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FUNDAMENTAL MORAL ATTITUDES Dietrich Von Hildebrand Contents 1. Reverence 2. Faithfulness 3. Awareness of Responsibility 4. Veracity 5. Goodness One: Reverence Moral values are the highest among all natural values. Goodness, purity, truthfulness, humility of man rank higher than genius, brilliancy, exuberant vitality, than the beauty of nature or of art, than the stability and power of a state. What is realized and what shines forth in an act of real forgiveness, in a noble and generous renunciation; in a burning and selfless love, is more significant and more noble, more important and more eternal than all cultural values. Positive moral values are the focus of the world, negative moral values, the greatest evil, worse than suffering, sickness, death, or the disintegration of a flourishing culture. This fact was recognized by the great minds, such as Socrates, or Plato, who continually repeated that it is better to suffer injustice than to commit it. This pre-eminence of the moral sphere is, above all, a basic proposition of the Christian ethos. Moral values are always personal values. They can only inhere in man, and be realized by man. A material thing, like a stone or a house, cannot be morally good or bad, just as moral goodness is not possible to a tree or a dog. Similarly, works of the human mind (discoveries, scientific books, works of art), cannot properly be said to be the bearers of moral values; they cannot be faithful, humble and loving. They can, at the most, indirectly reflect these values, as bearing the imprint of the human mind. Man alone, as a free being, responsible for his actions and his attitudes, for his will and striving, his love and his hatred, his joy and his sorrow, and his super-actual basic attitudes, can be morally good or bad. For, far above his cultural accomplishments, rises the importance of the man's own being: a personality radiating moral values, a man who is humble, pure, truthful, honest and loving. But, how can man participate in these moral values? Are they given to him by nature like the beauty of his face, his intelligence, or a lively temperament? No, they can only grow out of conscious, free attitudes; man himself must essentially cooperate for their realization. They can only develop through his conscious, free abandonment of himself to genuine values. In proportion to man's capacity to grasp values, in so far as he sees the fullness of the world of values with a clear and fresh vision, in so far as his abandonment to this world is pure and unconditional,

Fundamental Moral Attitudes

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FUNDAMENTAL MORAL ATTITUDESDietrich Von HildebrandContents1. Reverence2. Faithfulness3. Awareness of Responsibility4. Veracity5. GoodnessOne: Reerenceoral values are the hi!hest a"on! all natural values. Goodness# purity# truthfulness# hu"ility of "an ran$ hi!herthan !enius# brilliancy# e%uberant vitality# than the beauty of nature or of art# than the stability and power of a state. &hat is reali'ed and what shines forth in an act of real for!iveness# in a noble and !enerous renunciation( in a burnin! and selfless love# is "ore si!nificant and "ore noble# "ore i"portant and "ore eternal than all cultural values. )ositive "oral values are the focus of the world# ne!ative "oral values# the !reatest evil# worse than sufferin!# sic$ness# death# or the disinte!ration of a flourishin! culture.*his fact was reco!ni'ed by the !reat "inds# such as +ocrates# or )lato# who continually repeated that it is better to suffer in,ustice than to co""it it. *his pre-e"inence of the "oral sphere is# above all# a basic proposition of the.hristian ethos.oral values are always personal values. *hey can only inhere in "an# and be reali'ed by "an. A "aterial thin!# li$e a stone or a house# cannot be "orally !ood or bad# ,ust as "oral !oodness is not possible to a tree or a do!. +i"ilarly# wor$s of the hu"an "ind /discoveries# scientific boo$s# wor$s of art0# cannot properly be said to be the bearers of "oral values( they cannot be faithful# hu"ble and lovin!. *hey can# at the "ost# indirectly reflect these values# as bearin! the i"print of the hu"an "ind. an alone# as a free bein!# responsible for his actions and his attitudes# for his will and strivin!# his love and his hatred# his ,oy and his sorrow# and his super-actual basic attitudes# can be "orally !ood or bad. For# far above his cultural acco"plish"ents# rises the i"portance of the "an1s own bein!2 a personality radiatin! "oral values# a "an who is hu"ble# pure# truthful# honest and lovin!.3ut# how can "an participate in these "oral values4 Are they !iven to hi" by nature li$e the beauty of his face# his intelli!ence# or a lively te"pera"ent4 5o# they can only !row out of conscious# free attitudes( "an hi"self "ust essentially cooperate for their reali'ation. *hey can only develop throu!h his conscious# free abandon"ent of hi"self to !enuine values. 6n proportion to "an1s capacity to !rasp values# in so far as he sees the fullness of the world of values with a clear and fresh vision# in so far as his abandon"ent to this world is pure and unconditional# will he be rich in "oral values.As lon! as a "an blindly disre!ards the "oral values of other persons# as lon! as he does not distin!uish the positive value which inheres in truth# and the ne!ative value which is proper to error# as lon! as he does not understand the value which inheres in the life of "an# and the ne!ative value attached to an in,ustice# will he be incapable of "oral !oodness. As lon! as he is only interested in the 7uestion of whether so"ethin! is sub,ectivelysatisfyin! or not# whether it is a!reeable to hi" or not# instead of as$in! whether it is so"ethin! i"portant# whether in itself it is beautiful# !ood# whether it should be for its own sa$e# in a word# whether it is so"ethin! havin! a value he cannot be "orally !ood.*he soul of every "orally !ood attitude is abandon"ent to that which is ob,ectively i"portant# is interest in a thin!because it has value. *wo "en are# for e%a"ple# witnesses of an in,ustice which is bein! inflicted upon a third person. *he one who in every situation as$s only whether so"ethin! is a!reeable to hi"self or not will not be concerned about it because he calculates that no personal da"a!e to hi"self can result fro" the other1s in,ury. *he second "an# on the contrary# is willin! to ta$e sufferin! upon hi"self rather than re"ain disinterested in the in,ustice which is about to be done to the third person. For the second "an# the preponderant 7uestion is not whether so"ethin! is a!reeable to hi" or not# but whether it is i"portant in itself. *he one behaves "orally well# the other one "orally badly# because he indifferently by-passes the 7uestion of value.&hether one chooses or re,ects so"ethin! which is a!reeable# but is indifferent fro" the point of view of value# depends upon one1s own pleasure. &hether one does or does not eat an e%cellent "eal is up to oneself. 3ut the positive value calls for an affir"ation# and the ne!ative value for a refusal on our part. .onfronted with these# the way in which one should behave is not left to one1s arbitrary pleasure( instead it should be the sub,ect of preoccupation and the ri!ht response should be !iven# for interest in and ade7uate responses on our part are dueto values. &hether one does or does not help another person who is in need does not depend upon one1s arbitrary pleasure( he is !uilty who i!nores this ob,ective value.8nly he who understands that there e%ists thin!s 9i"portant in the"selves#9 that there are thin!s which are beautiful and !ood in the"selves# only the "an who !rasps the subli"e de"and of values# their call# and the dutyto turn toward the" and to let oneself be for"ed by their law# is capable of personally reali'in! "oral values. 8nlythe "an who can see beyond his sub,ective hori'on and who# free fro" pride and concupiscence# does not always as$# 9what is satisfyin! for "e49# but who leavin! behind hi" all narrowness# abandons hi"self to that which is i"portant in itself:the beautiful# the !ood:and subordinates hi"self to it# only he can beco"e the bearer of "oral values.*he capacity to !rasp values# to affir" the"# and to respond to the"# is the foundation for reali'in! the "oral values of "an.5ow these "ar$s can be found only in the "an who possesses reverence. Reverence is the attitude which can be desi!nated as the "other of all "oral life# for in it "an first ta$es a position toward the world which opens his spiritual eyes and enables hi" to !rasp values. .onse7uently# in these chapters which deal with "oral attitudes# i.e. attitudes which !ive a basis to the whole of "oral life# and are presupposed for this life# we "ust first of all spea$ of this virtue.*he irreverent and i"pertinent "an is the "an incapable of any abandon"ent or subordination of self. ;e is either the slave of his pride# of that cra"pin! e!ois" which "a$es hi" a prisoner of hi"self and blind to values# and leads hi" to as$ repeatedly2 &ill "y presti!e be increased# will "y own !lory be au!"ented4 8r he is a slave of concupiscence# one for who" everythin! in the world beco"es only an occasion to serve his lust. *he irreverent "an can never re"ain inwardly silent. ;e never !ives situations# thin!s and persons a chance to unfoldthe"selves in their proper character and value. ;e approaches everythin! in such an i"portunate and tactless way that he observes only hi"self# listens only to hi"self and i!nores the rest of bein!. ;e does not preserve a reverent distance fro" the world.6rreverence can be divided into two types# accordin! to whether it is rooted in pride or in concupiscence. *he first type is that of the "an whose irreverence is a fruit of his pride# that of the i"pertinent person. ;e is the type of "an who approaches everythin! with a presu"ptuous# sha" superiority# and never "a$es any effort to understand a thin! 9fro" within.9 ;e is the 9$now-all#9 school"aster type who believes that he penetrates everythin! at first si!ht# and $nows all thin!s 9ab ovo.9 ;e is the "an for who" nothin! could be !reater than hi"self# who never sees beyond his own hori'on# fro" who" the world of bein! hides no secret. ;e is the "an +ha$espeare has in "ind in his 9;a"let929*here are "ore thin!s in heaven and earth#;oratio#*han are drea"t of in your philosophy.9;e is the "an possessed of a bli!htin! inco"prehension# without yearnin!s# li$e Fa"ulus in Goethe1s 9Faust9 who is co"pletely filled by 9how wondrously far he has !one.9 *his "an suspects nothin! of the breadth and depth of the world# of the "ysterious depths and the i""easurable fullness of values which are bespo$en by every ray of the sun and every plant# and which are revealed in the innocent lau!hter of a child# as well as in the repentant tears of a sinner. *he world is flattened before his i"pertinent and stupid !a'e( it beco"es li"ited to one di"ension# shallow and "ute. 6t is evident that such a "an is blind to values. ;e passes throu!h the world with a bli!htin! inco"prehension.*he other type of "an who lac$s reverence# the blunt# concupiscent "an# is e7ually blind to values. ;e li"its his interest to one thin! only2 whether so"ethin! is a!reeable to hi" or not# whether it offers hi" satisfaction# whether or not it can be of any use to hi". ;e sees in all thin!s only that se!"ent which is related to his accidental# i""ediate interest. ourdain# )h.A.=on!"ans# Green and .o. 5ew @or$.opyri!ht 1B5C by Aietrich Von ;ildebrand)rovided .ourtesy of2