United Nations A/55/280/Add.2

General Assembly Distr.: General9 August 2000

Original: English and French

00-60489 (E) 171000 171000`````````

Fifty-fifth sessionItem 116 (b) of the provisional agenda*Human rights questions: human rights questions, includingalternative approaches for improving the effective enjoymentof human rights and fundamental freedoms

Elimination of all forms of religious intoleranceNote by the Secretary-General**

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the members of theGeneral Assembly Addendum 2 to the interim report on the elimination of all formsof religious intolerance, prepared by Abdelfattah Amor, Special Rapporteur of theCommission on Human Rights, in accordance with General Assembly resolution54/159 of 17 December and concerning his visit to Bangladesh of 15-24 May 2000.

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* A/55/150 and Corr.1 to 3.** In accordance with General Assembly resolution 54/248, sect. C, para. 1, this report is being

submitted on 9 August 2000 so as to include as much updated information as possible.

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Interim report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission onHuman Rights on the elimination of all forms of intolerance andof discrimination based on religion or beliefAddendum 2

Situation in Bangladesh

Contents

Paragraphs Page

I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1–11 3II. Legal aspects of freedom of religion or belief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12–33 4

A. Constitutional provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13–25 4B. Other legal provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26–33 5

III. Influence of the political sphere on freedom of religion or belief . . . . . . . . . 34–55 7A. Consultations with the authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34–47 7B. Consultations with non-governmental organizations and independent

experts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .48–54 12

C. Consultation with a representative of the Jamat-e-Islami party . . . . . . . 55 13IV. Situation regarding religion or belief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56–73 14

A. Status of Muslims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57–61 14B. Situation with regard to religious minorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62–67 15C. Religious situation of the ethnic communities of the Chittagong Hill

Tracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .68–73 17

V. Status of women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74–86 19VI. Conclusions and recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87–112 21

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I. Introduction

1. From 15 to 24 May 2000, the Special Rapporteuron the elimination of all forms of intolerance and ofdiscrimination based on religion or belief visitedBangladesh, at his own request, and at the invitation ofthe Government of Bangladesh. The SpecialRapporteur visited Dhaka (15 to 21 May, 24 May) andthe Chittagong Hill Tracts in Rangamati (21 to 23May).

2. During this visit, the Special Rapporteur spokewith government authorities (Minister of ForeignAffairs, Minister of Religious Affairs, Minister ofJustice, Minister of Education, Minister for theChittagong Hill Tracts, Secretary for Foreign Affairs,Secretary for the Interior, Secretary for Women andChildren, Secretary for the Chittagong Hill Tracts), theChief Justice and authorities of the Chittagong HillTracts (Deputy Commissioner; Mr. Shantu Larma,President of the Regional Council; and representativesof the Rangamati Hill Council District). He also spokewith a representative of the Islamic Foundation inDhaka.

3. The Special Rapporteur was also able to speakwith representatives of the Muslim community and ofthe Buddhist, Christian, and Hindu minorities, and alsomet with representatives of the ethnic1 communities(essentially those living in the Chittagong Hill Tracts).Lastly, the Special Rapporteur met with a number ofnon-governmental organizations (such as Ain o SalishKendro (ASK), the Coalition for Human Rights(ODHIKAR), and Land Rights and Development, aswell as a number of experts and prominentpersonalities (including Kamal Hossain, SpecialRapporteur on Afghanistan and former BangladeshiMinister of Foreign Affairs) and visited several placesof worship.

4. The Special Rapporteur would like to thank theauthorities for their full cooperation during this visit,which he was able to conduct in complete liberty andwithout hindrance.

1 The Special Rapporteur has used the term “ethnic

communities” subject to the clarifications to be found later inthe report, and with the understanding that the terms used byindigenous populations are also pertinent. The term “tribes”was also frequently mentioned during the SpecialRapporteur’s consultations.

5. The Special Rapporteur focused his attention onthe legal aspects of freedom of religion or belief, onthe influence of politics on the freedom of religion orbelief, as well as on the status of women.

6. The Special Rapporteur would like to begin bypresenting the following data and statisticalconsiderations. According to the most recent censuscarried out in Bangladesh, in 1991, the religiousdistribution among the population is as follows:

– Muslims 88.3 per cent

– Hindus 10.5 per cent

– Buddhists 0.6 per cent

– Christians 0.3 per cent

– Other religions 0.3 per cent

7. This census does not include information aboutnon-believers. According to the Minister of Educationand representatives of non-governmental organizationsinterviewed, there are very few atheists in Bangladesh.Most atheists are members of elite circles, and do notpublicly admit their belief, because this would beperceived negatively by society.

8. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs provided thefollowing statistics about places of worship andreligious officials.

Places of worship

Mosques 192,800

Temples 20,000

Pagodas 1,700

Religious officials

Imams 192,800

Porohits (Hindu) 20,000

Shromon/Vikhu 3,500

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs informed the SpecialRapporteur that he had no information concerningChristian places of worship or Christian religiousofficials.

9. We should note that whereas Muslims, Hindus,and Christians are distributed across the entire country,Buddhists live mainly in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.

10. In order to give a more accurate impression ofthis religious landscape, we should also mention

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Bangladesh’s ethnic communities, which make upslightly more than one per cent of the population andare mostly located in the Chittagong Hill Tracts and onthe plains of the Greater Dinajpur, Rajshashi,Mymensingh, Sylhet, and Tangail Districts. Accordingto information gathered from non-governmentalsources, those ethnic groups are theBongshi/Rajbongshi, Bawm, Buna, Chakma,Koach/Koch, Garo/Mandi, Hajong, Harizon, Khami,Khasi/Khasia, Khyang, Lushai, Mahat/Mahatu, Marma,Manipuri, Mro, Mong, Munda/Mundia, Murang,Pahari/Paharia, Pankue/Pankho, Pathor, Rajbansi, Sak,Saontal/Santal, Tanchangya, Tipra/Tripura, Urang/Oraon, Uruo/Urua/Uria, etc. Among thesecommunities, the largest are, in descending order, theChakma, the Santal, the Marma, the Tipra, and theGaro. With regard to the Chittagong Hill Tracts, non-governmental specialists say that whereas the Marma,the Chakma and the Tanchangya are Buddhistcommunities, smaller ethnic communities that wereoriginally animist, such as the Bawm, the Lushai, andthe Pankho, are gradually converting to Christianity, asa result of missionary activity. Outside the ChittagongHill Tracts, the Garo (who have their own religioustraditions, which are reminiscent of animism) aremostly Christians. According to the same sources, theKoch, Hajong, Pathor and Manipuri are Hinducommunities. The Santal have preserved their animisttraditions, but they have been influenced by Hinduism,and some have converted to Christianity. According tothe experts consulted, conversion to Christianity hasbeen taking place since the British colonial period, andthat this process was preceded by the spreading ofHinduism in the northern and north-eastern borderregions, and of Buddhism among the Chittagong HillTracts. There have been very few conversions to theMuslim faith.

11. With respect to the Chittagong Hill Tracts, theSpecial Rapporteur obtained non-governmentalestimates indicating that ethnic communities, whichformerly accounted for most of the population (97.3per cent in 1947), presently account for 50 per cent ofthe population, due to the large (mostly Muslim)Bengali community. According to informationprovided by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the 1991census found the following distribution of religions inRangamati: 26,382 Muslims, 8,871 Hindus, 12,006Buddhists, and 217 Christians. The same sources gavethe following figures for the number of religiousinstitutions in the Rangamati Municipal Area: 31

mosques, 8 mandirs, 10 Buddhist temples, 2 churches,2 madrasahs, 4 orphan centres, 26 maktabs, 5 Muslimgraves, 3 burning yards, and 1 Christian grave.

II. Legal aspects of freedom of religionor belief

12. Before we consider the Constitution and otherlegislation, we should note that Bangladesh is a partyto the following international human rightsinstruments: the International Covenant on Economic,Social and Cultural Rights; the Convention on theRights of the Child; the International Convention onthe Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination;the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms ofDiscrimination against Women; the Convention againstTorture and other Cruel, Inhuman or DegradingTreatment or Punishment; the Convention on thePolitical Rights of Women; the Convention on Consentto Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage andRegistration of Marriages; the Convention on thePrevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide;the International Convention on the Suppression andPunishment of the Crime of Apartheid; the SlaveryConvention; the Supplementary Convention on theAbolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutionsand Practices Similar to Slavery; and the Conventionfor the Suppression of Traffic in Persons and theExploitation of the Prostitution of Others.

A. Constitutional provisions

13. The Constitution approved by the ConstituentAssembly of Bangladesh on 4 November 1972 andpromulgated on 16 December 1972 was suspended on24 March 1982 by a military coup d’état, and thenrestored on 10 November 1986. Articles 39 and 41 ofthe Constitution guarantee freedom of religion andconscience and their manifestations, while definingcertain limits.

14. Article 39 guarantees (a) freedom of thought andconscience; (b) the right of every citizen to freedom ofspeech and expression; and (c) freedom of the press,subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by lawin the interest of the security of the State, friendlyrelations with foreign States, public order, decency ormorality, or in relation to contempt of court,defamation or incitement to an offence.

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15. Article 41 provides that subject to law, publicorder and morality, (a) every citizen has the right toprofess, practise or propagate any religion; (b) everyreligious community or denomination has the right toestablish, maintain and manage its religiousinstitutions; and that no person attending anyeducational institution shall be required to receivereligious instruction, or to attend any religiousceremony or worship, if that instruction, ceremony orworship relates to a religion other than his own.

16. The Constitution guarantees the principle of non-discrimination (Articles 10, 27 to 29, and 121).

17. Article 10 provides that steps shall be taken toensure participation of women in all spheres of nationallife.

18. Article 27 provides that all citizens are equalbefore law and are entitled to equal protection of law.

19. Article 28 provides that the State shall notdiscriminate against any citizen on grounds only ofreligion, race, caste, sex or place of birth; women shallhave equal rights with men in all spheres of the Stateand public life; no citizen shall, on grounds only ofreligion, race ... be subjected to any disability, liability,restriction or condition with regard to access to anyplace of public entertainment or resort, or admission toany educational institution.

20. Article 29 provides that there shall be equality ofopportunity for all citizens in respect of employment oroffice in the service of the Republic; no citizen shall,on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex or place ofbirth, be ineligible for, or discriminated in respect of,any employment or office in the service of theRepublic; nothing in this article shall prevent the Statefrom ... giving effect to any law which makes provisionfor reserving appointments relating to any religious ordenominational institution to persons of that religion ordenomination.

21. Article 121 provides that there shall be oneelectoral roll for each constituency for the purposes ofelections to Parliament, and no special electoral rollshall be prepared so as to classify electors according toreligion, race, caste or sex.

22. The Constitution accords a special role to Islam,which is defined as the State religion.

23. The Amendment of 1977 defines the Muslim faithas one of the nation’s guiding principles. Article 8,

paragraph 1 of the Constitution provides that “Theprinciple of absolute trust and faith in Almighty Allah... together with the principles derived from them as setout in this part, shall constitute the fundamentalprinciples of state policy” (“Absolute trust and faith inthe Almighty Allah shall be the basis of all actions”).This Amendment abrogated Article 12 of the 1972Constitution, which stipulated:

The principle of secularism shall be realized bythe elimination of communalism in all its forms:(a) the granting by the State of political status infavour of any religion; (b) the abuse of religionfor political purposes; (c) any discriminationagainst, or persecution of, persons practising aparticular religion.

24. The Amendment of 1988 states the State religionof the Republic is Islam but other religions may bepractised in peace and harmony in the Republic(Article 2.A). Article 25, paragraph 2 provides that theState shall endeavour to consolidate, preserve andstrengthen fraternal relations among Muslim countriesbased on Islamic solidarity.

25. The Chief Justice has stated that the Amendmentof 1988 had no legal consequences with respect toreligious communities, especially minorities, nor withrespect to the country’s jurisprudence. He further statedthat in any case, the Constitution stipulated thatBangladesh was bound by the international instrumentsit had signed. He added that the sharia did notconstitute the basis of the country’s legislation.

B. Other legal provisions

26. According to information gathered from theauthorities and from non-governmental organizations,there is no specific law regulating freedom of religionand belief. However, there are laws in force protectingreligion or having an impact either in areas perceivedas being a matter for religious officials, or on minorityreligions. There are also a number of religious personallaws.

1. Religious personal laws and other rules ofpositive law

27. Religious personal laws, also known as familylaws, relate for each community (Muslim, Christian,Hindu and Buddhist) to personal matters such asmarriage, divorce, dowry, maintenance, guardianship,

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inheritance, and restitution of conjugal life. Thesereligious personal laws thus regulate specific questions,and are unique to each community, while civil andcriminal law applies to everybody, regardless ofreligious affiliation. Asked by the Special Rapporteurwhether such religious personal laws (for example, thediscrimination against women in certain areas ofMuslim and Hindu Family Laws, see sect. V) werecompatible with the constitutional principle of equalityand with international human rights instruments, theMinistry for Women and Children and the Chief Justicereplied that no difficulty arose in this regard. Itappears, on the basis of the consultations held withthese authorities, that religious personal laws conformto the constitutional principle of equality, on thegrounds that religions do not discriminate on the basisof gender, and that positive-law legislation guaranteesthe principles of the Constitution, especially equalitybased on gender. The Secretary for Women andChildren said that polygamy was not contrary to humanrights, firstly, because of it conformed to Islam, andsecondly, because under the positive-law provisionsregulating polygamy, husbands were obliged to requestpermission from the first wife before taking anotherwife. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs explained thatreligious personal laws applied in specific areas, suchas marriage and divorce, and that it was also possibleto appeal to positive law and, in accordance with theConstitution, to appeal to the courts whenever a disputearose. The Secretary for Women and Children and hercolleagues explained that, for example, divorce could,under Muslim Law, occur through repudiation of a wifeby the husband, but that in order to protect the womanfrom all forms of arbitrary divorce, there was a lawstipulating that such divorces should be granted by acourt (the aim being to ensure that women were able toenjoy certain rights, such as a pension). It wasemphasized that religious personal laws may not beinfringed.

28. According to Law Professors at the University ofDhaka, the country’s Jurisprudence has madeconsiderable progress, with judges increasinglydisposed to give precedence to constitutionalprovisions regarding non-discrimination (Articles 27-29) and to the right to the protection of the law over allincompatible provisions of religious personal laws(Article 31: To enjoy the protection of the law, and tobe treated in accordance with law, and only inaccordance with law, is the inalienable right of everycitizen, wherever he may be ... and in particular no

action detrimental to the life, liberty, body, reputationor property of any person shall be taken, except inaccordance with law). The Professors also noted thatprecedents had been obtained in the area of childcare(the High Court judgement on child custody in the caseof Abdul Jalil and others v. Mrs Sharon Laily Begum(civil) established equal rights for Muslim women inthis respect; Bangladesh Legal Decision, BLD. vol. 18,AD 1998:21). However, the consultations revealed thatgreater progress was needed, both with respect to allcommunities (including minorities) and with respect toall problematical areas, such as inheritance (see sect.V).

2. Penal code

29. The penal code provides measures specificallyrelated to freedom of religion and its manifestations.Article 295 provides for imprisonment of a maximumof two years, and/or a fine, in the case of any attack onplaces of worship and sacred objects (for example, byacts of destruction or other damage). Article 295.Aprovides for the same penalties in the case of anyinsult — whether actual or intended — directed againstreligious beliefs or feelings. Article 296 protectsreligious worship and religious ceremonies against anyattack, and punishes such attacks with a prisonsentence of a maximum of two years and/or a fine.Article 297 sanctions in particular any act ofdesecration — for example of a tomb or a place ofworship — with penalties identical to those providedfor under Article 296. Lastly, Article 298 provides forimprisonment of a maximum of one year, and/or a fine,in the case of any intention to offend against a person’sreligious feelings — notably by means of a sound, aword, a gesture or an object.

3. Vested Property Act

30. According to information provided by non-governmental sources, the Vested Properties Actderives from the Enemy Property (Custody andRegistration) Order II of 1965, promulgated in Pakistanfollowing a brief war between India and Pakistan inSeptember 1965. According to the informationreceived, this order was directed against the Hinduminority (perceived as an enemy), and was used as aninstrument for appropriating land belonging to Hindusaccused of supporting India.

31. After Bangladesh won independence fromPakistan, the President of Bangladesh, in his Order

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No. 29 of 1972, changed the nomenclature to VestedProperty Act, without altering the content of the law.According to information from non-governmentalsources, the Government of Bangladesh has, within theframework of this law, taken possession of propertydeclared to belong to the enemy, by appropriating theproperty of members of the Hindu minority who hadmigrated to India, or by appropriating the property ofpeople who were heirs or co-owners. Furthermore, tothis day, interest groups and individuals continue toappropriate property belonging to the Hinducommunity, and indeed to do so with the complicity ofthe authorities and of influential people. In asignificant number of cases, Hindus are dispossessed oftheir property, even when they are the legal owners ofsuch assets. According to non-governmental sources,Clause 2 of Order No. 29 of 1972 states that none ofthese grounds may be challenged by a court.Furthermore, neither the Order nor the Vested PropertyAct has ever been revised.

32. According to the non-governmental sources, atleast two million acres of land have been seized fromHindu landowners under the Vested Property Act. Thislaw represents a major source of insecurity and ofhuman rights violations against the Hindu community.It also affects the northern Hurukh/Oroan tribes, whichare not Hindu, but are perceived as such because oftheir Hindu roots. In the view of non-governmentalorganizations, it is therefore clear that the VestedProperty Act is detrimental to minorities and to thereligious harmony of Bangladesh.

33. In December 1998, the Government set up aparliamentary subcommittee under the Ministry ofLand, to repeal the Vested Property Act and reinstatethe vested property to the original owners. Thiscommittee has prepared a bill, which is due to bepresented to Parliament. It appears, however, that thisbill would present serious problems. According to thenon-governmental sources, the bill provides thatproperties legally vested under the ownership of theGovernment and those declared to be enemy or vestedproperty after 16 February 1969 will not be consideredas vested property after the said period. Most Hinduproperty, however, was declared vested property afterthat date. The bill also states that the proprietorshipstatus of the vested property will not be challenged ifthe property was transferred to the Government, agovernment institution, or to a private individual, hasbeen sold or has been handed over permanently by the

Government at the directives of a court. It will not evenbe possible to challenge such cases in court. Accordingto the non-governmental organizations consulted, theseprovisions are contrary to the spirit and objectives ofthe bill. The bill also provides that if the originalowners do not submit their ownership documents to acourt within 180 days following promulgation of thelaw, their property will be acquired by the Government.This time period is considered too short by the Hinducommunity. Lastly, the bill provides that in the event ofthe decease of the original owner, rights of inheritanceshall apply in accordance with Hindu religiouspersonal laws. Hindu women would therefore beautomatically excluded from inheritance, since Hindureligious personal laws do not accord any rights ofinheritance to women. The bill, which is still in thestudy phase, therefore presents major difficulties.

III. Influence of the political sphere onfreedom of religion or belief

A. Consultations with the authorities

34. Most of the official sources consulted — theMinister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Justice, theMinister of Religious Affairs, the Minister for theChittagong Hill Tracts, the Secretary for the Interior,and the Chief Justice — said that the Government wasin favour of secularism, and operated within theframework of the Constitution, which was based on theprinciples of non-discrimination and freedom ofreligion and belief. They believed that Bangladesh wasa country characterized by harmony among the variousreligious communities, and especially between theMuslim majority and non-Muslim minorities.

35. The Minister of Religious Affairs noted thatfreedom of religion and of religious practice wasguaranteed under constitutional and penal laws, as wellas under religious personal laws, and that eachcommunity had a right to define its own religiousinstitutions. He said that the State would not interferein communities’ internal religious affairs. He addedthat public funds were allocated to these communities(including the Islamic Foundation, Buddhists, Hindus,and Christians) and that these funds were regulated byGovernment ordinances (for example, the HinduReligious Welfare Trust Ordinance of 1983, amendedby the Ordinances of 1985, 1986 and 1989; theBuddhist Religious Welfare Trust Ordinance 1983).

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The Special Rapporteur obtained information about thebudget allocation for the welfare of religiousinstitutions in the fiscal year 1999-2000: MuslimsTk 32,500,000; Hindus Tk 7,000,000; BuddhistsTk 1,500,000; Christians, Tk 500,000. Statistics werealso provided regarding civil servants, showing theparticipation of religious groups in the Government(total workforce 4,286; Hindus, 410 or 9.6 per cent);Buddhists, 24 or 0.65 per cent; Christians, 5 or 0.11 percent); and regarding government holidays to markreligious occasions (government holidays in generalapplicable to all: Muslim, 4; Hindu, 2; Buddhist, 1;Christian, 1; optional holidays applicable to thereligious groups: concerned: Muslim, 7; Hindu, 10;Buddhist, 4; Christian, 8.

36. The Minister of Foreign Affairs said that therehad been incidents in the past, such as certain tensionsamong ethnic groups in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, andthe isolated reactions of fanatics against the Hinduminority during the destruction of the Ayodhya Mosquein India. A Ministry for Foreign Affairs representativeexplained that the Government was doing its best topromote harmony in the community, and especially,like any other country, to combat any discriminationresulting from the weight of certain traditions, whoseeradication would involve a lengthy process. Herecalled the historical context of Bangladesh’saccession to independence, which occurred within thecontext of enormous sacrifices and a struggle fordemocracy and freedom, including religious freedom.Stressing the difficult economic and social conditionsin Bangladesh, which are common to all developingcountries, he explained that the Government’s effortswere aimed at demarginalizing poverty-strickenpopulations (especially through women’s educationprogrammes), and that this approach would helpcombat all forms of discrimination. He said that despiteits economic problems, Bangladeshi society was bothtraditional and religious, and both tolerant and liberal.He noted that there were incidents involvingminorities, but that the vast majority of incidentsinvolved Muslims. The Minister of Foreign Affairsdescribed the present situation as one of total harmony,especially with regard to the country’s ethniccommunities. He said that this was due in particular tothe political solution provided by the Government tothe question of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (a solutioninvolving various measures, including promulgation oflaws in favour of ethnic communities, the creation of a

Ministry for the Chittagong Hill Tracts, and a processaimed at restoring land to the ethnic communities).

37. The Minister of Justice stated that the conflict inthe Chittagong Hill Tracts (see also sect. IV.C) was notbased on religion. The Ministry and Secretary for theChittagong Hill Tracts explained that since the signingof the 1997 Peace Accord, relations between Muslimsand tribes of different religious confessions —Buddhist, Hindu, and Christian — were harmonious.Furthermore, all confessions were able to practise theirreligion under a secular regime. The DeputyCommissioner for Rangamati made a similarassessment. The Minister and Secretary for theChittagong Hill Tracts noted that the Peace Accord wasclearly being respected and applied, notably throughthe allocation of credits for development activities andfor the restoration of temples destroyed during theconflict; the return of 64,000 refugees, who wereprovided with State assistance; the restoration of a civiladministration committed to human rights andsecularism; the withdrawal of over 70 military camps;and the establishment of a Land Commission, whichwas due to visit Chittagong shortly, in order to beginworking towards a solution to land-related issues.Asked by the Special Rapporteur about allegations ofhuman rights violations in the Chittagong Hill Tracts(see sect. IV.C), the Minister for the Chittagong HillTracts replied that army factions hostile to the ethniccommunities had been rooted out, while the Secretaryreplied that he had not received any reports of forcedconversions to Islam organized by Muslim extremists.The Minister of Religious Affairs said that allcitizens — including Muslims — were free to changetheir religion, that the State was not in any wayinvolved in the alleged cases of forced conversion, andthat anyway, people did have the option of appealing tothe courts. With respect to an alleged attack on achurch in Rangamati, the Ministry for Foreign Affairsreplied that according to the record of the RangamatiPourashava and the testimony of Mr. Sankar PrashadBarua, a staff member of the Purashava Office, aChristian hostel at Bhandhiu Jishu Tila, in RangamatiMunicipal Area, was partially damaged by a suddenoutbreak of fire on 2 September 1999. A representativeof the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stressed that thequestion of the Chittagong Hill Tracts was complex,but that the Government was sincere in its applicationof the 1997 Peace Accord, a process that required time.He considered that this was an ethnic problem, not areligious one.

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38. Following his visit, the Special Rapporteurreceived a note from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs,stating:

The policies and programmes of the Governmentare designed to enlarge, and not restrain, freedomand essence of democracy with the prevalence ofthe views of not just the majority but theconsideration of the opinion of the minority aswell, be it religious or ethnic. The peacefullynegotiated political solution to the ChittagongHill Tracts issue is a unique example set, ofproviding, if not equal, but greater rights andopportunities to the minority tribal population, ofprimarily Buddhist origin in Bangladesh. TheGovernment is fully committed to the protectionand preservation of the socio-cultural heritage,including religious festivities of the tribalpopulation of the CHT by providing fiscal,educational and social privileges and benefits tomembers belonging to different tribes andreligion. The government allocated Tk 11,500million in 1999-2000 for development activitiesin the CHT, which is considerably higher than theper capita annual budget spent for the socio-economic development in other non-tribaldistricts in the country.

The population density of the CHT area is only78.2 persons per square kilometre, as compared tothe much higher 755 persons per km2 densitynationally. The forestry resources in the areacover more than one third of the country’s totalforest reserves. The per capita income of the CHTis estimated at Tk 14,400 (1992/1993) against thenational average of Tk 8,368. The literacy rateamong the Chakma, the largest tribal faction, isnearly 60 per cent, which is higher than thenational average of 52 per cent. There are morethan 92 primary schools per 100,000 people in thearea, against about 46 on average in the country.Similarly, there are 22 thana health complexes fora million population in the CHT, against 1 thanahealth complex for the same size of population inthe rest of the country.

Social policy and administrative measures arealso in place in line with constitutional provisionsto enable and encourage better access of theseminority tribes to the mainstream of nationalsocio-economic and development activities.Special quotas are in place for them in the

educational institutions, as well as in the publicservice.

39. The Minister of Foreign Affairs stressed thatalthough the Hindu, Christian, and Buddhistcommunities were in a special minority position, theybenefited from the same principle of equality accordedto all citizens, including within the administration. TheSecretary for the Interior said that Bangladesh did notexperience any real difficulties in the area ofreligion — especially with regard to minorities — asdemonstrated, in his view, by the growth of theChristian community (the result of active conversionamong the various tribes). The Secretary for theInterior acknowledged that certain incidents did occur.Particular mention was made of the opposition of localMuslim leaders to the extension of an Anglican churchin Dhaka. This opposition was motivated more byconsiderations of land than by religious considerations.Also mentioned were the attacks carried out over thelast four years against the Ahmadi, by small politicalgroups seeking to create instability. The Secretary forthe Interior felt, however, that any sense of insecuritythat might be felt by the country’s minority groups wasalso felt by the majority. The Minister of ReligiousAffairs noted that the Ahmadis, who were fullyrecognized as Muslims in Bangladesh, wereexperiencing national security problems affecting all ofBangladesh. He added that the Government was takingthe measures necessary to protect minorities. Withregard to the incident at the Saint Francis Xavier Girls’High School in Dhaka (see para. 66), he believed thatthis was the only case of an attack against churchproperty. He noted that a member of parliament hadsucceeded in reaching a compromise solution in thismatter (which was in fact a land issue), and that thePrime Minister had visited the site (see also the replyby Bangladesh to the communication of the SpecialRapporteur with regard to this incident,E/CN.4/1999/58, para. 36). The Secretary for theInterior said that in Bangladesh the main threat in thiscontext was related to poverty, and especially to genderdiscrimination — both of which were crucial obstaclesto development. The Minister considered that the fightagainst poverty and the improvement of publicinstitutions, particularly legal institutions, and law andorder institutions (plagued by a serious corruptionproblem) were key to the building of a modern society,and thus to the resolution of the various problems(including religious problems) faced by Bangladesh.

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40. The Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that therewas no real risk of religious extremism in Bangladesh,that the Government was in control of the situation,and that foreign funding of extremist groups, whichhad stemmed largely from the Middle East, hadstopped. A Ministry representative made the point thatBangladesh was acknowledged by all internationalbodies as a moderate Muslim country that had rejectedthe religious extremism espoused by certain groups,which were closely watched by society and the State.The Minister of Justice noted that with respect to theuse of religion for political purposes, Jamat-e-Islamiwas a tiny group, which had only three seats inParliament, and thus did not enjoy the support ofsociety in general, which wished to preserve ademocratic, moderate State. The Secretary for theInterior held the view that religious extremists werevery much in the minority, and that in any case, theirparties were politically marginal. He noted that theactivities of Islamic missionary groups funded fromabroad were closely monitored by the authorities, assuch organizations might prove problematical undercertain conditions. With regard to religious extremism,the Minister of Religious Affairs stated that theGovernment was committed to secularism and, unlikethe opposition parties, did not use religion for politicalpurposes. He added that government authorities tried asfar as possible to provide protection against extremism,but that they had to be careful not to infringeopposition parties’ freedom of expression. TheMinister of Justice said that the struggle againstextremism required education, while the Secretary forthe Interior noted that the democratic process enabledpolitical parties to strengthen themselves, based on theprinciple of social integration. The Minister ofEducation believed that religious parties had littleimpact on society or political life. He said that theseparties would be rapidly eliminated, except in caseswhere such parties formed alliances with other parties.However, he said that these parties could have aninfluence in certain madrasahs. He also noted thatextremism was a global phenomenon, which couldaffect any country.

41. With regard to women and religion, the Secretaryfor Women and Children explained that in accordancewith the Constitution, the secular State guaranteedequal rights for all and religious rights for everycommunity. The Secretary recalled her Government’sefforts to promote the advancement of women, in thelight of a social situation that was prejudicial to

women. Those efforts included its decision to adopt anational policy for the improvement of the status ofwomen and the formulation of a national plan of actionfor the implementation of the Beijing Platform forAction. In a voluminous report entitled “Governmentof the People’s Republic of Bangladesh — NationalAction Plan for Women’s Advancement:Implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action,”the Special Rapporteur noted the followingrecommendations with interest:

Ministry of Land: Ensure equal ownership bywomen with men over Khas land distributed.

Ministry of Religious Affairs: Review curriculumof imam training from a gender perspective andinsert sessions on women’s and girls’ issues andrights.

Ministry of Youth and Sports: Mobilization ofyouth of both sexes through youth clubs or otherprogrammes to promote and ensure birth,marriage and death registration; to prevent childmarriages and work actively against the practiceof dowry.

Ministry of Law, Justice, and ParliamentaryAffairs: Strong action to be taken against fatwasbeing used to victimize women — amend existinglaws to prevent discrimination against women.

Local government Division: Enforce registrationof all births, deaths and marriages.

42. This plan of action thus identifies problemsaffecting women and resulting in particular frompractices or traditions that are either religious orattributed to religion. We should also note certainpassages from Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’sdeclaration of 8 March 1997, concerning the NationalPolicy for the Advancement of Women:

Women in Bangladesh have been subjected toexploitation and negligence for decades. In asociety that is basically male dominated, womenhave always been oppressed by religiousfanaticism, superstition, oppression and variousacts of discrimination. The present Government isdetermined to bring out the womenfolk from theirbackward situation by improving their fate. Toachieve this objective of the advancement ofwomen, the comprehensive development andempowerment of women is to be ensured.

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43. The Secretary for Women and Children noted thatin the area of public-sector employment, a quotasystem had been introduced in favour of women. TheSpecial Rapporteur was told how women’sparticipation in economic life had been increasedthrough credit programmes designed to encourageindividual enterprise and managed by the Governmentand non-governmental organizations. With respect tothe participation of women in political life, it wasrecalled that Bangladesh was the first country in theworld in which two women had succeeded each otherboth as Prime Minister and leader of the parliamentaryopposition. Furthermore, in addition to the 300 seatsfilled by direct suffrage in the constituencies, therewere 30 parliamentary seats reserved exclusively forwomen.

44. With regard to the case of the writer TaslimaNasreen, who had been accused of blasphemy andthreatened by Muslim extremists, the Secretary for theInterior said that the police had provided her withprotection, and noted that she now lived abroad of herown free will, and was free to return to Bangladesh. Headded that the police could guarantee her safety. TheMinister of Justice considered that Taslima Nasreenhad offended the religious feelings of the people, andnoted that this was the only problematical case in acountry of 128 million people.

45. With respect to the religious practices of women,the Secretary for Women and Children and hercolleagues stated that there was no discrimination inthis area. It was explained that women were free toattend mosques, but did not generally do so, and thatcertain mosques made special arrangements toaccommodate women.

46. During his mission, the Special Rapporteur wasinformed about the Prime Minister’s speech tomembers of the Madrasah Teachers’ Association. In anewspaper article entitled “We do not want to usereligion for political gains as was done in the past,” thePrime Minister reportedly declared that Islam was thereligion of welfare, service, peace and humanity, andurged the madrasah teachers to preach Islam to thepeople in an easy way. She reportedly said that religionwas not at all affected during the rule of the presentGovernment and that the government had taken everypossible step for the development of Islam, includingsuch projects as the beautification of Baitul MukarramNational Mosque by the construction of towers; animam training project under the Imam Training

Academy; a mass-education programme conductedthrough different mosques; and provision for some 839new madrasahs, while 1,156 others are going on (in2000, the Government has reportedly listed 485madrasahs for development).

47. The Special Rapporteur would also like to give anaccount of his consultations with a representative ofthe Islamic Foundation, an official institution createdby the Government in 1975 (Islamic Foundation ActXVII.1975.). The Act creating the Foundation and theAmendment Ordinance of 1985 (Ordinance XXII,1985) state that the Director-General shall be appointedby the Government, that the Board of Directors shall beconstituted by State representatives, such as theMinister of Religious Affairs, and that the Foundationshall be financed partly by public funds. TheFoundation, which is listed in its publications as anindependent organization, aims to establish, manageand maintain mosques and Islamic mosques andIslamic centres, academies, and institutes; to undertakeresearch on the contribution of Islam to science,culture, politics and civilization; to propagate andassist in propagating the basic Islamic ideals ofuniversal brotherhood, tolerance and justice, toorganize and promote studies and research in Islamichistory, philosophy, politics, economics, culture, lawand jurisprudence; to publish books, periodicals andpamphlets on the above-mentioned topics, to organizeconferences, lectures, debates, and symposia onmatters relating to mentioned topics; to institute prizesand medals for outstanding contributions in the field ofIslamic studies; to award scholarships for Islamicstudies; and to manage and develop the BaitulMukarram National Mosque, and all other mosqueswhich may subsequently come under the managementof the Islamic Foundation. The representative of theIslamic Foundation explained that his institution had64 district offices, 7 Imam Training Academy centres,and 28 Islamic Mission centres (which had trained over4,000 muballigs and 3,000 maktab teachers). Withregard to women, the representative of the Foundationsubmitted a document entitled “Introduction to IslamicFoundation Bangladesh”, which states:

Islamic Foundation Bangladesh is very aware ofthe importance of women’s role in nation-building activities. Women ought to have dueshare and ample opportunities in the social andreligious spheres of life. Islamic Foundationprovides adequate facilities in the Baitul

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Mukarram Mosque for women during Eidcongregations and other special occasions ofnational and religious importance. A separatesection under the Department of Deeny-Dawatand Culture, which is totally staffed by women,organizes discussions, meetings, seminar-symposia, and other Islamic cultural programmes.Resource persons from amongst distinguishedwomen, visiting female dignitaries, scholars andladies of high rank speak at these functionsexclusively to female audiences. Theseprogrammes have a far-reaching impact onwomen’s participation in socio-economic andreligious activities and help increase theirknowledge of Islam.

The representative of the Foundation considered that,in accordance with the Constitution, every individualwas free to practise his or her religion in Bangladesh.He said that Muslim extremists found no support inBangladesh. With respect to the fatwas declared againstwomen, he noted that they were not real fatwas, sincethey were not imposed by qualified people.

B. Consultations with non-governmentalorganizations and independent experts

48. Non-governmental representatives and independentexperts consulted by the Special Rapporteur said thatState policies generally respected freedom of religionand belief, in the strictest sense of those terms, and alsorespected their manifestations, within the framework ofthe limitations provided by the law.

49. Paradoxically, however, it emerged that religiouscommunities — more particularly minorities and ethnicgroups, but also Muslims — encounter seriousproblems. Such problems arise sometimes or regularly,depending on the nature of the case and of thesituations involved.

50. According to the non-governmental sourcesconsulted, these problems in fact arise in two maincontexts. The first involves relations between the Stateand religious communities (for example, restrictedaccess for non-Muslims to public-sector employment,and especially to positions of responsibility, notably inthe army and the police (see sect. IV.B)); the VestedProperty Act, under which the assets of Hindus and theHurukh/Oroan tribes are stolen (see paras. 30 to 33);and legislation affecting women (see sect. V) andrelations between the State and ethnic communities

(for example, the delays in the implementation of thePeace Accord concerning the Chittagong Hill Tracts,and serious incidents against members of ethniccommunities involving State officials, see sect. IV).The second context involves relations between theState and non-ethnic communities, particularlyextremist religious parties. Here, it is glaringly obviousthat there is a real and effective threat of religiousextremism. That threat stems largely from religiousparties such as Jamat-e-Islami, which are very active intheir efforts to train Muslims by infiltrating mosquesand madrasahs and engaging in political action. Thisextremism is notably responsible for the climate ofinsecurity that reigns among non-Muslim minorities, aswell as among the Ahmadi Muslim minoritycommunity, among ethnic groups and among women,regardless of their religious confession (for example,the problem of the fatwas and the assaults on thephysical and moral integrity of women. The factremains, however, that it is the responsibility of theState that is in question — especially its responsibilityto protect its citizens from intolerance anddiscrimination.

51. According to the non-governmental experts, theseproblems stem largely from exploitation of thereligious domain by political parties seeking either towin or maintain power. It was stressed that extremistreligious parties had introduced this practice ofexploiting Islam for political purposes, and otherparties had followed their lead, becoming caught up inthe system. It was pointed out, for example, that theruling party had — just like the Islamic parties, andnotwithstanding its commitment to secularism —organized an electoral campaign employing Islamicsymbols such as the Koran and the veil. Thisphenomenon seems especially worrying because,according to the non-governmental sources consulted,it continues to be used by parties after they are electedinto office (Muslim symbols such as the reciting of theKoran remain a very prominent feature of Statetelevision and radio broadcasts). Thus, for reasons thatare purely electoral, the authorities tend to ensure thattheir actions do not offend the Muslim majority, andespecially their religious feelings, which in itself is alegitimate practice.

52. According to non-governmental representatives,this approach has the effect of rendering the authoritiespowerless in many areas, leading to inaction. Forexample, the Government tries to combat religious

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extremism while being careful not to offend Muslims,and this is an extremely hazardous process. Accordingto the experts, most of the population, afflicted bypoverty and illiteracy, is committed to religion withouttruly understanding it. This makes is easier (especiallyfor extremists) to manipulate this Muslim population,especially their religious orientation. Evidence of thisis provided by the absence of a popular reaction againstfatwas and by repeated instances in which extremistshave recklessly and violently mobilized crowds againstthe Ahmadis and non-Muslim minorities (suchinstances occur during certain international events,such as the Gulf War, or during attempts to imposecertain constraints or restrictions on the activities ofminorities, to confiscate assets, etc.)

53. Despite the existence of institutions such as theIslamic Foundation, which function as tools for Stateeducation of Muslims, the Government’s room formanoeuvre is limited, and sometimes reduced to zero,when electoral considerations prevail. According to thenon-governmental experts, this explains the secondaryimportance accorded to minorities, for example withrespect to their integration and advancement withinState circles, with respect to the provision of adequatefinancial support for religious activities (religiouseducation, for example) and religious institutions, andwith respect to the protection of non-Muslims(intervention by the forces of law and order duringattacks against minorities was said to be either half-hearted or non-existent, while action against thoseresponsible was said to be often non-existent orineffective). According to the non-governmentalrepresentatives, the Government’s position, citedabove, helps to explain the delays in theimplementation of the Peace Accord concerning theChittagong Hill Tracts, as well as the absence ofmeasures designed to eradicate the remaining vestigesof polygamy and end legislation affecting vulnerablegroups (minorities and women), or to provide adefinitive sanction against the illegal practice ofimposing fatwas. It also explains the half-heartednature of the struggle against extremists responsible forattacks against the Ahmadis. Indeed, the fact that theauthorities have recognized the Ahmadi community,despite its rejection as a community within Islam inmost Muslim countries, could lead to controversy,fuelled by extremists, among the majority ofBangladesh’s Muslim believers and religious officials,who are often poorly educated and traditionalist intheir approach to Islam and its interpretations.

Development of this very sensitive question mightplace the authorities in difficulty with respect to theMuslim electorate.

54. Non-governmental sources also noted that theseproblems could not, of course, be dissociated fromdifficulties shared by most developing countries, suchas the weakness of public institutions and the verydifficult economic and social conditions.

C. Consultations with a representative of theJamat-e-Islami party

55. A senior representative of the Jamat-e-Islamiparty in Dhaka presented his organization as an Islamicmovement similar to that of the “Muslim brothers,” inthe sense that it was not purely political and aimed tochanged society as a whole through democratic means(due to the absence of constraints in Islam) and Islamicmeans (through social and educational programmesaimed at training Muslims in the principles of Islam foruse in both their public and private lives, based on theidea that Islam is a way of life). He explained thatJamat-e-Islami comprised 150,000 grass-roots militantsand 12,000 officials distributed among the centre, thedistricts and the villages, as well as elected emirs and aShura Council. He noted that his organization washistorically linked to Pakistan, during the period whenPakistan included present-day Bangladesh, but thatsince independence there had been no furtherorganizational links with the Pakistani Jamat-e-Islami.He recalled that his organization had, at the time,opposed Bangladeshi independence, but he rejectedany suggestion that it had violated human rights duringthat period. He stated that Jamat-e-Islami was not anextremist organization, and stressed that it was opposedto all forms of intolerance and violence directed, notonly at non-Muslims, but also at Muslims having adifferent interpretation of Islam. He condemned the useof religion for political purposes, but noted that Islamwas not restricted solely to the realm of religiousbelief. He recalled that since 1976, when theconstitutional prohibition of religious parties waslifted, Jamat-e-Islami had been able to resume itsactivities. He believed that the defeat of hisorganization in the recent parliamentary elections didnot indicate society’s rejection of an organizationregarded as extremist, and was instead a reflection ofthe policies — and perhaps incompetence — of thoseleading Jamat-e-Islami at the time. He said that hisorganization was subject to political violence (which

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was in no way religious in character) on the part ofpolitical parties, and that with the help of its educationand training activities among the people, theorganization’s arguments would ultimately prevail,because its cause was just.

IV. Situation regarding religion orbelief

56. The following information reflects consultationsheld with religious representatives, lay officials, andpolitical representatives of the Muslim community aswell as of religious and ethnic communities in theChittagong Hill Tracts.

A. Status of Muslims

57. The Special Rapporteur was anxious to give anaccount of his consultations with representatives of theMuslim community in Bangladesh. He wishes to makeit clear that due to the extraordinary diversity of Islam,there is no single representative of the Muslim faith.Consequently, this report includes accounts ofinterviews conducted with religious officials in Dhakaand the Chittagong Hill Tracts, as well as with anofficial from Jamat-e-Islami. It should be noted thatwithin the framework of his consultations withMuslims, the Special Rapporteur has included anaccount of his interviews with the Ahmadis, since theyare fully recognized as Muslims by the Bangladeshiauthorities. Of course, even the views of all theinterviewees mentioned do not represent those of allMuslims in Bangladesh. They do, however, offerinsight into the status of Muslims. These views arecomplemented by consultations with the authorities,non-governmental organizations, and independentexperts, which are reflected in the section of this reportdealing with politics in the area of religion and belief(sect. III). Reference might also be made to theinterviews conducted among representatives ofreligious minorities and ethnic communities and, lastly,to the information provided about the status of women(see below).

58. Secretary Mowlana Aminul Islam, of the LalbaghShahi mosque, a representative consulted at thesuggestion of the Imam of Dhaka, said that Bangladeshwas a country characterized by religious harmony anduniversal freedom. He pointed out that minoritygroups — particularly Christian, Buddhist, and

Hindu — were not victims of incidents of any kind,and said that Muslim extremism did not exist inBangladesh. With respect to the Ahmadis, he said thatthey were not Muslims because they believed thatMuhammad was the last of the prophets. However, hestated that the Ahmadi community was free to practiseits religion, provided that they did not express theirviews in public, as this would cause problems amongMuslims. With respect to the practice of Islam, heexpressed his satisfaction at its importance inBangladesh, particularly with regard to Friday prayers.He added that there were not enough mosques for allthe faithful. He stated that there was one mosque thataccepted women in Dhaka, and also said that in hisview mosques were not places for women. With regardto Taslima Nasreen, he said that she was a mad woman,who had not been properly educated (that is, she wasignorant of Islam), and noted that a Muslim womanshould not have behaved as she had. He concluded bysaying that the return of Taslima Nasreen toBangladesh would cause public anger, but that it wouldnot be possible to kill her.

59. The imam consulted by the Special Rapporteur inRangamati said that the status of Muslims in theChittagong Hill Tracts was satisfactory, and that Islamwas spreading fast in the region. He noted that theMuslim community had 40 mosques in Rangamati, butthat there were places where the mosques were notlarge enough to hold all the assembled faithful, whowere obliged to worship in the streets. He said that themosques were forbidden to women and that Rangamatidid not have a mosque able to accommodate them. Headded that religious training was provided at fourmadrasahs, which were largely State funded.

60. The Ahmadi representatives described the statusof their community, which is fully recognized as aMuslim community by the State of Bangladesh. Theysaid that they were not hindered by the authorities anddid not encounter tensions within society. However,they did stress the danger of Muslim religiousextremism, which is fuelled from abroad, and has hadan impact on their community in recent years.Particular mention was made of the January 1999attacks that took place in the village of Koldiar, inKushtia, against an Ahmadi place of worship andagainst Ahmadi worshippers; the explosion of a bombat an Ahmadi place of worship in Khulna, on 8 October1999, which killed several worshippers; the discoveryof two bombs in the main Ahmadi mosque in Dhaka,

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on 10 October 1999; and the attacks against an Ahmadiplace of worship at Natore on 12 November 1999. TheAhmadi representatives believed that these events weredirectly linked to the actions of Muslim extremists whoconsidered their community as heretical. Furthermore,they deplored the fact that in the majority of cases, theresponse of the forces of law and order was passiveand/or ineffective. They believed that this responsereflected the authorities’ fear that efforts to combatextremists would translate into losses among theMuslim electorate.

61. The representative of Jamat-e-Islami in Dhakasaid that there were no religious restrictions inBangladesh, and that the constitutional recognition ofIslam as a State religion had changed nothing,especially since there was a Muslim majority inBangladesh. With regard to the Ahmadis, he recalledthat Muslim communities — notably the Sunni andShiite communities — had concluded that the Ahmadiswere not Muslims. He said that Ahmadis had the rightto exist as a community, but questioned whether theyhad a right to exist as a religious community. Herejected any suggestion that Jamat-e-Islami wasresponsible for the attacks on Ahmadi places ofworship, attributing the attacks to religious fanatics,and even to the Ahmadis themselves. He said that hisorganization did not harass Muslims who hadconverted to another religion. He condemned the use offatwas by unqualified persons. With regard to TaslimaNasreen, he said that the people’s reactions to her werespontaneous and justified, and that those reactions hadnot been organized by Jamat-e-Islami. He stressed thatit was wrong to insult a religion in the name offreedom of expression, but noted that the TaslimaNasreen affair had been blown up out of all proportion.He explained that Jamat-e-Islami had no objection todevout Christians or to a minority of Christians withwhom common ground could be found. He rejected anyallegation that Jamat-e-Islami was involved in attackson Christians. With regard to Buddhists and Hindus, hesaid that these communities should be respected.

B. Situation with regard to religiousminorities

1. Buddhist minority

62. The representatives of the Buddhist communitysaid that they were able to practise their religionwithout interference from the authorities. However,they said that their community was in an unsatisfactorysituation. With regard to the teaching of their religionin public schools, they lamented the fact that the Statedid not always make enough Buddhist teachersavailable to meet student demand. They described thelooting and destruction of temples, as well as theharassment of Buddhist monks and other Buddhists byMuslim extremist groups. In this context, they deploredthe absence of a genuine police reaction. They also saidthat Buddhists suffered discrimination with respect topublic-sector jobs (there were very few Buddhists inthe civil service, and Buddhists very rarely heldpositions of responsibility, despite the fact that theypossessed the required qualifications and experience).Finally, they noted that most Government fundsallocated to Buddhists were now allocated to ethniccommunities of Buddhist confession in the ChittagongHill Tracts.

2. Christian minority

63. Bangladesh’s Christian minority comprises all themain Christian denominations, especially Catholicismand Protestantism, but also many others (around 50denominational churches, mission bodies, and othergospel-centred organizations). The Special Rapporteurwas able to interview Anglican and Catholic religiousofficials.

(a) Anglican community

64. The representatives of the Anglican Church saidthat the Government did not present obstacles in thearea of religious affairs. However, they did describedifficulties encountered by foreign missionaries in theirattempts to win converts among Muslims (difficultiesthat could even lead to expulsion), as well asdifficulties encountered by all Muslims converting toChristianity. They thought that their community’ssituation should be improved. They wished to see anend to discrimination against Christians with respect toaccess to public sector employment, including accessto police and army jobs. They said that Muslims (withthe exception of the liberal and secular elite, who

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favoured religious harmony) regarded them withsuspicion. This was due to several factors, such asstereotypes representing Christians as anti-Muslim(because of the Crusades); an extremely restrictivecivil society; and the absence of any real interchangebetween the Christian and Muslim communities,especially in urban environments. Because of thissuspicion — which in their view was rooted inignorance and intolerance of others — Muslim officialshad, for example, opposed plans to extend a Dhakachurch, on the grounds that Anglican hymns were toonoisy (this, despite the fact that mosques usedloudspeakers for prayer). However, the Anglicanofficials stressed that extremist Muslim groups wereresponsible for manipulating the uneducated Muslimpopulation, against Christians. As a result, Christianswere accused of being agents of an “anti-Islam”West — particularly during certain international events.For example, it was recalled that during the Gulf War,the Anglican church in Old Dhaka had been attackedby a crowd of Muslims trained by extremists.

(b) Catholic community

65. The Catholic officials said that they were notsubject to Government interference. However, theynoted that the situation for Catholics was not entirelywithout difficulties. The officials said that despiteconstitutional guarantees concerning freedom ofreligion and religious practice, it was not possible inpractice to engage in conversion activities among theMuslim population. They added that any Muslimconverting to another religion — as a result of a mixedmarriage, for example — was forced to go into hiding,and even to leave Bangladesh, in order to avoid publiccondemnation. With regard to the teaching of religionin public schools, the officials lamented the fact thatthe authorities did not, in practice, recruit Christianteachers, even though there were enough Christianstudents to justify such recruitment. Indeed, it waspointed out that Muslim, and sometimes Hindu,teachers were in charge of Christian teaching, eventhough they were not qualified to do so. Because ofthis, the Catholic Church organized Christian teachingat its own institutions, outside normal school hours.However, the Catholic officials said that this was notthe best solution, as it excluded students who could notpay the cost of transporting them to the Catholicinstitutions offering this teaching.

66. With regard to places of worship, it was pointedout that extremist Muslim groups often opposed the useof bells and loudspeakers for hymns. This hostilitycould even be translated into acts of violence duringcertain international events, such as the Gulf War,which were immediately interpreted by extremists asattacks by the West against Islam. It was explained thaton such occasions, extremists would take it uponthemselves to train crowds of Muslims, urging them tocommit acts of destruction or looting against places ofworship belonging to the Christian community, whichwould be accused of working on behalf of an “anti-Muslim” West. The officials deplored the passive, evencomplicit approach taken by the police in suchsituations. The officials noted that even beyondspecific international events, there was a strong currentof anti-Christian activism. For example: on 28 April1998, the Saint Francis Xavier’s Girls High Schoolsuffered attack, looting, and damage to property at thehands of a crowd of Muslims. They had been spurredon by extremists using mosque loudspeakers to accusethe Catholic authorities (falsely, as they well knew) ofhaving destroying the mosque (see communication bythe Special Rapporteur, E/CN.4/1999/58, para. 36). Theincident was part of a conflict over boundaries, and theextremists were seeking to oppose renovation workbeing carried out on a Catholic Church propertyadjacent to a mosque. It was again noted that duringthese serious incidents, the forces of law and orderremained largely passive. The Catholic officials alsolamented the fact that, due to electoral considerations,the Prime Minister had not responded to their requestfor a public condemnation of such attacks or to theirrequest for symbolic reparations. They also noted thatlegal decisions in favour of the Catholic Church,concerning the use of their property, had not beenapplied, because extremist Muslims had opposed theirapplication on a variety of grounds. The officials alsowished to see an end to discrimination againstChristians in the area of public-sector jobs, especiallypositions of responsibility. The officials expressed thewish that Christian nationals be able to enjoy all therights deriving from their Bangladeshi citizenship.

3. Hindu minority

67. The Hindu representatives said that they wereable to enjoy freedom of religion and worship, withoutinterference from the authorities, as well as Hindureligious holidays. They expressed dissatisfaction,however, with regard to their community’s situation.

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They stressed the insecurity felt by Hindus, due partlyto the Vested Property Act, which was used for theillegal appropriation of their land, especially by Mafia-like groups enjoying political protection. They alsodescribed the vulnerability of the Hindu community,which suffered the condemnation of crowds incited byMuslim extremists during certain international events(for example, temples were destroyed, Hindusmurdered and Hindu women raped following thedestruction of the mosque at Ayodhya, India, in 1992).They also noted the insecurity felt by Hindu women,who were often victims of harassment and rape carriedout by criminal elements of society, without the policeproperly exercising their functions of protection andsuppression. They said that that all these variousoffences had driven Hindus from Bangladesh (theynoted that, according to the 1991 census, the number ofHindus had declined by 0.3 per cent since 1974). Theycalled for State assistance in the restoration of templesthat, in their view, constituted part of the nation’sheritage. The temples in question were those atChandranath, Langal bandh, Mahaprabhu, DaccaDashkia, Para Tirtha, and Adwaita Prabhu. Lastly, theycalled for an end to discrimination against Hindus withrespect to public-sector jobs and positions ofresponsibility, including army and police jobs.

C. Religious situation of the ethniccommunities of the ChittagongHill Tracts

68. The Special Rapporteur would like to point outthat the Constitution does not formally recognizeethnic communities as ethnic minorities or indigenouspopulations. However, in her 1999 speech to the HagueAppeal for Peace Conference, she referred specificallyto the question of the Chittagong Hill Tracts and to theright of an indigenous people — an ethnic, religious,cultural, linguistic and social minority — to preservetheir own identity, culture, tradition and values. TheSpecial Rapporteur’s consultations with the authoritiesand with representatives of ethnic communities focusedon the status of indigenous populations in theChittagong Hill Tracts — especially their religiousstatus. Analysis of this highly complex question isnecessary for the reasons cited above, in the extractfrom the Prime Minister’s speech: the issue is thepreservation of the identity of the indigenous peoplesof the Chittagong Hill Tracts. That identity ismultifaceted — mainly ethnic in nature, but also

religious. Thus, in order to analyze the situation of theethnic communities of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, weshould look briefly at the origins of the conflict thathas characterized this region; at the Peace Accord of1997; and at the implementation of that Accord.

69. As far as the origin of the conflict is concerned,non-governmental sources (particularly ethniccommunities) noted that under the Britishadministration, the Chittagong Hill Tracts had enjoyeda special autonomous status under which the sale ortransfer of land to non-indigenous populations wasprohibited. After Pakistan gained independence in1947, the region lost that special status, particularly asa result of a constitutional amendment introduced in1963. The Government authorized and encouraged thesettling of non-indigenous populations in theChittagong Hill Tracts, as well as the transfer of landownership and other resources to non-indigenouspopulations. The Government also decided to exploitthe hydroelectric potential of the Chittagong HillTracts, with the construction of the Kaptai Dambetween 1957 and 1963. As a result of this project, asubstantial portion of the region’s agricultural land(most of which belonged to the Chakma) disappeared,and around 100,000 indigenous people were displaced.Non-governmental sources said that because projectrehabilitation measures were inadequate, some 40,000indigenous people migrated to India at that time. Thispolicy was pursued after Bangladesh gainedindependence, despite the demands made in 1972 byindigenous people for the restoration of the ChittagongHill Tracts’ special status. From that point onward,land-related conflicts between the indigenous peopleand the newly arrived Bengalis (virtually all of whomwere Muslim, unlike the indigenous population, whichwas largely non-Muslim) represented a source ofconflict with the Government. The military solutionchosen by the Government led to violence, especiallyafter 1980, between the armed forces, associated withthe new Bengali population, and the indigenous people,especially the organization Chattagram Jana SamhatiSamiti (PCJSS) and its armed division, Shanti Bahini.The various attempts made by the BangladeshiGovernment to resolve the conflict ultimately led to thePeace Accord of 2 December 1997.

70. The Accord provides for the setting up of aRegional Council for the Chittagong Hill Tracts. ThisCouncil must be composed of “Local GovernmentCouncils of the Three Hill Districts.” Two-thirds of its

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members must be elected from among the indigenouspopulation of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (with eachcommunity being allocated a certain quota), and one-third from among the region’s non-indigenouspopulation. The President of the Council must be amember of the indigenous population, and holds therank of Minister of State. The Council must havepowers of supervision and coordination in areas suchas law and order, general administration, traditionallaw and social justice, as well as developmentactivities. A land Commission must also facilitateregulation of land-related conflicts — especially thoserelated to the restoration of property stolen from theindigenous population. The Accord also provides forthe granting of an amnesty to members of the ShantiBahini and the PCJSS; for the rehabilitation ofindigenous refugees and displaced persons (especiallythrough the Land Commission); for withdrawal fromtemporary military camps and village defence camps;and for the creation of a Ministry for the ChittagongHill Tracts, assisted by a consultative committee(comprising the Minister of the Chittagong Hill Tracts,the President/representative of the Regional Counciland each district council, three members of parliamentfor the Chittagong Hill Tracts, three leaders ofindigenous communities, and three non-indigenousmembers who are permanent residents of theChittagong Hill Tracts).

71. With respect to implementation of the Accord, allindigenous community representatives consulted by theSpecial Rapporteur lamented the obstacle, and thedelays that had been built up. Doubts had even beenexpressed as to whether the Government genuinelydesired to make the Accord succeed. Of primaryconcern in this context was the fact that theGovernment had not transferred to the RegionalCouncil the majority of the powers provided for underthe Accord, thus rendering the Council inoperative. Asa result, the Government continued to administer theChittagong Hill Tracts directly (through its localrepresentatives, the Deputy Commissioner and thearmy). Mention was also made of the delay in thesetting up of the Land Commission (two and a halfyears) and in the return of land; the fact that a largepart of the military presence had been maintained; andthe fact that rehabilitation of displaced persons andrefugees was still incomplete. It was further noted thatBengalis continued to be settled in the Chittagong HillTracts. Although this process had not been planned bythe Government, it did benefit from assistance

provided by local authorities (distribution of foodrations and allocation of housing) and Muslimextremists. Because of the lack of arable land in theChittagong Hill Tracts, it was stated that apart from theBengalis who were settled during the British period,and the few Bengalis who had settled legally, the restof the Bengali population should return their land tothe indigenous population and be resettled outside theregion. It was explained that this was a preconditionfor any reconciliation between the authorities and theBengalis, because the land was key to the survival andidentity of the indigenous peoples in the region, andthe essential and fundamental means for guaranteeingtheir survival and identity.

72. Apart from the issue of the implementation of thePeace Accord, with respect to the situation ofindigenous peoples in the field of freedom of religion,most of those consulted said that they had been able topractise their religious activities freely since the end ofthe armed conflict. It was also mentioned that the armyhad stopped destroying indigenous places of worship.However, many representatives of the indigenouscommunity described how they had been traumatizedby the incident of 16 October 1999. Following analtercation between indigenous people of the Jummatribe, which had arisen after a Bengali soldier hadmolested a Jumma woman, the army — assisted byaround 150 Bengali civilians — attacked the Jumma ofBabu Chara Bazar at Dighinala Thana/Khagrachari,leading to the deaths of three members of theindigenous population. The assailants also proceededto sack the Buddhist temple of Benuban, attackedmonks, and damaged statues of the Buddha. Eventhough a commission of enquiry had been set up, andsome victims compensated, this particular incident hadcreated a genuine feeling of insecurity among lay andreligious members of the indigenous community in theChittagong Hill Tracts, who were faced with an armyand a police force consisting entirely of MuslimBengalis. Those consulted also explained that theircommunities were subject to covert pressure fromIslamic non-governmental organizations, and evenMuslim extremist groups seeking to convert them toIslam, notably in return for services or money. Certainrepresentatives interpreted the financial assistanceprovided by the State for the construction of newmadrasahs and mosques as a discriminatory policyfavouring Islam, since, in contrast, indigenous religiousinstitutions received meagre public subsidies.

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73. Mr. Shantu Larma, one of the main spokespersonsfor the ethnic communities in the Chittagong HillTracts, and President of the Regional Council, said thatthe failure to implement the Peace Accord, as well asthe incidents reported above, threatened the survival ofthe cultural and religious identity of indigenouspopulations. He noted that between 1947 and thepresent, the Bengali Muslim population in theChittagong Hill Tracts had risen from 2.7 per cent to 50per cent, and called upon the UN to persuade theBangladeshi Government to grant the independencenecessary for the preservation of indigenouspopulations, their culture, traditions, and religion, andthereby to ensure full implementation of the 1997Accord.

V. Status of women74. The information provided below reflects theSpecial Rapporteur’s consultations with non-governmental organizations either representing womenor working for their emancipation, and with experts.By way of comparison, reference might be made to theinformation supplied by the authorities (see sect. II.Band III.A).

75. Non-governmental representatives stressed thatthe status of women in Bangladesh was problematicalin terms of individual human rights. Most of thoseinterviewed recognized that government actionprogrammes had made possible a certain amount ofprogress — notably the adoption of laws and otherlegal provisions in favour of women. In this regard, itwas stressed that the status of women in Bangladeshwas not entirely comparable to that of women incertain Muslims countries -particularly countries of theMiddle East. However, the representatives mentionedthe limited impact of the advances referred to above,and also described conditions that were detrimental towomen, in numerous areas that were not fully,effectively, or efficiently covered by governmentaction.

76. Special mention was made of the difficultiesinvolved in implementing legislation protectingwomen’s rights, particularly in rural areas, largelybecause of traditions — notably religious traditions orthose attributed to religion. For example, it wasexplained that legislation on the registration ofmarriages and the minimum age for marriageconflicted with the widespread practice of forcing

minors to marry (aimed mainly at preventing allextramarital sexual relations, which are subject tocultural and religious prohibitions). According to somenon-governmental estimates, around 800,000 minorswere married without their consent every year. Thesemarriages involving minors (which are illegal underpositive law) are not, of course, registered by theauthorities, as required under the law on theregistration of marriages. It has also been estimatedthat many marriages, including those involving womenof legal adult age, were not registered. This wasespecially the case in rural areas, due either to the factthat people were not informed about the requirement toregister, or to certain illegal practices on the part ofofficials who demanded money for the registration ofmarriages. This apparently widespread situation ofnon-registration of marriages is especially harmfulbecause it encourages the practice of repudiation, andthus reveals the limited implementation of divorcelaws. Despite the existence of the Anti-DowryProhibition Act, this situation also helps to maintainthe tradition of the dowry, thereby placing women inthe humiliating position of being objects of bargaining.This practice also contributes to the vulnerability ofwives, who are sometimes victims of violence on thepart of their husbands concerning goods inherited ordue to be handed down by the parents to the marriedwomen. According to non-governmental sources, 239women were subject to dowry-related violence in 1998.Of those victims, 60 per cent were murdered, and threeper cent committed suicide. Many wives apparentlysuffered acid attacks — a practice that appears to bewidespread within the context of dowry-relatedconflicts.

77. Experts stressed the Government’s inaction withrespect to polygamy. They said that current legislationauthorizing polygamy whenever permission had beengranted by the first wife was wholly contrary to humanrights and to the dignity of women. While recognizingthat the practice of polygamy was very limited(estimates say it occurs in one out of every 60marriages) — mainly due to economic factors andchanging attitudes — they called for the practice to beprohibited by law.

78. With respect to the difficulties involved inimplementing the aforementioned legislation, it wasstressed that these obstacles were especially seriousbecause they favoured religious personal laws, which

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were regarded as often discriminatory with regard toMuslim women and women of other faiths.

79. With regard to Muslim women, it was noted thatthe 1961 Muslim Family Ordinance was favourable towomen, especially in the areas of marriage andinheritance. With respect to divorce, it was explainedthat reform had made it possible, through the MuslimMarriages and Divorces (Registration) Act of 1974, toguarantee certain rights to Muslim women (3-months’advance notice and the right to appeal to the courts;mandatory registration of divorce; pension; etc.).However, it was stressed that these advances werebeing undermined, notably by the practice ofrepudiation, and especially in rural areas, becausemany marriages were not registered.

80. The status of women seems to be especiallyproblematical with regard to the Hindu minority.Mention was made of religious personal lawsgoverning the Hindu community, sources ofdiscrimination in the area of inheritance, divorce, andchildcare. According to non-governmentalrepresentatives, these laws do not recognize any rightof inheritance for women with respect to parentalproperty. This discrimination does in fact encouragethe practice of the dowry, and hence the relatedviolations mentioned above. Furthermore, according tonon-governmental experts, these religious personallaws make no provision for the registration of Hindumarriages and deny women any right to divorce.According to these same interviewees, since 1956 —despite protests from women’s organizations —,governments have refused to amend religious personallaws in favour of the rights of Hindu women, despitethe fact that the same reform has been introduced forMuslims. Unfortunately, the Special Rapporteur wasnot able to gather information about the status ofwomen from other minorities, within the framework oftheir religious personal laws.

81. The experts also described acts of discriminationagainst women in the area of religious practice. It wasnoted that whereas most mosques in urban areas wereforbidden to women (there were a few rare places ofworship where special facilities had been provided,allowing women access to mosques), in rural areas,virtually all Muslim places of worship were reservedexclusively for men. Reference should also be made tothe statements made by Muslim religious officials inDhaka and Rangamati (see sect. IV.A).

82. These acts of discrimination against women inBangladesh, whatever their religious affiliation, wereattributed by the various non-governmental sources totraditions (especially religious traditions or thoseascribed to religion) as well as to the preservation of apatriarchal system. In this respect, the fact that somewomen held key positions in Bangladesh was notconsidered to reflect the overall situation in thecountry. According to non-governmental sources,women’s access to these “positions of power” was infact limited, and dependent upon membership ofpowerful families.

83. In addition to this symbolic violence ofdiscrimination, experts described physical violenceagainst women, noting that the two forms of violencewere often linked. They denounced not only violenceassociated with the practice of the dowry, but alsoviolence related to fatwas. These fatwas, declared inthe name of the Muslim religion, are especiallycommon in rural areas. They are declared againstwomen who are accused — almost always wrongly —of having sexual relations outside marriage, and otherbehaviour subject to social and religious prohibition. Infact, however, these fatwas are declared by people whoare not qualified to do so — namely, by ShalishCouncils, members of the local clergy having asuperficial or flawed religious education, localofficials, extremists, or individuals enjoying the tacitsupport of extremist parties. Experts said that thefatwas declared by these officials were in fact designedto stifle any efforts to emancipate women. Forexample, women’s access to work was thought toundermine roles regarded as the exclusive preserve ofwomen and restricted to the private sphere of thefamily, enabling women to participate actively inpublic life. Such developments were regarded —especially in rural areas — as a threat to the patriarchalstructure of society, and therefore to men’smonopolization of power. This was the reason why thefatwas were accompanied by attacks carried out byextremists against certain Bangladeshi non-governmental organizations, which were very active inpromoting women’s rights. According to informationprovided by non-governmental sources, 43 fatwas weredeclared against women in 1993, and 26 in 1999. Themost famous case was, of course, that of TaslimaNasreen, who was forced to flee Bangladesh afterreceiving death threats from extremists. However, onemight also mention the case of 17-year-old Noorjahan,who on 10 January 1993, at Moulvibazar, was a victim

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of a fatwa declared by the imam of the mosque, whoaccused him in respect of a second marriage, andsentenced him to 101 lashes. As a result of the fatwa,Noorjahan committed suicide. Following his death, andas a result of action taken by non-governmentalorganizations working on behalf of women and humanrights, the culprit was brought to justice. These fatwas,which are entirely illegal, are especially seriousbecause as punishment the accused are often flogged,stoned, or shunned by society. The fatwas thusconstitute attacks on the physical and moral integrity ofwomen. According to non-governmental sources, thoseresponsible for these fatwas are usually not pursued bylocal officials responsible for enforcing the law. Fatwasissued by non-State actors also represent a threat to theGovernment’s efforts on behalf of women and towomen’s empowerment — notably in the area ofeducation.

84. The Special Rapporteur feels duty bound to notethat the local authorities sometimes convey a veryconservative, and sometimes obscurantist image ofwomen. One senior official stated quite frankly to theSpecial Rapporteur that according to his interpretationof Islam, women did not belong inside mosques, that aman should not shake a woman’s hand, and that inprivate life — including within the family — allmixing of the sexes outside marriage should be avoided(including mixing between fathers and daughters).

85. Furthermore, the experts noted that women fromminorities and ethnic communities were vulnerable toviolence from outside their communities. According tothese experts, Hindu, Buddhist, and Christian womenwere obliged to endure a climate of insecurity, due toan increased risk that they would be assaulted (notablyin the form of sexual harassment and rape). Thisincreased risk stemmed from the repercussions, withinBangladesh, both of international events concerningtheir community (for example, the anti-Hinduattacks — which included a significant number ofrapes — during the Ayodhya episode in India), and/orof the so-called honour question. With respect to thelatter question, it appears to be established andcommon practice that attempts to subject, or commitviolations against minorities and ethnic communitiesshould take the form of threats, or actual assaults (inthis instance rape) on the honour of women, whorepresent the honour of the whole community. Thisoccurs, for example, within the context of conflicts, forthe appropriation of property, etc. With regard to ethnic

populations, during his consultations in the ChittagongHill Tracts the Special Rapporteur was informed bynon-governmental representatives of numerous cases ofattacks against the physical and moral integrity ofwomen from ethnic populations, committed by thearmed forces and non-ethnic Muslim populationsduring the period of armed conflict. With respect to theperiod since the Peace Accord, emphasis was given tothe incident of October 1999, which was so traumaticfor the ethnic communities of the Chittagong HillTracts (see para. 72).

86. In addition to the various factors described above(traditions — notably religious traditions or thoseattributed to religion; cultural social and religioustaboos), non-governmental representatives lamentedthe fact that school textbooks did not convey a positiveimage of women, despite the efforts of UNICEF, inparticular. Mention was also made of the especiallyharmful role of Muslim extremists. Indeed, it wasconsidered that Muslim extremists profited from adifficult socio-economic system, under which mostpeople sought refuge in religion, but were,unfortunately, guided by religious officials who wereoften incompetent, and/or close to extremists. It wasfurther pointed out that the absence of girls and womenas students and teachers within the madrasahsconveyed a message that was unfavourable to womenand contrary to enlightened religious education.

VI. Conclusions and recommendations87. In formulating the following conclusions andrecommendations concerning legislation, politics, andthe situation with regard to religion and belief, theSpecial Rapporteur has paid particular attention to thestatus of women.

88. With regard to legislation, the Special Rapporteurconsiders that constitutional measures guaranteefreedom of religion and belief and their manifestations,in accordance with relevant international law.Furthermore, the Constitution guarantees the principleof non-discrimination, especially with respect toreligion and gender. With regard to the constitutionalrecognition of Islam as the State religion, the SpecialRapporteur would like to recall that, underinternational law, a State, or official religion is not initself contrary to human rights. However, this fact —which indeed is enshrined within the BangladeshiConstitution — must not be exploited at the expense of

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the human rights of minorities or rights that derivefrom citizenship and imply non-discrimination betweencitizens, based on, among other things, considerationsof faith and belief. The question of the treatmentaccorded to minorities will be considered below.

89. With regard to other legal provisions, the penalcode protects freedom of religion or belief and theirmanifestations. Penalties are notably provided in thecase of all offences against religion, such as thedestruction of places of worship and religious objects,disturbance of religious activities (for example,religious ceremonies), desecration, and defamation ofreligions.

90. With respect to religious personal laws, problemsof compatibility arise, not only with regard to nationallegislation (the Constitution), but also with regard tointernational law. Religious personal laws dodiscriminate against women, and therefore underminethe constitutional principle of equality for all,regardless of gender or religious affiliation. Effortscertainly have been made in this regard, but they havebeen limited to certain areas and communities, such asthe reform of 1974, which made it possible toguarantee certain rights under the law to Muslimwomen, in the area of divorce. These advances must bepursued, and extended to all problem communities andspheres (inheritance, marriage, childcare, etc.). Forexample, Hindu women must be given the legal right todivorce and inheritance. The Special Rapporteur notedwith pleasure the initiatives undertaken in the realm ofpositive law, with a view to improving the protection ofwomen, such as the adoption of laws on the registrationof marriage and divorce, the minimum age formarriage, and the banning of the dowry system. Theseinitiatives must be pursued, and efforts must be madeto ensure their concrete implementation, especially inrural areas, in order to combat religious traditions ortraditions attributed to religion, which perpetuate,among other practices, the illegal practice of forcingminors into marriage. Also in the context of theseinitiatives, it is imperative that a legal ban onpolygamy be introduced.

91. Concerning the Vested Property Act, it is ofurgent importance that the process of formulating andadopting new legislation in this area reach a successfulconclusion. However, it is essential to ensure that theHindu community and the Hurukh/Oroan tribes (whoare the main victims of this law) be consulted, andincluded in this exercise, and that their right to

property be fully restored to them, notably through thereturn of stolen property and through compensation. Inany event, and in a general sense, the Government musttake the appropriate measures — including legalmeasures — to ensure that the right to property beprotected and guaranteed for all, regardless of religiousor ethnic affiliation. This point is especially importantdue to the combination of Bangladesh’s difficulteconomic situation and its very high populationdensity, as a result of which land is a rare and highlysought after resource, and hence a source of conflict.

92. With regard to the influence of the politic sphereon religion and belief, the Special Rapporteur considersthat the State does, in general, respect freedom ofreligion and belief and their manifestations, inaccordance with international human rights standardsin this area. The authorities permit religious practice,the building of places of worship, religious instruction,journeys abroad by religious officials, the maintainingof contacts with adherents of the same religion livingabroad, etc. Similarly, the State provides publicfunding to different religious communities, andrecognizes religious festivals as national festivals thatmay have the status of holidays. Generally speaking,the State does not interfere in the religious affairs (inthe strictest sense of the term) of religiouscommunities. It should be stressed that no religiouscommunity is subject to a prohibition on the part of theauthorities. The Ahmadis, who are not recognized as anIslamic religious community in many Muslimcountries, are recognized as Muslims by the State ofBangladesh, and may exercise their religious activitiesin complete freedom (notably, they may build theirmosques). Thus, from this point of view, the situationis in fact entirely satisfactory.

93. Furthermore, while recognizing Islam as the Statereligion, the State declares its commitment tosecularism and religious harmony, whether with regardto the Muslim majority, religious minorities, or ethniccommunities.

94. However, the situation of religious and ethniccommunities is not without its problems. Nevertheless,it should first be noted that in Bangladesh, one cannottalk in terms of the repression of these communities.Another point that should be stressed is the complexityof the various situations. The obstacles, intolerance,and discrimination that can affect religious and ethniccommunities are due to a combination of severalfactors: especially political and religious factors, but

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also economic and religious factors, such as poverty,illiteracy, and the weight of tradition. It is clear thatpoverty is the primary and crucial problem inBangladesh, to the extent that all the other problemscan seem secondary in comparison. However, whilebearing in mind the economic and social context inBangladesh, which is common to all developingcountries, it seems that the key common denominatorwith regard to the problems described is theexploitation of religion by the political sphere.

95. Although historically, one of the foundingprinciples of Bangladesh was non-interference inreligion and politics, constitutionally recognizedthrough the principle of secularism and the ban onreligious parties, these principles have gradually beenundermined, especially during military coups d’état.The Constitution was amended by military leaders inorder to establish Islam as the State religion. Theirintention was to exploit the Muslim majority’scommitment to Islam, in order to legitimize their holdon power. This measure also facilitated the return ofthose who had originally opposed Bangladeshiindependence: Jamat-e-Islami, a religious partygenerally regarded as extremist. The restoration andlegitimization of this party effectively sanctioned thepoliticization of the religious sphere, to the detrimentof the State, society, and hence all religiouscommunities. The exploitation of Islam within thepolitical sphere in fact allowed extremists — includingJamat-e-Islami — to gain parliamentary representation,and led other parties to employ a similar strategy. Thus,despite its commitment to secularism, the partypresently in power used religious symbols such as theKoran and the veil during the last electoral campaign.Despite its Government’s progressivism in declaringitself in favour of religious harmony, religious andethnic diversity, and the demarginalizing of vulnerablegroups, including women, and in negotiating a PeaceAccord in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, the Governmentnow seems to be trapped by its purely electoral strategyof incorporating religion into the political sphere.

96. First of all, the State appears more sensitive to theinterests of Muslims. For non-Muslim minorities andethnic groups, this is reflected especially in obstaclesencountered with respect to access to public-sectorjobs, especially positions of responsibility, weakerfinancial support for the religious institutions of thesecommunities, and the teaching of their religion inpublic schools. This approach also appears to be the

reason for the delays in full implementation of thePeace Accord in favour of the ethnic communities ofthe Chittagong Hill Tracts.

97. Also, the State appears to be powerless, or at leastweakened, in its efforts to combat religious extremism,to the detriment of Muslims, minorities, and women.Indeed, apparently for fear of offending the religiousfeelings of the majority — who are often poor andilliterate, and have a superficial and traditionalknowledge of religion — the authorities do not appearto be earnest in their efforts to combat the harmfuleffects of religious extremism. Thus, a climate ofinsecurity affects the Ahmadis, religious minorities,and women of all faiths, due to sporadic, but traumaticattacks against Ahmadi and non-Muslim institutions(particularly places of worship); the stealing of land(especially Hindu land), or attempts to appropriateassets illegally; threats against women; or fatwasdeclared against Muslims. In the face of these attacks,which are organized and/or encouraged by extremists,the State does not appear to be playing its role ofsuppression or its role of prevention. In the majority ofcases, during attacks against Ahmadis and minorities,intervention by the forces of law and order isquestionable, because officers often either do nothingor are slow to offer assistance. Furthermore, thoseresponsible are rarely identified or pursued. TheSpecial Rapporteur would, however, like to pay tributeto the attention brought by the Government to theproblem represented by fatwas in the context of itsNational Action Plan for Women’s Advancement, andwould encourage the Government to implement itsrecommendation aimed at combating the practice of thefatwa.

98. For the reasons outlined above, the State alsoseems to be at a standstill with regard to all thoseinitiatives that are regarded as unpopular, but arenecessary in terms of human rights, such as the re-examination of the Vested Property Act, the adoptionof legislation in favour of women, notably the reformof religious personal laws and the abolition ofpolygamy, as well as measures (including throughsanctions) to implement laws on the registration ofmarriages and divorce and the minimum age formarriage.

99. It is vital that Bangladesh combat religiousextremism, which constitutes a real danger. Althoughextremists — in particular the Jamat-e-Islami party —do not hold many seats in Parliament, they nonetheless

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remain very active in terms of educating or attemptingto provide guidance to Muslims, especially through themosques and madrasahs and the Islamic non-governmental organizations providing assistance to themost destitute members of society. There is clearlyintolerance — especially on the part of religiousofficials, and sometimes even on the part of localauthorities. This is glaringly evident from the fatwasand the restrictions imposed upon Muslim women intheir practising of religion (such as the ban on womenin mosques). These public-sector actors do, and canexert a real and harmful influence over the Muslimmajority, which is easily manipulated. This is shown bythe absence of a popular reaction against the fatwasand the social boycotting of the fatwa victims, as wellas the manipulation of the crowds in the attacks againstminorities. These actions threaten to undermine anentire process of evolution achieved within society as awhole — a process marked by progressive andenlightened thinking. In particular, these actionsthreaten to undermine the emancipation ofmarginalized groups, such as women, promoted by theGovernment, notably through various relatedlegislative initiatives and action programmes.

100. While recalling that, in general, State policyrespects freedom of religion or belief and theirmanifestations, and is not opposed to religious andethnic communities or designed to oppress women, theSpecial Rapporteur has formulated the followingrecommendations with regard to the problemsdescribed above.

101. First of all, the Special Rapporteur recommendsthat religion be protected from all forms of politicalexploitation, since such exploitation is detrimental toboth the political and religious spheres, and hence tothe State, society, and, more especially, to religious andethnic communities and to women.

102. The Special Rapporteur therefore recommendsthat the State combat extremism, which is essentiallysimplistic and obscurantist.

103. In this regard, it is important that any direct orindirect involvement of extremists in attacks againstAhmadis, minorities, ethnic communities, and womenbe systematically pursued in the courts and combated,notably through education.

104. It is also vitally important that the State take thenecessary measures to protect the mosques andmadrasahs from all efforts at indoctrination on the part

of extremists, so that places of prayer, contemplationand religious education do not become instruments ofintolerance, discrimination, or hatred.

105. The Special Rapporteur also recommends that theState implement a policy of prevention, and especiallyto pursue its efforts in the area of education and tobroaden those efforts into a genuine culture of humanrights. This education policy must in particular addressreligious officials, who must receive more rigoroustraining. This means it must teach a perfectunderstanding of Islam, its diversity, and its values oftolerance, and train religious officials to respect otherreligions and faiths, as well as in the principles ofhuman rights, non-discrimination, and tolerance,especially with regard to women. This education policymust also address the rest of society, and especiallyBangladesh’s future citizens (its pupils and students).In this respect, it is recommended that the State reviseits primary-school textbooks and curricula, in order toensure that the religious and ethnic diversity ofBangladesh are reflected in such a way that eachreligion is presented in an objective manner, and inorder to promote the values of tolerance and non-discrimination. This education policy should helpensure that the values of tolerance and non-discrimination become fixed in the people’s minds, andremove socio-religious interdicts and taboos such asthose affecting women and the mixing of religions (forexample, marriages between people of differentreligions, and conversions — especially conversionsfrom Islam to another faith). It is also important thatthe Government pay particular attention to what isactually being taught in the madrasahs, and to what isbeing practised in the madrasahs on a day-to-day basis.

106. The Special Rapporteur recommends that theState take appropriate measures to ensure that themedia are open to the religious and ethnic pluralism ofBangladesh, and that it therefore educate thepopulation in the virtues of celebrating diversity.

107. The measures recommended above with respectto suppression and prevention must make it possible toconfront the development of extremism and, notably, toprotect Bangladesh from the consequences of thisscourge, which is rampant around the world, includingin Asia. In particular, they must also make it possibleto combat political exploitation of religion byextremists, and the tendency for this practice to betaken up by other, non-extremist (and especiallysecular) parties.

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108. The Special Rapporteur also recommends that theState be more aware of the legitimate claims ofminorities and ethnic communities:

(a) To this end, it is essential that members ofthese communities be given access — withouthindrance or discrimination, and in accordance with theconstitutional principle of equality — to public-sectorjobs, and especially to positions of responsibility. TheSpecial Rapporteur recommends that positive-discrimination measures (which are recognized,moreover, under Article 29 b) of the Constitution) betaken by the Government with regard to therecruitment and promotion of members of minoritiesand ethnic communities, especially within the policeand the army. It is also recommended that civil serviceentrance-examination boards and those responsible forcareer development should include non-Muslimmembers. Everything must be done to ensure thatmembers of minorities and ethnic communities aretreated as full citizens, that their concerns are properlyaddressed, and that they are able to enjoy all theirrights and contribute towards the general interest.

(b) The State must also examine, with completeobjectivity, the needs of minorities and ethniccommunities, especially with regard to the funding ofreligious institutions and religious training. It must alsoensure that the public funds allocated are sufficient anddistributed equally among all communities (Muslimand other faiths) with a view to encouraging toleranceand non-discrimination.

(c) The security of minorities and ethniccommunities — especially of religious institutions —must be fully and effectively guaranteed by the State.

(d) Concerning, in particular, the ethniccommunities of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, whilebearing in mind the complexity of the situation andstressing the essential contribution of the Governmentin the 1997 Peace Accord (for which the PrimeMinister received the UNESCO peace prize), theSpecial Rapporteur encourages the authorities to applythis Accord fully, and as rapidly as possible. Enormousdifficulties certainly do exist, such as the resettlementof Bengalis outside the Chittagong Hill Tracts, whichseems to be a very difficult enterprise. However, thisAccord is fundamental for the survival of the ethniccommunities of the Chittagong Hill Tracts and thepreservation of their ethnic, religious, and culturalidentity. As demonstrated by the incident of October

1999, implementation of this Accord is an absolutelyfundamental precondition for any process ofreconciliation and for peace.

109. The Special Rapporteur further recommends thatefforts be made to develop dialogue between thecountry’s different religions — certainly among leadersof each community, but above all at the local level, andespecially in urban areas, among adherents of all thevarious religions. Their involvement in joint religiousprogrammes, for example, is strongly encouraged.

110. Finally, the Special Rapporteur encouragespresent initiatives aimed at establishing a nationalcommission for human rights, while recommendingthat such a commission conform to the Paris principles,and that its members should include not only women,but also non-Muslims.

111. The Special Rapporteur recommends, lastly, thatBangladesh — which deserves the understanding andsupport of the international community — benefit fromthe technical cooperation and consultancy services ofthe United Nations Commission on Human Rights.This will enable Bangladesh to receive assistance in theimplementation of some of the aboverecommendations, especially with regard to educationand to indigenous minorities and populations.

112. The Special Rapporteur believes that theserecommendations are fully compatible withGovernment policies aimed at the development ofBangladesh, and in particular those policies concernedwith the struggle against poverty, social and economicequalities, and the demarginalizing of vulnerablegroups, including women. Indeed, implementation ofthese measures can help toward the development ofBangladesh, which is a priority objective with respectto the implementation of all human, economic, socialand cultural, and civil and political rights, to beenjoyed by all, regardless of religious or ethnicaffiliation.