Gainsaying the Prophet Jocasta, Tiresias, And the Lille Stesichorus

Accademia Editoriale

Gainsaying the Prophet: Jocasta, Tiresias, and the Lille StesichorusAuthor(s): Deborah MacInnesSource: Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura Classica, New Series, Vol. 86, No. 2 (2007), pp. 95-108Published by: Fabrizio Serra editoreStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20546428 .

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GAINSAYING THE PROPHET : JOCASTA, TIRESIAS, AND THE LILLE STESICHORUS

Deborah macInnes

The

recovered text of the Lille Stesichorus focuses on the quarrel of

Eteocles and Polynices, on Tiresias' prophecy of their mutual deaths

and the destruction of the city, and on their mother's attempt to avert di

saster. The first 175 lines of Stesichorus' poem are missing, but seem to have

dealt with the exposure of Oedipus' crimes, his imprisonment or death

(we do not know which), the quarrel between the brothers, and Tiresias'

baleful prophecy The best-preserved section of the papyrus is a speech by the mother of Eteocles and Polynices, who is referred to only as Slcn yuvdc, "noble lady" (232). She is most likely Jocasta,1 who in one version of the

Thebaid story survived the shame of incest and continued to be queen of

Thebes.2 Stesichorus' queen is skillful, audacious, and cunning in facing yet another crisis. In the first half of the surviving thirty-four lines, she lashes

out at the determinism implicit in Tiresias' prophecy In the second half, she devises the plan of the lottery to save her sons and her city Not sur

prisingly, her sons agree to the plan. Surprisingly, Tiresias acquiesces. Why should the prophet of Apollo and Zeus agree to a plan that circumvents

his prophecy? Why, moreover, does Jocasta seek Tiresias' approval, as well

as that of Zeus and the Moirai, after boldly challenging the inevitability of

events prophesied by Tiresias?

Bollack, followed by Bremer, has argued that Jocasta's plan does not con

tradict Tiresias' prophecy but has the power to win his assent.3 He theo

rizes that the prophecy was a conditional one along these lines: "if your sons continue to quarrel, they will kill each other or the city will be de

1 E. Tsitsibakou-Vasalos, 'The Homeric ?cpocp in the Oedipus Myth and the Identity of the

Lille Mother', Glotta 67, 1989, 60-88, summarizes the arguments for Jocasta or Euryganeia as mother of Eteocles and Polynices. Most scholars accept Jocasta as "the noble lady".

2 Euripides' Phoenician Women and Statius' Thebaid follow the tradition of the lost The

baid, an epic wherein Oedipus is held prisoner in the palace, disgraced and dishonored

because of his crimes of patricide and incest. None of the surviving fragments from this

epic, however, names Jocasta. Nevertheless, the mother-wife of Oedipus and mother of

Eteocles and Polynices is called "Jocasta" in Euripides' play and Statius' epic. 3

J. P. Bollack, J. de la Combe, H. Wismann, Ta r?plique de Jocaste: Papyrus Lille 73 et

76 a, b et c, Cahiers de philol. 2, 1977, 1-104, at 49; J. M. Bremer, 'Stesichorus, The Lille Pa

pyrus', in J. M. Bremer, A. M. van Erp Taalman Kip, and S. R. Slings (edd.), Some Recently Found Greek Poems: Text and Commentary, Leiden 1987, 128-174, ad line 227.



96 DEBORAH MACINNES

stroyed". The queen's plan of the lottery, he argues, aims at "suppressing the reason itself for the discord"1 by negating the condition of the proph

ecy. The chief problem with this argument - and with his reconstruction

of the prophecy - is that it does not account adequately for the vehemence

of Jocasta's outburst against determinism in the first half of the fragment. If the prophecy had been conditional in the first place, there would have

been no need for the outburst. I contend that the prophecy was not origi

nally a conditional one, but that Jocasta revises it by means of the lottery so that it becomes conditional. Her act is subversive. Paradoxically, how

ever, she operates within the boundaries of divine governance.2 At every

step she enlists the aid of the appropriate divine agency in order to carry out her plan and, in the end, she does acknowledge the long-term doom

that has befallen her race and city These factors enable Tiresias to agree to her plan.

What Did Tiresias Prophesy?

Of the lines preceding Jocasta's speech, 176-200, only some ten words at the

end of random lines have survived; "Zeus", "son", "great quarrel", "sons", and "provoked" are the more tantalizing. It is possible that Tiresias utters

these words in a speech. Burnett definitely assumes that these words are

his;3 Parsons and Bremer are not as sure.4 Nevertheless, it is clear from

Jocasta's opening lines that he has prophesied something dire (201-203). At

this point, I must acknowledge that there is little or no internal evidence

for the exact terms of Tiresias' prophecy It must be reconstructed from

the queen's speech. The import of it can be discerned in lines 216-217. Spe

cifically, she has declared that she would rather die before seeing one or

the other of these events: her children dead in the palace or the city sacked

(noiiSoiQ svl fjieyapoic / ?avovxa? r? tt?Xiv ?Xo?aav).5 Yet some ten lines later, she prays that Zeus save "the new progeny and also the city of lord Cad

mus" (y?vo? T? xal ?axu /K?Sfjiou avaxxo?, 228-229). Did Tiresias prophe

1 Bollack (cit.) at 55.

2 See C. Meillier, 'La succession d'Oedipe d'apr?s le P. Lille 76 a 4- 73, po?me lyrique

probablement de St?sichore', Rev. et. gr. 91,1978, 12-43, at 36, who argues that while Jocas ta's opposition to Tiresias "is perceptible, it can only be expressed in the recognition of the

sacred...". 3

A. Burnett, 'Jocasta in the West: The Lille Stesichorus', Class. Ant. 7,1988,107-154 at 108

n. 7. 4

P. J. Parsons, 'The Lille "Stesichorus"', Zeitschr.f. Pap. u. Epigr. 26,1977, 7-36, ad 176-200,

and Bremer (cit.) ad 176-200. 5

The text comes from M. Davies (ed.), 'Stesichorus 222b (P. Lille 76 A ii + 73 i)', in Poe

tarum Melicorum Graecorum Fragmenta 1, Oxford 1991, 213-218. Emendations are duly noted

and attributed. The translation is mine; square brackets denote emendations.



JOCASTA, TIRESIAS, AND THE LILLE STESICHORUS 97

sy the death of her sons or the destruction of the city or did he prophesy both events? Some scholars hedge, following the lead of Jocasta's seeming contradiction. Burnett, in arguing her theory that Tiresias has prophesied in response to an oracular sign, theorizes that this sign "seemed to bear

a double threat, against the city of Thebes and/or against the family of

Oedipus" although later she states that Tiresias' "warning apparently sug

gested alternatives".1 Maingon and March similarly waver.2 Meillier and

Bremer, on the other hand, firmly maintain that the prophecy is a condi

tional prophecy: either Eteocles and Polynices will kill each other or the

city will be sacked.3 Bremer goes so far as to reconstruct the prophecy:

After Oedipus' parricide and incest it is impossible for his sons to reign over The

bes; if they insist on doing precisely that, the result is bound to be disastrous, for

either their present quarrel about the succession will become worse and end in

fratricide, or if that is to be avoided (i.e. if they stay together in Thebes, sharing

royal power), enemies will come and take the city.4

His reconstruction is an attractive one for several reasons. Stesichorus, as

he notes, puts the fate of the family into a political context by pitting the

family (genos) against the city (polis).5 The survival of the family versus

the survival of the city6 And indeed Jocasta pairs genos and polis not once,

but twice, at lines 216-217 and 228-229. Bremer further supports his recon

struction of a conditional prophecy by citing Tiresias' prophecy in Odys

sey 11, where he takes into account what would happen if Odysseus harms

or does not harm the cattle of the Sun.7 The outcome depends on which

"if" statement comes true.

Despite the attractiveness of Bremer's formulation of the prophecy, there

is a problem with the second condition of his formulation. Under what cir

cumstances would the city be sacked? He claims that the condition is this:

if Eteocles and Polynices settle their differences and share power, then en

emies will come and take the city. But the outcome following the condition

does not make sense. Thebes would more likely be sacked with both heirs

dead than with both alive to defend it against outside enemies.

1 Burnett (cit.) at 112 and 118, respectively.

2 A. D. Maingon, 'Form and Content in the Lille Stesichorus', Quad. Urb. n.s. 31 (60),

1989,31-56 at 50 (deaths and destruction) and 53 (mutual deaths or destruction); J. R. March,

'Oidipous', in The Creative Poet: Studies in the Treatment of Myths in Greek Poetry, London

1987,119-154 at 127 ("Polyneikes ... and Eteokles ... are to die at each other's hands and/or

the city is to be captured ..."). 3

Meillier (at.) at 22; Bremer (cit.) ad 217. 4

Bremer (cit.) ad 217, emphasis his. 5

Bremer (cit.) ad 217. 6

On the genos-polis issue, see also Meillier (cit.) and Bollack (cit.) at 52-54. 7

Bremer (cit.) ad 227; see also C. Wick, Xe tirage au sort: un leitmotiv dans la Th?b?de

de Lille et les Sept contra Th?bes', Mus. Helv. 60, 2003, 167-174, at 168, for whom Stesichorus'

poem does not reflect the same attitudes towards prophecy as found in the tragedies.



98 DEBORAH MACINNES

The reconstruction by Bollack makes more sense: "if the discord of the

heirs continues, either they will kill each other or the city will be taken".1

He supports the reconstruction by arguing that since Jocasta is confront

ed with an inevitable sequence of cause and effect, the premise of which

is hypothetical, she "can only respond by attacking the premise itself".2

Jocasta does in fact attack the notion that strife is inevitable in lines 204

208, yet she does much more than this. She challenges every aspect of the

prophecy and deplores her fate (211-217). Would she do so if the logical al

ternative to Bollack's version - that if the heirs stop quarreling, all will be

well - were a possibility? Given her challenges to the prophecy and her outburst against fatalism,

it is far more likely that Tiresias uttered an unconditional prophecy, that

is, one that foretold of both events, with no contingencies. Jocasta's ei

ther/or formulation in lines 216-217 does not echo the exact wording of the

prophecy, but rather expresses her wish to die before seeing either event

happen. In other words, both events would be abhorrent, as is apparent in her prayer to Zeus (228-229). The external model for this prophecy is

not Tiresias' prophecy in Book 11 of the Odyssey, as Bremer suggests, but

Halitherses' in Book 2. Addressing the assembly in Ithaca, he reveals that

when the Argives went to Ilion, and Odysseus with them, he told him that

"after enduring many evils and after his companions perished, he would come home after twenty years, unknown to many. And indeed these things are now being accomplished" (Od. 2, 171-176). Unlike Tiresias' prophecy in

Book 11 about the same events, Halitherses' is an unconditional prophecy with no contingencies.3 The Homeric epics offer models of both kinds of

prophecy4 Jocasta herself is aware of both kinds.

Jocasta's Revision of Tiresias' Prophecy

Jocasta desperately wants a conditional prophecy with its possibility of

things turning out well if everyone behaves. She recasts Tiresias' prophecy so that it is a conditional prophecy. She adds the conditions - the if clauses

- and the wished-for result of the second condition: if your sons continue to

quarrel, they will kill each other and the city will be sacked; if they stop quarrel



3 For Tiresias' prophecy about Odysseus' homecoming,

see Od. 11,104-117; for Halitherses'

see Od. 2,171-176. There is also Polyphemus' curse at Od. 9, 528-535.1. J. F. de Jong compares the three passages in A Narratological Commentary on the "Odyssey", Cambridge 2001,55.

4 Halitherses' unconditional prophecy at Od. 2,171-176, for example, follows a conditional

prophecy to the Ithacans and the suitors (Od. 2,161-169). Examples of unconditional proph ecies are Calchas' in II. 1, 93-100 and 2, 323-329, Telemus' (as reported by Polyphemus) in

Od. 9, 510-512, and Theoclymenus' in Od. 20, 351-357.




ing, all will be well. To insure that the second premise comes true, she rea

sons, one of her sons must leave the city.

Just how does Jocasta revise the prophecy? In the opening extant lines, she

simultaneously denies the facts of the prophecy and attempts, as Bremer

states,1 "to neutralize" them (201-210):

in oCkyzai UT) âXerc?? nolei u-epifjiva?,

[JLYjS? (JLOL iÔn?G??

rcp?cpoave skni?0L? ?apeLac.

ours y?p al?v ojxca?

deol &?crav ?&?vocToi xax' a?av Ip?v velxo? ?ujreSov ?poTolcrcv

o?S? ya fi?v cpiXOTax', ini S' ? âvvoov ?vSpwv2

{jLavTocruvac Se xz?? ava? ?xa?pyo? 'AtcOXX?ov

UT] Tiaaa? xeX?acroa.

[...] Do not add terrible worries to our sorrows nor to me hereafter reveal expec

tations that are burdensome. For not always equally did the immortal gods put on

the holy earth strife that is permanent among men nor, for that matter, friendship either, for the gods establish the minds of men for [a day]. All your prophecies, lord, may Far-Working Apollo not accomplish.

There are five negative words in these ten lines (201, 202, 204, 207, 210), each

presenting a challenge to Tiresias' prophecy The first two formulate nega tive commands to him, saying in effect "Do not prophesy doom and gloom to me!" Stesichorus has, in fact, set up a typical ruler-prophet conflict, fa

miliar from the Homeric epics. Yet although Jocasta attempts to silence the

prophet, she does not chide him, as Agamemnon does Calchas ("you never

tell me what I want to hear!" [II. 1,106-108]), nor bully him, as Hector does

Polydamas ("you are demented and cowardly" [II. 12, 231-250]). Instead she

will attempt to seduce him and the audience with her logic.

Jocasta counters the inevitability of the prophecy, which focused on the

strife (veTxo?) between her sons and its disastrous consequences. She chal

lenges its logic by arguing that the gods did not irrevocably make (&?aav) strife or friendship permanent among men (205-206). The aorist verb o?aav

shows "definitive fact", as Bremer points out.3 She underscores the idea

of changeability by using the same verb in the present tense in line 208

(-zixre?ai), thus making it an ongoing action: "the gods establish the minds

of men for a day". Even by the gods' own workings, Jocasta argues, proph

1 Bremer (cit.) ad 225.

2 Bremens reading following Parsons: ?ni $' ?fiipa<i ?>v v?ov ?vSpcov.




100 DEBORAH MACINNES

ecy is not inevitable. Minds are changeable. Her willingness to debate theo

logical and philosophical issues in the face of catastrophe reminds us of

Euripides' portrayal of Hecuba decades later in the Trojan Women; each in

her own way challenges theistic determinism.

Jocasta's prayer ('All your prophecies, lord, may Far-Working Apollo not

accomplish!" 209-210), while passionate, is still nevertheless negative; it is

another attempt at counteracting the prophecy Here she shamelessly tries

to flatter Tiresias. The syntax of the title "lord" (aval;) in line 209 seems

deliberately confused. It can be either a nominative singular modifying

"Far-Working Apollo" or it can be a vocative singular addressed to Tire

sias, who is the referent in the phrase "your prophecies". One is justified in translating it as a vocative since Jocasta flatters Tiresias elsewhere ("god like prophet", 227).1 At the same time, Apollo, upon hearing her request, is free to construe the noun as a nominative modifying himself, just as it

does in Homeric epic (for example, at II. 15, 253).

Although Jocasta goes "over the head of his prophet"2 and appeals di

rectly to Apollo, she acknowledges Tiresias' status, if not his divine author

ity Her bold appeal challenges assumptions about the prophet that pre vail in the epics: that he is always right and that the mere utterance of the

prophecy makes it come true. Such an assumption lies behind Agamem non's complaint to Calchas in II. 1, 107-108: "and never yet have you said a word indicating good fortune or accomplished (?x?Xeaaa?) it!". The use

of the verb "to accomplish" implies that Calchas' very utterance can make a

prophecy come true. This is the verb used in prayers asking Zeus to ac

complish something.3 Embedded in the assumption that the prophet can

control events is the notion of the magical power of the spoken word, es

pecially when uttered by a person invested with religious authority, such as a prophet or a priest. The magical power of religious speech, D?tienne

says, "is above all efficacious".4 That is, "[ojracular speech does not reflect an event that has already occurred; it is part of its realization".5 This is why Jocasta reformulates the prophecy as a conditional prophecy and why she introduces the notion of mutability in the affairs of man. Why should the

prophet's words be "always equally" (aliv ofjiw? 204) borne out in events?

1 Bollack (cit.) at 50, Parsons (cit.) ad 209, and Burnett (cit.) at 110 (in her translation) take

the phrase as a vocative. C. Gallavotti, 'Un poemetto citarodico di Stesicoro nel quadro del

la cultura siceliota', Boll. Class. 25,1977,1-30, at 22, Bremer (cit.) ad 209, and E. Tsitsibakou

Vasalos, 'Two Homeric Formulae in the P. Lille Poem', Glotta 64, 1986, 165-184, at 173-184, take it as a nominative. 2

Burnett (cit.) at 114. 3

See, for example, II. 4, 160-161; 8, 415; 15, 228. 4 M. D?tienne, The Masters of Truth in Archaic Greece, trans. J. Lloyd, New York 1996, 74.

See also S. J. Tambiah, The Magical Power of Words', Man 3, 1968, 177-208. 5

D?tienne (cit.) at 73.




Therefore, she asks Apollo not to accomplish all ((jly? Tr?aac xeX?craai) of

the prophecies (209-210), leaving him and his prophet an escape clause.

In the next strophe (211-217), Jocasta continues to fight against Tiresias'

prophecies:

al S? (Ji? rcatSa? IS?a&at, ?tc' ?XX?Xocqi Safx?vxa?

(ji?pacfJL?v ?crcxv, ?7T?xXc?(jav Se Mo?paft,],

auT?xa [loe âv?xou x?Xo? aTuy?popo] yevfoixo,

7rplv Tr?xa xaux' ?aiSelv

?XyccKCJx, TToX?CTTOva Saxpu?evxaf- -,1

7racSa? ?vi [xsy?potc &av?vTac i] tc?Xiv ?XoLcrav.

If it is my fate to see my children overcome by one another, and the Moirai have

spun this destiny, may the final end of hateful death be mine at once before I look

upon these lamentable, tear-inducing [deeds] with grief~my children in the palace dead or the city sacked.

Here, with the first mention of the Moirai, the goddesses who are said to

spin the thread of one's destiny (ercexXcicjav Moipa[t], 212), Jocasta, not only invokes but also subverts epic formulas of destiny For the ancients them

selves could not say for sure who was in charge of whom. The Moirai are

indeed the goddesses of destiny or fate. But does Zeus "report to" them, or they to Zeus? (Apollo is definitely subordinate to Zeus.) In the Homeric

epics, the personification of fate is usually singular - Moira - rather than

the Moirai.2 Aisa, also a synonym for "fate", is used interchangeably with

Moira. And while the gods seem sometimes to control fate, as in the ex

pression "the fate of the gods" (Od. 22, 413), they must sometimes bow to

fate, as Zeus must do when Sarpedon dies (II. 16, 441-442).3 Crucial to Jo casta's stratagem is the manipulation of epic formulas. In the Iliad and Od

yssey both Moira /Aisa and the gods spin the thread of destiny. However, when Moira or Aisa spins, the verb v?co or ?niv?u is used;4 when the gods

spin, the verb eTiixXw&co is always used.* Jocasta has paired the Moirai with

1 Barigazzfs reading: x'epya.

2 Moira in the singular appears in ?. 19, 87, 410, and 24, 209. Moirai appears once in the

two epics, at II 24, 48, where Apollo says that the Moirai "give men enduring hearts". 3 W C. Greene, Moira: Fate, Good, and Evil in Greek Thought, New York 1963, sees nei

ther conflict between Moira and the gods in the epics nor a problem of who is superior

to whom: "Both express the cause of events which man is powerless to alter", he says,

and which divine agency is used is determined by "the demands of the story" or

by tradi

tional formulas (14-15). That said, he still maintains that the will of Zeus and of Moira are

not synonymous: "Not only is Poseidon subject to moira (Od. 9, 528-535), but even Zeus is

powerless to avert the death of his own son Sarpedon, though he apparently can postpone

the day of his doom" (15). 4

?. 24, 209-210 (MoXpa ?n?vr\ae); II. 20,127-128 (Alera ??c?vYjae); Od. 7,196-198 (KXw&e? [=

"spinners", i.e. the Moirai] and Alaoc vVjaavro).




a verb that is used in epic exclusively with the gods, ?7iixXco&(o. And she

will, in the antistrophe, make use of the confusion that she has created

through diction.

In the antistrophe Jocasta addresses her sons and reveals her plan (218

224):

aXX' aye TraLSe? ?fxol? (jluôl?, cpcXa [- - - -2

xaiSe y?p uulv ?ycov x?Xo? 7tpocpa[iv?r

x?v uiv eôvxa Sofjiou? vaUiv 7ia[p? v?[jiaai Aipxa?,

t?v S' <kn?[Lzv xxe?vT] xal )(pua?v eôvxa cplXou o-?ujtavxa [rcocxp?c,

xXapOTraX?jSov oq ?v

Tip?xo? Xdr/Yjt, exaxt,

Moipav.

But come sons, obey my words, dear children, for thus I reveal a course of action

to you: that one dwell near the river Dirce, possessing the palace, and the other

leave, possessing the goods and all the gold of your dear father, who[ever], when

the lots are shaken, would be first by aid of the Moira.

At lines 218-219, she again uses language to her advantage. The word she

uses for "course of action \ x?Xo? (219), is related to the verb xeX?aaoa ("to

accomplish"), which she used in line 210 when asking Apollo not to accom

plish all of the prophecies. This verb is crucial in Greek prophecy, denot

ing the fulfillment of the will of the gods.3 The noun x?Xo? likewise de

notes the supreme power of the gods,4 and the epithet of Zeus, xeXeacpo

po?, means "able to accomplish, all-powerfuT (Horn. Hymn 23, 2). Further

more, Jocasta pairs x?Xo? with Tipocpaivw ("I am revealing"), a verb that she

has used earlier in line 203 with reference to Tiresias' prophecy. It, too, is

a sacral verb when used in connection with divination.5 In appropriating sacral words she strives to make her plan seem equally divine.

Jocasta's counter-te?os is a plan to divide her sons' patrimony. One will

stay in Thebes and rule the city; the other will go into exile with the move

able wealth - cattle and gold (220-222). Thus separated for their lifetime, their lives will be saved and the city spared. But who is to get what portion? It will be decided by lots "according to the Moira" (223-224).

1 The verb ?7uxXc?&w is used whether "Zeus", "the gods", or the unspecific "daimon" is

the subject; see II. 24, 525-526, Od. 1, 17-18; 3, 208; 4, 207-208; 8, 579-580; 11, 139; 16, 64; 20,

195-196. 2 West's reading: cp?Xa [xexva, k?$zg$z.

3 II. 2, 330 and Od. 1,171-176.

4 Of the gods,

see Hesiod's Works and Days 669 and Semonides 1,1-2 (x?Xo? fx?v Ze?? l^51

?apuxTuruoc / 7i?vTwv ?ct' ?cttl xal t?^cj' oxY] êXei ["loud-thundering Zeus holds supreme

power / over all things that exist and orders them in what way he wishes"]). 5

Od. 12, 394, Herodotus 7, 37.




Casting lots was a form of divination that enabled the gods to decide on

an action or issue that was too difficult for humans because all factors and

men were equal or simply because the action or issue was so momentous

that it required divine intervention. For Jocasta even more is at stake. This

is the last step in her attempt to counteract the fatalism of the prophecy In the first lines of the fragment (201-203), she challenged the prophecy's

inevitability; in the first epode (204-210), she rationalized the workings of

the gods in the affairs of men; in the strophe (211-217), she took an heroic

stance against fatalism and conceived her x?Xo?, or course of action, which

aims at countermanding the x?Xo? of Apollo and Zeus. And here in the

second antistrophe, after revealing her plan to separate her sons forever

so that they will not kill each other, she tries to enjoin the Moirai to sanc

tion it by having her sons cast lots. The phrase "by the aid of the Moira"

(exaxi Moipav, 224) implies that outcome of the lot-shaking is the will of

the Moirai, whose decision, at best, will countermand Tiresias' prophecy or, at the least, postpone it. Jocasta, in fact, appeals to every divine agency associated with fate: Apollo, who reveals one's fate and enforces it (209),

Zeus, who sees to the details of working out one's fate (and may assign one's fate, depending on one's theology) (228), and the Moirai, who assign fate (and may be an abstraction for Zeus in his capacity of determining fate,

depending on one's theology) (212, 224). She places her hopes in all three

agencies, hedging her bets, as it were, and capitalizing on the imprecise hierarchical relationships among the agencies. Here, she virtually enjoins the Moirai to take charge of her sons' fate through the lottery And in her

eyes she risks very little in doing so. Instead of determining that her sons

will kill each other, the Moirai will determine merely who gets the throne

and who the cattle and goods.

Jocasta thinks that she has saved her sons' lives, as she states in the second

epode (225-231). She must now, however, enlist the cooperation of Zeus:

TOUTO y?p ?v Soxew

XuT7Jpt,OV UfJLJJLL XOCXOU ySVOLTO 7lOT(JLO[u,

(jidcvTioc 9paSaio"L &e(,ou,

at Y?l V?0V

KpovLSa? yevo? -ce xal ?o~Tu[~- -2

K?SfjLou avaxTo?,

ajJi?aXXcov xax?TOCTa rcoX?v XP^vov [- ?--3

7r?7tpcoToa yev?f&JXqa.

For this I think would free you from an evil fate in the warning4 of the god-like

1 Following M. Haslam, The Versification of the New Stesichorus (P. Lille 76 abc)', Gr.

Rom. Byz. Stud. 19,1978, 29-57, at 53 n. 52; the papyrus reads oars. 2

Barrett's reading: aawaei.

3 Lloyd-Jones' reading: ? ?aaiXeiai.

4 $pa87? (in line 227, fji?vTioc cppaSalai ftsiou) ranges in meaning from "understanding,




prophet, if, that is, Zeus [saves] the new progeny and also the city of lord Cad

mus, postponing for a long time the evils [that for the royal] line have been fore

doomed.

Before discussing this passage, I must acknowledge the controversy sur

rounding lines 228-231. At 228, the papyrus reads ouxeveov, a phrase that

presents syntactical problems. In addition, the ends of lines 228 and 230 are

missing and must be supplemented. More than a half dozen supplements and emendations have been suggested over the past thirty years, and each

in combination with the others spawns a different interpretation.1 For line

228 I have adopted Haslam's emendation of oCL ye v?ov, taking v?ov as mod

ifying y?vo?, and Barrett's supplement of gou?gzi, for reasons that will be

discussed shortly.2 This reading results in a simple conditional statement -

"if, that is, Zeus [saves] the new progeny and also the city ...". For the

end of line 230,1 have adopted Lloyd-Jones' supplement ? ?aaiXeioa, where

the antecedent of ? is xaxoxaxa - "the evils [that for the royal] line have

been foredoomed".

Despite the linguistic problems with the passage, it is clear that Jocasta wants to incorporate Zeus into her plan in a final attempt to revise the

prophecy. The main reason for accepting the proposed reading for lines 228

231 is that it offers Zeus an escape clause, a ploy already used in Jocasta's

appeal to Apollo in lines 209-210. If Zeus postpones the evils that have been

foredoomed, he can save both family and city for a time without abrogat

ing the laws of fate. Thus, he need not come into conflict with the Moirai.

Yet in proposing this course of action for Zeus, Jocasta seems to back down

from her bold stance against determinism in her earlier argument about

the mutability of human affairs (204-210). Tsitsibakou-Vasalos argues that

this is the precise reason for rejecting the proposed reading.3 Jocasta is not,

however, contradicting herself. Earlier she was arguing against the terms

of Tiresias' prophecy, which predicted the particular fate of her sons and

the city. Here she faces reality: the royal line has been doomed for a long

knowledge" to "hint, warning"; P. Chantraine, Dictionnaire ?tymologique de la langue grecque,

Paris 1980, ad cppa?w notes that the meaning "warning" is attested in the sixth century BCE.

1 On lines 228-231, see especially Bremer (cit.) ad 228, and E. Tsitsibakou-Vasalos, The

Textual Problems of the P. Lille Poem, w. 228-231', Quad. Urb. n.s. 28 (57), 1988,137-148; both

review the various suggestions for emendations and supplements. For another solution to

the problems, see G. Massimilla, To Stesicoro di Lille: nuove letture e integrazionf, Studi

it.filol. class, n.s. 61,1988, 25-29. 2

See Bremer (cit.) ad 228, who also accepts these emendations and supplements, for a

lucid discussion of their merits. 3

Tsitsibakou-Vasalos (cit.) at 142.




time. Laius and Oedipus were the most recent victims. She can only hope that the curse will skip a generation and not claim her sons.1

The Success of Jocasta's Plan

Not surprisingly, Jocasta persuades her sons to accept the plan (232-234):

<?? 9ax[o] 8|a yuv? uu&oi? ?y[a]vol? ?v?Troi?a, vsbteo? ?v [xeyapoi? [...]iaa2 7iai8a?,

a?v S' au,a Tecp[?]qia? x[?pacr7to]Xo?- o? S' [sjr??&ofvxo

Thus spoke the noble woman, speaking with mild words, [keeping] her sons from strife in the palace, and likewise in agreement was Tiresias, interpreter of prodi gies, and they [the sons] obeyed her ...

The words o? S' [?]??i?o[vxo ("and [the sons] obeyed her", 234) mark the

end of the fragment. The surviving phrases in succeeding lines (235-252)

give details about the lottery and its aftermath: "the other having precious

gold [should depart?]" (239), "splendid flocks were pastured" (241), "horses"

(243), "obscure prophecies" (247), "in his breast" (249), "he himself leaped

up" (251), "he spoke these words" (253). From these phrases, it appears the

lots were shaken and Polynices' fell out, signifying that he was to take his

father's cattle and gold and leave Thebes. Most likely he responds with an

outburst (was he the one who "leaped up" at line 251?) because someone

speaks at line 253. Evidence from one of the other fragments (P. Lille 111c) shows that lines 253-290 are the speech of one person,3 and that person is most likely Tiresias since the initial words of lines 265-269 read "many

things ... the gods give

... and many things" (rcoXX? ... ?eoi o6[iev ... 7ioXX?

o?). Furthermore, line 291 reads "Thus spoke ... the famous" (or "whose

name is famous"). Tiresias' name has been plausibly restored in the line.

The phrases at the end of lines 270-280 indicate that he addresses Polynices,

predicting a prosperous future for him - his exile in Argos and his mar

riage to Adrastus' daughter (274-276). Then Tiresias seems to warn Poly nices to stay away from Thebes and let Eteocles rule, or else disaster will

ensue (281-287).4

1 See Bremer (cit.) ad 228, who takes a similar position that Jocasta realizes that the evils

are "bound to come, finally and crushingly" upon the royal house and that she can only

hope that they come after the present generation. He does not discuss the apparent con

tradiction. 2

Barrett's reading: 7i[a?o]icra. 3

Bremer (cit.) ad 253^ 4

For another reading of these lines, see D. Campbell (ed. and trans.), Greek Lyric in. Ste

sichorus, Ibycus, Simonides, and Others, Cambridge Ma. 1991, 141-143, and W. G. Thalmann,

The Lille Stesichorus and the Seven against Thebes', Hermes 110, 1982, 385-391, at 389; both

believe that Tiresias is warning Eteocles to abide by the agreement.



lo? DEBORAH MACINNES

It is clear from line 234 of the fragment that Tiresias agrees to the plan: "and likewise in agreement was Tiresias, interpreter of prodigies" (a?v 8'

a?jia T?ip[e]?ia? T[spaa7io]Xo?). One must then ask how he can agree to a

plan that tries to circumvent his prophecy and undermine the very prem ises behind prophecy Premises such as "prophecy is the revelation of the

will of the gods and therefore infallible" and "the prophet tells the truth

when uttering a prophecy". The answer lies with Stesichorus, who was a bold innovator.1 In this

poem, he very likely omitted the oracle of Apollo and Oedipus' curse on

his sons as the motivation for fratricide, motives seen in Aeschylus' Seven

against Thebes, for example.2 Instead, he seems to have substituted Tiresias'

prophecy, a more malleable statement of destiny Along these lines, Stesi

chorus manipulates the epic characteristics of Tiresias, as seen in Odyssey 11, by placing him in a type-scene, that of the confrontation of the ruler

and prophet. First and foremost, the Odyssean Tiresias is helpful. He freely offers the

prophecies to Odysseus and tells him what he must do to get home safely He is a wise adviser in the Odyssey, the pervasive character type seen later

in Herodotus' Histories, telling of impending disaster if one does not attend

to the gods' will.3 Tiresias includes Odysseus' men in the warning about

the cattle of the Sun and states in no uncertain terms that they too will

perish if they do not heed the warning. In the Lille Stesichorus the queen

interprets his prophecy along these lines; she takes it as a warning, not as

an unconditional prophecy. Connected to Tiresias' character trait of helpfulness is his being a proph

et of contingencies. In the Odyssey, Odysseus (and his men) has some mea

sure of control over his fate. He is given guidelines within which to live, moral guidelines. Jocasta's reworking of Tiresias' prophecy does exactly

1 On the subject of Stesichorus' innovative handling of myth, see H. W Smyth, Greek

Melic Poets, New York 1963, 256-257; C. M. Bowra, Greek Lyric Poetry from Alem?n to Simo

nides, Oxford 19612, 87-119; C. Segal, Archaic Choral Lyric', in P. E. Easterling and B. M. W

Knox (edd.), The Cambridge History of Classical Literature. Greek Literature 1, Cambridge 1985,

165-201, at 189-197; and Maignon (cit.) 52-56. 2

Aeschylus, Seven against Thebes 742-749 (oracle), 642, 709-711 (Oedipus' curse). On the

topic of the oracle and curse in the play, see A. Burnett, 'Curse and Dream in Aeschylus'

Septem , Gr. Rom. Byz. Stud. 14, 1973, 343-368; W G. Thalmann, Dramatic Art in Aeschylus' "Seven against Thebes", New Haven 1978, 9-15, 17-20, and F. I. Zeitlin, Under the Sign of the

Shield: Semiotics and Aeschylus' "Seven against Thebes", Roma 1982, 42-49. 3

The seminal works on the motif of the wise adviser are H. Bischoff, Der Warner

bei Herodot, Berne-Leipzig 1932 (diss. Marburg), and R. Lattimore, The Wise Adviser in

Herodotus', Class. Philol. 34, 1939, 24-35. For a comprehensive overview of scholarship

on

the motif, see S. O. Shapiro, 'Learning through Suffering: Human Wisdom in Herodotus', Class. Journ. 89,1994, 349-355.




this. The unstated premise of her plan is the second premise of her refor

mulated prophecy: if her sons stop quarreling, disaster will be averted. The

preliminary argument of this premise is her defiant insistence that strife

does not have to last a lifetime (204-206). To ensure that her argument

proves true, she proposes the lottery Bremer is correct in arguing that the model for the Steisichorean Tire

sias is the Odyssean Tiresias, not the fifth-century Tiresias of tragedy1 Stesichorus, however, does not replicate the scene in the Odyssey with the

prophet enumerating contingencies and warning of outcomes and with

the addressee wordlessly acquiescing. Instead he sets up a confrontation

between ruler and prophet, a type-scene found in the Homeric epics with

both conditional and unconditional prophecies. There is, moreover, anoth

er literary model that features Tiresias in just such a scene, the sixth-cen

tury Melampodia, an epic about famous prophets, of which we have a few

fragments.2 The more famous one about Tiresias is aitiological, explaining how he became a blind prophet.3 Being asked to settle a quarrel between

Zeus and Hera as to whether males or females experience more pleasure in the sexual act, Tiresias replies that women experience far more plea sure. Extremely displeased with his answer, Hera blinds Tiresias. In com

pensation Zeus grants him the gift of prophecy The aitiology extends the

boundaries of the type scene by having the ruler - Hera - actually punish

the prophet rather than merely threatening him with punishment.4 In the Lille fragment Tiresias faces a desperate

- and displeased - female

ruler, who tries to negate the effect of his prophecy She does not resort

to violence but instead uses sophistry to enlist him and the gods in a plan to circumvent the prophecy It is not she who acquiesces, but he. Even so,

despite his helpful ways and despite his conceding to the lottery, Tiresias is

not derelict in his duties nor does he blindly embrace Jocasta's plan. In his

speech at lines 253-291, he seems to utter a conditional prophecy: "if you,

Polynices, stay put, things will be well; if not ...". This second prophecy of his clarifies her plan by reiterating the consequences of their quarrel. It

works within the boundaries of fate. For both Jocasta's conditional proph

ecy and Tiresias' second prophecy have provision for the death of the sons

and the destruction of the city


2 J. Schwartz, Pseudo-Hesiodeia: Recherches sur la composition, la diffusion et la disparition

ancienne d'oeuvres attribu?es ? H?siode, Leiden i960, 227, and I. L?ffler, Die Melampodie: Ver

such einer Rekonstruktion des Inhalts, Meisenheim an Glan 1963, 59. 3 Hes. fr. 275 M.-W

4 Hector threatens Polydamas at II. 12, 248-250, and the suitors threaten Halitherses at

Od. 2,187-193.



io8 DEBORAH MACINNES

For the ancient audience, this rendition of the familiar Thebaid story must have been thrilling. Apart from the wonder at the author's boldness

(and we must not forget that innovation forces the audience to pay more

attention whether they approve of the alterations to the story or not), the

audience was invited by Stesichorus to think about the ramifications of

characters gainsaying the prophet. What would happen if Jocasta's plan

really worked? What if human behavior controls events more than the

gods do? Jocasta accords to mortals a measure of self-determination. Her

plan assumes that Polynices will act freely and in accordance with self-in

terest, which dictates that he leave Thebes forever. Her plan, as the audi

ence knew full well, backfires. The Moirai decree that Polynices must leave.

He will, however, exercise free will by returning to Thebes with an army, thus fulfilling the original prophecy. Jocasta's attempted escape from des

tiny (Xuxiqpiov 7tox(jio[u], 226) aids and abets the very destiny she seeks to

circumvent.

Jesuit High School New Orleans



Documents

Gainsaying the Prophet Jocasta, Tiresias, And the Lille Stesichorus