Galinsky, Adam D.; Ku, Gillian; Wang, Cynthia S

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Perspective-Taking and Self-Other Overlap:Fostering Social Bonds and Facilitating SocialCoordinationGalinsky, Adam D.; Ku, Gillian; Wang, Cynthia S.

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Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:Galinsky, A. D., Ku, G., & Wang, C. S. (2005). Perspective-Taking and Self-Other Overlap: Fostering SocialBonds and Facilitating Social Coordination. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 8(2), 109-124. https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430205051060

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Perspective-Taking and Self–Other Overlap:Fostering Social Bondsand Facilitating SocialCoordination

Adam D. GalinskyNorthwestern University

Gillian KuLondon Business School

Cynthia S. WangNorthwestern University

The present article offers a conceptual model for how the cognitive processes associated withperspective-taking facilitate social coordination and foster social bonds. We suggest that thebenefits of perspective-taking accrue through an increased self–other overlap in cognitiverepresentations and discuss the implications of this perspective-taking induced self–otheroverlap for stereotyping and prejudice. Whereas perspective-taking decreases stereotyping ofothers (through application of the self to the other), it increases stereotypicality of one’s ownbehavior (through inclusion of the other in the self). To promote social bonds, perspective-takers utilize information, including stereotypes, to coordinate their behavior with others. Thediscussion focuses on the implications, both positive and negative, of this self–other overlap forsocial relationships and discusses how conceptualizing perspective-taking, as geared towardsupporting specific social bonds, provides a framework for understanding why the effects ofperspective-taking are typically target-specific and do not activate a general helping mind-set.Through its attempts to secure social bonds, perspective-taking can be an engine of socialharmony, but can also reveal a dark side, one full of ironic consequences.

Group Processes &Intergroup Relations

2005 Vol 8(2) 109–124

keywords perspective-taking, social bonds,social coordination, stereotyping and prejudice

GPIR

Copyright © 2005 SAGE Publications(London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi)8:2; 109–124; DOI: 10.1177/1368430205051060

Author’s noteAddress correspondence to Adam D. Galinsky,Department of Management andOrganizations, Leverone Hall, Kellogg Schoolof Management, Northwestern University,2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208, USA[email: [email protected]]

02 Galinsky (bc/s) 29/3/05 1:06 pm Page 109

THE FORMATION and maintenance of socialbonds is a critical ingredient for psychologicaland physical well-being (Maslow, 1968). Indeed,humans appear to have a fundamental need tobelong, to be connected to others, forming thebasis for much of social interaction. One waythat social bonds can emerge or be reinforcedis through smooth social coordination. Bycreating a psychological sense of similarity anda feeling of behavioral and mental connected-ness, social coordination is the glue that bindsand bonds social relationships.

What behaviors, social strategies, and cogni-tive processes are available to aid in the pursuitof social bonds? We propose that one simple yetvital strategy for smoothing the cogs of socialinteraction and building social bonds isperspective-taking. We define perspective-taking as the process of imagining the worldfrom another’s vantage point or imaginingoneself in another’s shoes. Although manyscholars have suggested that perspective-takingincreases feelings of sympathy and empathy(Batson, 1991), we suggest that the cognitiveconsequences of perspective-taking are acritical mechanism behind its ability to facilitatesocial coordination and foster social bonds.When we take the perspective of another, thereis greater overlap between mental represen-tations of the self and mental representations ofthe other (Davis, Conklin, Smith, & Luce, 1996;Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000a). We contend thatas a result of this increased self–other overlap,perspective-takers are able to effectively coordi-nate their behavior and to bond with others.

In this article, we offer a conceptual model forhow the processes associated with perspective-taking aid in the pursuit and maintenance ofsocial bonds, specifically highlighting itsapplication to research on stereotyping andprejudice (see Figure 1). Ample evidence has

demonstrated that perspective-taking leadsindividuals to see more of themselves in othersand affects how they evaluate and describeothers. For example, prior research has shownthat perspective-taking can aid in the formationof social bonds by decreasing prejudice andstereotyping of target individuals and groups(Batson, Polycarpou et al., 1997; Galinsky& Ku, 2004; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000a; Vescio, Sechrist, & Paolucci, 2003). Throughperspective-taking and the application of theself to the other, social bias is reduced, allowingperspective-taking to aid in the creation andmaintenance of social bonds.

Although research has shown that perspective-takers see more of themselves in the other, oneof the central questions we explore is whetherperspective-takers will also see more of theother in themselves and come to act more likethe target. By examining how taking theperspective of a member of a stereotyped groupimpacts one’s own self-description and one’sown behavior, we suggest that perspective-taking may be an effective means of not onlydecreasing stereotyping, but also increasingbehavioral mimicry and coordinating socialbehavior. We review some of our recent studiesthat show that perspective-taking, whiledecreasing stereotyping of others, also impactsself-description in a stereotypic manner andresults in more stereotype-consistent behaviors.Thus, not only can perspective-taking increasesocial bonds by decreasing prejudice and stereo-typing, it can also increase social bonds bycreating synchrony and social coordination. Weexplore this relationship between perspective-taking and facilitating social bonds and socialcoordination, discussing the role of stereotypesas an impediment and facilitator to the for-mation of social bonds. Through both seeingthe self in the other and seeing the other in the

Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 8(2)

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Figure 1. Reciprocal relationship between social bonds and perspective-taking when taking the perspective ofan individual from a stereotyped group.

Inclusion of Other in Self Increased Stereotypical Behavior of Self Social Coordination Social Bonds

Social Bonds Perspective-Taking

Inclusion of Self in Other Reduced Stereotypical Judgments of Others Social bonds


self, perspective-takers are able to navigate acomplex social world, coordinating theirbehavior with a diverse set of individuals, andestablishing multicultural social bonds.

The role of perspective-taking in socialcoordination and social bonds

Scholars from Maslow (1968) to Baumeisterand Leary (1995) have considered the need tobelong, or the desire to establish and maintainsocial ties, as the most important motivator ofbehavior once the basic physiological needs fornourishment and safety have been fulfilled. Thefundamental and motivating nature of the needto belong is best demonstrated through thesevere negative consequences that occur whensomeone is socially excluded. Social isolationimpacts cognitive, social, and physical function-ing, with excluded individuals displaying adecreased ability to exhibit logical reasoning(Baumeister, Twenge, & Nuss, 2002), anincrease in self-defeating behaviors (Leary,Kowalski, Smith, & Phillips, 2003; Twenge,Catanese, & Baumeister, 2003), and detrimen-tal physical responses, such as stress, anxiety,and reduced physical health (Williams, 2001).The need to belong is so strong that it leadspeople to expend great effort to maintain long-lasting bonds (Bridges, 1980), even when therelationship is destructive (e.g. abusive spouses,Strube, 1988).

We contend that perspective-taking, havinglong been recognized as critical to proper socialfunctioning, is a key ingredient in the reduc-tion of interpersonal conflict and the construc-tion, maintenance, and preservation of socialbonds. From cognitive functioning (Piaget,1932) to moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1976), theability to entertain different perspectives is acrucial mechanism of successful developmentand is oftentimes considered the foundation ofhuman social capacity (Mead, 1934). Davis(1983) discussed the role of perspective-takingin social coordination and social bonds, findingthat perspective-taking, as measured by anindividual difference measure, was positivelycorrelated with social competence. More directevidence that perspective-taking is geared

toward facilitating the need to belong and toform bonds with others comes from researchshowing that individuals are more likely to takethe perspective of close others and taking theperspective of others increases a sense ofpsychological closeness (Cialdini, Brown, Lewis,Luce, & Neuberg, 1997; Pickett, Gardner, &Knowles, 2004). As stated eloquently by Davis,‘[a] perspective-taking ability should allow anindividual to anticipate the behavior and reac-tions of others, therefore facilitating smootherand more rewarding interpersonal relation-ships’ (Davis, 1983, p. 115).

It is clear that forming rewarding socialbonds is a hallmark of well-being, and beingdeprived of these bonds is the epitome ofpsychological devastation. Unfortunately, socialbonds are damaged in the presence of inter-personal conflict and under the specter ofstereotyping. The very thought that one maystereotype another or that some unintentionalexpression could be interpreted as prejudicialcan taint interactions with a palpable feeling ofanxiety, making the prospect of intergroupcontact foreboding (Blair, Park, & Bachelor,2003; Plant & Devine, 2003; Shelton, 2003;Stephan & Stephan, 1985). Since perspective-taking has been shown to successfully decreasestereotyping, prejudice, and social aggression(Batson, Polycarpou et al., 1997; Finlay &Stephan, 2000; Galinsky & Ku, 2004; Galinsky &Moskowitz, 2000a; Richardson, Hammock,Smith, Gardner, & Signo, 1994; Stephan &Finlay, 1999; Vescio et al., 2003), it can be usedto improve and build social bonds. Impres-sively, taking the perspective of a target allowsperspective-takers to decrease stereotyping,prejudice, and intergroup bias toward the targetand the target’s group (Batson, Polycarpouet al., 1997; Finlay & Stephan, 2000; Galinsky &Ku, 2004; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000a; Stephan& Finlay, 1999; Vescio et al., 2003). By reducingstereotyping and the palpable concern that onemay display seemingly prejudicial responses,perspective-taking improves the climate ofsocial interaction and facilitates the formationand maintenance of social bonds.

Perspective-taking also appears to facilitatesocial coordination. Perspective-taking, as

Galinsky et al. perspective-taking and self–other overlap

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measured by an individual difference scale,increases one’s ability to mimic others’ behav-iors, which then produces smoother, moreharmonious interactions (Chartrand & Bargh,1999), suggesting that behavioral mimicryserves the need to belong, that it is a signalingdevice to communicate interpersonal connec-tions. Overall, mimicry is associated withgreater rapport (LaFrance, 1982), increaseswhen the need for affiliation is on active duty,with people mimicking those individuals whomthey like (Cheng & Chartrand, 2003; Lakin &Chartrand, 2003), liking those who mimic them(Chartrand & Bargh, 1999), and with naturaldifferences in perspective-taking (Chartrand &Bargh, 1999) moderating these effects.

Further evidence that perspective-taking,mimicry, and social coordination are relatedcomes from research on interdependent, asopposed to independent, self-construals. Inter-dependent and independent self-construalsdiffer in their conceptualization of individuals’relationships with others, with interdependentindividuals including others in the self-concept,and independent individuals focusing on a selfthat is autonomous from others (Markus &Kitayama, 1991; Schwartz, 1994). As one mightexpect, individuals with interdependent self-construals are more likely to take the perspec-tive of others (Vorauer & Cameron, 2002) andthose with interdependent self-construals,whether experimentally manipulated orexamined as a cultural difference (e.g.Japanese vs. Westerners), also display morebehavioral mimicry (van Baaren, Maddux,Chartrand, de Bouter, & van Knippenberg,2003). Through increased mimicry, perspec-tive-taking serves as a device of social coordi-nation, helping to cement and form socialbonds.

There is clearly a reciprocal relationshipbetween perspective-taking, behavioral mimicry,and rapport. Is there a common underlyingprocess that connects all of these variables? Weturn to the role of self–other overlap as animportant mechanism in driving the diverseeffects of perspective-taking.

Perspective-taking and self–otheroverlap: Application of the self to theother and application of the other tothe self?

Perspective-taking has been shown to increasethe overlap between mental representations ofthe self and mental representations of the other(Davis et al., 1996; Galinsky & Moskowitz,2000a). Indeed, many of the effects of perspec-tive-taking can be explained through thisincreased self–other overlap in cognitiverepresentations: the relationship between col-lectivism and perspective-taking is mediated bythe amount of self–other overlap (Vorauer &Cameron, 2002); the relationship betweenperspective-taking and decreased stereotypingis mediated by the level of self–other overlap(Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000a); and therelationship between perspective-taking andhelping behavior appears to be driven by per-ceptions of oneness (Cialdini et al., 1997). Forexample, Cialdini et al. (1997) found that therelationship between empathy and willingnessto help was eliminated when the degree ofself–other overlap was statistically controlled.

One question that emerges from theself–other overlap findings is whether theoverlap is driven more by seeing the self inthe other or by inclusion of the other in theself. The former, seeing more of the self in theother, refers to perceiving the other as possess-ing characteristics of the self, making the othermore ‘self-like’, as suggested by Davis et al.(1996). The latter, including the other in theself, on the other hand, refers to the extent theself comes to include characteristics of theother. Is the self only applied to the other or isthe other also applied to the self? This questionis particularly difficult to answer based on someof the methods used to judge self–otheroverlap. For example, in the study on therelationship between perspective-taking andcollectivism (Vorauer & Cameron, 2002),self–other overlap was measured using theInclusion of Other in the Self Scale (IOS). TheIOS (Aron, Aron, Tudor, & Nelson, 1991) is ascale that contains seven Venn diagrams repre-senting varying degrees of self–other overlap.


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Thus, the scale measures overlap between selfand other but cannot distinguish betweenwhether the self is being included in the otheror the other is being included in the self.Despite its name, the scale only measures per-ceived closeness.

Much of the research on perspective-takinginduced self–other overlap has focused on anddemonstrated that increased self–other overlapis typically characterized by seeing more of our-selves in the other, with a greater percentage ofself-descriptive traits being ascribed to thetarget (Davis et al., 1996). The representationof the target constructed by the perspective-taker comes to resemble the perspective-taker’s own self-representation. Not only doesperspective-taking result in greater applicationof the self to the target (Cialdini et al., 1997;Davis, 1983; Davis et al., 1996), it also leads togreater application of the self to the group towhich the target belongs (Galinsky & Ku, 2004;Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000a). In the Galinskyand Moskowitz study (2000a), the more theperspective-taker saw the self in the target,the more he/she saw the self in the target’sgroup, and the less likely the group was to bestereotyped. Since individuals tend to haveegocentrically biased opinions of themselves,perspective-takers apply positive self-descriptorsto the target, resulting in an improved view ofthe target and decreased prejudiced and stereo-typing (Galinsky & Ku, 2004). In fact, Cialdiniet al. (1997) have suggested that becauseperspective-taking leads one to see more ofoneself in the other, perspective-taking inducedhelping is not really altruistic, but can becharacterized as egoistically motivated.Although these studies demonstrate theimportance of applying the self to others inintergroup and interpersonal relations, they donot speak to whether the other is also appliedto the self during perspective-taking. Is perspec-tive-taking bidirectional with true self and othermerging or is the self applied to the otherwithout reciprocation?

Several lines of research provide someevidence that others can be included in the self.For instance, in their self-expansion model,Aron and colleagues (Aron & Aron, 1986, 1996,

1997; Aron & McLaughlin-Volpe, 2001; Aronet al., 1991; Wright & Tropp, 2002) argue thathumans can satisfy the basic motivation forinterpersonal closeness by expanding their self-concepts to include others in the self. Thus,close relationships (e.g. spouses) are character-ized by including the other in one’s own mentalself-representation (Aron et al., 1991). Simi-larly, like the work on independent and inter-dependent self-construals, when the social selfis made accessible (by priming people with theword ‘we’), individuals assimilate or includesocial comparison information into their self-representations (Stapel & Koomen, 2000).Additionally, on constructs related to affili-ation, individuals show inclusion of their inter-action partners in their own self-descriptions,suggesting that including others in the selfassists goals related to social connection(Tiedens & Jimenez, 2003). In an intergroupcontext, research has demonstrated that in-group identification can be measured by thedegree to which the in-group is included in theself (Tropp & Wright, 2001).

Seeing more of the other in the self alsorelates to the concept of self-stereotyping. Self-stereotyping refers to the extent to which groupmembers consider traits that are descriptive ofthe group to be descriptive of the self—inessence one possesses a stereotypical self-perception (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, &Wetherell, 1987). Such self-stereotyping oftentends to be selective, with group members morelikely to characterize positive stereotypic attrib-utes as self-descriptive (Biernat, Vescio, &Green, 1996). Importantly, self-stereotypingrelates to maintaining social bonds and meetingthe need for inclusion (Pickett, Bonner, &Coleman, 2002). When one’s need to belong ison active alert, one is more likely to alter one’sprivate and public image to correspond withthe specific stereotypic content of one’s in-group.

We therefore suggest that self–other overlapin perspective-taking is not only driven byapplying the self to the other but may also becaused by including the other in the self, withperspective-takers applying their own traits ontoothers but also viewing the other’s attributes as


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self-descriptive. We contend that not only willperspective-taking lead to changes in self-description, but it should also alter the behav-iorial tendencies of the perspective-taker tomatch those of the target (see Figure 1).Although some evidence suggests thatperspective-takers mimic the behaviors ofothers (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999), a questionremains of what happens when one takes theperspective of a member of a stereotypedout-group. Will one come to see the self aspossessing those traits that are characteristic ofthat group, as well as show behavioral tenden-cies that are consistent with the stereotype ofthat group?

Perspective-taking: Becoming andbehaving stereotypically

By applying oneself to the target and the targetgroup, perspective-taking has been shown to bean important strategy for decreasing stereo-typing and prejudice (Batson, Polycarpou et al.,1997; Finlay & Stephan, 2000; Galinsky & Ku,2004; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000a; Stephan &Finlay, 1999; Vescio et al., 2003), and thus,building and maintaining social bonds. Wehave recently begun to explore whetherperspective-taking increases the overlapbetween self and other representations by notonly applying the self to others, but also byassimilating the stereotype of others into theself. By including the other in the self, perspec-tive-takers should be more likely to coordinatebehaviors, to increase perceptions of closenessand connectedness, and ultimately to enhancesocial bonds.

In most of our studies, we contrast perspective-taking with stereotype suppression becauseboth are intuitively appealing strategies fornavigating multicultural landscapes. Galinskyand Moskowitz (2000a) demonstrated thatperspective-taking is a more successful strategyfor controlling stereotyping than is suppres-sion; whereas perspective-takers, by applyingthe self to the target, decrease stereotyping andprejudice, suppression often ironically andunintentionally produces the very stereotypicthoughts one is trying to avoid (Galinsky &

Moskowitz, 2000a; Macrae, Bodenhausen,Milne, & Jetten, 1994).1 By also including theother in the self and increasing social coordi-nation, we contend that perspective-taking is,overall, a more effective approach for securingsocial bonds than is suppression.

There are a number of ways that perspective-taking has been manipulated. In the mostutilized paradigm, participants listen to arandomly selected interview ostensibly from alocal radio station and are given specificinstructions on how to listen to the tape(Batson, Early, & Salvarani, 1997; Maner et al.,2002; Vescio et al., 2003). In most cases, theperson in the tape describes a distressing situ-ation (with the most commonly used tapeinvolving a woman named Katie Banks who losther parents in a car accident and is strugglingto stay in school while having to care for heryounger siblings). In the control condition ofthis paradigm, participants are told to listen tothe tape objectively, in a detached manner. Inthe typical perspective-taking manipulation,participants are instructed to imagine how theperson in the tape feels, focusing on how theevents have affected his or her life. This con-dition is often labeled ‘perspective-taking othercondition’ because the focus is on what theother person is thinking and feeling. Some-times, a second perspective-taking conditionhas been used, often labeled ‘perspective-takingself condition’, in which participants are told toimagine how they would feel if they were theperson in the tape. In this paradigm, themanipulation checks of perspective-takingoften involve measuring feelings of empathy(i.e. sympathetic, compassionate, soft-hearted,warm, tender, and moved) and/or askingparticipants to report the degree to which theyremained objective when listening to the tapeand the degree to which they imagined whatthe person in the tape was feeling and experi-encing. This paradigm allows researchers to usedifferent targets (e.g. from a stereotypedgroup) and to describe different types of situ-ations (e.g. whether the person is treated in adiscriminatory manner by others).

A second paradigm used to induce perspective-taking involves participants writing a narrative


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essay about the typical day in the life of a personin a photograph (Galinsky & Moskowitiz, 2000;Galinsky & Ku, 2004). In the control conditionof this paradigm, participants are simply told towrite about the typical day of the photographedindividual. In the perspective-taking condition,participants are told to go through the day as ifthey were that person, looking at the worldthrough their eyes. This manipulation ofperspective-taking is essentially a ‘perspective-taking self ’ manipulation. This paradigm wasadapted from Macrae et al. (1994) who used itto explore the consequences of stereotype sup-pression. In the suppression condition for the‘day in the life narrative essay’ task, participantsare told to actively avoid letting stereotypicthoughts influence their essays. Whether or notparticipants write their essays in the first personis often used as a manipulation check ofperspective-taking (Galinsky & Ku, 2004). In thisparadigm, the person in the photograph isusually a member of a salient stereotyped group.

The main differences between these twoparadigms is that in the ‘listen to an interview’paradigm, experimenters control the contentof all information and the participants are apassive recipient of that information. In the‘day in the life narrative essay’ paradigm,participants construct and control the contentof their expressions. Both paradigms representdifferent ways that individuals may psycho-logically interact with others and we used bothparadigms in investigating whether perspective-taking increases social coordination by increas-ing the stereotypicality of the perspective-taker’sbehavior.

Seeing the self stereotypicallyIn one experiment (Galinsky, Wang, & Ku,2005), we gave participants a photograph of acheerleader, replete with pom-poms, and askedparticipants to write a day in her life by eithertaking the perspective of the woman in thephotograph or by suppressing any stereotypesof the woman. After the day in the life task,participants rated how attractive and sexythey currently felt. We predicted that ifperspective-taking leads individuals to come tosee themselves as more like the target of

perspective-taking, these participants wouldfeel more attractive than suppression conditionparticipants, in line with the stereotype ofcheerleaders as beautiful and sexy. This isexactly what we found—simply taking theperspective of a cheerleader led participants tosee themselves as more attractive: perspective-takers became gorgeous in their own minds. Infollow-up studies, we have had participantswrite ‘a day in the life’ essays about a photo-graph of an African-American male or of anelderly male. Perspective-takers, compared toboth a control condition and a suppressioncondition, rated traits that were stereotypic ofAfrican-Americans and the elderly as moreself-descriptive. When we take the perspectiveof others we come to include their traits, evenstereotypic ones, as being part of the self.

Behaving stereotypically We next explored whether perspective-takers,having come to judge themselves in morestereotypical terms, would actually behave morestereotypically. This is a complicated questionbecause stereotype activation, in and of itself,often leads to stereotype-consistent behaviorson the part of perceivers. For example, beingprimed with the elderly stereotype led collegestudents to walk more slowly (Bargh, Chen, &Burrows, 1996) and being primed with theprofessor stereotype (Dijksterhuis & vanKnippenberg, 1998) led participants to performbetter on an intellectual task. Thus, the mereactivation of any construct, independent ofperspective-taking, tends to increase behaviorsconsistent with that construct.

However, some evidence suggests thatwhether stereotype-consistent behaviors occurmay be connected to whether social bonds aredesired or avoided. When there is conflict orcompetition with an out-group, intergroupcomparisons result in behavioral contrasteffects, with one’s own behavior becoming lesssimilar to the stereotype of the out-group(Spears, Gordijn, Dijksterhuis, & Stapel, 2004).For example, when social identities and an ‘usvs. them’ mentality are salient, one is likely towalk more rather than less quickly followingactivation of the elderly stereotype. In contrast,


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the amount of contact with members of astereotyped group has been shown to increasethe propensity to behave in ways that arestereotypical of that group (Dijksterhuis, Aarts,Bargh, & van Knippenberg, 2000). The factthat contact and amount of experience alsotends to increase perspective-taking suggeststhat perspective-taking may increase stereotyp-icality of an individual’s behavior. Thesefindings of behavioral contrast away from theactivated stereotypes when intergroup distinc-tions are high and of behavioral assimilationwhen previous experience with the outgroup isextensive provide some preliminary evidencethat concerns over social bonds may play a rolein whether one acts more or less like thetarget’s stereotype. Building off both thebehavioral mimicry work and the finding thatexperience with stereotyped groups predictsthe amount of stereotype-consistent behavior,we contend that perspective-taking will be likely to lead to stereotype-consistent behaviors.

Additionally, Wheeler, Jarvis, and Petty(2001) found that having participants write aday in the life of a person with a stereotypicallyAfrican-American name (Tyrone) led to morestereotype-consistent behavior (i.e. poorperformance on an intellectual task), with thiseffect strongest when individuals happened towrite their essays in the first person. Sincewriting narrative essays in the first person isoften used as a manipulation check for perspec-tive-taking (Galinsky & Ku, 2004), those partici-pants who wrote in the first person in theWheeler et al. study may have been taking theperspective of the target person, causing themto display more stereotypical behavior. However,because Wheeler et al. did not manipulateperspective-taking, the hypothesized relation-ship between perspective-taking and stereo-typicality of behavior is open to a number ofalternative explanations.

We specifically tested whether perspective-taking leads to an increase in stereotype-consistent behavior (Galinsky et al., 2005). Wemanipulated perspective-taking by tellingparticipants that they were going to listen to anaudiotape of a person describing a typical day

in his life and that they would later be asked togive their impressions of the person in theaudiotape. The person in the tape describedhimself as an assistant professor of politicalscience, a stereotypically analytical person. Weused the common perspective-taking manipu-lation (Batson et al., 1997; see also Vescio et al.,2003) of having participants imagine how theperson in the tape was feeling and thinking(perspective-taking other condition) orimagine how they themselves would feel andthink if they were that person (perspective-taking self condition). Non perspective-takers/control participants were told to listento the tape objectively. After listening to thetape, we had participants complete a sup-posedly unrelated task. The second task wasdescribed as a pilot test to develop materials foranother study exploring hemispheric differ-ences in cognition. Participants were instructedto complete 24 analytical questions adaptedfrom the Law School Admissions Test as quicklyyet accurately as possible in 20 minutes. We pre-dicted that participants would perform signifi-cantly better on the analytic task after takingthe perspective of the professor. Consistentwith this prediction, our results showed thattaking the perspective (both perspective-takingself and perspective-taking other conditions) ofa stereotypically analytical individual improvedanalytical reasoning ability. Becoming smarterafter taking the perspective of a professorshould facilitate interaction with such a person,allowing the perspective-taker to riff seamlesslyin conversation.

Increasing stereotypicality of one’s ownbehavior while decreasing stereotypicality in judgments of others Perspective-taking appears to increase thestereotypicality of behavior when the stereo-typic characteristics are positive and sociallyvalued (e.g. analytic ability for professors).The question of whether negative stereotypictraits will also affect perspective-takers’behavior is particularly interesting. Oneresponse by perspective-takers may be todecrease stereotypicality of their behavior tocompensate for the negative stereotypic


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attribute. For example, when interacting withan elderly person, a perspective-taker’smemory might become particularly active andaccurate. However, Tiedens and Jimenez(2003) have found that imagining interactingwith a familiar other who is agreeable leads tomore agreeable self-perceptions, but thatimagining interacting with a familiar otherwho is quarrelsome leads to more quarrelsomeself-perceptions, suggesting that even negativeattributes of others can become part of theself. Similarly, Galinsky et al. (2005) foundthat after taking the perspective of an AfricanAmerican, both positive (athletic andrhythmic) and negative (loud and aggressive)traits that are stereotypic of African-Americanswere deemed more self-descriptive. Thefindings by Dijksterhuis et al. (2000) that indi-viduals become more forgetful after havingspent time with the elderly suggests that behav-ioral compensation for the target’s negativestereotypic behavior may be unlikely. Negativestereotypic traits, having become momentarilyself-descriptive, may drive behavior, withperspective-takers acting in a stereotype-consistent fashion even when that behavior haspotentially negative connotations.

Considering the effects of self–other overlap,we might thus see that perspective-takers arelikely to walk more slowly after taking theperspective of an elderly male to calibrate theirbehavior with the expected behavior of anelderly person (through inclusion of the otherin the self). However, taking the perspective ofthe elderly should also decrease stereotyping ofthe elderly (through application of the self tothe other). Perspective-taking should improvesocial bonds by both decreasing social bias andby increasing social coordination.

Thus, it is possible that perspective-taking willresult in an intriguing dissociation betweenjudgment and behavior. Although sometheorists assume a direct perception tobehavior link (e.g. Wheeler & Petty, 2001),others have postulated separate schemas forperception and behavior. Carver, Ganellen,Froming, and Chambers (1983) suggested thatindividuals use interpretive schemas for per-ceiving and understanding behaviors, but use

behavioral schemas for producing manifestbehaviors. Similarly, Mussweiler and Förster(2000) have suggested that when an indi-vidual’s perceptual and behavioral experienceswith a stimulus diverge, judgments andbehavior may become dissociated from eachother. We contend that not only can differen-tial perceptual and behavioral experiences witha stimulus lead to a systematic dissociationbetween judgments and behavior, but that thisdissociation can also result from the strategiesand goals (e.g. perspective-taking) that an indi-vidual has.

To examine this potential judgment/behavior dissociation, we had participants takethe perspective of an elderly man, evaluate anambiguously dependent (a trait stereotypical ofthe elderly) individual, and then walk down ahallway (Galinsky et al., 2005). Participantscame to the lab and were first shown a photo-graph of an elderly man and were asked to writea day in his life by either taking the perspectiveof the man or by suppressing any stereotypes.After the day in the life task, participants reada paragraph adapted from Banaji, Hardin, andRothman (1993), in which a woman namedDonna performs a series of ambiguously depen-dent behaviors. To measure stereotype accessi-bility and application, participants were thenasked to evaluate Donna’s level of dependency.After rating Donna, participants were told thatthe first part of the experiment was over andthey could walk down the hall to the next part.To measure stereotypicality of behavior, we sur-reptitiously timed how long it took participantsto walk down the hallway because walkingslowly is a behavior that is stereotypic of theelderly. Since we believe that perspective-takingis a strategy geared toward social coordination,we predicted that perspective-takers would usethe stereotype in behavior, but would not usethe stereotype perceptually. We found exactlythat. Perspective-takers walked more slowly,using the stereotype to coordinate their behav-iors; however, perspective-takers also showedless stereotypicality in their judgments of howdependent Donna was, presumably using theactivated self-concept (rather than the stereo-type) in perception and judgment. We believe


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the reduction in stereotypicality of judgmentsand the simultaneous increase in stereotypical-ity of behavior is driven by the fact that perspec-tive-taking is a strategy geared towardsmoothing the cogs of social interaction andsecuring social bonds.

Discussion

Humans are social creatures who necessitateand actively seek out interactions with others tosatisfy the fundamental need to belong. In thisarticle, we have explored how perspective-taking is a simple and subtle strategy that canform and strengthen social bonds through anumber of means. Perspective-taking is able toimprove social relationships by decreasingstereotyping and prejudice toward the targetand target’s group. In addition, perspective-taking smoothes the cogs of social interactionby facilitating social coordination. Thesebenefits of perspective-taking can be explainedthrough a simple process: increased self–otheroverlap. During perspective-taking, represen-tations of the self and representations of thetarget of perspective-taking come to share anincreased number of features. We have dis-cussed how this increased self–other overlap isthe product of two different processes. First, theself is applied to the other, so that the otherbecomes more ‘self-like’; the representation ofthe target constructed by the perspective-takercomes to resemble the perspective-taker’s ownself-representation. Second, the other isincluded in the self, so that the self becomesmore ‘other-like’. Features of the target ofperspective-taking are now considered to beself-descriptive. When considered simul-taneously, we see that application of the self tothe other increases social bonds (throughdecreased prejudice and stereotyping) whereasapplication of the other to the self increasessocial coordination (and hence, social bonds).Through self–other merging—application ofthe self to the other and inclusion of the otherin the self—social coordination is facilitatedand social bonds strengthened (see Figure 1).

Davis et al. (1996) and Galinsky andMoskowitz (2000a) have both suggested that

there are two separate processes involved inperspective-taking—a conscious, explicit effectand a nonconscious, implicit effect. Feelings ofsympathy and increased liking are intended,conscious, explicit effects of perspective-taking.However, during perspective-taking, the self-concept is also implicitly activated and appliedtoward the target. Evidence that this overlapoccurs implicitly comes from research showingthat the increased self-target overlap followingperspective-taking is not mediated by increasedliking and is generally impervious to theavailability of cognitive resources (Davis et al.,1996). One question that remains for futureresearch is whether the inclusion of the otherin the self also occurs implicitly, whether bi-directional self–other merging is independentof the availability of cognitive resources.

Potential drawbacks of perspective-taking:Egocentric bias, target specificity, andproducing conflict and miscoordinationThus far, we have suggested that both appli-cation of the self to the other and inclusion ofthe other in the self generally have positiveeffects on social relationships. However, theseprocesses are not without their own potentialcosts. Increased application of the self to theother suggests a potential irony in the ability ofperspective-taking to reduce intergroup biases:perspective-taking builds off egocentric biasesto decrease stereotyping and improve out-group evaluations (Galinsky, 2002). Duringperspective-taking both positive and negativeself-descriptive attributes are applied to thetarget (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000a). Thus,the positive effects of perspective-taking onprejudice depend on the possession of highself-esteem. When perspective-takers feel posi-tively about themselves, their positive self-concepts are activated and applied, elevatingopinions of the target group. However, whenindividuals suffer from low self-esteem, noreduction in prejudice occurs. Galinsky & Ku(2004) found across two experiments, thatevaluations of a stereotyped group were onlyimproved when the perspective-taker hadpositive self-esteem, either chronically or exper-imentally manipulated. Applying the self to the


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other is not a panacea for prejudice reduction,but is only effective when perspective-takers feelpositively about themselves.

Similarly, we have focused on the role ofperspective-taking in building social bonds.However, unlike a multitude of other cognitiveprocesses and mind-sets, from counterfactualmind-sets (Galinsky & Kray, 2004; Galinsky &Moskowitz, 2000b) to implemental mind-sets(Gollwitzer, Heckhausen, & Steller, 1990),which persist when activated and are utilized inunrelated contexts, perspective-taking tends toproduce target-specific effects. Thus, perspec-tive-taking does not create a general helpingattitude; instead perspective-taking appears toassist in the formation and maintenance ofspecific social bonds. Taking the perspective ofone target person neither decreases stereo-typing nor improves evaluations of a differentsocial category, nor does it activate a moregeneral tendency to help. For example,Dovidio, Allen, and Schroeder (1990) foundthat, following the induction of empathy, assist-ance only increased for the problematic situ-ation for which empathy was induced and didnot activate a more general tendency to help.In intergroup conflicts, taking the perspectiveof one stigmatized group does not improve atti-tudes toward other stigmatized groups(Galinsky & Ku, 2005; Vescio et al., 2003). As aresult of its target-specific nature, the socialbonds that result from perspective-taking canconflict with other normative beliefs, such asjustice, fairness, and equity. Because the targetof perspective-taking is accorded ‘favored’status, perspective-taking can lead to preferen-tial treatment of the target, even when thisfavoritism leads to fewer contributions to theoverall collective (Batson, Batson et al., 1995;Batson, Klein, Highberger, & Shaw, 1995).

Who we take the perspective of has import-ant short- and long-term consequences for howthe effects of perspective-taking play out. If weconsider an individual taking the perspective ofa skinhead, one might imagine the perspective-taker empathizing with and forming tightersocial bonds with the skinhead, as well asforming more positive evaluations toward skin-heads in general. Although decreasing our

stereotypical judgments of skinheads may be aninitial step toward improving overall socialharmony, the perspective-taker may becomeinadvertently linked with the negativity of theskinhead and may be unjustly condemned bysociety. That is, perspective-taking can lead tostigma by association, what Goffman (1963)referred to as courtesy stigma, a belief byobservers that the perspective-taker embodiesthe negative characteristics of the target ofperspective-taking.

Taking the perspective of individuals that aredeemed objectionable is further complicatedwhen they are members of a salient out-group.For example, in the movie American History X,actor Ed Norton plays a skinhead who forms abond in prison with a Black inmate and isattacked by his fellow skinheads for this newbond. In real life, Susan Sontag and Bill Maherwere both condemned following the terroristattacks on September 11th for taking theperspective of the hijackers and suggesting thatthe hijackers demonstrated courage and notcowardice. Through perspective-taking, theyand others considered the broader socialcontext, suggesting that American foreignpolicy may, at least in part, have contributed tothe fury that motivated Osama Bin Laden andthe hijackers. Bill Maher lost his job and SusanSontag endured vicious verbal attacks. Takingthe perspective of salient out-group membermay strengthen the bond with that person, butmay cost individuals credibility and bondswithin the in-group, and can lead to socialexclusion.

These examples also relate to the claim thatperspective-taking increases moral relativism,that it reduces reliance on moral universals inthe long run. Critics of perspective-taking arguethat perspective-taking induced tolerance ofpotentially objectionable behaviors can lead toa slippery slope: with appropriate and con-structive horror placated and reduced, noxiousbehaviors become increasingly acceptable. Toomuch perspective-taking by too many peoplecan lead society away from moral absolutes, aworld of blacks and whites, toward a moraltwilight, a world of grays.

Not only can perspective-taking produce


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stigma by association, but by impacting self-description and behavior in the service of socialcoordination (Galinsky et al., 2005), it mightalso produce warranted condemnation. Forinstance, the perspective-taker may take oncharacteristics of the skinhead to coordinatetheir behaviors and further social bonding withthe skinhead. In so doing, the perspective-takermay behave in racist or biased ways that are notonly counternormative but could also distancehim or her from the rest of the world. Thus,when we consider the role of self–other overlapand target specificity in perspective-taking, itbecomes apparent that who the target isbecomes an important moderator of the effectsof perspective-taking. Although walking moreslowly down a hallway after taking the perspec-tive of an elderly man is essentially harmless,hating the world after taking the perspective ofa skinhead is a frightening and socially mal-adaptive consequence. Perspective-taking canhave a dark and ironic side, one that mayimpair rather than facilitate social bonds.

The manner in which perspectives are takencan also have a crucial impact on the conse-quences and effects of perspective-taking(Galinsky & Ku, 2005; Galinsky & Mussweiler,2001). For example, Galinsky and Ku (2005)found evidence that perspective-taking reducesthe drive toward expectancy confirmation, butonly when the perspective-taking instructionswere especially vivid, process-oriented, anddescriptive. The beneficial outcomes ofperspective-taking did not survive minimalmanipulations: simply telling people to takeanother’s perspective, without telling them howto do so, does not seem to have a discernableimpact on social behavior. Perspective-takingthat lacks deep deliberation, however, canactually be costly to the self and others. Anexample of how cursory consideration ofother’s perspectives can lead individuals andgroups down ill-conceived paths is the story ofthe Abilene Paradox. In what Jerry Harvey(1988) calls the ‘mismanagement of agree-ment’, the Abilene Paradox is a story of a familyfrom a small town in Texas that is enjoying acool and relaxed time of sipping lemonade ontheir porch. One family member proposes that

they go out for dinner and they decide to leavethe languid luxury of the porch to go to hotand dusty Abilene for a substandard dinner. Asit turns out, none of the individuals had adesire to go to Abilene, including the personwho made the original suggestion, but eachexpresses agreement only because they assumethe others are enthusiastic about the idea. TheAbilene Paradox suggests that pallid perspec-tive-taking might increase pluralistic ignorance,the tendency to see the overt behavior ofothers, despite being the same as one’s own, ashaving different underlying causes (Miller &McFarland, 1987). In the case of Abilene, theovert expressions of support and agreement byothers are presumed to correspond to anunderlying enthusiasm even though the sameovert behavior by the self is underpinned withambivalence. Each person considers the others’perspective, but only cursorily and not in a waythat understands or appreciates everyone’sambivalence. By trying to do right by othersand not expressing one’s true underlyingfeelings, right is done by and for no one. Theabsence of or superficial perspective-taking cancreate situations that nobody desires, leading tofrustration and the potential for future conflict.

Another potential irony of perspective-takingcan result when we consider what mighthappen if two parties take each other’s per-spectives. Thus far, we have only considered asituation with one perspective-taker and onetarget—the perspective-taker adapts his or herbehavior to the target. What might happen iftwo individuals are both perspective-takers andsimultaneously targets of perspective-taking?Interpersonal bias should decrease accordingto previous findings, but ironically, both partiesmight attempt to mimic the others’ behaviors,resulting in social miscoordination. As bothsides attempt to predict each other’s thoughts,desires, and actions, they can pass each other inthe night. Negotiations, for instance, are onecontext in which such miscoordination can playout. Perspective-taking by one negotiator in adyad has been shown to lead to the creation ofvalue and the construction of creative agree-ments that meet both parties’ interests (Galinsky& Ku, 2005). However, perspective-taking by


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both parties of a dyad may lead to poorercoordination than if only one negotiator tookthe perspective. For example, in the contextof cross-cultural negotiations, Japanese andAmerican negotiators use very differentmethods for acquiring information at the bar-gaining table. Americans tend to exchangeinformation directly by discussing and sharinginformation, whereas Japanese negotiatorstend to seek and share information indirectlyby inferring preferences from offers andcounteroffers (Adair, Okumura, & Brett, 2001).If both parties are taking the perspective of theother and adopting the other’s behavior, theAmericans may exchange information indi-rectly and the Japanese may use more directmethods of information acquisition. Not onlymight the well-intentioned negotiators passeach other in the night, but each negotiator willalso be using an unfamiliar strategy, potentiallyleading to poorer performance than if neitherhad taken the perspective of the other side!

Conclusion

This article recommends perspective-taking as asimple and subtle strategy to form andstrengthen social bonds. The benefits ofperspective-taking are numerous—it reducesstereotyping and prejudice, encourages helpingbehavior, and promotes behavioral mimicryand social coordination, all through increasingself–other overlap. Since perspective-takingassists in the formation and maintenance ofspecific social bonds, it does not activate ageneral helping mind-set, and therefore, is nota panacea for reducing all social bias—although specific bonds are built, others may bedamaged.

Despite its potential drawbacks, we contendthat perspective-taking is a useful tool forforming and supporting specific social bonds.By walking a mile in another’s shoes, perspec-tive-takers can apply their own self-concepts tostereotyped targets, thereby improving evalu-ations and preventing stereotyped judgments inmost cases. At the same time, perspective-takersoften utilize the targets’ stereotypes in theservice of social coordination, leading them to

behave in ways stereotypic of the target’s group.Who knew walking in the shoes of anothercould be so comfortable?

Note1. Stereotype suppression can sometimes be a

successful strategy for controlling stereotypingwhen individuals have abundant cognitiveresources and are highly and internally motivatedto control stereotyping (Gordijn, Hindriks,Koomen, Dijksterhuis, & van Knippenberg, 2004;Monteith, Spicer, & Tooman, 1998).

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Paper received 9 May 2004; revised version accepted 14December 2004.

Biographical notesADAM D. GALINSKY is an associate professor of

management and organizations at the KelloggSchool of Management at NorthwesternUniversity. His research interests include strategies(especially perspective-taking and suppression) toovercome the effects of stereotypes on perceivers,the impact of stereotypes and stigma on targets,counterfactual thinking, and the possessions andexperience of power.

GILLIAN KU is an assistant professor oforganisational behaviour at London BusinessSchool. She is interested in the role of emotionsand arousal in decision-making, auction fever,affective and behavioral forecasting, andperspective-taking and intergroup relations.

CYNTHIA S. WANG is a doctoral student inmanagement and organizations at the KelloggSchool of Management at NorthwesternUniversity. Her research interests include theimpact of leadership and power withinorganizations, intergroup relations andinteractions, and the effects of perspective-takingon social interaction.


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Documents

Galinsky, Adam D.; Ku, Gillian; Wang, Cynthia S