The Four Freedoms of the Internal Market in the light of the Court of Justice of the European Union

Table of contents

Introduction....... 3

A. Free Movement of Goods... 5

B. Free Movement of Persons. 8

C. Free Movement of Services.. 10

D. Free Movement of Capital 12

Conclusion... 14

Bibliography........ 15

IntroductionThere is no other community in the world that has put that much effort to integrate its economies and politics than the European Union (EU). The EU is a sui generis legal order that interacts simultaneously with international law and national law and it has evolved from a number of international treaties. The origins of EU date back to the 1957 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (Treaty of Rome) founded by six European countries. One of the raison dtre of the founders was to create an internal market (initially common market) in which tariff barriers would be removed and a common external customs tariff system will be established between the Member States (MS) and non-EU countries.[footnoteRef:1] [1: Paul Craig and Grainne de Burca, EU law: Text, Cases and Materials, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 11]

In 1987, the Single European Act (SEA) brought major amendments to the original Treaty and gave further impetus together with the White Paper aimed for the realization of the internal market by end of 1992. The SEA defined the internal market as an area without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of the Treaties.[footnoteRef:2] For the proper functioning of the internal market the Treaty through its provisions required both, positive[footnoteRef:3] and negative[footnoteRef:4] integration. The latest extensive amendment to the treaties where made by the 2009 Lisbon Treaty. [2: Article 26(2) of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union, ] [3: see Jacques Pelkmans, The Economics of single Market Regulation, 2012, p. 7( the positive integration has the market-shaping nature and gives authority to the EU to legislate in order to harmonize and/or create common regulation and common policies)] [4: Idem,( the negative integration has a martket-making nature, requiring the removal of unustified national barriers to the four freedoms between MS).]

Since its inception, the European Union expanded from six to twenty eight Members States. The internal market comprises a population of over half a billion people and with more than 20 millions of companies in which they enjoy the rights to move and trade freely across the Member States borders. The EU has signed agreements and treaties with other non-EU countries,[footnoteRef:5] in order to expand the trade boundaries, holding the exclusive competence in decisions concerning the internal market. Through almost sixty years of European integration process, it can be said that the realization of the internal market has not passed into history. The internal market is an ongoing process that lays at the heart of the EU activity, and which requires continuous effort, analysis and improvements.[footnoteRef:6] [5: the 1994 European Economic Area agreement between EU Members States and the countries of the European Free Trade Association (Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein); and treaties between Switzerland. ] [6: Catherine Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU. The four freedoms, Oxford University Press 2014, p.12]

The case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has also greatly supported the achievement of the economic integration and enhanced the effectiveness of the EU legislation by carefully balancing the interests of both EU and Members States. The main objective of CJEU is to shun national rules that hindered the realization of the internal market, by using the principles of non-discrimination,[footnoteRef:7] market access and mutual recognition. Although the CJEU was accused of judicial activism the internal market would unquestionable never be what it is at the moment without its pro-integrating decisions.[footnoteRef:8] [7: Article 18 TFEU (Within the scope of application of the Treaties, and without prejudice to any special provisions contained therein, any dicrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited) ] [8: see Maria Elvira Mendez-Pinedo, EC and EEA law: A Comparative Study of the Effectiveness of European Law, 2009, pp. 27-8]

In what follows, the paper will attempt to examine the four fundamental freedoms of the internal market thought the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of European Union and to analyze whether the Court uses the same approach across each of them. The paper is divided in four chapters. Thus, the first chapter will tackle the free movement of goods in the light of the Ker Optica case;[footnoteRef:9] the second chapter will cover the free movement of peoples (workers / establishment / citizens) through the case Commission v. Germany (subsidy on dwellings);[footnoteRef:10] the third chapter will explain the free movement of services through Kohll case;[footnoteRef:11] and the last chapter contains the free movement of capital with the case Commission v Portugal.[footnoteRef:12] In the final part, the paper will include the authors conclusion. [9: C-108/09 Ker Optica [2010] ECR I-12213] [10: C-152/05 Commission v Germany (subsidy on dwellings) [2008] ECR I-39] [11: C-158/96 Kohll [1998] ECR I-1931] [12: C-367/98 Commission v Portugal [2002] ECR I-4731]

A. FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS The free movement of goods (FMGs) has played the central role in the creation and development of the internal market of the EU.[footnoteRef:13] The goods are defined by the CJEU as products that can have economic value, and which are capable of creating the subject of commercial transactions.[footnoteRef:14] Goods may originate in the EU Member States, or from third states that are in free circulation in the EU.[footnoteRef:15] The provisions that govern the FMGs are classified in: [13: European Commission, Free movement of Goods: Guide to the application of Treaty provisions governing free movement of goods, 2010, p.8 ] [14: see C-7/68 Commission v Italy (Art Treasures) [1968] ECR 424 at 428, ] [15: C-41/76 Donckerwolcke [1976] ECR 1921]

tariff barriers Article 28 and 30 TFEU which forbids Member States from adopting customs duties on imports and exports (i.e. charges applied at the border of a state) or charges having equivalent effect (i.e. charges for inspections of imported goods);[footnoteRef:16] [16: see the definition for CEE in the C-24/68 Commission v Italy (statistical levy) [1969] ECR 193]

Article 110 TFEU which aims to eliminate internal taxation of a discriminatory nature; and non-tariff barriers Article 34 and 35 TFEU prohibit quantitative restrictions (QRs, i.e. ban or quota)[footnoteRef:17] on trade and all measures having equivalent effect (MEQRs)[footnoteRef:18] when importing and exporting; [17: see the definition for QR in the C-2/73 Geddo [1973 ECR 865, para.16 (quantitative restrictions are ... measures which amount to a total or partial restraint..of imports, exports or goods in transit)] [18: see in the Directive 70/50/EEC the classification of MEQRs in distinctly applicable (directly discriminating against imported goods) and indistinctly applicable (indirectly discriminating against imported and domestic goods, but affect more the imported ones) ]

Article 36 provides for exceptions to the QRs and MEQRs that are justified on grounds of public morality, public policy or public security; the protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants; the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value; or the protection of industrial and commercial property.In order to understand the concept of FMGs, it is important to examine briefly the Courts approach through Articles 34 and 35 TFEU in the most important judgments, by means of which the definition of MEQRs was developed beyond the Treaty provisions.The famous Dassonville case[footnoteRef:19] is the first case in the jurisprudence of the Court on the free movement of goods, were the CJEU widely defined the MEQRs as all trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade.[footnoteRef:20] Meaning that the discriminatory treatment is not the only aspect of the concept of MEQRs, but anything that could hinder directly or indirectly the free movement of goods. [19: C-8/74 Procureur du Roi v Benoit and Gustave Dassonville [1974] ECR 837] [20: Idem, para.5]

This was reaffirmed in the Cassis de Dijon case,[footnoteRef:21] and additionally the Court developed the general principle of mutual recognition indicating that every MS must accept on their market goods that are lawfully produced and marketed in other MS, regardless of whether there is no EU harmonized measure without imposing other restrictions.[footnoteRef:22] The Court developed on the rule of reason allowing MS to hold or impose trade barriers where necessary, in order to meet the mandatory requirements. [footnoteRef:23] The mandatory requirements are new open list exceptions (i.e. environmental protection)[footnoteRef:24] to those laid down in Article 36 TFEU. Nevertheless, the national measure invoked as mandatory must be justified and proportionate. [21: C-120/78 Rewe-Zentral (Cassis de Dijon) [1979] ECR 649] [22: Idem, para 14] [23: Idem, para 8] [24: C-302/86 Commission v Denmark [1988] ECR 4619]

After the Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon judgments, the caseload (preliminary rulings) significantly increased because traders began using Article 34 TFEU to challenge any domestic measures that restricted their commercial freedom, for instance cases regarding the prohibition of Sunday trading.[footnoteRef:25] [25: see e.g. C-145/88 Torfaen Borough Council v B&Q plc [1989] ECR 3851, para 12; C-169/91 Council of the City of Stoke-on-Trent and Norwich City Council v B&Q plc [1992] ECR I-6635.]

In response to the vagueness created by the Court in the previous rulings, it tightened the interpretation on MEQRs in the joined case Keck and Mittouard,[footnoteRef:26] by introducing a distinction between product requirements and certain selling arrangements. The new norm introduced by the Court provides that the national rules on product requirements (in terms of size, form, weight, etc.) will fall under the Cassis de Dijon principles, whereas in case of certain selling arrangements these were considered to not fall within Article 34-35 TFEU as indistinctly applicable, as long as they have been applied in a proportionate and non-discriminatory manner to all the products.[footnoteRef:27] The Court did not determine the concept of certain selling arrangements in the Keck ruling, however it was applied as a prohibition on sales at loss, regulations on opening hours for shops,[footnoteRef:28] interdiction on advertising,[footnoteRef:29] regulations on Internet and postal sales of medicinal products[footnoteRef:30], etc. [26: Joined C-267/91 and C-268/91 Criminal proceedings against Bernard Keck and Daniel Mithouard [1993] ECH I-6097] [27: Idem, para 15-16] [28: see e.g. C-418/93 Semeraro Casa Uno Srl v Sindaco del Comune di Erbusco [1996] ECR I-2975] [29: see e.g. C-405/98 Konsumentombudsmannen v. Gourmet International Products AB (GIP) [2001] ECR I-1795] [30: see e.g. C-322/01 Deutscher Apothekerverband (DocMorris) [2003] ECR I-14887]

In the latest Towing Trailers[footnoteRef:31] and Mickelsson and Roos[footnoteRef:32] cases the Court further explained what MEQRs are under Article 34 TFEU by adding the doctrine of market access. In the Towing Trailers judgment, despite reaffirming that the principles laid down in the Dassonville, Cassis de Dijon and Keck cases are still good law, the Court then adds that any other measure which hinders access of products originating in other Member States to the market of a Member State is also covered by that concept.[footnoteRef:33]Accordingly, after this sentence, Article 34 TFEU embodies the obligations to respect the three step test: the principle of non-discrimination, the principle of mutual recognition and the principle of market access. [31: C-110/05 Commisssion v Italy (Towing Trailers) [2009] ECR I-519] [32: C-142/05 Mickelsson and Roos [2009] ECR 842] [33: Idem,(Towing Trailers), para 37]

Finally, in the Ker-Optika case[footnoteRef:34] the Court was faced with a Hungarian measure restricting the sale of medical devices via the Internet, by requesting the sale of contact lenses in a specialized shop and with qualified stuff.[footnoteRef:35] The Court found that although the domestic measure in question regulated selling arrangements, the prohibition on selling contact lenses by mail order, deprives traders from other Member States of a particularly effective means of selling those products and thus significantly impedes access of those traders to the market of the Member State concerned.[footnoteRef:36]Moreover, any precautionary examinations by qualified ophthalmologists can be normally carried out in other places than specialized shops.[footnoteRef:37] The Hungarian measure violated the Electronic Commerce Directive[footnoteRef:38] and the law of distance selling.[footnoteRef:39] It amounted to an MEQRs and was found incompatible with the principle of proportionality. Overall, the case did not make any significant contribution to the online FMGs, rather it presents another case in the list of MEQRs rulings that hinder the market access. [34: C-108/09 Ker-Optika [2010] ECR I-12213] [35: Idem, para 7] [36: Idem, para 54] [37: Idem, para 66] [38: Directive 2000/31/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market] [39: Directive 97/7/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 1997 on the Protection of Consumers in Respect of DistanceContracts]

B. FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONSThe free movement of persons (FMPs) is the second central part of EU integration process. Originally the provisions of the Treaty were referred only to the economically active persons (employees, self-employed or providers of services). The concept has progressively evolved through constant amendments to the Treaty in order to cover all EU citizens, including non-economically active persons and citizens of third countries. The FMPs is governed by the Schengen agreements[footnoteRef:40] and the Directive 2004/38/EC[footnoteRef:41] and cover the following Treaty provisions: [40: the 1985 Schengen agreement and the 1995 Shengen implementing convention, introduced by the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam] [41: European Parliament and Council, Free Movement Directive 20047387EC of 29 April 2004 ]

Article 18 TFEU on non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality; Articles 20 and 21 TFEU, the free movement of citizens,[footnoteRef:42] refers to those holding the nationality of a MS;[footnoteRef:43] [42: the 1992 Maastricht Treaty introduced the concept of EU citizenship] [43: See C-135/08 Rottman v. Freistaat Bayern [2010] ECR I-1449, the questions regarding the nationality of citizens are decided by the MS ]

Articles 45 48 TFEU, the free movement of workers[footnoteRef:44] relates to those employed in genuine and effective economic relation, but not in a marginal or ancillary on;[footnoteRef:45] for a definite period of time (full/part time) and which are remunerated for the effectuated activity;[footnoteRef:46] [44: suplemented by secondary legislation: Council Regulation 492/2011/EU on Freedom of Movement for Workers within the Union, 2011] [45: C-139/85 Kempf v Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1986] ECR 1741, para 15] [46: C-66/85 Lawrie-Blum v Land Baden-Wurttemberg [1986] ECR 2121, para 16]

Article 49 TFEU, the freedom of establishment; Article 56 TFEU, the free to provide and receive services are also part of the FMPs.The free movement can be restricted only on the public policy, public security or public health grounds, and shall not apply to employment in the public service. The FPMs has been always a delicate subject, comparing with the FMGs. The FMPs has been gradually referred in the CJEU rulings. The most important development made by the CJEU jurisprudence is the shift from the prohibition of direct/indirect discrimination, towards a market access (restrictions/obstacles) approach, which is central for the achievement of the internal market. And if a barrier, limitation or any other obstacles to FMPs are found, these must be justified and proportionate.The relatively recent case Commission v Germany (subsidy on dwellings),[footnoteRef:47] deals with a German provision that grants a subsidy for the building or acquisition of dwellings to citizens liable to unlimited taxation of income only under the condition that these dwellings were located in Germany. The Commission delivered a notice to the Federal Republic of Germany that it found this provision incompatible with Article 45 TFEU on free movement of workers and Article 49 TFEU on freedom of establishment. Since the Commission was unsatisfied with the German officials response to that notice, the issue was referred to the CJEU. [47: C-152/05 Commission v Germany (subsidy on dwellings) [2008] ECR I-39]

The Court in its judgment stated that the provisions that are discouraging or hindering the citizens from leaving the country of origin in order to exercise their right to move freely amounts to a violation of Articles 45 and 49 TFEU.[footnoteRef:48] Germany claimed that the provision was justified, since its goal was to stimulate the national economy and to ensure adequate accommodations. However, the Court rejected this justification and said that the provision in question was applied not in a proportionate manner, exceeding what was necessary to reach the proposed objectives. [footnoteRef:49] [48: Idem, para 22] [49: Idem, para 27]

C. FREE MOVEMENT OF SERVICES The free movement of services (FMSs) is the third important freedom, since it holds 70% of the GDP and most of the employment within the Unions internal market. The FMSs comprises both the freedom of establishment, which allows a person or company to perform a stable and continuous economic activity in other MS,and the freedom to provide cross-border services, which allows a person or a company to offer services on a temporary basis, without need to establish in other MS. The FMSs are regulated by the Services Directive 2006/123 and the following Treaty provisions: Article 56 TFEU, a general prohibition of restrictions on FMSs, whenever the service provider or recipient is established in different MS; Article 57 TFEU, defines services as services that are normally provided for remuneration (non-economic activities are excluded) that are not governed by the provisions on free movement of goods, people or capital ; Articles 52 and 61 TFEU, derogations to FMSs are allowed on basis of public policy, public health and public security. The evolution of the FMSs in the jurisprudence of the CJEU is not as spectacular as, for instance, in the area of FMGs. The Court has struggled to define accurately what services are, mainly because of the unclear wording of Article 57 TFEU. Nevertheless, the approach is quite similar when the Court is dealing with indistinctly applicable measures, and again it has emphasized the new doctrine of market access. For instance in the Sger case, the Court said that Article 56 TFEU requires not only the removal of all forms of discrimination, but also the abolition of any other restrictions to free movement of services. [footnoteRef:50] This has been reaffirmed in the Gebhard case concerning the freedom of establishment, where the CJEU found that all national measures which hinder or make less attractive the exercise of fundamental freedoms are regarded as restrictions to free movement. [footnoteRef:51] From the judgment in this case, the restrictions on services will be allowed if national measures are equally applied to the domestic and foreign services, if it is justified by imperative requirement, such as legitimate public interest, and if it is proportionate.[footnoteRef:52] [50: C-76/90 Sger v Dennemeyer [1991] ECR I-4221, para 12] [51: C-55/94 Gebhard v Consiglio dellordine degli avvocati eprocuratori di Milano [1995] ECR I-4165, para 37] [52: Idem, para 38]

The social sensitive services, such as health care, education and sport are also subjected to Article 56, and they have been of great importance in EU to which the Court gave several judgments. Regarding cross-border health care services, the Kohll case[footnoteRef:53] gained a lot of legal attention. It concerns a Luxembourg national Mr. Kohll, covered with a health insurance in Luxemburg, who could not benefit for reimbursement for health care services for his daughter that were provided in Germany, because the insurance fund refused authorization to travel abroad based on the Regulation 1408/71 and that the treatment was not urgent and could be received in Luxemburg. Mr. Kohll argued that prior authorization constitutes a restriction to free movement of services and thus violates Articles 56 and 57 TFEU. [53: C-158/96 Kohll [1998] ECR I-1931]

First, the Court found that the national measure does not itself restrict the freedom to provide services, but just sets specific conditions for the reimbursement.[footnoteRef:54] It went on to hold that the national social security system must take in consideration the principle of FMSs. The Court concluded that the condition of prior authorization constituted a restriction to Article 56 and 57 TFEU. Such a restriction could not be justified on grounds of imperative requirements, since there was no general interest at stuck and that the reimbursement could not endanger the financial balance of social security system or the quality of the health services of the MS in question.[footnoteRef:55] [54: Idem, para 32 ] [55: Idem, para 50]

This case shows that despite the fact that health care is an area regulated by MS, the Court has penetrated into national law and came with positive outcome where this law opposed to EU. Moreover, it affirmed that EU citizens have the right to receive health care treatment outside the national borders.

D. FREE MOVEMENT OF CAPITALThe free movement of capital (FMC) is the fourth, the last and the only fundamental freedom of the internal market that needed more time to be liberalized. This is primarily because of the original Treaty provisions that did not requested full liberalization, MS just had to remove all the restriction that could affect the proper function of the internal market.[footnoteRef:56] [56: C-203/80 Casati [1991] ECR 2595, para 10]

Things changed when the Directive 88/361/EEC[footnoteRef:57] was created in order to give full liberalization of the FMC. Subsequently, the 1992 Maastricht Treaty established the single currency (euro) under the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). It also introduced the essential provisions of the Directive into the Treaty provisions under Article 63 TFEU, which prohibits all restrictions on free movement of capital and payments. These are applied between MS, and also between MS and third countries. Exceptions to the FMC are mainly related to taxation, public policy and security (Article 65), and financial sanctions on third countries agreed under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (Article 66 TFEU, safeguard clauses). [57: Council Directive 88/361/EEC of 24 June 1988 for the implementation of Article 67 of the Treaty, ]

In its turn, the Court stated that the FMC may be restricted only by national rules which are justified by overriding requirements of the general interest, and must be in accordance with the principle of proportionality.[footnoteRef:58] The overriding requirements have been further defined by the Court in its case law. These are for instance universal postal services,[footnoteRef:59] safeguarding supplies (petroleum, telecommunications, and electricity),[footnoteRef:60] etc. Moreover, the Court has moved from the non-discrimination and the restrictions approach, towards a broader interpretation by using the market access doctrine and terms such as obstacles or conduct liable to hinder, impede or affect persons or companies from having free cross-border movement.[footnoteRef:61] [58: C-174/04 Commission v Italy [2005] ECR I-4933] [59: See e.g. joined cases C-282/04 and C-283/04 Commission v the Netherlands [2006] ECR I-9141, para 38-39] [60: See e.g. C-463/00 Commission v Spain [2003] ECR I-4581] [61: Niamh Nic Shuibhne, The Coherence of EU law, Free Movement Law, Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 210-11]

The Commission v Portugal case[footnoteRef:62] is one of the so-called golden share[footnoteRef:63] cases, concerning direct discrimination. In this case, the Court was asked to review the national law regulating the privatization of undertakings in the banking, insurance, energy and transport areas. These instruments permitted to contain restrictions and penalties on the foreign capital held in privatized companies, and also required that before a single entity of national or foreign origin acquires shares over 10% in a privatized firm, it must obtain a prior authorization from the Portuguese Government. [62: C-367/98 Commission v Portugal [2002] ECR I-4731 ] [63: the term of golden share is used as a mechanism for keeping the state control over the state-owned enterprises from the main sectors of economy]

First, the Court said that the national restrictions on investors from other MS holding more than a given level of shares was discriminatory and thus violated Article 63 TFEU since it could not be justified under Article 65 TFEU.[footnoteRef:64] Concerning prior authorization requirement, the CJEU applied the Sger wording, and ruled that FMC is not merely about prohibition of unequal treatment on grounds of nationality between operators on financial markets, it also covers the national rules that are liable to impede or dissuade investors from other MS to invest in them.[footnoteRef:65] Thus, the measure was not discriminatory, but it was liable to impede the acquisition of shares and to render the FMC illusory.[footnoteRef:66] [64: Idem, para 40] [65: Idem, para 44] [66: Idem, para 45]

ConclusionsThe paper aim was to give a general view of the approaches taken by the CJEU in its jurisprudence across the four fundamental freedoms of the internal market of the European Union. The Court had always struggled to do justice, and fix the right balance between the interests of the European Union, its institutions and Member States, and their justified demand that seek to avoid the uncontrolled growth and development of the EU law. Undoubtedly, the Court has successfully fulfilled its mission in building and keeping alive the internal market project.First of all, when looking at the Courts judgments across all four freedoms it becomes obvious that at the heart of them lies the fundamental principle of equal treatment or non-discrimination, found in Article 18 TFEU. In accordance to the Courts view, this principle provides mainly that if goods and people are situated equally, there should be no direct[footnoteRef:67] or indirect discrimination. [67: See e.g. C-249/81 Commission v Ireland (Buy Irish) [1982] ECR 4005, para 22, the CJEU found direct discrimination in the Irish compain created to substitute the imported product that could threathen the Irish trade, with the national ones ]

In the field of indirect discriminations, the Court made a real revolution for the economic integration after Dawsonville, in the landmark decision Cassis de Dijon by introducing the principle of mutual recognition. The principle came with a different perspective of how the internal market should be perceived, by increasing the trust and removing barriers between Member States when there is no harmonized legislation. Only the mandatory requirements are accepted as a justification. Moreover, the burden of proof set for these requirements is really high, because the Member States should come first with a good reason and secondly they must show that the measure was applied in a proportionate manner.As a matter of fact, by looking at the decisions in Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon, it can be seen that the Court has smoothly redirected its attention from the non-discrimination approach, towards the market access doctrine. Focusing more on whether the national rule is hindering directly or indirectly, actually or potentially the trade within the European Union. Then in the latest Towing Trailers, the Court emphasized that the free movement is based on the three steps test: the principle of non-discrimination, the principle of mutual recognition and the principle of market access.Same in respect with other freedoms of the internal market, the Court stared progressively adopting the market access doctrine and the proportionality test. For instance in the Sger case, the Court required not only the removal of all forms of discrimination, but also the abolition of any other restrictions to free movement of services, justified only by the imperative requirements, as in case of public interest. The approach extended to the free movement of workers and freedom of capital. Overall in can be concluded from the case that the CJEU took mostly the same approach towards each of the EU internal markets freedoms, even though the evolution of them has been different. The shift from non-discrimination to the market access has demonstrated to be a remarkable instrument for the achievement of the idea behind EU, namely the internal market.

Bibliography General sources: Catherine Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU. The four freedoms. Oxford University Press, 2014 Niamh Nic Shuibhne, The Coherence of EU law, Free Movement Law, Oxford University Press, 2013 Paul Craig and Grainne de Burca, EU law: Text, Cases and Materials, Oxford University Press, 2010 Jacques Pelkmans, The Economics of single Market Regulation, 2012 M. E. Mendez-Pinedo, EC and EEA law: A Comparative Study of the Effectiveness of European Law, 2009 European Commission, Free movement of Goods: Guide to the application of Treaty provisions governing free movement of goods, 2010

Internet main source: European Union web site, http://europa.eu/index_en.htm European Union Law, http://eur-lex.europa.eu

Agreements, Conventions and Treaties: Treaty of the European Union Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Cases: C-108/09 Ker Optica [2010] ECR I-12213 C-152/05 Commission v Germany (subsidy on dwellings) [2008] ECR I-39 C-158/96 Kohll [1998] ECR I-1931 C-367/98 Commission v Portugal [2002] ECR I-4731 C-7/68 Commission v Italy (Art Treasures) [1968] ECR 424 at 428, C-41/76 Donckerwolcke [1976] ECR 1921 C-24/68 Commission v Italy (statistical levy) [1969] ECR 193 C-2/73 Geddo [1973] ECR 865 C-8/74 Procureur du Roi v Benoit and Gustave Dassonville [1974] ECR 837 C-120/78 Rewe-Zentral (Cassis de Dijon) [1979] ECR 649 C-302/86 Commission v Denmark [1988] ECR 4619 C-267/91 and C-268/91 Criminal proceedings against Bernard Keck and Daniel Mithouard [1993] ECH I-6097 C-174/04 Commission v Italy [2005] ECR I-4933 C-203/80 Casati [1991] ECR 2595 C-110/05 Commisssion v Italy (Towing Trailers) [2009] ECR I-519 C-142/05 Mickelsson and Roos [2009] ECR 842 C-135/08 Rottman v. Freistaat Bayern [2010] ECR I-1449 C-139/85 Kempf v Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1986] ECR 1741 C-66/85 Lawrie-Blum v Land Baden-Wurttemberg [1986] ECR 2121 C-76/90 Sger v Dennemeyer [1991] ECR I-4221, para 12 C-55/94 Gebhard v Consiglio dellordine degli avvocati eprocuratori di Milano [1995] ECR I-4165, para 37