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UFRGS Model United Nations

General Assembly – Special, Political and Decolonization Committee Esteemed Delegates, First of all, we welcome you to the simulation of the Fourth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly—the Special Political and Decolonization Committee—in this third edition of the UFRGS Model United Nations. After the successful experience in the UFRGSMUN 2004 edition, it is with great honor that we carry on the project engendered by our predecessors, Mr. Fernando Lusa Bordin and Mr. Filipe Scherer Oliveira, currently our distinguished Secretary-General and Under-Secretary-General for Academic Affairs. The chair moderating the debates on the proposed topics is formed by four dedicated students that, during one year, embraced the challenging task of creating an environment of academic growth and fruitful discussions. Matheus and Diego are both forth year students at UFRGS Law School. Matheus, a veteran from last year’s SPECPOL staff, invited the former Director of the 2004 Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute, Diego, to jointly direct the activities of the committee. They met on the first edition of this model, in which they took part as delegates to the Security Council, representing Pakistan and the People’s Republic of China respectively. Later they convened and attended Americas Model United Nations (AMUN) as representatives of the Republic of Korea. Furthermore, they were members of the UFRGS team at 2005’s edition of the Phillip C. Jessup International Law Moot Court Competition. In addition, Diego attended the forth edition of “Simulação de Organizações Internacionais” (SOI) representing the Russian Federation at the UN Environment Programme. The staff is completed by the charming second year International Relations students, Giovanna Bocaccio and Larissa Calza. In their first steps in the Model UN scenario, they have extraordinarily succeeded as representatives of South Africa and Germany at UFRGSMUN 2004. Larissa also attended the seventh edition of AMUN as a

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representative of the Empire of Japan at the Historical Committee and the first edition of “Thematic Simulation” (TEMAS) as a Canadian delegate to the Security Council. Together, Diego, Giovanna and Larissa recently attended the last edition of AMUN. We have carefully chosen the topics in order to provide you with a pleasant experience in studying and representing your countries’ positions. Moreover, we have put our efforts into preparing this Study Guide so as to offer you a good starting point for your research. We strongly encourage you to subscribe to our e-group, specpol_ufrgsmun2005@yahoogroups.com, as a way of keeping in touch with both fellow delegates and the chair so that you can start negotiations before the conference. The present Study Guide was elaborated from January to May 2005. We would like to warmly thank Lisa Jamhoury for its English revision. Prior to the conference, updates on the topics will be released to provide you with the latest developments in the topics. Please check the UFRGSMUN’s website on a regular basis to remain informed of them, as well as of news on the event. We sincerely expect you to have a tremendous experience in studying and learning, as well as making friends and enjoying your stay here in Porto Alegre. Feel free to contact us anytime you wish. Sincerely yours, Diego Rafael Canabarro Matheus Brandão Moraes diego.canabarro@ufrgs.br matheus.moraes@ufrgs.br Director Director Giovanna Antunes Bocaccio Larissa Schneider Calza giovanna.bocaccio@ufrgs.br larissa.calza@ufrgs.br Assistant-Director Assistant-Director

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INTRODUCTION

SPECPOL’s General Background The Special Political and Decolonization Committee (SPECPOL), General Assembly’s Fourth Committee, concerns itself with significant political matters, which are often also discussed by the Security Council. Indeed, SPECPOL is empowered with a broad mandate, which includes questions related to self-determination, decolonization, international security and peacekeeping operations, as well as other relevant political matters. The Committee was established as an ad-hoc entity by the General Assembly (GA) during its second session in 1947. In 1965, the Trusteeship Committee was integrated into SPECPOL, which nevertheless remained an ad-hoc body whose official duty was still to advise the First Committee on political matters. Since the Committee’s attributions were increasing, it officially became the 4th Committee of the General Assembly in 1978. Moreover, the continuing process of development led the organ to change its name in 1993 to “Special Political and Decolonization Committee”. In GA’s 59th Session, the Committee’s Agenda included matters as “The Effects of Atomic Radiation”, “Israeli Practices on Palestinian Occupied Territories”, and “Peacekeeping Operations”, among others. The Committee has a fruitful history of facilitating debates on controversial political issues. Since SPECPOL’s large number of delegations provides a wider representation of the International Community than those of the Security Council, its resolutions – despite their lack of binding character – contain a strong moral appeal, as they reflect the opinion of the majority of States.

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TOPIC AREA A

Ensuring Security and Sustainability in the Post-elections Iraq: The Role of the United Nations.

By Diego Rafael Canabarro, Matheus Brandão Moraes, Giovanna Antunes Bocaccio and Larissa Schneider Calza.

“The right to vote is the primary right by which other rights are protected”

Thomas Paine

1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND Contemporary Iraq is located in the ancient lands of Mesopotamia, the former homeland of the Sumer, considered to be the first human civilization on Earth.1 From its ancient moments up to present day, Iraq has always presented a controversial and unstable existence. Between the seventh and eighth centuries, Muslims invaded and conquered Mesopotamia, setting Baghdad as its capital. Mesopotamia then fell to the Ottoman Empire in the 16th century and passed under their direct administration up till the 19th.2 The end of World War I brought about the controversial split of the Middle East between France and Britain. Today this region includes Kuwait, Egypt, Iraq and Jordan, all which were placed under the control of the British. In 1920, Iraqi Nationalist elements revolted,

1 For the complete historical evolution of Iraq, please see TRIPP, Charles. A History of Iraq. London: Cambridge University Press, 2002, 346 p. MARR, Phebe. Modern History of Iraq. Boulder: Westview Press, 1985, 384 p. 2Armed Conflicts Events Data Website. Available at: http://www.onwar.com/aced/data/india/iraq1920.htm. Last accessed: 29 May 2005.

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seeking independence, but were suppressed by Britain. In 1921, the country was made a kingdom headed by Faisal I, subject to British military occupation and right of veto over Iraqi legislation. From this moment up to the next decade, many factions struggled for political and religious power, contributing, thus, to the unstable environment.3 The dissatisfaction with the imposition of national borders by foreign States was a cornerstone among those factions and late in time would produce relevant implications. After Jordan and Iraq announced their entrance into the Arab Union, Arab Countries began to voice strong opposition to Iraq’s closeness with the Occident.4 This opposition resulted in the 1958 Coup led by General Karim Qasim, by which the King and most of his family were brutally killed and the Iraqi Monarchy was overthrown.5 During these initial moments of the Cold War, Iraq pursued a policy of nonalignment; however, the country was flooded by military and technological assistance from the US, which aimed to counterbalance Soviet influence in the region.6 Iraq remained important to the Americans until the arousal of the Shah’s Iran. By Britain granting Kuwait’s Independence in 1961, Iraq’s ancient aspirations of including Kuwait in its territory were frustrated. As a result, Iraq prepared the invasion of Kuwait, but the movement was abandoned when Britain sent troops to stabilize the region. General Qasim was murdered in February 1963 by another military coup. Consequently, young Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath Party reached and sustained governmental power by its heinous acts against opponents. Saddam, however, only assumed power in 1979, continuing the purge of remnant rivals. During the first years of the Ba’ath domination, Iraq directed hostilities against the West, definitively putting an end to the 50’s approach by the development of a friendly relation with the USSR and the declaration of war on Israel during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Iran-Iraq relations revealed several acute grievances during the 70’s. On the one hand, border disputes and the Iranian support of the Kurdish cause7 were the main causes of animosity; on the other, the 1979 Islamic Revolution replaced the Shah’s pro-American government of Iran with a declared anti-American one. Therefore, the US once again

3 ADRIANSEN Hanne K. What Happened to the Iraqi Marsh Arabs and Their Land? – The myth of Eden and the Noble Savage. Available at: http://www.diis.dk/sw8601.asp. Last accessed: 20 May 2005, p. 3. 4 The year of 1928 is the mark of the first oil concession granted by Iraq to foreign companies to produce oil in its territory. In this sense, BLAIR, John M. The Control of Oil. New York: Pantheon Books, 1976, pp. 31-34. 5 For specific research on the matter, please see FAROUK-SLUGLETT, Marion; SLUGLETT, Petter. Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship. New York: IB Tauris, 2001, 390 p. 6 A current overview of the bipolar struggle for power during the cold war is found at NYE Jr., Joseph S. The Paradox of American Power. Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 2002, P. 35 7 O’LEARY, Carole A. The Kurds of Iraq: Recent History, Future Prospects. Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 4, 2002, p. 17-29. But see also ANDREWS. F. David. The lost Peoples of the Middle East: documents of the struggle for survival and independence of the Kurds, Assyrians, and other minority races in the Middle East. Salisbury: Documentary Publications, 1982, 171 p.

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turned to Iraq in order to maintain influence in the region. Up to 1980, the latter was benefited by the transference of billions of American dollars to its State Treasury.8 The War ended by the efforts of the UN guidance to the formation of a cease-fire agreement. Iraq acquired the status of the greatest military power within the Gulf Region. In spite of this, the country was drawn into considerable debts.9 In addition, the northern mountain Kurds increased their pressure for autonomy. Sadly, the Iraqi Government launched Weapons of Mass Destruction against the Kurdish population to suppress its rebellion,10 alerting the international community to the dangers of the use of nuclear technology for warfare purposes. Once again, in 1990, Saddam focused his action towards Kuwait, alleging that the international trends of falling oil prices were a result of prejudicial Kuwaiti measures in the international market. With this justification, Iraq invaded Kuwait and Saddam declared its annexation. The UN demanded “Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal.”11 Iraq refused to cooperate with the UN requisition, resulting in the action of a US-led coalition—acting under the auspices of the aforementioned resolution—responsible for expelling Iraqi armies from Kuwait. Before authorizing the assault, the UN Security Council had imposed a series of embargoes against the country, trying to compel it to leave Kuwait voluntarily. Due to Iraq’s noncompliance, its troops were forcefully withdrawn in 1991 and Iraq was subjected to a set of UN demands:12 surrendering its WMD and submitting to UN inspections to be performed by the UN Special Committee (UNSCOM). Saddam Hussein refused to cooperate and inspectors working in Iraq faced difficulties in accomplishing their tasks. Hussein’s secrecy about his nuclear activities posed international concerns on the matter.13 To worsen the situation, Iraq cut off cooperation with UNSCOM.14 This led to the evacuation of inspectors from Baghdad and the subsequent 1998 American and British “Desert Fox” Operation aimed at the destruction of Iraq’s atomic, biological and chemical weapons programs.

8 The commencement of the Iran-Iraq War led to an increase in amount of American financial transfers to Iraq. For further information, please visit the Princeton University Website. Available at: http://www.princeton.edu/~dmoller/Gulf%20war%20issues.pdf. Last accessed: 27 May 2005. 9 ZAINY, Muhammad-Ali. The Iraqi Economy: Present State And Future Challenges. Summary of a lecture delivered at the Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research on 25 April 2004. Available at: http://www.cges.co.uk/pdf-lib/otherpapersZainyEconomyAbridgedMEES.pdf. Last accessed: 27 May 2005. 10 ALI, Javed. Chemical Weapons and the Iran-Iraq War: a case study in Noncompliance. The non-proliferation review/Spring 2001, p. 43-58. 11 United Nations Security Council. S/Res/678, 29 November 1990. 12 United Nations Security Council. S/Res/687, 3 April 1991. 13 al-MARASHI, Ibrahim. Saddam’s Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Iraq as a Case Study of a Middle Eastern Proliferation. Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 3, 2004, p. 81-90. 14 The organ was replaced by UNMOVIC, which gained the status of a UN Security Council Subsidiary body in 1999. United Nations Security Council. S/Res/1284, 17 December 1999.

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Notwithstanding remnant ruin and poverty, the aftermath of the peration enhanced stability in Iraq. The initial efforts of the UN Oil-for-Food Programme15 could finally fully operate16 and Iraq was authorized to sell oil up to the amount corresponding to US$ 1 Billion on a regular basis as a way of acquiring enough revenue to buy food and medicine for its citizens, pay due compensation owed to Kuwait,17 and to cover other expenses. Since the beginning, inspections had been seen by the Iraqi Government as espionage. In 1999, Iraq rejected the UN arms inspection plan, mainly because of America’s recognition of spying practices performed by some of the inspectors.18 As a consequence, Iraq’s pressure for the end of the sanctions gained force. However, Saddam Hussein, advocating the defense of Iraq’s sovereignty, had a weak justification for the secrecy of its nuclear concerns and its non-cooperation with the UN Inspections System. In May 2002, the UN Security Council relieved the pressure on civilian trade, and expanded the number of goods that could be directly imported by Iraqis.19 Vis a vis, inspectors were able to return to the country backed by the November 2002 Resolution, which embodied threats of serious consequences for Iraq in the case of breaching its duties under the document.20 In spite of the positive tolerance of the inspectors’ return, the Iraqi parliament did not accept the provisions of the Security Council’s Resolution 1441 for a new inspection plan.21 In the beginning of 2003, a coalition of States tending to the American call at UN General Assembly 57th Session22 to confront the “grave and gathering danger” of Iraq, prepared the invasion of the country, justifying its actions with the obscurities and sways of Saddam Hussein concerning transparency of the purposes and ends of the Iraqi Nuclear Program. On the 17th of March, 2003, arms inspectors were withdrawn from the country and the US president, George Walker Bush, on behalf of the coalition, gave Saddam Hussein a period of 48 hours to leave the country; otherwise there would be military intervention to achieve such goal. Saddam did not leave Iraq and on the 20th of March, 2003, the coalition offense hit its first targets in Baghdad.

15 United Nations Security Council. S/Res/986, 14, April 1995. 16 UN Office of the Iraq Programme Oil-for-food Website. Available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/background/index.html. Last accessed: 30, May 2005. 17 United Nations Security Council. S/Res/687, 3 April 1991. 18 U.N. Inspectors or Spies? Iraq Data Can Take Many Paths – The Washington Post Website. Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/iraq/stories/analysis021698.htm. Last accessed: 30 May 2005. 19 United Nations Security Council. S/Res/1409, 14 May 2002. 20 United Nations Security Council. S/Res/1441, 8 November 2002. 21 UNMOVIC Website. Available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/Bx27.htm. Last accessed: 29 May 2005. 22 USA. White House Website. President’s remarks at the UN General Assembly. Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html. Last Accessed: 28 May 2005.

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After nine months of constant hitting of strategic targets, facing the horrors of guerrilla-style warfare and consolidating the US-led administration endorsed by the UN Security Council,23 the coalition forces dominated the city of Tikrit and captured Saddam Hussein.

2. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE Saddam Hussein was toppled on December 14, 2003.24 Early that year, however, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), a US-led administration, had already started to exercise powers of government meant to last until Iraq presented secure and stable conditions to the formation of (and transference of power to) a sovereign and representative Iraqi Government.25 This section will mainly address the implications of the electoral process, highlighting post-electoral issues that shall be faced and dealt with by the UN. 2.1. The Elections and Their Outcomes Parallel to the formation of the CPA, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) endorsed in its Resolution 1483 the formation of an Iraqi provisional administration, run by Iraqis, until an internationally recognized representative government was established and could assume the responsibilities of the CPA.26 Thus, in July 2003, the CPA formed the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) as the principal body of the ephemeral Iraqi administration27 to work jointly with the CPA on issues involving the temporary governance of the country.28 The major goal of the IGC was the drafting and approval of a Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) as Iraq’s interim constitution, formed after high and vivid negotiations between Iraqi religious and political factions.29 The TAL entered into force after the IGC dissolved itself to be succeeded by an Interim Iraqi Government (IIG) that was to assume the responsibilities of the CPA.30 Between 23 United Nations Security Council. S/Res/1483, 22 May 2003. 24 Saddam 'caught like a rat' in a hole - CNN News Website. Available at: http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/12/14/sprj.irq.saddam.operation/index.html. Last accessed: 20 April 2005. 25 For further information regarding the mandate of the CPA, please see CPA’s Regulation Number 1. Coalition Provisional Authority Website. Available at: http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030516_CPAREG_1_The_Coalition_Provisional_Authority_. pdf. Last accessed: 10 March 2005. 26 United Nations Security Council. S/Res/1483, 22 May 2003. 27 CPA’s Regulation Number 6 . Coalition Provisional Authority Website. Available at: http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030713_CPAREG_6_Governing_Council_of_Iraq_.pdf. Last accessed: 20 April 2005. 28 The decisions of the IGC were subject to the veto of Administrator Paul Bremer. 29 For the full text of the TAL, see Coalition Provisional Authority Website. Available at: http://www.cpa-iraq.org/government/TAL.html. Last accessed: 20 April 2005. 30 After the approval of an interim constitution and the establishment of a course to elections, as embodied in

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May and July 2004, in a terminal task, the IGC appointed Iyad Allawi as the Prime Minister and Sheik Ghazi al-Yawar as the President of the IIG. Therefore, sovereignty was handed back to the Iraqi People.31 Nevertheless, both the IGC and the TAL were molded with the participation of foreign actors. As a result the IIG did not entail full legitimacy to the Iraqi people.32 Only after the accomplishment of the plan established by the TAL, would Iraqis be able to enjoy full self-governance. The plan established a seven-month period of transition, in which Iraq would be run by the IIG (first phase).33 Right after assuming the control of the country officially, on July 28, 2004, all of its efforts were directed to the electoral process34 that ended the first phase and started the second one: the formation of a Transitional National Assembly (TNA), responsible for drafting Iraq’s new Constitution and for selecting a Presidency Council (a president and two deputy presidents)—responsible then for choosing, by consensus, a Prime Minister. This second phase commenced on January 30, 2005. Despite menaces and attacks launched against polling stations, civilians, and military troops by insurgents trying to undermine the elections,35 the process had a total turnout of about 58% of the Iraqi voters (8.5 million votes). Two hundred and seventy five members of the TNA and 111 members of the Kurdish Regional Assembly were elected. Also, each of Iraq’s 18 Governorates elected representatives to provincial parliaments.36 After the TNA convened for the first time, on March 16, 2005, an Iraqi transitional government started to get real bounds. Hajem al-Hassani (Sunni) was appointed as the president of the TNA, Jalal Talabani (Kurdish), as Iraq’s new President, and Adel Abdul- article 2 of the TAL. 31 CPA’s Regulation Number 9 . Coalition Provisional Authority Website. Available at: http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040609_CPAREG_9_Governing_Council_s_Dissolution.pdf. Last accessed: 24 April 2005. 32 Initially, the formation of the IIG would be jointly implemented by the UN, the CPA, the IGC and a panel of Iraqi Judges. This was the plan of Lakhdar Brahimi – UN Special Envoy, sent to Iraq in a request of the IGC, in order to help in the formation of the IIN. However, his plan was altered by the appointments of Dr. Allawi and Al-Yawar - to be respectively Prime Minister and President - by the IGC and the subsequent approval by the UN and the US. The IIG was formed by a President, two deputy-Presidents, a Prime Minister, and a cabinet of thirty-three members between Sunnis, Shiites, Kurds and Christians. In this sense: UNITED NATIONS FOUNDATION AND OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE. Iraq in Transition: post-conflict challenges and opportunities. Available at: www.unfoundation.org/IraqinTransition.pdf. Last accessed: 12 March 2005. But see also: UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE. Iraq’s Constitutional Process – shaping a vision for the Country’s Future. Available at: www.usip.org. Last accessed: 20 March 2005. 33 TAL, art. 2 (B)(1). 34 For a complete description of the electoral rules governing the process, see CPA’s Order n.º 96. Coalition Provisional Authority Website. Available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040615_CPAORD_96_The_Electoral_Law.pdf. Last accessed: 28 May 2005; for further research and clarifications on the electoral process, visit the website of the Council for Arab-British Understanding. CAABU. Iraq Election Briefing – January 2005. Available at http://www.caabu.org/press/factsheets/Iraq-Election-Briefing-January-2005.pdf. Last accessed: 12 March 2005. 35 Iraqis vote amid violence - CNN News Website. Available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/01/30/iraq.main.1454/. Last accessed: 2 February 2005. 36 A map with the location of each subnational entity is available at the Humanitarian Information Center for Iraq Website. Available at: http://www.hiciraq.org/mapcentre. Last accessed: 20 March 2005.

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Mahdi (Xiite) and Ghazi al-Yawer (Sunni Arab), as his deputy presidents. They appointed Ibrahim al Jaafari (Kurdish) as Iraq’s Prime Minister. Jaafari, on his turn, appointed his Cabinet of 36 Ministers. With the ratification of the nominations by the Presidency Council and the TNA, Iraq gained its first representative government in years.37 2.2. UN and the Elections The balance of governmental power achieved in the formation of the Iraqi Transitional Government is a result of exhaustive attempts of avoiding any undermining effect over the legitimacy of the elections. These attempts mainly consist of guaranteeing people’s reliance, as well as including all sectors of the Iraqi society in the progress. For instance, the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI), established in 2004 as an independent and autonomous non-governmental office, worked towards promulgation, implementation and enforcement of the electoral rules concerning the elections.38 The electoral rules, inter alia, adopted the proportional representation system and engendered a mechanism to achieve at least 25% of female representation in the new assembly.39 The UN played an active role by supporting and advising the IECI by the work of 56 experts, although it was not responsible for observing the elections.40 2.3. Challenges for the Recently Formed Government Besides electing and overseeing the Presidency Council and (indirectly) the Prime Minister and his Cabinet, the TNA is in charge of drafting the new Constitution of Iraq—the basis for a new electoral process to define Iraq’s definite sovereign government, as well as the new political organization of the State41—that will replace the TAL. Its drafting is to be approved—or not—by October 15, 2005. If not approved, the whole process of formation of the TNA and its subsequent aforementioned steps are to be repeated by 2006.

37 For the full composition of the TNA and the ratio between parties and number of seats, please visit the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq Website. Available at: http://www.ieciraq.org/Results/Elected_Candidate_Name_Lists.pdf. Last accessed: 18 February 2005. 38 For IECI composition and mandate, please see CPA’s Order n.º 92. Provisional Authority Website. Available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040531_CPAORD_92_Independent_Electoral_commission_of_Iraq.pdf. Last accessed: 20 May 2005. 39 CPA’s Order n.º 96. http://www.iraqcoalition.org. 40 Only for providing logistical and technical assistance to the IECI. 41 To assure that all political and religious factions of the Constitutional Assembly will have voice in the drafting procedures, the TAL established that two thirds of the voters in any three Iraqi provinces can veto the draft. See TAL art. 61(C).

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Notwithstanding, the new Government shall also pursue economic reconstruction, social inclusion, cultural balance and stability. “Peace is principally built of four main pillars, namely unity, well-being, security and respect, all of which have been disregarded in post-war Iraq.”42 Insurgency rates remain extremely high and attacks against the coalition forces and civilians—especially those launched by the Sunni minority linked to the former Baathist regime—are hindrances that tend to slow the complete withdrawal of foreign intervention.43 It places the Iraqi Government before a paradox: foreign presence undermines sovereignty, but the Iraqi Military forces are not prepared yet to deal with insurgency all alone.44 Among parties that currently compose the internal scenario, there is no consensus regarding the role of religion in politics. Secular and religious factions tend to diverge in the constitutional drafting. Besides, despite the aforementioned mechanisms established to avoid the predominance of one faction over the others, impending sectarianism is a great source of insecurity and instability. For example, Sunnis fear a possible Shiite and Kurdish oppression as a revenge for all the repression imposed by Hussein’s regime of segregation. Kurds represent a disruptive force by their ancient aspirations for independence. Finally, all of these factors—the conflict between politics and religion, the Kurdish autonomy, and ethnic grievances, for example—can be influenced by regional intervention once each one of Iraq’s neighbors has a full hand of different interests in the future of the country.45 In the view of UN Representative Lakhdar Brahimi, the ingredients for civil war are apparent.46 2.4. The Post-elections Momentum: SPECPOL’s Contributions There is a long way to go before Iraq can reach full stability and a sustainable government. Besides political reconstruction, there are social issues regarding education,

42 SPONECK, H. C. Graf von. Iraq and the United Nations, Post-War and Pre-Peace – The Dilemma of the Future. Essex Human Right Review, Vol. 2, n.º 1. Available at: http://projects.essex.ac.uk/ehrr/archive/pdf/File7-vonSponeck.pdf. Last accessed: 12 March 2005. 43 Rice: Troops will stay until Iraqis can take over - CNN News Website. Available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2005/ALLPOLITICS/01/30/iraq.troops/index.html. Last Accessed: 2 February 2005. Suicide bombing kills about 60 in Kurdish city - CNN News Website. Available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/05/04/iraq.main/index.html. Last Accessed: May 29 2005. 44 It is consensus that foreign forces are one of the great causes of rebellion and insurgency. The new Government recognizes that as soon as possible foreign troops should leave the Country. In this sense, BROWN, Nathan J. Post-election Iraq: facing the constitutional Challenge. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy Outlook , February 2005. Available at: http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=16455. Last accessed: 15 April 2005. 45 For further information on the matter, please visit the Chatham House Website. Especially Chatham House Middle East Programme Briefing Paper 04/02 - Iraq in Transition: Vortex or Catalyst? Available at: http://www.riia.org/pdf/research/mep/BP0904.pdf. Last accessed 28 May 2005. 46 U.N. envoy sees progress in Iraq vote dispute – CNN News Website. Available at: http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/02/13/sprj.nirq.main/index.html. Last accessed: 14 February 2005.

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health and Iraq’s economy, such as the loss of access to childhood education, the restructuring of the public health and judicial systems, employment creation, the combat of corruption, and turning Iraq’s economy into an attractive and favorable environment for Foreign Direct Investments.47 It is fundamental to Iraq in its constitutional and post constitutional periods that the international community provides consultation and assistance in financial, political, judicial, administrative and other internal issues that will bring life to the constitutional text.48 As Secretary-General Kofi Annan once stated, “the UN is working with the International Community on a common agenda: to move Iraq from the starting point—its successfully completed elections—to a peaceful, prosperous and democratic future.”49 Nonetheless, much of the UN’s work has been done from outside the country. On August 19th, 2003, a terrorist attack on the UNAMI Headquarters in Baghdad killed 23 people. Trying to safeguard the UN personnel in Baghdad, Mr. Annan promptly transferred the headquarters of the Mission to Amman.50 The UN shall work further in advising the Iraqi Government in the constitutional drafting and in the national referendum. A more extensive participation within the borders of Iraq, bearing in mind the credibility of the UN with Iraqi factions, could promote dialogue and inclusion, bringing confidence and legitimacy to the just-formed government. In this sense, SPECPOL is expected to recommend guidelines to be followed by the UN and the international community as a whole in Iraq’s reconstruction. All efforts must aim at minimizing the risks of a civil war triggered by the desire for political and religious power after the complete withdrawal of foreign intervention. In order to prevent hazardous effects to international security by the arousal of generalized conflict, regional struggles for influence must be discouraged as well.

3. PAST INTERNATIONAL ACTION In this session, we will analyze the role performed by the UN in post-war Iraq, paying special attention to the numerous Security Council resolutions addressing the issue.

47 UNCTAD. Foreign Direct Investment and Development - UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements. New York and Geneva: United Nations. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/10(Vol. I)), 1st September 1999. 48 Especially Chatham House Middle East Programme Briefing Paper 04/02 - Iraq in Transition..., p. 13. 49 UNITED NATIONS FOUNDATION. How did the United Nations contribute to the success of the Iraq elections? Available at: http://www.unfoundation.org/iraqelections.asp. Last accessed: 14 May 2005. 50 Blast demolishes UN office in Baghdad - China Daily Website. Available at: http://www2.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-08/20/content_256345.htm. Last accessed: 20 May 2005. UNITED NATIONS. Daily Press Briefing by the Office of the Spokesman for the Secretary General. Available at: http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2003/db062403.doc.htm. Last accessed: 20 May 2005.

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Furthermore, we will focus on the tasks performed by the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq during the electoral process. 3.1. Pre-Elections Iraq Although the Special Political and Decolonization Committee has never discussed the Situation on Iraq, it is an indisputable fact that Iraq remained a constant concern in the UN Agenda during the past decade. Lately, after the controversial invasion of Iraq—when the US-UK led forces claimed to be acting in pursuant of the provisions of Resolution 1441—the country turned into an international “hot-spot” which requires a careful international approach. The first Security Council resolution that dealt with the role to be performed by the UN in post-war Iraq was Resolution 1483.51 Among other provisions, this resolution lifted all economic sanctions on Iraq,52 including those contained in Resolutions 661 (1990)53 and 778 (1992),54 and requested that the Secretary-General appoint a Special Representative for the country. Moreover, the Resolution specifically recognized UK and US (CPA) as the “authority” on Occupied Iraq, urging them to promote peace and stability in order to provide opportunities for the Iraqis to determine their political future. Another important resolution approved by the Security Council in August 2003 is Resolution 1500.55 In this instrument, by the request of the Iraqi Government, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) was created with an initial mandate of 12 months.56 This resolution was almost unanimously approved by the Security Council,57 indicating that the “disagreement environment” among the Permanent Members of the Security Council was replaced by common consent pursuing a secure, stable and free Iraq. Sadly, on August 19th, just a few days after the approval of the aforementioned resolution, a bomb attack on the UNAMI Headquarters in Baghdad—in which the SG Special’s Representative on Iraq, Mr. Sergio Vieira de Mello was killed—multiplied the difficulties faced by the mission.58 For security reasons, the UN personnel were almost entirely withdrawn and the Missions’ headquarters was transferred to Amman, Jordan.

51 United Nations Security Council. S/Res/1483, 22 May, 2003. 52 The sanctions related to the prohibition to trade of arms into Iraq were not lifted. Moreover, Resolution 1483 created a Development Fund for Iraq to be used for humanitarian, reconstruction, disarmament and civilian administration expenses at the discretion of the Authority. 53 United Nations Security Council. S/Res/661, 6 August, 1990. 54 United Nations Security Council. S/Res/778, 2 October, 1992. 55 United Nations Security Council. S/Res/1500, 14 August, 2003. 56 UNAMI is a political mission guided by the UN’s Department of Political Affairs and supported by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 57 Resolution 1500 was approved by 14 votes in favor and only one country against, the Syrian Arab Republic. 58 For more information about this heinous act, which has been defined by the Security Council as a “terrorist criminal attack”, please see the United Nations Website. Available at: http://www.un.org/apps/news/storyAr.asp?NewsID=8023. Last accessed: 28 May 2005. And also the US

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Although other Resolutions have been approved by the General Assembly and the Security Council,59 Resolution 1546 deserves special attention as it can be considered the cornerstone of the UN presence in Post-War Iraq.60 Looking forward to the end of the occupation, this Resolution outlines the tasks that are to be performed by UNAMI, which, among others, are to: A. advise and support the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq, as well as the Interim Government of Iraq and the Transitional National Assembly, on the process for holding elections; B. promote national dialogue and consensus-building on the drafting of a national constitution by the people of Iraq; C. advise the Government of Iraq in the development of effective civil and social services;61 As the UNAMI mandate grew larger, it became clear that the “transitional political process” envisioned in the aforementioned resolutions could only be considered successful with transparent elections carried out by the interim Government. Therefore, coalition authorities and the TPA Iraqi Government called for a more active role for the UN, bearing in mind the previous UN expertise in assisting the electoral process. 3.2. The UN Role During Elections In response to this request, during February 6- thru 13, 2004, a “Fact Finding Mission” appointed by the Secretary General, was dispatched to Iraq.62 Led by the UN Special Advisor Mr. Lakdar Brahimi, the mission met with officials from the Coalition Provisional Authority, the Iraqi Governing Council, Sunni and Shiite religious leaders, tribal leaders, non-governmental organizations, women's groups, and human rights organizations. This group had one major task: to focus on proposing solutions and analyzing the feasibility of promoting elections in Iraq. Department of State Website. Available at: http://usinfo.state.gov/is/international_security/terrorism/terror_attack_on_un/terror_attack_sergio.html. Last accessed: 10 May 2005. 59 See also the following resolutions: United Nations Security Council. S/Res/1511, 8 June 2004; United Nations Security Council. S/Res/1518, 24 November 2003 and General Assembly. A/Res/58/304, 28 July 2004. 60 United Nations Security Council. S/Res/1546, 8 June 2004. 61 United Nations Security Council. S/Res/1546, 8 June 2004. Operative clauses: (a) ii; iii; b (i) 62 A satisfactory definition of fact finding mission is embodied in General Assembly. A/RES/46/59, 9 December 1991. Operative clause I(2): “For the purpose of the present declaration fact-finding means any activity designed to obtain detailed knowledge of the relevant facts of any dispute, or threatening conflict, in which the competent United Nations organs need to effectively exercise their functions pertaining to the maintenance of international peace and security.” (sic)

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The most important conclusion reached by Mr. Brahimi was that credible elections could not be made in a short time span.63 The report set conditions for the preparation of an election, requiring that three major conditions be met: (a) a legal framework to be established; (b) an institutional framework to be established; (c) required resources be made available. Furthermore, the mission estimated that at least eight months would be needed to prepare for direct elections.64 After the release of the report, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan fully endorsed its conclusions, stating “The UN is committed to doing everything possible to assist Iraq to move forward to the next phase of its political transition, particularly the drafting of a new constitution and the holding of a referendum and national elections.”65 Hence, by the Request of the Secretary General, UNAMI created its eleventh “cluster,” which had the mission of helping in preparing the elections.66 The UN also made clear that it would not go to Iraq “to monitor the elections in January,” having a subsidiary role in providing logistic support to the Iraqi Authorities. The UN participation in elections can be considered timid due to the lack of personnel and resources. Although the top UN election official, Carina Perelli, originally estimated that Iraq would need at least 270 UN advisors to oversee credible elections,67 only 35 UN Officials were in Iraq during this time. Nonetheless, according to the UN Foundation, the UN was able to overcome its lack of personnel in Iraq by training approximately 8,000 Iraqis to serve as electoral workers and helping to train an additional 148,000 poll workers for the 5,300 polling centers set up throughout the country.68 The successful elections on January 30th, when more than 8 million Iraqis voted, certainly represented a turning point in the Iraqi history. The election can be considered, in the words of the IECI spokesman, “a birth for Iraq, a free Iraq.”69 Even though Resolution 1557 extended the UNAMI

63 UNITED NATIONS. Fact Finding Mission. S/2004/140, 23 February 2005, par. 24. 64 Fact Finding Mission, par. 50. 65 For the full statement, please see UNITED NATIONS. United Nations Secretary-General Statements on Iraq. Available at: http://www.un.org/News/ossg/sg/pages/sg_iraq.htm. Last accessed: 30 April, 2005. 66 The UNAMI’s mission is subdivided into clusters, which are: Education and culture; Health, water and sanitation; Infrastructure and housing; Agriculture, water resources and environment; Food security; Mine action; IDPs and refugees; Governance and civil society; and Poverty reduction and human development. The UN is also involved in a number of rehabilitation and reconstruction activities, ranging from bringing in potable water, delivering medical supplies to capacity building for Iraqi authorities, food and relief delivery. 67 Limited U.N. Role Hinders Iraq Vote - Washington Post Website. Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A43378-2004Oct18?language=printer. Last accessed: 20 May 2005. 68 UNITED NATIONS. UNAMI Situation Reports. Available at: http://www.uniraq.org/library/sitreps.asp. Last accessed: 20 May 2005. See also USA. Department of State. Report on the Elections. Available at: http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/iraqelect/report.htm. Last accessed: 29 May 2005. 69 Shiite Slate Wins Plurality In Iraq - Washington Post Website. Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A20542-2005Feb13.html. Last accessed: 20 May 2005.

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mandate to August 2005,70 the very future of UNAMI and of the UN presence in the country remains uncertain.

4. BLOC POSITIONS The United States and the United Kingdom, as former occupying powers, have naturally been the most deeply involved in the process of reconstruction and transition to self-governance. Both countries have been providing various kinds of humanitarian and economic aid and have either closely supervised or effectively participated in the processes that culminated with the TAL, which provided a timeline for the constitution of an autonomous and democratic government. They sense the necessity of a safe, stable, democratic and self-governing Iraq to ensure that its reconstruction proceeds successfully. They have not only welcomed, but called for, UN involvement in post-war Iraq as early as the Azores summit which took place immediately before the initial intervention. The European Union itself has taken part in the reconstruction efforts, donating over € 300 million71 from its budget. France endorses resolution 1546 and has shown great appreciation to the announcement of the transitional government as well.72 It also demonstrated its willingness to “take part in the economical and political reconstruction of Iraq.”73 Germany backs resolution 1546 and actively contributes to the reconstruction process, “through numerous humanitarian, cultural and economic projects” and by “training Iraqi police officers and soldiers,”74 among others. Italy, after taking part in the military intervention, is now committed to the restoration of Iraq, being closely involved in both security and reconstruction. Some initiatives include the training of the new Iraqi police forces and the drafting of health care plans in support of local hospital facilities.75

70 United Nations Security Council. S/Res/1557, 12 August 2004. 71 Figures last updated on June 2004. More information available at the European Union Website: http://europa.eu.int/comm/world/iraqsit/overview.htm. Last accessed: 26 May 2005. 72 UNITED NATIONS. Permanent Mission of France to the UN. Formation of a transitional government. Statement by the Foreign Ministry Spokesperson. Available at: http://www.un.int/france/documents_anglais/050429_mae_presse_irak.htm. Last accessed: 20 May 2005. 73 UNITED NATIONS. Permanent Mission of France to the UN. Iraq – Answers given by the Foreign Ministry Spokesperson to questions asked at the press briefing (05/03/2005). Available at http://www.un.int/france/documents_anglais/050503_mae_presse_irak.htm. Last accessed: 20 May 2005. 74 Speech by Federal Minister Fischer at the international conference on Iraq, Sharm el-Sheikh, 23 November 2004. Available at: http://www.auswaertigesamt.de/www/en/ausgabe_archiv?archiv_id=6493. Last accessed: 21 May 2005. 75 ITALY. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Italian contribution to stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Iraq. Available at: http://www.esteri.it/eng/4_27_58_51.asp; Last accessed: 22 May 2005.

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The Republic of Poland, which maintains troops in the country, views the elections as fundamental to Iraq’s path towards self-governance. It envisions the outcomes of the elections as a turning point for Polish endeavors in the State, which will be of an increasing civilian nature.76 Russia is another supporter of resolution 154677 and sees the period between January and October of 2005 under a very positive light. Japan has been playing an important role in the rebuilding of Iraq. The Japanese government has committed itself to actively extend “as much humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to Iraq as possible.”78 To that end, Japan has been providing aid both independently and through various UN bodies, such as the UNCHR, UNICEF and UNDP. In addition, Japanit stresses the importance of a democratic autonomous government in Iraq, compliant with the constitutional process and resolution 1546.79 India has taken part in the financial assistance to reconstruction efforts, announcing the donation of US$ 30 million at the International Donors’ Conference for the Reconstruction of Iraq.80 The People’s Republic of China81 has publicly expressed its support to resolution 1546 and the formation of the Transitional Government led by Ibrahim al-Jaafari announced on April 28. The conflict in Iraq left Iran “in a position of increased geopolitical strength.”82 The plurality of its system results in often-conflicting views regarding foreign policy.83 The

76 UNITED NATIONS. Permanent Mission of the Republic of Poland to the UN. Government information on the Polish foreign policy presented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the RP, Prof. Adam Daniel Rotfeld, at the session of the Sejm on 21st January 2005. Available at: http://www.polandun.org/index.php?o=index/exposemsz; Last accessed: 20 May 2005. 77 RUSSIA. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Statement by Alexander Yakovenko, the Spokesman of Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Regarding the Formation of Iraq's Transitional Government. Available at: http://www.ln.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/a7ce0105f0a789aec3256ff2002fd1ec?OpenDocument. Last accessed: 22 May 2005. 78 JAPAN. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Helping the People of Iraq Towards Building a Bright and Peaceful Future – Japan’s Assistance for the Reconstruction of Iraq. Available at: www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/iraq/issue2003/assistance/pamph0404.pdf. Last accessed: 19 May 2005. JAPAN. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Japan’s Assistance to Iraq (Fact Sheet). Available at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/iraq/issue2003/assistance/assist0505.pdf. Last accessed 20 May 2005. 79 United Nations Security Council. S/Res/1476, S/Res/1483, S/Res/1490, S/Res/1500, S/Res/1511, S/Res/1518, S/Res/1538, S/Res/1546, and S/Res/1557. 80 UNITED NATIONS. Permanent Mission of India to the UN. Statement by H. E. Mr. Vinod Khanna, Minister of State for External Affairs at the International Donors’ Conference for the Reconstruction of Iraq in Madrid on October 24, 2003. Available at: www.un.int/india/ind845.pdf. Last accessed: 23 May 2005. 81 UNITED NATIONS. Permanent Mission of the Peoples Republic of China to the UN. Statement by Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations Wang Guangya at the Security Council after the Adoption of Resolution 1546 on Iraq. Available at http://www.china-un.org/eng/zghlhg/hphaq/zgzalh/ylk/t128850.htm. Last accessed: 23 May 2005. 82 Chatham House Website. Especially Chatham House Middle East Programme Briefing Paper 04/02 - Iraq

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radical and conservative parties believe Iran might benefit from a worsening instability in Iraq, as that would lead to an extension of Iranian influence in the region and also “[keep] America preoccupied.”84 However, most Iranians (reformists, pragmatists and moderate conservatives) would prefer a stable but weak Iraq, federated and with sufficient economical strength that would grow into a market for Iranian goods. Politically, there are some divergences as to whether a democratic settlement (defended by the reformists) or a demographic Shi’a democracy (similar to the one in Iran and supported by the moderate conservatives) would be preferable. Iraq also poses a sensitive issue to Saudi Arabia. While the country foresees some advantages arising from an unstable and fragmented Iraq, namely an enhancement of its position in the region and a lifting of the American pressure on the Saudi government for reform,85 they would not compensate for the internal turmoil that would result from this state of affairs. Iraqi fragmentation would have deep consequences on the fragile Saudi national identity, highlighting the minority status of the Wahhabis. A stable and legitimate Iraqi government might, nevertheless, still not satisfy Saudi interests, as a Shi’a government will most likely clash with Saudi Arabia’s Sunni one. Jordan, on its turn, has manifested a “preference for a pluralist but centralized secular State in Iraq, under a strong interim leadership, until security and, hence, business activity can be restored.”86 The King has also implied that the reestablishment of law and order takes precedence over democracy, which is not considered undesirable, but dispensable at this point. The Syrian government has expressed its support to a sovereign central government and the reduction of regional instability, which could bring at least a semblance of restoration of the status quo to the region. Turkey, on its turn, initially defended a strong central authority, but accepts the federated system as the most viable way of holding Iraq together. Ankara also wants a secular and democratic, or at least representative government in Iraq. Israel will also be affected by the situation in Iraq, mainly due to its close relations with the US. Therefore, it is in the best interest of Israel that Iraq is successful in establishing a stable and democratic government, even though some Israelis might view the fragmentation of Iraq as proof that the Arab world is not ready for democracy.

in Transition... p. 12. 83 In Iran there are three main religious-political groups: conservatives, reformists and pragmatists. Since the former won around 70% of the seats in last year’s parliamentary elections, their views (including on foreign policy) have gained increasingly greater influence. For further information, please see Chatham House Website. Especially Chatham House Middle East Programme Briefing Paper 04/02 - Iraq in Transition... p. 13. 84 Chatham House Website. Especially Chatham House Middle East Programme Briefing Paper 04/02 - Iraq in Transition... p. 14. 85 Chatham House Website. Especially Chatham House Middle East Programme Briefing Paper 04/02 - Iraq in Transition... p. 15. 86 Chatham House Website. Especially Chatham House Middle East Programme Briefing Paper 04/02 - Iraq in Transition... p. 17.

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South Africa and other African Countries endorse resolution 1546 and believe “that true legitimacy can only be conferred on the Iraqi political transition through a full and credible transfer of sovereignty and authority to the Iraqi people, which will contribute to sustainable peace, stability and security in Iraq.”87 Latin American countries have generally manifested their support for the actions taken by the UN, in particular the Security Council resolutions—especially Brazil and Chile, which were members of this body when many of the resolutions were approved.88 Other relevant positions: Canada has also been involved in the reconstruction of Iraq. It is a part of IRFFI89 and has been working closely with several other international organizations. Its priorities in the assistance to Iraq include the social and economic needs of Iraqis, the promotion of human rights and gender equality, and the reconstitution of the Iraqi security sector.90 Australia, as well, has made an important contribution in the agricultural and electrical sector through the assistance provided by many of its experts in addition to its donation of A$ 120 million.91

5. QUESTIONS TO PONDER Taking into account the aspects of the issue stated above, as well as the action taken by the international community so far, the Special Political and Decolonization Committee is called to review the following questions: A. How does SPECPOL evaluate UN participation in Iraq’s reconstruction thus far? What

aspects can be pointed out as keen lessons for the future and for further action?

87 SOUTH AFRICA. Department of Foreign Affairs Website. Statement on Adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546 (2004) on Iraq on June 8 2004. Available at: http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/2004/iraq0610.htm. Last accessed: 31 May 2005. 88 Brazil is currently a member of the UNSC (2004-2005). Chile was a member from January 2003 to December 2004. 89 International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq - a UN and World Bank co-managed multi -donor trust fund to provide coordinated international support for Iraq's recovery. For a brief summary of the fund, please visit: http://www.dihk.de/inhalt/themen/international_neu/regionen/downloads/irak_ws2_1_1.pdf. Last accessed: 25 May 2005. 90 CANADA. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Iraq - Canada's Support for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Efforts. Available at: http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/middle_east/iraq_assistance-en.asp. Last accessed: 21 May 2005. 91 AUSTRALIA. Ministry of Trade. Speech to the Rebuilding Iraq Subcontracting Conference - Building Foundations for Prosperity. Available at: http://www.trademinister.gov.au/speeches/2004/040430_rebuilding_iraq.html. Last accessed: 22 May 2005.

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B. Has the UNAMI accomplished its duties towards Iraq? Which recommendations could be directed to the UN Security Council and the international community as a whole in order to improve the effectiveness of the Mission?

C. Which role should the UN perform in the subsequent Constitutional drafting and

further steps of the post-referendum transitional period? D. What are the feasible courses of action to be taken by the international community to

prevent the spread of violence in the country? What guidelines could SPECPOL provide for the establishment of a stable environment for development in the sense of broad political and social participation among the Iraqi society?

E. Can the security of a State justify the suppression of another’s freedom of trade? What

measures could enhance singular and multilateral security without obstructing channels of development?

6. REFERENCES 6.1 Books and Articles ADRIANSEN, Hanne K. What Happened to the Iraqi Marsh Arabs and Their Land? – The myth of Eden and the Noble Savage. Available at: http://www.diis.dk/sw8601.asp. Last accessed: 20 May 2005. ALI, Javed. Chemical Weapons and the Iran-Iraq War: a case study in Noncompliance. The non-proliferation review, Spring 2001, p. 43-58. al-MARASHI, Ibrahim. Saddam’s Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Iraq as a Case Study of a Middle Eastern Proliferation. Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 3, 2004, p. 81-90. ANDREWS. F. David. The lost Peoples of the Middle East: documents of the struggle for survival and independence of the Kurds, Assyrians, and other minority races in the Middle East. Salisbury: Documentary Publications, 1982. BROWN, Nathan J. Post-election Iraq: facing the constitutional Challenge. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy Outlook, February 2005. Available at: http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=16455. Last accessed: 15 April 2005. FAROUK-SLUGLETT, Marion; SLUGLETT, Petter. Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship. New York: IB Tauris, 2001. MARR, Phebe. Modern History of Iraq. Boulder: Westview Press, 1985.

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NYE Jr., Joseph S. The Paradox of American Power. Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 2002. O’LEARY, Carole A. The Kurds of Iraq: Recent History, Future Prospects. Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 4, 2002, p. 17-29. SPONECK, H. C. Graf von. Iraq and the United Nations, Post-War and Pre-Peace – The Dilemma of the Future. Essex Human Right Review, Vol. 2, n.º 1. Available at: http://projects.essex.ac.uk/ehrr/archive/pdf/File7-vonSponeck.pdf. Last accessed: 12 March 2005. TRIPP, Charles. A History of Iraq. London: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 6.2. Documents of International Organizations Coalition Provisional Authority. CPA’s Order n.º 92. Available at: http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040531_CPAORD_92_Independent_Electoral_commission_of_Iraq.pdf . Last accessed: 20 May 2005. Coalition Provisional Authority. CPA’s Regulation Number 1. Available at: http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030516_CPAREG_1_The_Coalition_Provisional_Authority_.Pdf.Last accessed: 10 March 2005. Coalition Provisional Authority. CPA’s Regulation Number 6. Available at: http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030713_CPAREG_6_Governing_Council_of_Iraq_.pdf. Last accessed: 20 April 2005. Coalition Provisional Authority. CPA’s Regulation Number 9. Available at: http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040609_CPAREG_9_Governing_Council_s_Dissolution.pdf. Last accessed: 24 April 2005. Coalition Provisional Authority. CPA's Order n.º 96. Available at: http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040615_CPAORD_96_The_Electoral_Law.pdf . Last accessed: 28 May 2005. Council for Arab-British Understanding (CAABU). Iraq Election Briefing. January 2005. Available at http://www.caabu.org/press/factsheets/Iraq-Election-Briefing-January-2005.pdf. Last accessed: 12 March 2005. General Assembly. A/Res/58/304, 28 July 2004. Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq. Elected Candidates Name Lists. Available at: http://www.ieciraq.org/Results/Elected_Candidate_Name_Lists.pdf. Last accessed: 18 February 2005. UNCTAD. Foreign Direct Investment and Development - UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements. New York and Geneva: United Nations.

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UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/10(Vol. I), 1st September 1999. United Nations Security Council. S/Res/1284, 17 December 1999. United Nations Security Council. S/Res/1409, 14 May 2002. United Nations Security Council. S/Res/1441, 8 November 2002. United Nations Security Council. S/Res/1483, 22 May 2003. United Nations Security Council. S/Res/1490, 3 July 2003. United Nations Security Council. S/Res/1500, 14 August, 2003. United Nations Security Council. S/Res/1511, 8 June 2004 United Nations Security Council. S/Res/1518, 24 November 2003 United Nations Security Council. S/Res/1538, 31 April 2004. United Nations Security Council. S/Res/1540, 28 April 2004. United Nations Security Council. S/Res/1546, 8 June 2004. United Nations Security Council. S/Res/1557, 12 August 2004. United Nations Security Council. S/Res/661, 6 August, 1990. United Nations Security Council. S/Res/678, 29 November 1990. United Nations Security Council. S/Res/687, 3 April 1991. United Nations Security Council. S/Res/687, 3 April 1991. United Nations Security Council. S/Res/778, 2 October, 1992. United Nations Security Council. S/Res/986, 14, April 1995. UNITED NATIONS. Fact Finding Mission. S/2004/140, 23 February 2005. WORLD BANK. Within the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq. Available at: www.dihk.de/inhalt/themen/international_neu/regionen/downloads/ irak_ws2_1_1.pdf. Last accessed: 29 September 2005. 6.3 Recommended Websites Armed Conflicts Events Data Website – Wars of the World. Available at: http://www.onwar.com/aced/data/index.htm . Last accessed: 29 May 2005.

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Coalition Provisional Authority Website. Available at: http://www.cpa-iraq.org. Last accessed: 20 April 2005. Humanitarian Information Center for Iraq Website. Available at: http://www.hiciraq.org. Last accessed: 20 March 2005. Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq Website. Available at: http://www.ieciraq.org. Last accessed: 18 February 2005.

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TOPIC AREA B

Trade of Nuclear Materials and Its Impacts to International Security. By Diego Rafael Canabarro, Matheus Brandão Moraes, Giovanna Antunes Bocaccio and Larissa Schneider Calza.

“The atomic age has moved forward at such a pace that every citizen of the world should have some comprehension (...) of the

extent of this development of the utmost significance to every one of us (…). It is not enough to take this [nuclear] weapon out of the

hands of the soldiers. It must be put into the hands of those who will know how to strip its military casing and adapt it to the arts

of peace” Dwight D. Eisenhower92

1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND Nuclear technology can be considered one of the most revolutionary discoveries of the 20th century. It was first used by the US during World War II, in the notorious bombings of the Japanese cities Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in August 1945. Since then, a myriad of truly remarkable developments has been made in the field, both for belligerent and pacific purposes. Most of the atomic weaponry available nowadays is as much as hundreds of times more destructive than Little Boy and Fat Man.93 Fortunately, the past 60 years have also witnessed extraordinary progress on the pacific uses of nuclear technology. The generation of electricity could arguably be considered the

92 Former American President. Speech given to the 470th Plenary Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly on Tuesday, 8 December 1953. 93 These were the names of the first two atomic bombs, dropped respectively on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Further information available at: http://www.atomicmuseum.com/tour/dd2.cfm. Last accessed: May 31, 2005.

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most relevant of them all as it greatly benefited countries with little natural resources that were unable to obtain it hydroelectrically or thermoelectrically. Currently, 16% of the world’s electricity is generated by nuclear power plants.94 Nonetheless, atomic technology can be held responsible for much of the ever-present tension that came to be one of the most distinctive characteristics of the Cold War period. The nuclear explosions of 1945 generated an arms race which would last until the demise of the Soviet Union, resulting in a permanently increasing arsenal of weapons with a growing capacity for destruction. By the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis—considered the tensest point of the Cold War—both the US and the USSR had such a large stock of atomic weaponry that, were the crises not averted, millions of lives could have been claimed.95 The acknowledgement of the potentially catastrophic effects of this technology by the countries that retained it prompted a series of non-proliferation efforts.96 The first was the unsuccessful Baruch Plan in 1946,97 which was followed by President Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” programme,98 the first proposal of this nature to produce effective results, one of which was the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1957. The continued talks on the matter ultimately led to the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968.99 More propositions have been made since then, such as the creation of an international nuclear fuel authority and the multi-nationalization of the fuel cycle, the latter of which was thoroughly discussed at the IAEA’s Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS).100 In the last 15 years, the threat of nuclear trafficking has generated great apprehension in the international community, leading, among other things, to the signing of an Additional Protocol improving IAEA’s inspection capabilities.

94 IAEA Website. Statement by IAEA’s Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei. Available at: http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2004/ebsp2004n005.html. Last accessed: May 31, 2005. Other applications of this expertise can be found in the medical, industrial and environmental fields. IAEA Website. Available at http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1181_web.pdf. Last accessed: 31 May 2005. 95 McMAHON, Robert J. A near Miss. Reviews in American History, Vol. 32, No. 2, June 2004, p. 263. 96 For a brief chronology of non-proliferation initiatives, visit the IAEA Website. Available at: http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/FuelCycle/key_events.shtml. Last accessed: 30 May 2005. 97 In this plan, the USA proposed the creation of an international atomic development agency to which States would transfer ownership of and control over dangerous nuclear activities and materials. Once it was extremely inconsistent with the political realities of the time, it failed. Its full text can be found at: http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Deterrence/BaruchPlan.shtml. Last accessed: 31 May 2005. 98 “Atoms for Peace” is the famous speech given by American President Dwight D. Eisenhower to the UN General Assembly on December 8, 1953. Its main emphasis was on the importance of cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Full text available at www.ifpaenergyconference.com/pdf/speech.pdf. 99 The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was signed in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. Its main objectives were to prevent the spread of nuclear weaponry (and its technology), to further cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to achieve disarmament (both nuclear and in general). Available at: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Treaties/npt.html. Last accessed: 30 May 2005. 100 CAS convened from 1980 to 1987. It held 21 sessions in this period, but, unfortunately, did not reach a consensus on the matter.

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In recent years, two great concerns have been manifested in the international community: the potentially harmful effects of atomic energy to the environment and the menace of nuclear terrorism.

2. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE The trade of nuclear material consists of a complex political matter, involving a wide range of discussions regarding international security in different aspects. Thus, SPECPOL is expected to discuss the matter in a politically oriented approach, recommending solutions to be adopted to solve the numerous issues presented and respecting its mandate and the framework provided by international law. 2.1. Trade of Nuclear Materials and Non-Proliferation Efforts Although non-proliferation is not the exact scope of the discussions on this topic, there are some preliminary considerations to be made regarding the matter. “Non-proliferation” can be defined as the global effort to prevent or slow the spread of nuclear weapons and the materials and technologies used to produce them.101 It must be highlighted that the need for non-proliferation imposes to all States a duty to pay close attention to uranium and nuclear fuel markets. In order to pursue a safer nuclear future, States must also cooperate in keeping a “close watch” on theirnuclear installations, maintaining strict control over nuclear exports. Due to its “unique nature”, the trade of nuclear materials is strictly regulated through several international instruments.102This strict control falls within the scope of the NPT,103 probably the most widely adhered to treaty for arms control in history, which regulates the international supply of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes.104 The main concept behind the NPT is that States not develop nuclear weapons, but are empowered to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Specifically, its Article III.2 prohibits any signatory from providing nuclear or associated material for peaceful purposes to any non-nuclear weapons State, unless IAEA safeguards conditions are met.

101 SCHRAFSTETTER, Susanna; TWIGGE, Stephen. Europe, the United States, and the Struggle for Nuclear Non-poliferation: 1945-1970. Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2004, p. 163. 102 Controversies regarding the applicability of International Trade provisions within the scope of the World Trade Organization and other instruments regulating trade will be better addressed further. 103 For a complete analysis of NPT’s provisions and concepts in all of its aspects, please see The NPT Briefing Book, April 2004, available at: http://cns.miis.edu/research/npt/pdf/bb04apr.pdf. Last accessed: 30 May 2005. 104 DWYER, Anabel. The Model Nuclear Weapons Convention: a way out of the nuclear quagmire. Michigan State University-DCL Journal of International Law (MSU-DCL J. Int'l L. 291), p. 299.

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In this sense, exports controls can be understood as measures that deal with the tension among trade and security, because they make it more difficult for States to acquire nuclear material for non-peaceful purposes. However, since there is no unified legislation regarding these controls, some organizations have been created with the intention of establishing universal guidelines to regulate such trade.105 Another important topic to be presented is “the perils of the black market”. The obscurities of an illegal market must be faced, as highlighted by the report issued by the IAEA in 2004 which stressed that “we cannot definitely announce whether any country has achieved the nuclear know how, machinery, and material through the black market”.106 Notwithstanding international concerns regarding the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and its implications, some other relevant questions should be discussed by the Committee as a way of incorporating the whole scope of the issue. 2.2. The Issue of Transportation Nuclear material is widely carried throughout the world: more than twenty million packages containing radioactive materials are transported worldwide annually on public roads, railways and ships.107 The IAEA is responsible for setting safeguards regarding nuclear transportation.108 We shall now address the most important security implications regarding transport.

2.2.1. Terrorist Threats on Transportation The possibility of nuclear cargo falling into terrorists’ hands is a major concern to be taken into account on the discussion of this topic. After September 11th, this threat became of high concern regarding international security and shall be dealt with in the scope of the Fourth Committee. 105 The most important international group of the Nuclear Suppliers is the NSG (Nuclear Suppliers Group), which has been created in 1974, following the first explosion of a nuclear device by a non-nuclear State Further information at: http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org. Last accessed: 23 May 2005. 106 IAEA Website. Available at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/un/un-040309-irna01.htm. Last accessed: 28 May 2005. 107 World Nuclear Association Website. Available at: http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/printable_information_papers/inf20print.htm. Last access: 28 May 2005. 108 Those standards include, among others: (1) Double hulls to withstand collision damage; (2) Enhanced buoyancy to prevent the ship from sinking even in extreme circumstances; (3) Dual navigation, communications, cargo monitoring and cooling systems; (4) Satellite navigation and tracking; and (5)Twin engines and propellers. Further information at: http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/printable_information_papers/inf20print.htm. Last accessed: 28 May 2005.

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In 1999, two ships owned by the British Nuclear Fuels Ltd., the Pacific Teal and the Pacific Pintail sailed to Japan carrying Mixed Plutonium and Uranium Oxide (MOX), a highly radioactive substance of which 255 kg contains enough plutonium to make 50 nuclear bombs. Even though the ship was armed with 30mm cannons and small arms, there was no military escort during the voyage.109 According to specialists, “a second-year undergraduate could extract enough plutonium from 5 kg of MOX to make a crude nuclear bomb”.110 Those situations described above provide a stark illustration of the severity of the threat. Piracy also represents a major concern regarding the safety of nuclear shipments.111 According to the International Maritime Bureau, in 2000 there were more than 350 reported acts of maritime piracy, mostly along the coast of Indonesia, Philippines and Yemen, although none of these attacks were against vessels transporting nuclear cargo.112 In this sense, it is correct to affirm that insufficient government regulation, absence of effective policing capabilities, and the lack of adherence of merchant vessels to internationally monitored sea-lanes,113 are the main causes that create a favorable environment for terrorists and pirates to operate in. Maritime piracy is attractive to terrorist groups because private ships and their cargos afford an easy and highly profitable source of funding, one that dodges existing international efforts to freeze terrorist finances. Furthermore, the nuclear cargo provides an additional element, which could be used by rogue groups to produce a nuclear “dirty-bomb.”114 The attack on the American destroyer USS Cole in October 2000 has shown how vulnerable maritime targets can be. Furthermore, upon his capture, the alleged al-Qaeda mastermind behind the attack, Abdul Rahim Mohammed Hussein Abda Al-Nasheri, reportedly confessed his planning future attacks against US and British ships in the Strait of Gibraltar.115

109 The transportation of nuclear materials by merchant vessels is normally carried out without any sort of armed escort by military vessels of the exporting countries. 110 Nuclear Control Institute Website. Available at http://www.nci.org/nuketerror.htm. Last accessed: 29 May 2004. 111 Every State has an imperative duty of forestalling piracy, which is an international crime. It is important to distinguish piracy in its international sense from piracy in its municipal sense. The first correspond to those acts perpetrated on the high seas that fall entirely within the concepts established by both the Convention on the High Seas of 1958 (art.16) and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (art. 102). Piracy in its municipal sense corresponds to those acts that sovereign governments set as crimes committed within their jurisdictions. Some States adopt the international concept of piracy in their legislation. Others modify it, broadening or restricting its scope. For further information, please consult BROWNLIE, Ian. Principles of Public International Law. Oxford: University Press, 1998, pp. 235-237. 112International Chamber of Commerce Website. Available at: http://www.iccwbo.org/home/news_archives/2002/excerpt_trends.asp. Last accessed: 2 June 2005. 113 IAEA. Board of Governors. GOV/1998/17, 20 April 1998. 114 USA. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Website Available at: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/dirty-bombs.html. Last accessed: 29 May 2005. 115 "Al Qaeda has multi faceted marine strategy". Agence France Press Website. Available at: http://www.suaramerdeka.com/harian/0301/22/eng3.htm. Last accessed: 28 January 2005.

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Bearing in mind that terrorist organizations have already demonstrated their capacity in attacking maritime targets on previous occasions, SPECPOL is called to take a stand on the matter, proposing measures in order to enhance the security of such transportations.

2.2.2. Threats to the Environment Finally, the most recent concern—and also one of the most controversial matters regarding the issue—refers to the security of the coastal State during the passage of vessels carrying nuclear substances.116 The concept of security can be understood in different meanings, which includes the protection of the marine environment and human life.117 Ten years ago, in 1995, during the first voyages of the British-owned vessel Pacific Pintail from England to Japan, many coastal States voiced their opposition to the passage of the ship through their internal waters.118 They claimed that the risk of a ship carrying hazardous materials on their waters could endanger their national security as well as represent a potential threat to the marine environment, since plutonium has a radioactive half-life of 24,000 years. Moreover, according to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) regime, States are required to take all measures necessary to prevent pollution of the marine environment from any source.119 The following paradigmatic situation offers a clear explanation of the impasse. In a very controversial course of action, the Chilean Government expressly banned the Pacific Pintail from its Exclusive Economic Zone. The radio transcriptions of the conversations between the command of the vessel and the Chilean Navy at the time revealed that the latter claimed to be acting in accordance with the precautionary principle stated in the Rio Declaration of 1992.120 Although the vessel’s captain invoked the right of innocent passage, it was denied by the coastal State since no previous notification was given by the exporting State (UK).121

116 This section is to be understood in its broad sense: environmental implications affect the whole community of States, not only the one that suffers direct damages. In this sense, VAN DYKE. Jon M. Applying the Precautionary Principle to Ocean Shipments of Radioactive Materials . Ocean Development & International Law, 27, 1996, pp. 379-396. 117 MARIN, Lawrence. Oceanic Transportation of Radioactive Materials: The Conflict Between the Law of the Seas' Right of Innocent Passage and Duty to the Marine Environment. Florida Journal of International Law, Summer 2001, pp. 361-378. 118 These countries were, among others, Uruguay, Colombia, Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, Portugal, Fiji, Dutch Antilles, Jamaica, Philippines, Chile, Spain, Puerto Rico, Commonwealth of Dominica, Federated States of Micronesia, Honduras, Hawaii, Ethiopia, South Africa and Republic of Nauru. 119 UNITED NATIONS. Convention on the Law of the Seas, A/CONF.62/122, 10 Dec., 1982, art. 145. 120 UNITED NATIONS Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. A/CONF.151/26, 1992, Preamble. DYKE. Jon M. Applying the Precautionary Principle to Ocean Shipments of Radioactive Materials... p. 380. 121 For the concept of Exclusive Economic Zone and controversial questions related to sovereignty, please see: BROWNLIE, Ian. Principles of Public International Law. Oxford: University Press, 1998, pp. 206-210.

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Even though the legal scope of the matter is very complex, some concepts must be clarified. First, the “right of innocent passage” is a well-established customary rule of international law, embodied in numerous international instruments.122 Moreover, the passage of vessels is considered innocent, as long as it does not impair peace and good order of the coastal State.123 It is not correct to affirm that States should necessarily be impaired from developing nuclear trade because, in accordance with the tenets of NPT, States are allowed to pursue nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as long as they commit themselves to not develop nuclear weapons. Obviously, the transport of nuclear material has to be carried out by States on a clear and safe pattern. In the “Pacific Pintail” incident, UK (the exporter) and Japan (the importer) claimed to be acting in pursuance with article 6 of the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which grants States the right to not inform other parties about the planned route of a shipment124 on the grounds of security: the less information about the planned route available, the harder it is for terrorist groups to plan attacks against vessels. Furthermore, exporting States contend that ships enjoying the right of innocent passage do not have to notify coastal states since there is no legal duty to do so.125 Therefore, the fundamental question to be answered is the following: can the freedom of trade be impaired by the interests of the coastal State of protecting its marine environment and national security? Could the security of the coastal State be enhanced by measures such as previous notification, although there is no legal instrument imposing such duty? Bearing in mind that it is not a legal body of the UN, the 4th Committee is expected to express its position on the matter.

3. PAST INTERNATIONAL ACTION The UN, through its General Assembly, established an Atomic Energy Commission in 1946 to face the controversies that have risen as a consequence of the discovery and advances of the use of nuclear energy.126 The major concern of the Organization at that time was the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.127 122 Convention on the Law of the Seas, art. 19. 123 Convention on the Law of the Seas, art 19.1. 124 IEAE, Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, INFCIRC/274/Rev.1, 1980 art. 6. 125 IAEA. Board of Governors. GOV/1998/17, 20 April 1998. 126Nuclear Threat Initiative Website. Available at: http://www.nti.org/h_learnmore/npttutorial/index.html. Last accessed: 28 May 2005. 127Bulletin Of Atomic Scientists, Vol. 3.; No. 7, 1947. Available at: http://www.thebulletin.org/pdf/003_007_003.pdf. Last accessed: 29 May 2005.

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Today, nuclear technology discussions range from the management of wastes to the use of nuclear nukes and missiles. Therefore, despite the broad spectrum of implications inherent to the trade of nuclear materials, we decided to regroup relevant aspects of the issue stated above. 3.1. Environmental Concerns Notwithstanding that SPECPOL’s mandate does not cover the protection of the environment as a primary duty, it is relevant to say that environmental stability figures in the UN system as one of the cornerstones of peaceful coexistence.128 Questions related to water, climate change and the protection of rainforests are among relevant causes of conflicts today.129 The 1972 Stockholm Conference established the “need for a common outlook and for common principles to inspire and guide the peoples of the world in the preservation and enhancement of the human environment”.130 Since then, several bilateral and multilateral nuclear treaties have embodied the aforementioned pattern. We have selected a few environmental fields of international action in attempt to subsidize proper discussions on the topic.

3.1.1. Waste Management The first multilateral agreement to deal with questions related to nuclear waste was adopted in the year of 1997. “The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management” reflects IAEA's Waste Safety Section efforts of developing common standards on the safety of radioactive waste.131 Inter alia, the IAEA supports member States with technical assistance, equipment and training. Earlier, however, the increasing energy demands of Post-World War II forced the Council of the OEEC (today OECD) to create, in 1958, the European Nuclear Energy Agency (renamed to Nuclear Energy Agency in 1972).132 Today it has a

128 For a complete chart of the integrated UN System main organs and the goals they pursue, please visit http://www.un.org/aboutun/chart.html. Last accessed: 28 May 2005. 129 In this sense: MYERS, Norman. Ultimate security: the environmental basis of political stability. New York: W.W. Norton, 1993. 308 p. 130United Nations Environmental Programme Website. Available at: http://www.unep.org/Documents.multilingual. Last accessed: 29 May 2005. 131 Under the scope of the UN Environmental Programme, the Basel Convention deals with the questions related to the transboundary movements of hazardous wastes and their disposal. It does not bring the questions related to nuclear movements; however, recent revisional developments tend to broaden the collaboration between the latter and the Joint Convention. See more at: http://www.basel.int/pub/basics.html#Intro. Last accessed: 30 May 2005. 132 Nuclear Energy Agency Website. Available at: http://www.nea.fr/html/pub/neabrochure.pdf. Last accessed: 31 May 2005.

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variety of waste management programs involving its 27 member States133 and works closely with the IAEA on nuclear safety standards and other technical activities.

3.1.2. Climate Change The 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) prepared the ground for the development of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, a multilateral attempt of reducing the levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. The main target of the protocol is the reduction of emissions by an average of 5.2% below 1990 levels from 2008 to 2012. Due to its controversial binding character directed only towards developed countries, the protocol only could enter into force after 2004. Nuclear energy—peacefully used—can play a significant role in limiting emissions of greenhouse gases.134

3.1.3. GATT/GATS The applicability of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the General Agreement on Trade in Services has been controversial when it comes to the regulation of trade in the light of environmental protection.135 International trade of all types is being liberalized under the framework of the WTO. Tariffs are not being applied by main nuclear trading countries on nuclear materials. However, article XXI of GATT (and the similar article XIV of GATS) can be used in exceptional circumstances to tariff goods that represent environmental danger, increasing difficulties in the free access to the nuclear market for peaceful purposes. 3.2. Security Issues As it was previously stated, in 1957, the UN established the IAEA with the main task of overseeing the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Formed today by 138 members,136 ranging from countries with atomic energy programs and countries without them, the IAEA is in charge of developing standards, guidelines and recommendations regarding nuclear safety to be followed by members in their own legislations, regulatory documents and guidelines. In addition, IAEA provides technical help to members regarding radiological practices and protection.

133 For further information, please visit: http://www.nea.fr/html/rwm/welcome.html. Last accessed: 28 May 2005. 134 World Nuclear Association Website. Available at: http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/info.htm. Last accessed: 29 May 2005. But see also World Nuclear Association Website. Available at: http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf34.htm. Last accessed: 29 May 2005. 135 WTO Website. Available at: http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/docs_e.htm. Last accessed: 21 May 2005. 136 As of November 2004, latest update of the IAEA website.

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3.2.1. The Leading Role of the IAEA From its foundation, especially after the advent of the NPT, the Agency has developed the safeguards system,137 which represents international cooperation in developing nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes and indirectly causes great impact on nuclear trade. In spite of the fact that the NPT does not restrict it, the IAEA created the safeguards regime, by which all members of the NPT138 shall declare their handling with nuclear material and conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency, so that the latter can inspect and assure that such items are not diverted or misused in the formulation of weaponry technology.139 Additional Protocols: By the early 90’s discovery of a clandestine nuclear weapons development program in Iraq, the safeguards system was strengthened by the Agency’s giving emphasis to the completeness of declarations, not only to the correctness of the activities performed at facilities and locations that States had declared as having nuclear material.140 The UN Security Council requested that the Agency set up a more effective monitoring system to ensure that Iraq (and any other country) could not rebuild any aspect of its programme, which was dismantled during the Gulf War.141 Under the System of Additional Protocols, a State is required to provide the IAEA with information covering all aspects of its nuclear fuel cycle-related activities and grant broader access to inspectors.142 Thus the IAEA has virtually total control over every piece of nuclear material that flows from one country to another.

3.2.2. Transboundary Movement of Nuclear Materials All UN work related to the transport of dangerous materials is centralized and coordinated by the ECOSOC Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods. Every year the Experts publish the “Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods”, also called the “Orange Book”.143

137 For a complete overview of the methods, rights and duties of the IAEA and of States, as well as updated news, please visit http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/index.html. Last accessed: 21 May 2005. 138 Up to date, more than 180 have stressed not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons. There’s qualitative discretion between the rights and duties of nuclear-weapon States and Non-nuclear-weapon States. In this sense, IAEA Website. Available at: www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/S1_Safeguards.pdf. Last accessed: 28 May 2005. 139 IAEA Website. Available at: http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/safeg_system.pdf. Last accessed: 28 May 2005. 140 IAEA Website. Available at: http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/safeg_system.pdf. Last accessed: 28 May 2005. 141 United Nations Security Council. S/Res/1284, 17 December 1999. 142 IAEA Website. Available at: http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/. Last accessed: 28 May 2005. 143 A vast relation of UN bodies and subsidiary bodies and its functions related to terrorism can be found at: http://www.un.org/issues/m-terror.asp. Last accessed: 29 May 2005.

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In March 1980, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material was signed. It obliges contracting parties to develop and enhance the protection of every nuclear material within their territory or on board their ships or aircraft during nuclear transportation according to pre-established patterns. Recently, in July 2005, a diplomatic conference was called to adopt amendments to the Convention. It resulted in the strengthening of its existing provisions, with the expansion of its scope to the protection of peaceful nuclear facilities against sabotage. During 1988, The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation was designed to prevent and respond to rogue attacks against vessels’ cargoes.144 IAEA regulations have been the main guideline in the protection of nuclear materials from falling in the wrong hands in about 60 countries, being adopted by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International Maritime Organization (IMO), and regional transport organizations. Lastly, the Security Council unanimously approved resolution 1540 in April 2004,145 adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The resolution focuses on the transfer of nuclear weaponry and related materials to non-State actors, bearing in mind the threat of nuclear terrorism, and calls for States to establish internal regulations to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including legislation on any related materials. In this sense, it also created the 1540 Committee, formed by 16 members, currently in charge of reporting to the UN Security Council on the implementation of the before-mentioned resolution.

4. BLOC POSITIONS The United States of America strongly upholds the enactment of the Proliferation Security Initiative in order to intercept and prevent illicit shipments of weapons of mass destruction and related nuclear material.146 In its current crusade against terror the US has been intensively committed to pursuing alternatives to prevent and combat terrorism of all forms, by supporting stricter export and import controls on radioactive materials. The United Kingdom, as a major exporting country, upholds its strong commitment to IAEA regulations. UK authorities, in response to coastal States’ claims, defend that the country’s security and safety precautions are kept under a regular review, and that the

144 IMO Website. Available at: http://www.imo.org/Conventions/mainframe.asp?topic_id=259&doc_id=686. Last accessed: 29 May 2005. 145 United Nations Security Council. S/Res/1540, 28 April 2004. 146 UNITED NATIONS. Permanent Mission of the United States to the UN. Statement by Stephen Rademaker, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, at the 2005 NPT Review Conference. Available at: http://www.un.int/usa/05_089.htm. Last accessed: 31 May 2005.

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transportation of hazardous substances never takes place if the required security arrangements are not fulfilled.147 On its turn, France attaches the greatest relevance to the maintenance of the highest level of safety and security when transporting hazardous substances, in compliance with the most stringent international standards. The French Government supports the right of navigation and the freedom of the seas, as stipulated in the relevant instruments of international law. Hence, the French Government defends that a certain amount of freedom must remain in maritime and cross-border shipping.148 Due to political and economic reformation and considerable decrease in rough nuclear materials mining and processing, Russia has been directing its nuclear potential to civilian purposes, such as microelectronics and fuel production for foreign enterprises. In this sense, besides developing projects in the fields of environmental protection, research and development of new technologies, and nuclear weapons’ reduction by means of cooperation between the Ministry of Atomic Energy and the IAEA, Russia attaches great importance to the use of nuclear energy instead of electricity. 149 Japan stimulates the strengthening of IAEA safeguards regarding the trade of nuclear material, particularly by promoting the universalization of the IAEA Additional Protocol System and the enhancement of export controls.150 Sharing this view, The Republic of Korea upholds that under better export controls it is feasible to expand the peaceful use of nuclear energy by reducing the risk of proliferation.151 The People’s Republic of China defends proper balance between non-proliferation and international cooperation for peaceful use of the relevant high technologies. The country, being a recent member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSP), endorses the IAEA’s full-scope safeguards as the nuclear export condition and strictly controls the export of sensitive nuclear items and technology. 152 Argentina, representing a shared view of MERCOSUR, wants shipments only to be performed by States that agree to promote the safety of the material which should be cargo of minimal risk, transported by ships of the highest standards. Also, New Zealand

147 UK. The Department of Trade and Industry Website. Available at: http://www.dti.gov.uk/non-proliferation/iaea-ukso.htm. Last accessed: May 29 2005. 148 UNITED NATIONS. Permanent Mission of France to the UN. Available at: www.un.int/france. Last accessed: 30 May 2005. 149 RUSSIA. Ministry of Atomic Energy Website. Available at: http://www.x-atom.ru/minatom/minatom.html. Last accessed: 28 May 2005. 150 JAPAN. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/npt/conf0505-4.html. Last accessed: 30 May 2005. 151 UNITED NATIONS. Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the UN. Available at: http://www.un.int/korea/index.htm. Last accessed: 30 May 2005. 152 CHINA. Foreign Ministry. Available at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/jks/kjlc/fkswt/dbfks/t141201.htm. Last accessed: 28 May 2005.

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expressed during the Sixth NPT Review that it supports a regime of prior notification and, ideally, also prior consent for the transboundary movement of radioactive material. This position is also supported by the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the South Pacific Group (SOPAC),153 and Australia, that, while noting that responsibility in security matters rests entirely with States, has expressly acknowledged the IAEA's important contribution in assisting States to meet appropriate safety standards.154

5. QUESTIONS TO PONDER A. Can the security of a State justify the suppression of another’s freedom of trade? What

measures could enhance singular and multilateral security without obstructing channels of development? What aspects concerning export control shall be deemed as relevant? How can SPECPOL influence organizations in charge of elaborating these regulations?

B. What are the Committee’s concerns regarding the use of nuclear materials for both

peaceful and non-peaceful purposes? In this sense, what can SPECPOL recommend to international organizations and the whole community of States in order to prevent rogue groups’ access to nuclear materials and the diverting of their peaceful uses?

C. Has the 1540 Committee effectively fulfilled its role so far? What can the SPECPOL

suggest to the UN Security Council regarding the adoption of measures to ensure broader acceptance and cooperation? What position shall the UN main bodies adopt before other international fora?

6. REFERENCES 6.1. Books and Articles BARUCH, Bernard. The Baruch Plan. 1946. Available at: www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Deterrence/BaruchPlan.shtml. Last accessed: 31 May 2005.

153 The Acronym Institute Website. Available at: http://www.acronym.org.uk/npt/npt7.htm. Last accessed: 30 May 2005. 154 AUSTRALIA. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Available at: http://www.dfat.gov.au/security/asia_pacific_nuclear_safeguards_conference_04.html. Last accessed: 29 May 2005.

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BLAIR, John M. The Control of Oil. New York: Pantheon Books, 1976.

BROWNLIE, Ian. Principles of Public International Law. Oxford: University Press, 1998.

DWYER, Anabel. The Model Nuclear Weapons Convention: a way out of the nuclear quagmire. Michigan State University-DCL Journal of International Law (MSU-DCL J. Int'l L. 291), p. 299.

EINSENHOWER, Dwight D. Atoms for Peace (speech). New York, 1953. Available at: www.ifpaenergyconference.com/pdf/speech.pdf. Last accessed: 29 May 2005.

ELBARADEI, Mohamed. Nuclear Power: A Look At the Future (statement). Moscow, 2004. Available at http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2004/ebsp2004n005.html. Last accessed: May 31, 2005.

MARIN, Lawrence. Oceanic Transportation of Radioactive Materials: The Conflict Between the Law of the Seas' Right of Innocent Passage and Duty to the Marine Environment. Florida Journal of International Law, Summer 2001, pp. 361-378.

McMAHAN, Rober J. A near Miss. Reviews in American History, Vol. 32, No. 2, June 2004, p. 262-266.

MYERS, Norman. Ultimate security: the enviromental basis of political stability. New York: W.W. Norton, 1993.

SCHRAFSTETTER, Susanna; TWIGGE, Stephen. Europe, the United States,and the Struggle for Nuclear Non-poliferation: 1945-1970. Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2004.

VAN DYKE. Jon M. Applying the Precautionary Principle to Ocean Shipments of Radioactive Materials. Ocean Development & International Law, 27, 1996, pp. 379-396.

6.2. Conventions and Documents of International Organizations IAEA. Board of Governors. GOV/1998/17, 20 April 1998.

IEAE, Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, INFCIRC/274/Rev.1, 1980.

United Nations Security Council. S/Res/1284, 17 December 1999.

UNITED NATIONS. Convention on the Law of the Seas, A/CONF.62/122, 10 Dec., 1982.

UNITED NATIONS. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. A/CONF.151/26, 1992.

BASEL CONVENTION. Available at: http://www.basel.int/pub/basics.html#Intro. Last accessed: 30 May 2005.

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IAEA. Analytical Applications of Nuclear Techniques. IAEA. Vienna, 2004. Available at: http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1181_web.pdf. Last accessed: 31 May 2005.

IAEA. Board of Governors Resolution GOV/1998/17, 20 April 1998. Available at: www-ns.iaea.org/downloads/rw/radiation-safety/gov98_17.pdf. Last accessed: 30 May 30 2005. IAEA. IAEA Safeguards: Stemming the Spread of Nuclear Weapons. Available at: www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/S1_Safeguards.pdf. Last accessed: 28 May 2005. IAEA. The Safeguards System of the International Atomic Energy Agency (“The Agency”). Available at: http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/safeg_system.pdf. Last accessed: 28 May 2005. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE. ICC Piracy Report (excerpt).2001. Available at: http://www.iccwbo.org/home/news_archives/2002/excerpt_trends.asp. Last accessed: 2 June 2005. 6.3 Recommended Websites Atomic Museum Website. Available at: http://www.atomicmuseum.com. Last accessed: May 31, 2005.

Basel Convention Website. Available at: www.basel.int. Last accessed: 30 May 2005.

GlobalSecurity.org Website. Available at: www.globalsecurity.org. Last accessed: 28 May 2005.

International Atomic Agency (IAEA) Website. Available at: www.iaea.org. Last accessed: 29 May 2005.