From Department of State Operations Center

8/14/2019 From Department of State Operations Center

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.. '! .... '-: FROM DEPARTMENT OF STATE OPERATIONS CENTER UNE:E;.NSS r F l ~ - r f ' 1e:9 l/NO. 3700000831 P 2SECRETINODIS

TaskerRELEASED IN PARTB6 : ~ . ~ .:/A

Paper J)ue: OODWednesday, 26 September 2001< W . ~ l I F A X PAPERS TOSTATElSlWCl AMB. ~ R O S P E R }

Discussion Meeting: Time TBD, Wednesday, 26 September 2001I. Per the rwG meeting on 21 September, papers will bedrafted onthe benefits and. limitations ofeachof the fOUT judicial mechanisms below:1.Federal District CourtsDOl r--- '---sharewithStatelL ~ L . . - - _2. U.S. Military CourtsDOD3. Unilateral U,S.1vfilitary CommissionDOD.-share.with D ~ StatelL _

StatelS-..,.-------4, Multilateral (Military) Commission/Court

StatelSI\VCI -r . I....sharewithSWelL4. DODPress Guidance.being draftedby:State/SIWCINSCOLe wi1l review the finished papers.

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DECAPTIONED

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n. To be discussed at 26 SeptembermeMing: Policy andpragmatic considerations inpursu ing prosecution under above options and diplomatic approaches. .. . .

SBCRETINODISClassified by Ambassador Pierre-Richard ProsperforReasons 1.5 (d)UNITED STATESDEPARTMENTOF STATE Declassify on 09121/1)REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES L DARISCLASSIFIGATION: UNCLASSIFIEDDATE/CASEID: 0 4 ~ O V 2 0 0 9 200908948 UNCLASSIFIED

Released on

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ALL FBI 1NFOIUlATIOH COlITAINEDHEREIN 13 UNCLASSIfIEDDATE 10-05-2009 DY 65179 DMHiHJS

TO:STUART LEVEY

CmusWRAY

JACKG6tDSlvfiTH

I.NlT1ALS DATE

k ~ e l i v e r e d thisdocumentto me,an 1wanted you tohavea copy. b6 P8R FBIb7C

FROM:CHUCK ROSENBERG

CHIEFOFSTAFF.1 0

TlmDEPUTY AnoRNEY GENERALRooM 4216RFKI I

1100980


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DECLA3SIFIED BY 65179 DUH/HJ3ON 10-0.5-2009

(Rev.08-28-2000>~ / O R C O N / N O F 6 R N

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONb6b7c

05/30/2003ate:A / S C i ~ - - 1. CTOR - tA/UC lMIiDUMarionE. Bowman,Senior Counsel f or Nati onalSecuri ty Af fai rsSAC Hector M. P e s ~ e r a ;ASh0 C. Fra Figl iuzzi ;SSAL JAttn:

Attn:

Attn:

MiamiGeneral Counsel

To: Counterterrorism-Preoedence: ROUTINE

From:. 'CIRGB ~ h a v i o r a l . t l l f ~ . . ; ' ) C J ; : i . u Z - J . . L , L L , , I , , j , , . . . . l . . ~ . l o L . L . --.Con1:aot.: SSAApproved By:

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(U) . GTMO-INTEL. ,. . . ' ' .GUANTAIg40 B . A , ~ , : e ~ 1 \ .. OO:MtAMIMAJOR Cl\SE 188

." Synopsis: ' (U) . To document BAU ass is tance and chailenges encoun tere,d" ~ ' ' : ' ; ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 1 ' ' , . , . ~ durlng.. : . . T P X : i 5 G l s s i g n m e n j ; ; ~ ~ n , , , G u a n . t a p a m b ..Bay.; . ; t G ~ 9 J ~ . " 1 . : - ~ ~ ' ~ ' : . ~ 0:....:.. {.:;...::., :." ,'...:;. -,. ~ / O R C O N / N O F O R N

. , ~ . l I ... " ' ~ o , 1 ~ l f . " ' \ ~ m t . . . , I f ' ..." J ! ~ ~ ~ ' W - ' ~ ~ ~ ~ X f I f t ~ ~ f I l 7 . ~ ~ \ ' ~ t 1 : ; a l r ~ " : ' ~ ~ ~ ~ , < ! ~

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/6/09


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b6b7C

G.R.

~ / O R C O N / N O F O R NTo: Counterterrorism From: CrRGRe: (U) 2 6 5 A - M M ~ C 9 9 1 0 2 f 05/30/2003

. 3_ (LES) FBI (BAU) Let ter ,forwarded t9f Major G e n e r ~ l (MGEN)Miller f Commander, Jo in t Task Force-170 o n . 1 1 / 2 ~ / 2 0 0 2 .(U) - 4: P ' U. S i Army Legal Brie' f on Proposed Counter-Resistance.S t ~ ~ i e s f 10/15/2002.

5. (LES) Legal Analysis of Interrogation Techniques by SSA II IFBI (BAU')., ---(U ) -.6 . _. DHS In.terroga t ion . P l ~ l l for Detainee :ff63, 11/22/20'02.

7. ( L ~ S ) FBI(BAU)/CITF ~ n t e r r o g a t i o n Plan fo r Detainee #63,11/22/2002. '(u ) ...... 8 " ' ~ R e ~ i e w of JTF-iTMO Interrogation Plan by l111'2212002. 1 .- _

9. ~ L E S ) Let te r from'FBI GTMO Supervisor/BAU to M G E ~ Miller re : Video'Teleconference on 11/21/20'02..10 . (LES) Draft of C ~ T F Memorandum For JTF-GTMO/J2, 12/17/2002.1J. . (LES) Draft Memorandum For. Record, 11 J ~ g g r e s s i v e In ' terrogationHistorical Record,u 01/15/2003.

. ..12. (4ES:' FBI ( B ~ t H :il:nter.view n o t e ~ . : s ; ~ : De:tainee'-# 682, . ll/.22 /2'002.. '. , I' .... '.b6{U) .. .. D e t . a ; L l s ~ .. During the TOY assignments of SSA I I \)"lC

, . (10/27 / 2 0 c r 2 ~ 1 2 / 0 6 ' / 2 0 0 2 ) and SSA I I (11/07-2002-12/18./2002) I" ~ : ' " \ : . - ~ i ~ ~ ~ ~ \ ~ ~ l I - a ; ; ~ . < ; > ~ ) & ~ a n t ~ a m o . , ~ ~ a y , ~ , / ( GTMpt'., .. several . d i s c ~ ~ ~ ion.;; . \ w e ~ ~ ; . . p . ~ l ~ . ~ t : - ~ : . ~ , s . ~ r { ~ $ . f I U i : . n ~ . : I " , , ~ , ~ ,~ ' : : - : ' ; ' . ' 1 . ; t 1 ~ ~ " t h e hnost \;'e f fect'i v e ' ~ - : m e a n : S l,-of .'conduct.Lnq : ' i ~ n t e r V ~ e w s '="6 f :det'aJ.iiees : 1 ; i ~ ~ T h e s e t . . . .. ,,'.. . ,. olscussions were 'prompted by t he r ecogn it ion tha t members o'f:the .... ~ . . ; , ..Defense Intel l igence Agency's (DIA) Defense Humint Services (DBS)were being encouraged a t times to use aggressive interrogation tacticsin GTMO which are of qUestionable e f f e c t i v ~ n e s s and subject to .uncertain interpretat ion based on law ana regUlation. Not only arethese. t ac t ic s a t od9S with legally p e r m ~ s s i b l e interviewing techniquesused by u.s. law e n f b r c ~ e n t a g ~ n c i e s in the United Sta tes , but theyare being employed by personnel il l GTMO Who appear to have l i t t-le, i fany, experience el ici t ing information for jud ic ia l purposes_ Thecontinued USe of these techniques has the potent ial of negatively. . ' impacting. future interviews by FBI agents as they ,attempt. to ga1;.her

; : . : t ~ ! ~ ~ ~ " : i n t e l 1 i g ' e n c e ~ a n d 'prepare :.cases ' for prosecution.': ' . ;: '.'" , : ~ ' ~ ' ~ ; : : ' / ' , i : ' \ ~ ~ ~ : : l ' t " " " i l " : i , , ' { : ; " ; ,... ~ ,... -I ~ ~ . . . . ..... ..

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~ / O R C O N l N O F O ~To:. Counterterrorism From: CIRGR e (U) 2 6 5 A - M M ~ C 9 9 1 0 2 , 05./30/2003

(U) The interrogation t ~ c h I i . i q u e s taught by DHS to militaryinterrogators in GTMO come from a U.s. Ar.my Field Manual (#34-52)ent i t led "Intelligence Interrogation," (Encl 1) and from tact ics usedin u ~ s . Army Search, Escape, R e s i s t h n c ~ and Evasion (SERE) t ~ a i n i n g (Enel 2) to prepare' mili tary personnel to r e s i s t in terrogation in th eevent they are t aken prf soner by the enemy.,Although SERE techniqUesmay be effect ive in e li ci ti n g t a ct ic a l intel l igence in a batt lefie ldcontext , the re l iab i l i ty of i n f o ~ a t i o n obt ai ned using such tact ics ishighly q u e s t i o n ~ b l e , not to mention potent ial ly l ~ g a l l y inadmissiblein court. .b6b7CU) ... . . . ... SSAS l ~ - - l with the concurrence of BAUmanagement, argued for the use of a rapport-based approach ininterrogations (Encl 3 ), p oin tin g out th e succe ss of the FBI in

el ic i t ing infor.mation f ~ o m host i le and recalc i t rant i ~ d i v i d u a l s i previous terror ism investigations. Unfortunately, . these arguments weremet witli considerable skepticism and resistance by ' senior DRSofficials in GTMO, despi te several .attempts ,to c o n y ~ n c e themotherWise. Nonetheiess, the"DHS have falsely claimed t ha t ths BAU hashelped to develop and suppor t DRS I.S in te r roga t ion plans.(U) During t h e i r TDY assignmentr, SSAs' I IandCJ ke .p t . .'the BAU apprized of detai ls of ' the abovecontroversy. Additionally, ?Othey offered ~ n t e r v i e w i n g assistance and 'provided training on . ~ 7 interrogation methods to F ~ I / C I T F personnel .... ...., .......'.... .. / ... '" .' 1 ,. .' . ... . .t 'U) .. . (sc( Orl 121Q2120'02, " ~ ~ A I : : : : J sen't s e v ~ ; ; a l documencs via e- ,'.. ~ ~ c :mail to unitChief l :j BAU,' Quantico, 'who advised he wouldforward them to Marion Bowman, Legal Counsel, FBIHQ. These documents

.... .: included a l e t te r to the JTF-170 Coromanaing Genera l , Major General.'; ~ . 1 ) ; " ~ ; ~ ~ . 5 ; k 1 - , ( M G E N ) ~ ' : V : .G : ~ J ' l M i l l e r . ~ , ( Encl, \.;3 )~ ; ~ ~ a : U '61S ;," ,Army '"Legal Brief O!1: )?,J::qposed,.', " 1 ' i . t ' ~ ~ r . f . . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ o u P t E t ~ ; : R e s ' f ; ~ r t ~ c e : ; < r s t l ! a ' t e ~ f e ~ " ~ : l i p p E ~ i n g " the use r 0 f : a f . i ~ F e ~ ' S ive ;"';','.'. ., ' . ~ , . " , ,\7olo inter-ragat ion' techniques (Enel' 4) ,.. :'and .a Legal Analysis" 0 f ..' ,. Inter rogat ion Techniques ( E n < : : ~ 5) l;>y SSAI :I '.

(U) : ~ i s noteworthy' t h ~ t the 'case agent in GTMO, SA ~ ~ I : J and senior off ic ia ls from t he C rim inal I n v e s t ~ g a t i v eTask Force ('CITF), who have been involved in GTMO s ince the beginning,. concur with the BAU's approacn to interrogation. Among those most. " ~ u p p o r t i v e o such methods i I I. C h i ~ f P S ~ C : O l O r i s t. with the Nayal ~ r i m i n a l I n v e ~ t i g a t i v e . s e r v ~ c e ~ N C I S ) : L hasbeen an a d v ~ s o r ' to the CITF.1n ~ T M O S2nce ~ t s ' 2 n c e p t 2 0 n an as.. "''' ';' ' ' ' ;/ re:eatr l lY argued fo r implemE\ntation of a ..rapport-based approach.:... : ' : ; : ' f ' ; : J ' : F ~ : ~ r t t ~ : l a m ~ n t e d ...tha t '"many DB;S : interrogators seem to ' b e l . r e v f ? , ~ : . t h a t : fne-'

:. . , ..on y way to elic i t" information f:rom uncoopera:cive d e t a i n e ~ s ' is to useaggress ive techniques on them. ....~ . J . I - l f ~ ..~ ~ ...~ ~ I " t \ ~ ~ ~ ~ / ~ R C O N ' / N O , F O R N ~ ~ I J " i ! 5 . ' $ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ...~ W \ Q l . ~ . , t

. . . . t

3

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1,6b7C

)lleftf5i!'ORCON/NOFOBNTo: C o u n t ~ r t e r r o r i s m From: CIRGRe: (U) 265A-MM-C99102, 05/30/2003

(U) .-. ''';- .... ...: The differences between DRS and FBI interrogat iont echniques ana the p o t e n t i a ~ legal 'problems which ~ o u l d arise were'. b6discussed with DHS off ic ia ls . However, they a re adamant th at th eir b7Ci n te r roga tion s t ra t egies are the bes t ones to ~ s despite a ,lack ofevidence of the i r success. The issue regarding the effec t iveness ofDRSls techniques w a s ' ~ p l i f i e d during an awkward'te1econference 'between GTMO and.Pentagon,officials. During th is te leconference, t ~ GTMO o f f i c ~ r overseeing m i l i ~ a r y interrogations, LCOL I -JUSA, b ~ a t a n t 1 y misled the Pentagon into believing t h a t - t ~ h ~ e ~ B ~ A ~ U ~ - endorsed DHSIS aggressive and controversial I n t e r r o g a ~ i o r t Plan (Encl6) for M o ~ a r n m e d ' A l - Qatani, a detainee cqromonlV r y f e r ~ o as #63.Prior to th is video teleconference, SSAs l - _JandL-- j haddiscussed with DHS the advan tages and rat ionale regarding the 'FEllsinter-rogation strategy fo r #63 (Enel 7)/ and'had m a ~ e a v a i l a b ~ e tothem a written' qraft: of this plan.(u) ... . . . . ._.. J:gc( Despite ohi 'ec t jops :r;aised by the BAU as w ~ l l asconcerns art iculated bL j q s n c ~ 8) / the DHS ~ n i t i a t e d ana g g r e s s i v ~ interrogat ion plan for #63. This plan incorporated ac o ~ u s i n g array o f phy si ca l and psychological s t r ~ s s o r s which weredesigned, presumably; to e l i c i t *63 1s cooperation. Needless to say,this plan was eventually abandoned when the DBS realized it was notworking and when #63 had to be hospital ized briefly,

( u ) .......:fx{ The mili tary and DHS J S inaccurate portrayal to t h e 'I ' ,Perttago-n the B,AU had .endorsed and, in f ~ C G t 'helped ,tor c.reate, . . . . . ' ,UHS I S interrogation plan fo r #63 prompted S SA , I SSA 0 and bGthe FBI on-scene TOY operations supervis.or," SSA ----f tosend 'a l e t t e r (Encl 9), to MGEN Mill er c or re ct in g th ese misstatements b7C

, , and requesting an .oppor tuni ty to address ,the matter wi:th MGEN Miller,; . p . : ~ : ' : d : ; n ' : : ~ ' . " ~ ; ' i n per :dn : . ~ ; : : r i n c r . $1 J h s e m l l : n ~ ~ n t e e t i n g ! betw:


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re co rd o f the development o interagency pol ic ies regarding aggressiveinterrogation techniques in GTMO. b6blC(U) . ; . M SSAs I I ' a n d ~ observed tha t DBS personnelhave an a ~ ; r l t a g e over the F ~ as a resu l t of t h ~ i r longer p e r i o d ~ of.deployment. Currently, DHS personnel are deployed fo r s ix months,whereas the FBI on-scene supervisor and in te rv iewing agents areassigned for periods of only 30-45 days. About the t ~ an FBIsupervisor or i nt ervi ew ing agent beg in s to feel comfortable withhis /her surroundings and i s able to establ ish meaningful rapport withdetainees, he/she must prepare to depart GTMO. There are several

~ x a m p l e s in which DRS personnel have awa it ed the d ep artu re o f ~ FBIsupervisor before embarking on aggressiye l uni la te ra l interrogationplans which 1;:hey d n i t haye been endorsed by the FBI. Forth is reason SSA and. suggested to Acting uni t Chief ,(A/UC) t a t the GTMO Task Force consider' extending per iods 'of d e p l o ~ e n t or the on-si te FBI supervisor and for some agentsa . ~ s i g i 1 . e d to conduct i n t e r v : i e w ~ ..

(U)w ... u ... _'[.g.{ SSAsl ! a ndC]d i s c u s s ed the above issu es notonly w i t h ~ ~ m a n a g e m e n t , but, also with A/ucl I ~ r a v e l e d toGTMO in early December. As par t of h is v i s i t , A I U C L - J p a r t i ~ i p a t e din a second te leconference between MGEN Miller, b is s ta f f and the.Pentagon. During th is te leconference, A/Ue c::J challengeq DHS IS' ~ ~ asser t ion t ha t the FBI had'endorsed DHS's interrogation techniques. 'Tli:i.s . d i s ~ l o s u : v e ~ s t i l r p r i s e ~ .pentagon: o ~ 1 = . i c ~ a l s who' had been.., le .tbelieve that , the FBI and 'DRS were working as a .team.. who.was present a t the Pentagon during this teleconference, a V2se tha the would' follow up on th is ~ s s u e by meeting with senior members of the. Department of Defense (DOD) Legal Counsel to provide further" i ' ~ ; ~ : ~ ' . \ ; . , ; ' . o . . . :: b a c k g r c i u n d . ~ o r i ..: . t h i s , ~ i s s u e :.. . . ; ~ , ; . . . \ : - . , , , : , : ~ ' : ; . : . ~ ~ . , , , ~ , ~ ~ r . i : i ~ ' \ l \ I '. r ' ~ , ~ . : ;, " . ~ . l ( .. : ,\ .; w ~ : ' t '"to ~ ; l " " " ' ' : ' l ; \ ' ' ' ~ \ ' ; ':;"'''''''1.1.

I . ' t . ~ ~ ~ . : " \ _ . ~ . . , . . , . , , ....' \ . ~ ... ~ . . J no ' ~ ~ ' l ~ ~ " Y ~ f f l ' \ I } 4 ' ~ F . 1 . ! ~ ~ ' Y ' : r ~ - ' V ' ; ' l " \ o ~ ~ J r ' ; p ~ ~ ' : " " r l . ~ ~ ~ . \ ~ ~ X \ ( ; . . : :Ut"'"f 1 . . . ~ : f t . : \ f = ". . . ".,.1,: f . ; / . ; . . ~ .... :,,1.. a : l ! i ~ ' ' ' . < f ' r ' t l ~ ~ ~ n ' M ~ ;.. ' ..'. ' . ; . ~ ' . ' J ~ " :(';) ; < ~ ~ ~ n ~ ~ h ~ i r ~ e t u ~ ~ ' ~ ~ b ~ " G ~ o : : ' 'SSAS I ... .' l a ~ ~ l " i'..

bi ie fe the BAU and .provided uni t mempers with copies o f re le vantdocuments. DUring th is br ie f l both expla ined ~ h a t a lt hough they werec o ~ p e l l e d Py t iming and circumstances to devote a considerable amountof' t ime to the above pol icy issues, they were able, n ev er th ele ss , toass i s t agents conducting interviews' and provide tra in in g to F B I / C ~ T Fpersonnel. Of par t icu la r : ;: o rt ance were a ser ies of successfuli n t e r y ~ e w s which SSAI ._ 1conducced with(:. b6I j(known as d e t a ~ n e e 8 ~ ) , who had stopped talking to b7Cinterrogators. u t ~ l i z i n g interviewing t e c h n i q u e s ~ t a u g ~ t by the RAU, .SSAI I was gradually ~ l to re-establ isq a dialogue (Encl 12) . .,. . :. ". ,which":ultimately' lli3q . t ~ : : : t h e .detainee I s renewed c o o p e r a t i . o n : . f ~ . ; ' . : ' . ~ . ,".:,::. : ~ ~ ~ , J . , . . h . t ~ P " ' l ! ( ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . " . ~ ~ t O R C O N t < N O F O R N ~ ~ ~ ~ O ! . * " ~ . ~ : J : ~ .. .

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~ / O R C O N / N O F O R NTo: Counterterrorism From: CIRGRe: (U) 265A-MM-C99102, 05/30/2003

b6b7C,", ' .. . .. SSAs I land[:J recognize tha t issues regardingd i f f e r e n c ~ ~ i n t e r r o g a t i o ~ techniques may not be encountered by a l lBAU agents who t ravel to GTMO. However, considering t.he cQnstantplacement and. turnover of personnel there, it i s an i ssue , w h i ~ h i sl ikely to-surface again. At present, FBI agents and DOD investigatorsconduct interviews on dai1y basis in response to a steady number of 'criminal and in tel l igence-related leads. Some of the informationgathered from these interviews is l ikely to be used in militarytribunals and, possibly, in federal court . Therefore, i t i s ' essent ia lthat FBIHQ, DOJ and DOD provide specif ic ~ i d a n c e to protect a g e ~ t sand to avoid t a in t ing cases which may be ~ e f e r r e q for prosecution.

... . ...: ., ..... ., 'I" 1': I

," .. .. ~ ~ ' f II, , ..

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~ O R C O N / N O F O E t NTo: C o u n t ~ r t e r r o r i s m From: CIRGRe : (U) 265A-MM-C99102, 05/30/2'003

LEAD(S) :

Set Lead 1 : (Discret ionary)COUNTERTERRORISM

'" .........., . .. .. .. - . .. ._ . .. - . .._--..-_.... t .... ~ . ,.

AT WASHINGTON, D. C .. (U) I t is recommended tha t CTD, in cooxdLnat.Lon with OGC,consider implicat ions of interview and interrogat ion m e t ~ o d s employedby mil i tary personnel atGTMO on potent ia l future criminal ' .prosecutions or mili tary t r ibunals and provide specif ic guidance toFBI'personnel deployed to GTMO. Request CTD provide infor.mation

~ o n t a i n e d in th is communication to PENTTBOM team, as deemedappropriate.Set Lead 2: ' ( D i s c r e t i o n a : r : Y ~

GENERAL COUNSELAT l'lASHINGTON. DC(U) It is recommended tha t OGe, in coordination with CTD," 9 0 n $ i d e r \ i m p l i c a t ~ o Q s . o f . i n t e ~ v i e w a n d . ~ n t e ~ ~ o g a t i o ~ m e t A o d ~ . ~ p l o y ~ ~by mili tary 'personnel a t 'GTMO on potent ial ' future criminal " ,

p r o ~ e c u t i o n s or 'ndli tary tribunals and provide specif ic guidance to. FBI personnel deployed to GTMO. .

AT MIAMI. FLORIDA(0) For information only.

co: SSA I IBAU-East b6GTMO Coordinator b7C, "

++

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' I ' D ~ f t e l b;:FaI (BAD)personnel ~ OuantanamoBaywith on-site FBIoperations supervisorand forv:arded to \1'- li CommandingGeneral) JointTask Forqe.-110 on 11122/2002, ALL UJFORUATIOU '-CONTAilfEDf" . ... .,) HEPEHJ IS tltJCLASSIFIED. . .. . DAT 10-06-2009 BY 6S1 79 D ~ I H J } I J S

Aswe approach the one-year anniversary of the confinement ofAI Qaeda/Talibandetainees at GTMO, perhaps i t isa good time to revisit our interrogation strategies whichmay be in need of revision.' . .

. ,

Since lastyear, detainees havebeen interrogated by representatives oftheDefenseHumanIntelligence Services (DRS) and bymembers of theFBI/CITF in anefforttoobtain valuable intelligence. In thissense) themissions appear to be identical. However,both theFBIand theCITF haveadditional responsibilities. While theFBIisworking toobtain information to strengthen existing terrorism investigations fOf prosecution, theCITF is trying to ensuretliat incriminating information gathered from the detainees isdone ~ a manner acceptable formilitary tribunals.Central to thegathering of reliable, admissible evidence is themanner inwhich itisobtained, Interrogation techniques usedby theDHS aredesigned specifically for shortterm'use'in combat environments where the immediate' retrieval of tactical intelligence iscritical. ManyofDHSJsmethods are considered coercive byFederal LawEnforcement

and UCMJstandards. Notonlythis,but reports from thoseknowledgeable about theuseof'thesecoercive techniques arehighlyskeptical as to theireffectiveness and reliability,Sincenearlyall of theGTMO detainees havebeen lntervlewed many timesoverseasbeforebeing sent here,the FBIICITF would argue that a different approach should 'beundertaken in terms of tryingto elicit.lnformation from them, TheFBilcITF favors theuse of tesscoercive techniques) onescarefully designed for long-term useinwhichrapport-building skills are carefully combined witha purposeful and incrementalmanipulation ofa detainee'senvironment andperceptions ..Amodel of thisapproach wasoffered recently inanFBIICITF interview plan fordetainee 063,.: :. . .,': -', t. Fi3YCITF a g ~ n t s ari w ~ i l w t r a i 1 1 e d , highif e x p ~ r i e n ~ - e d . a n d ' verysuccessful' -:inovercoming suspect resistance inordertoobtainvaluable information incomplex .criminal-cases, including the investigations of terrorist bombings inBastAfrica andtheUSSCole; etc. FBI/Crn interview strategies aremost effective when tailored'.' s p e c g i y a n Y ' i ~ sulta suspect's , o r , ~ d ~ ! 1 ~ ? s . n ~ e d s andvulnerabilltles.Contrary to popular, :', benet; thesevulnerabilities aremore likely to reveal themselves through theemploymentof individually. designed and sustained lntervlewstrategies rather than through; thehaphazard use of'prescrlptlve, time-driven approaches. TheFBI/eITF strongly believesthatthe continued use of diametrically opposed interrogation strategies in GTMO will .onlyweakenour efforts to obtainvaluable information ..

A second problemwith tpe currentinterrogation strategy is that detainees aresmarternow thanwhenthey first arrived. No longer are theysusceptible to suggestionsforearly release or special consideration. Indeed, no oneseemsto knowwhen themilitary' tribunals will begin. As IDY interrogators continue to interview and re... . interview detainees utilizing every theme imaginable, detainees have become ... :.. , . . . ' . ' . : ~ . : .lncreaalnglycynlcal of any. offersofconcession. Moreover? theyappear to' have becomebetterconditioned for almost all interrogation approaches with manydetainees simply. refusing to answer anyquestions. Complicating matters is the.structural set-up of Camp ." " " " 1 ~ ~ " ~ " " ~ ~ ' , ~ " " " - - ~ ~ ~ } W _ " ' ' ' ' ; I . ' ' ' ' ' ' ' I ' * R ~ .~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ' ! ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ i W ' t ' ' ~ \ 1 l " ..~ , , ~ , ; . . . , ; ~ ~ ~

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Delta, whichenables detainees to exchange counter-interrogation resistance strategieswithrelativeeasewhile at thesametime strengthening their solidarity,Exceptfor a recently enacted rewardsystem offering minor creature comforts tocooperative detainees, thereis a lackof majorincentives which-could encouragedetainees to provide more information..Major, incentives aregreatly needed. Recently,investigators fromItalyweresuccessful in retrieving valuable information andcooperation from somedetainees aftertheywereprovided withguarantees of judicial 'leniency.

.' ,In addition to a review of interrogation strategies the F ~ r n Q representativeswishto discuss withtheCommanding General the following issues:1. Projected long term FBI AgentandProfessional Supportpresence in supportofJTFGTMO mission2. FBI continued technical support ,3. nor prosecutorial interest in'GTMO detainees

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LEGAL ANALYSISOF I N T ~ R R O G A T I O ~ TECHNIQUES:

Interrogation TechniquesCategory I -L' Gagging wIth gauze.2. ,Yelling atdetainee. '3. Deception.a! Multiple Interrogatorsb. Interrogator posing, as an Interrogator from a foreign nation.wltha reputation of harsh treatment of detalnees.

Category II.. ,1. U s of stress posItions (such as standing) for a maximum of 4 hrs.2; Use of falsIfied documents or reports. '3. Isolatlon'facllity for 30day Increments.4. Non-standard interrogation environment/booth.5. Hooding detainee ..6, l)seof 2.0 ...hour lnterrooatlon ~ e g m e n t s . t7. Removal ofall comfort items (including religIous items).8. Switching detalnee from hot rations to MRE/s.9. Removal of all clothing.10.Forced groomlng,(shaving of facial hajr etc...) , ,11.Use of Individual phobias (such as-tear of dogs) to induce stress.

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~ . C ~ t e g o r y ,III'."" .. '..., ' , . : , ' '" " . . " ~ " " , . ' ",' ", 1. Use of scenarios deslqned to convince detainee that death or 'severe, pain is lmmlnent for him er'hls family.2, Exposure tocold weather or water (with medfcal monitoring). ,,3, Use pf wet towel ',and.drippIng water , ~ induce the misperception of.'drowning. ',,'.; . ,:,.,,' -r- I " # ,' : . : , ' . ',1' ~ . , \'_' :', , ' . . . : . , ' ,4. Use of mildphysical contact such as grabbing t lightpushing andpokingwith frnger.

CFltegory IV1. Detainee will besentoff GTMO; either temporarily or perrnanentlv, toJordan, Egypt, or another third country to allow those countrles to employInterrogation techniques that vyill enable them to obtain the requisiteInformation. ' " ' . , ,

' ~ ~ > ; \ " " " ' ' ' f f : ' ~ t ' : ' ' ~ ~ ~ ~ " ' ~ ~ ~ I I r t ' ~ , r- ~ , : . . " : , , , , ~ ~ , . ~ Y ~ r ~ , " ~ " ' ' h ' ~ ~ ~ ' ~ ' ' ' ~ ' ' ' ' ' : ~ ~ ' r t o ' ' ; ' ' ' ~ ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ~ ~ ~ l l t ' $ J ' ~ " ' ; " ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' W ' ' ,... ,. . ..r 001 0.:,"


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Legal Analysis

The followlng techniques are examples of coercive interrogationtechnlques w ~ ~ c h arenot permitted by the ~ . S . C o ~ s t l t u t l o n :Category'I -3. b. ;rnterrogator posing asan Interrogator from a foreign nationwith'areputanon of harsh treatment of detainees.Category II , ,1. Use of stress positions (such asstanding) fora maximum of 4 hrs,2. Use of falsIftea documents or reports.5. Hooding detaInee.6. Use 'of 20-hour interrogation segments. '9. Removal ofall clothing. ,

, 11.Use of Il;1dlvldual phobias (such as fearof dogs) to induce stress.Category 111-1. Use of scenarios designed to convince detainee that death orsevere pain Is Imminent for him or his family.2. Exposure to cold weather or water (with medical monitoring).3. Use of wet towel and dripping water to induce the mlsperceptlon ofdrowning, ' ," ,

, Inf0rmation obtained through these-methods wllI',npt be admlsslble in any, "CrimInal Trial In the U : ~ . A l t b o O g ~ 1 information obtained throuqhthesemethods -,might b admissible InMUftary Commission cases, theJudge and or'Panel maydetermIne that little or np ~ e r g h t shoulooegiven tojntorrnation that is obtained"under duress. "f :;.':.:. " . ' , " . . ,... .. 'I '. f . ~ .14i"~ : \ ~ ~ ~ , : ~ J t l : ' l ~ . ~ ~ t t" :- : ~ ' I 11.

The folloWing techniques 'are examples of coercive mterroqatlont e c h n l q u e ~ which may vlolate 18U,S.C. s. ,2340, (Torture Statute):~ a t e g o r y rr-5,' Hooding detainee.11.Use of IndivIdual phobias (such as fear of dogs) to mduce stress.Category 111-1. Use of scenarios deslgned'to convince detainee that death orsevers paIn Is imminent for him' 9r his family."' . . . , .

2. Exposure to cold weather orwater(With medical monitoring). . .4. Use of wet towel and dripping water to induce the rnlsperceptlon of' ~ I I A " - ~ . . : ~ " . , ' : " ..",. -.fH..):,


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in 18 U.S.C. s. 2340( (Torture statute), torture is defined as "an actcommitted bya person' actIng under color of lawspecifically intended to Inflictsevere physical or mental pain' or suffering upon another person withIn hiscustodvor control." The torture statutedefines "severemental ~ i n . o t :s u f f e r i n g l f . a ~ "theprolo.nged.mental harm caused byor resulting from theintentional Inf1Ictlon or threatened InfUction of severe physical pain or suffering;or tile administration or application, or threatened admlnlstratfon orepptcaton,of mlnd.altering substances or other procedures calculated to.disruptprofoundly. thesenses of the personalltv; or thethreatof Imminent death; or the threat thatanother person will Imminently besubject to death/ severe pbyslcal pain orsuffering, or theadministration or appucatton, of mind-altering substances orother procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the s ~ n s e s of the p ~ r s o n a l l t : Y ,"

. Although theabove Interrogation technlques may not be perse violationsof the United States Torture Statute/ thedetermination of whether anyparticularuse of these techniques isa violatIon of this statuewill hinge on the intent of theuser, TheIntent of. theuser will bea.question of fact for the Judge orJury todedde. Therefore, ~ Ispossible that those' ~ ~ employ these techniques may beindicted, prosecuted, and possibly 'convicted if the trier of fad: determines thatthe userhad the requisite Intent. Under these circumstances it Is .recommendedthat these techrnques not be utilized.

The following technique is an e>-:: ...... . ; 1 ; . : ~ - t . : : ; \ - : : ~ ~ i ( 1 j : ! ~ ~ ~ ~ . ; ; i \ < ~....:.... ~ * t " ,. .' ' ' I - t l ' : r : ~ , ( ' ' r -: .,'. : " t ~ ...'" . . . ' 1 ~ ~ ) . ~ : ~ " ' r - ' h f ~ .. A , . ~ : . ~ ':'-:.1 ,.,."i,":\t l"', t " ' ~ ~ : " ' : : L t \.... .. . ",. u . 1r(" ~ . ... f .,'" '.Inasmuch asthe lAtent of this category Is to utilize, outside the U ~ S . ,interrogation techniques which would violate 18 U.S.C. s, 2340 If committed Inthe U.S., it ls'aperseviolation of the U.S. Torture Statute .Dlscusslng any planwhlcflIindudes.thls category, could be seen as a consplracv to "I1d1ate 18U.S.C.s, 2340. ;:Any person whotakes any action In furtherance of Implementing suchaplantwould'inculpate all persons who were Involved In creating' this plan. thistechnlque can not beutilized wIthout Violating U. S. federal law: .

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DraftedbyFBI(BAU) andCITFpersonnel atGuantanamo Bayand forwarded toCommanding General, JointTask I .Force-170, On 11/22/2002. . . . I'."': : _ -."'-- ALL I N F O P J I A T I O r ~ CONTAII1ED" ' : ~ . . HEREI.J IS U l ~ C L A S S I F I E D

DATE 10-06-Z009 BY 65179 Dflli/HJ5

LAW ENFORCEMENTSENSITIVED r November.22, 2002. INTRODUCTION'The : h 1 t e ~ o g a t i o n 'PlanforGTMO detainee #63,Mohammad Al-Khatani, offeredbelowis theresultof a collaborative effortbyrepresentatives of theFars Behavioral ~ a l y s i s .Unit (BAU), andbehavioral specialists, psychlatristsand psychologists with theCriminalInvestigation. TaskForce (ClTF). Themembers of theFBI (BAD) and the CITFBScrare wellknownfor theirexpertise in consultation on interrogation approachesandstrategies throughout the worldregarding criminal investigations and counterintelligenceoperations. The CITFBehavioral ConsultationTeam iscomprised of professionalsfromNeIS, Army eID, AirForceOS!., NSAsNRO,CIA. The FBI'BAU is comprised ofSupervisorySpecialAgentswith an averageof 18 years of experience incriminal andcounterintelligence investigations. Thisplanis based on interrogation approaches, 'strategiesand teclmiques usedby federalagents throughouttheUnitedStates andaroundthe worldin lnvestigations, interrogations, and operations involvingpotential attacksagainst theUnitedStates and.It's alliesbyAl-Qaeda andotherterroristorganizations.Theapproachesdeveloped and Included in this plan are derivedfroman extenslveanalyslsofAl-Qaeda,as it relatesto the psychology of theMiddle Eastern mindset, organizationalrecruftment, radicalization as reflected in the training and deployment of operativesagainst the UnitedStates and their allies. These strategies arecurrently used to train Jawenforcement and intelligence professionals in the United Statesand allied professionalscurrently engagedin investigations andoperations againstAl-Qaeda around theworld.BaSed onareview of the 1 i m i t ~ portions'of #,63' s casefile thatw'ere m'ade availabletous, westrongly recommend thata long-termrapport-building approachbe implementedimmediately to optimize the reliabilityor operationally relevant information collected. It

. Is believed that theeffects of threemonths of isolationarebeglnningto take theirtoll on:' .....; . : ( ~ ~ ....!. ~ ~ # 6 R . ~ J ! .. p ~ i c t i R I Q g i c a l s t a t e . , ; . j y I ~ ~ ~ ~ v ~ , ~ ~ a t t h i ~ i an ~ d v a i t i a g e o ~ ~ 'to . ~ t i a ~ a j , ~ ~ ~ r ; 1 " f ' ~ " - :. ' . ' . . caret}illfdesigned.plan to cIeate an increasing amount of dependence and trustbetween .#63 and theinterviewerwhich, ultimately, maymake himmore susceptible to influenceand persuasion indeciding to shareinformation hemayhavepreviously withheld. '. .

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InAugust2002,#63wasplaced into isolation at theOND brigfor his lack of. .cooperation in providingtruthful information regarding.his knowledge of known AI..Qaedamembers or terroristactivities.When#63wasplaced-into confinement,, interviewersbelieved thathis isolation from other detaineesmight providehimwith . . _. ' : ' : : ~ ; : s u f f i c i e n d n b t i 4 a t l o 6 to c o o P e r a t ~ inorefully.)nd'eed,a ~ \ 1 e w , ofhisfile reve8ls'that :.',:/ .... .; : ' - ~ .:,sinceMarch2002:# 63 hasbeeninterviewed at leasteight times in GTMO by an array ofinterviewers fromdifferent agencies. The'actualnumberof interviews is believedto be..' f P ~ 9 ~ pigher s i n ~ e . i t , ~ p p ~ , ~ ~ ~ ~ o m ~ , i n t e r v i . t ? V f ~ : h ~ y e . n . o ! y e t beendocumented i ~ . h i s "file.The cOnCIU$lQU drawn from this analysis 1S that #63 hasnever been interrogated .using a sustainedrelationship-oriented strategic approach.. " J ., b1\l' . "' . '" ' .. ' U:U 027'~ - - - - - - - - - - - - ...._"-._._ .._...- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

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'..EFFECTS OF ISOLATIONObservationsby guards, psychologists andmembersof various Interviewteamsall'1ndicate that#63' s behaviorhaschangedsignificantlyduringhis three months ofisolation. He spendsmuch ofhisday coveredby a sheet, eithercrouched in the comerof 'his cell or hunchedon hisknees ontopof his bed,These behavi?IS appear tobeunrelated,to hispraying activities. Hiscellhasnoexteriorwindows,andbecause it is continuouslylit, he is preventedfromorientating himselfas to time of day. Recently, he was observedby a hidden videocameraHaving oonversations withnon-exiatent people. Duringhis lastinterviewon 11117/02, hereportedhearingunusual soundswhichhe believes are evilspirits, including Satan. It isnotclear to us whether thesebehaviors indicate that #63ishallucinatingor whetherPlesebehaviors are a consciouseffortdesigned to,convinceus ofhis mentaldeterioration in aneffortto be releasedfrom isolation. Indeed, duringhis lastinterview, he repeatedlyrequested tobe returned to CampDeltato'be amonghisfellowdetainees. Althoughweareuncertain as to his mentalstatusandrecommend amentalevaluation beconducted,there is littledoubt that#63 is hungry for human interaction.Our plan is des.igned to exploitthis need and to create an environment in which it easierfor #03 to please the interviewer with'whomhehas-cometo havecomplete trust anddependence thusdeveloping amotivation to be forthrightandcooperative in providingreliableinformation.RATIONALE FOR RAPPORT..BUILDlNG APPROACH

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N u m ~ r 9 U S approacheshave been attempted oil,#63with a ,vBf!ety of,themes !n,clugip,g\' pointingout inconsistencies inhiscoverstory;appealing tohissense.ofgUilt, describinghis fallures.ln life. disclosing thebetrayalof his comrades, discussingthe futility ofhlspredicament, telling him hewill neverbe a father and thathewill never.seehismotheragain.None of these approaches hasbeensuccessfulin persuadinghim to provide ', : : , ~ : ' : \, ; : ; ~ ' , ~ , " ~ ' : i , : t t p ~ ~ o n n ~ q p , : : : W ~ ~ ~ ~ y i , ~ ' p J ; e d i c t a b l e p a ~ a s : ~ m e r g e a . ~ ! t : ~ ~ ? y : ~ y . e ~ f ~ ~ : , : l ; J ~ L : ~ " : ", , . weeks, a new set of luterYiewmg agents attempts to establishbasic rapport withhimovera short periodof timebeforelaunching into a seriesof questions about his terroristactivities. The e f f ~ t of thispattern is that# 63appears to havebecomeresistant to anyapproach that beginswithshort-term rapport-building themes andturns quic14y intospecific questioning. Indeed, it appears that many interviews with#63 have endedwiththe Interviewing agentsyelling at him, therebymaking itmoredifficult for subsequentinterview teams to e ~ t a b l i s h sincere, meaningful rapport and trustwith him. 'Ironically, #63!s negativecontact with interviewing agentsonly reinforcesAI-Qaeda ,stereotypes about evilAmericans andvalidates theirexpectation of harsh treatmentand ' ,'., p ~ t e n t i a l ~ . i t u r e . , ~ a t h ~ ? , ~ ~ ~ t i ~ g an envlronment : t l ; t ~ f 1 n I g h t insplry, him':tc?,id6ntify : : , ~ . : ' '. '.WIth his captors aridcompel himto questionhis loyalty'andalliances to Al-Qaeda.we 'believe he would bemorel.lkely to increase his resolve to withholdInformationfromUS, "thusreinforcing his beliefsystem Inresistinginterrogation. Jndivlduals.who become

,: '. affiliated with ixiren11st groups'who promulgate'nate;'wbether-politlcal or religIous, ' a r ~ , " " ' : ,; .frequently Insearchof a psychological anchor.Direct challenges 1:0 their beliefsystems '001028,

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are a threat to theirsense'of self-worth. Our approach is aimed at creating a dependencyand trust between #63 and a singleinterviewer whose behaviorand personafitY....contradictthe negative image that#Q3 has imaginedor encountered. .Over lime,Yfe.. '., believeit is possible that his loyalty to AIooQaeda may be 'weakened, and that he ismorelikely to reveal Informationtosomeone whom he trusts,

Whether #63's ability to resistmaking full disclosure of Wsactivities is a productofpersonalstrength or the successful utilization of counter-interrogation techniques, orboth,webelievethetime is right forutillzation of an altogetherdifferentapproach, one. which has not been tried before with#63 and has beenutilized successfully in otherinvestigations against Al-Qaeda. .

INTERVIEW PLAN'

Our approachemphasizes long-term rapport-building in which questions of aninvestigative nature wouldpurposely be avoided in order to allow the opportunity,for#63'and the interviewer to develop a bond onmatters unrelated to.theinvestlgatlon. Thelong-term strategyweuldbe to createan environment.in whichtotal dependence and trustbetween #63 and the interviewer is established at its own pace. Such a plan should'begiven up to a year tocomplete although theactual time may beconsiderably shorter.depending on howevents unfold.To helpfosteran environment conduclve to theestablishment of dependence and trust,we propose that the interviewer initiallymeet with #63 every other day. This'shouldbe, his only contact'withether'people, and 'we believe 'hewill anxlously.loek forward'to these,meetings. No investigative questions will be asked, This will confuse #63, ashe willexpect-to.bequestioned about his terrorist activities.. , . . . ;"

, ' . ''J,' '. ': ; .: . : ,\ '. ': , . ' . , ,: . ' ; ' . ' ' . ~ . : . . : ,.4;\ ,...: ~ ~ . ; J ; i } : , ~ ; : .... ; ~ ~ i : ; . : ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ t J . D : ~ O . t h i ~ plan.\Yill be p e ~ . ~ c : s ~ s o r s : . s u c h as t h smppm.g of.c e ~ p . . ~ ~ s ~ ~ 4 ' f ~ t ' 1 ~ ~ i ' ~ " : ' .:."J ; . ' : \ comfortfromhimby' guards, such as the removal ofhis mirroror the issuance ofasheet e , ",, half the size of theone he likes to drape aroundhimself. These and other stressors willbe,carefullyand subtly'introducednotby the interrogator, but by guards, We believethat '#63 will likely lookto his onlyhuman contact,his interviewer, in an attempt togain help.The interviewer'sstatusas a caregiver andproblem-solver willthus be increased. At thesametime,consideration should be given to introducing visual stimuli to #63 which issomething we believehe is hungry for. Such materials could includevisual imagesdesigned toinvoke sympathy or carefullyculledarticles from Arabicnewspapers whichcould help weaken#63's sense of loyalty to Al-Qaedaassociates.

'. : - ; ': ' ! ~ ! ~ I " ( : . \ ~ 1 1 ~ u i l t Intoour planis fleXibility. ' : H o w ~ v e r , ~ f l e x i b i ~ i t Y wiltbe purpose{ul,:'aiid i t ~ l f \ " : ~ l " ...: ~ ~ .,.. be continuously assessedfor its effectiveness.The emphasis must be placed onpatience . .and subtlety. At no time should the plan be rushed. In fact, demandsby #63 for :. " .restoration of thingstaken from him should behonored slowly so as to create the .impr?ssien that ~ h interviewercan u l t i m a t ~ l Y h e l 1 ? ~ I n : although not necessarily q u ~ ~ l d y , : -r .'or WIth ease . .. '. , .. , ......h : , .01)10:29.:: ...

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1__ 1"ALL nJFOR}UlTION CONTAINEDHEFLIN IS m ~ C L A S S I F I E DDATE 10-06-2009 BY 65179 D ~ m ! H J 5

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In la te 2002 and continuing into mid-2003, the BehavioralAnalysis Unit raised concerns over interrogation t ac t i cs beingemployed by th e U.S. Military. As a resul t an Be dated5/30/03, was generated summarizing the FBI's ~ o n t i n ~ e dobj ec ti on s t o the use of SERE (Search, Escape, R e s i s ~ a n c e andEvasion) techniques to in terrogate prisoners. This Be i sattached and includes a collect ion of mili tary documentsdiscussing and authorizing th e techniques. We are not aware ofthe FBI participating direct ly in any SERE interrogat ions. I t should bft noted that FBI concerns and Objections weredocumented and presented to Major General Geoffery Miller , whooversaw GTMO operations. MG Miller .i s now in I ra q s er vi ng asthe commander in charge of t h military j a i l s . MG Millerappeared in th e New York Time on 5/5/04 defending "coe rc iveaqq ~ g g r e s ~ ~ v ~ u i ~ t e + r 0 g a ~ ~ o Q m ~ t h o ~ ~ . FBI oper at ion s i n Afghanistan, Iraq and GTMO have each beenqueried and a l l have reported back that they do no t have anydi rec t knowledge of 'any abusive incerrogation techniques beingused. Each location was aware of rumors of abuse which havesurfaced as a direct resul t of pending M i l ~ t a r y i n v e s t i g ~ t i o n sinto abusive interrogation techniques. ~ h FBI has part ic ipated ~ the interv.iew of 204 ihdividualsin Iraq and 747 in GTMO. Our Afghan operation needs

addit ional time to prepare a l i s t of t hose in te rviewed intheater . Attached are the l i s t s from GTMO and Iraq. A'key word search of the Iraq interviews ident i f ied oneindfvidual a l 1 ~ i n g abuse by mili tary personnel. In th isinstance a woman indicateq she was h it with a s t ick and shewanted to ta lk only to German off ic ia ls . FBI personnei assigned to t he M il it ar y Tribunal effor tinvolving GTMO.detainees has duri ng the review of discovery-mater ia l seen, on a f e rare occasions, documentation of SEREtechniques being noted in interviews conducted by 'Militar.ypersonnel. In t hese inst ances th e material was cal led to th eat tent ion of military. 's Criminal I n v e s t i g ~ t i v e Task Force(CITF), an d Office Military Commissions (OMe) personnel.

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Concerningfood,which is reportedly amajor issue with#63, carewill'be takento createthe impression thatthe intervieweris theone who has occasional influenceover t h l d n ~of food#63is ,given. . , .. ,Additionaldetailsof this planwillbetailoredspecifically to the behaviorandcognitivestyle.,eg commurdcatlon, thinkingprocess; use of deception, of #63 in consultationwith,the behavioral analysis components with the overall objectiveof continuing to fostercomplete dependence and trustasa precursorto'the elicitation.\,Theprogress of the interrogation process willbe assessed on anongoing basis,TIle .interrogatorwillbesupportedby a teamof behavioral consultantswho will help totranslate themeaning of the detainee'sbehaviors, communications and activities in andout for the interrogation room,Monitors will include the assessment o( the detainee'scommunications andbehavior for the useof deception, avoidanceandmanipulation toassist in directing inquiryaIJ.d ensurethevalidity and reliabilityof the infonnatlonelicited viathisprocess .:

We have mentioned in several placesthe role of the guards in this interrogation plan.Oneof themostvaluable contributions that the guards can make during an interrogation,would be tobecome the eyes andears inbetween interrogation sessions. It isrecommended thatthe guardswhoare assigned to #63 be provided specialized trainingtcbecome attentive tospecific patterns of behavior displayed by#6'3 in between sessions toaid in the ongoing assessmentof theinterrogation.process.Further, it is recommendedthat a special log beestablishedwith theguidanceof the interrogator to be available to-the interrogatorandthe behavioral supportteam. This strategyhas been found.to be very.useful in otherhighvalue Interrogatlona," Finally,Agentsfromthe FaI andCTIFwho are most knowledgeable about thiscase

:.. ~ . , : i . , , ' : ' . l l ; ; , , ~ r ; : 1 . i \ n ~ ~ q u l 4 . be ~ ' ! ; C i : . d . l t ~ J E ~ p ' : a n b 1 ~ l l ' O g a t i o n matrix , ~ a t : i 4 e l \ t i f i e s ; t l i e , most;critical : ~ ~ $ : * : ' , : : ~ l : ~ J r ~ f : ' " G.:.. ' ': ' -objectlves and'leads::7::At this time,this planreflects a: behavioral 'approach thatwill . ,, facilitate thenecessary relationshipand rapportwith this detaineeneededbeforewecanmove onto substantive questioning. .

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-,... .. ... 1 _ . - . . . . , . . . . . ~ . . . . . . .. ". ,Drafted \?y FBI (BAU) ~ r s o n n e l atGuantanamoBay withon-site FBIoperationssupervisor~ f o ~ ; d toCommanding General, JolntTaskForoe-170 on 1112212002. .ALL INFORMATION C01JTAlNEDHEREIN IS U N C L A 5 ~ I r I E DDATI 10-06-2009 BY 65179 D ~ r n / H J 3

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From: FBI, Guantanamo BaySubject: VTC 21 November 2002To: Major General MillerThe p u r p o s ~ ~ i t h i s c o r r e s p o n d ~ n c e ' is ' to bring t theCommanding General's a t t e n t ~ o n c o n c e r n ~ t h FBI has regardingrepresentations that were made about the FBI's posi t ion on theproposed operational approach to IBN U S 9 ~ A - 0 0 0 6 3 D P (Maad M u h a ~ a dal-Khatani) .a t th e 21 November. VTC.'A t the d ~ r e c t 1 o n of the CommaQdinq General and in an effortto find some methodological common ground with r es pe ct to anInterrogation Plan for detainee 6 3 the ~ B On-site S u p e r v i s o ~ .

a ~ Supervisors from the FBI Behavioral Analysis Unit met withJTF GTMO s ta f f members on the evening of 20 November. Our ingthis meeting, DHS presented i ts draft Interrogation Plan. TheFBI voicedmisgiYings about th e overall coercive natur.e andpossible i l legal i ty of elements of th is p l a ~ . The FBI alsoyoiced i t s strong objections r e g ~ r d i n g the e ffic ac y o f a f e ~ r based approach.

The FBI offered in writing an alternative interrogation,approach based on long term rapport-building. This approach waspreviously discussed extensively' between FBI Behavioral expertsand DHS and JTF s ta f f members .. At the 20 November meeting, DRSarid JTF s ta f f members recognizeGi 'advantaqea of the F B I ' ~ sapproach, and dec ided to ' ~ e v i s e their plan by incorporating someof the' FBI's rapport-building aspects. DeSpite the .c l o s e workingenvironment of this consultation, JIG and DHS s taff never advised.FBI personnel that th e revised plan ~ o u l d be presented thef o ~ l o w i n g day to the Pentagon Office of G e n ~ r a l Counsel. Infact, the FBI representa t ives s tated c lear ly to the JIG and DHS

;: ' I ~ ~ p r e . f : } ~ n : t : ? t. iy':e./t..t ~ t : ' 1 . , t , ~ e " . t . ~ c : : h n i q u e s p r ~ p o , s .ed.. in . ~ q . P ,an . : ~ ~ ~ :be':'. "reviewed and.::f6rmail'!j :appro'ved by FEIHQ and .BAU .'off icials -: p r , ~ o r .tb ~ n Imp.l.ementat.Lon , . " '.ad the JIG advised the FBI of h is i nt en ti on s t o present ther e v ~ s e d DHS. plan to DOD at the 21 November VTC as an FBI/DRSplan, FBI representat ives would have strenuously objected.: ~ t j n : l 1 v alt:oJlah all aaencle; rere aware that the ncrsI ; -- .was soheduled to arrive on~ o v ~ e r o r t p u r ~ Q s e Qf e v a ~ u a t i n g the DHS and FBI pians,the JIG ~ ~ ~ . not S O l ~ c i ~ l . prQfeSSiOnal o p ~ n i o n . .. 'This m a t t e , : i ; . ~ i s .brouqnt; to. th e Commanding General r s attentionfo r the 'purpose"'of' s e t t i ~ g an important record str.aight. The FBIremains commf, t ted to supporting- the JTF GTMO mdasLon , '.

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ALL INFORMATION CO}JTAINEDHEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIEDDATE LO-06-Z009 BY 65179 DJiH/HJ5

. ....: :b6Memo to: File II b"1C Memo From: SSA .

Subject: . , ~ u e s t ~ . ~ ~ m p t s to re-establish rapport ~ t detainee#682.... ... , to . ~ .."" -t .. ~ .1'.:.-. ....... ";"... r

, .. Althoughdetainee#682hadbeenfairly cooperative in the past,he hadcompletelyshut downall communicationwiththe interviewteam assignedtohim since.his intervlewby theCTCon 10/28/02. Detainee #682is'a. Saudi Arabianborn, 28yearold malewho bas spentconsiderable timein theUnitedStates as a student He iswelleducatedandarticulate in theEnglish language and is- particularlyproudofhis abilitytointellectualize anddiscussIslamicissues. In aneffort to re-establishrapportwiththisdetainee,andat therequestoftbe interview team,writer engaged in a-series ofnoninvestigative rapportbuilding discussions with. detainee#682 regardingIslamanditspeople. It iswriter's intention touse thisdiscussion to get the detainee talkingagainaboutnon-threatening topicswhichshould leadto themeswhich canbe exploited byhis.interviewteam in the near future.

Writermetwith-detalnee #682 on11102/02, 1rl.09/02, 11/11/02, 1i1l7/02 .and 11120/02, and wassuccessful in developing rapport. -Writer then transitioneddetainee #682backto theoriginal interview team on 11122/02: Attached is a summary ofthe results of these discussions.

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, ' , Islam is first introduced to childrenin the familybybothparentsif theyareboth.presenr in thehome. However, Muslims believetbat phildren are bomwith the imiate .knowledge or'Allah. Specifically, that thereexists onlyonetrue"God" andthatisAllah.Thisknowledge is foundwithin thesoulof everyhumanbeing. 'Fhis beliefis supportedby a passage in theQur'anwhich statesthat A;llahmakes '.l covenant with hisservantsbeforetheyareborn, Allahisseenas Just,so Muslims believe that if a personisneverexposed toIslamtheywillnotbejudged badlybutwill beexcused byAllah. ArabMuslims believe thatWesterners havebeenexposed to Islambutchoose to r ~ j e c t Allah'strueteachings.Muslims further believe 'thatJesuswas a Prophet, whosemission wasto returntheJewishpeopleto'TrueJudaism." Mohammed toowasa Prophet, whosemission wastoreturnChristians to "TrueChristianity," Theyacknowledge thatallProphetscometous

withmiracles so that theycanprove who theyare. Moses,JesusandMohammed allhadtheirmiracles, whicharedivine interactions willi thephysicalworld. Mohammed'sgreatestmiraclewas therevelation oft4eQur'an, TheQur'an wasrevealed.to .Mohammed directlyfrom Allah. Thewordsthemselves are sacred. TheysetouttheSharia Law, which is a. comprehensive setof rulesgoverning Islamicliving. Thusit isimpossible to separate theIslamic faith fromeveryday life. ShariaLawdoesnotseparaterightfromwrong as muchas it delineates PermissibleConduct(Halal) from . .. Impermissible Conduct (Haram). . ' . ,o Sharia lawis updated andexplained viaFatwas whichare specific rulings made

b-y Islamicscholars thr-ough a process Galled Ijtihad. Sharia lawis perpetual andinfallible. Fatwas are timeandcircumstance dependant Theygiveclarificationandperspective undercircumstances atthe timetheyare made. SomeFatwas are consideredunnecessary, such'as'theFatwa declaring cigarettesmokingbarmful and thusagainst . ' ." ,..; ;,:";,Shariii l a ' W . ~ O n e who follows 'f}leFatwaofan Islamic.Scholar : W h Q ~ p e i m i t s . H a r a n 1 : a n d .t ~ ~ , ,'0,,:'.. forbids H8Ial).lias elevated thatscholarto thepositionof.God. rThis is stronglyforbiddenin the Islamic fait\1. ,Patwas' have beenusedat times.by se1f..interested scholars forpolitical reasons. (This isa goodargument for notblindlyfollowing an Islamic Scholarwho issues a Fatwathat isclearly wrong.)

, '. Allahapparently changed histeachingan theconsumption ofalcohol over time,sinceJesusdrank wineandearlyfollowers ofMohammed didtoo. During Mohammed'slifetime, anabsolute prohibition againstalcohol was revealed in Sharialaw. However,eventhis absoluteis notabsolute. For ifyou arestrandedin thedesertandhavenothingto drinkandcomeuponajug ofalcohol andthere isnothingelsetokeep you, alive,youmaydrink the 'alcoliol.tOSave.your'iife and get yourselfto'safety;:However: theie'aretworestrictions: Youmustnotdesire thealcohol. and you,mustonlydrinktheminimum .amountnecessary to sustain yourlife.: (Thismaybe a usefulanalogy to employ whenconfronted witha detainee whorefuses to answerquestions thatmightburthisbrotherson religious grounds. eg.; Youneed to cooperate to helpyourself: Aslongasyoudon't001057

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desire tohurtyourfriends andyou tell us only theminimum necessary to getyoubackhometoyour family, it is the right thing to do.), : , M ~ l i m s b e l i ' e v e t l i ~ t all Jews and C h i i s t i ~ s are "Disbelievers." That is.jheyreject theteachings oftheProphet Mohammed andcontinue ona dlvergentpath, Fromthe Islamicperspective, Judaism is seenas promoting nan eyeforandeye.n Whereas

< Cbrlstianity is seen as promoting "tum the other cheek," Muslims believe in thetenetof"an eyeforan.eye,but it is betterforyou ifyouchoose to forgive." ThustheMuslim has 'the choiceto seek retribution in kindorto forgive the transgressor,9/11 has causeda resurgencein the IslamicFaith in theArab world. ArabMuslims consider the embassy bombings in Africa, theColebombing inYemen andthe9/11 hijackings in theU.S., tobe actsofreactionand self-defense and notactsofaggressionor violence. They believe that thepeople o f t h ~ United Statesfeel "Injured"by theseattacks. LiberalIslamicthinkersmay.believetheseattackswere unjustified, butfundamentalists believetheattackswereakin totheU.S. :Military dropping atomicbombson Japan's civilianpopulation duringWorldWarII. That is, theywere necessary tostoptheU.S. from killingMuslims. ArabMuslimsbelieve that theU.S. and Israel areengaged inthe killingofMuslims.as amatterQfpoJ)cy. and fact;Immediately after 9/11, the'GovenunentscholarsinSaudiArabia spokeout'against the.acts of thehijackers as againstIslam. This'isbecauseIslarnpreaches theprotectionof innocent woinen andchildten and non-combatants. However, shortly.thereafter,otherscholars said these' actswere consistent with the Sharia. They based thisdecision inparton a 500 year old Fatwawhich says if theenemyhas takenMuslimscaptive and there is a threatfrom tpflt enemyI thenyou cankillthe enemyandallof the 'captives. Underthe concept ofWala,Muslimsare.toloveand protect all otherMuslims.Muslimshateto seeMuslims gettingkilled. On the contrary, Barameans thatMuslimsshouldnot takedisbelievers onas'intimatefriends, however, theymUst bejust andfair tothem. , . ,

...;: : ~ : ! : r ' : .'';:r' "',' ,,: ~ ' ~ ) - ' " : ' : ~ ' . : : \ , ~ : , ~ . ~ , ~ ! : , ~ , l ' i i ~ ~ ; ~ - r . 4 : : ! ~ i . ~ f . \ :.~ ~ . ~ : . f " l . . , ' ,', .J' ....:;. ' " ,p: '; ;{{: : :.., . ', -Musllms further believe thatthe American public hasa: fundamental lackof ""understanding of its enemy. That is, theydon't take into account ~ a thelrenemy wantsto die. Jihadfighters wantto becomemartyrs, Also, since'Usama BinLaden (UBL)works from cells,'he doesnot needAl-QaldatowagehiswaragainsttheU.S. Sotherecentvictory overAl-Qaida and'theTalibeninAfghanistan is'a hollow victory.Itis obvious from VEL's actions that he'wantedto reachtheMusliu't public, HemetwiththeMujahideen, hemadevideo tapesandhewas.interviewed by. thepress all in.an effort towin publicapproval. ManySaudiArabiansbelieve Ul?Lwas successful in ~ . this endeavor. TheSaudi public is generallybehinduaL. Itis notonly the extremistswhocheerUBLon, Heiswell llkedbymiddle'of'the roadMuslims. . ' . .Saudi Arabiahas thelargestnumber o f f u n d a m ~ n f a l i s t Muslims in the-world, and60%of its population is under theage of.22. It isvery easy tomanipulate youthfulMuslimsintofighting the jihad againstthe U.S. Although it is illegalin SaudiArabia to. .

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, ,call fOJ;a jihad against theU.S., onespeechina mosquecouldresultin 2000youngpeoplejoining thejihad. Many of those whowentto fight jihad were not fundamentalistMuslims. . , ... " " ' ~ . . ' .. . . .-Saudi ArabianMuslims b ~ l i e v e that if theU.S. continuesitsmilitary responseagainst-Muslims the suicide actswillcontinueand thesituationwill evolveintoanIsraelilPalestinian conflict, butonamuch larger scale. They fear that the U.S. wiU feelemboldenedby the "victory"overtheTalibaninAfghanistan ln.onlytwo months andsay ,we shouldhave donethisbefore. Theybelievethatunlike theRussians who continue tothrow soldieraftersoldier into the.frayof a losingbattle,theU.S. intelligently withdrewfrom Somaliaand Lebanon. Theyaredissatisfied with thepresenceofU.S. troops inSaudiArabia and blamethecurrent economicproblems theyfaceon thepresenceofthesetroops. TheybelievethattheU.S.should ~ e m o v e its troopsfromSaudiArabia. and'Afghanistan, and not invade Iraq. In addition, they feel that theU.S. shouldat leastmakeit appear that theyareno longer backing Israel in itsuse of forceagainstthePalestinians.Thismay be accomplished byusingaMuslimmiddlemanwhoknowsthe Religion and

culture of Islam. This, they feel, willbetheway toendtheU.S.lAl Qaeda conflict.MuslimsbelievethatAllah knows all, including thefuture, They speakabouta'book inwhichall thingsthathappen in aman's lifeare written. Theyoften speakof theirfate being inAllah's hands. TheMuslim wordforfate is "Kadar." Theyusethewordin'situationsofmisfortune, for examplewhena childisstruck by a car and killed. It i saidthat even the faithfulhavenocontrol overthese things. However, thisconcept does not ' .:wipeoutman's freywill. ThatiS J man muststill takeresponsibility foi' his own actions,He must do right insteadofwrong andhemustdo thethingsnecessary to insure causeand effect. ' ,

, SomeMuslimpeople alsowantto rationalizeaway theirown negligence as 'fate.To Illustratethis pointtheyspeakofa parabletoldbyMohammedhimselfinwhichhe.aees.aman whose cameliswandering off into the desert. Mohammedasks theman ifhe..had.tiedup 'the camel and theDian replies'that he.doesn't haveto worry abouttying up his .camelbecause it is in the hands ofAllah. 'Mobammedreplied,no youmustfirsttake careofyour responsibilities by tyingupyourcamelthenyou canpu t it in thehandsofAllah.In otherwordsAllah requires thatyourparticipate in life byusingyourGQ,d givenskillsandnot simplysitting backandputting life in the hands ofAllah. It isonlyafteraMuslimexhausts all ofhismeans, thathe can legitimately leave it in thehandsof Allah.(Therefore,detaineeswhoinvoke the'WillofAllah,shouldbe reminded of thisparable..and encouragedto dowhatAllahrequires, ie.;whatis in theirpower tosave themselves.),

, .. Some of the detainees willinvariably say they don't have any control overwhathappens to them. Theconcept oftawkul means their livesare inAllah'shandsandtheyrely on:A11ah to takecareof them. (These detainees shouldbe reminded thatthetest~ l l ~ gives themin this lifeisverydifficult-and this interview/interrogationprocess ispart of that.test. Theyshouldparticipate in theprocess asAllah requires andtakeanactive role in their lives. Thisis whattheirfamilies .would expectof them aswell.). , ,

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Afterthedeathof theProphetMohammed, theIslamicworldwas ruledby four'successive Khalifas (Islamicleaders whoruledoverall Muslims) withoutdivision. However,afterthemurderof the fourth Khalifa, Ali, therewasa splitamongMuslims.Theydivided intothe Sunnis, whoremainedfaithful to theSharia,and theShiites, who'beganpraylng toKhali,fa Ali, andwent theirseparateways. SomeShiitesevenworshipKhalifaAli.

. .Today SunniMuslims outnumber Shiitesand'consider them a deviant sect. TheShiites instituted self-punishmentrites to express theguilt they felt forfailingto protecttheir fallenKhalifa, Ali. Ayatola Khomeni'sfollowers areShiitesand are consideredstrict fundamentalists. LikemostotherShiites, Khomeni's foIJowers did not fight in tileJihad inAfghanistan. .LiketheHezbollah, mostMuslims in IranandLebanonare Shiites, Thesepeoplehaveneverbeena directthreatto theU.S.. Ontheotherhand,Al-Qaidais madeupmainlyof Sunnis, whoare engaged in ajihad against the U. S. .TherearemanyQur'anicve!sesregardingmartyrdom. Theseversesspeakof the'.Heavenlyincentives of martyrdom. These incentives aremeant topushfollowers ofIslam toresistthe fearof deathanddie in the defense of their faith. Most of theQur'anicverses calling peopleto jihad andmartyrdom wererevealed toMohanuned inthe 8 yearshe spent inMedina. In contrast, mostofthe verses revealed toMohammedin theprior13years he spent inMeccawerepeaceful, calling peopleto worshiponeGodandspreading ethics. . .Mohammed ledby example, fighting onthefrontlinesof the firstIslamicjihadand getting injured at times. However, his-followers did their best to protect.bim frominjury. Mohammed spent 13years in Mecca, then8years inMedinawherehe "establishedan Islamic anny beforereturning toMeccaandgoingon toconquermostof

theknownworld. . .;. . ~ : . . . t I. . . . , \ ..i r i ' 2 0 0 0 ~ 'a SaudiArabianscholar i s ; u ~ ~ f a ~ a a n d . a : p u b l i ~ statementthatPalestiniansuicide bombersarenotactsofMartyrdom: Theyare simplyacts of suicide,. wbicp are againstIslam. Thisis believed to havebeenmotivatedby theSaudigovernment. Thisattempttoquellsuicide bombings seems to havebackfiredbecausemany Islamic Scholars aroundtheworld thenmadetelevised statements sayingthesuicidebombings are acts ofMartyrdom as longas theyare not done outofdespair. .After 9/11,people in SaudiArabia were.celebrating in thestreets becausethey considerthese greatactsofMartyrdom,

. The Qur'anhas manyverseswhicQ call'believers to martyrdomand it apparentlydoesnot envision a timeforpeace. In factit cansforMuslimsto spreadIslamuntil onlyo n religionprevails) theonethatpraisesthe trueGod,Allah. Each believerhasthechoicetomartyr himselfor to find anotherwayto fultin his faith. At thispoint intime,however, almost alljihad movements aregeared toward self-preservation andnot towardspreadingIslam,


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In Islam, Faithand.Jihadcannotbe separated, however,jihad can be a violentor anon-violent struggle. If.a jihad shouldbringMuslims in conflictwithMuslims, theQur'an says theyshould try to reconcile. Both sidesshould exhausteverymeans in theirpowerbeforeputting the,conflict inthehandsofAllah. I f theconflict is not resolved, 'theaggressor is'seenaswrong andtruebelievers arecalled to join thesideof theoppressed.

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From Department of State Operations Center