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18 April 2012 | Vol. 3, № 14.
From the Editor’s Desk
Dear FDI supporters,
Welcome to this week’s edition of the
Strategic Weekly Analysis. This week, we
open with an analysis by FDI Associate
Professor Sandy Gordon of the security
situation in the Indian Ocean; then
another leading expert and FDI Associate,
Dr Christopher Snedden, takes us to the
sub-continent with a discussion of the
India-Pakistan standoff on the Siachen
Glacier.
Still in South Asia, we consider the
implications of the Nepalese
Government’s newly stated policy of
ending the recruitment of Nepali citizens
into the British and Indian Armies as
Ghurkhas. Next, FDI Associate Rizwan Zeb
provides us with a very informative
discussion of the state of US-Pakistan
relations.
Moving to the Middle East, we report on
the water supply crisis now gripping Syria
and the upcoming P5+1 nuclear talks with
Iran.
Next, the Global Food and Water Crises
research programme reports on an
innovative new crop production system
that has the potential to transform
agriculture both in Australia and overseas.
We conclude this week’s SWA with an
analysis from the Energy Security
Research programme of the looming
energy dilemma confronting the United
Kingdom, as doubts grow over the long-
term future of nuclear power in the UK.
Owing to the Anzac Day public holiday,
next week’s SWA will be released on
Thursday, 26 April. In the meantime, I
trust that you will enjoy this edition of the
Strategic Weekly Analysis.
Major General John Hartley AO (Retd) Institute Director and CEO Future Directions International
*****
Page 2 of 16
Indian Ocean: Don’t Militarise the “Great Connector”
Background
The Indian Ocean is Australia’s back yard – at least if one lives in the West. It also plays a
major role in transporting energy from the oil- and gas-rich Persian Gulf to Australia’s
principal trading partners, China and Japan. With each passing year, these and other East
Asian powers become more dependent on the free passage of oil across the Indian Ocean.
Comment
This dependency makes China nervous. India and China have an ambivalent relationship. On
the one hand, they have common interests, based on growing trade and similar positions in
the World Trade Organization and on climate change. But, on the other, they have abiding
suspicions over the longstanding border dispute and what India sees as Chinese meddling in
its own back yard: South Asia and the Indian Ocean region.
New Delhi is, above all, concerned about China’s friendship with India’s principal competitor
in South Asia, Pakistan, and also with Beijing’s growing economic and military relationships
in the Indian Ocean region.
For its part, Beijing is deeply concerned about India’s growing naval clout in the Indian
Ocean. It fears that India, possibly in collusion with the US, could interdict its oil in times of
rising tension or war. Even though India is far weaker than China, it has the advantage of
occupying a strategic “box seat” in the Indian Ocean. It also shares many commonalities with
the US in its longer-term strategic outlook and the two navies frequently exercise together.
All this gives rise to a classic “security dilemma” in the Indian Ocean region – one in which
China fears India might cut off its oil, while India fears China’s counter-manoeuvres are
intended to “surround” it.
If this were not bad enough, the Indian Ocean is surrounded by some of the poorest, most
troubled countries in the world. It confronts enormous issues of poverty and food and water
scarcity. It suffers serious non-conventional security threats: terrorism, people smuggling
and trafficking, drug and gun smuggling, piracy and a host of environmental and natural
disaster challenges.
Any actions that would have the effect of deepening this security dilemma, such as the
proposals recently floated in Washington to base US reconnaissance aircraft on the Cocos
(Keeling) Islands and nuclear-powered submarines at HMAS Stirling, should be avoided.
China would definitely interpret any such moves as an attempt to threaten its “soft
underbelly” – its high dependency on Middle East oil – during times of rising tension.
What is needed instead is a strategy designed to provide for joint action in the “commons”,
to alleviate the sense of insecurity on the part of the major powers that their legitimate
interests in the Indian Ocean might not be met.
Unfortunately, the security-building mechanisms in the Indian Ocean are inadequate and
show little prospect of improvement. Unlike the Asia-Pacific, where four great powers (the
Page 3 of 16
US, China, Japan and Russia) to an extent balance each other, India is by far the dominant
littoral power in the Indian Ocean. Australia has the next most powerful navy, and it can only
aspire to be a middle power.
This means that India is able to dominate the security-building mechanisms in the Indian
Ocean: no India, no viable mechanisms. As with any great power, India will use its influence
to ensure its wishes are met. Those wishes have more to do with locking out what it fears to
be a China-Pakistan combination, rather than building a regime capable of solving some of
the region’s manifest problems so that can all “rise on the same tide”.
So, Canberra should be working quietly trying to convince New Delhi that the best way to
ensure that China doesn’t seek a permanent military presence in the Indian Ocean region
would be to work with it to alleviate its concerns, through collective action to address the
non-conventional and other problems of the region.
This would not be a short-term prospect, however. Australia’s challenge would be to
convince Washington of this need, as much as it would be to convince India and China. But
we must make a beginning. The Indian Ocean must remain “the great connector”, which has
been its principal role throughout its long history.
If, indeed, US forces require reinforcing in the Indian Ocean, then at the very least it will be
important to ensure that they are perceived to be, and are in fact, designed to assist the
region meet its multifarious non-conventional security challenges. This would, in turn,
require that Washington take a stronger interest in security building mechanisms in the
region than it has hitherto.
Professor Sandy Gordon FDI Associate
About the Author: Professor Gordon is a visiting fellow at the College of Asia and the Pacific, Australian National University, Canberra. He is a specialist on South Asia and the Indian Ocean, is co-editor of South Asia Masala and author of ‘Security and Security Building in the Indian Ocean Region’.
*****
A Tragedy on Siachen Glacier
Background
Pakistan’s recent loss of 138 military and civilian personnel, buried by an avalanche in the
Siachen Glacier area, is a tragedy. Apart from the obvious loss of life, this disaster is tragic
because of the futility of Indian and Pakistani forces “fighting” on a remote glacier that is
6,000 metres (or 20,000 feet) above sea level.
Page 4 of 16
Comment
These forces do little actual fighting, chiefly because the high and rarefied altitude makes
that difficult at the best of times. Add in snow, fog, inclement weather, freezing conditions
and remoteness, and a posting on Siachen is more about surviving harsh conditions,
loneliness and boredom, than about slaying the enemy. Not surprisingly, most soldiers from
either nation die from exposure, altitude sickness and associated illnesses, or from natural
calamities, such as avalanches. Few die from actual fighting.
Nevertheless, India and Pakistan continue to post forces to this wasteland – as they have
done since about 1984. They do so for reasons of national pride, because of the doctrine
that dominates the political and military thinking of both nations of “not giving an inch” of
territory to the enemy, and for strategic reasons.
Siachen Glacier is located in an area of the disputed former princely state of Jammu and
Kashmir (J&K), where the ceasefire line, later renamed the Line of Control (LOC), was never
delimited. This was because no one envisaged that anyone would want to station forces in
this high, barren and inhospitable area beyond map point NJ980420, where the LOC officially
ends. Apart from waterways that rise in the area, the glacier is close to the strategic
Karakoram Pass that links J&K with China (not be confused with the Karakoram Highway that
enters J&K from China via the Kunjerab Pass, much further north). Even though any
conventional, land-based invasion by Chinese troops into J&K would require a massive
capability, given the strength of China-Pakistan relations, India wants to control this area to
prevent any such possibility.
A further reason that India and Pakistan are on Siachen is to do with territory. The ceasefire
line/LOC talks of the undelimited LOC heading ‘north to the [J&K-China] border’. New Delhi
takes this as being north-west; for Islamabad, it is north-east. Both are making a naked grab
for more land – albeit remote and inhospitable.
A further tragedy is that few powerbrokers in India or Pakistan seem to feel much urgency to
end the very costly – not to mention inhumane – exercise of posting troops on Siachen.
Soldiers usually spend about three months on the glacier, with equivalent times either side
acclimatising, then declimatising. A few years ago, the cost for India was some US$3 million
per day. With shorter supply lines, it costs Pakistan less, although, relatively speaking, given
that India’s economy is getting stronger while Pakistan’s flounders, the cost for India is less.
Since January 1986, India and Pakistan have sought to demilitarise Siachen Glacier. The issue
was also one of the eight items considered by India and Pakistan in their now-stalled
Composite Dialogue. Some progress was apparently made, although the sticking point was,
is, and will remain, the fact that India and Pakistan don’t trust one another. Analysts call this
the “trust deficit”, an appropriate term in relation to Siachen, as evidenced by the Indian
Army. Usually impeccably apolitical, senior Indian army officers have in the past unusually
used the Indian media to “play politics” on the issue of demilitarising the glacier. These
officers distrust the Pakistani Army’s fidelity. On more than one occasion, Indian generals
have called for “cast-iron”, internationally-enforceable guarantees from Pakistan that its
Page 5 of 16
army would not violate the demarcated – and tactically superior – position of the Indian
Army on Siachen Glacier, should Indian forces ever withdraw.
There are a number of reasons why the Indians don’t trust the Pakistanis, although limited
space here does not allow me to expand. Equally, and not surprisingly, however, the
Pakistanis don’t trust the Indians. The issue of mistrust is arguably the major reason why
India and Pakistan have not been able to demilitarise Siachen Glacier. It also explains why
they have poor-to-parlous relations and why they are unable to solve the Kashmir dispute. If
they could resolve the tragedy that is Siachen, then they may be able to move forward on
their other disputes and issues.
Dr Christopher Snedden FDI Associate
About the Author: Dr Christopher Snedden is Dean/Head of College at the Navitas College of Public
Safety, Melbourne, and Director of ASIA CALLING, a consultancy that undertakes work on South Asia.
His latest publication is The Untold Story of the People of Azad Kashmir, published by Hurst and Co.,
London, and Columbia University Press, New York.
*****
Nepal: Maoist-led Government Seeks to Halt Ghurkha
Recruitment
Background
The Maoist-led government of Prime Minister Baburam Bhattarai has directed the Nepalese
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to implement recommendations made by a controversial report.
The report proposes to end the longstanding tradition of allowing recruitment of Nepalese
citizens, referred to as Ghurkhas, into the British and Indian Armies. The directive, however,
has attracted strong criticism from dissenting groups, including Nepalese youths, who have
long seen the opportunity to join the British and Indian Armies as a life-changing career
pathway.
Comment
The controversial policy comes at a time when the Nepalese Government is struggling to
agree on its long-overdue constitution and is facing issues in integrating former-Maoist
combatants into the Nepalese Army. Following the recommendations made by the report
Foreign Policy of Nepal in Changed Context 2068 BS (2011/2012), and passed by the All-Party
Parliamentary Committee, the Maoist-led government has ordered its Ministry of Foreign
Affairs to stop the recruitment of Nepali citizens into the British and Indian Armies, which
they have joined in large numbers for generations.
Page 6 of 16
Ghurkha recruitment into the British and Indian Armies has a rich history stretching back
nearly two-centuries. Besides family tradition and the honour associated with joining those
armies, the opportunity also presents under-privileged Nepalese youths with the prospect of
a better livelihood. At present, there are approximately 3,800 Ghurkhas in the British Army,
which has four Ghurkha units, including two independent companies. Similarly, the Indian
Army has an estimated 30,000 Ghurkhas within its ranks, amounting to 39 battalions.
Pro-Ghurkha associations and other groups have threatened to stage massive protests if the
policy is implemented. Given that remittances generated by the service of Ghurkhas are
estimated at US$370 million annually, the consequences of this policy are likely to hit the
Nepalese economy and youth hard, especially since there are few options for employment in
a country with an unemployment rate of around 46 per cent.
Yet, despite these advantages, Nepal’s Maoist-led government has cited nationalist and
ideological reasons for halting recruitment, stressing that Nepal will not be seen as a source
of “mercenaries”. The move is seen by the government’s critics as an attempt to deflect
criticism and attention from its poor performance in delivering much-needed reform in
governance.
The decision by the Nepalese Government appears to show all the hallmarks of a poorly
thought out and executed policy, given that there appear to be no alternative plans to
accommodate the economic void that will be created. The backlash has prompted the
government to hint at concessions, as evidenced by parliamentarian Suresh Ale Magar, who
stated in early-January this year: ‘Since this issue is related to the country’s sovereignty, we
need to be very sensitive.’
Although it is unlikely that the Maoist-led government will retract the policy, it is more
feasible that it will attempt to implement it slowly over a period of time, at a politically
tenable pace. The Maoist-led government’s end goal is clear; it is seeking to significantly
reduce British and Indian influence within the Nepalese Army, which has raised tensions
because the military is displeased with the policy. This may make the prospect of integrating
former-Maoist guerrillas into the military a much more difficult task and further complicate
Nepal’s fragile political situation.
Paras Lohani FDI Research Assistant South and West Asia Research Programme
*****
Page 7 of 16
Pakistan-US Relations: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?
Background
Last year was a tough year for Pakistan-US relations; 2011 witnessed increasing distrust
between the two countries and a stronger belief in the US that Pakistan is the problem when
it comes to Afghanistan. For the US, Pakistan – despite being a frontline state in the “War on
Terror” – is supporting the Taliban and the Haqqani network; is among the most anti-US
countries in the world; and is the place where Bin Laden was hiding when he was killed by
US Navy SEALs. Islamabad is of the view that its contribution and sacrifices in the War on
Terror are ignored. It believes that it is being held up as a scapegoat for the overall
international failure in Afghanistan, and that it is being bypassed in the making of decisions
for the region, which will also have implications for Pakistan.
Comment
After a decade-long engagement in the region, the US declared that it would withdraw from
Afghanistan by 2014. How the Americans have fared in Afghanistan is anybody’s guess. The
US has failed to achieve most of its objectives and the country continues to be mostly
lawless. Many observers believe that, after the US withdrawal, Afghanistan will face another
civil war.
Under this atmosphere of distrust, on 26 November 2011, NATO attacked the Pakistani
Salala border post. Immediately after the attack, Islamabad decided to block all NATO supply
routes and told the US to vacate the Shamsi air base in Baluchistan. Islamabad’s reaction
that this attack was an attack on its sovereignty can be better understood if seen in the
context of its overall frustrations, as mentioned above.
Despite various attempts to downplay the significance of the supply route from Pakistan, the
blocking of the NATO and ISAF supply line is having an adverse effect on American and NATO
forces in the region. About 40 to 60 per cent of their supplies go through this route.
At the heart of the issue, is the failure of the US and the West to take into account
Islamabad’s threat perception and interests in the region. Pakistan and Afghanistan have a
history of issues that cannot be ignored. Prime among these issues is the Durand Line
frontier, which remains unresolved. Kabul continues to contest the validity of this border
between Pakistan and Afghanistan, as it wants to keep the issue alive. Its opposition to
border fencing is a case in point.
It is possible, however, that efforts are being made to address the situation. There were
reports of contacts between General John Allen and General Ashfaq Parvez Kyani, in which
both generals, according to General Allen, expressed a commitment to work through the
incident. During the unannounced visit of US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta to
Afghanistan, Panetta stated that ‘It’s been said a number of times that ultimately we can’t
win the war in Afghanistan without being able to win in our relationship with Pakistan as
well,’ adding:
Page 8 of 16
‘It’s going to be important, as we continue to move and progress in our efforts in
Afghanistan, that we continue to outreach to Pakistan. This has been a difficult
and complicated relationship but it is an important relationship.’
The attempts to improve the relationship further intensified with the visits of Generals
James Mattis (head of CENTCOM) and John Allen (US commander in Afghanistan).
On 4 April, an American delegation, headed by US Deputy Secretary of State Tom Nides,
arrived in Pakistan to discuss Pakistan-US relations. However, the news of a $10 million
bounty on the chief of Jamaat-ud-Dawah, Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, stole their thunder.
Regardless of the legality of this act, the timing of the announcement was surprising. It can
be seen in two ways. First, the timing was particularly chosen to exert pressure on
Islamabad, and second, different departments in the US Government lack co-ordination.
Both conclusions are problematic for Pakistan-US relations.
The current coldness in Islamabad-Washington relations and Islamabad’s reaction to the
NATO attack can be better understood if analysed in totality. For Islamabad, it is yet another
sign of the distrust and deterioration in Pakistan-US relations. There is an urgent need to
improve bilateral relations. Both countries need each other and their mutual interests go
beyond the war against terror. However, as the bigger partner in the game, Washington has
to understand Pakistan’s concern regarding Afghanistan. Former Indian Prime Minister
Vajpayee once said that you can’t change your neighbours; this is perhaps the important
point to be kept in mind when addressing the Pakistan-Afghanistan issue. How Pakistan-US
relations will look in the days ahead will depend on whether both sides can establish
confidence and trust in each other and whether or not Islamabad’s legitimate concerns are
addressed.
Rizwan Zeb FDI Associate
About the Author: Rizwan Zeb is a Ph.D. candidate at the Centre for Muslim States and Societies,
Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Western Australia. He is a
former visiting scholar for the India/South Asia Project, Foreign Policy Programme at the Brookings
Institution, Washington DC, USA and a Benjamin Meaker visiting professor of politics, IAS, University
of Bristol, United Kingdom.
This article is an updated and revised version of ‘Pakistan Responds to NATO Attack’, published in CACI
Analyst, 11 January 2012.
*****
Page 9 of 16
Syria Struggles with a Critical Resource: Water
Background
Since January 2011, Syria has been facing violent civil unrest as elements of the population
seek the resignation of President Bashar al-Assad. However serious the political struggle may
be, according to a new report Syria faces an even more severe crisis relating to water
security, which could threaten the long-term future of the country.
Comment
The report, titled Water Status in the Syrian Water Basins, suggests that water levels in
Syria’s seven main water basins will halve by 2025. Water resource engineering experts at
the Swedish University of Lund, Khaldoon A. Mourad and Ronny Berndtsson, published the
report in the Open Journal of Modern Hydrology in early 2012.
The report states that two of the seven Syrian basins are facing a water scarcity problem.
Projections suggest that, by 2025, the availability of water will be halved. To manage this
scarce resource effectively, the main obstacles to consider are: supply and demand; climate
change; population growth; and politics. From 2006 to 2011, up to 60 per cent of Syria
experienced the worst long-term drought and the most severe set of crop failures ever.
Approximately 75 per cent of agriculturally-dependant Syrians suffered near total crop
failure during that period, with a resultant social and economic loss.
In 2009, the United Nations reported that over 800,000 people lost their livelihoods due to
the drought. By 2011, the number of people driven into extreme poverty was estimated to
be between two and three million. This has led to a substantial migration of farmers from
the countryside to the cities. The UN estimated that, in 2010 alone, 50,000 families migrated
from rural areas. This, coupled with the influx of Iraqi refugees, has placed a strain on scarce
resources, such as water.
With a population of 25.4 million expected by 2025, Syrian demand for water for domestic,
industrial and agricultural uses will increase. The United Nations Food and Agriculture
Organization states that the available water per capita will be halved by 2025. Historically,
emphasis was placed on the supply of water by controlling surface flows and creating
multipurpose reservoirs. Now, emphasis needs to be placed on managing the demand for
water through adoption processes, such as developing a water market in which the holders
of water rights are able to trade them freely.
According to Water Status in the Syrian Water Basins, the largest water-consuming sector is
agriculture, which accounts for about 90 per cent of usage. This suggests that better
irrigation techniques need to be developed, particularly in the process of adapting to climate
change. As it stands, there is a high seasonal rainfall variation within Syria. About 900
millimetres falls on the coast, yet only 60mm falls in the inland, eastern, regions. Climate
change projections suggest that, by 2050, there will be a 20 to 25 per cent decrease in
precipitation, resulting in a 23 per cent reduction in surface runoff, and a decreased flow in
the Euphrates River. Additionally, temperatures are expected to increase by 2.5°C by 2050,
Page 10 of 16
increasing the rate and amount of evaporation and thus further reducing the availability of
water.
In addition to increased population and climate change, water politics is another issue
affecting the availability of water in Syria. For many Middle Eastern countries, water is a
catalyst for confrontation that has ramifications for national security, foreign policy and
domestic stability. Some of Syria’s most important water resources, such as the Euphrates
River, are shared with other countries, like Turkey and Iraq. To improve the management of
the Euphrates, Turkey agreed to release at least 500 cubic metres per second. Of that, Syria
can use 42 per cent, with the rest released to Iraq. As a result, the annual Syrian share from
the Euphrates is approximately 6,623 million cubic metres.
To overcome the scarcity of water, the management of non-traditional water resources,
such as rainwater harvesting and water recycling, needs to be improved. There are,
however, a large number of management constraints on the efficient use of water that need
to be overcome. They include economic, physical, environmental, technical and institutional
issues. Resource projects are dependent on external funding. Also, there is a lack of public
awareness of environmental problems, such as ground and surface water pollution, while
overlapping water management schemes can result in a lack of
co-operation.
While it appears that there are reasons to be alarmed about Syria’s water availability, water
harvesting – not to mention peace – can play an important part in water availability. Though
climate change could have an enormous impact on water resources, implementing properly
integrated water management techniques could contribute to better sustainability and more
effective water conservation.
Shona Shah FDI Research Assistant Global Food and Water Crises Research Programme
*****
Nuclear Talks with Iran: A Continuing Challenge
Background
Although both sides hailed their first meeting in 14 months as a positive step forward in
easing fears that Iran might weaponise its nuclear programme, the most constructive
outcome was probably the intention to meet again in Baghdad on 23 May.
Page 11 of 16
Comment
Significant differences remain. Both sides agree, for instance, that talks should be guided by
the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Yet, Iran claims never to have violated the Treaty.
Indeed, it asserts that all its nuclear material has been disclosed and that it allows
International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors to monitor all its nuclear facilities. The IAEA,
however, accuses Iran of failing to co-operate and states there is no guarantee that Tehran is
not hiding nuclear material that could ultimately be used for weapons.
Iran also faces significant challenges that were not present a year ago. Economic sanctions
are certainly having an impact on its major source of revenue: the export of oil. International
banking networks have almost completely excluded Iran, there is widespread discontent
over the rising cost of living and declining employment opportunities, and the ever-present
threat of military action from Israel and the US cannot be discounted.
These concerns, to a certain extent, are ameliorated by motives of patriotism, which are
reinforced by a sense of justice and scientific achievement. Iran’s leadership may see its
position strengthened by perceptions of international bullying. There is also the recognition
that the West no longer calls for a complete halt to enrichment, as it did a year ago.
The West’s intentions are not completely clear, nor is there unanimity on how to approach
Iran within the P5+1 (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China and
Germany). Among the outcomes considered, are the suspension of medium-level
enrichment, the closure of a deeply buried enrichment facility, greater access for inspectors
and the removal of more highly enriched uranium.
Most analysts believe that Iran will attempt to reduce the impact of sanctions and that there
may be some compromise to its previous position. But talks are likely to be protracted with
minor concessions made, at least for some time.
Major General John Hartley AO (Retd) Institute Director and CEO Future Directions International
*****
Sundrop Offers Food Security Solution for Arid Regions
Background
Australian firm Sundrop Farms is spearheading work on a new crop production system that
has the potential to transform agriculture in Australia and places like the Middle East. The
technology provides the means for countries facing food security concerns to maintain a
level of self-sufficiency.
Page 12 of 16
Comment
Sundrop Farms has developed a greenhouse powered by the sun and that uses only salt
water for irrigation.
Philipp Saumweber, Reinier Wolterbeek and David Pratt have devised a means of using the
sun’s rays to remove the salt from sea water and produce heating, cooling and power for
horticultural production. The method achieves a saving of up to 15 per cent over fossil
fuelled glasshouses. Horticulture is normally water and energy intensive and can represent
up to 70 per cent of total farm expenses, according to Sundrop. Therefore, the technology
has significant economic and environmental benefits.
Sundrop says that the technology reduces fossil-fuel requirements, produces fresh water,
reduces pesticide use, and produces salt and mineral by-products. The system can transform
unsuitable land and achieves yields up to 30 times greater than conventional field methods.
The group has developed the concept in Port Augusta, South Australia, but is already looking
at markets for the technology in Africa and the Middle East. Sundrop claims the technology
works at optimum efficiency in arid regions with lots of sunshine, close to the sea or saline
water and in proximity to markets.
The technology is particularly useful where ground water is being depleted and on degraded
land.
If the system is as good as the company claims, this could be a lucrative export of Australian
technology that can assist countries confronting food and water crises.
Page 13 of 16
For more details: http://www.sundropfarms.com/
Gary Kleyn Manager FDI Global Food and Water Security Programme [email protected]
*****
United Kingdom Faces Emerging Energy Dilemma
Background
The decision, late in March 2011, by energy utilities RWE and E.ON to abandon plans to
develop the United Kingdom’s next generation of nuclear reactors, has created an emerging
energy security challenge. London has proposed an expansion of natural gas sourced
electricity to alleviate projected shortages. This brings accompanying challenges, however.
To mitigate these potential threats British Prime Minster David Cameron should look to
continental Europe for guidance and pursue a platform of renewable energy.
Comment
The United Kingdom is facing a long-term energy security challenge. Nuclear power plants,
developed by German energy companies RWE and E.ON, were to form the foundation of
Britain’s long-term energy requirements. Motivated by the European Union’s climate law,
requiring the closure of 30 per cent of Britain’s coal and oil-fired power plants by 2015, the
proposed plants in Gloucestershire and Anglesey, North Wales provided the most reliable
low-carbon option.
In late March, however, the plans suffered a serious setback, after both companies
abandoned the multibillion-dollar nuclear power project. Citing the Fukushima nuclear
disaster in Japan, and the resulting German policy of abandoning nuclear power by 2022, the
companies have opted to exit the project to concentrate on other investments.
This creates a considerable policy challenge for London, as the government seeks to secure
long-term energy supply in an era of austerity. Financing may potentially prohibit smaller
developers from entering the project. Reports in the media have highlighted interest from
Rosatom, the Russian state-owned utility. Political considerations and the company’s safety
record, however, make this an unlikely prospect. Similarly, such concerns have the potential
to preclude emerging Indian and Chinese companies.
This makes French utility Électricité de France (EDF) the most probable, and arguably the
only, candidate to fill the energy void. Currently, in addition to supplying fossil and
renewable energy to the British market, EDF boasts a portfolio of eight nuclear power
Page 14 of 16
stations across the United Kingdom. Additionally, the utility is in the process of expanding its
Somerset nuclear site, with plans to open the plant by 2016.
Significantly, however, like much of Europe, France has experienced growing anti-nuclear
sentiment, with nuclear power much less palatable in a post-Fukushima world. This has been
seized upon by Socialist candidate, and most likely future President, François Hollande, who
has proposed reducing the ratio of nuclear supply in France’s energy mix by more than one-
third over the next decade. Such a policy may have considerable implications for the United
Kingdom, with EDF potentially adopting a similar aversion to nuclear development as RWE
and E.ON.
To mitigate potential exposure, analysts have suggested that London is likely to increase
investment in natural gas, adopting policies of seeking opportunities in supplier states, the
development of new plants, and exploration in areas such as the North Sea. Previously,
London has cited the merits of gas, including the production cost and lower carbon intensity,
in expanding its ratio in the energy supply. With doubts over the long-term stability of
nuclear development in the UK, the prospect of increased reliance on natural gas is likely.
This in itself brings additional challenges. Analysts suggest that the growth in gas demand
will be accompanied by an increased cost to consumers, particularly as the market supply
tightens. Despite the development of shale and deep-water extraction technology, gas
exploration is an expensive process. In addition, the UK’s domestic supply is in rapid decline,
with pessimistic projections about the long-term future of the North Sea. Symptomatic of
this, in 2011 – for the first time since 1967 – the UK imported more natural gas than it
produced. The UK is increasingly dependent on foreign supplies of liquefied natural gas
(LNG), which is accompanied by various transportation, political and economic concerns.
With these latest challenges, it is time for London to reconsider its future energy strategies.
By 2030, the UK population is expected to grow to approximately 71 million, leading to a
substantial increase in the demand for electricity. The country is also suffering from well-
documented, economic challenges; energy insecurity could further exacerbate them. It is
with some urgency, therefore, that Prime Minister Cameron should develop strategies to
address the challenge.
One such approach may be to replicate a renewable energy focus, as demonstrated across
continental Europe, adopting solar, nuclear, wind and tidal power. In addition to providing a
low-carbon alternative, renewable projects could spur economic growth through
construction and research, and even potentially provide synergies for projects in other
states.
A more nuanced energy policy is vital for Britain. For the short-term, a more rigorous
commitment will spur economic growth, while, over the long-term, a clearly defined and
implemented policy will provide sufficient energy resources to meet the UK’s ever-increasing
requirements.
Denis Leonov FDI Research Assistant Energy Security Research Programme
Page 15 of 16
*****
What’s Next?
The NATO/ISAF Foreign and Defence Ministers’ meeting is taking place in
Brussels, from 18-20 April, to discuss the ongoing transfer of security
responsibility from the international coalition to the government of
Afghanistan.
The 28th Food and Agricultural Organization regional conference for Europe will
be held on 19-20 April in Baku, Azerbaijan. For details, see:
http://www.fao.org/docrep/meeting/024/mc857e.pdf
On 20 April, a Strategic Briefing on “Engaging the Arab World” will be held from
4.30pm-9.00pm at the BankWest Lecture Theatre, Building 200, Curtin
University, Bentley WA. Speaking will be Dr Alexey Muraviev, Cynthia Dearin
and Dr Anne Aly. RSVP essential to Dr Alexey Muraviev at
[email protected] or (08) 9266 2234.
The International Food Policy Research Institute will launch its Global Food
Policy Report on 23 April. For details, or to watch the live webcast, visit:
http://www.ifpri.org/event/launch-ifpris-first-global-food-policy-report
The 27th session of the Regional Conference for Africa, organised by the Food
and Agricultural Organization, will be held in Brazzaville, Congo on 23-27 April.
For details, see: http://www.fao.org/bodies/rc2012/arc27/en/
The annual World Bank Conference on Land and Poverty will be held at the
World Bank Headquarters in Washington DC on 23-26 April. It will discuss “Land
Governance in a Changing Environment”. For more, visit:
http://www.landandpoverty.com/
The 10th International Conference on Southern Hemisphere Meteorology and
Oceanography will be held in Noumea, New Caledonia, from 23-27 April. For
details, visit: http://10icshmo.org
The New Zealand Defence Force will host 35 US Marines and 41 US Army
personnel for Exercise Alam Halfa, a joint exercise to be held at locations in
Palmerston North, Waiouru and Napier between 26 April and 6 May. The US
personnel will exercise with 1,500 personnel of the New Zealand Army’s 1st
Brigade in the two countries’ first traditional military exercise on New Zealand
soil since the mid-1980s.
Page 16 of 16
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