityattentivness),intelligence, emoryand perhaps esire). y elementaryogicalmanipulations,e meanto include ecompositionsnder he n-verses ffundamentalogical perationsike onjunction,egation,existential eneralization,ingular redication,nd so forth.24(Theseformsfrationalismre examinednmy rojectedookontheautonomyfphilosophy.)What s t or personopossess eterminatelyneconceptatherthan nother? desideratumor ny cceptablepistemologysthatthere hould e some bjectivelyescribablentellectualeatureftheperson hatmarkshis istinction.hat s, deally,ossessingneconcept ather han nother hould onsistn someobjectivelydescribablentellectualeaturef heperson. ationalismtrivesoprovideuch n intellectualeature,amely,heperson's apacityincognitivelydeal ircumstancesoget t modal nd ogical ruthsthat old f ne butnot heother oncept. n this iew, conceptisnot free-floatinghinghat necan ust appenpon ndependent-lyof ne's orrelativeognitiveapacities.hedeterminateosses-sionof concepts not n "atomic"henomenon:personannothave disconnectedieceof mind; mind omes s whole loth.Or so rationalistsouldhaveusbelieve.Letusnowreturno our argerine f rgumentndtheproblemof he videntialtatus f ntuitions.ccordingorationalists,per-son cannot ossess concept eterminatelynless hepersonhas



36/78

LimitsfScientificssentialism323an associatedapacity omake udgmentsbout he pplicabilityftheconceptohypotheticalases,whichudgmentsavea strongmodal ie o he ruth.or his eason,he udgmentshatrise romthe xercise f his apacity re the ort f udgmenthat personcouldnotfail o be justifiedn using n subsequentheoreticaln-ferences.herefore,uch eliefs ould ualifys evidencedata) ortheperson. hus he ationalists'heoryfdeterminatenessmpliestheir heory fthe videntialtatus f ntuitions.In thenext ections, e will urvey wo lternateheoriesf heevidentialtatusf ntuitions,mpiricismndcoherentism.ur on-clusionwill e that ither heyre unsatisfactoryr they educe oa rationalistheory.ollowinghat,wewill howwhy ationalismcannot e satisfactorys itstands

Documents

George Bealer - The possibility of philosophical knowledge