From Norms to Trust

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2003 6: 173European Journal of Social TheoryJanne Jalava

SystemFrom Norms to Trust: The Luhmannian Connections between Trust and

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From Norms to Trust

The Luhmannian Connections betweenTrust and System

Janne JalavaUNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI, FINLAND

Abstract

This article explores the concept of trust put forth by Niklas Luhmann and

Talcott Parsons. It shows the outline of Luhmanns theory of trust and its

connections to his autopoietic systems theory. It also deliberates upon the

role of trust in the Luhmannian research of future society as well as examines

the role of trust in risk society and shows why norms, values and familiarity

play only a peripheral role in todays society. Trust is a way to control

everyday interaction of the future. But what are the challenges and limits of

Luhmanns concept of trust?

Key words

confidence control familiarity norm trust

Introduction

One of the best-known early theories by Niklas Luhmann is his theory of trust.In his book, Vertrauen (1968), Luhmann presented his basic theses about trust.The function of trust is to reconstruct or to reduce the growing complexity ofsociety. Although Luhmanns theory of trust has been used as a theoretical back-ground in many sociological texts (Giddens, 1990; 1991; Misztal, 1996;Seligman, 1997; Warren, 1999; Sztompka, 1999; Mllering, 2001), none ofthese texts has seen trust as a part of Luhmanns autopoietic systems theory,formulated in the bookSoziale Systeme(1984). Trust has been examined frommany points of view: From the perspective of ontological security and commit-ments (Giddens, 1984; 1990; 1991), trust as a part of social capital (Fukuyama,1995), trust in the context of welfare and democracy (Inglehart, 1997; 1999;

Hardin, 1999) and trust as an important historical concept (Seligman, 1997;Frevert, 2000).

The aim of this article is to show why trust in particular is of central concernin contemporary social theory and in todays society and to examine the

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connections between Luhmanns theory of trust and his autopoietic systemstheory. We shall analyse the development of Luhmanns theory of trust and seehow it functions in todays society. The connections between Luhmanns theory

of trust and that of Talcott Parsons will also be addressed.First, we outline the development of Parsons normative open systems theoryand the role of trust in it. Parsons was Luhmanns teacher and one of his mostimportant theoretical influences. The central question here is: how does trustfunction under normative order? We also point out the weaknesses Luhmann sawin the idea of normative systems and Parsons theory of trust.

The second main topic of this article is to provide an overview of closed,autopoietic systems and compare the similarities and differences between psychicand social systems as seen by Niklas Luhmann. The essential question here is:

why is the concept of an autopoietic system more useful than an open and norma-tive one in controlling the change of modern society?

Third, we shall address the differences and similarities between Luhmannianconcepts of trust, confidence and familiarity. How could we adapt Luhmannstheory of trust to his autopoietic systems theory? Is systems control of societyimpossible without trust and confidence? But first of all we deliberate about whythe role of trust is different and more important now than ever before.

Why Trust?

In the traditional world where risks were natural compared to the contingentrisks of the modern world control and socialization were enough to guaranteethe stability of the social reality. As Talcott Parsons stated, norms as well as thefamiliar form of trust (which is based on the membership of societal communityand norms) were enough to guarantee integration as well as continuity of systems.

We could say that familiarity has to do with the past, but trust as well as confi-dence has to do with the future and risks. Familiarity is an unavoidable fact oflife, but trust is an expectation of or a solution to specific problems of risk

(Luhmann, 1988). The first reason why we need trust is that the development ofsociety has not been predictable but deviant. Certainty has changed its form. Infact, as Patterson (1999: 1534) has pointed out, trust, confidence and famili-arity are all trust situations, differentiated by the level of risk and the means by

which such risk is conceptualized.After all, familiarity has not disappeared anywhere. We still use familiar

symbols, norms and habits, and live in a familiar world. However, we know in afamiliar way about the unfamiliar (Luhmann, 1988: 956). We know that thereis a level to which our codes of communication and thoughts have not yet devel-

oped. The role of trust is emphasized in risk society. We do not need trust in afamiliar world. Trust presupposes a situation of risk. It requires a previous engage-ment on ones part. That is to say, to trust is to take a risk. For example, by buyinga used car one takes the risk of it turning out to be a lemon. But one can alsochoose not to buy it and go on living in the familiar world. By avoiding risk,

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then, one eliminates the need, or, gives up the possibility of trust. It should bestressed that the significance of risk does not lie with risk but what risk is attachedto risk is a cognitive construct, horizon or definition.

When it comes to trust, one chooses one action in preference to others in spiteof the possibility of being disappointed by the action of others. Trust is onlypossible in a situation where the possible damage may be greater than the advan-tage one seeks (Deutsch, 1962: 302). Otherwise we would stay in a familiar worldand trust in the Parsonsian (normative) sense. But always when we trustsomebody, it is possible for that person to abuse our trust. There is no trust

without risks.Why is confidence, too, a risk-based selection? Like trust, confidence also

refers to expectations which may lapse into disappointments. This happensbecause ego cannot predict the others reactions, but the level and the attribu-tions in particular are different. As this article shows, confidence is easier toacquire than trust. Therefore, in the situation of confidence, there is less often aneed to act in an unfamiliar way. That is to say, confidence has many of the samequalities as familiarity. Or, confidence has many of the same qualities as Parsonsconcept of trust. Therefore, in the case of confidence, the expectations thatactivate one to act in an unfamiliar way are not so deep as they are in the case oftrust. As Luhmann (1988: 97) notes, if you do not consider alternatives, you arein a situation of confidence. For example, you could dress in a personal way andnote that others do not like your style. Probably you react to this disappointment

only by external attribution and changing your dressing style, but your reactionshave not so much to do with communication but cognitive observations.

To conclude, the complex, risky and ambivalent character of social life appearsto make the task of addressing the problem of trust and social control morepressing than ever. We need trust and confidence because norms and familiarityalone are not enough to solve the problems of todays risk society. But beforesaying more about the trust problems of today, we examine the trust theories ofTalcott Parsons and Niklas Luhmann.

The Dynamics of Parsons Systems

In the first decades after the Second World War, system theoretical sociology wasalmost synonymous with Talcott Parsons structural functionalism (1962; 1966).Structural functionalism was based on the assumption that social systems couldnot function and maintain themselves without a normative foundation. Parsonstreats the social system as one part of the primary subsystems of the human actionsystem. The others are behavioural organism, the personality of the individual

and the cultural system. According to Parsons (1966: 5) Action consists of thestructures and processes by which human beings form meaningful intentions andimplement them in concrete situations.

Every action system has its own functional category. Cultural systems arespecialized in the function of pattern-maintenance. That is to say, they are

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concerned with the maintenance of the highest controlling patterns of the system.Social systems, on the contrary, are specialized in the internal integration of actingunits (of human individuals) of the system. Finally, personality systems are

specialized in goal attainment in relation to systems environment and behaviouralorganisms in adaptation to the non-action, physical environment (Parsons,1966: 7).

In Parsons theory, the social system is the integrative sub-system of action.This is because it is made up of the interaction of human individuals. Eachmember is both actor and object of orientation both for other actors and himself(Parsons, 1977: 67). Therefore, because of such connection, each of the otherthree action systems (culture, personality, behavioural organism) constitutes theenvironment of a social system.

If the social system is the most important subsystem of action, there must bealso some type of the social system where the integrative character comes intoplay. According to Parsons (1966: 2), that is society because it is the most self-sufficient type of social systems. Furthermore, the entity that takes care of inte-gration and norms is the societal community. At the same time it is the core ofa society. Altogether, societal community is the entity that creates the self-sufficiency of society and integrative role of the social systems:

The core of a society, as a system, is the patterned normative order through which thelife of a population is collectively organized. As an order, it contains values and differ-

entiated and particularized norms and rules, all of which require cultural references inorder to be meaningful and legitimate. As a collectivity, it displays a patterned concep-tion of membership which distinguishes between those individuals who do and do notbelong. (Parsons, 1966: 10)

What can we conclude from the qualities of action systems? Regarding the inter-connection of action and system, Parsons point simply seems to be that actionis a system (Stichweh, 2000: 6). A normative system is internally coherent andbroadly shared by its members. The normative rules, which Parsons called struc-tural imperatives, create the basis for the social processes which form the struc-

ture and activity of society. It would be difficult to imagine any action withoutnorms which control the social systems and values which control the interactionbetween the social and cultural systems. These norms and values are insti-tutionalized in society, or exactly, societal community, whose form is collective.In this community human beings play their roles determined by the patternednormative order through which the life of a population is collectively organized.

In addition to the structure of social processes, normative rules also create thefoundation for social action and proper conduct of man, the socialization of ahuman being. Socialization does not occur by itself, but two of the most import-

ant institutions behind it are the family and school (which are subsystems of asociety). As well as socializing the present generation, they transmit the norma-tive structure to future generations. That is to say, socialization is the product ofthe cultural system. As Parsons notes (1966: 6), no individual (social system) cancreate a cultural system. The main patternings of cultural systems change only




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over periods of many generations and are always shared by relatively large groups.Norms and values hereby are the controlling part of action and systems today butsocialization is the part of the past which affects the present as well as the future.

After all, norms and values need socialization and vice versa.Parsons system theory is totally bound on norms. The core of a society is thesocietal community that creates the culture of society as well as defines the limitsof its membership. Because of the control exerted by the societal community,human beings know how to act in a society. If this control is enough, do we,then, need trust? Is there any need for trust in Parsons systems theory?

Trust as a Part of Familiarity

To Parsons (1978: 456) the problem of trust emerges in relationships between

professionals and lay persons. There is a competence gap between the expert andthe layman. Because the layman cannot fully understand what the professional(for example, a doctor) is doing, there must be a basis of trusted validation ofcompetence other than the typical laymans personal competence to evaluate it.Thus, in order for trust to exist between these persons, they must have commonvalues and common goals. There must also be adequate symbolization of bothcompetence and integrity:

Sharing values makes agreement on common goals easier, and confidence incompetence and integrity makes commitment to mutual involvement in such goals

easier . . . All these considerations focus mutual trust in the conception or feeling ofthe solidarity of collective groups. (Parsons, 1978: 467)

Parsons point, then, seems to be that trust is a feeling which can be activatedonly between the members of collective group. Or, as Parsons (1978: 47) puts it:People defined as sharing ones values or concrete goals and in whose competenceand integrity one has confidence come to be thought of as trustworthy indi-viduals or types. This is to say, there can be trust only inside the societalcommunity. If norms and values created by the societal community definethe limits of its membership, thus, they also define the limits of trust. We cannot

or at least it is not rational to do so trust outsiders, but only those peoplewho have the same values and goals as we do. This is also the way Luhmann inter-prets Parsons theory of trust. Actually Luhmann concentrates on Parsons (1951)concept of boundary maintaining system and does not directly see his conceptof trust only as a feeling:

It is a basic thesis of systems theory that systems constitute themselves by means ofthe distinction between inner and outer and maintain themselves by stabilizing thisboundary. If we conceive rationality in the sociological sense as systems rationality, itis plausible to seek in this inner/outer distinction a rational criterion for the distinc-

tive location and the joint increase of trust or distrust. (Luhmann, 1979: 90)

In Parsons theory trust is a parallel concept to familiarity. Or, rather, the twoconcepts are nearly synonymous. It is not hereby rational to trust strangers or anypeople who do not have the same values, goals or even culture as ours. This kind




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of internal condition of trust increases the likelihood of a particular type of trusttowards something. But what is the aim of trust?

As Luhmann (1979: 27) notes, Parsons concept of trust (as well as distrust)

. . . is an affective (non-neutral) and diffuse (non-specific) attitude, according tothe way in which an object is presented, as particular (non-universal) and ascribed(not achieved). In conclusion, this means that trust cannot be neutral, becausethere can be trust only between familiar people (we do not trust strangers). There-fore, trust is also spread because of familiarity. We already know, or feel, the foun-dation of trust, or the people who are and who are not reliable. Thus, inParsons model, the only form of trust is particular not general and it is alsoascribed because it functions as a crucial element of mutual interaction. Therelationship of trust to an object is independent of specific individual interestsand contexts of experience. Therefore, we can say, in Parsons theory trust is afeeling or attitude based on familiarity and common culture, but activated onlyby making decisions. Or, as Luhmann (1979: 27) puts it, trust is an attitude

which is neither objective nor subjective; it is not transferable to other objects orto other people who trust. This kind of attitude or feeling is affecting only ourmind.

Being this kind of attitude, trust has to be learned. Therefore, trust is also partof socialization. As noted above, socialization does not occur by itself, but two ofthe most important institutions behind it are the family and school. Here we havea clear connection between Parsons and Luhmann. According to Luhmann

(1979: 28), learning how to trust is part of the socialization of the family. InParsonsian language, it could be said that the family is the subsystem of societythrough which human beings learn the real character of trust. After all, becauseof common values and norms we know the limits of trust, but the subsystemthrough which we learn how and whom to trust, is the family. The aim of trust,then, is to stabilize the changing conditions in societal community. We canconclude that boundaries of system, its particular form and familys socializingrole were important milestones in Parsons theory of trust. These were alsostarting points for the theory of trust developed by Luhmann.

The Dynamics of Autopoietic Systems

As long ago as the early 1960s Luhmann had become convinced that Parsonsstructural functionalism had run its course without fulfilling its theoreticalpromise; but also without exhausting the potential inherent in the prospect of asociological functionalism. One of Luhmanns most important ambitions was tocreate a theory whose aim was to reconstruct, not to eliminate, the growing

complexity of a system. This was where his theory of trust came into play. Beforesaying more about trust, we need to look at the basic facts of closed systemstheory which has been presented as a solution for the biggest problem of opensystems theory, namely the interaction between a system and its environment.




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The Autopoietic Solution of Systems Theory

In the core of closed systems theory are the self-organization and the self-produc-tion of a system. What is essential for a system is how it produces and reproduces

itself through its own elements. Humberto Maturana and Francesco Varela(1980) called this process autopoiesis. The concept of autopoiesis situates self-reference on every level; it pertains to all units or elemental components of asystem. Autopoietic systems reproduce all the components of which they consistby means of a network of these components themselves and in this way distin-guish them from their environment.

Maturana and Varela (1980) developed the concept of autopoiesis to charac-terize living organisms, in other words, as a biological concept. Autopoieticsystems are at the same time open and closed systems; open because they are

influenced by their environment, but also closed because environment does notdirectly influence the structure and elementary processes of the systems.

The extension of this concept to other fields and other types of systems wasquickly taken into consideration. One of the authors taking the lead in this regard

was Niklas Luhmann. Luhmann (1984; 1995) adapted the idea of autopoiesis tosocial, psychic and organic systems. All systems have their own elements, whichreproduce themselves. Abstracted from biological connotations, Luhmannsconcept leads to a sharp distinction between meaning and life as different kindsof autopoietic organizations. We shall here concentrate only on the former.

The meaning-using systems have to be distinguished according to whetherthey use consciousness or communication as modes of meaning-based reproduc-tion (Luhmann, 1986a: 173). The most important mode for social systems iscommunication. It is the basic form of the autopoietic reproduction of socialsystems. With regard to the basic form of psychic systems (human beings), repro-duction is consciousness (thoughts). How does communication in social systemsfunction?

Luhmanns conception of communication differs considerably from thetraditional senderreceiver model. For Luhmann, the traditional concept, ormore specifically the metaphor of transmission, is useless because it seems tooontological. The development of society has not been as causal as this modelassumes. We are rather to understand communication as a synthesis and process-ing of three different and independent choices or selections: information, utter-ance and understanding. In information it is a matter of what we utter, inutterance how we utter it and in understanding the separation of uttered infor-mation from the way we utter it. Understanding consists of the communicativeactions through which the receiver reacts to the message. Therefore, communi-cation is an emergent, three-part unity and the processing of information.

For Luhmann (unlike Parsons), social systems consist of communicative

processes, not of human beings. Human beings are a part of the environment ofa social system. Human beings are not bound by social roles, norms and struc-tures, but they are rather psychical and organizational entities:




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One does not locate society inside individuals but between them. Society exists onlywhen individuals communicate. Until they begin to communicate, individuals are notin society. And when they do communicate when they do participate in society individuals do so to a very limited extent, never as whole persons. The limits of society

are established by the limits of communication. All that is not communicated remainsoutside of society. (Lee, 2000: 322)

There is, however, a connection between psychic and social systems: both areradically temporal. The elements of the systems vanish immediately after theirappearance. In other words, elements are continually replaced by other elements(different communication, different thoughts). Due to this constant change thereis always a lack of balance between these different systems and direct connectionbetween them is impossible.

On the other hand, the temporal characteristic allows for a high degree ofcongruence between social and psychic systems. Social systems can properlyassume that psychic systems experience and know what has been communicated.That is to say, the actions of psychic systems (thoughts of an individual) are moreor less influenced by ongoing communication. This is possible because humanbeings are acting in an environment set by social systems and communication istaking place in an environment consisting of psychic systems. We can observe theessential nature of the other and listen to his communication, but we could notknow his real thoughts, his inner being. And, of course, All communicationdepends on its environment as a source of information, and every communi-

cation indisputably refers via meaning references directly or indirectly to thesystems environment (Luhmann, 1995: 144). Without temporality there wouldnot be any congruence. However, a direct connection is impossible.

When talking about connections between social and psychic system we mustnot forget the main idea of autopoietic systems. As Luhmann (1995: 215) notes:

To be sure, interpenetrating systems converge in individual elements that is, theyuse the same one but they give each of them a different selectivity and connectivity,different pasts and futures . . . The elements signify different things in the participatingsystems, although they are identical as elements: they select among different possi-

bilities and lead to different consequences.To conclude, closed systems avoid the fundamental problem (direct connectionbetween system and environment) of open ones by the concept of autopoiesis.System and environment remain separated, neither of them tries to control theother. Communication does not try to achieve the level of thoughts and viceversa. Or, as Luhmann (1995: 144) notes, There can be no environmental corre-late for communication. The unity of communication corresponds to nothing inthe environment.

Control and Socialization

The concept of systems and the idea of systems theory are certainly entangledwith modern societys attempt to monitor and control itself (Baecker, 2001: 59).Therefore, the system theoretical approach could always be seen as modern. One




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of the classics of systems theory, Norbert Wiener, emphasizes in his bookCyber-netics: or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Man (1961) theimportance of relationship between communication and control. The central

point of the book is simple: control cannot be mentioned without speaking ofcommunication. As a matter of fact, control is communication and can only besuccessful to the extent that communication is successful (Wiener, 1961; Baecker,2001: 59).

For Parsons, norms and values produced by societal community were enoughto control interaction and communication between human beings. Or actually,because of linguistic codes, human beings could make communicationaldecisions (Parsons, 1966: 201). In Luhmanns theory the concept of control isnot as simple as for Wiener or Parsons. Due to autopoiesis, control can be onlyself-control:

An important structural consequence that inevitably results from the construction ofself-referential systems deserves particular mention. This is abandoning the idea ofunilateral control. There may be hierarchies, asymmetries or differences in influence,but no part of the system can control others without itself being subject to control.(Luhmann, 1995: 36)

Therefore, every social system determines itself the structure of its control. Thesystem is the white box that emerges from two interacting black boxes(Glanville, 1982). These black boxes are the whole and the environment. Accord-

ing to Dirk Baecker (2001: 601) we can explain the functions of control in twoways:

System has a higher reflective power than the whole, which encompassessystem and environment, because the system alone knows about the degreesof freedom it eliminates.

Only system knows the reasons why these degrees of freedom have to beeliminated.

However, it is too simplistic to say (as Wiener does) that control is communi-cation. This is not the case. We would rather suggest that the knowledge of howto control communication emerges through communication. This kind of know-ledge can be called social control or communicative control of social systems. AsLuhmann (1995: 445) notes:

Communication is correspondingly coded as a (positively or negatively interpreted)proposal of meaning, which can be understood or not understood, accepted orrejected. The control of this doubling and especially this negativity of not under-standing or rejecting unfolds recursively and thus already determines the selection ofthe proposal whether the proposal aims at agreement or conflict. Thus a knowledgeof how to estimate what can be understood emerges.

In system theoretical reflection control and self-observation demand also thesupport of socialization. It is the process, steered by communication, thatforms the psychic system and the bodily behaviour of human beings (Luhmann,1995: 241). Socialization is, therefore, psychic systems equivalent to the




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communicative control of social systems. It is psychic systems means of addingpredictability and reducing complexity. Socialization shapes, but it does notcontrol, the thoughts of a human being. It has rules, norms and habits different

from those of control. That is to say, control and socialization have different kindsof conditionalities.Thinking about psychic systems, we have to notice that each of them has

different norms, rules and habits, for example, every human being has differentappearance and thoughts. That is to say, in Luhmanns systems theory there is nonormative centre of the kind that societal community is in Parsons theory. Butas noted before, human beings (in closed systems) are in a way freer thancommunicative actors who have to act under social control. Comparing the func-tions between socialization and communication, this greater level of freedomfinds an important role. Raf Vanderstraeten (2000: 58990) interpretsLuhmanns view of socialization in the following way:

Socialization can only be self-socialization. The psychic system is a closedtemporal system. Therefore, it is always unique and different. Every system hasits own elements (norms, rules and habits), which are constantly changing theirform. In different systems these elements have always somehow differentmeanings. Elements signify different things, while they select from differentpossibilities and lead to different consequences. Socialization is always deviant,always self-socialization.

Socialization inevitably reiterates the option between conforming and deviant

behaviour. Socialization does not create norms and rules. Weighting social selec-tions, there is only two alternatives: familiar one (conform) or risk-based option(deviant). This is possible because of the relative freedom of psychic systems. One

way to lead human beings to make right selections is education. Education,according to Luhmann and Schorr (1988), is an activity of social systems special-izing in people processing. But education itself is in contrast to socialization a communicative activity, and displays the characteristics of social systems. Itdefines the constant values of socialization and thus reduces the risk-based selec-tions of human beings.

The System Theoretical Role of Trust

As we have seen, Luhmann separates psychic (human beings) and social(communication) systems. This is important when we examine the role of trustin his systems theory. Trust is not identical in social and psychic systems. Becausethey are autopoietic, they also have different structures of trust.

In Luhmanns theory there are two different observers. One is the ego, or egos,

that is, conscious (physical) systems. The other type of observer is social systems.These systems observe via communication, while conscious systems observe viacognition. What happens, either through a cognitive act or a communicativeevent, is that something, through a distinction, is the centre of either cognitive orcommunicative attention (Luhmann, 1992: 98; Arnoldi, 2001: 5). For Luhmann,




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trust is a general communicative medium, and therefore trust has to do with socialsystems. But does trust also have something to do with psychic systems?

Trust as System Theoretical Communication

Luhmann wrote only two works dealing directly with trust: Vertrauen (1968[English trans. 1979]) and Familiarity, Confidence, Trust. Problems and Alterna-tives (1988). However, the notion of trust is thematically very significant inLuhmanns theory:

Trust (Vertrauen), in broadest sense of confidence in ones expectations, is a basic factof social life. In many situations, of course, man can choose in certain respects whetheror not to bestow trust. But a complete absence of trust would prevent him even from

getting up in the morning. (Luhmann, 1979: 4)Trust is something that we can affect. The necessity of trust can be regarded alsoas an appropriate starting point for the derivation of rules for proper conduct,or, how to act successfully in the world of complexity and uncertainty (Luhmann,1979: 4). As a matter of fact, it is this complexity and uncertainty that create theneed for trust. Where there is trust, there are increased possibilities for experi-ence and action, there is an increase in the complexity of the social system andalso in the number of possibilities which can be reconciled with its structure,because trust is an effective form of reducing complexity (Luhmann, 1979: 8).

Luhmann separates concepts of trust and confidence quite clearly. Trust is acommunicative medium that reduces complexity. According to Luhmann (1979:423) communicative trust has three bases:

The process of trust demands mutual commitment and can only be put tothe test by both sides becoming involved in it, in a fixed order: First, thetruster and, then, the trustee.

The participants must know the exact situation and they must know fromone another that each one knows it. The building up of trust thereforedepends on easily interpretable situations and not least, for that reason, onthe possibility of communication (the rule of situation).

It is not possible to demand the trust of others; trust can only be offered andaccepted.

What can we conclude from these qualities? What does Luhmann really meanwhen he talks about mutual commitment? Building of trust requires always atleast two actors and because of this, mutual commitment is an absolute precon-dition for trust. How does the rule of situation (what we can call Luhmannssecond quality of communicative trust) work? The actors, who engage in the

process of trust, must recognize the situations that have to do with trust. Thebuilding of this process is dependent on easily interpretable situations and thepossibilities of communication. It is also not possible to demand the trust ofothers, but only the iniator may confer trust, or perhaps utilize an opportunityraised by chance to show himself to be trustworthy (Luhmann, 1979: 43).




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However, communicative trust is not enough to explain wider trust processes.Social reality (unlike social systems) is not only dependent on communication,but also on institutions and psychic and organic systems. In addition to

communicative elements, there must be also other ways to build trust. This iswhere confidence or system trust comes to play.

Confidence as a Part of Psychic Systems

Following Luhmann, behind system trust, or confidence (the two terms are hereused synonymously), functions a tactical and supportive perspective. Anyone

who trusts in a system basically assumes that the system is functioning and placeshis trust in that function, not in people (Luhmann, 1979: 50). If system trust

functions supportively, it is advantageous to both individuals and the system (aswell as to communicative actors). In the modern world communicative trustcannot work alone, but because of changing conditions we need also confidenceor system trust to reduce complexity:

Essential structures and territorially bound cultural entities are largely displaced bytime-limited entities such as fashion and style. These new conditions of access andtemporal pressure, of opportunity and dependence, of openness and lack of inte-gration, change the relation between confidence and trust. Trust remains vital in inter-personal relations, but participation in functional systems like economy or politics is

no longer a matter of personal relations. It requires confidence, but no trust.(Luhmann, 1979: 102)

Trust, then, involves communication between (at least) two communicativeactors. These actors are observers of social systems. Trust is, just like control, ameans of reducing complexity. We could draw a parallel between trust andcontrol. Because of rapid communicative changes, absorbing the codes of trustis often difficult. The abiding process of trust does not grow in a minute, but isthe result of continuous communicative processes.

Confidence, in turn, is an element of psychic systems. It has different norms,

rules and structure than trust. Confidence builds up largely on the level ofthoughts. That is to say, only egos, not communicative actors, could have or buildconfidence. Socialization shapes our confidence. We can, therefore, say thattogether socialization and confidence reduce complexity and balance the system.

According to Luhmann (1979: 50), system trust is easier to acquire thancommunicative trust but, on the other hand, it is much more difficult to control.This may be because human beings and their thoughts are freer than communi-cation. We cannot know the thoughts of others but their communication isperceivable. It is this invisibility of confidence that makes it so difficult to control.

It seems that Luhmanns concept of confidence has many of the same qualitiesas Parsons concept of trust. Because socialization shapes confidence, it must havesome cultural characters. As noted above, what Parsons calls trust, and what wehave, following Luhmann, called confidence, are something that has to belearned. Besides being an element of psychic systems, confidence has to be also




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some kind of background noise of social systems or trust. The existence of confi-dence hereby affects an actors abilities to trust, or at least, facilitates his willing-ness to turn to trust situations.

Are there, then, other connections between trust and confidence? As notedabove, behind confidence functions a tactical and supportive perspective and itcould also bring some relief to the situation of trust. Without these qualities ofconfidence, then, it would be impossible to trust anybody. We have to alsoremember that trust is part of communication (social systems) and confidence ispart of thoughts (psychic systems). Thus, there must be some temporal connec-tion and congruence between them. Trust hereby needs confidence, but confi-dence also needs trust.

To conclude, if we want to research the role of trust in modern society, confi-dence plays only a supporting part. The explanation for this conclusion is simple:if we agree with Luhmann, that society consists only of communication, insociety there is no space for confidence. Of the two, only trust is the communi-cative medium. Therefore, it is socially more important to examine the relationsbetween trust, control and society. Confidence, of course, does not disappearanywhere, but from a sociological point of view trust seems more important.Confidence affects our thoughts and is a product of our thoughts. Furthermore,it affects indirectly also communication and its capabilities to add trust andreduce complexity. But only through trust the controlling of modern society ispossible in a perceivable way.

Imaginary Trust and the New Social Order

Before going in greater depth into the role of trust in the Luhmannian theory offuture societies, we should outline some picture of society and its limits. As notedabove, in the Luhmannian conception, society exists only when individualscommunicate and the limits of society are established by the limits of communi-cation. According to Helmut Willke (1993), society is an imaginary institutionthat no one has seen but everyone talks about, and it exists, in fact, only because

we do talk about it. The role of society takes shape in the structural wholenessand interaction of the social world where it appears (Kangas, 2001: 378).Against the self-illusion of profession, sociological knowledge is nothing morethan a desperate attempt to know about the non known (Willke, 1993: 83).

Willkes idea is suitable also for describing the character and limits of trust.No one has seen it, everyone talks about it and there could be no trust withoutcommunication. Moreover, trust is also linked to desperation and uncertainty.

We do not need it in certain and constant situations, but in unfamiliar anddeviant situations. Therefore, we could say that the concept of trust, like that of

a society, is imaginary. Or, as Guido Mllering (2001: 409) puts it, Luhmannsconcept of trust rests on illusion. Imaginary trust functions as one element anda medium of communication in imaginary institutions and society.

The concept of trust is an important part of sociological knowledge. Byaddressing the conditions of trust, its artificiality and contingency, sociology can




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provide new perspectives for the examination of reflexive society. This would nothave been necessary, or even possible, in the normative society of yesterday risksand uncertainty have created new possibilities for the sociology of trust.

Luhmann (1993: 259) notes that the function of sociology is to release thepossibilities of self-observation of a society, which are not bound to theconventional limits of functional systems. Confidential action and communi-cation are one way to release this kind of observation and escape the control offunction systems. Trust is an important medium of the self-description of society.It is based on daily actions and it has certain functions but the action possibilitiesof trust are not limited. Therefore, it can reduce complexity and be imaginary.That is to say, trust could reduce the imaginary complexity produced by imagin-ary institutions. After all, Luhmann perceives trust as functionally rational butepistemologically and ontologically transcendental (Mllering, 2001: 409).

But what about the relationship between trust and social order? How is socialorder built into Luhmanns theory? Luhmann solves the problem of social order

with the help of behaviour expectations. More precisely, social order is based onestablished behaviour expectations between persons (Kangas, 2001: 138). Theseexpectations can be established in several ways. They are not bound to sharednorms or values: on the contrary, norms and values themselves are based on theseexpectations. Therefore, the whole social order is based on structures of expec-tations. In Luhmanns view (1983; 1984), this means that actors have becomeindifferent: communication is not based on commonly accepted values or

purposes, but only on the expectations of other persons reactions.Trust also depends on the expectations that the truster places on the reactions

of the trustee. Luhmann (1979: 25) describes the rationale for action based ontrust as . . . a movement towards indifference: by introducing trust, certain possi-bilities of development can be excluded from consideration. In the reflexivesociety, where norms and values are not stable, trust assumes an important rolein building the social order. This is because social order based on shared valuesand norms becomes very improbable. Or, as Luhmann (1984: 14890)concludes, the value consensus plays only a peripheral role in modern society. To

summarize, in Luhmanns theory, trust is an effort to know about the non-known, one way to answer the challenges of the imaginary society. Or, asLuhmann (1979: 26) notes, trust is a blending of knowledge and ignorance. Itcould even be seen as one the most important elements of indifferent communi-cation of modern society.

Trust in Todays Society

Until the 1960s, the social sciences focused on the communication of social

experiences. Culture, norms and values were at the core of research. It is nosurprise that this concept lost its central theoretical position when processes ofchange became the focus of concern to the social sciences (Vanderstraeten, 2000:595). As Luhmann (1975: 920) notes, a strong emphasis on the importance ofvalues, norms and solidarity is in contradiction with the idea of functional




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differentation. Systems theory was a way of taming the wild modern change.Luhmanns theory provided us at least with a framework in which a theoreticallycontrolled reconceptualization of controlled change and socialization are

possible.Systems theory is a way of reconstructing the growing complexity. The way inwhich human beings and societies are developing is bound to the developmentof systems (the development of communication and thoughts). Risks haveincreased and changed their forms. This has also created new challenges tosystems theory. Control and socialization are not enough to guarantee thecontrollability of society. In Luhmanns theory, trust and confidence are theanswers to this dilemma. We could even say: where control ends, trust begins.Or, in other words, we do not have to care about the knowledge of how to controlcommunication, if we trust.

One thing that is certain is that Parsons perspective of trust is not adequatein todays world. As Seligman (1997: 16) notes, Parsons heroic attempt tosystematize and generalize the implications of trust rested on the collectivecognizance of the sacred individuality of each member. This solution to themodern problem of trust was no solution. Therefore, one of Parsons biggest

weaknesses is the connection he makes between trust and familiarity. If trust is afeeling based on familiarity, it means that the more trust there is, the less there issuspicion, questions, wondering and reflexivity. This kind of conception of trustdoes not help us understand the problems of todays society.

Surely we have to admit, that Luhmanns way of describing the function oftrust, as well as society, is quite peculiar. According to Luhmann (1990: 6236),the conditions of scientific discourse are the differentation of society and thedisengagement of a scientific subsystem. This is the reason that makes Luhmannsterminology so uncolloquial and reduces the amount of potential readers whoreally understand his theory. If we do not accept Luhmanns idea of autopoieticsystems, we cannot accept his theory of trust either. For example, the foundingfathers of autopoiesis, Maturana and Varela, did not accept Luhmanns theory ofautopoietic social systems. According to them, social institutions are closed but

not autopoietic.After all, it is difficult to say what society, system and trust really mean.

Also, it is not easy to adapt Luhmanns ideas of trust to his systems theory becausehe created the theory of trust about fifteen years before his autopoietic systemstheory. On the other hand, the less we understand about the functions and repro-duction of society or systems, the more we try to examine and explain them. Thesame may be true of the theory of trust. In any case, Luhmann provides us withan adequate way of examining the controllability of society. In his systems theorytrust is a functional element or medium of reducing complexity. The degree to

which our own behaviour, in spite of social dependencies, is thought to have animpact on our future state, has varied considerably in the course of history(Luhmann, 1988: 98). We seem to live in a time when the dependence ofsocietys future on decision making has increased (Luhmann, 1994: xii; see alsoSztompka, 1999: 11). Thus, we have moved from societies based on fate to those




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moved by human agency. In order to face the future actively and constructively,we need to deploy trust. Because trust is a medium, it does not have limits. Trustis, then, a functional part of indifferent whole something without which we

really cannot get up in the morning. But with it we can get up and gain an oppor-tunity to act successfully in the world of complexity and uncertainty.

Conclusion

The aim in this article was to describe Niklas Luhmanns theory of trust and toshow its connections to his autopoietic systems theory. However, it would besociologically incorrect to deliberate Luhmanns theory of trust without the influ-ences of Talcott Parsons theory. This is because Parsons ideas played a signifi-cant role in the development of Luhmanns theory of trust as well as his wholesystem theoretical thinking. On the other hand, it would also be impossible todescribe the functions of trust in todays society without knowing the basics ofLuhmanns autopoietic systems theory. Autopoietic system theory was Luhmannsanswer to the considerable problem of open systems theory: the interactionbetween a system and its environment.

Some conclusions emerge from these summarized notions. First, trust basedon norms and values cannot work alone in todays world. This kind of Parson-

sian trust is keenly bound to the functions of normative professions and thefamilys socializing role. Trust could not be learned because it is not a part offamiliarity but a part of unforeseen events and risk taking.

Furthermore, in Luhmanns theory trust is a part of communication andhereby a part of social systems. Its basic function is to reconstruct or reduce socialcomplexity. Confidence, instead, is a part of thoughts and psychic systems. It isnot as intensively bound on mutuality and the rule of situation as trust. Butbecause of their temporal character, trust needs confidence and vice versa. Thatis to say, without the tactical and supportive perspective of confidence, it would

be more difficult to trust anybody. But without communication there would beno visible forms of trust.

Finally, because of the expeditious change of norms and values the role of trusthas been emphasized in todays society. The motivation to trust is influenced bythe challenges of the risk society. We do not need trust in a familiar world but inthe world where control (certainty) is not enough. Positive (family, societalcommunity, etc.) as well as negative control (forcible measures) are not the only

ways of reacting to the dilemma of growing complexity. In order to be able tocommunicate and think through future expectations, we need trust and confi-

dence. If we accept the view of society as an imaginary institution, trust expec-tations come to play an important role. The ambivalence of todays society makesus confront the need of trust.




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Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Rudolf Stichweh, Klaus Japp, Risto Ersaari, KeijoRahkonen and Tuomas Yl-Anttila for their comments.

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Janne Jalava is a researcher and PhD Student in the Department of Social

Policy, University of Helsinki, Finland. He has also worked as a visiting researcher

in the University of Bielefeld, Institut fr Weltgesellschaft, Germany. His work is in

the field of systems theory and theory of trust. Address: Department of Social

Policy, University of Helsinki, POBox 18 (Snellmaninkatu 10), FIN-00014 Universityof Helsinki, Finland. [email: [email protected]]


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From Norms to Trust