Functional and Geographical Enlargement of the Alliance

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D O U B L I N G N A T O :F U N C T IO N A L A N D G E O G R A P H IC A L E N L A R G E ME N T O F T H E A L L IA N C E

byErdogan KurtB.A. August 1996, Turkish Military AcademyM.A. July 2001, Naval Postgraduate School

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of Old Dominion Universityin Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree ofD O C T O R O F P H IL O S O P H YIN T E R N A T IO N A L S T U D IE S

O L D D O MIN IO N U N IV E R S IT YMay 2010

Approved by:

20 10 Erdogan Kurt.All rights reserved.


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A B S T R A C TD O U B L IN G N A T O :F U N C T IO N A L A N D G E O G R A P H IC A L E N L A R G E ME N T O F T H E A L L IA N C E

Erdogan KurtOld Dominion University, 2010Director: Dr. Regina Karp

This dissertation studies NA TO expansion as institutional adaptation. Morespecifically, it examines the interaction between NATO's functional and geographicalenlargement. This study asserts that there is a close relationship between N A TO 's new

functions and its enlargement. Over time, NA TO evolved from a collective defen cealliance to a comprehensive security organization. As NATO undertook new functions,its capabilities no longer matched the requirem ents of the new fun ctions. Thegeographical enlargem ent, in fact, constitutes a vehicle for the ful film ent of the capabilityshortfall.

Furthermore, this dissertation asserts that the new security environment w ill forceNA TO to focus on the regions at a strategic distance. More sp ecifically, the Black Seacorridor will be the next area for NA TO engagement. N ew fu nctions such as energysecurity may bring new m embers from the wider Black Sea region into the club.

The case studies offer a detailed analysis of NATO's post Cold War functionaland geographical enlargement. The second case study also highlights the fact that there isno an automatic geographical enlargement as a result of new NATO functions.

The timing of dissertation coincides with a significant transformation in NATO'sstructure and core tasks. 2010 will be the year of a NEW NA TO with a new peaceestablishment and strategic concept. NATO will still be a relevant Euro-Atlantic


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organization with a global area of responsibility in the twenty-first century securityenvironment for as long as it continues to protect the vital interests of its members.


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A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S

It is a great honour fo r me to thank my dissertation chair and m embers, frien ds,and family, for supporting me during the writing of this dissertation. Professor Regina C.Karp, Ph.D., Director, Graduate Program for International Studies, has been theCom mittee Chair fo r this dissertation. Dr. Karp, thank you for your advice, guidance, andpatience at every step since the beginning of the program. I want to also give a specialthanks to Dr. Austin T. Jersild and Th omas E. Chapm an for the significant role you

played in reading and comme nting on the drafts I wrote. I owe my dissertation comm itteea great intellectual debt. I am gra teful to my fe llow students and the entire faculty at theGraduate Program for International S tudies for providing an intellectually challengingenvironment for my studies. I have been very fortunate to study with Dr. Peter S chulman,Dr. David Earnes t, Dr. Jie Chen, Dr. Qiu Jin, Dr. Steve Yetiv, and Dr. Simon S erfaty.Thank you all very m uch.

My w ife, Gulsen, to whom I have dedicated this dissertation, deserves my veryspecial thanks. Thank you for making it possible for me to take on this goal.


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter PageI . INTRODU CTION 1NAT O AT 60 4N A T O 'S P E R S IS T E N C E 6THE ENLAR GEM ENT ISSUE 82 1 s t CENTURY SECURITY ENVIRO NM ENT 10N A T O IN T H E 2 1 s t CENTURY 13NEW FUNCTION S . 16T H E MA IN A R G U M E N T 19THE PURPOSE OF INQUIRY 22ME T H O D O L O G Y 2 5

MIL E S T O N E S O F N A T O E N L A R G E M E N T 2 5IMP O R T A N C E 2 6N A T O E N L A R G E M E N T IN T H E L IT E R A T U R E 2 7THE THEORETICAL APPROA CH 30CHAPTER SUMM ARIES 31II THEOR ETICAL BACK GRO UND 37INTRODUCTION 37POW ER BASED THEOR IES 37CONSTRUCTIVISM 41INTEGRATION BASED THEORIES 44NEW INSTITUTIONALISM 45E N L A R G E M E N T A S A D A P T A T IO N 4 7THE SECURITY DILEM MA AND RUSSIA 47A G E N T -B A S E D E X P L A N A T IO N S 4 8I II . N A T O 'S F U N C T IO N A L E N L A R G E M E N T 5 0INTRODUCTION 50N A T O S U MMIT S O N E N L A R G E M E N T 5 3NA TO STRATEGIES 56THE CASE FOR NEW FUNCT IONS 58NEW CAPABILITIES 59N A T O F U N C T IO N S D U R IN G T H E C O L D WA R 6 2NAT O FUNCTION S IN THE POST COLD-W AR ERA 69NA TO FUNC TIONS IN THE POST 9/11 ERA 83FUTURE NATO 90CONCLUSION 97


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Chapter PageIV . N A T O 'S G E O G R A P H IC A L E N L A R G E M E N T 9 9INTRODUCTION 99C O L D WA R E N L A R G E M E N T 102

P O S T C O L D WA R E N L A R G E M E N T 112CONCLUSION 134V . K O R E A N WA R A N D N A T O E N L A R G E ME N T 138INTRODUCTION 138THE WAR IN KOREA 138THE IMPORTA NCE OF THE KOREA N WAR 140SECURITY ENVIRO NM ENT 141NA TO 'S REACTION 142THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE WA R 143N A T O 'S N E W F U N C T IO N S A F T E R T H E WA R 145

CAPABILITY DEVE LOPM ENT 148G E O G R A P H IC A L E N L A R G E M E N T 1 50CONCLUSION 156VI. BOSNIA WAR AND NAT O ENLA RGEM ENT 159INTRODUCTION 159THE SECURITY ENVIRO NM ENT 160THE BOSNIA WA R 161NA TO 'S INTERVEN TION 165N A T O 'S N E W F U N C T IO N 1 68CAPABILITY DEVE LOPM ENT 169GEOGR APHICAL ENLA RGEM ENT 171R O A D B L O C K S T O N A T O E N L A R G E M E N T 174CONCLUSION 176VII . ANA LYSIS AND CONCLU SION 180INTRODUCTION 180THE CAUSAL RELATION SHIP 182THE BENEFITS OF NAT O ENLAR GEM ENT 187U N IN T E N D E D C O N S E Q U E N C E S O F T H EENLARGEMENT 188NEW FUNCTIONS AND NEW TERRITORIES 191REGIONAL VS. GLOB AL NATO 194CONCLUSION 194THE AREA FOR FURTHE R RESEAR CH 196

REFERENCES 198VITA 212


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LIST OF TAB LES

Table Page1. Aspiring Countries' Population, Arm ed Forces,GD P, Military Expenditure as of 1999 1252. New Mem bers ' Population, Armed Forces,GD P, Military Expenditure 1353. The Summ ary of Analysis 197


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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Page1. NA TO Operations 52. A Model for NA TO Transformation 213. Conceptual Framework 254. N A TO 's Functional Evolution 515. N A TO 's Six Rounds of Enlargemen t 1006. N A TO 's Second W ave of Enlargement 113


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CHAPTER IIN T R O D U C T IO N

Do we still need NAT O? The question has been discussed extensively in the pasttwo decades and at the dawn of the new m illennium; there is a near consensus throughoutthe political spectrum that NATO still matters for international security. Considering theSoviet threat was eliminated su ccessfully, it might have been costly to continue on thecommitments of NATO when there is no any threat to the members. Even more,engaging additional commitments by accepting new members can be seen as a hugepolicy error within and outside of the alliance. Why is NA TO enlarging continuously?This dissertation aims to provide a new perspective on NATO enlargement. As explainedbelow, NATO's geographical enlargement is explicitly tied to the alliance's functionalenlargement. W hen the alliance develops new functions to cope with the new challengesin the security environm ent, the new capabilities are required to satisfy the functions.NATO accepts new nations only when the required capabilities cannot be developedinternally among the members. Though NATO expansion can be explained by othermeans such as alliance form ation, hegemonic interests and cultural affiliation of the newand existing members, no study highlights the common characteristics of NATOenlargements throughout its history. Rather, the existing literature explains eachenlargement round as a separate case, thus not providing a consistent answer to theenlargement phenomenon.

This paper fo l lows the format requirements of The Chicago Manual of Style, 15 th edit ion by Univers i ty ofChi cago Pres s .


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Alliances typically cease to exist when the threat disappears. Having existed as asecurity organization of the last 60 years, NA TO has not just surpassed the expectationsof its mo st severe critics, but has also evolved into one of the core organiza tions of thetwenty-first century. Today, there is no other international organization that can enforcepeace and security in any part of the globe. The deficiencies of United Nations, OS CEand other similar organizations w ere underscored w ith the ethnic violence in ex-Yugoslavia in 1990s.

In the last twenty years, NATO underwent a huge transformation: New functions,

new capabilities and new m embers. W e are witnessing a new power shift in theinternational structure. Asia is rising as a power center in the new w orld order. N AT Oneeds to continue to transfo rm itself to cope with the new challenges.

What makes NATO's unique integrated military structure is the most importantelement that distinguish it from other organizations . NA TO is the most su ccessfulpolitical and military alliance of the history. The cold war ended pe acefully without abullet shot and Europe became one of the most prosperous regions of the w orld.Ironically, the success of NA TO became also a question mark fo r the alliance's ownexistence. In spite of the cold war's peaceful resolution, discussions of NATO's futurehave not ended. Those w ho believe NA TO will be dissolved prove redundant. 1 N A T Omanaged to adapt and transform itself throughout the years. The adaptation of NA TO hasbeen twofold. First, it has expanded the functions it performs and second, it has acceptednew mem bers in the east.

1 "There's no need for an acrimonious divorce , but perhaps NATO at 60 can look forward to NATO at 75enjo ying a quiet and we ll-d ese rve d retirement - sti l l alive, but a lot less active." Stephan W alt, CFRS y m p o s i u m o n N A T O a t 6 0 , h t t p : / / www. c f r . org / pro j ec t / 1406 / c f r_s ympos i um_on_nat o_a t _60 . h t ml
http://www.cfr.org/project/1406/cfr_symposium_on_nato_at_60.htmlhttp://www.cfr.org/project/1406/cfr_symposium_on_nato_at_60.html


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The current debate on NA TO 's future is focused on N AT O' s effectiveness in thefuture international order. Especially, the war in Afghanistan is seen as a test case forN A T O 's future. The rise of death toll in the alliance's first Article-5 operation and theever-increasing cost of the war has forced many countries in Europe to question NATO'sroles and capabilities. Those w ho raise concerns about the war in Afgha nistan state thatNA TO should act in accordance with its original mandate and just ensure the defense ofthe alliance territory. Out of area operations, like Afghanis tan, can jeopard ize thecredibility of the alliance.

NA TO enlargement is not a post cold war policy. In fact enlargement is acontinuation of a NA TO policy based on Article 10 of the Wash ington Treaty:

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in aposition to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security ofthe North A tlantic area to accede to this Treaty.

NATO enlargement was widely discussed both in political and academic circlesin the 1990s. NA TO countries expressed their consensus and desire for accepting newmem bers to the alliance in 1995 by publishing the study on NA TO enlargement. Thestudy underlines how NATO sees the enlargement issue and what it expects from theaspiring countries to be a member.

In principle, NA TO countries propose mem bership to any Euro-Atlantic countryhaving a market oriented democratic regime. Th e decision to admit a new country is

2 NATO, "The North At lant ic Treaty ," ht t p : / / www. nat o . i n t / cps / en / na t o l i ve / o f f i c i a l _ t ex t s _17120 . h t m,( acce s s ed May 13 , 2009 ) .3 NA TO , "St udy on NA TO Enl argement , " h t tp : // www. f as . org / man/ na t odoc / en l - 9502 . h t m, (accessed Apri l14 , 2009 ) .
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htmhttp://www.fas.org/man/natodoc/enl-9502.htmhttp://www.fas.org/man/natodoc/enl-9502.htmhttp://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm


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taken solely on consen sus bases. There is no any automated procedu re to accept newcountries which meets the criteria of the memb ership. Rather, NA TO evaluates everycase separately.

NATO AT 60NA TO is not merely an alliance of the cold war. In fact NA TO has become a

security comm unity with an em bedded network of political and military structures. Thealliance triumphed in the cold war w ithout any tragedy. In the afterm ath of the Soviet

collapse, instead of becoming obsolete, NAT O deepened and widened its structure.Nearly half of the current NA TO mem bers joined the club after the end of cold war.

Today, NA TO involves all kind of operations besides the conventional task ofterritorial defense. As seen in the figure 1, NA TO operations increased in complexity andrange in time. As of 2009, NA TO involved in one ma jor operation in Afg hanistan andfive small operations across the globe:

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND ASSISTANCE FORCE (ISAF) IN AFGHANISTANEstablished in 2001, ISAF operations in Afghanistan are lead by NATO since

2003. More than 42 nations contribute over 67.000 personnel for NA TO operation inAfghanistan. 4 NATO's mission in Afghanistan is to "extend the authority of the Afghancentral gov ernm ent" and to fos ter the reconstruction effo rts through 26 ProvincialReconstruction Teams (PRTs).

4 NATO, "Internat ional Securi ty Ass is tance Force (ISAF): Facts and Figures ,"ht t p : / / www. nat o . i n t / i s a f / docu / epub / pdf / p l acemat _arch i ve / i s a f _p l acemat _091001 .pdf . (accessed October 15,2 0 0 9 ) .
http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat_archive/isaf_placemat_091001http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat_archive/isaf_placemat_091001


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OPERATION ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR (OAE)Af ter the 9/11 terrorist attacks, NA TO initiated a num ber of counter terrorism

operations. OA E is a maritime operation in order to deprive terrorists from usingMediterranean Sea.

SUPPORT TO THE AFRICAN UNIONNATO supported the African Union in Somalia and Sudan by providing air lift

capability.

COUNTER PIRACY O PERA TIONIn 2009 N AT O launched Operation Allied Protector to protect the sea lines of

commerce in the horn of Afric a . 6

N A T O 'S P E R S IS T E N C EThere are many explanations for NA TO 's persistence after the cold war. First of all,

NATO is a highly institutionalized alliance. Most institutions outlive the initial purposeof their establishment. Once established, every institution will carry a sunk cost.Institutions will most likely survive by adapting to the new structure even w hen theirrationale fades away "because they are costly to create and less costly to m aintain."7Second, NA TO is too valuable to forgo. It is valuable for the US because through NA TO ,the US can legitimize its worldw ide security policies. NA TO is the symbol of Am ericansupremacy of the last century. Current international structure is a post world war II6 Ibid.7 Celeste A. W al lander, "Insti tut ional Asse ts and Adaptabi l i ty: NA T O after the Cold War," InternationalOrganization 54, no. 4 (2000): 705.


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institutional design of the US. T he structure of US state apparatus is reflected w orldwideo

through institutions such as NA TO . Furthermore, the US feels more com fortable in aninstitutional environment than bilateral relations. Thus the demise of a highly popularorganization will signal unintended messages about US power in the post cold war.Third, NA TO guarantees the peace and stabilization for European countries. Especiallyfor Germany, NATO means to mitigate the security concerns of other European powers.For Eastern European countries, NA TO is the ultimate security gu arantee for theirsurvival.

To sum up, NA TO survives as long as the mem bers see themselves better off in theclub.9 Especially in a time of m ultidimensional risks and threats, N AT O w ill lengthen theshadow of the future. Befo re exploring N A TO 's double enlargement, it is important todetermine when and how NATO did the right thing.

THE GOLDEN DA YS OF NA TONeedless to say, the cold war was a NA TO era. The W est recovered economically

under the N A TO 's security umbrella. The consolidation of Europe was anotherachievement of the alliance. NA TO exploited the opportunity to dem ocratize the Centraland Eastern Europe in the imm ediate aftermath of the fall of Berlin wall. NA TOmem bership provided the conditions to foster the democratic reform s, tamper the securitycompetition and enabled the denationalization of the defense in Central and EasternEurope. The new m emb ers were able to reform their political and econom ic systems and

8 Michael W. Reisman, "The United States and International Institutions," Survival 41, no. 4 (1999): 63 .9 Stephen M. Walt , "Why Al l iances Endure or Col lapse ," Survival. 39, no. 1 (199 7): 156.


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resolve disputes with neighboring countries peacefully. 10For the first time in the history,Europe is close to becoming an island of peace. To quote Brzezinski,

NA TO enlargement w as historically timely and also the right thing to do. Bythe early years of the twenty-first century, the almost total geopolitical overlapbetween membership in NATO and membership in the EU made it clear thatEurope w as finally both secure and united. 11

NATO'S FAILURES

The late reaction to the Yugoslavia con flict was one of the crucial mistakes forNATO. The war showed how the security of neighboring regions is linked to the Euro-Atlantic security. The spillover of conflict in Yugos lavia would have undermined thebasic norms of the alliance if it had not intervened. The lessons of the Bosnian Warhelped NATO to prevent another regional crisis in Kosovo. Although Russians werealienated in the Koso vo intervention, the relative peace in K osovo prov es to be a positivemark for NATO.

T H E E N L A R G E M E N T IS SU ELooking at the NA TO 's achievem ents and faults, it is fair to say that enlargem ent

issue is one of the most debated issue in N A TO 's history. To some it is the "centerpiece

10 Phi l ip H. Gordon, "NATO: Enlargement and Effect iveness ." Brookings Inst i tut ion, 23 ,h t t p : / / www. brook i ngs . edu / t e s t i mony / 2008 / 031 l _nat o_gordon . as px ( acces s ed November 21 , 2009 ) ." Zb igniew B rzezinsk i , "An Ag end a for NA TO : Tow ard a Global Securi ty Web," Foreign Affairs 88, no.5 (2009): 6 .
http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2008/031http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2008/031


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Should NA TO be only a Euro-Atlantic collective security organization or reach tothe areas traditionally beyond Europe? Does NATO need new functions or new territoriesor both? Is there a causal relation between fu nctional and geographical enlargem ent? Ifyes, how is the functional enlargement related to geographical enlargement?

In order to explore the above unknowns, we need to take a close look at thesecurity environment and NATO's tasks to cope with the challenges.

2 1 s t C E N T U R Y S E C U R IT Y E N V IR O N ME N T

The security environment has substantially changed in the last decade. The newthreats such as terrorism, nuclear proliferation, failed states, threats to Informationnetworks, and insecurity of energy sources demand common commitment by theinternational com munity. N o individual country is able to respond the above threatsalone.

THREATS TO VALUES AND PEOPLENA TO is not just an interest dominated organization. The democratic values and

norms constitute the mere intra-alliance function . Any threat to the values and people isperceived a com mon security concern. As stated in the latest NA TO M ultiple FutureStudy, "the Alliance will face rivals for strategic influence, values and ideas; itsvulnerabilities will be exploited on and beyond Alliance territory; and its populations andforces attacked in unexpected way s."15

15 NATO, "Mult iple Future Study," 4 ,h t t p : / / www. ac t . na t o . i n t / med i a / Mul t i p l e_Fut ures / 20090503_MFP_f i nd i ngs . pdf ( acces s ed Nov emb er 17 ,2 0 0 9 ) .
http://www.act.nato.int/media/Multiple_Futures/20090503_MFP_findings.pdfhttp://www.act.nato.int/media/Multiple_Futures/20090503_MFP_findings.pdf


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THREATS TO TERRITORYThe collective def ens e is the glue of the alliance. Alth ough rare, there is still a

residual conventional threat to the alliance. The stability in Balkans and Caucasus isvolatile and the spread of any conflict can undermine the Euro-Atlantic Security.

THREATS FROM FRAGILE O R FAILED STATESNA TO will have to engage intra state conflicts in the future. The instability

caused by failed states can negatively affect the alliance security in terms of im migration

and spill over of the conflict to the NA TO territory. Thus, NA TO might increasinglyconduct peace keeping operations in areas at strategic distance.

WMD THREATBoth state and non-state actors can easily develop or access to the W MD

capabilities in the coming decades. In particular, terrorist access to the WMD can becatastrophic for the alliance security.

TERRORISMTerrorism is one of the major threats to the alliance in the 21st century. As stated

in the Declaration on Terrorism by NATO Foreign Ministers:Defence against terrorism may include activities by NATO's military forces,based on decisions by the North Atlantic Council, to help deter, defend, disruptand protect against terrorist attacks, or threat of attacks, directed from abroad,against populations, territory, infrastructure and forces of any member state,


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including by acting against these terrorists and those who harbour them. Anyoperations undertaken in the defence against terrorism will have a sound legalbasis and fully conform w ith the relevant provisions of the United Nations Charterand all relevant international norms and standards.16

CLIMATE CHANGEClimate change m ight cause societal unrest in the near future. NA TO , as being the

only institutions that can provide security, may need to conduct hum anitarian operations

in order to assist national and international organiz ation as it did in "the Asia T suna mi,the 2006 United States Hurricane season and the Kashmiri earthquake." 17

ENERGY SECURITYThe disruption of gas to Europe in 2007 demonstrated the vulnerability of allies in

the energy sector. In the 1980s, NATO protected the tanker traffic during the Iran-Iraqwar. Today, the energy security may necessitate a wide variety of actions includingprotecting the infrastructure, providing security to energy producer countries and to callfor collective response in the face of a threat to the flow of energy.

In the Energy Security, NA TO might have a role for "informa tion and intelligencefusion and sharing; projecting stability; advancing international and regional cooperation;

16 NATO, "Declarat ion on Terrorism," para. 3 ,h t t p : / / www. nat o . i n t / cps /en / na t o l i ve / o f fi c i a l _ t ex ts _21031 . ht m ( acces s ed Nov emb er 21 , 2009 ) .17 NATO, "Future securi ty Environment ," 58,http: / /www.act .nato . int /media/Mult iple_Futures /ACTFutureSecuri tyEnvironmentFirstEdit ion.pdf ( acces s edN o v e m b e r 2 1 , 2 0 0 9 ) .
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_21031http://www.act.nato.int/media/Multiple_Futures/ACTFutureSecurityEnvironmentFirstEdition.pdfhttp://www.act.nato.int/media/Multiple_Futures/ACTFutureSecurityEnvironmentFirstEdition.pdfhttp://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_21031


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supporting consequence m anagem ent; and supporting the protection of critical energy1 Qinfrastructure."

VIRTUAL THREATThe coordinated cyber attacks to Estonia in 2007 raised the security of the

alliance inform ation networks. As E stonian D efense M inister put it correctly, " at present,NA TO does not define cyber-attacks as a clear military action. This means that theprovisions of Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, or, in other words collective self-defense, will not automatically be extended to the attacked country. Not a single NA TOdefense minister would define a cyber-attack as a clear military action at present.How ever, this matter needs to be resolved in the near future." 1 9

To sum up, the world in the next 20 years will be more globalized and00

unpredictable. NA TO can not solve all kind of global problems , how ever NAT O shouldbe a part of network of organizations which will address the global threats and risks. Thenew threats "to vital interests will challenge the strategic unity, and solidarity within the 21alliance as well the comm on und erstanding of what constitutes an article 5 attack."

N A T O IN T H E 2 1 s t C E N T U R YRecent studies questions the relevance of NA TO in the face of new challenges.

Although politicians often refer to NA TO as the most successful alliance in history, it is

18 NATO, "Bucharest Summit Declarat ion," art ic le 48 ,h t t p : / / www. nat o . i n t / cps / en /na t o l i ve / o f f ic i a l _ t ex t s _8443 . h t m ( acces s ed November 23 , 2009 ) .19 Ian Traynor, "Russ ia accused of unleashing cyber war to disable Estonia ," Guardian, May 17 , 2007 ,h t t p : / / www. guard i an . co .uk / wor l d / 2007 / may / 17 / t ops t or i es 3 . rus s i a ( acces s ed November 23 , 2009 ) .20 NATO, "Mult iple Future Project ," 3 .21 Ibid. ,22 .
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htmhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/may/17/topstories3.russiahttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/may/17/topstories3.russiahttp://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm


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not uncommon to see the remarks of NATO being "insufficient to the agenda." 22 A newNA TO should clarify the N A TO 's roles and missions and find a balance between its corefunctions. To do that, NA TO should reach a consensus on the future challengesespecially regarding Russia.

Com mo n sense requires that states in a collective security organization m ay h avesimilar threat perceptions if the aggressor has a substantial aggregate econ omic, militaryand human resources. How ever, different perceptions of threats are not rare in thealliances. As claimed by Stephen M . Walt, the level of threats depends on the

aggressor's aggregate power, proximity, offensive capability and offensive intentions.23

Thus, states close to the aggressor feel more threatened compared to the other states in acollective security organization. States having historical or territorial problems with theaggressor will assess the threat seriously.

The danger with the divergent threat perception is that it can jeopardize theeffectiveness of the alliance. When we look at NA TO , it is easy to discover that som eNATO members want reassurance against Russian aggression which became evidentafter the Russia-G eorgia conflict. The W estern European countries, how ever, see Russiaas a partner rather than a threat. In the last Munich security conference, Sarkozy statedthat he does n o t " believe that modern Ru ssia constitutes a military threat to the Eu ropeanUnion and NATO." 2 4 The below visions of NATO help understanding NATO in the newcentury.

22 Daniel Ham il ton et a l. , "Al l iance Reborn an Atlant ic Com pact for the 21st Century," (Wa shington , DC:Atlant ic Counci l of the United States , 2009) .2 3 Stephen M. Walt , "Al l iance Formation and the Balance of World Power," International Security 9, no. 4( 1985 ) : 9 .24 Craig Whit lock, "'Reset ' Sought on Relat ions With Russ ia , Biden Says ," The Washington Post,ht t p : / / www. was h i ng t onpos t . corn / wp- dyn / cont ent / ar t i c l e / 2009 / 02 / 07 / AR2009020700756 . h t ml ( acces s edN o v e m b e r 2 3 , 2 0 0 9 ) .
http://www.washingtonpost.corn/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/07/AR2009020700756.htmlhttp://www.washingtonpost.corn/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/07/AR2009020700756.html


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MINIMALIST NATOWith the resurgence of Russia, some NATO nations felt the urgency of focusing

on home m issions instead of away m issions. Mainly, the east European countries believethat NA TO can be relevant only if it provides the core function of collective defen seagainst the NA TO territory. Even some old NA TO m embers such as Norw ay, want "theneed for renewed focus on security challenges on NA TO territory and in our im mediateneighborhood." 25

EXPEDITIONARY NATOThose who support an expeditionary NATO emphasize that a large scale military

aggression against the alliance territory is very unlikely. The m ost form idable form ofthreat will likely originate far from the alliance territory. NATO needs to have thedeploy able capabilities to conduc t expedition ary operations across the globe. Even thearticle 5 missions might be expeditionary type. The NATO Response Force (NRF) can beused in the full range of expeditionary operations in strategic distance.

GLOBAL NATOAlthoug h not as powerfu l as the above voices, there are proposals to expand the

alliance globally by including countries with the similar democratic values and culture,such as Australia, Japan and South Korea. Globalists believe that NA TO should be theultimate security institution of the all democratic countries:

25 Espen Barth Eide, "Norway's securi ty out look - s trengthening the re levance of NATO," Ministry ofDef ens e , Government o f Norway ,http: / /www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/fdyaktuel t / ta ler_art ikler /pol i t i sk_ledelse /s tatssekretaer_espen_barth_eide/2009 / norwa ys - s ecur i t y - out l ook- . h t ml ? i d= 562975 ( acces s ed Nov emb er 23 , 2009 ) .
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NATO's next move must be to open its membership to any democratic state in theworld that is willing and able to contribute to the fulfillment of NATO's newresponsibilities. Only a truly global alliance can address the global challenges ofthe day . 2 6

N E W F U N C T IO N SNATO is the fundamental organization that ties both sides of the Atlantic. NATO

will maintain its relevance as long as it guarantees the mem bers ' sovereignty. Past NA TO

enlargements have contributed enormously to the European pacification. However thereis still work to be done in the Balkans, Black S ea and Caucasus. While NA TO is thelegitimate vehicle of the international community to handle global security concerns, itshould not be expected to find solutions to all global problems. Instead, NA TO should bea stage setter. It should serve as "a training tool, as a tool of assistance for other regionalbodies."27 NA TO should match its capabilities with its ambitions to remain credible. Thefollowing function s are indispensable for a future NAT O:

DETERRENCE AND COLLECTIVE DEFENSEArticle 5 is and should remain the core theme of the alliance. However, it needs to

be reassessed to better reflect what it does and does not cover. On one hand, a large scalemilitary aggression against NA TO territory is unlikely. On the other han d,unconventional threats will be most likely. Therefore, NATO should decide whether

26 Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier , "Global NATO," Foreign Affairs 85, no. 5 (2006): 106.27 Charles A. Kupcha n, "N AT O At 60 Symp osium : Sess ion I: N A TO in the Internat ional System ,"Counci l On Foreign Relat ions , h t t p : / / www. c f r . org / pro j ec t / 1406 / c f r_s ympos i um_on_nat o_a t _60 . h t ml ( acce s s ed November 23 , 2009 ) .
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these new threats warrant the implementation of the article 5 or not. NA TO shouldeffectively demonstrate its solidarity and will in the face of any threat to its territory andpeople. If NA TO fails to guarantee the territorial sovereignty of its memb ers, therenationalization of the defense in Europe w ill cause the old rivalries to resurface.

CONFLICT RESOL UTIONNA TO will probably engage in a regional crisis beyond its territory in the co ming

decades. NA TO will have to use its political and military assets to prevent any conflict

that jeopard izes its security.

ENERGY SECURITYN AT O m ight have to ensure the undisrupted flow of oil and gas to the western

markets. The stability of the energy producer countries is important for the alliance in thisrespect.

CYBER DEFENSENA TO should have a capability to ensure the safety of not just the physical but

also the virtual comm ons.

PREVENTION OF THE PROLIFERATION OF WM DThe worst scenario that can happen in today 's globalized w orld is terrorist access

to WMD. NATO needs to develop new instruments to prevent proliferation ashighlighted in the latest comprehensive Counter-WMD policy:


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the spread of WMD and their means of delivery and the possibility that terroristswill acquire them are the principal threats facing the Alliance over the next 10-15years. Therefore, the Alliance seeks to prevent their proliferation through anactive political agenda of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, aswell as by developing and harmonising defence capabilities, and, when necessary,employing these capabilities consistent with political decisions in support of non-proliferation objectives.

TRANSA TLANTIC LINKNA TO is the main platform for Euro-Atlantic Security. Any transatlantic rift will

only contribute to the ineffectivenes s of the alliance. In NA TO 's history, it is notuncommon to find examples of US-Europe disagreement. However in the past decade,the mutual blow to the alliance solidarity was a concern for every politician. One of thebiggest tests of NA TO 's credibility occurred before the Iraq war. Based on the articlefour of the Washington treaty, Turkey requested NATO's assistance because it fearedbeing drawn a big conflict with Iraq. Surprisingly, France and Germ any resisted therequest and caused a crisis in NAT O. A lthough the decision to aid Turkey was taken late,the stalemate had already rung the alarm bells for NA TO solidarity. As the NA TO

9 0

secretary asserts "the alliance has been damag ed but it is not bro ken ." Similarly, USreluctance on calling NAT O help for the conduct of Afgh anistan and Iraq war was a big28 NA TO , "N AT O's Com prehen sive , Strategic-Level Pol icy for Prevent ing the Prol i feration of Weapo ns ofMas s Des t ruc ti on ( W M D) and Def end i ng aga i nst Chemi ca l , B i o l og i ca l , Rad i o l og i ca l and Nuc l ear ( C BR N)Threats," article 5, h t t p : / / www. nat o . i n t / cps / en / SI D- F8FB6D58-07B4 753A / nat o l i ve / o f f i c i a l _ t ex t s _57218 . h t m ( acces s ed Nov emb er 23 , 2009 ) .2 9 Mich ael R. Gordon," NA TO : The Ins ide Story," New York Times, February 25, 2003,h t t p : / / www. nyt i mes . com/ 2003 / 02 / 25 / i n t erna t i ona l / wor l ds pec i a l 3 / 25CND_DI SP. h t ml ?pagewant ed= a l l( acce s s ed November 23 , 2009 ) .
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disappointment for the allies. The US missed an unprecedented opportunity to transformthe transatlantic relations in the wake of the Iraq war. To quote Asm us,

"for the first time ever, NA TO invoked the defense clause enshrined in Article Vof its charter, and U .S. allies offer ed to join the fight in Afghanistan. But theopportunity was then squandered. Instead, the decision to mak e Iraq the nexttarget in the war on terrorism and the m anner in which the administration choseto topple Saddam Hussein led to a spectacular political train wreck across theAtlantic." 30

PARTNERSHIP NETWORKSNATO should continue to enhance the partnership programs with other

international organizations and countries. NA TO should be able to access the civiliancapabilities of the other organizations in any operations. NA TO needs to develop a newpartnership program w ith the neighboring regions of Black Sea, Caucasus, C entral Asiaand Middle East in order to secure the people and territory of the alliance.

T HE M A IN A R G U M E N TThe fast pace of globalization, the source of new threats and their asym metric nature

all forced NA TO to change its security approach fro m a geographical to functional one.NATO's future missions and open door policy will depend on the consequences of thefunctional approach to security. In the past, NA TO expansion wa s explained by theinterest accumulation of several key nations. There is no study which looks at the

30 Ronald D. Asmus, "Rebui lding the At lant ic Al l iance ," Foreign Affairs 82, no. 5 (2003): 21 .


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implementation of NATO's new functions, however. Functional enlargement is a vehicleof NATO's adaptation to new security environment.

This study examines whether there is a linkage between NATO's functional andgeographical enlargement. The main argument of the study is that NATO's functionalenlargement requires new capabilities which in turn could result in g eographicalenlargement. A New Security Environment brings new challenges which in turns demandNA TO adaptation. NA TO functions are a part of the adaptation process. Requiredcapabilities are derived from the NA TO functions. Capabilities can be acquired by

developing within NATO, cooperating with partners or importing from new members.The figure 2 depicts the main argum ent.

NATO has transformed itself from a cold war alliance to a more complexinstitution in the last two decades. During this period, NA TO both widened and deepenedin contrary to the expectations. My research shows that NATO's geographical wideningis closely related to functional deepening. Indeed, NA TO geographical enlargement isa capability aggregation process. NATO enlargement can be explained in twodimensions: Functional and Geographical enlargement.

The central hypothesis is that NATO's new functions drive the geographicalenlargement. In other words, NAT O enlarges g eographically unless the capabilitiesneeded to satisfy the new NA TO functions can be developed by existing structure. Anygeographical enlargement should bring additional capabilities to address the NATO'sevolving functions.


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THE PURPOSE OF INQUIRYThere is an emerging discussion on NATO's effectiveness and functionality due to thewar in Afghanistan. It is highly believed that a failure in Afghanistan will undermineNA TO 's credibil i ty . This study examines how N A TO 's new functions affect thegeographical enlargement. The theoretical and case studies provide answers for why thefunctional and geographical enlargement did not occur at the same time. The studyexamines the consequences of the NATO's involvement in the Wider Black Sea region aswell.

THE IMPACT O F AFGHANISTANWith the global war on terror, NATO's security paradigm has changed

considerably. The allies' response to the 9/11 was quick and decisive. On September 12,2001, NAC declared the implementation of the article-5 of the Washington treaty. Thepolitical contribution of NATO's decision was much more important than the militaryone. Although NA TO did not join the Afgha nistan operation initially, by 2003,Afghanistan becomes one of the most important NATO operations.

Afghanistan operation is important in two ways. First it is the first article-5operation in NATO's history. NATO used its military muscle for the first time, whichproves its capability and solidarity in the post cold war. Secondly, Afghanistan operationis the first full-scale out of area operation NA TO is undertaking. So far all the operationswere in Europe, thus gov ernments could easily explain the rational to the public.Afghan istan operation can not be explained with the old rationale of collective de fenseand European security. In fact, it is the new security paradigm that produced the


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France's Reentry to Military StructureFrance reintegrated to the military structure in 2009. As a result of the

reintegration, France assumed the one of the top military posts in the alliance: SupremeAllied Transformation Com mander.

Global Economic CrisisThe global economic crisis forced the NAT O countries to further narrow their

defense budget and contributions. The resource constraints will have a huge impact in

NA TO 's functions and accessions of new m embers.

Renewed Transatlantic Focus on NATOW ith the new US administration, NA TO regained the transatlantic focus. There is

a consensus that NA TO should retain its position as the sole security platform in Euro-Atlantic region.

New Secretary GeneralFor the first time, an ex- prime m inister assumed the position of S ecretary

General. Mr. Anders F ogh Rasm ussen brought a fresh voice to the alliance.

New Strategic ConceptIn 2010, NATO will decide on its new strategy which will guide the alliance in

the next decade.


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M E T H O D O L O G YThis study is a qualitative analysis of N A T O 's functional and geographical

enlargement fo cusing especially on the post cold war era expansion. T he two case studiesexplore the validity of the hypothesis that there is a close relationship between N A TO 'sfunctional and geographical enlargement. F unctional enlargement is tending to drive thegeographical enlargement. In figure 3, the conceptual fram ewo rk of the dissertation isdepicted.

Independent Variable Intervening Variable Dependent Variable

CapabilityShortfall

GeographicalEnlargement

Fig. 3. Conceptual Framework

The level of functional enlargement is the independent variable while the level ofgeographical enlargement is the dependent variable. The capability shortfall ties the twovariables.

Each Case Study w ill be analyzed in terms of the Security En vironment, changesto the NA TO function s and capability D evelopment. The goal of the case studies is todetermine whether the new functions resulted in new members or not.

MIL E S T O N E S O F N A T O E N L A R G E ME N TThere are three milestones in NATO's enlargement. The first milestone is the

1950 Korean W ar. The war reveals the dimensions of the Soviet threat. NA TO


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recognized that Soviet ideological and territorial expansion threatened the WesternSecurity.

The second m ilestone is the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 1990 NA TO gave awarm welcome to the developments in the communist world. NATO mentioned that therewould be no security at the expense of any country. NA TO changed its security approachdramatically with the end of the cold war. The change could be seen in the classificationand preparation of the allies' top strategic docum ent. NA TO 's 1991 Strategic C oncept

51has been driven by the political authorities and allowed for public access.

The third milestone is the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001. Thedevelopm ents in the aftermath of the attack revealed the necessity fo r consideringsecurity not only conventional territorial defens e but also new threats far away fromNATO territory. The new motto is that Euro-Atlantic security starts from Hindu-KushMountains.

IMP O R T A N C EThis research enhances the em pirical development of the existing literature in

several ways. First, the current literature explains the NA TO enlargement in only onedimension, accession of new mem bers. This study looks at both functional and territorialdimension. The chapters explain why NA TO enlarges functionally and geographically.

Second, the existing literature explains NA TO 's exp ansion, by the interaction ofmajo r powers. This research contributes to the expansion literature by explaining anuntouched phenomenon: New NATO functions. The research also makes predictions33 NATO, "NATO' s 1991St ra t eg i c Concept , " www. nat o . i n t / cps / en / na t o l i ve / t op i c s - 56626 . h t m ( acces s edNovember 17 , 2009 ) .
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about the direction of future NA TO expansion by examining the new NA TO tasks andmissions. In particular, the energy security and stability in the wider Black Sea has beenextensively covered in the research. My research provides a new understanding of theN A TO 's role in the Caucasus corridor.

Third, the study contributes to the discussions of the NA TO ' adaptation to thenew security environm ent. The enlargement is the centerpiece for the persistence ofNA TO in the post cold era. Here, my research brings the functional enlargement at thecenter of the discussion. The dissertation states that NA TO enlargement is an institutionaladaptation which should be " built on the logic of relative costs and the functions of

3 4institutions.

N A T O E N L A R G E M E N T IN T H E L ITE R A T U R ENA TO enlargement is heavily discussed from a territorial expansion point of view

in 1990s. The studies can be categorized in three groups. In the first group, there arescholars who believe that with the demise of Soviet threat, NAT O does not have a futureand it will lose its significance. Thus NA TO enlargem ent does not make sense since itdoes not have a future. Even if it can survive artificially for some time, it is destined tofade away. The above argu ment is m odified in later years by suggesting that as long asthe US has an interest to keep NA TO to interfere in European D efense and F oreignPolicy, NATO's will continue to exist.

34 Wallander, "Inst itut ional Asse ts and Adaptabi l i ty: NA TO after the Cold War," 707 .35 John J. Mea rsheim er, "B ack to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," InternationalSecurity 15, no. 1 (199 0): 5 .36 Kennet N . W al t z , "NATO E xpans i on: A Rea l i s t ' s V i ew , " in Explaining NATO Enlargement, ed. RobertW. Rauchhaus (London; Port land, Or. : Frank Cass , 2001) , 29 .


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In the second category, there are opponents of the expansion. The opponentsclaim that NA TO enlargement w ill not help secure the Euro-Atlantic region. On thecontrary, such a mov e will jeopardize the dem ocratization of Russia and divide Europewith new lines. The countries who rem ain outside the line will feel insecure withNATO's enlargement. Moreover, the opponents claim that the cost of enlargement willoutweigh the benefits of having new mem bers. It will be difficult to reach consens uswhen the num ber of countries continue to rise.

In the last category of literature, there are the advocates of NA TO enlargement.

Mainly neoliberals and constructivists scholars support the NA TO enlargement in thatNA TO w ill help the democratization of the Central and East Europe. By joining the club,the aspiring countries will forgo the security competition with their neighbors. There willbe spillover effect in economic and social areas. The aspiring countries can focus ondomestic refor ms and democratization. The rationale behind the tampering securitycompetition is that Article 5 of the W ashington treaty provides ultimate security warrantyfor the new mem bers. Not all the advocates have reached a consensus on the limits of theNA TO enlargement. While some support only a European enlargement, others likeNicholas B urns support the idea of a more global NA TO reaching Central Asia and theMiddle East.37

There are valuable studies on NAT O functions in the literature as well. Thecentral theme of these studies is the transformation of the alliance from "a predom inantlydefense-based m ilitary A lliance into a comprehensive political and military security

37 Rebecca R . Moore , NATO's New M ission : Projecting Stability in a Post-Cold War World (Westport ,Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2007), 5.


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community ." 3 8 Especially Emanuel Adler argues that NATO enlargement is an exampleof the spread of security communities. Adler believes that NATO's enlargement was acooperative security enlargement to develop a comm on identity. The diffusio n of NA TOpractices in the 1990s brought the geographical enlargement.39 The Partnership for PeaceProgram (PfP ) is the most important N AT O practice after the cold war. The Pf P practicecause the spread of NATO's background knowledge which in turns socialize the PfPcountries.40 The enlargement studies done by Allied Command Transformation do notgive a bright picture for the future of N A TO 's expan sion. The futu re world scenarios

study articulates four scenarios of which only the last one result in enlargement:41

THE STRONG TOOLBOXThis future represents a strong US and a fragmented European commitment.

There is a comm on threat perception am ong the allies. NAT O is seen as the main vehiclefor global security.

THE SHARED PARTNERSHIPThe future represents a strong US and European commitment. NATO is highly

capable of conducting any operations globally. The capability gap is reduced between theallies. There is division in functional and geographical lines between EU and NA TO .

38 NATO, "Mult iple Future Project ," 353 9 Emanuel Adler , "The Spread of Securi ty Communit ies: Communit ies of Pract ice , Sel f -Restraint , andNATO's Post-Cold War Transformation," European Journal of International Relations 14, no. 2 (2008):196 .40 Ibid.: 208.41 NATO, "Future World Scenarios ,"ht t p : / /www. ac t . na t o .i n t / med i a / Mul t ip l e_Fut ures / ACTFut ureW or l dScenar i o s Apr06 . pdf ( acces s edNovember 3 , 2009 ) : Chapt er 4 - 11 .
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While NATO conducts high intensity collective defense operations, theEU conducts lowintensity peace keeping operations.

THE FRAGMENTED TOOLBOXThe US and European commitments are weak. There is no consensus on the

threat. NA TO can still have all kinds of operations. Howev er, there is a transatlantic rifton the use of political and military assets.

EURO-CENTRIC TOOLBOXThis vision represents a weakened transatlantic link. NA TO operates only at the

region around Europe and US continue act unilaterally.42 The US engagement in NA TOis very limited and there is no consensus on the threat perception. NA TO conducts onlylow intensity operations. Ne w E uropean countries join the club.

As aforem entioned, almost all of the studies examine only one dimension ofNATO expansion: either NATO functions or the geographical enlargement. Noconnection between functions and membership has been offered yet

T H E T H E O R E T IC A L A P P R O A C HAlthough the aim of the study is not to test any theory, but rather to highlight

NATO's double enlargement, it is worth explaining the major theoretical approaches onNATO enlargement. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the enlargement theories.

42 Ibid.: Chapter 4-9


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CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND OF NATO ENLARGEMENTThis study borrows mostly f rom the theories of institutional exp ansion, a term

wh ich refers to the proc ess and practices of the organization rath er than the structure ofthe international system that trigger the N A TO 's geographical enlargement.

CHAPTER 3: NATO'S FUNCTIONAL ENLARGEM ENTThis chapter underscores the evolution of NATO's security approach from a

collective defen se to comprehensive security. In the last 60 years, N A T O 's core functio ns

expanded dramatically. Having a Deterrence and Defens e function in the early years ofthe alliance, NAT O, today, has a wide variety of functions ranging from crisismanag ement to high intensity operations. In order to satisfy these functions, NA TO hadto acquire the required capabilities. In some cases the capabilities are developed withinthe alliance with its own resources, in other cases they are developed by cooperatingpartners and in some cases new mem bers are accepted to import the capabilities.

There are three critical thresholds in the N A TO 's post cold war functionalenlargement: 1990 London Summit, 1994 Brussels Summit and 2004 Istanbul Summit.NA TO countries agreed on the new directions for the Euro-Atlantic security in thesesummits.

CHAPTER 4: NATO'S GEOGRAPHICAL ENLARGEM ENTThere were 12 members originally in the alliance. In the next 60 years, the

alliance enlarged to 28 mem bers. The geographical enlargem ent took place in 6 rounds.The bulk of enlargem ent took place in the post-co ld era. I categorized th e geogr aphical


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enlargement in three waves. The first wave enlargement consist of 1952 accession ofGreece and Turkey, 1955 accession of Germany and 1982 accession of Spain. The firstwave enlargemen t aimed at filling the gap in the western security and containing Sov iet'sthreat. The geostrategic position of the new mem bers w as as important as their m ilitarycontribution to the alliance security. The European Security w ould have been endangeredif the first wave never had happened.

The second wav e of enlargement occurred after the cold war and aimed toenhance dialogue and coo peration with the form er eastern bloc. Initially the enlargem ent

was not on the agenda. In fact, NA TO had been an identity crisis. Many scholars claimedthat the days of NATO were numbered. It was until the Bosnian war, that NATO realizedthat its post cold war security approach needed to be modified radically to better copewith the post cold war threats.

From 1997 until now, 12 central and Eastern European countries joined thealliance in the second w ave. The m embe rship of the CEE C helped the stabilization of allEurope. Furthermore it did not produce much resistance from Russians. The NATOmem bership w as important for the CEEC since it is the ultimate w arranty of theirindependence. Without NATO membership, the nationalization of the defense wasprobable.

The last round of enlargement occurred in 2009 with the accession of Albania andCroatia. This round is crucial for the "greater stability in southeastern Europe, especiallygiven the independence of Kosovo and the enduring hostility to NATO of importantpolitical factions in Serbia." 44

44 Vincent Morel l i and Paul Belkin, "NATO Enlargement Albania , Croat ia , and Poss ible FutureCandidates ," (Washington, D.C. : Congress ional Research Service , 2008) , 22 .


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levels in Europe. NA TO accepted Greece, Turkey and German y to the club in order tomatch the Soviets' M ilitary capabilities.

CHAPTER 6: BOSNIAN WAR AND NATO ENLARGEMENTThe case study highlights the volatility of the stability in Eastern Europe with the

end of cold war. The honey moo n of the early 1990s ended with the tragic events of theBosnia war. NAT O was the only military power to be able to end the war. Thevulnerability of new dem ocracies in Europe was a concern for the west. As Craw ford

asserts Bosnian W ar provides NAT O " a renewed legitimacy that it needed to expandeastward". 47

The Bosnian War horrified the Central and East European countries (CEEC) aswell. Therefore, the second wave of enlargement w as driven not by NA TO alone but theaspiring countries as well. The CEE C urgently requested to be a part of the alliance.These countries see the ineffectiveness of the EU in the Bosnian w ar. They do not wan t avictim of Russian hegemo ny anymore. The CEEC counts on Am ericans more thanEuropeans for their security. The new motto for these countries is Americans in, Russian

AQOut and Europe down.

As long as Balkans and Eastern Europe rem ains the source of instability, theEurope will not be secure. The second wave of the enlargement is still underway. It willcome to an end when the B alkan countries have been stabilized.

4 7Bev erly Crawford, "The Bosn ian Road to N A TO En largement ," in Explaining NATO Enlargement, ed.Robert W. Rauchhaus (London; Port land, Or. : Frank Cass , 2001) , 27 .48 Asmus, Opening NATO 's Door : How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New E ra, 33.


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CHAPTER 7: ANALYSIS AND CONCLU SIONSThe research concludes that NATO's enlargement is two fold. The geographical

enlargement is a continuation of the functional enlargement. T he time lag between thesetwo enlargem ent process is a result of the alliance 's adaptation to the new function . Ne wfunctions do not always result in new mem bers. But the allies' options are either gainingnew capabilities within the existing mem bership structure, cooperating with otherinternational actors or importing the new capabilities by inviting new mem bers. T hefuture geographical enlargement w ill depend on how effectiv ely NA TO can undertake

the new fun ctions. The research sho ws that stabilization of the wider Black Sea region isvital for energy security in the next decades. The black sea corridor constitutes a securityblack hole in the near future for the alliance. The area that stretches from Europe toCentral Asia between M iddle East and Soviet Union is the energy route of the NA TO .Instability in this region will harm the vital security interests of the alliance. Therefore, itis important for the alliance to extend the security umbrella to the black searegion.49 Although it is constantly denied by NATO members, Russian reaction is a majorfactor on NATO's decision to enlarge.

49 Ronald D. Asmus, "Europe's Eastern Promise: Rethinking on NATO and Eu Enlargement ," ForeignAffairs 87, no. 1 (20 08 ): under "Uncertain Fu tures".


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institutions. Both theories explain the expansion of NAT O in terms of rational decisionmaking of the states.

NEOREALISMAccording to Neorealism , NA TO is a product of a bipolar international system . In

the absence of a ma in threat, the alliance sooner o r later will diss olve. It is jus t a matter oftime. Suspicion will arise as a result of relative gain problems in the new structure.Balance of Threat theory suggests that "states prefer to join the less threatening side,where a perceived aggressive intention is one component of threat. Eastern Europeanstates, still feeling a potential threat from the East, turn to a less threatening alliance forshelter."1

As W alt argues, "states form alliances to balance against threats rather thanbandwagon with them." 2 Alliance requires the coordination of efforts to dismiss theexternal threats. Member countries are expected to share the costs of alliance. Aconsiderable amou nt of resources are put aside for force developments. T he military isthe most common vehicle by which alliances meet their goals. NATO can only surviveand grow w hen facing a substantial threat to its existence. In other words, NA TO willeventually break down in the absence of the main adversary. The existence of a crediblethreat provides the venue of cooperation and makes free riding costly. Cooperation ismore efficient and cost saving. Exclusion from the club mak es punishm ent effective.Likewise, when the outside threat vanishes, the alliance may lose the glue that holds ittogether. In the absence of a common threat, a relative-gains problem amon g the1 And rew Ky dd, "Trust Bui ldin g, Trust Breaking: The Di lem ma of NA TO Enlargement ," InternationalOrganization 55, no. 4 (2001): 804.2Walt , "Al l iance Formation and the Balance of World Power," 5 .


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members will make cooperation difficult. 3 The Allies' cooperation during the WWIImight be a good example of the need for a comm on threat. After the removal of H itler,the West and Soviet Union began to see each other as a threat rather than allies.

States in a security organization may have similar threat perceptions if theaggressor has substantial aggregate economic, m ilitary and hum an resources. T heoffensiv e capability of an aggressor also leads to successful collective action. O n theother hand, proximity and offens ive intentions of an aggressor are subjective. States closeto the threat feel more threatened compared to the other states in a collective securityorganization. States having historical or territorial problems with the aggressor will assessthe threat seriously. Therefore, when the main threat vanishes, the collective action isdifficult to achieve.

Additionally, the unipolar international structure will force the NA TO countriesto balance the remaining superpower. Thus, internal balancing will bring an end toNA TO . Neorealism has the best explanatory power for Cold War enlargement when theSoviet Union w as the main threat to the alliance.

Some scholars also highlight the disengagement of the US from Europe. Waltzstates that NATO is not a military treaty. It is more like a treaty of guarantee. 4 The USguaranteed the security of Europe in exchange for preserving the balance w ith Soviets.After the cold war, the US may not be w illing to share the huge portion of the cost.

3 Joseph M. Grieco, "U nderstanding the Problem of Internat ional Cooperat ion," in Neorealism andNeoliberalism : The Contemporary Debate, ed. David A. Baldwin (New York: Columbia Univers i ty Press ,1993) , 314.4W al t z , "NATO Expans i on: A Rea l i s t ' s V i ew , " 27 .


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ALLIANCE THEORYAlliance Theory suggests that NA TO expansion is a product of the alliance

formation. W altz argues that "an alliance is a formal or informal com mitm ent for securitycooperation between two or more states." 5 The main purpose of an alliance is toaggregate power in order to achieve a commo n objective. NA TO is a highlyinstitutionalized defensive alliance with asymm etrical mem bership.6 As the mostpow erful mem ber, the US is both a leader and carrier of the alliance's greatest burdens.

NATO enlargement is driven by countries outside NATO in order to reduce the

vulnerability of their geographical locations. Germany was an especially strong and eagersupporter of the enlargement.7 The alternative to the enlargement w as a power vacuum inthe region, which would be filled either by a security alliance of the regional countries oran anarchic environm ent in which all Central and European C ountries would form ad hoc

o

alliances to balance each other. Furthermore, the Bosnian war demonstrated theresurfacing of historical tensions in the region.

LIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISMKeohan e defin es an institution as a "related com plex of rules and norm s,

identifiable in space and time."9 Liberal institutionalism suggests that alliances can stillexist even after the threat has faded. Lisa L. Martin and Beth A . Sim mon s explain ho w

5 Walt , "Why Al l iances Endure or Col lapse ," 157.6 Ibid.Jonat h an Eya l , "NATO' s En l argement : Anat om y o f a Dec i s i on , " International Affairs 73, no. 4 (1997):7 1 4 .8 Ibid.: 705.9Rober t O . Keohane , International Institutions and State Power : Essays in International Relations Theory(Boulder: Westview Press , 1989) , 163.


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NORM DIFFUSIONAcharya asserts that NA TO enlargement is a norm d iffus ion process. He points out

that local actors promote the transnational norm diffusio n, which in turn gives birth tonew tasks for the existing institution.17 Henceforth, the diff usio n brings institutionalchange and expansion.

SOCIALIZATIONSocialization theory claims that NA TO enlargement is a process of exporting

Western values of democracy, accountability and transparency to unstable regions. TheWestern C ountries believe that democratic norm s and values bring stability and security.Therefore, NA T O 's eastern expansion w as in fact a socialization process of Central and

1 REastern Europe. Checkel states that "in adopting comm unity rules, socialization impliesthat an agent switches from follow ing a logic of consequences to a logic of

appropriateness."19

The socialization can be achieved either by "teachin g and9 0 9 1persuasion " approach or by a "rational approach." The aspiring countries' decisiondepends on the cost and benefits of the compliance to the enlargement criteria enforcedby NA TO . According to Schim melfennig, "in the constructivist perspective, the

n A m ita v Achary a, "How Ideas Spread: W hose Norm s Matter? Norm L ocal izat ion and Insti tutional Chang ein Asian Regional ism," International Organization 58, no. 2 (2004): 247.18 Jeffrey T. Checkel, "International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework,"International Organization 59, no. 4 (2005): 821.19 Ibid.: 804.2 0Alexandra Gheciu, "Securi ty Inst i tut ions as Agents of Social izat ion? NATO and the New Europe,"International Organization 59, no. 4 (2005): 973.21 Frank Schimmelfennig , "Strategic Calculat ion and Internat ional Social izat ion: Membership Incent ives ,Party Constellations, and Sustained Compliance in Central and Eastern Europe," InternationalOrganization 59, no. 4 (2005): 827.22 Ibid.


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enlargement of an international organization is primarily conceived of as a process ofinternational socialization."23

CULTURAL APPROACHAccording to advocates of the cultural approach, NA TO enlargement is a

cultural expression of security. In his review article, Simon Dalby asserts that, after thecold war, NA TO becam e a "civilisational entity." 24 Similarly, Merje Kuus proclaims thatthe conception of Eu ropeanness affects the discourse of the enlargement.25 N A T Oenlargement is essential for the full Europeanization of the "not-yet -f ul ly Euro peans." 2 6

INTEGRATION BASED THEORIESIntegration based theo ries highlights the deepening of the institutions over tim e.

Especially it is usefu l to explain the evolution of the Euro pean U nion and other postWW II institutions by these theories. Am ong these theories, the intergovernmentalism hasthe most merit to understand the structure and functions of NATO.

FUNCTIONALISMFunctionalism states that "forms follows functions." 2 7 International institutions

perform the fu nctions that are identified objectively and rationally by the peop le. In other

23 , "NATO Enlargement: A Construct iv is t Explanat ion," Security Studies 8, no. 2 /3 (1999): 211.2 4 Sim on D alby, "World Pol i t ics , Securi ty and Culture: Cri tical Connect ions ," Geopolitics 14, no. 2 (2009):4 0 5 .25 Merje Kuus, "Europe's Eastern Expansion and the Reinscription of Otherness in East-Central Europe,"Progress in Human Geography 28, no. 4 (2004): 473.2 6 Ibid. : 484.2 7Ben Ros amond , Theories of European Integration, The European Union Series (New York: St . Mart in'sPress , 200 0) , 34-3 5.


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words, functio ns serve the actors' needs. Institutional change and expansion is a meansof institutions' functions.

TRANSACTIONALISMTransactionalism admits that international conflict can be reduced when states are

integrated in a sense of comm unity. New m emb ers of an existing security organizationwill increase their level of communication, and thus reduce the level of violence.

NEOFUNCTIONALISMNeof unctiona lism highlights the spillover effec t of the integration. The integration

in one issue area will "create pressure for further integration beyond that sec tor." 2 9

INTERGOVERNMENTALISMAccording to the intergovenrmentalism theory, the state is the main actor for

integration.30 In order to provide collective good s through institutions, sovereign statesbargain their preferences in an institutional environment. Societal dem ands andinterdependence will require more deepening and widening of integration.

N E W IN S T IT U T IO N A L IS MThe New Institutionalism of Com parative Politics also offers usefu l insight into

how institutions expand. T he emergence of institutions is a response to the problem of

28 Ibid. , 42-48.29 Ibid. , 51-52.30 Andrew Moravcs i k , The Choice for Europe : Social Purpose and State Power from Messina toMaastricht, Cornel l Studies in Pol i t ical Eco nom y (I thaca, NY : Cornel l Univers i ty Press , 1998 ) , 18-86.


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trust and protection fro m aggression.31 As the shadow of the future shortens andreciprocity d iminishes, institutions are needed to solve the collective problems .

Rational Choice of New Institutionalism states that institutions affect the strategicinteractions by providing information, policing, and putting alternatives on the table.Institutions will change in accordance with actors' preferences about collective gains.NA TO enlargement is a rationalistic approach of the leading parties to pursue theirinterests. When there is a convergence of interests the expansion occurs.

As proponents of a second type of new institutionalism, sociological

institutionalists believe that institutions change or develop not to have a more efficiencybut rather to enhance the social legitimacy of the organization.

New Institutionalism rejects the aggregation of interests. The sum of allindividuals' interest is not equal to the common interests. In fact, the aggregation processaffects the interests. In other words there is an institution bias that affects some

34

interests.Institutional expansion can be explained by human learning.35 Individuals'

communication with each other results in the formation of shared mental models, "whichprovide the framework for a common interpretation of reality and give rise to collectivesolutions to the problems arising in the environment." 3 6 Learning first takes place in thefamily and neighborhood and for ms the basic element of know ledge exchange.31 C. Mantzavinos , Douglass C. North, and Syed Shariq, "Learning, Inst i tut ions , and EconomicPerformance," Perspectives on Politics 2, no. 1 (2004 ): 75 -84.32 Peter A. Hall and Ros ema ry C. R. Taylo r, "Political Sci enc e and the Three New Institutionalism s,"Political studies. 44 , no . 5 ( 1996 ) : 936 - 5 7 .33 Ibid.34 Ellen M. Immergut , "The Theoret ical Core of the New Inst i tut ional ism," Politics & Society 26, no. 1( 1998 ) : 5 - 34 .35 Mantzavinos , North, and Shariq, "Learning, Inst i tut ions , and Economic Performance," 75.36 Ibid.: 76.


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E N L A R G E ME N T A S A D A P T A T IO NNATO expansion is also viewed from the mutual defense benefits and cost

savings perspective. According to Todd Sandler,The expansion issue is related to alliance formation (i.e., an expansion fro m zeroallies), which hinges on whether prospective allies view their mem bership asproviding a net gain after associated costs are covered. These net gains aredependent on alliance size and composition, which can affect benefits (e.g., costreductions, enhanced deterrence) and costs (e.g., decision m aking, joint

maneuvers).37

Sandler asserts that expansion is driven by "spatial" location considerations. T hegeographical location and the size of a country determine its benefit from the expansion.The interior location causes less defense burden, thus decreasing cost to the mem bers.Therefore, members in the outer circle of an alliance are eager to expand the alliance tofriendly countries.

THE SECURITY DILEMMA AND RUSSIANATO enlargement can be seen as resolving the security dilemma in Euro-

Atlantic area. Trust and mistrust are at the core of the NAT O enlargem ent dilemm a thegoal of enlargement is to foster trust among the new allies, and the unwanted side effectis to lessen trust with Russia. On the one hand, newly accepted m emb ers w ill acquire asecurity guarantee against any aggression, and on the other hand, the expansion itself can

37 Todd Sandler , "Al l iance Formation, Al l iance Expansion, and the Core," Journal of Conflict Resolution43 , no . 6 ( 1999 ) : 727 .


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becom e a threat for the outsiders.38 In fact, the Russian position is the single m ostimportant factor in the futur e of NA TO expansion. In spite of countless statements byNATO countries that NATO enlargement is not against Russian interests, Russia stillsees the enlargement as a zero-sum gam e. Enlargement threatens Ru ssian Security

39interests.

A G E N T -B A S E D E X P L A N A T IO N SIn contrast to the structural explanation, agent-based theories look at the

individual nations to explain NAT O enlargem ent. For the most part, geopoliticians treatNA TO enlargement as a spatial extension of the US, which is intended to help keep itsworld power status.

In that sense, enlargement of a community is "the diffu sion of democracy andfree-mark et principles through the guise of paninstitutions, in wh ich those that areincorporated will not wage war one another and thus, in the case of NA TO , willstabilize Europe from violent conflict that might otherwise erupt and disrupt the w orldorder." 4 0

According to Ian Oas, NATO is "a hegemonic institution of extraterritoriality."41Henceforth, NATO expansion is a tool for forging US hegemonic order. New markets areneeded to maintain US hegem onic status. NA TO is the majo r vehicle to integrate the ex-rival markets into the US-led global economy. Institutionalization is the most successfu l

38 Kyd d, "Trust Bui lding , Trust Breaking: The Di le mm a of NA T O Enlargem ent ," 802.39 Russia Today, "NATO considers Russ ia 's securi ty s trategy," ht t p : / / www. rus s i a t oday . ru / Po l i t i c s / 2009 -07 - 23 / RO AR~ NAT O- cons i ders - R us s i a - s - s ecur i t y - s t ra t egy . h t ml ( acce s s ed Nov em ber 27 , 2009 ) .40 Colin Flint, ed. The Geography of War and Peace : From Death Camps to Diplomats ( Oxf ord , NewYork: Oxfor d Univer s i ty Press ,2005) , 398 .41 Ibid. , 409.
http://www.russiatoday.ru/Politics/2009-http://www.russiatoday.ru/Politics/2009-


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method for enhancing hegemonic control globally. 42 With the help of NATO, the US isable to exert its power without the use of force.

The expansion is a proof of "the surrender of the socialist modernity as globalcompetitor to the west." 43 Thus it is no coincidence that the US and G ermany are the m ainenforcers of NAT O enlargement.44 However, the decline of US hegemonic powercomplicates the NATO expansion. On the one hand, the leader promotes expansion of theorganization since it is the biggest benefiter of the cooperation. On the other hand,during the descent of the leader, the organization n eeds to expand to fulfill the capability

gap. The hegemon has the ability to share the bulk of defense costs, which in turnenables the successful implem entation of an arms control regime for the rest of the club.Although individual nations are always important, no agent-based theory would beadequate to explain the NATO enlargement in general. Any argument based on theinterest of individual nations provide only one dimension of the NA TO expansion.

To summarize, Liberal Institutionalism and Constructivism generally support theenlargement of NATO while Neorealism opposes an eastern expansion. Neorealismproclaims that expansion will cause a security dilemm a and in fact will make the Euro-Atlantic region more insecure by allowing an assertive Ru ssia to gain strength.

42 Ibid. , 400.43 Ibid. , 396.4 4 Wallander, "Inst itut ional Asse ts and Adaptabi l i ty: NA TO after the Cold W ar," 707 .


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CHAPTER IIIN A T O 'S F U N C T IO N A L E N L A R G E ME N T

IN T R O D U C T IO NThis chapter is the first stage setter chapters of the dissertation. Here, N A TO 's

functional evolution is examined thoroughly. As stated in the main argum ent, N AT Oadapted its main fu nctions along with the changes in the security environments. The n ewfunctions necessitate ne w capabilities that are either fulfilled internally w ithin NA TO or

imported from ou tside of the organization.Over the years, NATO transformed from a Collective Defence organization to a

Comprehensive Security organization. Throughout the past 60 years, NATO's functionsincreased in number and complexity. Today, NATO undertakes responsibilities which arebeyond the military realm. During the Cold War, NATO was purely a collective defenceorganization which used mainly defensive military capabilities. With the fall of Ironcurtain, NATO engaged with ex-communist countries in the Euro-Atlantic region. NATOused an active political approach during the 1990s. The rising new threats in the secondmillennium forced NAT O to be proactive and use both political and military resources tomeet its members' security needs. Today, NATO has become a comprehensive securityorganization engaging multiple partners globally. Figure 4 depicts NATO's functionalevolution over time.


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CollectiveDefense

-Limited Actors-LimitedGeography

- MultipleActors-LimitedGeography

-MultipleActors-GlobalGeography

DefensiveMilitary

-Active-Political

-Proactive **.-Political/Military

1949 1989 2001

Fig. 4. NATO's Functional Evolution


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COLLECTIVE DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONThe main goal of a collective defense organization is to defend its me mb ers'

territorial integrity. The source of the threat is generally military. Non geographicalthreats are not considered to be of param ount impo rtance. Thre ats against stability of thenon-m emb ers are not a concern for the alliance. Nations are strongly affected by wh etherthey join or remain outside the alliance. NA TO practices are targeted to achievedeterrence and intra-club political military cooperation. The security policy is state-centered, and the alliance takes action when there is a threat to any individual state's

sovereignty.

COOPERA TIVE SECURITY ORGANIZA TIONCooperative security is a practice of building trust and cooperation not just amo ng

the members, but also with non-mem bers. The purpose of a cooperative securityapproach is to foster regional stability. The norms and values are the glue of the club.There is no a substantial difference between being a m ember and partner. In fact, the clubacts as a magnet of peace and security, engaging in multi dimensional partnerships withthe neighboring regions. Through partnership, NA TO teaches partners that sharing acommon identity will bring peace and security to all parties. 1 Cooperative securitypractices entail political, military and institutional cooperation with the partners. Bothstate and individual rights are linked to the new security perception. Even when there isno obvious threat to the alliances' interest or territory, the alliance still takes actions whenthere is aggression against civilians outside of its territory. As Lloyd Axworthy noted,

1 Adler , "The Spread of Securi ty Communit ies: Communit ies of Pract ice , Sel f -Restraint , and NATO's Post-Cold War Transformation," 215-16.


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STRASBOURG - KEHL SUMMIT, 2009Albania and Croatia joined the Alliance. NATO's open door policy is reaffirmed.

NA TO also launched an initiative to identify the alliance's new Strategic Concept.During the sum mit the leaders expressed their determination to secure Afghanistan . Thealliance stated that "security in the Euro-Atlantic area is closely tied to Afghanistan'ssecurity and stability." In the 2009 summ it, the France reintegrated N A TO 's militarystructure.

BUCHAREST SUMMIT, 2007Albania and Croatia started the accession process. NAT O declared that Ukraine

and Georgia would each become a NATO member in the future.

ISTANBUL SUMM IT 2004NATO invented new mechanisms to reach out to Mediterranean countries,

Central Asia and the Caucasus. The alliance aimed to establish new bilateral securityrelations in the above regions. These partnerships reveal the alliance's goal of prom otingsecurity to the wo rld's p roblematic region. The Istanbul summ it is a breakthrough inNATO's outreach to the south and east. The theme of the summit, "Projecting stability,"reveals NATO's new strategy. NATO launched the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative tocooperate with the countries in the Middle East.

3 NA TO , "Strasbourg - Kehl Sum mit s trengthens Transat lant ic Link and looks at NA TO 's futurechal lenges ," ht t p : / / www. nat o . i n t / cps / en / na t o l i ve / news _52845 . h t m ( acces s ed November 24 , 2009 ) .
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_52845.htmhttp://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_52845.htm


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PRAGUE SUMMIT, 2002The Prague Summit was an enlargement summit. NATO expanded to an alliance

of 26 nations as a result of the decision taken at the sum mit. NA TO capabilitydevelopment was also a key item on the summit agenda. In order to function effectively,NATO established the NATO Response Force and declared the Prague CapabilityCommitments.

MADRID SUMMIT 1997

Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland began accession talks with NATO. Apartnership charter was signed between NATO and Ukraine as well.

BRUSSELS SUMMIT, 1994The Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative was launched. NA TO decided to take

serious action in regard to the Bosnian conflict.

ROME SUMM IT, 1991The Alliance's new Strategic Concept was signed. NATO expressed its readiness

for peace and cooperation with the Soviet Union.

LONDON SUMMIT, 1990The London Declaration was announced. NATO underscored that the Soviet

Union was no longer an adversary to NATO. The declaration highlights NATO's desireto cooperate in political and military areas with Central and Eastern Europe countries.

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Functional and Geographical Enlargement of the Alliance