G Immigration Law Full Text

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[G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999]

ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO andthe COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

MENDOZA, J.:

Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzanowere candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.The other one was Gabriel V. Daza III. The results of the election were as follows:

Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894Gabriel V. Daza III 54,275[1]

The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pendingpetition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that privaterespondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.

In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998,[2]the Second Division of the COMELEC

granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate ofcandidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualifiedfrom running for any elective position. The COMELECs Second Division said:

What is presented before the Commission is a petition for disqualification of EduardoBarrios Manzano as candidate for the office of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May11, 1998 elections. The petition is based on the ground that the respondent is anAmerican citizen based on the record of the Bureau of Immigration andmisrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino citizen.

In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, the respondent admitted that heis registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien Certificate ofRegistration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he wasborn in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the UnitedStates, San Francisco, California, on September 14, 1955, and is considered anAmerican citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as anAmerican citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.

Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent Manzano is both aFilipino and a US citizen. In other words, he holds dual citizenship.

The question presented is whether under our laws, he is disqualified from theposition for which he filed his certificate of candidacy. Is he eligible for the office heseeks to be elected?

Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those holding dual citizenshipare disqualified from running for any elective local position.

WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby declares the respondent Eduardo BarriosManzano DISQUALIFIED as candidate for Vice-Mayor of Makati City.

On May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. [3]Themotion remained pending even until after the election held on May 11, 1998.

Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, dated May 10, 1998,of the COMELEC, the board of canvassers tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor ofMakati City but suspended the proclamation of the winner.

On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene in the case fordisqualification.[4]Petitioners motion was opposed by private respondent.

The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the COMELECen banc rendered its resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one commissioner abstaining,the COMELEC en banc reversed the ruling of its Second Division and declaredprivate respondent qualified to run for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11,1998 elections.[5]The pertinent portions of the resolution of the COMELEC en bancread:

As aforesaid, respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in San Francisco,California, U.S.A. He acquired US citizenship by operation of the United StatesConstitution and laws under the principle of jus soli.

He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 PhilippineConstitution, as his father and mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth. At theage of six (6), his parents brought him to the Philippines using an American passportas travel document. His parents also registered him as an alien with the PhilippineBureau of Immigration. He was issued an alien certificate of registration. This,

however, did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he did notrenounce Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the UnitedStates.

It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of majority, he

registered himself as a voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998,which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law. UnderPhilippine law, he no longer had U.S. citizenship.

At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division,

adopted on May 7, 1998, was not yet final. Respondent Manzano obtained thehighest number of votes among the candidates for vice-mayor of Makati City,garnering one hundred three thousand eight hundred fifty three (103,853) votes overhis closest rival, Ernesto S. Mercado, who obtained one hundred thousand eighthundred ninety four (100,894) votes, or a margin of two thousand nine hundred fiftynine (2,959) votes. Gabriel Daza III obtained third place with fifty four thousand twohundred seventy five (54,275) votes. In applying election laws, it would be far betterto err in favor of the popular choice than be embroiled in complex legal issues

involving private international law which may well be settled before the highest court(Cf. Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 257 SCRA 727).


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WHEREFORE, the Commission en banc hereby REVERSES the resolution of theSecond Division, adopted on May 7, 1998, ordering the cancellation of therespondents certificate of candidacy.

We declare respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano to be QUALIFIED as acandidate for the position of vice-mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998,elections.

ACCORDINGLY, the Commission directs the Makati City Board of Canvassers, upon

proper notice to the parties, to reconvene and proclaim the respondent Eduardo LuisBarrios Manzano as the winning candidate for vice-mayor of Makati City.

Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the board ofcanvassers, on the evening of August 31, 1998, proclaimed private respondent asvice mayor of the City of Makati.

This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the aforesaid resolution ofthe COMELEC en banc and to declare private respondent disqualified to hold theoffice of vice mayor of Makati City. Petitioner contends that !

[T]he COMELEC en banc ERRED in holding that:

A. Under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S. citizen when he:

1. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he attained the age of majority whenhe was already 37 years old; and,

2. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he (merely) registered himself as avoter and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.

B. Manzano is qualified to run for and or hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of theCity of Makati;

C. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Divisionadopted on 7 May 1998 was not yet final so that, effectively, petitioner may not bedeclared the winner even assuming that Manzano is disqualified to run for and holdthe elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati.

We first consider the threshold procedural issue raised by private respondentManzano !whether petitioner Mercado has personality to bring this suit consideringthat he was not an original party in the case for disqualification filed by ErnestoMamaril nor was petitioners motion for leave to intervene granted.

I. PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO BRING THIS SUIT

Private respondent cites the following provisions of Rule 8 of the Rules ofProcedure of the COMELEC in support of his claim that petitioner has no right to

intervene and, therefore, cannot bring this suit to set aside the ruling denying hismotion for intervention:

Section 1. When proper and when may be permitted to intervene. !Any person

allowed to initiate an action or proceeding may, before or during the trial of an actionor proceeding, be permitted by the Commission, in its discretion to intervene in suchaction or proceeding, if he has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in thesuccess of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so situatedas to be adversely affected by such action or proceeding.

. . . .

Section 3. Discretion of Commission. !In allowing or disallowing a motion forintervention, the Commission or the Division, in the exercise of its discretion, shall

consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice theadjudication of the rights of the original parties and whether or not the intervenorsrights may be fully protected in a separate action or proceeding.

Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the matter in

litigation nor an interest to protect because he is a defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati City [who] cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor ofMakati City even if the private respondent be ultimately disqualified by final and

executory judgment.

The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought tointervene in the proceedings before the COMELEC, there had already been aproclamation of the results of the election for the vice mayoralty contest for MakatiCity, on the basis of which petitioner came out only second to private respondent.The fact, however, is that there had been no proclamation at that time. Certainly,petitioner had, and still has, an interest in ousting private respondent from the race atthe time he sought to intervene. The rule in Labo v. COMELEC,[6] reiterated inseveral cases,[7] only applies to cases in which the election of the respondent is

contested, and the question is whether one who placed second to the disqualifiedcandidate may be declared the winner. In the present case, at the time petitionerfiled a Motion for Leave to File Intervention on May 20, 1998, there had been no

proclamation of the winner, and petitioners purpose was precisely to have privaterespondent disqualified from running for [an] elective local position under 40(d) ofR.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who originally instituted the disqualificationproceedings), a registered voter of Makati City, was competent to bring the action, sowas petitioner since the latter was a rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.

Nor is petitioners interest in the matter in litigation any less because he filed amotion for intervention only on May 20, 1998, after private respondent had beenshown to have garnered the highest number of votes among the candidates for vicemayor. That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for

the disqualification against private respondent is clear from 6 of R.A. No. 6646,otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides:

Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shal l not

be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason acandidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and


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he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Courtor Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, orprotest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during thependency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidatewhenever the evidence of guilt is strong.

Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings fordisqualification even after election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.

The failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioners motion forintervention was tantamount to a denial of the motion, justifying petitioner in filing theinstant petition for certiorari. As the COMELEC en banc instead decided the meritsof the case, the present petition properly deals not only with the denial of petitionersmotion for intervention but also with the substantive issues respecting privaterespondents alleged disqualification on the ground of dual citizenship.

This brings us to the next question, namely, whether private respondentManzano possesses dual citizenship and, if so, whether he is disqualified from beinga candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.

II. DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION

The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under 40

of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which declares asdisqualified from running for any elective local position: . . . (d) Those with dualcitizenship. This provision is incorporated in the Charter of the City of Makati.[8]

Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner, as well as the Solicitor

General, who sides with him in this case, contends that through 40(d) of the LocalGovernment Code, Congress has command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility ofpersons possessing dual allegiance to hold local elective office.

To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former

arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two ormore states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states.[9]

For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizensof a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state whichfollows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso factoand without any voluntaryact on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering thecitizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classesof citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:

(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries whichfollow the principle of jus soli;

(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by thelaws of their fathers country such children are citizens of that country;

(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are

considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to haverenounced Philippine citizenship.

There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may,without performing any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above casesare clearly possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship.

Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a personsimultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dualcitizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition.

With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, 5 of the Constitution provides:

Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with

by law. This provision was included in the 1987 Constitution at the instance ofCommissioner Blas F. Ople who explained its necessity as follows:[10]

. . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not dual citizenship. I

have circulated a memorandum to the Bernas Committee according to which a dualallegiance - and I reiterate a dual allegiance - is larger and more threatening thanthat of mere double citizenship which is seldom intentional and, perhaps, neverinsidious. That is often a function of the accident of mixed marriages or of birth onforeign soil. And so, I do not question double citizenship at all.

What we would like the Committee to consider is to take constitutional cognizance ofthe problem of dual allegiance. For example, we all know what happens in thetriennial elections of the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce

which consists of about 600 chapters all over the country. There is a Peking ticket,as well as a Taipei ticket. Not widely known is the fact that the Filipino-Chinesecommunity is represented in the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China inTaiwan. And until recently, the sponsor might recall, in Mainland China in the

Peoples Republic of China, they have the Associated Legislative Council foroverseas Chinese wherein all of Southeast Asia including some European and Latincountries were represented, which was dissolved after several years because ofdiplomatic friction. At that time, the Filipino-Chinese were also represented in thatOverseas Council.

When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I speak of this unsettled kind ofallegiance of Filipinos, of citizens who are already Filipinos but who, by their acts,may be said to be bound by a second allegiance, either to Peking or Taiwan. I also

took close note of the concern expressed by some Commissioners yesterday,including Commissioner Villacorta, who were concerned about the lack ofguarantees of thorough assimilation, and especially Commissioner Concepcion whohas always been worried about minority claims on our natural resources.

Dual allegiance can actually siphon scarce national capital to Taiwan, Singapore,China or Malaysia, and this is already happening. Some of the great commercialplaces in downtown Taipei are Filipino-owned, owned by Filipino-Chinese !it is ofcommon knowledge in Manila. It can mean a tragic capital outflow when we have to

endure a capital famine which also means economic stagnation, worseningunemployment and social unrest.

And so, this is exactly what we ask !that the Committee kindly considerincorporating a new section, probably Section 5, in the article on Citizenship which

will read as follows: DUAL ALLEGIANCE IS INIMICAL TO CITIZENSHIP AND


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he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed bylaw is satisfied and complied with. The determination whether such renunciation isvalid or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within theprovince and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply thelaw duly enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law mayor should interfere with its operation and application. If the requirement of theChinese Law of Nationality were to be read into our Naturalization Law, we would be

applying not what our legislative department has deemed it wise to require, but whata foreign government has thought or intended to exact. That, of course, is absurd. Itmust be resisted by all means and at all cost. It would be a brazen encroachmentupon the sovereign will and power of the people of this Republic.

III. PETITIONER'S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP

The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco,California on September 4, 1955, of Filipino parents. Since the Philippines adheres

to the principle of jus sanguinis,while the United States follows the doctrine of jussoli, the parties agree that, at birth at least, he was a national both of the Philippinesand of the United States. However, the COMELEC en banc held that, byparticipating in Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998, private respondenteffectively renounced his U.S. citizenship under American law, so that now he is

solely a Philippine national.

Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking part inPhilippine elections is not sufficient evidence of renunciation and that, in any event,as the alleged renunciation was made when private respondent was already 37years old, it was ineffective as it should have been made when he reached the ageof majority.

In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private respondent renouncedhis American citizenship, the COMELEC must have in mind 349 of the Immigrationand Nationality Act of the United States, which provided that A person who is anational of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose hisnationality by: . . . (e) Voting in a political election in a foreign state or participating

in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory. To besure this provision was declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court inAfroyim v. Rusk[16] as beyond the power given to the U.S. Congress to regulateforeign relations. However, by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for hispresent post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effectrenounced his American citizenship. Private respondents certificate of candidacy,filed on March 27, 1998, contained the following statements made under oath:

6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF NATURAL-BORN ORNATURALIZED) NATURAL-BORN

. . . .

10. I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT NO. 747-A,BARANGAY SAN LORENZO, CITY/MUNICIPALITY OFMAKATI, PROVINCE OF NCR .

11. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, ORIMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.

12. I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE

ELECTED. I WILL SUPPORT AND DEFEND THECONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND WILL MAINTAINTRUE FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE THERETO; THAT I WILLOBEY THE LAWS, LEGAL ORDERS AND DECREESPROMULGATED BY THE DULY CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIESOF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND THAT I

IMPOSE THIS OBLIGATION UPON MYSELF VOLUNTARILY,WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF

EVASION. I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FACTS STATEDHEREIN ARE TRUE AND CORRECT OF MY OWN PERSONALKNOWLEDGE.

The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American

citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dualcitizen. Thus, in Frivaldo v. COMELEC it was held:[17]

It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would theretroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under

Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code would disqualify him from running for anyelective local position? We answer this question in the negative, as there is cogentreason to hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath ofallegiance and even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment,Frivaldo wrote that he had long renounced and had long abandoned his Americancitizenship-long before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the interim-when he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before he was repatriatedto his Filipino citizenship.

On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:

By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenshipwhen he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran forGovernor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an

oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government.

These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before theelections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basicthat such findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent anyshowing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or abuse.

There is, therefore, no merit in petitioners contention that the oath ofallegiance contained in private respondents certificate of candidacy is insufficient toconstitute renunciation of his American citizenship. Equally without merit ispetitioners contention that, to be effective, such renunciation should have beenmade upon private respondent reaching the age of majority since no law requires theelection of Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority age.

Finally, much is made of the fact that private respondent admitted that he is


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registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation andthat he holds an American passport which he used in his last travel to the UnitedStates on April 22, 1997. There is no merit in this. Until the filing of his certificate ofcandidacy on March 21, 1998, he had dual citizenship. The acts attributed to himcan be considered simply as the assertion of his American nationality before thetermination of his American citizenship. What this Court said in Aznar v.COMELEC[18]appliesmutatis mutandisto private respondent in the case at bar:

. . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and anAmerican, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not

mean that he is not stilla Filipino. . . . [T]he Certification that he is an American doesnot mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or

citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship;truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When Weconsider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must beexpress, it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine citizenshipwhen there is no renunciation, either express or implied.

To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipinocitizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that hewill defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith andallegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, privaterespondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively

repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before asa dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippines,when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, receivedhis education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections inthis country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertakingmade under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions fordeclaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriateproceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago,[19]we sustained the denial of entry into

the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalizedcitizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared incommercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. Asimilar sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship,renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constitutingrenunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorariis DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,Quisumbing, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, andYnares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Panganiban, and Purisima, JJ., on leave.Pardo, J., no part.


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G.R. No. 130115 July 16, 2008

FELIX TING HO, JR., MERLA TING HO BRADEN, JUANA TING HO & LYDIA

TING HO BELENZO,- versus - VICENTE TENG GUI,

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N

PUNO, C.J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1]assailing the Decision[2]ofthe Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 42993 which reversed and set asidethe Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City, Branch 74, in CivilCase No. 558-0-88.

The instant case traces its origin to an action for partition filed bypetitioners Felix Ting Ho, Jr., Merla Ting Ho Braden, Juana Ting Ho and Lydia TingHo Belenzo against their brother, respondent Vicente Teng Gui, before the RTC,

Branch 74 of Olongapo City. The controversy revolves around a parcel of land, andthe improvements established thereon, which, according to petitioners, should formpart of the estate of their deceased father, Felix Ting Ho, and should be partitionedequally among each of the siblings.

In their complaint before the RTC, petitioners alleged that their fatherFelix Ting Ho died intestate on June 26, 1970, and left upon his death an estateconsisting of the following:

a) A commercial land consisting of 774 square meters, more or less,located at Nos. 16 and 18 Afable St., East Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City, covered byOriginal Certificate of Title No. P-1064 and Tax Declaration No. 002-2451;

b) A two-storey residential house on the aforesaid lot;c) A two-storey commercial building, the first floor rented to different

persons and the second floor, Bonanza Hotel, operated by the defendant alsolocated on the above described lot; and

d) A sari-sari store (formerly a bakery) also located on the above

described lot.[3]

According to petitioners, the said lot and properties were titled and tax declaredunder trust in the name of respondent Vicente Teng Gui for the benefit of thedeceased Felix Ting Ho who, being a Chinese citizen, was then disqualified to ownpublic lands in the Philippines; and that upon the death of Felix Ting Ho, therespondent took possession of the same for his own exclusive use and benefit totheir exclusion and prejudice.[4]

In his answer, the respondent countered that on October 11, 1958, FelixTing Ho sold the commercial and residential buildings to his sister-in-law, VictoriaCabasal, and the bakery to his brother-in-law, Gregorio Fontela.[5] He alleged thathe acquired said properties from the respective buyers on October 28, 1961 and hassince then been in possession of subject properties in the concept of an owner; andthat on January 24, 1978, Original Certificate of Title No. P-1064 covering the

subject lot was issued to him pursuant to a miscellaneous sales patent granted tohim on January 3, 1978.[6]

The undisputed facts as found by the trial court (RTC), and affirmed bythe appellate court (CA), are as follows:

[T]he plaintiffs and the defendant are all brothers andsisters, the defendant being the oldest. They are the onlylegitimate children of the deceased Spouses Felix Ting Ho and

Leonila Cabasal. Felix Ting Ho died on June 26, 1970 while thewife Leonila Cabasal died on December 7, 1978. The defendantVicente Teng Gui is the oldest among the children as he was born

on April 5, 1943. The father of the plaintiffs and the defendant wasa Chinese citizen although their mother was Filipino. Thatsometime in 1947, the father of the plaintiffs and defendant, FelixTing Ho, who was already then married to their mother LeonilaCabasal, occupied a parcel of land identified to (sic) as Lot No. 18

Brill which was thereafter identified as Lot No. 16 situated at AfableStreet, East Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City, by virtue of thepermission granted him by the then U.S. Naval Reservation Office,Olongapo, Zambales. The couple thereafter introducedimprovements on the land. They built a house of strong material at16 Afable Street which is a commercial and residential house andanother building of strong material at 18 Afable Street which was aresidential house and a bakery. The couple, as well as their

children, lived and resided in the said properties until their death.The father, Felix Ting Ho had managed the bakery while themother managed the sari-sari store. Long before the death ofFelix Ting Ho, who died on June 26, 1970, he executed onOctober 11, 1958 a Deed of Absolute Sale of a house of strongmaterial located at 16 Afable Street, Olongapo, Zambales,specifically described in Tax Dec. No. 5432, in favor of VictoriaCabasal his sister-in-law (Exh. C). This Deed of Sale cancelled

the Tax Dec. of Felix Ting Ho over the said building (Exh. C-1) andthe building was registered in the name of the buyer VictoriaCabasal, as per Tax Dec. No. 7579 (Exh. C-2). On the samedate, October 11, 1958 the said Felix Ting Ho also sold abuilding of strong material located at 18 Afable Street,described in Tax Dec. No. 5982, in favor of Gregorio Fontela,of legal age, an American citizen, married (Exh. D). This Deedof Sale, in effect, cancelled Tax Dec. No. 5982 and the same was

registered in the name of the buyer Gregorio Fontela, as per TaxDec. No. 7580 (Exh. D-2). In turn Victoria Cabasal and herhusband Gregorio Fontela sold to Vicente Teng Gui onOctober 28, 1961 the buildings which were bought by themfrom Felix Ting Ho and their tax declarations for the buildingthey bought (Exhs. C-2 and D-2) were accordingly cancelledand the said buildings were registered in the name of thedefendant Vicente Teng Gui (Exhs. C-3 and D-3). On October

25, 1966 the father of the parties Felix Ting Ho executed anAffidavit of Transfer, Rel inquishment and Renouncement of Rightsand Interest including Improvements on Land in favor of his eldest

son the defendant Vicente Teng Gui. On the basis of the saiddocument the defendant who then chose Filipino citizenship filed a


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miscellaneous sales application with the Bureau of Lands.Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 7457 of the land which wasthen identified to be Lot No. 418, Ts-308 consisting of 774square meters was issued to the applicant Vicente Teng Guiand accordingly on the 24

th of January, 1978 Original

Certificate of Title No. P-1064 covering the lot in question wasissued to the defendant Vicente Teng Gui. Although the

buildings and improvements on the land in question were sold byFelix Ting Ho to Victoria Cabasal and Gregorio Fontela in 1958 andwho in turn sold the buildings to the defendant in 1961 the said

Felix Ting Ho and his wife remained in possession of the propertiesas Felix Ting Ho continued to manage the bakery while the wifeLeonila Cabasal continued to manage the sari-sari store. During allthe time that the alleged buildings were sold to the spouses VictoriaCabasal and Gregorio Fontela in 1958 and the subsequent sale of

the same to the defendant Vicente Teng Gui in October of 1961 theplaintiffs and the defendant continued to live and were under thecustody of their parents until their father Felix Ting Ho died in 1970and their mother Leonila Cabasal died in 1978.[7] (Emphasissupplied)

In light of these factual findings, the RTC found that Felix Ting Ho, beinga Chinese citizen and the father of the petitioners and respondent, resorted to a

series of simulated transactions in order to preserve the right to the lot and theproperties thereon in the hands of the family. As stated by the trial court:

After a serious consideration of the testimonies givenby both one of the plaintiffs and the defendant as well as thedocumentary exhibits presented in the case, the Court is inclined tobelieve that Felix Ting Ho, the father of the plaintiffs and thedefendant, and the husband of Leonila Cabasal thought of

preserving the properties in question by transferring the saidproperties to his eldest son as he thought that he cannot acquirethe properties as he was a Chinese citizen. To transfer theimprovements on the land to his eldest son the defendant VicenteTeng Gui, he first executed simulated Deeds of Sales in favor ofthe sister and brother-in-law of his wife in 1958 and after three (3)years it was made to appear that these vendees had sold theimprovements to the defendant Vicente Teng Gui who was then 18

years old. The Court finds that these transaction (sic) weresimulated and that no consideration was ever paid by the vendees.

x x x x x x x xx

With regards (sic) to the transfer and relinquishment ofFelix Ting Hos right to the land in question in favor of the

defendant, the Court believes, that although from the face of thedocument it is stated in absolute terms that without anyconsideration Felix Ting Ho was transferring and renouncing his

right in favor of his son, the defendant Vicente Teng Gui, still theCourt believes that the transaction was one of implied trust

executed by Felix Ting Ho for the benefit of his family[8]

Notwithstanding such findings, the RTC considered the Affidavit ofTransfer, Relinquishment and Renouncement of Rights and Interests over the landas a donation which was accepted by the donee, the herein respondent. Withrespect to the properties in the lot, the trial court held that although the sales weresimulated, pursuant to Article 1471 of the New Civil Code[9]it can be assumed that

the intention of Felix Ting Ho in such transaction was to give and donate suchproperties to the respondent. As a result, it awarded the entire conjugal share ofFelix Ting Ho in the subject lot and properties to the respondent and divided only the

conjugal share of his wife among the siblings. The dispositive portion of the RTCdecision decreed:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor ofthe plaintiffs and against the defendant as the Court orders the

partition and the adjudication of the subject properties, Lot 418, Ts-308, specifically described in original Certificate of Title No. P-1064and the residential and commercial houses standing on the lotspecifically described in Tax Decs. Nos. 9179 and 9180 in thename of Vicente Teng Gui in the following manner, to wit: To thedefendant Vicente Teng Gui is adjudicated an undivided six-tenth(6/10) of the aforementioned properties and to each of the plaintiffsFelix Ting Ho, Jr., Merla Ting-Ho Braden, Juana Ting and Lydia

Ting Ho-Belenzo each an undivided one-tenth (1/10) of theproperties[10]

From this decision, both parties interposed their respective appeals. Thepetitioners claimed that the RTC erred in awarding respondent the entire conjugalshare of their deceased father in the lot and properties in question contrary to its ownfinding that an implied trust existed between the parties. The respondent, on theother hand, asserted that the RTC erred in not ruling that the lot and properties do

not form part of the estate of Felix Ting Ho and are owned entirely by him.

On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC. Theappellate court held that the deceased Felix Ting Ho was never the owner and neverclaimed ownership of the subject lot since he is disqualified under Philippine lawsfrom owning public lands, and that respondent Vicente Teng Gui was the rightfulowner over said lot by virtue of Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 7457 issued in hisfavor, viz:

The deceased Felix Ting Ho, plaintiffs and defendants latefather, was never the owner of the subject lot, now identified asLot No. 418, Ts-308 covered by OCT No. P-1064 (Exh. A; Record,p. 104). As stated by Felix Ting Ho no less in the Affidavit ofTransfer, Relinquishment and Renouncement of Rights andInterest etc. (Exh. B: Record, p. 107), executed on October 25,1966 he, the late Felix Ting Ho, was merely a possessor or

occupant of the subject lot by virtue of a permission grantedby the then U.S. Naval Reservation Office, Olongapo,Zambales. The late Felix Ting Ho was never the owner and never

claimed ownership of the land. (Emphasis supplied)


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The affidavit, Exhibit B, was subscribed and sworn to before aLand Investigator of the Bureau of Lands and in the said affidavit, thelate Felix Ting Ho expressly acknowledged that because he is aChinese citizen he is not qualified to purchase public lands underPhilippine laws for which reason he thereby transfers, relinquishesand renounces all his rights and interests in the subject land,including all the improvements thereon to his son, the defendant

Vicente Teng Gui, who is of legal age, single, Filipino citizen andqualified under the public land law to acquire lands.

x x x x x x x x x

Defendant Vicente Teng Gui acquired the subjectland by sales patent or purchase from the government andnot from his father, the late Felix Ting Ho. It cannot be said

that he acquired or bought the land in trust for his father becauseon December 5, 1977 when the subject land was sold to him bythe government and on January 3, 1978 when MiscellaneousSales Patent No. 7457 was issued, the late Felix Ting Ho wasalready dead, having died on June 6, 1970 (TSN, January 10,1990, p. 4).[11]

Regarding the properties erected over the said lot, the CA held that the finding

that the sales of the two-storey commercial and residential buildings and sari-saristore to Victoria Cabasal and Gregorio Fontela and subsequently to respondent werewithout consideration and simulated is supported by evidence, which clearlyestablishes that these properties should form part of the estate of the late spousesFelix Ting Ho and Leonila Cabasal.

Thus, while the appellate court dismissed the complaint for partition withrespect to the lot in question, it awarded the petitioners a four-fifths (4/5) share of the

subject properties erected on the said lot. The dispositive portion of the CA rulingreads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealedfrom is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and NEW JUDGMENTrendered:

1. DISMISSING plaintiff-appellants complaint with respect to

the subject parcel of land, identified as Lot No. 418, Ts-308, coveredby OCT No. P-1064, in the name of plaintiff-appellants [should bedefendant-appellant];

2. DECLARING that the two-storey commercial building, thetwo-storey residential building and sari-sari store (formerly a bakery),all erected on the subject lot No. 418, Ts-308, form part of the estateof the deceased spouses Felix Ting Ho and Leonila Cabasal, and

that plaintiff-appellants are entitled to four-fifths (4/5) thereof, theremaining one-fifth (1/5) being the share of the defendant-appellant;

3. DIRECTING the court a quo to partition the said two-storey commercial building, two-storey residential building and sari-

sari store (formerly a bakery) in accordance with Rule 69 of theRevised Rules of Court and pertinent provisions of the Civil Code;

4. Let the records of this case be remanded to the court oforigin for further proceedings;

5. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Office of the

Solicitor General; and6. "There is no pronouncement as to costs.#

SO ORDERED.[12]

Both petitioners and respondent filed their respective motions forreconsideration from this ruling, which were summarily denied by the CA in itsResolution[13]dated August 5, 1997. Hence, this petition.

According to the petitioners, the CA erred in declaring that Lot No. 418,Ts-308 does not form part of the estate of the deceased Felix Ting Ho and is ownedalone by respondent. Respondent, on the other hand, contends that he should bedeclared the sole owner not only of Lot No. 418, Ts-308 but also of the propertieserected thereon and that the CA erred in not dismissing the complaint for partitionwith respect to the said properties.

The primary issue for consideration is whether both Lot No. 418, Ts-308and the properties erected thereon should be included in the estate of the deceasedFelix Ting Ho.

We affirm the CA ruling.

With regard to Lot No. 418, Ts-308, Article XIII, Section 1 of the 1935Constitution states:

Section 1. All agricultural timber, and minerallands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potentialenergy and other natural resources of the Philippinesbelong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation,development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens ofthe Philippines or to corporations or associations at

least sixty per centum of the capital of which is ownedby such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease,or concession at the time of the inauguration of theGovernment established under this Constitution(Emphasis supplied)

Our fundamental law cannot be any clearer. The right to acquire landsof the public domain is reserved for Filipino citizens or corporations at least sixty

percent of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos. Thus, in Krivenko v. Registerof Deeds,[14]the Court enunciated that:

Perhaps the effect of our construction is to precludealiens, admitted freely into the Philippines from owning sites


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where they may build their homes. But if this is the solemnmandate of the Constitution, we will not attempt to compromise iteven in the name of amity or equity. We are satisfied, however, thataliens are not completely excluded by the Constitution from the use oflands for residential purposes. Since their residence in the Philippinesis temporary, they may be granted temporary rights such as a leasecontract which is not forbidden by the Constitution. Should they desire

to remain here forever and share our fortunes and misfortunes, Filipinocitizenship is not impossible to acquire.[15]

In the present case, the father of petitioners and respondent was aChinese citizen; therefore, he was disqualified from acquiring and owning realproperty in the Philippines. In fact, he was only occupying the subject lot by virtue ofthe permission granted him by the then U.S. Naval Reservation Office of Olongapo,Zambales. As correctly found by the CA, the deceased Felix Ting Ho was never the

owner of the subject lot in light of the constitutional proscription and the respondentdid not at any instance act as the dummy of his father.

On the other hand, the respondent became the owner of Lot No. 418,Ts-308 when he was granted Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 7457 on January 3,1978, by the Secretary of Natural Resources By Authority of the President of thePhilippines, and when Original Certificate of Title No. P-1064 was correspondinglyissued in his name. The grant of the miscellaneous sales patent by the Secretary of

Natural Resources, and the corresponding issuance of the original certificate of titlein his name, show that the respondent possesses all the qualifications and none ofthe disqualifications to acquire alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.These issuances bear the presumption of regularity in their performance in theabsence of evidence to the contrary.

Registration of grants and patents involving public lands is governed bySection 122 of Act No. 496, which was subsequently amended by Section 103 of

Presidential Decree No. 1529, viz:Sec. 103. Certificate of title pursuant to patents.

Whenever public land is by the Government alienated, granted orconveyed to any person, the same shall be brought forthwith under theoperation of this Decree. It shall be the duty of the official issuing theinstrument of alienation, grant, patent or conveyance in behalf of theGovernment to cause such instrument to be filed with the Register ofDeeds of the province or city where the land lies, and to be there

registered like other deeds and conveyance, whereupon a certificate oftitle shall be entered as in other cases of registered land, and anowners duplicate issued to the grantee. The deeds, grant, patent orinstrument of conveyance from the Government to the grantee shallnot take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate onlyas a contract between the Government and the grantee and asevidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make registration. Itis the act of registration that shall be the operative act to affect and

convey the land, and in all cases under this Decree registration shallbe made in the office of the Register of Deeds of the province or citywhere the land lies. The fees for registration shall be paid by the

grantee. After due registration and issuance of the certificate oftitle, such land shall be deemed to be registered land to all intents

and purposes under this Decree.[16](Emphasis supplied)

Under the law, a certificate of title issued pursuant to any grant or patentinvolving public land is as conclusive and indefeasible as any other certificate of titleissued to private lands in the ordinary or cadastral registration proceeding. Theeffect of the registration of a patent and the issuance of a certificate of title to the

patentee is to vest in him an incontestable title to the land, in the same manner as ifownership had been determined by final decree of the court, and the title so issued isabsolutely conclusive and indisputable, and is not subject to collateral attack.[17]

Nonetheless, petitioners invoke equity considerations and claim that the rulingof the RTC that an implied trust was created between respondent and their fatherwith respect to the subject lot should be upheld.

This contention must fail because the prohibition against an alien from owninglands of the public domain is absolute and not even an implied trust can be permittedto arise on equity considerations.

In the case of Muller v. Muller,[18]wherein the respondent, a Germannational, was seeking reimbursement of funds claimed by him to be given in trust tohis petitioner wife, a Philippine citizen, for the purchase of a property in Antipolo, theCourt, in rejecting the claim, ruled that:

Respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition andexpressly admitted his knowledge thereof to this Court. He declaredthat he had the Antipolo property titled in the name of the petitionerbecause of the said prohibition. His attempt at subsequently assertingor claiming a right on the said property cannot be sustained.

The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust

was created and resulted by operation of law in view ofpetitioner's marriage to respondent. Save for the exceptionprovided in cases of hereditary succession, respondent'sdisqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute.Not even an ownership in trust is allowed. Besides, where thepurchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of itsexpress provision, no trust can result in favor of the party who is guiltyof the fraud. To hold otherwise would allow circumvention of the

constitutional prohibition.

Invoking the principle that a court is not only a court of law but alsoa court of equity, is likewise misplaced. It has been held that equity asa rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectlywhich, because of public policy, cannot be done directly...[19]

Coming now to the issue of ownership of the properties erected on the

subject lot, the Court agrees with the finding of the trial court, as affirmed by theappellate court, that the series of transactions resorted to by the deceased weresimulated in order to preserve the properties in the hands of the family. The records

show that during all the time that the properties were allegedly sold to the spousesVictoria Cabasal and Gregorio Fontela in 1958 and the subsequent sale of the same


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to respondent in 1961, the petitioners and respondent, along with their parents,remained in possession and continued to live in said properties.

However, the trial court concluded that:

In fairness to the defendant, although the Deeds of Saleexecuted by Felix Ting Ho regarding the improvements in favor of

Victoria Cabasal and Gregorio Fontela and the subsequent transferof the same by Gregorio Fontela and Victoria Cabasal to thedefendant are all simulated, yet, pursuant to Article 1471 of the

New Civil Code it can be assumed that the intention of FelixTing Ho in such transaction was to give and donate theimprovements to his eldest son the defendant Vicente TengGui [20]

Its finding was based on Article 1471 of the Civil Code, which provides that:

Art. 1471. If the price is simulated, the sale is void,but the act may be shown to have been in reality a donation, orsome other act or contract.[21]

The Court holds that the reliance of the trial court on the provisions ofArticle 1471 of the Civil Code to conclude that the simulated sales were a valid

donation to the respondent is misplaced because its finding was based on a mereassumptionwhen the law requires positive proof.

The respondent was unable to show, and the records are bereft of anyevidence, that the simulated sales of the properties were intended by the deceasedto be a donation to him. Thus, the Court holds that the two-storey residential house,two-storey residential building and sari-sari store form part of the estate of the latespouses Felix Ting Ho and Leonila Cabasal, entitling the petitioners to a four-fifths

(4/5) share thereof.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decisiondated December 27, 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 42993 ishereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.


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[G.R. No. 137000. August 9, 2000]

CIRILO R. VALLES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS andROSALIND YBASCO LOPEZ, respondents.

PURISIMA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, pursuant toSection 2, Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing

Resolutions dated July 17, 1998 and January 15, 1999, respectively,of the Commission on Elections in SPA No. 98-336, dismissing thepetition for disqualification filed by the herein petitioner, Cirilo R.Valles, against private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, in the May1998 elections for governor of Davao Oriental.

Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in NapierTerrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses, TelesforoYbasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, andTheresa Marquez, an Australian. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she leftAustralia and came to settle in the Phi lippines.

On June 27, 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, aFilipino citizen, at the Malate Catholic Church in Manila. Since then,

she has continuously participated in the electoral process not only as avoter but as a candidate, as well. She served as Provincial BoardMember of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental. In 1992,she ran for and was elected governor of Davao Oriental. Her election

was contested by her opponent, Gil Taojo, Jr., in a petition for quowarranto, docketed as EPC No. 92-54, alleging as ground therefor heralleged Australian citizenship. However, finding no sufficient proof thatrespondent had renounced her Philippine citizenship, the Commissionon Elections en bancdismissed the petition, ratiocinating thus:

A cursory reading of the records of this case vis-a-vis the impugned resolutionshows that respondent was able to produce documentary proofs of the Filipinocitizenship of her late father... and consequently, prove her own citizenship andfiliation by virtue of the Principle of Jus Sanguinis, the perorations of the petitioner tothe contrary notwithstanding.

On the other hand, except for the three (3) alleged important documents . . . no otherevidence substantial in nature surfaced to confirm the allegations of petitioner thatrespondent is an Australian citizen and not a Filipino. Express renunciation ofcitizenship as a mode of losing citizenship under Commonwealth Act No. 63 is anequivocal and deliberate act with full awareness of its significance andconsequence. The evidence adduced by petitioner are inadequate, nay meager, toprove that respondent contemplated renunciation of her Filipino citizenship. [1]

In the 1995 local elections, respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopezran for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental. Her opponent,

Francisco Rabat, filed a petition for disqualification, docketed as SPANo. 95-066 before the COMELEC, First Division, contesting her

Filipino citizenship but the said petition was likewise dismissed by theCOMELEC, reiterating substantially its decision in EPC 92-54.

The citizenship of private respondent was once again raised as

an issue when she ran for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental inthe May 11, 1998 elections. Her candidacy was questioned by theherein petitioner, Cirilo Valles, in SPA No. 98-336.

On July 17, 1998, the COMELECs First Division came out witha Resolution dismissing the petition, and disposing as follows:

Assuming arguendo that res judicata does not apply and We are to dispose theinstant case on the merits trying it de novo, the above table definitely shows thatpetitioner herein has presented no new evidence to disturb the Resolution of this

Commission in SPA No. 95-066. The present petition merely restates the samematters and incidents already passed upon by this Commission not just in 1995Resolution but likewise in the Resolution of EPC No. 92-54. Not having put forth anynew evidence and matter substantial in nature, persuasive in character or sufficientlyprovocative to compel reversal of such Resolutions, the dismissal of the presentpetition follows as a matter of course.

xxx.................................... xxx.................................... xxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered and there being no new matters and issuestendered, We find no convincing reason or impressive explanation to disturb andreverse the Resolutions promulgated by this Commission in EPC 92-54 and SPA.95-066. This Commission RESOLVES as it hereby RESOLVES to DISMISS thepresent petition. SO ORDERED.[2]

Petitioner interposed a motion for reconsideration of theaforesaid Resolution but to no avail. The same was denied by theCOMELEC in its en bancResolution of January 15, 1999.

Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via the

present petition; questioning the citizenship of private respondentRosalind Ybasco Lopez.

The Commission on Elections ruled that private respondentRosalind Ybasco Lopez is a Filipino citizen and therefore, qualified to

run for a public office because (1) her father, Telesforo Ybasco, is aFilipino citizen, and by virtue of the principle ofjus sanguinis she was aFilipino citizen under the 1987 Philippine Constitution; (2) she wasmarried to a Filipino, thereby making her also a Filipino citizen ipsojure under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473; (3) and that, sherenounced her Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before theDepartment of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and herAustralian passport was accordingly cancelled as certified to by the

Australian Embassy in Manila; and (4) furthermore, there are theCOMELEC Resolutions in EPC No. 92-54 and SPA Case No. 95-066,declaring her a Filipino citizen duly qualified to run for the elective

position of Davao Oriental governor.


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Petitioner, on the other hand, maintains that the privaterespondent is an Australian citizen, placing reliance on the admittedfacts that:

a) In 1988, private respondent registered herself with the Bureau of Immigration asan Australian national and was issued Alien Certificate of Registration No. 404695dated September 19, 1988;

b) On even date, she applied for the issuance of an Immigrant Certificate ofResidence (ICR), and

c) She was issued Australian Passport No. H700888 on March 3, 1988.

Petitioner theorizes that under the aforestated facts andcircumstances, the private respondent had renounced her Filipinocitizenship. He contends that in her application for alien certificate ofregistration and immigrant certificate of residence, private respondentexpressly declared under oath that she was a citizen or subject ofAustralia; and said declaration forfeited her Phi lippine citizenship, andoperated to disqualify her to run for elective office.

As regards the COMELECs finding that private respondent had

renounced her Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before theDepartment of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and had her

Australian passport cancelled on February 11, 1992, as certified to bythe Australian Embassy here in Manila, petitioner argues that the saidacts did not automatically restore the status of private respondent as aFilipino citizen. According to petitioner, for the private respondent toreacquire Philippine citizenship she must comply with the mandatoryrequirements for repatriation under Republic Act 8171; and theelection of private respondent to public office did not mean therestoration of her Filipino citizenship since the private respondent was

not legally repatriated. Coupled with her alleged renunciation ofAustralian citizenship, private respondent has effectively become astateless person and as such, is disqualified to run for a public office inthe Philippines; petitioner concluded.

Petitioner theorizes further that the Commission on Electionserred in applying the principle of res judicata to the case underconsideration; citing the ruling in Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner ofImmigration,[3] that:

xxx Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in ajudicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court oradministrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally notconsidered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again andagain as the occasion may demand. xxx

The petition is unmeritorious.

The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus

sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship ofthe parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to thedoctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on thebasis of place of birth.

Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to thespouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet,Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. Historically,this was a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at that

time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were theprincipal organic acts by which the United States governed the

country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and thePhilippine Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, also known as the JonesLaw.

Among others, these laws defined who were deemed to be

citizens of the Philippine islands. The Philippine Bill of 1902 definedPhilippine citizens as:

SEC. 4 xxx all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein whowere Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-

nine, and then resided in the Philippine Islands, and their children born subsequentthereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and assuch entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall haveelected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with theprovisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain signed atParis December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight. (underscoring ours)

The Jones Law, on the other hand, provides:

SEC. 2 That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on

the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided insaid Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and heldto be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to preservetheir allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treatyof peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth,

eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, and except such others as have since becomecitizens of some other country: Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, hereinprovided for, is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine

citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who cannot come within theforegoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, andsuch other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the UnitedStates, or who could become citizens of the United States under the laws of theUnited States if residing therein. (underscoring ours)

Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who wereSpanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including theirchildren are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondentsfather, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on January 5, 1879 in Daet,

Camarines Norte, a fact duly evidenced by a certified true copy of anentry in the Registry of Births. Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902


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and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippinecitizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at thetime of her birth, Telesforos daughter, herein private respondentRosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.

The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution hasestablished the principle ofjus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition ofPhilippine citizenship, to wit:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the

adoption of this Constitution.

(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, beforethe adoption of this Constitution had been elected to public officein the Philippine Islands.

(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, uponreaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.

(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by

virtue of blood relationship, was subsequently retained under the1973[4] and 1987[5] Constitutions. Thus, the herein private

respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having beenborn to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is nottantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia followsthe principle ofjussoli, then at most, private respondent can also claimAustralian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.

Petitioner also contends that even on the assumption that theprivate respondent is a Filipino citizen, she has nonethelessrenounced her Philippine citizenship. To buttress this contention,petitioner cited private respondents application for an Alien Certificateof Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR), onSeptember 19, 1988, and the issuance to her of an Australian passport

on March 3, 1988.

Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen may losehis citizenship:

(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;

(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;

(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitutionor laws of a foreign country upon attaining twenty-one years ofage or more;

(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a

foreign country;

(5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization;

(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of thePhilippine armed forces in time of war, unless subsequently, aplenary pardon or amnesty has been granted: and

(7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if, by virtueof the laws in force in her husbands country, she acquires hisnationality.

In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, suchrenunciation must be express. Petitioners contention that theapplication of private respondent for an alien certificate of registration,and her Australian passport, is bereft of merit. This issue was put to

rest in the case ofAznar vs. COMELEC[6]and in the more recent caseof Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC.[7]

In the case of Aznar, the Court ruled that the mere fact thatrespondent Osmena was a holder of a certificate stating that he is an

American did not mean that he is no longer a Filipino, and that anapplication for an alien certificate of registration was not tantamount torenunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

And, in Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC, it was held that

the fact that respondent Manzano was registered as an Americancitizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and was holdingan American passport on April 22, 1997, only a year before he filed acertificate of candidacy for vice-mayor of Makati, were just assertionsof his American nationality before the termination of his Americancitizenship.

Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind YbascoLopez was a holder of an Australian passport and had an aliencertificate of registration are not acts constituting an effectiverenunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her claim ofFilipino citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss ofcitizenship, the same must be express.[8]As held by this court in the

aforecited case of Aznar, an application for an alien certificate ofregistration does not amount to an express renunciation or repudiationof ones citizenship. The application of the herein private respondentfor an alien certificate of registration, and her holding of an Australianpassport, as in the case of Mercado vs. Manzano, were mere acts ofassertion of her Australian citizenship before she effectively renouncedthe same. Thus, at the most, private respondent had dual citizenship -she was an Australian and a Filipino, as well.

Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child ofFilipino parent/s was born in another country has not been included asa ground for losing ones Philippine citizenship. Since privaterespondent did not lose or renounce her Philippine citizenship,

petitioners claim that respondent must go through the process of

repatriation does not hold water.


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Petitioner also maintains that even on the assumption that theprivate respondent had dual citizenship, still, she is disqualified to runfor governor of Davao Oriental; citing Section 40 of Republic Act 7160otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, whichstates:

SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running forany elective local position:

xxx.................................... xxx.................................... xxx(d) Those with dual citizenship;

xxx.................................... xxx.................................... xxx

Again, petitioners contention is untenable.

In the aforecited case of Mercado vs. Manzano, the Courtclarified dual citizenship as used in the Local Government Code andreconciled the same with Article IV, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitutionon dual allegiance.[9]Recognizing situations in which a Filipino citizen

may, without performing any act, and as an involuntary consequenceof the conflicting laws of different countries, be also a citizen of anotherstate, the Court explained that dual citizenship as a disqualificationmust refer to citizens with dual allegiance. The Court succinctly

pronounced:

xxx the phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, xxx 40 (d) and in R.A. No. 7854,xxx 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, personswith mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.

Thus, the fact that the private respondent had dual citizenshipdid not automatically disqualify her from running for a public office.Furthermore, it was ruled that for candidates with dual citizenship, it isenough that they elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of theircertificate of candidacy, to terminate their status as persons with dualcitizenship.[10] The filing of a certificate of candidacy sufficed torenounce foreign citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification

as a dual citizen.[11]This is so because in the certificate of candidacy,one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that he/she willsupport and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and willmaintain true faith and allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which isunder oath, operates as an effective renunciation of foreigncitizenship. Therefore, when the herein private respondent filed hercertificate of candidacy in 1992, such fact alone terminated herAustralian citizenship.

Then, too, it is significant to note that on January 15 1992,private respondent executed a Declaration of Renunciation ofAustralian Citizenship, duly registered in the Department ofImmigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia on May 12, 1992. And, asa result, on February 11, 1992, the Australian passport of private

respondent was cancelled, as certified to by Second Secretary RichardF. Munro of the Embassy of Australia in Manila. As aptly appreciated

by the COMELEC, the aforesaid acts were enough to settle the issueof the alleged dual citizenship of Rosalind Ybasco Lopez. Since herrenunciation was effective, petitioners claim that private respondentmust go through the whole process of repatriation holds no water.

Petitioner maintains further that when citizenship is raised as anissue in judicial or administrative proceedings, the resolution ordecision thereon is generally not considered res judicata in anysubsequent proceeding challenging the same; citing the case of MoyYa Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration.[12]He insists that the

same issue of citizenship may be threshed out anew.

Petitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is concerned, i.e.the principle of res judicatagenerally does not apply in cases hingingon the issue of citizenship. However, in the case of Burca vs.Republic,[13] an exception to this general rule was recognized. TheCourt ruled in that case that in order that the doctrine of res judicatamay be applied in cases of citizenship, the following must be present:

1) a persons citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversywhere said person is a party;

2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took activepart in the resolution thereof, and

3) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by this Court.

Although the general rule was set forth in the case of Moy YaLim Yao, the case did not foreclose the weight of prior rulings on

citizenship. It elucidated that reliance may somehow be placed onthese antecedent official findings, though not really binding, to makethe effort easier or simpler.[14] Indeed, there appears sufficient basisto rely on the prior rulings of the Commission on Elections in SPA. No.95-066 and EPC 92-54 which resolved the issue of citizenship in favorof the herein private respondent. The evidence adduced by petitioneris substantially the same evidence presented in these two prior cases.Petitioner failed to show any new evidence or supervening event to

warrant a reversal of such prior resolutions. However, the proceduralissue notwithstanding, considered on the merits, the petition cannotprosper.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the

COMELEC Resolutions, dated July 17, 1998 and January 15, 1999,respectively, in SPA No. 98-336 AFFIRMED.

Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is hereby adjudgedqualified to run for governor of Davao Oriental. No pronouncement asto costs. SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago,

and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.Bellosillo, J., abroad on official business.


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G.R. No. 195649 July 2, 2013

CASAN MACODE MACQUILING,PETITIONER, vs. COMMISSION ONELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO Y CAGOCO, AND LINOG G. BALUA.RESPONDENTS.

R E S O L U T I O N

SERENO, J.:

This Resolution resolves the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent on May10, 2013 and the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration filed on May 20, 2013.

We are not unaware that the term of office of the local officials elected in the May2010 elections has already ended on June 30, 2010. Arnado, therefore, has

successfully finished his term of office. While the relief sought can no longer begranted, ruling on the motion for reconsideration is important as it will either affirmthe validity of Arnados election or affirm that Arnado never qualified to run for publicoffice.

Respondent failed to advance any argument to support his plea for the reversal of

this Courts Decision dated April 16, 2013. Instead, he presented hisaccomplishments as the Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and reiterated thathe has taken the Oath of Allegiance not only twice but six times. It must be stressed,however, that the relevant question is the efficacy of his renunciation of his foreigncitizenship and not the taking of the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of thePhilippines. Neither do his accomplishments as mayor affect the question before thisCourt.

Respondent cites Section 349 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of the UnitedStates as having the effect of expatriation when he executed his Affidavit ofRenunciation of American Citizenship on April 3, 2009 and thus claims that he wasdivested of his American citizenship. If indeed, respondent was divested of all therights of an American citizen, the fact that he was still able to use his US passport

after executing his Affidavit of Renunciation repudiates this claim.

The Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws,1which must be presented as

public documents2 of a foreign country and must be "evidenced by an official

publication thereof."3Mere reference to a foreign law in a pleading does not suffice

for it to be considered in deciding a case.

Respondent likewise contends that this Court failed to cite any law of the UnitedStates "providing that a person who is divested of American citizenship thru anAffidavit of Renunciation will re-acquire such American citizenship by using a USPassport issued prior to expatriation."

4

American law does not govern in this jurisdiction. Instead, Section 40(d) of the Local

Government Code calls for application in the case before us, given the fact that atthe time Arnado filed his certificate of candidacy, he was not only a Filipino citizen

but, by his own declaration, also an American citizen. It is the application of this lawand not of any foreign law that serves as the basis for Arnados disqualification to runfor any local elective position.

With all due respect to the dissent, the declared policy of Republic Act No. (RA) 9225is that "all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be

deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act."5

This policy pertains to the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Section 5(2)6

requires those who have re-acquired Philippine citizenship and who seek electivepublic office, to renounce any and all foreign citizenship.

This requirement of renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship, when read

together with Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code7which disqualifies those

with dual citizenship from running for any elective local position, indicates a policythat anyone who seeks to run for public office must be solely and exclusively aFilipino citizen. To allow a former Filipino who reacquires Philippine citizenship tocontinue using a foreign passport which indicates the recognition of a foreign stateof the individual as its national even after the Filipino has renounced his foreigncitizenship, is to allow a complete disregard of this policy.

Further, we respectfully disagree that the majority decision rules on a situation ofdoubt.

Indeed, there is no doubt that Section 40(d) of the Local Government Codedisqualifies those with dual citizenship from running for local elective positions.

There is likewise no doubt that the use of a passport is a positive declaration thatone is a citizen of the country which issued the passport, or that a passport provesthat the country which issued it recognizes the person named therein as its national.

It is unquestioned that Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen, or that he acquiredAmerican citizenship by naturalization. There is no doubt that he reacquired hisFilipino citizenship by taking his Oath of Allegiance to the Philippines and that herenounced his American citizenship. It is also indubitable that after renouncing hisAmerican citizenship, Arnado used his U.S. passport a t least six times.

If there is any remaining doubt, it is regarding the efficacy of Arnados renunciation ofhis American citizenship when he subsequently used his U.S. passport. Therenunciation of foreign citizenship must be complete and unequivocal. Therequirement that the renunciation must be made through an oath emphasizes thesolemn duty of the one making the oath of renunciation to remain true to what he hassworn to. Allowing the subsequent use of a foreign passport because it is convenientfor the person to do so is rendering the oath a hollow act. It devalues the act oftaking of an oath, reducing it to a mere ceremonial formality.

The dissent states that the Court has effectively left Arnado "a man without acountry".1wphi1On the contrary, this Court has, in fact, found Arnado to have more

than one. Nowhere in the decision does it say that Arnado is not a Filipino citizen.What the decision merely points out is that he also possessed another citizenship at


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the time he filed his certificate of candidacy.

Well-settled is the rule that findings of fact of administrative bodies will not beinterfered with by the courts in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the partof said agencies, or unless the aforementioned findings are not supported bysubstantial evidence.

8 They are accorded not only great respect but even finality,

and are binding upon this Court, unless it is shown that the administrative body hadarbitrarily disregarded or misapprehended evidence before it to such an extent as tocompel a contrary conclusion had such evidence been properly appreciated.

9

Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that COMELEC First Division found thatArnado used his U.S. Passport at least six times after he renounced his American

citizenship. This was debunked by the COMELEC En Banc, which found that Arnadoonly used his U.S. passport four times, and which agreed with Arnados claim that heonly used his U.S. passport on those occasions because his Philippine passport wasnot yet issued. The COMELEC En Banc argued that Arnado was able to prove thathe used his Philippine passport for his travels on the following dates: 12 January2010, 31 January 2010, 31 March 2010, 16 April 2010, 20 May 2010, and 4 June2010.

None of these dates coincide with the two other dates indicated in the certificationissued by the Bureau of Immigration showing that on 21 January 2010 and on 23

March 2010, Arnado arrived in the Philippines using his U.S. Passport No.057782700 which also indicated therein that his nationality is USA-American. Addingthese two travel dates to the travel record provided by the Bureau of Immigrationshowing that Arnado also presented his U.S. passport four times (upon departure on

14 April 2009, upon arrival on 25 June 2009, upon departure on 29 July 2009 andupon arrival on 24 November 2009), these incidents sum up to six.

The COMELEC En Banc concluded that "the use of the US passport was because tohis knowledge, his Philippine passport was not yet issued to him for his use."

10This

conclusion, however, is not supported by the facts. Arnado claims that his Philippinepassport was issued on 18 June 2009. The records show that he continued to use

his U.S. passport even after he already received his Philippine passport. Arnadostravel records show that he presented his U.S. passport on 24 November 2009, on

21 January 2010, and on 23 March 2010. These facts were never refuted by Arnado.

Thus, the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc is based on a misapprehension of thefacts that the use of the U.S. passport was discontinued when Arnado obtained his

Philippine passport. Arnados continued use of his U.S. passport cannot beconsidered as isolated acts contrary to what the dissent wants us to believe.

It must be stressed that what is at stake here is the principle that only those who areexclusively Filipinos are qualified to run for public office. If we allow dual citizens whowish to run for public office to renounce their foreign citizenship and afterwards

continue using their foreign passports, we are creating a special privilege for thesedual citizens, thereby effectively junking the prohibition in Section 40(d) of the LocalGovernment Code.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplemental Motion for

Reconsideration are hereby DENIED with finality.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Bersamin, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Reyes, andPerlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur. Leonardo-De Castro, Del Castillo, Mendoza, andLeonen, JJ., joins the dissent of J. Brion. Brion,J., I dissent.

DISSENTING OPINION

BRION, J.:

I maintain my dissent and vote to reconsider the Courts April 16, 2013 Decision. I sovote for the reasons stated in my main Dissent, some of which I restate below foremphasis. Most importantly, I believe that the majoritys ruling runs counter to thepolicy behind Republic Act No. (RA) 9225

1, is legally illogical and unsound, and

should thus be reversed.

a) The assailed Decision rules on a situation of doubt and in the relatively uncharted

area of application where RA 9225 overlaps with our election laws. It reverses theCommission on Elections (COMELEC) ruling that respondent Rommel C. Arnadosuse of his United States (U.S.) passport was isolated and did not affect hisrenunciation of his previous U.S. citizenship and his re-acquisition of Filipinocitizenship. These, to my mind, should have been the starting points in the Courtsconsideration of the present case and the motion for reconsideration.

b) After complying with the twin requirements of RA 9225, Arnado not only became a"pure" Filipino citizen but also became eligible to run for public office. To be sure, themajority in fact concedes that Arnados use of his U.S. passport is not a ground forloss of Filipino citizenship under Commonwealth Act No. 63 as the law requiresexpress renunciation and not by implication or inference from conduct. Why the normwill be any different with respect to the loss of citizenship rights is, to my mind, aquestion that the majority ruling left hanging and unanswered as it disregards a

directly related jurisprudential landmark Aznar v. Commission on Elections2 -

where the Court ruled that the mere fact that therein respondent Emilio Mario RennerOsmea was a holder of a certificate that he is an American did not mean that hewas no longer a Filipino, and that an application for an alien certificate of registrationdid not amount to a renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. Through the Courtsruling in the present case (that by Arnados isolated use of his U.S. passport, he isreverted to the status of a dual citizen), the Court effectively reversed Aznar and,under murky facts and the flimsiest of reasons, created a new ground for the loss of

the political rights of a Filipino citizen.

c) In a situation of doubt, doubts should be resolved in favor of full Filipino citizenshipsince the thrust of RA 9225 is to encourage the return to Filipino citizenship ofnatural-born Filipinos who lost their Philippine citizenship through their acquisition ofanother citizenship.

3Note in this regard that Arnado consciously and voluntarily gave

up a very much sought after citizenship status in favor of returning to full Filipino

citizenship and participating in Philippine governance.


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From the perspective of our election laws, doubts should also be resolved in favor ofArnado since his election to the office of Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte wasnever in doubt. The present voters of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte have eloquentlyspoken and approved Arnados offer of service not only once but twice in 2010 andnow in 2013. Note that the present case was very much alive in the minds of theKauswagan voters in the immediately past May 13, 2013 elections, yet they againvoted Arnado into office.

d)

Documents

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