Ga. Code Ann., s 15-11-28 - THELAW · 2009. 6. 13. · Ga. Code Ann., s 15-11-28 C West's Code of Georgia Annotated Currentness Title 15. Courts Chapter 11 ... deprivation shall have

Westlaw_Document_16_38_34[1]

Ga. Code Ann., s 15-11-28

C

West's Code of Georgia Annotated Currentness

Title 15. Courts

Chapter 11. Juvenile Proceedings (Refs & Annos)

+ Article 1. Juvenile Proceedings (Refs & Annos)

+ Part 3. Jurisdiction and Venue

>> s 15-11-28. Jurisdiction over juveniles

(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction.Except as provided in subsection (b) of thisCode section, the court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over juvenilematters and shall be the sole court for initiating action:

(1) Concerning any child:

(A) Who is alleged to be delinquent;

(B) Who is alleged to be unruly;

(C) Who is alleged to be deprived;

(D) Who is alleged to be in need of treatment or commitment as a mentally ill or mentally retarded child;

(E) Who is alleged to have committed a juvenile traffic offense as defined in Code Section 15-11-73; or

(F) Who has been placed under the supervision of the court or on probation to the court; provided, however, that such jurisdiction shall be for the sole purpose of completing, effectuating, and enforcing such supervision or a probation begun prior to the child's seventeenth birthday; or

(2) Involving any proceedings:

(A) For obtaining judicial consent to the marriage, employment, or enlistment in the armed services of any child if such consent is required by law;

(B) Under the Interstate Compact on Juveniles, or any comparable law, if enacted or adopted in this state;

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(C) For the termination of the legal parent-child relationship and the rights of the biological father who is not the legal father of the child, other than that in connection with adoption proceedings under Chapter 8 of Title 19, in which the superior courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction to terminate the legal parent-child relationship and the rights of the biological father who is not the legal father of the child;

(D) Under Article 3 of this chapter, relating to prior notice to a parent or guardian relative to an unemancipated minor's decision to seek an abortion; or

(E) Brought by a local board of education pursuant to Code Section 20-2-766.1.

(b) Criminal jurisdiction.

(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, the court shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the superior court over a child who is alleged to have committed a delinquent act which would be considered a crime if tried in a superior court and for which the child may be punished by loss of life, imprisonment for life without possibility of parole, or confinement for life in a penal institution.

(2)(A) The superior court shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the trial of any child 13 to 17 years of age who is alleged to have committed any of the following offenses:

(i) Murder;

(ii) Voluntary manslaughter;

(iii) Rape;

(iv) Aggravated sodomy;

(v) Aggravated child molestation;

(vi) Aggravated sexual battery; or

(vii) Armed robbery if committed with a firearm.

(A.1) The granting of bail or pretrial release of a child charged with an offense enumerated in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph shall be governed by the provisions of Code Section 17-6-1.

(B) After indictment, the superior court may after investigation and for extraordinary cause transfer any case involving a child 13 to 17 years of age alleged to have committed any offense enumerated in subparagraph (A) of this

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Westlaw_Document_16_38_34[1] paragraph which is not punishable by loss of life, imprisonment for life without possibility of parole, or confinement for life in a penal institution. Any such transfer shall be appealable by the State of Georgia pursuant to Code Section 5-7-1. Upon such a transfer by the superior court, jurisdiction shall vest in the juvenile court and jurisdiction of the superior court shall terminate. Any case transferred by the superior court to the juvenile court pursuant to this subparagraph shall be subject to the designated felony provisions of Code Section 15-11-63 and the transfer of the case from superior court to juvenile court shall constitute notice to the child that such case is subject to the designated felony provisions of Code Section 15-11-63.

(C) Before indictment, the district attorney may, after investigation and for extraordinary cause, decline prosecution in the superior court of a child 13 to 17 years of age alleged to have committed an offense specified in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph. Upon declining such prosecution in the superior court, the district attorney shall immediately cause a petition to be filed in the appropriate juvenile court for adjudication. Any case transferred by the district attorney to the juvenile court pursuant to this subparagraph shall be subject to the designated felony provisions of Code Section 15-11-63 and the transfer of the case from superior court to juvenile court shall constitute notice to the child that such case is subject to the designated felony provisions of Code Section 15-11-63.

(D) The superior court may transfer any case involving a child 13 to 17 years of age alleged to have committed any offense enumerated in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph and convicted of a lesser included offense not included in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph to the juvenile court of the county of the child's residence for disposition. Upon such a transfer by the superior court, jurisdiction shall vest in the juvenile court and jurisdiction of the superior court shall terminate.

(E) Within 30 days of any proceeding in which a child 13 to 17 years of age is convicted of certain offenses over which the superior court has exclusive jurisdiction as provided in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph or adjudicated delinquent on the basis of conduct which if committed by an adult would constitute such offenses, the superior court shall provide written notice to the school superintendent or his or her designee of the school in which such child is enrolled or, if the information is known, of the school in which such child plans to be enrolled at a future date. Such notice shall include the specific criminal offense that such child committed. A local school system to which the child is assigned may request further information from the court's file.

(c) Custody and support jurisdiction.

(1) Where custody is the subject of controversy, except in those cases where the law gives the superior courts exclusive jurisdiction, in the consideration of these cases the juvenile court shall have concurrent jurisdiction to hear and determine the issue of custody and support when the issue is transferred by proper order of the superior court.

(2)(A) In any case where a child is alleged to be a deprived child as defined in paragraph (8) of Code Section 15-11-2, the juvenile court upon a finding of deprivation shall have jurisdiction to order temporary child support for such child to be paid by that person or those persons determined to be legally obligated to support such child. In determining such temporary child support,

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Westlaw_Document_16_38_34[1] the juvenile court shall apply the child support guidelines provided in Code Section 19-6-15. Where there is an existing order of a superior court or other court of competent jurisdiction setting child support for the child, the juvenile court may order the child support obligor in the existing order to make such payments instead to the caretaker of the child on a temporary basis but shall not otherwise modify the terms of the existing order. A copy of the juvenile court's order shall be filed in the clerk's office of the court that entered the existing order. The juvenile court shall have jurisdiction to order temporary child support for the child to be paid by any other person determined to be legally obligated to support such child.

(B) Temporary child support orders entered pursuant to subparagraph (A) of this paragraph shall be enforceable by the juvenile court through the contempt powers of the juvenile court as provided in Code Section 15-11-5 so long as the juvenile court is entitled to exercise jurisdiction over the deprivation case.

(d) Age limit for new actions.The juvenile court shall not have jurisdiction toinitiate any new action against an individual for acts committed after he or shehas reached the age of 17 years. This subsection does not affect the court'sjurisdiction to enter extension orders pursuant to Code Section 15-11-58.

(e) Concurrent jurisdiction as to legitimation petitions.

(1) The juvenile court shall have concurrent jurisdiction to hear any legitimation petition transferred to the juvenile court by proper order of the superior court.

(2) The juvenile court shall have jurisdiction to hear any legitimation petition filed pursuant to Code Section 19-7-22 as to a child with respect to whom a deprivation proceeding is pending in the juvenile court at the time the legitimation petition is filed.

(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection, after a petition for legitimation is granted, if a demand for a jury trial as to support has been properly filed by either parent, then the case shall be transferred to superior court for such jury trial.

CREDIT(S)

Laws 1915, p. 35, s 2; Laws 1935, p. 399, s 1; Laws 1950, p. 367, s 9; Laws1951, p. 291, s 9; Laws 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 87, s 3; Laws 1955, p. 610, s1; Laws 1956, p. 603, s 1; Laws 1968, p. 1013, s 3; Laws 1971, p. 709, s 1;Laws 1973, p. 882, s 1; Laws 1977, p. 181, s 1; Laws 1979, p. 1179, s 1; Laws1979, p. 1404, s 1; Laws 1985, p. 149, s 15; Laws 1987, p. 1013, s 1; Laws1990, p. 1572, s 1; Laws 1994, p. 1012, s 14; Laws 1997, p. 1064, s 2; Laws1997, p. 1436, s 3; Laws 1997, p. 1681, s 1; Laws 2000, p. 20, s 1; Laws 2000,p. 618, s 2; Laws 2002, p. 1162, s 2; Laws 2003, Act 377, s 1, eff. July 1,2003.

Formerly Code 1933, s 24-2402; Code 1933, s 24A-301; Code 1981, s 15-11-5.

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Westlaw_Document_16_38_34[1]HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES

The 2000 amendment by Act 467, which restructured this chapter into parts andmodified statutory references to reflect this restructuring, renumbered thissection from s 15-11-5. In addition the amendment substituted reference to childfor juvenile and provided gender neutral referents.

The 2000 amendment by Act 685 added subsec. (a)(2)(E).

The 2002 amendment substituted in the second sentence of subsec. (b)(2)(C) for"withdraw the case and lodge it" the words "cause a petition to be filed".

The 2003 amendment by Act 377 rewrote subsec. (c) which had read as follows:

"(c) Concurrent custody and support jurisdiction.Where custody is the subject ofcontroversy, except in those cases where the law gives the superior courtsexclusive jurisdiction, in the consideration of these cases the juvenile courtshall have concurrent jurisdiction to hear and determine the issue of custody andsupport when the issue is transferred by proper order of the superior court."

CROSS REFERENCES

Alternative educational systems, expulsion or suspension for felonies, see s 20-2-768.

Interstate Compact on Juveniles, see s 39-3-1 et seq.

Juveniles under age of 17, felony convictions, committal, see s 17-10-14.

Municipal courts, jurisdiction in alcohol cases involving underage persons, see s 36-32-10.

Parent and child, petition for legitimation of child, see s 19-7-22.

Public school disciplinary tribunals, disciplinary orders of other school systems, see s 20-2-751.2.

LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARIES

Child Custody--Jurisdiction and Procedure. Christopher L. Blakesley, 35 Emory L.J.291 (1986).

Comment. 12 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 80 (1995).

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Courts k 178.

Infants k 196.

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Westlaw_Document_16_38_34[1] Westlaw Topic No. 106.

Westlaw Topic No. 211.

C.J.S. Infants ss 24 to 25, 41, 46 to 48.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR Library

39 ALR 5th 103, Propriety of Exclusion of Press or Other Media Representativesfrom Civil Trial.

Encyclopedias

Ga. Jur. Criminal Law s 2:3, Children.

Ga. Jur. Criminal Law s 45:1, Delinquency of Minor.

Ga. Jur. Family Law s 13:6, Jurisdiction of Juvenile Court.

Ga. Jur. Family Law s 2:27, Jurisdiction for Judicial Consent.

Ga. Jur. Family Law s 9:35, Jurisdiction of Superior and Juvenile Courts.

Forms

Georgia Appellate Practice with Forms s 3-8, Juvenile Courts--Generally.

Georgia Appellate Practice with Forms s 19-8, The State's Right to Appeal in aCriminal Case--When Applicable, Certiorari in Supreme Court, Bail Pending State'sAppeal.

Georgia Magistrate Court Handbook with Forms s 9-1, Jurisdiction to Issue ArrestWarrants.

Georgia Magistrate Court Handbook with Forms s 10-3, Initial AppearanceHearing--Purposes and Procedures.

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Treatises and Practice Aids

Agnor's Georgia Evidence s 1-4, The Camera in Court.

Davis and Shulman's Georgia Practice and Procedure s 6:11, Juvenile Courts.

Georgia Criminal Trial Practice s 21-9, Age as a Defense--General.

Georgia Criminal Trial Practice s 28-4, Right to Appeal--State.

Georgia Criminal Trial Practice s 13-26, Offenses Committed by Juveniles.

Georgia Criminal Trial Practice s 14-55, Double Jeopardy--Mistrial--New Trial.

Georgia Divorce, Alimony, and Child Custody s 20:2, Jurisdiction and Venue.

Georgia Divorce, Alimony, and Child Custody s 22:2, Jurisdiction and Venue.

Georgia Divorce, Alimony, and Child Custody s 22:4, Transfers from Superior Court.

Georgia Divorce, Alimony, and Child Custody s 22:5, DeprivationProceedings--Generally.

Georgia Divorce, Alimony, and Child Custody s 11:63, LegitimationProceeding--Pleading and Procedure.

Georgia Divorce, Alimony, and Child Custody s 11:64, LegitimationProceeding--Effect of Legitimation.

Georgia Divorce, Alimony, and Child Custody s 22:14, Termination of ParentalRights--Pleading, Procedure, and Hearing.

Georgia Juvenile Practice and Procedure s 1:5, Georgia Juvenile Court Code of1971.

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Georgia Juvenile Practice and Procedure s 1:7, Exclusive Jurisdiction of JuvenileCourts.

Georgia Juvenile Practice and Procedure s 1:8, Concurrent Jurisdiction.

Georgia Juvenile Practice and Procedure s 3:1, Procedure for Determination ofMental Incompetency of Allegedly Delinquent or Unruly Child--Introduction.

Georgia Juvenile Practice and Procedure s 5:1, "Exclusivity" of Jurisdiction.

Georgia Juvenile Practice and Procedure s 5:2, Subject Matter Jurisdiction.

Georgia Juvenile Practice and Procedure s 6:2, Interrelationship With Adoption.

Georgia Juvenile Practice and Procedure s 6:3, Subject Matter Jurisdiction.

Georgia Juvenile Practice and Procedure s 8:4, Medical Evaluations and Treatment.

Georgia Juvenile Practice and Procedure s 8:7, Transfers for Final Determination.

Georgia Juvenile Practice and Procedure s 8:8, Transfers for Investigation andReport.

Georgia Juvenile Practice and Procedure s 8:9, Legitimation--ConcurrentJurisdiction.

Georgia Juvenile Practice and Procedure s 9:3, Concurrent Jurisdiction andCriminal Courts.

Georgia Juvenile Practice and Procedure s 9:7, Place of Detention.

Georgia Juvenile Practice and Procedure s 10:1, Subject MatterJurisdiction--"Unruliness".

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Georgia Juvenile Practice and Procedure s 10:2, Subject MatterJurisdiction--Proceeding Against Parents for Failure to Cooperate in SchoolConference.

Georgia Juvenile Practice and Procedure s 11:1, Subject Matter Jurisdiction andVenue.

Georgia Juvenile Practice and Procedure s 12:5, Interstate Rendition of Juveniles.

Georgia Juvenile Practice and Procedure s 5:23, Dispositional Order; Extension andTermination of Temporary Custody.

Georgia Juvenile Practice and Procedure s 5:24, Temporary Child Support inDeprivation Cases.

Georgia Juvenile Practice and Procedure s 8:11, Legitimation--Hearing and Effectof Legitimation.

Georgia Juvenile Practice and Procedure s 8:12, Legitimation--Establishment ofDuty for Support.

Georgia Juvenile Practice and Procedure s 9:14, Transfer Hearing.

Georgia Juvenile Practice and Procedure s 9:22, Disposition in Cases Involving"Designated Felony Acts".

Georgia Juvenile Practice and Procedure s 9:23, Disposition in Certain CasesWithin Jurisdiction of Superior Court.

Georgia Juvenile Practice and Procedure s 9:28, Access to Juvenile Files andRecords.

Georgia Juvenile Practice and Procedure s 9:30, Notice to School Officials.

Georgia Procedure Courts s 1:144, Exclusive Original Jurisdiction.

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Georgia Procedure Courts s 1:145, Exclusive Original Jurisdiction--Age Limitation.

Georgia Procedure Courts s 1:146, Concurrent Jurisdiction.

Georgia Procedure Courts s 1:148, Power to Determine Custody and Support.

Georgia Procedure Criminal Procedure s 2:10, Juvenile Courts.

Georgia Procedure Criminal Procedure s 2:23, Municipal Courts--Furnishing Alcoholto Underage Persons; Purchasing and Possession of Alcohol by Underage Persons.

Georgia Procedure Criminal Procedure s 34:3, Exclusive Appellate Jurisdiction ofConstitutional Issues--Preserving Constitutional Issue in Trial Court forAppellate Review.

Georgia Procedure Criminal Procedure s 36:4, Access to Juvenile Court Files andRecords--Juvenile Law Enforcement Records.

Georgia Procedure Criminal Procedure s 36:15, Right to Bail.

Georgia Procedure Criminal Procedure s 36:16, Jurisdiction of the Child.

Georgia Procedure Criminal Procedure s 36:17, Exclusive Jurisdiction of JuvenileCourt.

Georgia Procedure Criminal Procedure s 36:18, Exclusive Jurisdiction of JuvenileCourt--Concurrent Jurisdiction With Superior Court.

Georgia Procedure Criminal Procedure s 36:19, Exclusive Superior CourtJurisdiction of Particular Offenses.

Georgia Procedure Criminal Procedure s 36:21, Delinquent Acts.

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Westlaw_Document_16_38_34[1]Georgia Procedure Criminal Procedure s 36:22, Traffic Offenses.

Georgia Procedure Criminal Procedure s 36:25, Cases Over Which Superior Court HasExclusive Jurisdiction.

Georgia Procedure Criminal Procedure s 36:30, Conduct of Hearings, Generally.

Georgia Procedure Criminal Procedure s 36:38, When Child May be Taken IntoCustody--Procedure.

Georgia Procedure Criminal Procedure s 36:40, Place of Detention.

Georgia Procedure Criminal Procedure s 36:72, Involving Designated Felony Acts.

Georgia Procedure Special Remedies and Proceedings s 6:111, Use of Habeas Corpusin Custody Disputes; Limitations.

Georgia Rules of Evidence s 1.2, Scope; Applicability.

Kurtz Criminal Offenses and Defenses in Georgia I27, Infancy Defense.

Kurtz Criminal Offenses and Defenses in Georgia I33, Insanity Defense and MentalIncompetency to Stand Trial.

Molnar Georgia Criminal Law - Crimes and Punishments s 1-5, Felonies andMisdemeanors.

Molnar Georgia Criminal Law - Crimes and Punishments s 11-2, Unlawful Sale,Purchase, and Possession of Alcoholic Beverages by a Person Under 21 Years of Age.

NOTES OF DECISIONS

In general 1

Armed robbery cases, criminal offenses 22

Burglary, criminal offenses 23

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Capital offenses, generally, criminal offenses 18

Child molestation, criminal offenses 21

Child support controversies 12

Concurrent jurisdiction, generally 6

Criminal offenses 16-25

Criminal offenses - In general 16

Criminal offenses - Armed robbery cases 22

Criminal offenses - Burglary 23

Criminal offenses - Capital offenses, generally 18

Criminal offenses - Child molestation 21

Criminal offenses - Larceny 24

Criminal offenses - Murder cases 19

Criminal offenses - Rape 20

Criminal offenses - Traffic offenses 25

Criminal offenses - Transfer of criminal cases 17

Custody controversies, generally 9

Deprivation proceedings 10

Double jeopardy 5

Due process 2

Equal protection 3

First court to exercise jurisdiction 7

Guardianships 15

Instructions 27

Judgments or orders, generally 28

Larceny, criminal offenses 24

Legitimation proceedings 14

Murder cases, criminal offenses 19

Probation violation 26

Rape, criminal offenses 20

Review 30

Sentencing 29

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Westlaw_Document_16_38_34[1] Separation of powers doctrine 4

Termination of parental rights 8

Traffic offenses, criminal offenses 25

Transfer of criminal cases, criminal offenses 17

Transfer of custody controversies 11

Visitation controversies 13

1. In general

Supreme Court would not adopt a rule mandating competency hearings for childrenunder 17 years of age who face trial in superior court under the statute whichvests the superior court with jurisdiction over children between the ages of 13and 17 who are charged with certain crimes, including murder. Lewis v. State,2005, 279 Ga. 69, 608 S.E.2d 602, reconsideration denied, certiorari denied 126S.Ct. 571, 546 U.S. 987, 163 L.Ed.2d 478. Infants k 68.1

When court has before it matter where it has no jurisdiction of subject matter, nolegal judgment can be rendered except one of dismissal. In Interest of A.D.B.,1998, 232 Ga.App. 697, 503 S.E.2d 596. Judgment k 16

Juvenile courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, possessing only those powersspecifically conferred upon them by statute. O.C.G.A. s 15-11-5. In Interest ofJ.O., 1989, 191 Ga.App. 521, 382 S.E.2d 214. Courts k 175

Juvenile courts are without authority to compel state agencies or local schoolsystems to provide or fund specialized services for handicapped or abusedchildren. Op.Atty.Gen. No. U89-6, March 20, 1989.

2. Due process

Under Georgia law, juvenile court judge's refusal without a hearing to acceptpetition alleging delinquency and thereby accept jurisdiction of homicide case,thus allowing indictment to be filed against juvenile as an adult in superiorcourt which had concurrent jurisdiction with juvenile court, did not deprivejuvenile of due process of law. Code Ga. ss 24A-301(b), 24A-1601, 24A-1602. Lanev. Jones, 1980, 626 F.2d 1296, certiorari denied 101 S.Ct. 1384, 450 U.S. 928, 67L.Ed.2d 359. Constitutional Law k 4466; Infants k 68.5

Provision of juvenile court jurisdiction statute giving superior court exclusivejurisdiction over certain juvenile defendants, and granting both superior courtand district attorney authority to transfer case to juvenile court afterinvestigation and for extraordinary cause, did not violate juvenile's due processrights by not providing for any hearing; juvenile did not have any protectedrights until after his case was transferred. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; O.C.G.A.s 15-11-5(b)(2). Bishop v. State, 1995, 265 Ga. 821, 462 S.E.2d 716,reconsideration denied. Constitutional Law k 4466; Infants k 68.2;Infants k 68.6

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Westlaw_Document_16_38_34[1]Superior court's original exercise of jurisdiction over juvenile does not operateto deprive juvenile in felony cases that are punished by death or lifeimprisonment of any substantive or procedural due process rights. U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 5, 14; O.C.G.A. s 15-11-5(b). Chapman v. State, 1989, 259 Ga. 592,385 S.E.2d 661. Constitutional Law k 4466

3. Equal protection

Provisions of juvenile court jurisdiction statute giving the superior courtexclusive jurisdiction over various listed offenses were rationally related toneed for secure placement of certain violent juvenile offenders, safety ofstudents and citizens, and need for Department of Children and Youth Services toapply its resources to less violent and nonviolent juvenile offenders and,therefore, did not violate juvenile's equal protection rights. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14; O.C.G.A. s 15-11-5(b)(2). Murphy v. State, 1998, 233 Ga.App.579, 504 S.E.2d 484, reconsideration denied , certiorari granted , reversed 270Ga. 880, 515 S.E.2d 148, on remand 238 Ga.App. 123, 518 S.E.2d 430.Constitutional Law k 3741; Infants k 68.5

Juvenile defendant failed to support claim that statute which allowed him to betried as adult in superior court was unconstitutionally applied to him and otherblack males, where statistics did not show purposeful discrimination and showed nodissimilar treatment between white and black juvenile defendants charged asadults, and juvenile produced no evidence to support his allegations that youngblack males were being discriminated against at time of arrest and that youngwhite males were apparently being charged with lesser crimes. O.C.G.A. s15-11-5(b)(2)(A)(vii). Skidmore v. State, 1997, 226 Ga.App. 130, 485 S.E.2d 540,reconsideration denied , certiorari denied. Infants k 68.2

Provisions of juvenile court jurisdiction statute giving the superior courtexclusive jurisdiction over various listed offenses were rationally related toneed for secure placement of certain violent juvenile offenders, safety ofstudents and citizens, and need for Department of Children and Youth Services toapply its resources to less violent and nonviolent juvenile offenders and,therefore, did not violate juvenile's equal protection rights. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14; O.C.G.A. s 15-11-5(b)(2). Bishop v. State, 1995, 265 Ga. 821,462 S.E.2d 716, reconsideration denied. Constitutional Law k 3741; Infants k 68.2

4. Separation of powers doctrine

Juvenile court jurisdiction statute did not violate separation of powers doctrineto extent it gave superior court exclusive jurisdiction over certain juveniledefendants but gave district attorney preindictment discretion, afterinvestigation and for extraordinary cause, to decline to prosecute in superiorcourt and to lodge case in appropriate juvenile court, and gave superior courtpostindictment discretion to transfer case to juvenile court after investigationand for extraordinary cause. Const. Art. 1, s 2, Par. 3; O.C.G.A. s15-11-5(b)(2). Bishop v. State, 1995, 265 Ga. 821, 462 S.E.2d 716,reconsideration denied. Constitutional Law k 2355; Infants k 68.2

Prosecutor's decision to bring felony action against juvenile in superior courtrather than juvenile court does not violate separation of powers doctrine becauseinitial option to select forum when concurrent jurisdiction exists belongs tolitigant, and it is neither judicial, legislative, or executive power. Const.Art. 1, s 2, Par. 3; O.C.G.A. s 15-11-5(b). Chapman v. State, 1989, 259 Ga. 592,

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Westlaw_Document_16_38_34[1]385 S.E.2d 661. Constitutional Law k 2621; Constitutional Law k 2623

5. Double jeopardy

Child "deprivation" is established by proof of parental unfitness arising fromeither intentional or unintentional misconduct resulting in the abuse or neglectof the child or by what is tantamount to physical or mental incapability to carefor the child. In re A.B., 2004, 267 Ga.App. 466, 600 S.E.2d 409. Infants k156

Superior court having taken jurisdiction of sodomy charge before the juvenilecourt took jurisdiction, if it ever did, superior court was authorized to retainthat jurisdiction; hence, proceedings in superior court did not subject defendantto double jeopardy. O.C.G.A. s 15-11-5(b); U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5. Williams v.State, 1984, 171 Ga.App. 34, 318 S.E.2d 768. Double Jeopardy k 52

6. Concurrent jurisdiction, generally

Superior court had concurrent jurisdiction with juvenile court over 16-year-olddefendant who committed armed robbery, under law in effect at time that providedthat superior court had jurisdiction over crimes for which child could be punishedby confinement for life, and thus, conviction was not void and could be used toenhance instant sentences for armed robbery under recidivist statute. Moore v.State, 2005, 276 Ga.App. 55, 622 S.E.2d 417. Infants k 68.5; Sentencing AndPunishment k 1328

Where the superior court and juvenile court have concurrent jurisdiction, thefirst court to take jurisdiction will retain it, but once the juvenile court takesjurisdiction, it may transfer the case to the superior court. Code, ss24A-301(b), 24A-2501. J. G. B. v. State, 1975, 136 Ga.App. 75, 220 S.E.2d 79.Courts k 475(1); Infants k 68.5

7. First court to exercise jurisdiction

Filing of juvenile complaint form, though it may be sufficient to commenceinformal proceedings against juvenile, did not operate to vest exclusivejurisdiction over juvenile in the juvenile court and did not preclude superiorcourt from exercising jurisdiction over juvenile when indictment was filed againsthim, arising out of same incident, that same day. State v. Whetstone, 1994, 264Ga. 135, 441 S.E.2d 842. Infants k 68.5

Superior court and juvenile court have concurrent jurisdiction over juvenilescharged with capital offenses and whichever court first takes jurisdiction overmatter may retain it, subject to right of juvenile court to transfer case tosuperior court; taking jurisdiction means taking jurisdiction over specificoffender as to specific offense. Ward v. State, 1992, 205 Ga.App. 504, 423 S.E.2d288. Infants k 68.5

Superior court acquired jurisdiction, though defendant had originally appeared injuvenile court for detention hearing, once defendant was indicted. O.C.G.A. ss15-11-11, 15-11-19, 15-11-23. Thompson v. State, 1991, 260 Ga. 820, 400 S.E.2d312. Infants k 68.5

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Under statute conferring upon superior court concurrent jurisdiction with juvenilecourts over person who commits a crime punishable by life imprisonment or death,first court to take jurisdiction will normally retain it. O.C.G.A. s 15-11-5(b).Couch v. State, 1985, 253 Ga. 764, 325 S.E.2d 366. Infants k 68.5

Superior court first took jurisdiction of minor's case by conducting committalhearing to determine whether there was probable cause to believe minor guilty ofcrime charged and, if so, to bind him over for indictment by grand jury, and,after detention order was issued, minor was, in effect, being detained by superiorcourt and under its jurisdiction pending issuance of indictment by grant jury,thus juvenile court had no jurisdiction on basis of petition alleging that minorwas deprived and unruly and citing him for lesser included offense of crimecharged in superior court and juvenile court's order transferring juvenile tosuperior court was void. Code, s 24A-2501. J. T. M. v. State, 1977, 142 Ga.App.635, 236 S.E.2d 764. Infants k 68.7(5)

Superior court and juvenile court have concurrent jurisdiction over juvenilescharged with capital offenses, and whichever court first takes jurisdiction overthe matter in question may retain it, subject to right of juvenile court totransfer case to superior court. Code, ss 24A-301(b), 24A-2501. Relyea v. State,1976, 236 Ga. 299, 223 S.E.2d 638. Infants k 68.5

Indictment of a juvenile for a noncapital felony in the superior court does notoust juvenile court of its first obtained jurisdiction. Code, s 24A-2201; Const.art. 6, s 4, par. 1. J. W. A. v. State, 1975, 233 Ga. 683, 212 S.E.2d 849, onremand 134 Ga.App. 321, 214 S.E.2d 409. Infants k 68.5

Arson indictment returned by grand jury in the superior court against 16-year-oldjuvenile, whose case had been transferred to the district attorney by the juvenilecourt, did not operate ipso facto to deprive the juvenile court of its firstobtained jurisdiction. Code, ss 24A-2201, 24A-2501; Const. art. 6, s 4, par. 1.J. W. A. v. State, 1975, 233 Ga. 683, 212 S.E.2d 849, on remand 134 Ga.App. 321,214 S.E.2d 409. Infants k 68.5

8. Termination of parental rights

Juvenile court had jurisdiction over petition to terminate father's parentalrights, though adoption petition had been filed in superior court of anothercounty, as statute gave superior court concurrent jurisdiction with the juvenilecourt. In re B.A.S., 2002, 254 Ga.App. 430, 563 S.E.2d 141, reconsiderationdismissed, certiorari denied , certiorari denied 123 S.Ct. 1580, 538 U.S. 928, 155L.Ed.2d 323. Courts k 472.1

Juvenile court order in termination of parental rights proceeding recitedsufficient jurisdictional facts, where order stated it was addressing petition toterminate father's parental rights. In re B.A.S., 2002, 254 Ga.App. 430, 563S.E.2d 141, reconsideration dismissed, certiorari denied , certiorari denied 123S.Ct. 1580, 538 U.S. 928, 155 L.Ed.2d 323. Infants k 210

Incarcerated father waived and abandoned issue of whether juvenile court whichterminated his parental rights had personal jurisdiction over him; father wasserved with process, did not challenge jurisdiction in juvenile court, and did notassert or point to any evidence establishing juvenile court lacked jurisdiction in

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Westlaw_Document_16_38_34[1]Court of Appeals. In re B.A.S., 2002, 254 Ga.App. 430, 563 S.E.2d 141,reconsideration dismissed, certiorari denied , certiorari denied 123 S.Ct. 1580,538 U.S. 928, 155 L.Ed.2d 323. Infants k 243; Infants k 244.1

Juvenile court had subject matter jurisdiction to determine whether mother's andfather's parental rights should be terminated, even though mother was a Mexicancitizen, where children were born in Georgia. Const. Art. 1, s 1, Par. 7;O.C.G.A. s 15-11-81. In re J.H., 2000, 244 Ga.App. 788, 536 S.E.2d 805. Infants k 196

Each deprivation petition in which parent seeks to terminate parental rights ofother parent must be judged on its own merits; if it appears from an analysis ofthe pleading that it is actually a disguised custody matter, then it is outsidethe subject matter jurisdiction of the juvenile courts. In re M.C.J., 1999, 271Ga. 546, 523 S.E.2d 6, on remand 242 Ga.App. 852, 531 S.E.2d 404. Infants k196

Juvenile court could consider whether it had jurisdiction over mother's petitionto terminate parental rights of children's biological father; overruling In theInterest of W.W.W., 213 Ga.App. 732, 445 S.E.2d 832; In the Interest of M.A., 218Ga.App. 433, 461 S.E.2d 600. O.C.G.A. s 15-11-80 et seq. In re M.C.J., 1999, 271Ga. 546, 523 S.E.2d 6, on remand 242 Ga.App. 852, 531 S.E.2d 404. Infants k196

Juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over mother's petition toterminate parental rights of children's biological father, as mother was requiredto file case in superior court. In re M.C.J., 1999, 236 Ga.App. 225, 511 S.E.2d533, reconsideration denied , certiorari granted , reversed 271 Ga. 546, 523S.E.2d 6, on remand 242 Ga.App. 852, 531 S.E.2d 404. Infants k 196

Divorced mother's contemplation that her current husband would possibly adopt herchild did not automatically render termination proceeding one in connection withan adoption, and thus, Juvenile Court, as opposed to Superior Court, hadjurisdiction, pursuant to statute giving Juvenile Courts exclusive jurisdictionover cases involving termination of parental rights, other than that in connectionwith adoption proceedings, in which the Superior Courts have exclusivejurisdiction; no adoption proceeding was pending when mother filed petition toterminate father's parental rights. O.C.G.A. s 15-11-5(a)(2)(C). In Interest ofD.L.N., 1998, 234 Ga.App. 123, 506 S.E.2d 403. Infants k 196

Although father and mother, who had custody of child pursuant to divorce decree,consented to jurisdiction of Superior Court, Superior Court lacked subject matterjurisdiction over mother's petition to terminate father's parental rights sincetermination petition was not in connection with adoption proceedings and parties'consent could not confer subject matter jurisdiction on Court. O.C.G.A. s15-11-5(a)(2)(C). In Interest of A.D.B., 1998, 232 Ga.App. 697, 503 S.E.2d 596.Infants k 196

Superior court has jurisdiction to consider termination of rights of putativefather only in connection with adoption proceedings. O.C.G.A. s 15-11-5(a)(2)(C).Alexander v. Guthrie, 1995, 216 Ga.App. 460, 454 S.E.2d 805. Infants k 196

Action to terminate parental rights, except in conjunction with adoptionproceedings, is within exclusive subject matter jurisdiction of juvenile courts.

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Westlaw_Document_16_38_34[1]O.C.G.A. s 15-11-5(a)(2)(C). In Interest of W.R.S., 1994, 213 Ga.App. 616, 445S.E.2d 367. Courts k 472.1

Child in custody of county department of family and children's services wasrebuttably presumed to have continuing residence in that county so that juvenilecourt in that county had subject matter jurisdiction to terminate parental rights.O.C.G.A. ss 9-11-4, 15-11-5(a), 15-11-15, 24-4-21. In Interest of S.K.L., 1991,199 Ga.App. 731, 405 S.E.2d 903. Infants k 172; Infants k 196

Juvenile court had jurisdiction to terminate parental rights despite mother'scontention that termination decision was improperly predicated on possibility ofadoption. O.C.G.A. ss 15-11-1, 15-11-5(a)(2)(C). In Interest of E.P.N., 1989,193 Ga.App. 742, 388 S.E.2d 903. Infants k 196

Statute which confers jurisdiction on superior court in proceeding to terminateparental rights in connection with adoption proceedings does not give independentauthority to superior court to entertain petition which seeks, in first instanceand without any indication of compliance with requirement that identified putativefather whose location is known be given notice of his rights and opportunity toprotect those rights, termination of all rights of putative father whose identityand location are known. O.C.G.A. ss 15-11-5(a)(2)(C), 19-8-7. In re H.C.S.,1984, 170 Ga.App. 551, 318 S.E.2d 59, reversed 253 Ga. 404, 321 S.E.2d 321, onremand 172 Ga.App. 819, 325 S.E.2d 925. Infants k 198

Where prospective adoptive parents had not instituted adoption proceedings priorto filing petition for termination of parental rights of father whose identity andlocation were known, superior court did not have jurisdiction within meaning ofstatute which confers jurisdiction for petition to terminate which is filed "inconnection with adoption proceedings." O.C.G.A. ss 15-11-5(a)(2)(C), 19-8-1 etseq., 19-8-7. In re H.C.S., 1984, 170 Ga.App. 551, 318 S.E.2d 59, reversed 253Ga. 404, 321 S.E.2d 321, on remand 172 Ga.App. 819, 325 S.E.2d 925. Infants k196

Superior court did not have jurisdiction, based on contention that proceeding wasessentially child custody case, over petition to terminate putative father'sparental rights filed by prospective adoptive parents who had not institutedadoption proceedings. O.C.G.A. ss 15-11-5(a)(2)(C), 19-8-7. In re H.C.S., 1984,170 Ga.App. 551, 318 S.E.2d 59, reversed 253 Ga. 404, 321 S.E.2d 321, on remand172 Ga.App. 819, 325 S.E.2d 925. Infants k 196

Proceedings wherein termination of parental rights are involved must be initiatedin juvenile court; if termination is in connection with adoption proceedings,superior court has jurisdiction to terminate the parental rights and any rights ofputative father. Quire v. Clayton County Dept. of Family & Children Services,1978, 242 Ga. 85, 249 S.E.2d 538. Infants k 196

Parents' appearance in deprivation suit brought by county department of family andchildren services to acquire child because of mistreatment by grandparents did nothave effect of waiving parents' right to object to improper venue in separatetermination suit brought by department. Code, s 24A-1101 et seq.; Const. art. 6,s 14, pars. 1-6. Quire v. Clayton County Dept. of Family & Children Services,1978, 242 Ga. 85, 249 S.E.2d 538. Infants k 196

A petition to terminate the parental rights to a child previously adjudicated"deprived" and in agency custody is cognizable in the juvenile court. Code, ss

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Westlaw_Document_16_38_34[1]24A-301(a)(1)(C), 24A-3201(a)(2). In Interest of K. C. O., 1977, 142 Ga.App. 216,235 S.E.2d 602. Infants k 196

9. Custody controversies, generally

Non-custodial father's deprivation petition was not disguised custody suit, andthus, juvenile court had jurisdiction to transfer temporary legal custody of childto father and paternal grandmother; there were no custody disputes between motherand father, father was not seeking termination of mother's parental rights, andallegations and evidence in support of petition were unchallenged. In re K.L.H.,2006, 281 Ga.App. 394, 636 S.E.2d 117. Infants k 192; Infants k 197

While custody disputes cloaked as deprivation actions are not within the exclusiveoriginal jurisdiction of the juvenile courts of Georgia, each deprivation petitionmust be judged on its own merits; if it appears from an analysis of the pleadingthat it is actually a disguised custody matter, then it is outside the subjectmatter jurisdiction of the juvenile courts. In re T.L., 2004, 269 Ga.App. 842,605 S.E.2d 432. Child Custody k 404; Infants k 196

Deprivation proceeding brought by Department of Family and Children Services(DFACS) was not essentially custody proceeding, as would deprive juvenile court ofjurisdiction; deprivation petition alleged existence of filthy home that wasunsafe for child, although petition asked that temporary custody be granted tofather, child was first placed with another relative while mother was givenopportunity to comply with safety plan, and at deprivation hearing, State objectedto certain questions alleging that mother's attorney was trying to turn hearinginto custody battle, and State requested that case should be transferred tosuperior court if custody was issue rather than deprivation. In re T.L., 2004,269 Ga.App. 842, 605 S.E.2d 432. Infants k 196

Petition brought by children's grandmother to terminate mother's parental rightswas not prima facie custody matter, so as to deprive juvenile court ofjurisdiction to hear termination petition without jurisdiction having beentransferred from superior court; grandmother was not wresting custody away frommother, insofar as grandmother had had custody of children for more than threeyears. In re K.N.C., 2003, 264 Ga.App. 475, 590 S.E.2d 792. Infants k 196

Custody disputes cloaked as deprivation actions are not within exclusive originaljurisdiction of juvenile courts. O.C.G.A. s 15-11-5. In Interest of B.C.P.,1997, 229 Ga.App. 111, 493 S.E.2d 258. Infants k 196

Juvenile court lacked jurisdiction over deprivation petition filed by paternalgrandmother who had been granted temporary guardianship and had custody of childduring the week; grandmother had assumed status and obligations of parent by wayof the guardianship, and her claim in juvenile court that child was deprived wastransparent attempt to use juvenile court system to seek custody of child.O.C.G.A. ss 15-11-5, 29-2-1. In Interest of B.C.P., 1997, 229 Ga.App. 111, 493S.E.2d 258. Infants k 196

Juvenile court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over custody disputesdisguised as deprivation proceedings. O.C.G.A. s 15-11-5(a)(1)(C). In Interestof M.A., 1995, 218 Ga.App. 433, 461 S.E.2d 600. Infants k 18; Infants k196

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Because all deprivation proceedings between parents are prima facie custodymatters, they must be brought in the superior court. O.C.G.A. s 15-11-5(c). InInterest of M.A., 1995, 218 Ga.App. 433, 461 S.E.2d 600. Infants k 18;Infants k 196

Only the superior court may make determination that deprivation proceeding betweenparents is not custody dispute. O.C.G.A. s 15-11-5(c). In Interest of M.A.,1995, 218 Ga.App. 433, 461 S.E.2d 600. Courts k 472.1

Juvenile courts should not entertain deprivation proceeding brought by one parentagainst another because it is very likely that the parent is actually seekingcustody and is attempting to avoid the more stringent standard of proof requiredfor modification of custody award. O.C.G.A. s 15-11-5(a)(1)(C). In Interest ofM.A., 1995, 218 Ga.App. 433, 461 S.E.2d 600. Infants k 196; Infants k 200

Juvenile court's change of custody of children was not modification of finaldivorce decree as to be outside of juvenile court's jurisdiction, but wasdisposition based upon court's determination that children were deprived and waswithin juvenile court's authority. O.C.G.A. ss 15-11-5(a)(1)(C), 15-11-33(a),15-11-34(a), (a)(2)(A), 24-9-61. In Interest of A.L.L., 1994, 211 Ga.App. 767,440 S.E.2d 517. Child Custody k 601; Infants k 222

Juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to make valid award of temporary custody ofchild to mother, where mother failed to allege that child was deprived of properparental care, control, subsistence or education at that time, but rather allegedthat child had been deprived while in father's custody, and might once againbecome deprived if returned to father's custody, and thus sought to maintainstatus quo of child's alleged nondeprived condition rather than to amelioratecurrent deprived condition. O.C.G.A. s 15-11-5(a)(1)(C). Lewis v. Winzenreid,1993, 263 Ga. 459, 435 S.E.2d 602. Infants k 156

Superior and juvenile courts exercise concurrent jurisdiction over all mattersrelating to custody and visitation, except in those situations in which exclusivejurisdiction is vested in superior court. O.C.G.A. s 15-11-5(c). In Interest ofD.N.M., 1989, 193 Ga.App. 812, 389 S.E.2d 336, certiorari denied. Courts k472.1

Juvenile court did not retain jurisdiction to hear paternal grandparents' petitionfor permanent custody after it determined that mother's four minor children weredeprived, where grandparents' complaint for permanent custody was not in thenature of deprivation petition and did not allege that they should be grantedpermanent custody on basis that children were deprived. O.C.G.A. ss(a)(1)(C), 19-9-23(a, b). In Interest of C.C., 1989, 193 Ga.App. 120, 387 S.E.2d46. Infants k 221

Jurisdiction obtained by juvenile court during divorce action could not serve toretain jurisdiction for change of custody purposes; thus, in absence of superiorcourt order transferring change of custody petition to juvenile court, juvenilecourt was without jurisdiction to hear petition. O.C.G.A. s 15-11-5(c). Owen v.Owen, 1987, 183 Ga.App. 472, 359 S.E.2d 229. Child Custody k 601

Where order of juvenile court, having life span of two years, declaring childrento be deprived and granting temporary custody to county department of family andchildren services was still in effect, superior court had no jurisdiction of

Page 20

Westlaw_Document_16_38_34[1]habeas corpus petition by father seeking custody of the children, and habeascorpus was not an available remedy. Code, ss 24A-301(a)(1)(C), 24A-2301(a)(2),24A-2701(c), 24A-2801. West v. Cobb County Dept. of Family & Children Services,1979, 243 Ga. 425, 254 S.E.2d 373. Habeas Corpus k 536

Juvenile court did not have original jurisdiction over motion by father, after hisrelease on probation, for custody of child, who had been placed in care of hismaternal grandparents after murder of son's mother, in that such motion was innature of application for writ of habeas corpus and such an action had tooriginate in superior court or court of ordinary. Code, ss 24A-301, 24A-301(c),24A-302, 24A-401, 50-103. In re J. R. T., 1974, 233 Ga. 204, 210 S.E.2d 684.Courts k 472.1

10. Deprivation proceedings

Deprivation proceeding involving child was not a disguised custody matter, and,thus, juvenile court had jurisdiction over proceeding; deprivation petition wasfiled by Department of Family and Children Services (DFACS) amid multiplereferrals dating back almost 16 months, and there was no evidence that father wascontesting custody or attempting to acquire custody of child from mother. In reD.T., 2007, 284 Ga.App. 336, 643 S.E.2d 842. Infants k 196

Superior Court had subject-matter jurisdiction over petition for adoption andtermination of parental rights brought by relatives seeking to adopt minor childwho had been found deprived by juvenile court; adoption jurisdictional statutegranted superior courts exclusive jurisdiction over adoption matters, except suchjurisdiction as may be granted to juvenile courts, and superior courts hadconcurrent jurisdiction over termination of parental rights petitions filed inconnection with an adoption petition. Snyder v. Carter, 2005, 276 Ga.App. 426,623 S.E.2d 241. Courts k 472.1

Evidence did not support determination that child was deprived, based ondetermination that mother suffered from Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, whichallegedly caused mother to abuse child by repeatedly subjecting her to unnecessaryand invasive medical treatment; mother's reports of child's difficulty in eatingfood and child's seizures were corroborated by medical personnel and other personswho observed same behavior, child was diagnosed with severe gastroesophogal refluxwhich required surgical procedures and insertion of nasogastric feeding tube,mother's anxiety was related to concerns over appropriateness of treatment, andsome of child's symptoms continued even after child was placed in foster care. Inre A.B., 2004, 267 Ga.App. 466, 600 S.E.2d 409. Infants k 179

State courts had jurisdiction over proceedings for child's adjudication asdeprived, despite mother's contention that she had moved out of state on daybefore child's birth, where evidence supported trial court's finding that childand her parents still resided in state at time of child's birth, and child wasalready in custody of county Department of Human Services at time deprivationproceedings were commenced. In re K.C.H., 2002, 257 Ga.App. 529, 571 S.E.2d 515.Infants k 196

Deprivation proceeding brought between parents is prima facie custody matter, andas such must be filed initially in superior court for determination that it isindeed valid deprivation case. In re M.C.J., 1999, 236 Ga.App. 225, 511 S.E.2d533, reconsideration denied , certiorari granted , reversed 271 Ga. 546, 523S.E.2d 6, on remand 242 Ga.App. 852, 531 S.E.2d 404. Infants k 196

Page 21


Juvenile court's jurisdiction in deprivation matter extends to custodycontroversies involving deprived child. O.C.G.A. s 15-11-5. In Interest ofB.C.P., 1997, 229 Ga.App. 111, 493 S.E.2d 258. Infants k 196

Juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction over juvenile matters and issole court in which to initiate action concerning any child who is alleged to bedeprived. O.C.G.A. s 15-11-5(a)(1)(C). In Interest of J.P., 1997, 267 Ga. 492,480 S.E.2d 8, reconsideration denied. Infants k 196

Upon determining that deprivation petition brought by one parent against anotheris valid, the superior court must transfer the matter to the juvenile court understatute providing juvenile court with exclusive jurisdiction over deprivationproceedings. O.C.G.A. s 15-11-5(a)(1)(C). In Interest of M.A., 1995, 218 Ga.App.433, 461 S.E.2d 600. Courts k 472.1; Courts k 486

Juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction over deprivation proceedings. O.C.G.A.s 15-11-5(a)(1)(C). In Interest of M.A., 1995, 218 Ga.App. 433, 461 S.E.2d 600.Courts k 472.1

Juvenile court did not have proper subject matter jurisdiction over deprivationpetition brought by children's mother against their father where there had been nodetermination by the superior court that the petition was valid. O.C.G.A. s15-11-5(c). In Interest of M.A., 1995, 218 Ga.App. 433, 461 S.E.2d 600. Infants k 196

When juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to determine noncustodialfather's deprived child petition, mother did not submit to juvenile courtjurisdiction by filing counterpetition. In Interest of W.W.W., 1994, 213 Ga.App.732, 445 S.E.2d 832. Infants k 196

Even when styled as child deprivation petition, dispute between parents is primafacie a child custody matter, although superior court may determine proceeding isvalid deprivation petition, and, if so, it can transfer case to juvenile court asany court would do on finding it lacked jurisdiction. O.C.G.A. s 15-11-5(c). InInterest of W.W.W., 1994, 213 Ga.App. 732, 445 S.E.2d 832. Infants k 196

Superior court had jurisdiction to entertain adoption petition despite pendency ofdeprivation proceedings in juvenile court. O.C.G.A. ss 15-11-5(a)(1)(C),15-11-34(a)(2)(A), 19-8-2(a). Edgar v. Shave, 1992, 205 Ga.App. 337, 422 S.E.2d234. Courts k 475(1)

Child was not deprived, so as to confer subject matter jurisdiction on juvenilecourt to determine custody, where county social service agency had admitted thathomes of both maternal grandmother and paternal grandparents, who were seekingcustody of child subsequent to mother's death, were suitable as placements forchild. O.C.G.A. s 15-11-5(a)(1)(C). In Interest of C.F., 1991, 199 Ga.App. 858,406 S.E.2d 279. Infants k 196

11. Transfer of custody controversies

Although a juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction of deprivation petitions,where the matter is in truth a custody controversy in the nature of a habeas

Page 22

Westlaw_Document_16_38_34[1]corpus proceeding, the juvenile court has subject-matter jurisdiction of thematter only if the case originated in the superior court and is transferred to thejuvenile court by order of the superior court. O.C.G.A. s 15-11-28(a)(1)(C), (c).In re K.R.S., 2002, 253 Ga.App. 678, 560 S.E.2d 292. Courts k 472.1

Juvenile court was not divested of jurisdiction over juvenile by virtue of factthat the was no longer resident of county in which proceedings had been initiatedat time of transfer hearing; venue was appropriate in delinquency actions incounty in which alleged offenses occurred. O.C.G.A. s 15-11-15(a). Interest ofD.L., 1997, 228 Ga.App. 503, 492 S.E.2d 273. Infants k 68.5; Infants k196

When custody is the subject of controversy, the juvenile court has concurrentjurisdiction with the superior court to determine custody issues only when thecase is properly transferred by the superior court. O.C.G.A. s 15-11-5(c). InInterest of M.A., 1995, 218 Ga.App. 433, 461 S.E.2d 600. Courts k 472.1

Juvenile court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to determine noncustodialfather's deprived child petition, and judgment placing custody of two of parties'three children with father was void, where father alleged deprivation by motheronly after she sued for change in child support, and juvenile court found thatfather's allegation of child abuse by mother was not substantiated; record aswhole, including court's disposition, showed that case was custody dispute overwhich juvenile court would have concurrent jurisdiction only if case had beentransferred by superior court. O.C.G.A. s 15-11-5(c). In Interest of W.W.W.,1994, 213 Ga.App. 732, 445 S.E.2d 832. Infants k 196

Where child custody is subject of controversy, juvenile court has concurrentjurisdiction to hear and determine custody issues only when case is transferred bysuperior court. O.C.G.A. s 15-11-5(c). In Interest of W.W.W., 1994, 213 Ga.App.732, 445 S.E.2d 832. Courts k 472.1

Juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to determine which grandparentswere entitled to custody of child, where there was no order of superior courttransferring issue of custody. O.C.G.A. s 15-11-5(c). In Interest of C.F., 1991,199 Ga.App. 858, 406 S.E.2d 279. Courts k 488(3)

Superior court lacked jurisdiction to dismiss complaint for modification of childcustody as custody issue had been properly referred to juvenile court fordetermination and that court had not resolved issue. O.C.G.A. s 15-11-5(c). Owenv. Owen, 1990, 195 Ga.App. 545, 394 S.E.2d 580. Courts k 488(1)

In divorce action, superior court was authorized to transfer question of permanentcustody of the parties' minor child to juvenile court for investigation anddetermination. O.C.G.A. ss 15-11-5(c), 15-11-6(b); Const. Art. 6, s 4, Par. 1;Laws 1971, p. 756, s 1 et seq. Matter of J.S.S., 1985, 175 Ga.App. 361, 333S.E.2d 417. Courts k 485

Juvenile court, acting pursuant to proper order of transfer from superior courthearing divorce case, had jurisdiction to determine question of permanent custodyof the parties' minor child. O.C.G.A. ss 15-11-5(c), 15-11-6(b); Const. Art. 6,s 4, Par. 1; Laws 1971, p. 756, s 1 et seq. Matter of J.S.S., 1985, 175 Ga.App.361, 333 S.E.2d 417. Courts k 488(1)

Page 23

Westlaw_Document_16_38_34[1]Juvenile court has concurrent jurisdiction in normal, adversary custody andsupport cases, in nature of habeas corpus, if transferred to juvenile court byproper order of superior court. Code, s 24A-301(c). In re J. R. T., 1974, 233Ga. 204, 210 S.E.2d 684. Courts k 484

Juvenile court had no jurisdiction over subject matter of proceeding to determinecustody of minor child under 17 years of age as between parents of child, wherefather's claim to custody was based on decree of domestic relations court of Texasawarding custody to father and not on neglect, insufficient guardianship, badenvironment, health, or other statutory grounds of juvenile court jurisdiction,and case had not been transferred to juvenile court by a court of record handlingdivorce or habeas corpus actions. Code, ss 24-2408(5), 24-2409(2), 30-127;Const. art. 6, s 2, pars. 4, 9. Bartlett v. Bartlett, 1959, 99 Ga.App. 770, 109S.E.2d 821. Child Custody k 743

Exclusive original jurisdiction to determine custody of minor children under 17years of age as between parents of child is vested by statutes in courts havingjurisdiction of habeas corpus or divorce and alimony actions, and juvenile courtcan obtain jurisdiction to determine custody of such children in a contest betweenparents only by a transfer of jurisdiction from court having jurisdiction indivorce or habeas corpus cases. Code, ss 24-2408(5), 24-2409(2), 30-127; Const.art. 6, s 2, pars. 4, 9. Bartlett v. Bartlett, 1959, 99 Ga.App. 770, 109 S.E.2d821. Courts k 472.1

12. Child support controversies

Lack of proper transfer order from superior court to juvenile court, and furtherlack of recitation of jurisdictional facts in juvenile court's order precluded afinding of juvenile court's jurisdiction and thus its orders in child support casewere void. O.C.G.A. s 15-11-5(c). Lockhart v. Stancil, 1988, 258 Ga. 634, 373S.E.2d 355. Child Support k 173

13. Visitation controversies

Fact that statute vested superior court with authority to transfer custody casesto juvenile court only if they were cases involving divorce, alimony, or habeascorpus did not mean that superior court lacked authority to transfer caseinvolving visitation issue brought by mother after final judgment of divorceresolving visitation issue was entered; statute merely authorized transfer ofquestions of custody and support in cases over which superior court wouldotherwise exercise exclusive jurisdiction, and request to modify visitation waswithin concurrent jurisdiction of superior and juvenile courts. O.C.G.A. ss15-11-5(c), 15-11-6(b). In Interest of D.N.M., 1989, 193 Ga.App. 812, 389 S.E.2d336, certiorari denied. Courts k 472.1; Courts k 484

14. Legitimation proceedings

Superior court did not lack jurisdiction to hear petition from avowed biologicalfather of a child allegedly born as a result of an affair with married woman,though petitioner labelled petition as one for termination of legal father'sparental rights and only juvenile court had jurisdiction to enter that kind oforder, where petition was in substance a complaint to determine paternity and tolegitimate the child; legal father's rights regarding the child were ancillary tothe paternity and legitimization issues, over which superior court did have

Page 24

Westlaw_Document_16_38_34[1]jurisdiction. O.C.G.A. ss 15-11-5(a)(2)(C), 19-7-22, 19-7-40. Ghrist v. Fricks,1995, 219 Ga.App. 415, 465 S.E.2d 501, reconsideration denied , certiorari denied.Children Out-of-wedlock k 36

15. Guardianships

Order of juvenile court granting temporary custody of minor children to auntliving in Florida in no way deprived Georgia probate court of jurisdiction to hearguardianship petition of paternal grandfather for guardianship over persons andproperty of his two orphaned grandchildren. Code, ss 24A-302, 24A-401(h)(4).Abrams v. Daffron, 1980, 155 Ga.App. 182, 270 S.E.2d 278. Guardian And Ward k8

Where child's mother was dead, father was incarcerated and child was withoutguardian or custodian, juvenile court had jurisdiction, in 1971, to appointguardians of person and property of child, but such an order of dispositionterminated two years after its entry. Code, s 24A-2701(c). In re J. R. T., 1974,233 Ga. 204, 210 S.E.2d 684. Guardian And Ward k 8; Guardian And Ward k25

16. Criminal offenses--In general

Municipal court lacked jurisdiction to try defendant for offense of underagepossession of alcohol based on use of uniform traffic citation as charginginstrument, where statute listing offenses for which defendant could be tried uponuniform traffic citation did not include non-traffic offenses. O.C.G.A. s17-7-71(b)(1). Shaver v. City of Peachtree City, 2001, 253 Ga.App. 212, 558S.E.2d 409, reconsideration denied , certiorari granted , reversed 276 Ga. 298,578 S.E.2d 409, on remand 261 Ga.App. 296, 582 S.E.2d 246. Infants k 68.5

Juvenile court retained exclusive jurisdiction over juvenile when juvenile turnedseventeen, where juvenile was under age of seventeen at time he committed act ofdelinquency. O.C.G.A. s 15-11-2(2)(A, B); s 15-11-5 (1999). In re J.T.D., 2000,242 Ga.App. 243, 529 S.E.2d 377. Infants k 68.5

Exclusive jurisdiction vests in the juvenile court when a petition of delinquencyis filed. State v. Sullivan, 1999, 237 Ga.App. 677, 516 S.E.2d 539. Infants k68.5; Infants k 196

Superior court is not divested of jurisdiction over juvenile defendant merelybecause some, but not all, evidence of criminal acts is beyond scope of itsjurisdiction, so long as that evidence stems from same criminal transaction whichvests superior court with jurisdiction. O.C.G.A. s 15-11-5(b)(2)(A, B). Reynoldsv. State, 1996, 266 Ga. 235, 466 S.E.2d 218. Infants k 68.5

Unless General Assembly provides otherwise, the superior court has exclusivejurisdiction over juveniles in all felony cases. Const. Art. 6, s 4, Par. 1.Bishop v. State, 1995, 265 Ga. 821, 462 S.E.2d 716, reconsideration denied.Infants k 68.5

Exclusive jurisdiction rests in juvenile court only when petition of delinquencyis filed. Flowers v. State, 1995, 265 Ga. 688, 461 S.E.2d 533. Infants k68.5

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Superior court had jurisdiction over defendant's criminal prosecution, as juvenilecourt never had jurisdiction over murder, aggravated assault, and armed robberyoffenses for which defendant was convicted, where juvenile court proceedings wereinitiated by complaint of mother of the juvenile who sold gun to defendant; thejuvenile court considered only the matter of the defendant's purchase of thehandgun, constituting theft by receiving, but juvenile court did not considerinstant offenses and did not take jurisdiction of these offenses. Griffin v.State, 1995, 265 Ga. 552, 458 S.E.2d 813. Infants k 68.5

A juvenile accused of felony has no right to be tried in juvenile court unlessstatutes provide otherwise. O.C.G.A. s 15-11-5(b); Const. Art. 6, s 4, Par. 1.Chapman v. State, 1989, 259 Ga. 592, 385 S.E.2d 661. Infants k 68.5

Juvenile court does not have jurisdiction over persons between the ages of 17 and21 years, who have committed noncapital felonies, and who are under supervision ofor are on probation to juvenile court for acts of delinquency committed beforereaching age of 17 years. Code, s 24A-401(c)(2). State v. Crankshaw, 1979, 243Ga. 183, 253 S.E.2d 69. Infants k 68.5

Where defendant, who was 17 years of age at time of sale of marijuana, and at timeof sale was on indefinite probation in juvenile court for acts of delinquencycommitted prior to reaching age 17, was "child" for purposes of jurisdiction ofjuvenile court, juvenile court had exclusive jurisdiction of defendant chargedwith selling marijuana by reason of defendant's having been placed undersupervision of such court, and superior court had no jurisdiction until and unlessdefendant was transferred by juvenile court to superior court. Code, ss24A-401(c)(2), 24A-2501. Crankshaw v. State, 1978, 146 Ga.App. 892, 247 S.E.2d613, reversed 243 Ga. 183, 253 S.E.2d 69. Infants k 68.5

Adjudication of guilt of juvenile in superior court is criminal adjudication.Const. art. 6, s 4, par. 1. Carrindine v. Ricketts, 1976, 236 Ga. 283, 223 S.E.2d627. Infants k 68.1

Where juvenile was adjudicated guilty of crime in superior court, fact that he wascommitted to youth development center did not change criminal adjudication tocivil adjudication of delinquency. Code, s 99-213; Const. art. 6, s 4, par. 1.Carrindine v. Ricketts, 1976, 236 Ga. 283, 223 S.E.2d 627. Infants k 68.1

Superior court has concurrent jurisdiction with juvenile court for trial ofjuvenile defendants accused of felonies for which maximum penalty is neither lifeimprisonment nor death. Code, ss 24A-301, 24A-2501. J. J. v. State, 1975, 135Ga.App. 660, 218 S.E.2d 668. Infants k 68.5

Nothing in the Juvenile Court Code or in the proceedings of a juvenile court canabrogate the constitutional jurisdiction of the superior court to try a personaccused of felony if he has reached the age of criminal responsibility. Code, s24A-2501; Const. art. 6, s 4, par. 1. J. E. v. State, 1972, 127 Ga.App. 589, 194S.E.2d 288. Infants k 68.5

While juvenile court jurisdiction embraces all minors under age of 17, thesuperior courts cannot be deprived of their constitutional felony jurisdiction.Code, ss 24-2408, 26-301. Jones v. State, 1969, 119 Ga.App. 105, 166 S.E.2d 617.

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Westlaw_Document_16_38_34[1]Infants k 68.5

Juvenile court of county of residence of a minor under seventeen years of age,charged with burglary, arson and other offenses, had exclusive jurisdictioninsofar as juvenile proceedings were concerned, though such offenses werecommitted in another county, but since offenses charged included felonies, suchminor was also subject to original jurisdiction of superior court of county inwhich such felonies were committed. Code, ss 24-2408(1, 6), 24-2416; Const. art.6, s 4, par. 1; art. 6, s 14, par. 6. Whitman v. State, 1957, 96 Ga.App. 730,101 S.E.2d 621. Criminal Law k 93; Infants k 68.5

Juvenile Court Act does not deprive superior court of jurisdiction to trydefendant for felony, though defendant was under 16 when committing crime (Laws1915, p. 35). Johnson v. State, 1931, 43 Ga.App. 474, 159 S.E. 295. Infants k68.5

In light of the 1997 amendments to the School Safety and Juvenile Justice ReformAct limiting the exclusive jurisdiction of the superior courts to the trials ofjuveniles charged with offenses enumerated in O.C.G.A. s 15-11-5(b)(2)(A), judgesof the magistrate court may issue arrest warrants for juveniles charged with suchoffenses. Op.Atty.Gen. No. U98-9, July 14, 1998.

The School Safety and Juvenile Justice Reform Act grants exclusive jurisdiction tothe superior court over any matter concerning any child 13 to 17 years of age whois alleged to have committed certain serious felony offenses; therefore, amagistrate court judge must be designated to serve as a superior court judge inorder to issue arrest warrants, conduct a first appearance hearing, and conduct apreliminary or committal hearing for juveniles covered by the Act. Op.Atty.Gen.No. U95-9, May 3, 1995.

Court records concerning juveniles should be afforded the same treatment as anyother superior court records when the superior court retains exclusivejurisdiction over a case involving a juvenile thirteen to seventeen years of agewho is accused of committing any of the seven offenses specified in O.C.G.A. s15-11-5(b)(2)(A). Op.Atty.Gen. No. U95-8, April 17, 1995.

17. ---- Transfer of criminal cases, criminal offenses

Juvenile's due process rights were not violated when juvenile court dismissed,without holding a transfer hearing, delinquency petition charging juvenile withcommitting an act which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted theoffense of aggravated sodomy; even if juvenile court's jurisdiction over thematter vested when the petition was filed, statute governing transfer hearings didnot apply to any proceeding within the exclusive jurisdiction of the superiorcourt, including proceedings charging a juvenile with aggravated sodomy. In reN.C., 2008, 2008 WL 3877168. Infants k 68.5

Armed robbery by use of handgun, which was punishable by life imprisonment, wasnot transferable from the superior court to the juvenile court. State v. Harper,2005, 271 Ga.App. 761, 610 S.E.2d 699. Infants k 68.6

Statute that gave Superior Court exclusive jurisdiction over trial of any child 13to 17 years of age alleged to have committed armed robbery if committed withfirearm and that provided that Superior Court may, after investigation and for

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Westlaw_Document_16_38_34[1]extraordinary cause, transfer case gave Superior Court discretion to investigateand transfer case but did not establish duty to do so. Martin v. State, 2002, 256Ga.App. 527, 568 S.E.2d 754, reconsideration denied , certiorari denied. Infants k 68.7(1)

Juvenile court retained jurisdiction over juvenile past his 17th birthday foroffense he allegedly committed at age 16; once court exercised its jurisdiction byfiling of petition alleging delinquency, court could not have divested itself ofjurisdiction except by transfer hearing which it had jurisdiction to conduct afterjuvenile's 18th birthday. O.C.G.A. ss 15-11-5, 15-11-11(4). Interest of D.L.,1997, 228 Ga.App. 503, 492 S.E.2d 273. Infants k 68.5

Indicting and trying defendant as adult without first conducting transfer hearingwas not error, although defendant was originally detained as juvenile, where nopetition of delinquency was filed prior to defendant's indictment. Flowers v.State, 1995, 265 Ga. 688, 461 S.E.2d 533. Infants k 68.5

Presence of offenses that were not within exclusive jurisdiction of superiorcourt, because they occurred before effective date of jurisdiction statute, didnot present "extraordinary cause" warranting discretionary transfer of case tojuvenile court, in light of superior court's exclusive jurisdiction overaggravated sodomy and aggravated child molestation counts; superior court couldtry charges arising before statute's effective date as part of its concurrentjurisdiction. O.C.G.A. s 15-11-5(b)(2)(A, B). Reynolds v. State, 1995, 217Ga.App. 570, 458 S.E.2d 855, reconsideration denied , certiorari granted ,affirmed 266 Ga. 235, 466 S.E.2d 218. Infants k 68.6

After juvenile was acquitted of aggravated child molestation and aggravated sodomycharges, over which superior court had exclusive jurisdiction and which gavesuperior court concurrent jurisdiction for other charges, juvenile was notentitled to transfer of case to juvenile court for disposition of remainingcharges. O.C.G.A. s 15-11-5(b)(2)(D). Reynolds v. State, 1995, 217 Ga.App. 570,458 S.E.2d 855, reconsideration denied , certiorari granted , affirmed 266 Ga.235, 466 S.E.2d 218. Infants k 68.6

Because superior court was first court to exercise jurisdiction over defendant whowas 16 at time of crime and at trial for murder, armed robbery, and motor vehicletheft, superior court was not required to transfer case to juvenile court.O.C.G.A. s 15-11-5(b). Couch v. State, 1985, 253 Ga. 764, 325 S.E.2d 366.Infants k 68.6

Where no delinquency petition was filed, superior court was not required to holdtransfer hearing for defendant who was 16 at time of crime and at trial. Couch v.State, 1985, 253 Ga. 764, 325 S.E.2d 366. Infants k 68.6

Transfer hearing is not required where offense is one over which juvenile andsuperior courts have concurrent jurisdiction and superior court first takesjurisdiction. Code, s 24A-1403(b). Lewis v. State, 1980, 246 Ga. 101, 268 S.E.2d915. Criminal Law k 101(2)

The juvenile court and the superior court have concurrent jurisdiction ofdelinquent acts which constitute capital felonies, but juvenile court may considerquestions of custody only if such issues are transferred to it from superiorcourt. Code, s 24A-301. Quire v. Clayton County Dept. of Family & ChildrenServices, 1978, 242 Ga. 85, 249 S.E.2d 538. Courts k 472.1

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Requirements of statute, such as whether child is amenable to treatment orrehabilitation through available facilities, must be met in a juvenile courttransfer hearing, and burden is on State to establish those requirements. Code,ss 24A-2501, 24A-2501(a)(3). W. F. v. State, 1978, 144 Ga.App. 523, 241 S.E.2d631. Infants k 68.5

Superior courts and juvenile courts have concurrent jurisdiction over juvenilescharged with capital offenses and whichever court takes first jurisdiction overmatter may retain it, subject to right of juvenile court to transfer case tosuperior court. Code, s 24A-2501. Hartley v. Clack, 1977, 239 Ga. 113, 236S.E.2d 63. Infants k 68.5

Where jurisdiction over juveniles charged with capital offenses is first acquiredby juvenile court, subsequent superior court indictment does not divest juvenilecourt of its jurisdiction unless proper transfer proceeding has been held. Code,ss 24A-301(b), 24A-2501. Hartley v. Clack, 1977, 239 Ga. 113, 236 S.E.2d 63.Infants k 68.5

Where superior court effectively transferred its jurisdiction over 15-year-olddefendant for alleged murder offenses to juvenile court, only means by whichjuvenile court could divest itself of jurisdiction was under statute pertaining totransfers after petitions alleging delinquency have been filed. Code, s 24A-2501.K. G. W. v. State, 1976, 140 Ga.App. 571, 231 S.E.2d 421. Infants k 68.6

Superior court jurisdiction over trial of juveniles for felony offenses notinvolving capital crimes attaches after juvenile court has determined that childcannot be rehabilitated. Code, ss 24A-301, 24A-2501. J. J. v. State, 1975, 135Ga.App. 660, 218 S.E.2d 668. Infants k 68.5

18. ---- Capital offenses, generally, criminal offenses

In capital case, juvenile does not acquire special rights in juvenile court systemuntil juvenile court exercises its concurrent jurisdiction. O.C.G.A. ss15-11-5(b), 15-11-11, 15-11-39. In Interest of C.R., 1993, 263 Ga. 155, 430S.E.2d 3, on subsequent appeal 264 Ga. 215, 442 S.E.2d 737. Infants k 68.5

Jurisdiction of prosecution of juvenile for capital offense properly vested insuperior court, rather than in juvenile court which had concurrent jurisdiction,where juvenile was indicted and delinquency petition was never filed in juvenilecourt; thus, no transfer hearing was required. O.C.G.A. ss 15-11-39, 16-5-40(b).Taylor v. State, 1990, 194 Ga.App. 871, 392 S.E.2d 57. Infants k 68.5

Concurrent jurisdiction of superior court over capital felonies committed byjuveniles must necessarily extend to related lesser crimes which are part of samecriminal transaction. O.C.G.A. ss 15-11-5, 16-8-2, 16-8-12(a)(4)(A). Worthy v.State, 1985, 253 Ga. 661, 324 S.E.2d 431. Infants k 68.5

Exclusive original jurisdiction rests in juvenile courts over juveniledelinquents, except in capitol felony cases. Crankshaw v. State, 1978, 146Ga.App. 892, 247 S.E.2d 613, reversed 243 Ga. 183, 253 S.E.2d 69. Infants k68.5

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Superior court and juvenile court have concurrent jurisdiction over juvenilescharged with capital offenses, and whichever court first takes jurisdiction overthe matter may retain it. K. G. W. v. State, 1976, 140 Ga.App. 571, 231 S.E.2d421. Infants k 68.5

19. ---- Murder cases, criminal offenses

Superior Court was not divested of jurisdiction over juvenile defendant withrespect to criminal acts that ordinarily would have been beyond scope of SuperiorCourt's jurisdiction, including alleged violation of Street Gang Act, but for factthat evidence of each crime stemmed from the same criminal transaction of murderand armed robbery, which alleged crimes vested Superior Court with exclusivejurisdiction pursuant to statute governing jurisdiction over juveniles. Seaboltv. State, 2005, 279 Ga. 518, 616 S.E.2d 448. Infants k 68.5

Felony murder was "murder," within meaning of statute vesting the superior courtwith exclusive jurisdiction over trials of young people aged 13 to 17 alleged tohave committed murder. Miller v. State, 2002, 275 Ga. 730, 571 S.E.2d 788,reconsideration denied, certiorari denied 123 S.Ct. 1911, 538 U.S. 1004, 155L.Ed.2d 835, habeas corpus denied 2007 WL 639737, certificate of appealability2007 WL 2406879, affirmed 276 Fed.Appx. 927, 2008 WL 1931308. Infants k 68.5

Once shooting victim died and charge against 13-year-old was upgraded fromaggravated assault to murder, superior court was vested with exclusivejurisdiction, and voluntariness of juvenile's subsequent custodial statement toinvestigator was to be determined under criteria of Riley v. State, and withoutregard to any alleged violation of statute that sets forth procedures for takingchild into custody. O.C.G.A. ss 15-11-5(b)(2)(A)(i), 15-11-19(a). Murphy v.State, 1998, 233 Ga.App. 579, 504 S.E.2d 484, reconsideration denied , certiorarigranted , reversed 270 Ga. 880, 515 S.E.2d 148, on remand 238 Ga.App. 123, 518S.E.2d 430. Criminal Law k 86; Criminal Law k 412.1(2); Infants k68.5

Juvenile court, rather than Superior Court, had jurisdiction over 15-year-oldsuspected of capital murder, even though no delinquency petition had been filedwhen arrest warrant issued; filing of juvenile complaint form "commenced" case,for purposes of placing jurisdiction in juvenile court. O.C.G.A. s 15-11-11. InInterest of C.R., 1993, 263 Ga. 155, 430 S.E.2d 3, on subsequent appeal 264 Ga.215, 442 S.E.2d 737. Infants k 68.5

Superior court properly had jurisdiction over juvenile accused of murdering halfsister, as superior court had taken jurisdiction of case before petition was filedin juvenile court, and juvenile court petition did not contain endorsement statingthat filing of petition was in best interest of public and child as required bystatute. O.C.G.A. s 15-11-23. In Interest of D.H.C., 1988, 185 Ga.App. 738, 365S.E.2d 884. Infants k 68.5

Superior court properly had jurisdiction over automobile theft charge broughtagainst 16-year-old defendant who was also charged with two counts of murder, evenabsent a hearing on transfer of charge from juvenile court, as superior court'sconcurrent jurisdiction over defendant's murder charges necessarily extended torelated lesser offense of automobile theft which was part of same criminaltransaction. O.C.G.A. s 15-11-39. Golden v. State, 1985, 176 Ga.App. 412, 336S.E.2d 332. Infants k 68.5

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Superior court had jurisdiction over theft by taking count of two-count indictmentagainst juvenile defendant where the other count charged murder with maliceaforethought. O.C.G.A. ss 15-11-5, 16-8-2, 16-8-12(a)(4)(A). Worthy v. State,1985, 253 Ga. 661, 324 S.E.2d 431. Infants k 68.5

Under statute providing that petition alleging delinquency of child shall not befiled unless court has determined and endorsed upon petition that filing ofpetition is in best interest of public and child, juvenile court did not abuse itsdiscretion in refusing to accept or file petition alleging delinquency of15-year-old juvenile, tendered prior to return of murder indictment, on groundthat it was policy of such court not to accept jurisdiction of capital felonycases. Code, s 24A-1601. Lane v. Jones, 1979, 244 Ga. 17, 257 S.E.2d 525.Infants k 68.5; Infants k 191

Where, though juvenile court judge issued orders authorizing photographing,urinalysis, fingerprinting and blood testing of 16-year-old accused after he wasarrested and charged with murder and judge appointed guardian ad litem foraccused, no petition alleging delinquency was filed, juvenile court had notobtained jurisdiction over the offense; thus, a transfer hearing in juvenilecourt was not required and superior court obtained jurisdiction when accused wassubsequently indicted for the offense. Code, ss 24A-801, 24A-1601, 24A-1603,24A-2501. Longshore v. State, 1977, 239 Ga. 437, 238 S.E.2d 22. Infants k68.5

Juvenile court's issuing order that juvenile be incarcerated at youth developmentcenter was not exercise of juvenile court jurisdiction so as to bar superior courtfrom gaining jurisdiction by means of indictment for armed robbery and murder.Code, ss 24A-301(b), 24A-2501. Hartley v. Clack, 1977, 239 Ga. 113, 236 S.E.2d63. Infants k 68.5

Superior court had exclusive jurisdiction of murder prosecution of boy under theage of 17, and no action was required by juvenile court. Const. art. 6, s 4, par.1; Code, s 24-2410. Holmes v. State, 1968, 224 Ga. 553, 163 S.E.2d 803. Infants k 68.5

The Juvenile Court Act did not withdraw from the Superior Court jurisdiction totry a petitioner of the age of 16 for the offense of murder, nor was theconviction invalidated by failure to make the pretrial investigations required bythe Juvenile Court Act for trials in juvenile court. Laws 1951, p. 291. Jones v.Balkcom, 1954, 210 Ga. 689, 82 S.E.2d 657. Infants k 68.5

In prosecution of 14 year old defendant for murder, the Superior Court hadjurisdiction over person of defendant. Const. art. 6, s 4, par. 1, Ga.Code Ann. s24-2401 et seq. Armstrong v. State, 1954, 90 Ga.App. 173, 82 S.E.2d 51. Infants k 68.5

Amendment to Juvenile Court Act striking provision excepting crimes committed bychildren under 16 years of age which are punishable by death or life imprisonmentfrom terms of act did not deprive superior courts in a county in which juvenilecourts have been established of right to try a defendant indicted for a felonysuch as murder, although defendant may have been less than 16 years at time ofcommission of alleged crime (Laws 1915, p. 36, s 2(a), as amended by Laws 1935, p.400, s 1; Const. art. 6, s 4, par. 1). Mills v. State, 1937, 56 Ga.App. 390, 192S.E. 730. Infants k 68.5

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20. ---- Rape, criminal offenses

Juvenile court never took jurisdiction over 17-year-old defendant who was onprobation in juvenile court at time rape was committed and therefore defendant waswithin jurisdiction of superior court when grand jury indicted him for rape;juvenile court conducted hearing on matter which did not involve defendant becauseof dismissal of charge for lack of probable cause in magistrate court and juvenilecourt did not order transfer to superior court. Ward v. State, 1992, 205 Ga.App.504, 423 S.E.2d 288. Infants k 68.5

21. ---- Child molestation, criminal offenses

Although original child molestation charge against juvenile should have been filedin juvenile court, rather than superior court superior court gained jurisdictiononce state added aggravated sexual battery count. In re K.C., 2008, 290 Ga.App.416, 659 S.E.2d 821. Infants k 68.5

The trial court had jurisdiction to convict defendant of two counts of childmolestation, even though defendant was a juvenile for the first six months of thethree year period alleged in the indictment; the victim testified that theinappropriate touching occurred "a lot" and happened "every time" defendant spentthe night at her house, the victim's mother testified that during the relevanttime period defendant visited the home a couple days per week and on mostweekends, and spent the night "some of the times," the victim testified thatdefendant spent the night "most of the time," the abuse of victim occurredconsistently over the three year period alleged in the indictment, and thusevidence established that defendant abused victim when he was an adult. McGruderv. State, 2006, 279 Ga.App. 851, 632 S.E.2d 730. Infants k 68.5

Fact that some of the acts of child molestation and sodomy charged againstjuvenile defendant in superior court were alleged to have occurred beforeeffective date of statute vesting superior court with exclusive jurisdiction overcertain offenses committed by juveniles, including some of the offenses chargedagainst defendant, did not create the "extraordinary cause" warranting transfer tojuvenile court under the statute. O.C.G.A. s 15-11-5(b)(2)(A, B). Reynolds v.State, 1996, 266 Ga. 235, 466 S.E.2d 218. Infants k 68.5; Infants k 68.6

Testimony of alleged child molestation victims supported finding that alleged actsoccurred after defendant's 17th birthday as necessary to find defendant guilty.Johnson v. State, 1994, 214 Ga.App. 319, 447 S.E.2d 663, certiorari denied.Infants k 68.5

Superior court had authority to try defendant for child molestation, despite hiscontention that he was under 17 at time offenses were committed, where jury wasinstructed that defendant could be found guilty only if he committed alleged actsafter turning 17. O.C.G.A. s 15-11-5. Johnson v. State, 1994, 214 Ga.App. 319,447 S.E.2d 663, certiorari denied. Infants k 68.5

Juvenile court's finding, that no evidence was presented that acts of childmolestation charged in juvenile court were committed when defendant was youngerthan 17, amounted to finding that juvenile court did not have exclusive originaljurisdiction, and thus it was not necessary for juvenile court to transfer chargesto superior court in order for superior court to have jurisdiction. O.C.G.A. ss

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Westlaw_Document_16_38_34[1]15-11-2(2)(A), 15-11-5(a), (a)(1), (d). Landrum v. State, 1993, 210 Ga.App. 275,436 S.E.2d 40. Infants k 68.5; Infants k 68.7(4)

22. ---- Armed robbery cases, criminal offenses

Superior Court exceeded its authority in transferring juveniles' armed robberycases to Juvenile Court after state had elected to pursue cases in Superior Court;district attorney, and not court, made election regarding whether to pursue caseagainst juvenile in Superior Court or Juvenile Court, and where district attorneyproperly invoked Superior Court's jurisdiction by pursuing cases against juvenilesin Superior Court, Superior Court was obligated to retain jurisdiction over casesand was not authorized, sua sponte, to transfer it prior to indictment. State v.Henderson, 2007, 281 Ga. 623, 641 S.E.2d 515, reconsideration denied. Infants k 68.6

Superior Court had concurrent jurisdiction with Juvenile Court over juveniles whoallegedly committed armed robbery. State v. Henderson, 2007, 281 Ga. 623, 641S.E.2d 515, reconsideration denied. Infants k 68.5

Defense counsel's failure to file petition to have 16-year-old defendant's armedrobbery case transferred to juvenile court was not ineffective assistance ofcounsel, where trial court had original jurisdiction over individuals, likedefendant, between 13 and 17 years of age who had been charged with any of sevenoffenses, including armed robbery, committed with a firearm. Hall v. State, 2005,274 Ga.App. 842, 619 S.E.2d 344. Criminal Law k 1893

Superior court had exclusive jurisdiction over armed robbery case involvingalleged use of shotgun by defendants who were 16 and 15 years old at time ofrobbery, and thus, transfer of case to juvenile court was not warranted. O.C.G.A.s 15-11-5(b)(2)(A)(vii). Bearden v. State, 2000, 241 Ga.App. 842, 528 S.E.2d 275.Infants k 68.5

Trial court correctly considered sufficiency of evidence on armed robbery chargeagainst juveniles when they raised challenge to superior court's subject matterjurisdiction over matter ordinarily within jurisdiction of juvenile court.O.C.G.A. s 15-11-5(b)(2)(A). State v. Watson, 1999, 239 Ga.App. 482, 520 S.E.2d911, reconsideration denied , certiorari denied. Criminal Law k 92

Undisputed fact that victim obeyed gunman's order, issued at gunpoint, for victimto drop his money demonstrated that gunman exercised complete control over moneyand would support finding of "taking" within meaning of armed robbery statute,which therefore supported subject matter jurisdiction of superior court to tryjuveniles for armed robbery. O.C.G.A. ss 15-11-5(b)(2)(A), 16-8-41. State v.Watson, 1999, 239 Ga.App. 482, 520 S.E.2d 911, reconsideration denied , certioraridenied. Criminal Law k 92; Robbery k 5

Superior court did not lack jurisdiction to convict juvenile of aggravated assaultwhere aggravated assault was part of same criminal transaction as greater offenseof armed robbery, an offense over which superior court had jurisdiction. O.C.G.A.s 15-11-5(b)(2)(A). Leeks v. State, 1997, 226 Ga.App. 227, 483 S.E.2d 691.Infants k 68.5

Because juvenile court first assumed jurisdiction over minor alleged to havecommitted armed robbery, its jurisdiction was exclusive unless and until case was

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Westlaw_Document_16_38_34[1]properly transferred to superior court and, thus, any error in ordering transferwould not be harmless. O.C.G.A. s 15-11-39. In Interest of J.D., 1990, 195Ga.App. 801, 395 S.E.2d 280. Infants k 68.5; Infants k 68.8

Juvenile court had no authority to take jurisdiction over alleged delinquent actsconstituting offenses of armed robbery and of kidnapping with bodily injury wheresuperior court had, as authorized by statute, already taken jurisdiction over suchoffenses. Code, s 24A-301. D. L. M. v. State, 1981, 160 Ga.App. 424, 287 S.E.2d355. Infants k 68.5

Where 16-year-old juvenile was charged with armed robbery, a crime for which hecould be punished by loss of life or confinement for life in the penitentiary, andsuperior court first took jurisdiction over juvenile, judgment of such courtdenying motion which sought to transfer jurisdiction to juvenile court and whichsought a hearing to determine juvenile's amenability to rehabilitation in juvenilecourt system was not error. Code, ss 24A-2501, 99-209(a)(5). Brown v. State,1975, 235 Ga. 353, 219 S.E.2d 419. Infants k 68.6

23. ---- Burglary, criminal offenses

Juvenile became 17 years of age for purposes of jurisdiction of superior court onthe day preceding the 17th anniversary of his birth; thus, superior court, ratherthan juvenile court, had jurisdiction to try defendant for burglary which occurredbetween 12 a. m. and 1 a. m. on July 18, 1979, even though defendant's birthcertificate showed that he was born at 1:10 a. m. on July 18, 1962. Code, ss24A-301(a)(1)(A), 24A-401(c)(1), (e)(1). Edmonds v. State, 1980, 154 Ga.App. 650,269 S.E.2d 512. Infants k 68.5

The age of criminal responsibility being 14 years of age, or earlier in certaininstances, even if language of Juvenile Court Act might indicate that it wasintention to give original jurisdiction to juvenile courts in all cases pertainingto criminal charges of persons less than 17 years of age, superior courts ofcounties having no juvenile court did not lose jurisdiction to try 15-year-old boyon burglary and robbery charges. Code, s 26-301. Foster v. Caldwell, 1969, 225Ga. 1, 165 S.E.2d 724, certiorari denied 90 S.Ct. 398, 396 U.S. 117, 24 L.Ed.2d309. Infants k 68.5

Superior court, as respects burglary prosecution of boy under 16, properlyoverruled plea to jurisdiction. Laws 1915, p. 35 et seq. Thomas v. State, 1932,174 Ga. 654, 163 S.E. 734. Infants k 68.5

Juvenile court's commitment of child under 16 to state reformatory, after hearingon specifications alleging burglary, etc., by order reciting that child wasdelinquent, did not amount to a trial for burglary, over which superior court,under Const. art. 6, s 4, par. 1 (Civ.Code, s 6510), had exclusive jurisdiction,and commitment was valid under Acts 1915, p. 35 et seq., as amended by Acts 1916,pp. 58, 59. Williams v. Davidson, 1917, 147 Ga. 491, 94 S.E. 564. Infants k68.5

The juvenile court act held not to deprive the superior court of its jurisdictionof a burglary case under Const. art. 6, s 4, par. 1, though accused was less than16 years old when the crime was committed. Hicks v. State, 1917, 20 Ga.App. 61,92 S.E. 558. Infants k 68.5

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The juvenile court act held not to deprive the superior court of its jurisdictionof a burglary case under Const. art. 6, s 4, par. 1, though accused was less than16 years old when the crime was committed. Hicks v. State, 1917, 146 Ga. 706, 92S.E. 216. Infants k 68.5

24. ---- Larceny, criminal offenses

Juvenile Court had jurisdiction of case against juvenile commenced by filing ofpetition alleging that named juvenile was in county and charged by criminalwarrants with three specific counts of automobile larceny though juvenile hadwaived examination on alleged charges and had been bound over on bond by justiceof peace to Superior Court. Code, ss 24-2401, 24-2404, 24-2408 to 24-2410,24-2411, 24-2418, 24-2443. Powell v. Gregg, 1968, 118 Ga.App. 225, 163 S.E.2d251. Infants k 68.5

Where no warrant or commitment papers were forwarded to Superior Court inconnection with charges against juvenile of larceny, Superior Court did notacquire jurisdiction over juvenile. Code, s 27-420. Powell v. Gregg, 1968, 118Ga.App. 225, 163 S.E.2d 251. Infants k 68.5

Allegation that juvenile was charged with three counts of automobile larceny wassufficient to bring juvenile within jurisdictional provisions of Juvenile Court.Code, s 24-2408(1). Powell v. Gregg, 1968, 118 Ga.App. 225, 163 S.E.2d 251.Infants k 68.5

25. ---- Traffic offenses, criminal offenses

Speeding charge against 16-year-old juvenile could be tried only in juvenilecourt, inasmuch as speeding was designated as "crime." O.C.G.A. ss 15-11-2(2)(A),(6)(A), 15-11-5(a)(1)(A). In Interest of L.J.V., 1986, 180 Ga.App. 400, 349S.E.2d 37. Infants k 68.5

26. Probation violation

Violation of probation which occurs after juvenile's 17th birthday will notauthorize initiation of new delinquency petition against juvenile, even thoughviolation of probation may be "delinquent act" that could permit revocation ofprobation on proper petition. O.C.G.A. ss 15-11-5(d), 15-11-37(e, f). InInterest of B.S.L., 1991, 200 Ga.App. 170, 407 S.E.2d 123. Infants k 152

27. Instructions

Incorrect jury charge that defendant could be convicted for child molestation ifalleged offenses occurred on or about alleged date of indictment "or" after 17thbirthday of defendant was not reversible error, even though "or" should have been"and," where jury charge as a whole informed jury that it could not convict absentfinding that defendant was 17 years old at the time of events alleged. O.C.G.A. s15-11-5. Johnson v. State, 1994, 214 Ga.App. 319, 447 S.E.2d 663, certioraridenied. Criminal Law k 822(5)

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Westlaw_Document_16_38_34[1] 28. Judgments or orders, generally

Juvenile's remedy for state's alleged failure to meet procedural and timingrequirements governing juvenile court cases before her case was transferred fromsuperior court to juvenile court was to seek dismissal of superior court charges,rather than raising procedural issue as a substantive defense to delinquencypetition; dismissal would have been without prejudice, and state would have beenauthorized to file new delinquency allegations in juvenile court. In re K.C.,2008, 290 Ga.App. 416, 659 S.E.2d 821. Criminal Law k 303.30(1); Infants k68.6

Juvenile court proceedings involving custody and support could not be consideredadjudication by court of competent jurisdiction for res judicata purposes informer husband's action for fraud, breach of contract, perjury, slander, anddefamation of character against former wife, where nothing in statute settingforth jurisdiction of juvenile court purported to give juvenile court jurisdictionover claims in former husband's complaint. Litsky v. Schaub, 2004, 269 Ga.App.254, 603 S.E.2d 754. Child Custody k 532; Child Support k 225

Juvenile court order terminating father's parental rights was not void on groundsthat father had relinquished his parental rights to his mother, and thus superiorcourt order granting adoption petition of maternal uncle also was not void, asjuvenile court order terminating father's parental rights rendered father'srelinquishing of his rights ineffective. In re B.A.S., 2002, 254 Ga.App. 430, 563S.E.2d 141, reconsideration dismissed, certiorari denied , certiorari denied 123S.Ct. 1580, 538 U.S. 928, 155 L.Ed.2d 323. Infants k 221

Juvenile court order that stated on its face that it was addressing the allegeddeprivation of child recited sufficient facts to confer subject matterjurisdiction. O.C.G.A. s 15-11-28(a)(1)(C). In re M.L.C., 2001, 249 Ga.App. 435,548 S.E.2d 137. Infants k 221

Order entered by juvenile court in action to terminate father's parental rightswas not void, for failing to recite facts necessary to establish juvenile court'ssubject matter jurisdiction over action; by indicating that action was fortermination of father's parental rights, order was sufficient to show basis forjuvenile court's subject matter jurisdiction. O.C.G.A. s 15-11-5(a)(2)(C). InInterest of W.R.S., 1994, 213 Ga.App. 616, 445 S.E.2d 367. Infants k 221

Where order of juvenile court terminating parental rights of father contained nofactual findings concerning venue and jurisdiction over person of father, suchorder was void. Const. art. 6, s 14, par. 6. Williams v. Department of HumanResources, 1979, 150 Ga.App. 610, 258 S.E.2d 288. Infants k 221

Juvenile court is a court of special and limited jurisdiction, and its judgmentsmust show on their face such facts as are necessary to give it jurisdiction ofperson and subject matter. Williams v. Department of Human Resources, 1979, 150Ga.App. 610, 258 S.E.2d 288. Infants k 221

If order of a juvenile court fails to recite jurisdictional facts, its judgment isvoid. Williams v. Department of Human Resources, 1979, 150 Ga.App. 610, 258S.E.2d 288. Infants k 221

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Westlaw_Document_16_38_34[1]Where juvenile court's order taking custody, control and supervision of childfails to show that it was by reason of specified statutory grounds, it is void forwant of jurisdiction. Code, s 24-2401 et seq. Ferguson v. Hunt, 1966, 221 Ga.728, 146 S.E.2d 756. Infants k 221

Juvenile court is a court of special and limited jurisdiction, and its judgmentsmust show upon their face such facts as are necessary to give it jurisdiction ofthe person and the subject matter, and if such jurisdiction is not shown, suchjudgments are void. Ferguson v. Hunt, 1966, 221 Ga. 728, 146 S.E.2d 756. Infants k 221

29. Sentencing

Defendant's prior burglary conviction by guilty plea as juvenile did notconstitute valid felony conviction under recidivist sentencing statute, and thus,defendant was not subject to recidivist sentencing for instant conviction fortheft by taking; although State claimed that defendant was, at time of priorconviction, sentenced as adult under Youthful Offender Act, juvenile courtretained jurisdiction over that case, and Act was inapplicable in defendant's casesince it applied only to offenders who were at least 17, but less than 25, yearsof age, and Act impacted defendant's prior sentence, not his prior conviction.Smith v. State, 2004, 266 Ga.App. 111, 596 S.E.2d 230. Sentencing And Punishment k 1291

Superior court was not required to transfer case to juvenile court for sentencingafter defendant was convicted of offense, i.e., voluntary manslaughter, in whichcourts would share jurisdiction. O.C.G.A. 15-11-5. Murphy v. State, 1998, 233Ga.App. 579, 504 S.E.2d 484, reconsideration denied , certiorari granted ,reversed 270 Ga. 880, 515 S.E.2d 148, on remand 238 Ga.App. 123, 518 S.E.2d 430.Infants k 69(1)

Superior court did not abuse its discretion in denying juvenile defendant's motionto transfer to juvenile court for sentencing in prosecution for child molestationand sodomy after jury returned verdict finding him guilty only on charges overwhich superior court lacked exclusive jurisdiction, where superior court had heardall evidence in case so as to be in best position to impose sentence, and thus itwas likely that transfer solely for purpose of disposition after conviction wouldhave done little more than impede judicial process with procedural steps.O.C.G.A. s 15-11-5(b)(2)(D). Reynolds v. State, 1996, 266 Ga. 235, 466 S.E.2d218. Infants k 69(4); Infants k 69(5)

Division of family and children's services was authorized to effectuate purpose ofjuvenile court order complained of by prescribing confinement pursuant tostatutes; if juvenile court judge wished to insure confinement, this could bedone by placing child in institution, camp or other facility for delinquentchildren operated under direction of court or other local authority, or bytransferring offense for prosecution to appropriate court having jurisdiction ofoffense. Code, ss 24A-101 et seq., 24A-2302(c, d), 24A-2501, 24A-2701,24A-2801(b), 99-201 et seq., 99-212(c), 99-213, 99-213(d)(2, 3), 99-222. InInterest of R.D., 1977, 141 Ga.App. 843, 234 S.E.2d 680. Infants k 68.5;Infants k 222

30. Review

Defendant's claim that juvenile jurisdiction statute violated due process and

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Westlaw_Document_16_38_34[1]equal protection provisions of federal and state constitutions was not properlybefore appellate court; superior court's ruling appealed from was based uponcourt's finding that charge against defendant had been reduced to robbery, andthus, claim was not specifically ruled upon by superior court. State v. Harper,2005, 271 Ga.App. 761, 610 S.E.2d 699. Criminal Law k 1045

Defendant waived on appeal claims that statute that permitted the State to try himin superior court on murder charge, when he was 14 years old, was unconstitutionalon its face and as applied, constituted cruel and unusual punishment, and violateddue process and equal protection, where defendant failed to raise theseconstitutional challenges during trial, although his new trial motion did includetwo of these claims. Lewis v. State, 2005, 279 Ga. 69, 608 S.E.2d 602,reconsideration denied, certiorari denied 126 S.Ct. 571, 546 U.S. 987, 163 L.Ed.2d478. Criminal Law k 1030(2)

Order transferring minor from juvenile court to superior court was a final order,since it operated to transfer case to superior court after which cause was nolonger pending in "the court below," within statute providing for appeal wherejudgment is final, that is, where cause is no longer pending in court below.Code, ss 6-701(a), par. 1, 24A-3801. J. T. M. v. State, 1977, 142 Ga.App. 635,236 S.E.2d 764. Infants k 68.8

Juvenile court has original jurisdiction in custody controversy involvingdelinquent child, unruly child or deprived child, and appellate jurisdiction insuch cases is vested in Court of Appeals. Code, ss 24A-302, 24A-401. In re J. R.T., 1974, 233 Ga. 204, 210 S.E.2d 684. Courts k 217(3); Infants k 196

Ga. Code Ann., s 15-11-28, GA ST s 15-11-28

Current through end of the 2008 Regular Session.

(C) 2008 Thomson Reuters/West.

END OF DOCUMENT

© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

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Ga. Code Ann., s 15-11-28 - THELAW · 2009. 6. 13. · Ga. Code Ann., s 15-11-28 C West's Code of Georgia Annotated Currentness Title 15. Courts Chapter 11 ... deprivation shall have