Research Journal of Public Administration. Vol.2(1), pp. 008-021, July, 2016 Available online at http://www.apexjournal.org

© 2016 Apex Journal International

Full Length Research

Recentralizing while decentralizing: Challenges for bringing institutional capacity of urban local

government in Bangladesh

Mohammad Nashir Uddin1,2

1Public Administraton, Shahjalal University of Science and Technology, Sylhet 3114, Bangladesh

2Sustainable Resource Management, School of Environmental and Life Sciences, University of Newcastle, Central

Coast Campus, Ourimbah, NSW 2058, Australia. Email: nashir.pad@gmail.com, Mohammad.N.Uddin@uon.edu.au Tel: +61-469411224

Accepted 20 April, 2016; Published 20 July, 2016

Institutional capacity building, considerably, depends on constitutional framework; power and authority sharing, periphery regulation, and degree of dependence of local bodies. This study reviewed the existing capacity building factors of urban local self-government institutions and chalked out challenges for brining institutionalized form. However, the existing structure of urban local government of Bangladesh is suffering from excessive dependency, financial inadequacy, structural boundary, and political interference. Within the purview of current institutional arrangement, it is difficult to promote the level of independence enjoyed by the urban bodies due to colonial attitude of the administrative officials, ever controlling motive of national government, and apathy of elected representatives. It is evident that central government has direct control over the urban institutions through financial regulations. Furthermore, several challenges like political unwillingness, ineffective policy adoption and application, lack of political commitment, inadequate financial support etc. were evident. Key words: Recentralization, Decentralization, Urban Local Government, Institutional Capacity, Sylhet District

INTRODUCTION Bangladesh has undergone a massive experimentation in decentralization of local government (LG) by successive regimes attempting structural reform. Unfortunately, most of them proved to be failed in particular to ensure access and participation of the poor that often resulted in apathy and frustration (Khan, 2009: 41; Khan and Rahman, 1997: 513-526). The political and administrative structure of the country was largely inherited from the British regime who (in urban level

1) started municipal councils

and municipal corporations. The urban local bodies were

1 Mughals were credited to develop ULG in Indian sub-continent since they

were essentially urban people and accorded much importance to the

development of township (Siddiqui, 1994:33, Khan, 2009; Khan & Obaidullah,

2008:5-26).

of three grades: municipal corporations, municipal councils for towns, and wards for the villages. These bodies were elected on a universal suffrage basis where all citizens above the age of 18 years had a right to vote

2.

The establishment of self-governance system at local levels got little concern due to consistent supreme colonial objectives (that is, maximizing revenue, maintaining law and order, justice through courts) (Khan, 2009:93; 2011:35). The journey towards a ‗representative‘ local self-government had been slow,

2 Khan & Obaidullah (2008); Khan (2009); Ahmed (1991) described it as an

unhealthy state of urban politics; Khan (1996:358) described these elections as

a contest of wealthy, ambitious and selfish individuals resulting internal

disputes, jealousy, enmity, revenge and personal aggrandizement.

haphazard, piecemeal and painstaking (Khan, 2009:64; Khan and Obaidullah, 2008:5-26) due to excessive dependence on central government (CG) (in respect of financial authority and capacity in mobilizing local resources. It tightened holds over almost all affairs of LG and thereby caused vulnerability of recentralization by ignoring the spirit of decentralization (Khan, 2009:93; 2011:36).

Constitutional articles 59 & 60 of Bangladesh has outlined LG system to be constituted with elected representatives at each unit of administration facilitating effective participation of the people. In compliance with this spirit, promotion and protection of institutionalized democratic values and aspirations in all walks of life it is obligatory to ensure effective operation of LG organizations. A potential conflict arises while interpretations of constitutional provisions do not reflect the spirit of local self-government rather acts as a persistent threat for establishing strong LG system (Khan, 2009:93; 2011:1). The immediate government in the post-independent Bangladesh embarked policies and programmes to re-stabilize central-local relations through concerted decentralization efforts in fiscal, political and administrative responsibilities to the lower levels of government with the forms and degrees of their decentralization projects. For some, decentralization was seen as a panacea for the all-too-often over-extended CGs. They held it as an antidote to corrupt practices and inefficiency and as a way of promoting accountability through the enhanced involvement of academicians, experts and the often-disparaged sub-national governments. Unfortunately, the successive governments used the decentralization process to engender new clientelistic local elites, along with predictable opportunistic behavior and profligacy. The military governments created opportunities for political incumbents to expand their authority in one hand and create their support bases on the other by recentralizing key institutions. This is because of their assumption that decentralization could involve a fundamental reconfiguration of central-local arrangements and could be challenged by various organized interests and societal groups.

The dynamics of decentralization in Bangladesh is dominated by the politicians' efforts to acquire and retain power. The successive government's clever recentralization process caused the consequential emergence of those institutions out of that process. Decentralization reforms should generate divisible benefits and rewards and thus almost invariably create winners and losers among various organized interest groups (e.g. CG bureaucrats and their agencies). However, this generated in turn, new challenges for key interests that encouraged some of them towards recentralization. For example, some politicians at the

Uddin 009 centre, particularly incumbents, sought to use decentralization reforms as instruments for maintaining and restructuring their support coalitions. Likewise, decentralization process created opportunities for ambitious politicians to increase their power and influence. Recentralization initiatives following decentralization reforms thus served as means of preserving power and control in most cases. The nature of the country's urban local self-government institutions, particularly who possesses authority over the decentralization process, structure of the policy-making process and the responsiveness to societal interests, all tend to contribute to recentralization of the system.

In Bangladesh with unitary systems of government, there are no completely autonomous policy jurisdictions at the urban sub-national level; recentralization efforts are most likely to be territorially uniform. It is also often the case that, in such systems, the career incentives of many lower level politicians (as well as the bureaucrats accountable to them) are heavily defended by their accountability opposed to other societal demands. When political incumbents at the centre successfully reassert their influence on the decentralization process, any number of general institutional outcomes may emerge, depending on the nature of the interaction between politicians and societal groups renegotiating central-local relationship. In addition, recentralization generates oligarchic policy frameworks that mostly benefit small groups of elites. For instance, where powerful private interests dominate a country‘s political landscape, political incumbents may find themselves compelled to indulge in recentralization strategies that engender monopolistic advantages for elites at the centre. Ultimately, the outcome of any recentralization will depend on the strategic interaction between politicians and societal groups bargaining over the centre-local relationship.

Moreover, the urban local bodies do not have enough resources and management capacity. In addition, the urban bodies are more or less ―One Man Show‖ institution where people have no potential participation. Many functions performed by municipalities are now being performed by centre and threatening decentralized mode of urban local bodies. Dhaka, the prime urban local government (ULG) body, faces all the usual problems of a large city in the developing world with a poor resource-base and is compounded by extremely dysfunctional governance-structures along with conflicts between local and national government (Islam et al., 2003)

3. In the

3 There are enormous scope of central control, interference, and obstruction

over its operations: LG bodies are the receiving end of laws and rules

formulated by the CG; formulated laws usually negate the self-governing status

and capacity; and expectation of change for extensive local autonomy has

never been realized.

010 Res. J. Public. Admin 1990s, a new emphasis was placed on capacity building for promoting participation and empowerment. In Bangladesh, the capacity development aspects in the context of local government institutions (LGIs) also received impetus. The advocacy movement gained momentum for a decentralized system of administration with greater powers and functions for the existing LGIs in the country. In this respect, the development partners played a significant role by taking up projects in the broader area of local governance. Later, the objective changed to ensuring greater participation of the people and improving the service delivery situation at the local level through the local bodies. The government also realized the importance of the need for greater capacity development of the relevant stakeholders concerned with governance at the local level. Recognizing the importance of continuous training and research in the LGIs and rural development, they have established three different institutions, in separate locations, under the Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperatives (MoLGRD&C): The National Institute of Local Government (NILG), Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development (BARD), and the Rural Development Academy (RDA). These organizations at different points of time contributed to building the capacities of the concerned human resources, both elected and official, for the efficient functioning of the LGIs in their policy formulation and thereby ensure good governance at the local level.

Capacity development (CD), as a long-term continual process of development, involves all stakeholders including ministries, local authorities, non-governmental organizations, professionals, community members, academics and more. CD uses a country‘s human, scientific, technological, organizational, institutional and resource capabilities. The goal of is to tackle problems related to policy and methods of development, while considering the potentials, limits and needs of the people of the country concerned. The National Rural Development Policy (NRDP) provides support for the development of mechanisms to develop the role of the LG as a facilitator and creator of the necessary conducive environment for the required services to be provided to the rural people and expand the opportunities. It underlines the importance of ‗accountable and responsive‘ LGIs, where ‗people will be made aware of and given access to services and opportunities offered by government‘ (Khan and Hussain, 2011). With this background in context, this paper attempted to make an assessment of the state of ULG and its role in promotion of remote governance. The paper emphasizes on the efficacy of the LG, in particular the urban institutions in the process to overcome the constraints and challenges for capacity building.

Bangladesh is one of the most populous countries in

the world with an immature combination of rural and urban governance system. The tiers of LG are (i) Union Parishad (UP), (ii) Upazila Parishad (UZP), and (iii) Zila Parishad (ZP) at rural areas and (i) Pourasabha (Municipality) and (ii) City Corporations (CCs) are at urban areas. The representatives, directly elected by local people (GOB 2009, 2012), constitute the LG bodies. However, the ULG institutions do not have a well-defined authority, structure, functional/fiscal domain, and capacity like higher levels of government. Historically, the CG has always played controlling role over the urban local self-government and has never devolved upon adequate authorities and responsibilities to themselves. The capacity of the urban local self-governments has yet to be strengthened to cope with the growing challenges of urbanization, urban poverty, environmental management, infrastructural inadequacy, and inefficient services to urban dwellers. There are eleven CCs (Dhaka South and North, Chittagong, Rajshahi, Khulna, Barisal, Sylhet, Rangpur, Comilla, Naraynganj, and Gazipur) and 311 Pourasabhas within ULG structure.

The main objective of the study was to review the existing decentralized pattern of urban local-self government institutions and chalk out the challenges for responsive administrative culture while recentralizing was the issue of concern in place of decentralization. Therefore, the study specified: a. To justify legal/constitutional basis in distribution of functions and responsibilities between centre and urban local-self government institutions; b. To draw an explanation of centre‘s authority and power (e.g. political, economic and administrative) over urban periphery and the level of independence that urban local bodies enjoyed; and c. To suggest policy agenda to develop and nurture urban local-self-government institutions in line with decentralization. LITERATURE REVIEW Lack of funds for operation and maintenance of urban infrastructure services is still a major problem for LGIs. Training is often required in technical subjects, contract management, operation and maintenance of equipment, and business management. The functioning of local governance units in Bangladesh reveals that these have all along been under strict administrative control and supervision of the public bureaucracy with limited power, functions and access to resources (Khan and Hussain, 2011). It enjoys very little power compared to its responsibilities emanated due to bureaucratic influence and lack of political will (Khan, 2009:94; 2011:4). As a result, these local governance bodies could not emerge

as true self-governing bodies with adequate capacity to discharge their assigned roles and functions efficiently; and has fallen far short of meeting expectations of the people. LGIs have always been institutionally and financially weak, poorly managed and lacked in social and political credibility. Local authorities are generally more receptive and have more potential than is perceived by the central agencies. A comprehensive training and technical assistance programme is needed to provide support LGIs in such development efforts, experience clearly shows that local authorities can perform accordingly (Khan and Hussain, 2011). Administrative and managerial competence has to be developed by adding various logistic supports (computer, transport facilities) and inducting technical and professional staff like assistant engineer, computer operator and accountant, (Ali, 2009). A significant percentage of the urban poor are still not aware of the spirit and mode of implementation of the Local Government Support Project (LGSP). There is a need for extensive trainings for the elected representatives and members of the Scheme Implementation Committee (SIC) and Scheme Supervision Committee (SSC) to ensure efficient utilization of fund and proper social monitoring and quality control of the projects under LGSP (Ali, 2009).

Therefore, mass awareness of the urban community must immediately be created to enhance social accountability, participation and community based monitoring. Non-government organizations (NGO) should be encouraged and used in inspiring people to participate actively in the development functions. Bangladesh is now facing several inherent internal and external challenges for improved LG system. Although democracy, to some extent, has brought popular representation to ULG, but this has not been accompanied by effective powers and a political culture to enact the local popular will (Khan, 2009:63; Khan and Obaidullah, 2008:5-26). The urban local institutions have limited capacity and incentive to raise revenue and are therefore highly dependent upon CG grants (Aminuzzaman, 2010). Projects are designed and decisions are being taken at the Ministry level and relegated to the Zila based line agencies for implementation only. Central Government Ministries, which determine the allocation of resources as well as the nature of interventions to be implemented at the grassroots level and the communities who look after them as the answer to their immediate needs (REOPA, 2007).

Training is one of the major tools for human capital development through the acquisition of knowledge and skills. In this context, training would improve the performance level of the officials of the LGIs. A number of institutions including government agencies, NGOs, civil society and development partners have been actively involved in strengthening the local governance process in Bangladesh. Within the governmental institutions, NILG is

Uddin 011 strongly involved in capacity building, using BARD and RDA as resource partners, whereas LGED and BRDB focus their local governance projects on infrastructure and development. Good governance has eight major characteristics like participatory, consensus-oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive and following the rule of law. The capacity building

4 actions pave the way for

effective, efficient and functional system of governance through utilization of transformed knowledge, ensured participation, and make institutions‘ representatives responsive to community people that ultimately evolve nuance of governance. Unless knowledge and capacity is increased, good governance seems hard task for any institution to run smoothly. The capacity development and institutional governance are reciprocal by nature because when institutional capacity is developed, LG representatives can follow those rules and regulation (Ali, 2011). Democratic process should be maintained in decision-making, programme designing and implementation and feedback, debriefing, follow-up and monitoring that must be practiced to receive regular update of the progress and sustainability. METHODS AND TECHNIQUES The study has used the sample survey method with an explanatory-descriptive design. It examined the factors involving structural decentralization and recentralization strategies and the central policy in capacity building process of ULG institutions. In addition, methodological triangulation of mixed method was deployed (Survey method with mixed analysis). The study focused on some specific logics; the issue of institutional development with power and authority at local level. Depending on the nature and objectives of the study as well as availability of resources, the study has collected data from different places of SCC through most common methods of data collection techniques like face-to-face interviewing, group study, informal discussion. A semi-structured self-administered questionnaire was used to collect empirical data from 60 (sixty) respondents [a combination of general people and political representatives and officials] through a simple random sampling method. Further a guided schedule was used to get in-depth information of the respondents and the study areas. The secondary sources of data comprised the relevant documents and publications of government agencies, website of CC and different archive, library, education and research institutions. The study intended to represent the comprehensible picture of efficiency and effectiveness of

4 by focusing on efforts to enhance people’s capacity to manage their own

affairs to met their own needs (Khan, 2009: 7-8; Khan, 1985: 241-262).

012 Res. J. Public. Admin level of government institutions in exercising power and authority. The data was processed through editing to improve their quality and coded to convert them to the form of numerical codes representing attribute of variables and upgraded SPSS software was used to get appropriate combination of data. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION Urban local-self-government institutions in Bangladesh are now enjoying a certain degree of self-autonomy in terms of their operational activities that does not focus the strengthening the institutions through capacity-building. Policies undertaken for developing the institutions are generally dictated by CG philosophy. Nevertheless, in most cases, institutions were also adapted i.e. they were not only simple replication of central practices, but also took a distinct local character (Larmour, 2002). Policies are as a particular account of CG. Policy takes its place alongside accounts, all of which continue to have some force; these accounts explain government in terms of order; tradition; collective action problems; distribution and redistribution; and inertia (Colebatch, 2004). There is a huge space that covers legal, operational and financial matters controlled and monitored by the centre. In this regards, there are three indicators found in establishing relationship at policy adoption and policy practices: (1) Capacity building strategies; (2) Policy application strategies; and (3) Shifting process from existing form to service-oriented form.

In that context, though the Syleht City Corporation (SCC) was established in 2001 under the SCC Act 2001, failed to provide necessary services (that is, public health; water supply and waste management; food and drinking water; animals; town planning; control of building constructions; roads; public security; tree, park, forest management; education; culture; social welfare and development etc.) to people. As an urban local-self government institution, it is facing challenge to overcome these problems and meet the demand of the people of this constituency by their own way. In doing so, capacity building becomes a necessary requirement.

The study attempted to unearth existing challenges in policies that are barring towards making service- and welfare-oriented. In doing so, sixty respondents were selected to gather in-depth information where maximum respondents (around 61%) were male and a significant portion were (38%) female (Table 2). That reflects the exact picture of representation and participation from both representatives‘ and mass people‘s perspectives. The Table 1shows the general characteristics of the respondents participated in the study.

Age distribution of the respondents surveyed ranged

from 15 to 50 comprised diverse levels of urban government areas and institutions. Maximum numbers of respondents (around 65%) were from young people up to 30 years only. Another 10% were older than 40 years. The education level of the respondents generally varied depending on their professional engagement. It is marked that a considerable portion (around 77%) completed their graduation and/or post-graduation degree though unexpectedly a significant portion (around 17% percent) failed to reach higher secondary level. Respondents‘ political representation in the society as well as the institutions marks that mass people (65%) (that is, students, academicians, businesspersons, officials etc.) participated and expressed some important perception regarding the capacity building issue while elected representative and institutional officials of CC were also represented to good extent

5. Most of the respondents

(75.0 percent) belonged to income less than BDT10000 only, and very few (only around 3%) earned above BDT20000. It is obvious that the respondents were working in city, which inspires them (60%) to live at surrounding areas in or around. The family status is a vital factor in meaningful thought of the issue. It is identical representation of the study that major portion of the respondents (38%) came from middle class family whereas only 10% belonged to higher level. According to constitutional article 59 and 60 of the state and the legislations of SCC Act 2001, the government determines the administrative and institutional structure of that urban institution. Mode of administration and removal of functionaries and responsibilities considering the sources of funds and expenditure pattern are also fixed up by the centre. Besides this, the CG formulates detailed rules of procedure relating to election mode, power and duties of Mayor, assessment of taxes, preparation of budget, making contract and appointment, accounts and audits and other related issues. Though the LG body has right to make new regulations, it is subject to the approval of national government. The relationship between central and ULG institutions is not so well as desirable due to its inefficient and ineffective mode. The study showed that around 75% of the respondents believed that the communication status of the both sides were either negative, minimum or callous whereas only 5% seemed positive (Table 2). The national government always retains the power and authority to dominate local institutions.

Furthermore, the national government issues circulars and directives on various aspects to LG bodies, which

5 The ULG bodies are staffed by two different types of officials – those directly

employed by the institutions and those deputed by the Bangladesh Civil

Service Administration. There were only 2 cadre officials and 15 non-cadre

officials employed from the CG who were involved directly in formulation and

implementation of policies. It is significantly evident in the study that there

were 134 employees, who were recruited by the concerned institution.

Uddin 013

Table 1. Respondents general characteristics

Characteristics Label

No. of respondents (N=60)

Percentage Cumulative Percentage

Gender/sex Male 37 61.67 61.67

Female 23 38.33 100.0

Age distribution

15-20 2 3.33 3.33

21-25 19 31.67 35.00

26-30 18 30.00 65.00

31-35 6 10.00 75.00

36-40 9 15.00 90.00

41-45 1 1.67 91.67

46-50 5 8.33 100.0

Education

Primary 2 3.33 3.33

Secondary 6 10.0 13.3

Higher secondary 6 10.0 23.3

Graduation 26 43.33 66.67

Post-graduation 20 33.33 100.0

Illiterate 0 0.00 100.0

Respondent type

Elected and selected officials

21 35.00 35.00

Mass people 39 65.00 100.0

Income level

≤5000 27 45.00 45.00

5001-10000 18 30.00 75.00

10001-15000 10 16.67 91.67

15001-20000 3 5.00 96.67

20,001≥ 2 3.33 100.0

Place of residence

Remote area 8 13.33 13.33

Paurashava 16 26.67 40.00

Main City 36 60.00 100.0

Family Status

Higher class 6 10.00 10.00

Upper middle class 11 18.33 28.33

Middle class 23 38.00 66.66

Lower middle class 12 20.00 86.66

Lower class 2 3.33 90.00

Marginal level 6 10.00 100.0

Total 60 100.0

Source: Field data.

makes the institution vulnerable in spontaneous performing its tasks. CG keeps some specific instruments in its hand to control local institutions such as rule making, regulations approval and giving directions. Lack of funds for operation and maintenance of urban infrastructure services is still a major problem for ULGs.

Training is often required in technical subjects, contract management, operation and maintenance of equipment, and business management. The functioning of local governance units in Bangladesh reveals that these had been under the strict administrative control and supervision of the public bureaucracy with limited power,

014 Res. J. Public. Admin

Table 2. Central and LG institutions.

Areas of concern Responses No. of respondents (N=60)

Percentage Cumulative Percentage

Nature of relationship

Positive 3 5.00 5.00

Moderate 9 15.00 20.00

Callous 11 18.33 38.33

Minimum 23 38.33 76.66

Negative 14 23.33 100.0

Support to strengthen ULG institutions

Full Power and authority 0 0.00 0.00

Respective Acts/rules 12 20.00 20.00

Moderate level 6 10.00 30.00

Only for development functions 17 28.33 58.33

As CG desires 2 3.33 61.66

Power to impose tax/VAT only 23 38.33 100.0

Controlling motive

Yes 36 60.00 60.00

Partially 11 18.33 78.33

No 7 11.67 90.0

No comment 6 10.0 100.0

Total 60 100.0

Source: Field data.

functions and access to resources. As a result, these local governance bodies could not emerge as true self-governing bodies with adequate capacity to discharge their assigned roles and functions efficiently. LGIs have always been institutionally and financially weak, poorly managed and lacked social and political credibility. Local authorities are generally more receptive and have more potential than is perceived by the central agencies (Khan and Hussain, 2011). In this regard, the above table shows that none found any supporting gesture in order to strengthen local bodies. However noteworthy portion (38%) thought that the only function of the institution is imposing tax/VAT though determined rate by the CG. Moreover, around 28% of the respondents believed that the institution was engaged in executing development function. There is an interesting finding that none thought that institutions are running as constitution desires. Apart from this, major portion (more than 78%) of the respondents believed that all kinds of controlling mechanisms were vested in the hand of CG where the powers and functions were defined in the parent law, the rules framed there under, and that helped to inspire them to control the local institutions (Table 2).

Central Government Ministries determine the allocation of resources as well as the nature of interventions to be implemented at the grassroots level. Officials are acceptable to the community as public representatives and they are able to take decisions on behalf of the communities they represent (REOPA, 2007). The CCs are given few mandatory and supplementary/optional functions. The responsibilities include civic duties,

revenue and general administration related duties, development activities, transferred functions, judicial responsibilities. According the Act, CCs are supposed to form 8 (eight) standing committees, comprising ward commissioners and elected female representatives (REOPA, 2007). One of the female representatives expected removal of basic drawbacks of the administration and incorporating them through equal participation and representation in the development process. Perception shared by a female representative (Reserved Seat 05, SCC): “The government has no will to strengthening the CC as they made these institutions dependent. Most of the local ruling party elites are not conscious about their role to develop the institutions. In contrary, they always want to establish their power and authority. It is beyond imagination that how much abuse and mismanagement go on in this institution due to lack of accountability and transparency in institutional form.” The study marked that more than half of respondents (57%) suggested immediate legal changes necessary to building capacity of the institutions. Some people (13%) believed that shifting from present presidential form of LG system to parliamentary form like national government will make it more effective and efficient. Table 3 also shows that about one-third (33%) respondents presumed connectivity governance in the urban institutions had scope to strengthen the CC in line with people‘s expectation. Moreover, many had diverse opinions that

Uddin 015 Table 3. Capacity building of CC from central perspective.

Respondent’s response

No. of respondents (N=60)

Percentage Cumulative Percentage

Directly involved factors

Community Participation 4 6.67 6.67

Legal changes for decentralization 34 56.67 63.34

Change existing Presidential to parliamentary form

8 13.33 76.67

Local MP‘s desire 10 16.67 93.33

Power in managing local administration 4 6.67 100.0

Structural innovation (Agencification) 18 30.0 30.0

Indirectly involved factor

Technical and technological 16 26.67 56.67

Advancement Connectivity system 17 28.33 85.0

Integrated development philosophy 9 15.0 100.0

No comment 0 00.0 100.0

Factors narrowing process

Traditional order of LG 14 23.33 23.33

Presidential form of LG 1 1.67 25.00

Afraid to change 9 15.00 40.00

Individualistic action to development 16 26.67 66.67

Distribution & redistribution of power 20 33.33 100.0

Inertia of government machineries 0 0.00 100.0

No comment 0 0.00 100.0

Adaptation of modern technologies 11 18.33 18.33

Central elitism bring changes

Political arrangement of institutions 23 38.33 56.66

Ensuring electoral validation 6 10.00 66.66

Collective actions for development 8 13.33 79.99

Functional government machineries 2 3.33 83.32

No comment 10 16.67 100.0

Local institutional perspective

Regulated constitutional power exercises 11 18.33 18.33

Economic independence 23 38.33 56.66

Political unity at local level 8 13.33 70.00

CG‘s true willingness 6 10.00 80.00

Strict on rules and regulations of the institutions

10 16.67 96.67

No comment 2 3.33 100.0

Direct social forces

Private organizations 6 10.00 10.00

Lower level politicians 28 46.67 56.67

Nominated officials 0 0.00 56.67

Elite class of the society 14 23.33 80.0

Government owned organizations 12 20.0 100.0

Others (If any) 0 0.00 100.0

Working capacity

Fully 5 8.33 8.33

Partially 9 15.0 23.33

Callous condition 38 63.33 86.67

No comment 8 13.33 100.0

Total 60 100.0

Source: Field data.

(30% and 27% rspectively) agencification, technical and technological advancement might change the existing

scenario. The Ordinance and Acts have worked out the details of

016 Res. J. Public. Admin functions that a committee is to perform and the powers it is to exercise development project activities. Besides, the government has the discretionary authority to assign a LG body as they desire. The government is empowered to transfer any development scheme to local bodies. In the ground of financial autonomy, government monitoring and control is also comprehensive. The national government regulates the income of the institution though the Acts vested the power to local authority. Democratic process should be maintained in decision-making, programme designing and implementation and feedback, debriefing, follow-up and monitoring must be practiced to receive regular update of the progress and sustainability related achievement. The policies, structural and functional status, donor‘s support, institutional initiatives and performed actions, support from actors and beneficiaries and suggested actions have contribution in strengthening capacity of LGIs. That sometimes created misunderstanding between the people and representatives because the people were less aware about development activities. The exchange of knowledge and skills among actors is crucial activities for capacity development. The LGIs are actively participating in implementation of programme but institutional capacity building issue needed special attention from the Local Government Division (LGD), because acts and policy prescription are there but continuation, follow-up and monitoring system felt necessary for making effective and keeping functional of their activities (Ali, 2009). Around on-third respondents (33%) assumed that existing distribution and redistribution system of power and authority caused narrowing capacity building whereas more than one-fourth (27%) thought individual action for development was responsible for such condition (Table 3).

Therefore, mass awareness of the rural community must immediately be raised in order to enhance social accountability, participation and community based monitoring. Non-government organizations (NGO) should be encouraged and used in inspiring people to actively participate in the development functions of the CC. Policies taken by the CG consist of converting recentralization policy that greatly enhanced powers of central authorities (or their allies) at the local level, even at the lowest forms of sub-national government. These also influence subsequent strategic interactions between administration and societal groups regarding the nature of the centre-local institutional arrangements. Within the argument, around 40% respondents believed that the existing political institutional arrangement greatly influenced by CG and the system intentionally created difficulties. Apart from this, nearly one-fifth respondents (19%) thought that through government machineries it was not enough to change current service sector of the institutions. However, they needed to develop from local

perspectives (Table 3). In that case, another representative (Ward 16, SCC) expressed opinion: “The political elites failed to formulate new policies and/or implementation in most of the cases as they have no administrative and managerial power and authority. CG always creates pressure on us for bringing effective services. Policies taken by the CG are changing by the successive governments regime due to crises of political philosophy for development. But it is unexpected……..” Administrative and managerial competence has to be developed by adding various logistic supports (computer, transport facilities) and inducting technical and professional staff like -assistant engineer, computer operator and accountant (Ali, 2009). A significant percentage of the poor are still not aware of the spirit and mode of implementation of the LGSP. There is a need for extensive trainings for the elected representatives and members of the Scheme Implementation Committee (SIC) and Scheme Supervision Committee (SSC) to ensure efficient utilization of fund and proper social monitoring and quality control of the projects under LGSP (Ali, 2009). The CC has its own strategies to develop their capacity though CG that historically tried to expand control over the local bodies. It is evident in the study that a major portion of the respondents (around 39%) believed that economic dependency created societal and institutional constraints in policy level that made the institution ineffective. Again, around 20% respondents presumed that they had no authority to exercise constitutional rules and regulations (Table 3). In that case, one of the ward commissioners (Ward 19, SCC) expressed his judgment: “If CG gives up their control from CC, it will be effective to provide services to people. Moreover, CC should increase their income and reduce dependency on CG. People’s participation must be encouraged to reduce central’s control.” In addition to the above mentioned control mechanisms, there are few social forces which were blamed to make the institutions vulnerable. Around half of the respondents (47%) believed that involvement of local level politicians as a social force could make those institutions more dynamic and effective. Furthermore, another quarter (24%) still thought that local elite class could perform as a catalyst for capacity building (Table 3). The study also found that the national government always politicized the institutions. Around two-third respondents (64%) believed that there was wide gap between theory and practices (Table 3).

Relationship between elected representatives and local officials cannot be characterized by mutual mistrust,

suspicion and even hostility. Power and authority for coordination of the Mayor is very limited. The CC Act that was formulated with particular focus to the ward committees, citizens‘ charter, transparency, increased human resources, use of information technology, budgeting, etc. and strengthening the monitoring and technical assistance role of the LG should be revised (Aminuzzaman, 2010). The development partners sponsor a number of local governance projects implemented by the NGOs in partnership with the government of Bangladesh. The capacity building actions pave the way for effective, efficient and functional system of governance through utilization of transformed knowledge, ensure participation, and make institutions‘ representatives responsive to community people that ultimately germinate nuance of governance. Unless knowledge and capacity is increased, heading towards ensuring good governance seems a hard task for any institution. The capacity development and institutional governance are reciprocal by nature because when institutional capacity is developed, LG representatives can easily follow those rules and regulation (Ali, 2009). Nearly half of the respondents (44%) still believe that the CG mainly dominated the local institutions with financial regulations and control though some other (20%) believe that the government damaged the system through arbitrary amendment in acts and rules (Table 4).

In order to get rid of such control, these institutions and the concerned authority should take immediate measures. In that regard, mostly one-third respondents (30%) opined to emphasize on economic development policies that were in vulnerable. Still a big portion of respondents (39%) thought that true willingness of the central and LG might help to make the institutions independent and more effective. In order to have a strong and self-controlled institution, it is now obvious to resist arbitrary policy adoption process of CG from colonial influence. Good number of respondents (42%) believed that only political willingness of the LG could refuse to accept those central strategies (Table 4).

The study manifested that some important measures should be taken into consideration such as restructuring legal framework, economic independence of local bodies, efficient and effective performance of local politicians and create political consciousness among the people. The institutions of representative government— parties, parliaments and elections— are more or less present in Bangladesh, but their significance varies. They were often tagged to the bureaucratic structure of government as part of the decolonization process. It is also marked categorically that the capacity building factors at urban local institutions are influenced by central policies, the level of education does matter. Those who did not go up to higher secondary education are only interested in governmental functional machineries ranging from 50%

Uddin 017 to 100%. On the other hand, those who finished graduation and post-graduation showed additional interest in adaptation with modern technologies and collective actions for development ranging from 27% to 35% (Table 5). They believed that effective and efficient central and LG machineries may bring positive changes in capacity.

Government in Bangladesh is characterized as "elitist". Societies are characterized by wide disparities of wealth and opportunity, with one end of the spectrum populated by landless peasants and the urban poor, for whom it is all they can do to survive, and at the other, super-affluent families with palatial houses in the capital and investments in children‘s education abroad. Moreover, there is a hereditary element in this differentiation: the senior official is much more likely to be the son of a senior official than of a poor peasant. In this way, government reflects, and reproduces, the existing social structure. Furthermore, where maximum officials and elected representatives (around 67%) assume that the governments are creating obstacles by random changes in constitutional Acts and rules while that should be checked. Mass people mostly (43%) emphasized on budgetary control with equal importance with rule and party affiliated appointment (28% each) (Table 6).

Another control area of local institutions on CG was considered on policy-making process. Here elected representatives and officials are more concerned with arrangement of government machineries (43%) and political institutions (38%) while mass people emphasized additional areas like adaptation with modern technologies and collective actions and put almost similar weightage on all aspects talked about (ranged from 21% to 28%) to develop existing situation (Table 6).

In addition to that, capacity-building process is always negotiating with dumped policies of central elitism. In this regards, highly educated people (30 – 58%) opined about few significant issue that are administrative decisions, efficiency in service delivery and most prominently economic development policies might be from developed societies but they must be applied in our own fashion. Other less educated people were mostly concerned with efficient services and economic development. Interestingly enough, no people were concerned with political culture that reflects their lost interest over time (Table 7). Conclusion and Policy Recommendations For a start, the local governmental process in Bangladesh has already got more or less elected governments but practices are not done continuously; and governmental activities are operated through an array of bureaucratic structures. The traditional

018 Res. J. Public. Admin Table 4. Central control and vulnerability of urban institutions.

Responses

No. of respondents

(N=60) Percentage

Cumulative Percentage

Controlling system Amendment in constitutions & Acts 12 20.00 20.00

Create political support base 15 25.00 45.00

Financial control 26 43.33 88.33

Appointment of personnel 7 11.67 100.0

Most vulnerable areas Administrative decisions and implementation 17 28.33 28.33

Economic development policies 18 30.00 58.33

Parochial political culture 9 15.0 73.33

Efficiency and service oriented administration 16 26.67 100.0

Control over local politicians 0 00.0 100.0

Ways of escape Regulate constitutional power exercises 9 15.0 15.0

Economic independence 12 20.00 35.00

Political unity at local level 13 21.67 56.67

Government‘s true willingness 23 38.33 95.00

No comment 3 5.00 100.0

Measures should be taken

Maintain and restructuring legal framework 21 35.00 35.00

Central political willingness 25 41.67 76.67

United central party politics 0 0.00 76.67

Making institutions independent economically 5 8.33 85.00

Local politician‘s performance 2 3.33 88.33

People‘s consciousness 7 11.67 100.0

No comment 0 0.00 100.0

Total 60 100.0

Source: Field data.

Table 5. Association between the capacity building factors of urban local institution influenced by central policies with Educational level.

Prime concern of the policy

making process

Educational level

Total

Primary secondary

higher

secondary Graduation

Post-

graduation Illiterate

Adaptation of modern

technologies

0

(00.0%)

2

(33.3%)

2

(33.3%)

5

(19.23%)

3

(15.00%)

0

(00.0%)

12

(20.0%)

Political arrangement of

institutions

0

(00.0%)

1

(16.67%)

3

(50.0%)

7

(26.92%)

6

(30.0%)

0

(00.0%)

17

(28.33%)

Functional government

machineries

2

(100%)

3

(50.0%)

0

(00.0%)

9

(34.62%)

6

(30.00%)

0

(00.0%)

20

(33.33%)

Collective actions for

development

0

(00.0%)

0

(00.0%)

1

(16.67%)

5

(19.23%)

5

(25.0%)

0

(00.0%)

11

(18.33%)

Total 2

100.0%

6

100.0%

6

100.00%

26

100.00%

20

100.00%

0

100.0%

60

100.0%

Source: Field data.

dominance of officials had been reinforced by the colonial impact and in most cases; policies are sustained in the

post-colonial period. Endorsement of governments through popular elections is becoming more common, but

Uddin 019

Table 6. Association of the control spaces and capacity building factors of urban local institution with respondents‘ engagement in LGIs.

Types of respondents Total

Control Mechanisms

Elected & selected officials

Mass people

Central administration operations

Amendment in constitutions & Acts 14

(66.67%)

11

(28.21%)

25*

(41.67 %)

Budgetary control 4

(19.05%)

17

(43.59%)

21

(35.0%)

Appointment of party based officials

3

(14.29%)

11

(28.21%)

14

(23.33%)

Prime concern of the policy-making process

Adaptation of modern technologies

3

(14.29%)

11

(28.21%)

14

(23.33%)

Political arrangement of institutions

8

(38.10%)

11

(28.21%)

19

(31.67%)

Functional government machineries

9

(42.86%)

8

(20.51%)

17

(28.33%)

Collective actions for development

1

(4.76%)

9

(23.08%)

10

(16.67%)

Total

21

100.0%

39

100.0%

60

100.0%

*Relation showed in two separate areas. Therefore, column percentage should be counted for each variable separately out of column total. Source: Field data

Table 7. Association between the policy application processes for capacity building sectors of urban local institution influenced by central elitist policies with level of education.

Area of concern

Educational level

Total

Primary

Secondary

higher

secondary Graduation

Post-

graduation

Illiterate

Policy

application

process

influenced by

western policies

Administrative decisions

and Implementation

0

(00.00%)

3

(50.00%)

2

(33.33%)

5

(19.23%)

9

(45.00%)

0

(00.00%)

19

(31.67%)

Parochial political

culture

0

(00.0%)

0

(00.0%)

0

(00.0%)

0

(00.0%)

0

(00.0%)

0

(00.00%)

(00.00%)

Economic development

policies

1

(50.00%)

0

(00.00%)

3

(50.00%)

15

(57.69%)

6

(30.00%)

0

(00.00%)

25

(41.67%)

Efficiency and service

oriented administration

1

(50.00%)

3

(50.00%)

1

(16.67%)

6

(23.08%)

5

(25.00%)

0

(00.00%)

16

(26.67%)

Total

2

100.0%

6

100.0%

6

100.00%

26

100.00%

20

100.00%

0

100.0%

60

100.0%

Source: Field the elections are accompanying feature of government rather than a major source of ideas. Nevertheless, the bureaucracy is not a single structure of authority: rather,

separate structures have been established, often built around particular technically defined skills: engineering, medical care, accounting, etc. The extent to which these

020 Res. J. Public. Admin distinct bodies form a whole, or could be seen as sharing a single set of objectives— that is, the extent to which they make up an entity called "the government"— is open to question. Each of them has their own agendas, they approach CG for capacity building of the LGs in terms of their own experiences, and they are prone to view other agencies as potential rivals and competitors. Recentralization is being visible while successive governments have been undertaking different reform and reorganization efforts of decentralization despite a little to implement due to lack of strong political will in one hand, and ‗bureaucratic culture characterized by centralization of authority, elitism, authoritarianism, corruption, lack of transparency, resistance to change, and subordinate status of citizens (Khan, 2002: 5-23; Khan, 2003: 723-738; Khan, 2011: 30)‘ on the other.

Moreover, different agencies of ULG institutions tend to have command over particular areas of practice, to be able to define what may or may not be done. The rhetoric of constitutionalism is used not to introduce democratic participation in government, but to legitimate "a policy that would rule on behalf of the bureaucracy" (Riggs, 1966). A change of government as a result of a contested election is almost unknown at the national level, and even in the states where parliamentary institutions are best established, the dominant party (which has held power since independence) commonly uses its command of the police, the legislative process and the courts to marginalize the opposition. The governmental process, then, is seen as an official activity, not one involving the citizens. Citizens may make appeal to "the authorities", but what is done in response is outside their field of view. Few organizations outside the official circle are accepted as legitimate participants in discourse about how public authority might be deployed. Blunt (1988), drawing on research by Hofstede (1980), identified "power distance" as a major cultural value; the perception that is a great distance between ordinary people and those in a position to influence what is done in government. Consequently, ordinary people (or even officials without any direct responsibility) do not see it as being either relevant or appropriate for them to have views on what government might do.

However, governments are part of wider patterns of governing, which include both organizational arrange-ments and expectations about the alignment of activities. Considering the given circumstances, government and concerned authority to bring synchronized work force for developing the relationship might consider following strategies:

a. Citizens should be empowered and/or allowed to impeach public officials as well as elected representa-tives and to propose new community regulations, and also to sue against public officials or organizations that

failed to perform their authorized functions; b. Until the conversion between centre and municipalities, all the powers should be vested in the hand of local institutions to decide on development issues of the constituency. Moreover, a different parliamentary system with local assembly can be established to perform their duties; c. Constitution determines "provisions of the law" that stipulate the division of powers and duties of public service provision between state and LGs as well as among LGs themselves by "having particular regard to the promotion of decentralization". It makes it mandatory to draw up a law containing a plan and a step-by-step procedure for decentralization of power and authority. d. The Local Government Ministry/Division had considered several experimental schemes to reform the institutions to enable them to effectively implement government policies and better serve the public. However, all those reform initiatives were subsequently abandoned, largely because of a lack of political will among the political leadership and the senior central agency leaders. It should be addressed now; e. To empower the committee system through autonomy of finance and decision-making process; f. The government should take new schemes to draw up ―urban development strategies" with "clearly-defined objectives", ostensibly with ―participation of representatives of local communities"; g. The civil service may be divided into three main sectors according to the roles and responsibilities of government agencies: economy-related, society-related, and policy management and security related; and h. The CG should take necessary action to revive the urban institutions by building professionalism on policy matters for capacity building. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT The author is thankful to the University Grants Commission (UGC) of Bangladesh for financing the project under Social Science Research Support in 2013 based on which report the paper is prepared. REFERENCES Ali, M. S. (2009). ―An Examination of Innovations in Union

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