Formerly Water Resources Update Issue 129 October 2004 · 2017-10-25 · JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY WATER RESEARCH AND EDUCATION UCOWR Murray 1 Water and Homeland Security: An Introduction

Issue 129October 2004

A Publication of theUniversities Council on Water Resources

Journal of Contemporary

Water Research & EducationFormerly Water Resources Update

Water and Homeland Security

Ken RubinPA Consulting

Penny FirthNational Science Foundation

Tamim YounosVirginia Polytechnic Institute

Ari MichelsenTexas A & M University

JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY WATER RESEARCH & EDUCATIONUniversities Council on Water Resources

1000 Faner Drive, Room 4543Southern Illinois University

Carbondale, Illinois 62901-4526Telephone: (618) 536-7571

EDITORChristopher L. Lant

Universities Council on Water Resources1000 Faner Drive, Room 4541

Southern Illinois UniversityCarbondale, Illinois 62901-4526

(618) 453-6020FAX (618) 453-2671

[email protected]

ISSUE EDITOR

EDITORIAL STAFF

EDITORIAL BOARD

Regan MurrayLos Alamos National Laboratory

John BradenUniversity of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Stuart DavisU.S. Army Corps of Engineers

Gary JohnsonUniversity of Idaho

Ethan T. SmithUSGS (Retired)

L. Allan JamesUniversity of South Carolina

Sarah BiggerBoise State University

Subscription Information: The Journal of Contemporary Water Research & Education is published quarterly by the Universities Council onWater Resources. The annual subscription rate is $35 (domestic) and $55 (international). Prices per copy for past issues are $15 (domestic)and $20 (international). Members of UCOWR receive Journal of Contemporary Water Research & Education as a part of their membership(dues are $350 per institution per fiscal year).

UCOWR is not responsible for the statements and opinions expressed by authors of articles in Journal of Contemporary Water Research &Education.

Jim StiversSouthern Illinois UniversityCarbondale, Illinois 62901

[email protected]

Regan MurrayResearch Scientist

National Homeland Security Research CenterU.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Washington, DC(513) 569-7031

[email protected]

Stephen KonieczkaSouthern Illinois UniversityCarbondale, Illinois 62901

[email protected]

Journal of ContemporaryWater Research & Education

October 2004Issue No. 129


Contents

Water and Homeland Security: An IntroductionRegan Murray ........................................................................................................................................................... 1

Water Security Research and Policy: EPA’s Water Security Research and Technical Support Action PlanJonathan Herrmann and Grace Robiou ..................................................................................................................... 3

Assessing the Vulnerabilities of U.S. Drinking Water SystemsJeffrey Danneels and Ray Finley .............................................................................................................................. 8

Responding to Threats and Incidents of Intentional Drinking Water ContaminationSteven Allgeier and Matthew Magnuson .................................................................................................................. 13

Water Treatment and Equipment Decontamination TechniquesKim Fox ................................................................................................................................................................. 18

Linking Public Health and Water Utilities to Improve Emergency ResponseR.J. Gelting and M.D. Miller .................................................................................................................................... 22

Safeguarding the Security of Public Water Supplies Using Early Warning Systems: A Brief ReviewJafrul Hasan, Stanley States, and Rolf Deininger ................................................................................................... 27

Use of Systems Analysis to Assess and Minimize Water Security RisksJames Uber, Regan Murray, and Robert Janke ...................................................................................................... 34

Wastewater SecurityEileen J. O’Neill and Alan Hais ............................................................................................................................... 41

UCOWR Board of Directors .................................................................................................................................... 47

UCOWR Member Institutions ................................................................................................................................. 48

The Benefits of UCOWR Membership..................................................................................................................... 49

Friends of UCOWR ................................................................................................................................................ 50

2004 UCOWR Awards ............................................................................................................................................ 51

JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY WATER RESEARCH AND EDUCATION UCOWR

1Murray

Water and Homeland Security: An Introduction

Regan Murray

U. S. Environmental Protection Agency

UNIVERSITIES COUNCIL ON WATER RESOURCESJOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY WATER RESEARCH AND EDUCATION

ISSUE 129, PAGES 1-2, OCTOBER 2004

The possibility of terrorist disruption orcontamination of the United States’ waterresources recently entered our national

consciousness. Since September 11, 2001, severalmedia reports revealed plots to contaminate drinkingwater. In 2002, suspected terrorists in Italy andFrance were arrested under suspicion of planningto contaminate drinking water systems—maps ofwater distribution systems and service connectionswere found in their possession. In 2003, an emailfrom an al Qaeda spokesman to an Arabic mediaoutlet stated the group’s intention to poison the UnitedStates’ water supply. In response, public and privateentities have cooperated to determine effectivepreventative measures and counter-measures toimprove the security of the water supply. The U.S.Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), as the leadfederal agency for protecting the nation’s watersupply, began working with water utilities, waterassociations, other federal agencies, and the statesto fortify the tens of thousands of utilities that providewater to the American people. The Public HealthPrevention and Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of2002, in part, provides funding and direction for watersecurity initiatives.

Individual water utilities have incurred greatexpense and effort to improve their security. Manyhave spent large sums of money to harden theirsystems against attacks by adding locks, fences,security guards, new policies and procedures foremployees, and updated computer systems. Utilitieshave also improved their emergency responsecapabilities, forming local and regional partnerships

with law enforcement and public health officials.Now, to address the threat of contamination, waterutilities are considering the use of sensors and earlywarning systems, and the use of computationalmodels to track, isolate, and optimize treatment ofcontaminated water.

However, many questions remain about thenation’s ability to protect water systems adequately.To a large degree, effective political policies andemergency response protocols are hindered by thelack of available and reliable scientific information.

An avalanche of research has been sparked toaddress these unknowns. Much is focused on thepotential agents of contamination: Which agents posea real threat to drinking water systems? How dothese agents behave in drinking water systems? Canthey be removed or inactivated with conventionaltreatment? Can better analytical methods andlaboratory protocols be developed to sample, identifyand verify these agents? Research also pertains tomethods to detect contamination—improved sensorsand hardware and public health surveillancenetworks. Much research is also focused on dataanalysis tools and computational models—vulnerability assessments, real time patternrecognition and data analysis for early warningsystems, and improved hydraulic and water qualitymodels to prepare for and respond to attacks.Research is also needed in the social sciences,including cost-benefit analysis for securityimprovements.

This issue of the Journal of ContemporaryWater Research and Education outlines the current

Water and Homeland Security: An Introduction2

JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY WATER RESEARCH AND EDUCATIONUCOWR

major areas of research in water security, andhighlights the scientific unknowns that are preventingthe development of reliable and robust protectivemeasures for our nation’s water supply. Expertsfrom various government agencies, nationallaboratories, universities, water utilities, and waterassociations prepared the papers in this issue. Thepapers address the following topics: EPA’s policyand research efforts in water security; methods toidentify vulnerabilities of water systems; earlywarning systems; applications of hydraulic modeling;treatment and decontamination; emergency responseprotocols; public health initiatives; and wastewatersecurity. Research in these areas promises tobroaden our basic understanding of drinking watersystems, improve water security, water quality andsystem operations. It is hoped that these paperswill inspire readers to initiate research in these areas.

The papers in this issue are drawn largely fromUCOWR’s 2003 conference held in Washington,D.C., on “Water and Homeland Security in the 21st

Century.” We hope readers will considerparticipating in our 2005 conference to be held July12-14, in Portland, Maine, on “River and LakeRestoration: Changing Landscapes.” See the backof this issue for the call for papers.


3Herrmann and Robiou

Water Security Research and Policy:EPA’s Water Security Research

and Technical Support Action Plan

Water—every drop of it—is a preciousnatural resource that Americans onceenjoyed with little thought to potential

tampering by terrorists or others. Today, however,U.S. citizens are increasingly aware of threats ofharm to our homeland. The terrorist attacks ofSeptember 11, 2001, and the delivery of anthrax-contaminated letters later that year have taught allof us to anticipate threats to our waters.

Terrorist threats are targeted not just atindividuals, but also at the country’s vital institutionsand infrastructure, including the nation’s drinkingwater and wastewater systems. Government, waterutilities, state and local water agencies, public healthorganizations, emergency and follow-up responders,and academia, as well as the private sector fromacross the country must be ready to protect waterinfrastructure. These organizations are workingtogether to reduce vulnerabilities to terrorism, preventand prepare for terrorist attacks, minimize publichealth impacts and infrastructure damage, andenhance recovery from any attacks that may occur.

In 2002, the Administration developed a road mapfor securing the homeland—The National Strategyfor Homeland Security 1 —which lays out specificobjectives for border and transportation security,emergency preparedness and response, protectingcritical infrastructure, domestic counterterrorism,defending against catastrophic threats, andintelligence and warning. This road map designates

the United States Environmental Protection Agency(EPA) as the lead federal agency for protectingcritical drinking water and wastewater treatment anddistribution system infrastructure.

EPA’s Role in Water Security

The Public Health Security and BioterrorismPreparedness and Response Act (Bioterrorism Act)of 20022 is the legislative mandate for EPA’s workin water security. This law, coupled with executivedirectives and the Agency’s own strategic plan forhomeland security, guide the Agency’s research andtechnical support activities to protect waterinfrastructure. The Homeland Security PresidentialDirective on Critical Infrastructure Identification,Prioritization, and Protection (HSPD-7)3 reinforcesEPA’s role as the sector-specific lead for waterinfrastructure. It also assigns the responsibility ofcoordinating the overall national effort to protectcritical infrastructure and key resources of the UnitedStates to the Department of Homeland Security.

As the sector-specific federal lead for protectingthe nation’s drinking water and wastewaterinfrastructures, EPA plays a critical role in thehomeland security arena. To meet theseresponsibilities, the Agency’s Office of Water (OW)established the Water Protection Task Force. InAugust 2003, the Task Force was organized formallyas the Water Security Division (WSD). Additionally,



Jonathan G. Herrmann, P.E. DEE1 and Grace M. Robiou, M.P.H.2

1Water Security Team Leader, National Homeland Security Research Center, Office of Research and Development,U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2Branch Chief, Threat Analysis, Prevention and Preparedness Branch,

Water Security Division, Office of Water, U. S. Environmental Protection Agency

Water Security Research and Policy4


the Agency’s Office of Research and Development(ORD) officially established the National HomelandSecurity Research Center (NHSRC) in February 2003.These organizations work together to provide researchand technical support for the drinking water andwastewater sectors.

NHSRC’s Water Security Team contributes byconducting applied research and then reporting on waysto better secure the nation’s water systems from threatsand attacks. The Water Security Research Programproduces analytical tools and procedures, technologyevaluations, models and methodologies,decontamination techniques, technical resource guidesand protocols, and risk assessment methods. All ofthese products are for use by EPA’s key waterinfrastructure customers—water utility operators, publichealth officials, and emergency and follow-upresponders (see Table 1). Other research programs inNHSRC deal with the protection of buildings and rapidrisk assessment.

EPA’s WSD provides support to drinking water andwastewater systems by preparing vulnerabilityassessment and emergency response systems and tools,providing technical and financial assistance, anddeveloping information exchange mechanisms. WSDis also charged with supporting best security practices,providing security enhancement guidance, andincorporating security into the day-to-day operationsof the drinking water and wastewater sectors. Inaddition, WSD works closely with NHSRC in deliveringresearch results in a timely and appropriate fashion.

Along with providing research and technical support,both NHSRC and WSD encourage information sharingand risk communication strategies among key waterinfrastructure customers. This includes making use ofthe Water Information Sharing and Analysis Center(WaterISAC)4.

Water Security Research andTechnical Support Action Plan

To better understand the security problems of thewater industry in the United States, EPA has engagedin conversation with numerous water experts andstakeholders from government, industry, and academia.Other key participants are representatives from publichealth organizations, emergency responders and follow-up responders, law enforcement officials, environmentalgroups, and related professional associations.

As a result of these meetings, EPA has gainedvaluable insights on the vulnerabilities and technicalchallenges facing the water industry for which researchand technical support are crucial. With assistance fromother federal agencies and contractors, both WSD andNHSRC are addressing these challenges. Issues, needs,and projects are summarized in the comprehensiveWater Security Research and Technical SupportAction Plan, otherwise known as the Action Plan.

Much of the work described in the Action Planhas begun, and what is not underway will begin duringthe next few months. The Action Plan must berecognized as a snapshot in time. As new informationis developed on threats, contaminants, and threatsituations, adjustments will most certainly be necessary.Revisions to the Action Plan will be made periodicallybased on input from others dealing with drinking waterand wastewater security. The Action Plan will alsoevolve based on changing needs in the homelandsecurity arena.

The Action Plan addresses drinking water supply,water treatment, finished water storage, and drinkingwater distribution system infrastructure. It alsoaddresses wastewater treatment and collectioninfrastructure, which includes sanitary and stormsewers or combined sanitary-storm sewer systems,wastewater treatment, and treated wastewaterdischarges to rivers, estuaries, and lakes.

Research and Technical SupportQuestions

In various meetings with EPA, federal partners andwater stakeholders discussed issues, needs, and projectsto secure water infrastructure and safeguard waterquality. The Action Plan developed as a result of thesemeetings describes research and technical support thataddresses many questions focused on protecting waterinfrastructure. Some of the questions are as follows:

Water industry representativesState, regional, and local response organizationsPublic health officials and organizationsFederal agencies and departmentsLaboratories with water sample testing capabilitiesIndividuals and organizations with water expertiseElected officials and the public

Table 1. Potential users of information developedunder the Action Plan.



Drinking water questions1. What are the most plausible threats,

contaminants, and threat scenarios facing thewater industry? How does this informationcompare with intelligence information onpossible threats?

2. How could computers be tampered with,particularly supervisory control and dataacquisition systems to negatively impactwater system operations? What might thoseimpacts be and how best can such tamperingbe prevented or minimized?

3. What would be the cascading effects of anattack on a water system, and what are theimpacts on water systems when other criticalinfrastructure systems malfunction? How canthese effects or impacts be minimized?

4. What types of biological and chemicalcontaminants could be introduced into watersystems and what are their physical,chemical, and biological properties? What arethe potential health impacts of thesecontaminants?

5. What are the most effective means to detectcontaminants in water? How can thisinformation be combined with reporting,analysis, and decision making to arrive at areliable and cost effective early warningsystem?

6. Do surrogates, or chemical, biological, andbiochemical alternatives exist that might besafely used for research and testing purposesin place of hazardous and potentially lethalagents? How reliable are these surrogatesin representing actual agent characteristicsin water?

7. Can effective methods be developed to ensurethat a sufficient number of qualified laboratoriesexist to perform rapid analysis of watercontaminants in the event of an attack?

8. If contaminants are introduced into a watersystem, where will they travel? How quickly willthey travel? What will be their concentration atvarious points along their path? Can the humanhealth impacts of these contaminants beeffectively minimized?

9. How can water that has been contaminated beeffectively treated so that it can be released towastewater systems or otherwise effectivelydisposed of?

10. How can water materials and equipment thatare contaminated, be cleaned, and returned toservice as quickly as possible after an attack? Whatare the best ways to determine residualcontamination, if any, that might linger over the longterm?

11. Are alternative water supplies available in theevent of an attack? How would water utilities orgovernments most effectively supply clean waterto affected communities and business in both theshort and long term?

12. What are the routes of human exposure tocontaminants if a water system is attacked?

13. What are the acute and chronic impacts fromthese exposures and can they be adequatelyrepresented based on existing risk information?

14. Can a health surveillance network be establishedto rapidly identify disease outbreaks associatedwith contaminated water? Are there other meansof providing early warnings or alerts from watercontamination using surrogate health data?

Wastewater questions1. What are the risks of hazardous substances that

may be introduced into wastewater treatmentsystems?

2. Can intrusion and surveillance monitoringtechnologies be improved to rapidly detect watercontamination and alert authorities should awastewater facility be compromised?

3. Are alternative wastewater treatments anddischarge locations available in the event of anattack?

Information questions1. How best can emergency responders, public

health officials, health care providers, and thepublic be effectively and efficiently informed inthe event of an attack?

Recommendations from partner and stakeholdermeetings are organized in the Action Plan underthe seven issues listed in Figure 2. The plan describessignificant research needs for these categories andlists specific projects for each need (refer to theAction Plan for more information). Although theAction Plan focuses primarily on biological andchemical (including radiological) contaminants indrinking water systems, it also addresses physical

Water Security Research and Policy6


Table 2. Example Action Plan Needs

and cyber threats, contingency planning, riskassessment and risk communication, andinfrastructure interdependencies. The Action Planfocuses on research to:1. Protect drinking water systems from physical

and cyber threats2. Identify drinking water threats, contaminants,

and threat scenarios3. Improve analytical methodologies and

monitoring systems for drinking water4. Contain, treat, decontaminate, and dispose of

contaminated water and materials5. Plan for contingencies and address

infrastructure interdependencies6. Target impacts on human health and inform the

public about risks7. Protect wastewater treatment and collection

systems

Action Plan Schedule and Products

The challenges facing the Agency in protectingwater infrastructure are interdependent and complex.The goal of the Action Plan, however, is to provideuseful and timely products to key customers by theend of 2005 and, of course, along the way. Toaccomplish this goal, EPA is partnering with other

federal agencies, national laboratories, non-governmental water industry research groups, and theprivate sector to build on existing strengths, share theworkload, and take advantage of related researchalready underway. One example of this is theDistribution System Research Consortium, formed byNHSRC and WSD. The consortium meets twice ayear to address research and technical support issuesaround distribution systems. Members includerepresentatives from the Department of HomelandSecurity, the Centers for Disease Control andPrevention, the Department of Defense, theDepartment of Energy, and the U. S. Geological Survey,among others. Work in progress will also be shared inopen forums such as journals, conferences, andworkshops. If the information is sensitive, it will beshared through more limited venues such as theWaterISAC.

EPA’s research and technical support activities willresult in various types of products, tools, andtechnologies, such as those listed in Table 3. Thesewill be available to the water industry, public healthofficials, elected officials, health care providers,emergency responders, and others to aid in the fightagainst terrorism. A listing of all available researchproducts, as well as many of the products themselves,will be placed on NHSRC’s Web site at: http://

Ensure the protection of existing water infrastructureEnhance cyber security and other external means of disrupting water systemsIdentify and characterize threats that could be used to disrupt water systemsDevelop methods for detecting and monitoring contaminants in waterCreate rapid screening technologies for the identification of unknown contaminantsTest and evaluate the performance of sensors and biomonitorsImprove detectors and early warning systems for water distribution and collection systemsEnhance models for contaminant transport in pipes and distribution systemsRefine fate and transport information for contaminants in waterDevelop treatment or inactivation techniques for water contaminantsEvaluate and improve decontamination and disposal techniques for contaminated materials and equipmentEstablish contingency planning and infrastructure backup proceduresImprove methods for assessing risks to the public from water contaminationEnhance risk communication and information sharing among individuals and organizations dealing witha threat or attackProvide training and exercises that enhance preparedness, response, and mitigation to water systemthreats or attacks



www.epa.gov/ordnhsrc. An internet-based catalogwith publicly-available products from both WSD andNHSRC will be located on the WSD Web site at: http://www.epa.gov/safewater/security. EPA informationclearinghouses, booths at conferences and workshops,and announcements and press releases will be used todeliver Action Plan results as well.

Additional Information

With a long history in environmental protection, andassessing and managing risks, EPA is well positionedto develop the tools and technologies that addressthreats to and attacks on drinking water andwastewater systems. As the lead for the research underthis Action Plan, NHSRC is providing applied researchthat can be used quickly by those with a stake in securingwater system infrastructure. As the lead for technicalsupport to key customers in the water arena, WSD ischarged with a much broader responsibility that isinformed by NHSRC’s research. The Water SecurityResearch and Technical Support Action Plan is ajoint and collaborative undertaking that involves bothorganizations. Such an approach in addressing watersecurity has worked well to date and will continue intothe future.

Acknowledgements

The efforts of members of both the Water Security Team in theOffice of Research and Development’s National HomelandSecurity Research Center and the Water Security Division in theOffice of Water are greatly appreciated. Virginia Hodge and Markvan Hook of SAIC provided editorial and technical support inpreparation of the Action Plan.

Author Bio and Contact Information

JONATHAN HERRMANN is the Water Security Team Leader for theNational Homeland Security Research Center. He has served invarious capacities within EPA’s Office of Research andDevelopment (ORD) since 1978. Prior to his current position,Jon was a strategic planner for the National Risk ManagementResearch Laboratory where he developed the Mercury ResearchStrategy for ORD. He holds a bachelor’s degree in CivilEngineering and a master’s degree in Business Administration.Jon is a member of the American Society of Civil Engineers, theAmerican Academy of Environmental Engineers, and theAmerican Water Works Association. He is a ProfessionalEngineer in the State of Ohio. Address: 26 W. Martin LutherKing Drive (MS 163), Cincinnati, OH 46268; e-mail address:[email protected]

GRACE ROBIOU is presently the chief of the Threat Analysis,Prevention and Preparedness Branch of the USEPA’s WaterSecurity Division. This group is responsible for identificationand analysis of threats and related risks to water and wastewaterutilities, development of emergency response tools and training,implementation of research and technical support plans, andrelated activities. Prior to joining EPA’s water program, she wasinvolved in registration, regulatory harmonization projects andmigrant agricultural worker safety issues related to pesticides.She holds a master’s degree in public health and a bachlelor ofscience degree in environmental science. Address: 1200Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Mail Code 4201M, Washington, D.C.20460; e-mail address: [email protected]

Notes

1. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA). 2004.Water Security Research and Technical Support Action Plan.EPA/600/4-04/063. Cincinnati, OH: U.S. EnvironmentalProtection Agency, Office of Research and Development,and Washington DC: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,Office of Water. Available at http://www.epa.gov/ordnhrc/pubs/bookActionPlan031204.pdf

2. United States Congress. 2002 Public Law 107-188. PublicHealth Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness andResponse Act of 2002. Available at http://www.epa.gov./safewater/watersecurity/pubs/security-act.pdf.

3. The Whitehouse Office of Homeland Security. 2002. NationalStrategy for Homeland Security. Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/nat_strat_hls.pdf

4. The Whitehouse Office of the Press Secretary. 2003.Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-7. CriticalInfrastructure Identification, Prioritization and Protection.Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12 20031217-5.html

Computerized data compendiumsResponse guides and protocolsTechnical resource documents, case, studies, and

model proceduresLaboratory methods and protocolsCommunication tools and frameworksTechnology screening, evaluation, and verificationWorkshops and seminarsComputerized tools and software systemsRisk assessment methods and proceduresJournal articles, fact sheets and technical bulletins

Table 3. Action Plan Products

Assessing the Vulnerabilities of U.S. Drinking Water Systems8


Assessing the Vulnerabilitiesof U.S. Drinking Water Systems

Jeffrey J. Danneels and Ray E. Finley

Sandia National Laboratories

During the Clinton administration, theimportance of our critical infrastructure washighlighted by the National Security Council

in Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD 63).PDD 63 was superseded recently when PresidentBush signed Homeland Security PresidentialDirective 7 (HSPD-7). HSPD 7, like its predecessorPDD 63, establishes a national policy under whichfederal departments and agencies are required toidentify and prioritize United States criticalinfrastructure and the key resources needed toprotect them from terrorist attacks. PDD 63 andHSPD 7 also encourage Federal departments andagencies to form public and private partnerships topursue the goal of lowering risks to our national assetsdue to malevolent events. The EnvironmentalProtection Agency (EPA) is assigned responsibilityfor the water infrastructure, which includes bothdrinking water and wastewater systems.

Subscribers (mainly water utilities) of theAmerican Water Works Association ResearchFoundation (AwwaRF) were also becomingconcerned about security at drinking water utilitiesand encouraged AwwaRF to assist them inunderstanding potential malevolent threats. Inresponse to PDD 63, and with input from public waterutilities, both EPA and AwwaRF initiated programsto understand and mitigate the security vulnerabilitiesof drinking water utilities. The events of 9/11accelerated the development of these programs.

This paper describes efforts to assess and mitigatethe vulnerabilities of drinking water utilities. (SeeO’Neill and Hais, this issue, for a discussion of

wastewater security issues.) This paper coversseveral key areas, including threat assessment, watercontamination, and response effectiveness.

Law Requires VulnerabilityAssessments

On June 12, 2002, President Bush signed thePublic Health Security and BioterrorismPreparedness and Response Act of 2002 into law(PL 107-188). This Act requires community watersystems that serve populations of greater than 3,300persons to conduct vulnerability assessments.According to EPA statistics, approximately 4,800water utilities fit into this category. When combined,these water utilities serve over 256 million people.

Large drinking water utilities, defined as thoseserving more than 100,000 people, were required toconduct their vulnerability assessments and submita report to the EPA by March 31, 2003. Drinkingwater utilities serving 50,000 to 100,000 people wereto conduct their vulnerability assessments and submita report by December 31, 2003. Drinking waterutilities serving 3,300 to 50,000 people were toconduct their vulnerability assessments and submita report by June 30, 2004.

Vulnerability Assessment Process

In cooperation with the EPA and AwwaRF,Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) created theRisk Assessment Methodology for Water Utilitiesknown as RAM-WTM. RAM-WTM is the most widely




9Danneels and Finley

used methodology to assess security risks at largewater utilities. Several thousand water utility owners/operators, regulators, and water industry consultantshave been trained in the use of RAM-WTM. Othertools have been developed by other entities and wereused at several large water utilities, but were appliedmore prevalently to medium and small water utilities.

Figure 1 illustrates the process followed in RAM-WTM and demonstrates the iterative nature of themethodology. This methodology was developedthrough decades of security research anddevelopment at Sandia, initially focused on safety ofnuclear facilities. Ideally, the entire analysis is drivenby the threats one wants to protect against. In manyhigh-security applications, this threat level isdetermined by a federal entity (e.g., the Departmentof Energy or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission)and a designated security analyst then evaluates theeffectiveness of the security system. Most high-security applications also employ an on-site guardforce, usually armed and well trained, to respond tomalevolent incidents. Managers of the majority ofcivilian infrastructures do not employ a dedicatedresponse force and operate geographically distributedassets, the majority of which reside in the publicrealm.

Each major block of the methodology has multiplesteps and/or requirements. For a complete

description of RAM-WTM, please contact theAmerican Water Works Association for a copy (therequestor must demonstrate a need-to-know andmust sign a nondisclosure agreement). AwwaRFsubscribers may contact them directly.

Results

Sandia conducted several vulnerabilityassessments during the development and validationof RAM-W TM and water utility owners/operatorsand consultants applied the methodology at severalhundred additional locations. As a result, the watercommunity gained a good understanding of the stateof security at water utilities and identified challengesthat may lie ahead. In a recent project, AwwaRFand Sandia teamed to collect information on thevulnerability assessments conducted by the largewater utilities to better understand (1) how well theprocess worked, (2) remaining areas of concern,and (3) what further developmental efforts to pursue(AwwaRF 2004).

Defining the Threat to Water Utilities

Although encouraged to contact local lawenforcement and other authorities, most waterutilities found it difficult to obtain relevant threat data.

Figure 1. RAM-WTM Process



As stated earlier, the specified threat drives the riskanalysis. Therefore, water utilities are faced with ahigh degree of ambiguity about what the actualthreats are while having to undertake risk reductionprograms that may cost millions of dollars. Evenwith the billions of dollars already being spent toimprove the security of our nation’s water utilities, itis questionable whether or not the utilities will beable to withstand a high-level threat. Much of theutilities’ infrastructure resides in the public realm, isbroadly distributed, and is very difficult to protect.

The federal government has not defined a threatthat can be used as the basis of a security design forthe water infrastructure, nor is there agreement inthe water community about what threats to consider.Therefore, the water utilities analyzed a multitudeof threats and threat levels. Neighboring waterutilities often used significantly different threat levelsduring their risk assessment. The number ofadversaries and their projected capabilities willdramatically affect the outcome of the security riskanalysis.

Contamination of Water Supplies

One of the least understood threats to the drinkingwater industry is contamination, particularly in thewater distribution system. At the beginning of theprogram to assess the vulnerabilities of waterutilities, very little was known about malevolent watercontamination and even fewer analytical tools wereavailable to help understand and analyze the problem.Since 9/11, several groups, including the AwwaRF,the EPA, and the Center for Disease Control, havecollaborated to collect and characterize informationon contaminants that may pose a significant healththreat in drinking water systems. Prioritizingcontaminants, developing methods to rapidly detectthem, developing a full understanding of contaminantfate and transport, developing estimates forcontamination risks to water distribution systems,creating programs for isolating and treatingcontaminants, and final restoration of clean watersupplies are all in their early stages of development.

Sandia has launched an internal research program,with collaborators at EPA, to provide tools foranswering many of these important contamination-related questions. This research program willdevelop numerical tools to probabilistically predictthe fate and transport of a variety of potential

contaminants and thus facilitate the development ofcontamination risk maps for water distributionsystems. The research program will also helpdetermine optimal sensor locations for detection ofcontaminants (assuming the appropriate sensors aredeveloped) and develop analytical tools to quicklylocate where contaminants were introduced.

Response to Threats

High-security environments often have an on-siteresponse force to deal with malevolent threats. Thevast majority of water utilities do not employ such astrategy. Instead, they rely on cooperation from locallaw enforcement, public health authorities, and otherproviders of emergency services. This is not anunusual situation within the community of criticalinfrastructures, but this approach leads to longresponse times, raising a concern about the level ofsecurity provided.

Immediately after 9/11, many metropolitan areasassigned police officers at water utility assets to deteradversaries. Due to budget constraints and a beliefthat the threat is not as imminent as previouslybelieved, this practice has been largely discontinued.

Recommendations

Based on the experience of applying RAM-WTM

to hundreds of water utilities, several improvementscould enhance future risk assessments. Theseimprovements include: a refined threat description,complete integration of the water distribution systemcontamination analysis with the risk assessment,and improved response protocols. Naturally, theserecommendations will require resources and timeto accomplish.

Because the threat level drives the riskassessment analysis and ultimately, the riskreduction recommendations, the area of threatassessment could be improved. A variety ofapproaches may be taken, such as the following:1. Issue a mandatory threat level for all water

utilities (minimum standard) to use as the basisfor determining which risk reduction upgradesare appropriate

2. Use a graded approach to implementingupgrades based on population served or someother statistic, such as volume of water shipped


11Danneels and Finley

3. Water-community-developed threat scenariosthat are graded by population

4. Threat levels based on regional or targetattractiveness

Whatever threat definition system is chosen,consistency and minimally acceptable threat levelsshould be created to provide a balanced approachto countering the threat.

The water distribution system has long beenknown to represent one of the greatest securityvulnerabilities. Current challenges include a lackof clear understanding of the fate and transportand consequences of potential contaminants withina water distribution system coupled with generallyeasy access into the system. To minimize thepotential risks from a malevolent contaminationattack, it is first necessary to develop computationaltools that can predict the fate and transport ofcontaminants within distribution systems, or moregenerally, how contaminants might move in ahydraulically complex pipe network. Thiscomputational tool must be integrated within asystematic framework (as embodied inRAM-WTM), so that a more comprehensive riskassessment can be accomplished. Such a tool (orset of tools) (1) would be capable of determining(in a probabilistic sense) the spread of contaminantswithin a distribution system, (2) could be used toestimate consequences from such an attack, (3)would be able to identify optimum locations forearly-warning sensors, and (4) would be able toidentify the source location (point of introduction)in near-real time. Determining the extent ofcontamination in a water distribution system in realtime is essential so that proper actions can be takento minimize the further spread of the contaminants.

Methodologies for conducting vulnerabilityassessments should include a framework forcleanup and recovery. The tools to estimate thefate and transport of contaminants within a waterdistribution system could also play a significant rolein developing a methodology for recovery aftersuch an event and could serve as the instrument tointegrate both components for the protection ofdrinking water systems.

Better response protocols are needed in severalareas. Response to water contamination events isentirely different than response to an armed attackwhere the intent is to damage the utility’s physicalassets. The current research underway to

understand the fate and transport of contaminantswill help decision makers understand the risk andto develop new response protocols that addressthat attack before the contamination event. Thoseprotocols must include clean-up processes andplacing the system back in service.

Responding to threats may require newapproaches that greatly enhance the time anadversary needs to complete a malevolent act.Threats can be countered by storing high-consequence assets underground, limiting the pathsan adversary might exploit and thereby creatinglong task times. For example, pumping stationscould be protected better by installing them belowgrade in protected shelters.

In testimony to the United States House ofRepresentatives Committee on Science entitled“H.R. 3178 and the Development of Anti-TerrorismTools for Water Infrastructure,” Jeffrey J.Danneels of Sandia suggested several alternativesthat might provide the improved security desiredat a much lower cost than the physical securityapproaches currently in use. Research dollarsshould be made available to study alternatives thatput final treatment of the water supply closer tothe consumer, consider much of the present potablewater system as non-potable to decentralize theimpact of a potential event, and evaluate theefficacy of creating municipal bottling facilities andother novel approaches that provide the level ofsecurity demanded by the water consumer andwhich may not be achievable through any othermeans.

Conclusions

Understanding and analyzing the vulnerabilitieswithin the water infrastructure is a very importantundertaking. Our government needs to protect oneof the most basic assets America has—a cleanwater supply. Understanding and analyzing thevulnerabilities within the nation’s water infrastructurewill help us protect the health and safety of ourcitizens. The efforts completed to date havehighlighted several vulnerabilities that will requiresignificant amounts of effort to correct. Within thelist of 14 U.S. critical infrastructures listed in HSPD-7, the water infrastructure is probably the most takenfor granted. A large investment will be required toprovide even minimal levels of security for this



important resource. “When is enough, enough?”will be a difficult question to answer and will bedebated for years to come.

Acknowledgements

Sandia is a multiprogram laboratory operated by SandiaCorporation, a Lockheed Martin Company, for the United StatesDepartment of Energy under Contract DE-AC04-94AL85000.


JEFFREY J. DANNEELS is a Department Manager within theSecurity Systems and Technology Center at Sandia NationalLaboratories. He manages critical infrastructure securityprograms and is responsible for the Risk AssessmentMethodology for Water Utilities, RAM-W™. Shortly after theevents of 9/11 he testified to Congress on two occasions. Hisfirst testimony concerned the security of the water infrastructureand in the second he outlined security research needs to betterprotect the water infrastructure. Mr. Danneels has providedsecurity training to hundreds of students and led thedevelopment of a security course for water utility employeesthat has been attended by thousands. Mr. Danneels was theProgram Director for the international Innovative Technologiesfor Disaster Mitigation conference held in Washington, DC inOctober of 1999. This three-day Architectural Surety®conference provided a forum for experts from around the worldto exchange information on mitigating the consequences of naturaland man-made disasters. He holds a BSCE from Michigan StateUniversity, a MSCE from Louisiana State University, and aMasters in Management from the University of New Mexico.Jeff has been with Sandia since 1985. Jeffrey J. Danneels, SandiaNational Laboratories, PO Box 5800, Albuquerque, NM 87185,Phone: 505-284.3897, FAX: 505-284-8677,[email protected]

RAY FINLEY is the Manager of the Geohydrology Department atSandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Hehas evaluated security aspects related to Sandia’s criticalinfrastructure program since the mid-1990’s. He participated inthe development of methodology for evaluating thevulnerabilities of large federal dams, electrical transmissionsystems, and drinking water systems. In this role he has led andparticipated in numerous vulnerability assessments, trainingprograms, applications of the methodologies, and vulnerabilityassessment reports. He continues to be actively engaged inassessing vulnerabilities of critical infrastructures, includingphysical disruption and contamination of water distributionsystems.

References

Awwa Research Foundation. 2002. Risk AssessmentMethodology for Water Utilities (RAM-WTM). 2nd ed. Denver,Colorado: Awwa Research Foundation and Sandia NationalLaboratories.

Awwa Research Foundation. 2004. Results from the Water UtilityVulnerability Assessment Lessons Learned Study. Denver,Colorado: Awwa Research Foundation and Sandia NationalLaboratories.

Environmental Protection Agency. n.d. FACTOIDS: DrinkingWater and Ground Water Statistics for 2001. Available athttp://www.ngwa.org/pdf/01factoids.pdf.


13Allgeier and Magnuson

Responding to Threats and Incidents ofIntentional Drinking Water Contamination

Steven C. Allgeier1 and Matthew L. Magnuson2

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Cincinnati, OH1OW/OGWDW/Water Security Division 2ORD/NRMRL/Water Supply and Water Resources Division

Both water contamination threats andintentional water contamination incidentscould be designed to disrupt the delivery of

safe water to a population, interrupt fire protection,create public panic, or cause disease or death in apopulation. A water contamination threat occurswhen the introduction of a contaminant into the watersystem is threatened, claimed, or suggested byevidence. A water contamination incident occurswhen a contaminant is successfully introduced intothe water supply. A water contamination incidentmay be preceded by a threat, but not always. Bothwater contamination threats and incidents may beof particular concern due to the range of potentialconsequences:1. Creating an adverse impact on public health

within a population2. Disrupting system operations and interrupting

the supply of safe water3. Causing physical damage to system

infrastructure4. Reducing public confidence in the water supply5. Long-term denial of water and the cost of

remediation and replacement.Some of these consequences would only be realizedin the event of a successful contamination incident;however, the mere threat of contamination can havean adverse impact on a water system if improperlyhandled.

In characterizing any threat, both the possibilityand probability should be considered. A generalassessment of the threat of intentional contaminationof drinking water indicates that it is possible to cause

varying degrees of harm through contamination ofthe drinking water supply. However, an evaluationof past incidents at drinking water facilities wouldindicate that the probability of an actualcontamination incident is relatively low, but theprobability of a contamination threat is relatively high.Many of the apparent security breaches at drinkingwater utilities that have occurred since 9/11 havebeen perceived as potential contamination incidents.Although a few threats have been verbal, most havebeen circumstantial, such as a low-flying airplaneover a reservoir or a lock cut from the hatch of adistribution system storage tank. Given the possibilityof contamination, many utilities choose to treat thesesecurity breaches as potential contamination threats.

Vulnerabilities to intentional contamination existin all drinking water systems. While it may bepossible to improve security at some critical systemlocations to reduce the level of vulnerability, it isimpossible to eliminate all vulnerabilities. Thus, thecontamination threat may be most effectivelymanaged through thorough planning, carefulevaluation of any specific threats, and implementationof appropriate response actions.

Managing a Contamination Threat

Management of a contamination threat involves:1) planning for the response prior to an incident, 2)evaluating the credibility of the threat, and 3)implementing appropriate response actions based onavailable information and the circumstances of thesituation. This article provides an overview of the



Responding to Threats and Incidents of Intentional Drinking Water Contamination14


process for managing a contamination threat, whilemore detailed guidance is available from theResponse Protocol Toolbox: Planning for andResponding to Drinking Water ContaminationThreats and Incidents (EPA 2003a). This toolboxis organized into six modules, which discuss waterutility planning (EPA 2003b), water contaminationthreat management (EPA 2003c), sitecharacterization and sampling (EPA 2003d), sampleanalysis (EPA 2003e), public health response, andwater system remediation and recovery. Additionalresources for drinking water security in general maybe found at the EPA Water Security Division website(http://www.epa.gov/safewater/security/).

1. Planning a Response to ContaminationThreats

Planning is the foundation of making goodresponse decisions. For water contamination threatsand incidents, planning takes on a special meaningbecause of the multitude of potential and/orthreatened contaminants, whether they arebiological, chemical, or radiological. However, toparaphrase the World Health Organization, it isneither possible nor necessary to specifically planfor attack with all possible contaminants, butincreasing preparedness to counter the effects forsuch an attack by planning and preparation canprovide the capabilities to deal with a wide range ofpossibilities (WHO 2003).

Planning for any type of emergency, includingwater contamination threats and incidents, begins atthe local level. Officials within the utility and localgovernment will have a collective knowledge of theorganizations and systems that exist to providesupport during an emergency. During this planning,the utility and local or state authorities will need todetermine:1. Who will respond to the initial threat?2. Who will determine if the threat is possible or

credible?3. Who will evaluate the site and collect samples?4. Who will perform analyses?5. Who will make public health decisions?6. Who will manage remediation and recovery

activities?In many cases, the answers to these questions

will not be immediately evident, or may vary withthe circumstances of the situation. This is especiallytrue in the case of drinking water contamination

threats where it is unclear whether or not the waterhas been contaminated and presents a threat to publichealth. Proper planning should establish roles andresponsibilities of various parties under a variety ofscenarios. There are many planning activities thata drinking water utility can undertake to improvepreparedness and the ability to respond effectivelyto a drinking water contamination threat or incident,and several are briefly described below.1. Know your water system: This includes

documentation of construction, design, operation,and personnel; assessment of vulnerabilities tocontamination threats; and identification ofcritical customers.

2. Update Emergency Response Plans: Manyutilities have existing Emergency ResponsePlans (ERPs); however they may need to beupdated to cover terrorist threats, includingintentional contamination.

3. Develop Response Guidelines: A set ofResponse Guidelines (RG) is a streamlined,action-oriented, easy-to-follow document thatis intended to support responders and decisionofficials in the midst of a crisis. An RG mightinclude organizational charts, notification trees,contact information, standard operatingprocedures, decision trees, and reporting formsamong other tools.

4. Establish Structure for Incident Command: Theleadership and chain-of-command must beclearly established prior to an actual threat orincident. There is a formal Incident CommandSystem that has been adopted by many responseorganizations (FEMA 2003). IncidentCommand for drinking water response isintricate because the water utility may behandling the early stages of the threat evaluation,while other parties, such as law enforcement,may be in charge during later stages(EPA 2003b).

5. Develop Information Management Strategy:Timely and accurate information will be key toevaluating the credibility of a threat and takingsteps to protect public health as necessary. Asystem should be in place to manage the flowof this critical information.

6. Establish Communication and NotificationStrategy: Predefined communication pathwaysand notification trees are essential to theeffectiveness of any incident command



structure and will help to ensure that importantparties are notified at the right time.

7. Perform Training and Conduct Desk/FieldExercises: Training and practice are essentialto the proper application of any emergency plan(e.g., ERP, RG). Desk-top or field exercisesthat involve all of the key players are a valuabletest of the plan.

8. Enhance Physical Security: Enhancements tophysical security at sites identified as particularlyvulnerable to contamination, or which have beensubject to intrusion in the past, may significantlyreduce false alarms that would otherwiseexpend utility resources.

9. Establish a Baseline Monitoring Program:Unusual water quality data or consumercomplaints may indicate a potential problem, butonly if the results can be compared against anestablished baseline that accounts for normalfluctuations.

2. Evaluating a Contamination ThreatA contamination threat is typically triggered by

an occurrence or discovery that indicates thepotential for water contamination. Several potentialthreat warnings are summarized in Figure 1. Threatwarnings occur on a regular basis if they aremonitored; however, the vast majority are due toharmless activity and require no response.Nonetheless, every threat of potential drinking watercontamination should be evaluated in order to identifythe handful of credible threats that might exist amongthe large number of threat warnings.

The overall response to a contamination threat isschematically depicted in Figure 2 and indicates two

parallel and inter-related activities: the threatevaluation and response actions. A fundamentalprinciple of this process is the concept of expandedresponse actions as the credibility of the threatincreases. This is intended to avoid both under- andover-response to a contamination threat since bothhave potential adverse consequences to the public.For example, a complete lack of response to acredible threat might put the public at anunacceptable risk of exposure to a harmfulcontaminant. On the other hand restrictions placedon water usage, such as a notice not to drink thewater, in response to a threat that has not beendetermined to be credible carries its ownconsequences.

A threat evaluation is a process that considersavailable information about a contamination threatto determine if it is “possible,” “credible,” or a“confirmed” incident. Each of these stages isdepicted in Figure 2 as a decision point and describedin more detail below:1. Stage 1: “Is the threat possible?” A water

contamination threat is characterized as“possible” if the circumstances of the threat

Initial Threat Evaluation

TH

RE

AT

EV

AL

UA

TIO

NP

RO

CE

SS

Is ThreatPossible?

Threat Warning

PLANNING AND PREPARATION

Is ThreatCredible?

Is IncidentConfirmed?

Site Characterization andSampling

Immediate OperationalResponse Actions

Public Health ResponseActions

Sample Analysis

Remediation and Recovery

EX

PA

ND

ED

RE

SP

ON

SE

AC

TIO

NS

Figure 2. Overview of Response to a Contamination Threat

THREATWARNING

SecurityBreach

WitnessAccount

Notification byPerpetrator

Notification byLaw Enforcement

Notification byNews Media

Unusual WaterQuality

ConsumerComplaint

Public HealthNotification

Figure 1. Summary of Threat Warnings

Responding to Threats and Incidents of Intentional Drinking Water Contamination16


warning appear to have provided an opportunityfor contamination. Response to a “possible”threat might include immediate operationalresponse actions in an attempt to contain thewater, and collection of additional informationto help establish whether or not the threat is“credible.” Site characterization activities aredesigned to collect additional information tosupport this determination.

2. Stage 2: “Is the threat credible?” A watercontamination threat is characterized as“credible” if information collected during thethreat evaluation process (e.g., sitecharacterization activities) corroboratesinformation from the threat warning. Thethreshold at the credible stage is higher than thatat the possible stage, thus more significantresponse actions might be considered, such asrestrictions on public use of the water (e.g.,issuance of a “do not drink” notice).Furthermore, steps should be initiated to confirmthe incident and positively identify thecontaminant.

3. Stage 3: “Has the incident been confirmed?” Awater contamination incident is “confirmed” ifthe information collected over the course of thethreat evaluation provides definitive evidencethat the water has been contaminated. Responseactions at this point include all steps necessaryto protect public health, supply the public withan alternate source of drinking water, and beginremediation of the system.

3. Responding to a Contamination ThreatFigure 2 illustrates the elevation of potential

response actions as the threat evaluation progressesthrough the “possible,” “credible,” and “confirmed”stages. In addition to the results of the threatevaluation, consideration should be given to thepotential consequences of the suspectedcontamination incident as well as the impact ofresponse actions on consumers. The consequencesof contamination are a function of contaminantproperties (e.g., toxicity, infectivity, persistence inwater, etc.), the concentration profile of thecontaminant through the system, and the populationwithin the contaminated area. In many cases, it willbe difficult to accurately assess the potentialconsequences since the identity of the contaminantmay be unknown and the information necessary to

estimate the spread of the contaminant through thesystem may be unavailable. Nonetheless, even anestimate of potential consequences within a coupleorders of magnitude may be useful in makingdecisions regarding response actions (e.g., are tensor thousands of people potentially affected?).

Various response actions will have differentimpacts on consumers. For example, immediateoperational response actions such as containmentmay go unnoticed by the public. On the other hand,restrictions on water usage could have a substantial,negative impact on consumers. Consumers mayneed to find an alternate supply of water forconsumption and food preparation. For the mostsevere restrictions, sanitation and fire fighting mayalso be adversely impacted.

Early in the response to a contamination threat,before credibility has been established andconsequences evaluated, relatively low impactresponse actions would be appropriate. For example,isolation of a storage tank, reservoir, or small areaof the distribution system might be a suitableresponse to a ‘possible’ contamination threat. Oncea threat has been deemed ‘credible’ it may benecessary to take steps to limit public exposure. Thismight involve more extensive isolation, or if thesuspect water cannot be contained, it may benecessary to notify the public and place restrictionson water usage (i.e., issue a “do not drink” order).Finally, once a contamination incident is confirmed,all actions necessary to limit exposure and protectpublic health should be initiated. Furthermore, it willbe necessary to arrange for an alternate watersupply and begin planning for remediation activities.

Summary

All drinking water systems have some degree ofvulnerability to contamination, and analysis showsthat it is possible to contaminate drinking water atlevels causing varying degrees of harm.Furthermore, experience indicates that the threat ofcontamination, overt or circumstantial, is probable.Thus, there is a clear need to address thecontamination threat. While certain steps may betaken to reduce the vulnerabilities and preventintentional contamination, it is impossible tocompletely eliminate this vulnerability, although autility could spend a lot of resources trying to do so.Instead, it may be more effective to plan forresponding to contamination threats that do arise.



Acknowledgements

The authors would like to acknowledge the hard work andcontributions of Bart Koch, Ric DeLeon, and Mic Stewart ofthe Metropolitan District of Southern California and RonHunsinger of the East Bay Municipal Utility District.


STEVEN ALLGEIER has been an environmental engineer with U.S.EPA, OGWDW in Cincinnati, Ohio since 1996. He is currentlyinvolved in both the drinking water regulatory and securityprograms with a focus on contaminant removal through advancedtreatment processes. Address: 26 W. Martin Luther King Drive,Cincinnati OH 45268. Email address: [email protected].

MATTHEW MAGNUSON has been a research chemist at the U.S.EPA/ORD/NRMRL in Cincinnati, Ohio since 1996. He iscurrently involved in both security programs and researchdirected towards a wide range of problems in environmentalanalytical chemistry related to risk management research ofcontaminants in watersheds and drinking water. Address: 26W. Martin Luther King Drive, Cincinnati OH 45268. Emailaddress: [email protected].

References

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). 2003a. IS-195 Basic Incident Command System – EMI IndependentStudy Program.Washington, DC: Federal EmergencyManagement Agency. Available at http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/is195.asp.

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA). 2003a.Overview of the Response Protocol Toolbox. EPA-817-D-03-007. Washington, DC: U.S. Environmental ProtectionAgency, Office of Water. Available at http://www.epa.gov/safewater/security/pdfs/guide_response_overview.pdf.

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA). 2003b. WaterUtility Planning Guide - Module 1. EPA-817-D-03-001.Washington, DC: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,Office of Water. Available at http://www.epa.gov/safewater/security/pdfs/guide_response_module1.pdf.

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA). 2003c.Contamination Threat Management Guide - Module 2 EPA-817-D-03-002. Washington, DC: U.S. EnvironmentalProtection Agency, Office of Water. Available at http://w w w . e p a . g o v / s a f e w a t e r / s e c u r i t y / p d f s /guide_response_module2.pdf

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA). 2003d. SiteCharacterization and Sampling Guide - Module 3. EPA-817-D-03-003. Washington, DC: U.S. EnvironmentalProtection Agency, Office of Water. Available at http://w w w . e p a . g o v / s a f e w a t e r / s e c u r i t y / p d f s /guide_response_module3.pdf.

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA). 2003e.Analytical Guide - Module 4. EPA-817-D-03-004.Washington, DC: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,Office of Water. Available at http://www.epa.gov/safewater/security/pdfs/guide_response_module4.pdf.

World Health Organization (WHO). 2003. Public healthresponse to biological and chemical weapons: WHOguidance, 2nd ed. (Draft, March 2003). Available at http://www.who.int/csr/delibepidemics/biochemguide/en/index.html.

Water Treatment and Equipment Decontamination Techniques18


Water Treatment and EquipmentDecontamination Techniques

Kim R. Fox

National Homeland Security Research CenterU. S. Environmental Protection Agency

In responding to an intentional contamination of adrinking water system, water utility personnel(along with many other entities) will be faced

with both providing clean and safe drinking waterfor their consumers and for cleaning up thecontamination. How those two responsibilities arehandled will be dictated by the type of contaminatingevent. For example, if a major ground water aquiferis contaminated, then decontamination of the aquifermay not be possible and treatment of the water fromthat aquifer would be required before the water couldbe used. If a storage tank is contaminated, the storagetank could possibly be taken off line. Thecontaminated water would then be treated prior todisposal and the storage tank decontaminated(cleaned) prior to bringing the storage tank backonline.

This summary article will discuss the variouswater treatment and decontamination techniques thatcould be used during an intentional contaminationevent. For this article, water treatment will refer totechniques that would be used to treat thecontaminated water and decontamination will referto the techniques that would be used to clean hardsurfaces such as the insides of a pipe or storagetank. Although this article will not discuss specificactions to take during specific events (or specificcontaminants), the article provides summaryinformation that will guide water personnel towardsthe proper treatment techniques.

The basic contaminants that could be used in anintentional attack against a water system could bebroken down into chemical (inorganic or organic),

microbial (bacteria, protozoan, or viruses), andradiological classes. Various groups have madepublic lists available (States 2003; CDC 2003). Thisarticle will not discuss the merits of those lists, thespecific contaminants on those lists, nor attempt todefine where or how those contaminants could beintroduced into a water system. The discussioncontained in this article will start with the assumptionthat a contaminating event has occurred. Althoughthis article focuses on the basis of an intentionalcontamination, the same process described herecould be used during an unintentional contaminatingevent. This article will also address some of theknowledge gaps missing in the water treatment anddecontamination area that could lead to researchneeds.

Water Treatment

The various types of water treatment technologiesavailable (or applicable) depend on the type ofcontaminant and the extent of the contamination.For example, if a storage tank was contaminatedwith a microbial contaminant that could be inactivatedby disinfectant, then proper levels of the disinfectantcould be added to the storage tank for the properlength of time and no additional treatment would benecessary. In the case where an inorganic chemicalcontaminant was introduced into an aquifer, agranular activated carbon water treatment plantmight need to be constructed in order to treat thewater for very long periods of time. The varioustypical water treatment practices are described




19Fox

below along with a summary of their capabilitiesand where they could be used. A full description ofthe following techniques can be found in the literature(AWWA 1999).

Conventional coagulation/settling/filtration watertreatment uses chemical pretreatment to causeparticulate material in a water system to form flocthat would then be settled out in a sedimentationbasin and/or removed by filters. The typicalpretreatment chemicals include aluminum or ironcoagulants, lime or polymers and the type and amountof chemical depends on the water quality present.This type of treatment is very good at removingparticulate matter (including microorganisms), smallamounts of various chemical contaminants, and tosome extent various radionuclide contaminants.Although this process is very good at removing manycontaminants, the process would be difficult to installduring an emergency situation. There are somemobile water treatment units that utilize thistechnology, but those mobile units could not treatlarge quantities of water. This technology would be(and is) very useful for treating the drinking waterfor communities that use surface waters for theirsource water. As an added advantage, this processprovides a measure of protection in case their sourcewater becomes contaminated.

One modification to the conventional process isknown as direct filtration. In direct filtration, thesedimentation step is eliminated. Source waters thatcontain low levels of particulate material may besuitable for direct filtration. The types ofcontaminants removed by direct filtration and thelimitations of direct filtration are similar toconventional treatment.

Granular activated carbon (GAC) is an absorptionmedia that can be used to remove many organiccontaminants from water. GAC is also effective inthe removal of lesser amounts of inorganiccontaminants and radionuclides. The GAC istypically placed into a contactor and the water passesover and through the carbon. The contaminantsattach themselves to the carbon and are removedfrom the carbon during reactivation or remain onthe carbon for disposal (depending on thecontaminant). GAC contactors can be installedquickly and the carbon replaced when it is spentrather than trying to reactivate the carbon. GACsystems are also readily available for smallerapplications such as apartment buildings; they are

even small enough for houses and single faucets.Thus, during an emergency situation, GAC unitscould be utilized to treat only the water that was tobe used for consumption or to treat all of the waterthat was being distributed.

One modification to GAC is known as powderedactivated carbon (PAC) where instead of the waterflowing through a carbon contactor, the PAC isadded to the water and then removed by otherprocesses. The types of contaminants removed byPAC are similar to those listed under GAC. PAC istypically used in situations where seasonal (oroccasional) contaminantion occurs and the activatedcarbon is only needed for relatively short times.

Aeration is a process in which high volumes ofair are passed through the water in an effort totransfer the contaminant from the water to the airand thus remove the contaminant from the water.There are several types of aeration systems utilizedin drinking water treatment and they range frompipes that bubble air into a pool of water, topressurized, diffused bubble systems, to toweraeration processes. In all cases, the treatmentprocess is to pass air through the water to strip outthe contaminant. Aeration techniques are typicallyused to remove volatile organic contaminants butthere are a few radionuclides that can be strippedfrom water by this process. Aeration systems canbe installed in relatively short periods of time andthey are adaptable to various sizes of systems. Forexample, aeration systems have been placed intoopen-air reservoirs, down single wells or to centrallytreat water in a community. One draw back toaeration systems is that the water will have to bere-pumped after aeration to pressurize the system.

There are several treatment technologies that fallunder the category of membrane treatment. Thosetechnologies include reverse osmosis, nano-filtration,and micro-filtration. In all three cases, the idea is topass water through a membrane by pressure whileleaving the contaminants on the other side of themembrane and removed from the system in aconcentrated waste stream. In drinking watertreatment, these three technologies are differentiatedby the size of the contaminant that will go throughthe membrane. Reverse osmosis systems arecapable of removing chemicals (inorganic ororganic), microorganisms, and radionuclides. Nano-filtration would typically be capable of removinginorganic chemicals, some large organic compounds,

Water Treatment and Equipment Decontamination Techniques20


and microorganisms. Micro-filtration would only beused to remove the microorganisms.

All of the membrane technologies are such thatthey can be installed easily and range in size fromsingle faucet application (e.g., home reverse osmosisunits) to large-scale applications for treating waterfor large communities. There are mobile watertreatment systems utilized by the military and someof these use membrane technologies to be preparedto remove as many contaminants as possible.

Ion exchange technology is one where waterpasses over a bed of ion exchange media (typicallyresin beads). The resin beads have sacrificialchemical groups attached to them such as sulfate,sodium, potassium, hydrogen and others. Thechemicals in the water exchange themselves for thechemical group on the resin. Currently, ion exchangesystems are utilized for inorganic chemical,radionuclides, and some organic chemicals. Ionexchange systems can be installed easily and arereadily available in cartridge systems for smallapplications, whole house systems (home watersoftener), commercial size for industrial uses, andfull-scale water treatment systems.

Activated alumina treatment is not a commonpractice in drinking water treatment, but is beingused to remove specific inorganic chemicals fromsome water supplies. The removal process is by bothadsorption and ion exchange within the activatedalumina. Activated alumina has not been used toremove organics or microorganisms from drinkingwater.

One of the most common forms of watertreatment that would be used during and intentionalattack of a water system is the use of a disinfectant.Currently, the most common drinking waterdisinfectants used are chlorine, chloramines, andozone. Ultraviolet light is also used to disinfectdrinking water. Typically, the drinking waterdisinfection processes are utilized to inactivatemicroorganisms, oxidize inorganic chemicals ordestroy some organic compounds. The amount andtype of disinfectant required is dependant on thewater quality, type and number of organisms, andchemical to be oxidized. Disinfectant technologiesare probably the easiest technology to implement inan emergency situation. Quantities of disinfectantcould be added manually to a storage tank ifnecessary, the water utility could increase thedisinfectant addition at the treatment plant or

disinfection equipment could be added in desiredlocations.

Heat inactivation is the final process to bediscussed. During drinking water emergencies, boilwater orders are often implemented. Notices aregiven for individuals to boil their water prior toconsumption. This process is only given for microbialproblems and should only be given when boiling isthought to be the desired treatment.

In all of the treatment technologies describedabove, one does need to be aware of the wasteproducts that are generated. In the conventional (anddirect filtration) technology, waste sludge is generatedthat could potentially be very hazardous. The wastesludge in this case would have to be disposed of (ortreated) properly. All of the above technologiesgenerate some sort of waste product.

Decontamination Techniques

After an intentional contamination attack on awater system, there is a concern that some of thecontaminant could remain on the interiors of thestorage tanks, distribution system pipes, or in homefixtures. Decontamination of that infrastructure maybe necessary to remove the contaminants from theinteriors so that the residual contaminant does notpose a health or aesthetics problem. In most cases,simple flushing of the system with clean water willremove the bulk of the contaminants. Simple flushingmay need to increase to high velocity flushing toallow for some physical scouring in addition to cleanwater rinsing. Processes for doing uni-directionalflushing are described in the literature (AWWARF2003) and care should be taken that the flushingprogram does not contaminate a clean areaaccidentally.

In some cases, other decontamination methodsmay need to be implemented to fully remove thespecific contaminant. At this time, there are notdefinitive measures described for individualcontaminants, thus generic decontaminationtechniques are described.

The disinfection chemicals described in the watertreatment section may also play a major role indecontaminating a water system. High levels ofdisinfectant put into a storage tank (or pipe network)will inactivate many of the organisms that attachedthemselves to the interior structures. The high levelsof disinfectants could also disrupt the normal biofilm


21Fox

in the system that some of the contaminants couldhide in and not come out during routine flushing. Inmany cases, the flushing technique described abovewill be done at the same time that high levels ofdisinfectant are added to the flush water.

At this time, little is known about the ability ofvarious surfactants to remove specific contaminantsfrom pipe walls. Other techniques used in drinkingwater distribution pipe network rehabilitation includepigging and relining. There is also little know abouthow these techniques could play a role indecontaminating a water system after an intentionalattack. (See AwwaRF 2003b for a review ofmethods to clean the interior of pipes in order toimprove bulk water quality.)

Future Work

At the present, the U. S. EnvironmentalProtection Agency’s (U. S. EPA) National HomelandSecurity Research Center (NHSRC) is evaluatingspecific water treatment and decontaminationtechnologies for various drinking water contaminants.The list of contaminants includes those not normallyfound in drinking water system and those that couldbe used in an intentional attack. The informationgathered in those projects will be made available towater utilities and those that assist water utilitiesduring an emergency. The data that are considerednon sensitive will be published in peer journals or onEPA’s web site. For data that are consideredsensitive, secure publications and access will beavailable.

Future research will also be necessary on newlycreated chemicals and mutated or genetically alteredmicroorganisms. Much of that work will be long termresearch projects as the specific contaminant isidentified.


KIM R. FOX has worked for the U.S. EPA since December 1975.His work at EPA has been focused on research to removeinorganic chemicals and microbials from drinking water. Mr.Fox has also been the lead EPA investigator for waterbornedisease outbreaks both here in the U.S. and in several foreigncountries. Currently, Mr. Fox is conducting research focused onthe homeland security efforts in drinking water. Kim R. Fox,P.E. DEE, Research Environmental Engineer, National HomelandSecurity Research Center, U. S. Environmental ProtectionAgency, 26 W. MLK Dr.,Cincinnati, OH 45268. Email:[email protected] Voice: 513-569-7820 Fax: 513-487-2555

References

American Water Works Association (AWWA). 1999. WaterQuality & Treatment. Denver, Colorado: American WaterWorks Association.

American Water Works Association Research Foundation. 2003.Establishing Site-Specific Flushing Velocities. Denver,Colorado: American Water Works Association.

American Water Works Association Research Foundation.2003b. Investigation of Pipe Cleaning Methods. Denver,Colorado: American Water Works Association.

Centers for Disease Control (CDC). 2003. EmergencyPreparedness & Response. Atlanta, Georgia: Center forDisease Control.

States, S., et al. 2003. Utility-based Analytical Methods toEnsure Public Water Supply Security. Journal AmericanWater Works Association 95(4): 103-115.

.

Linking Public Health and Water Utilities to Improve Emergency Response22


Linking Public Health and Water Utilities to Improve Emergency Response

R. J. Gelting and M.D. Miller

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), National Center for Environmental Health/Agency for ToxicSubstances and Disease Registry, Environmental Health Services Branch

Intentional contamination of a drinking watersystem may be discovered in several ways. Ifthe potential contamination is unannounced or

covert, its first indications might be detected by thewater utility operating the system or by the publichealth system. In contrast, if a terrorist groupannounces a contamination event (or the threat ofone), water utilities and the health-care system bothmay learn about the event simultaneously throughsuch channels as mass media. Various otherscenarios are also possible, such as a threat beingtelephoned to a water utility. In all of these scenarios,water utilities and the public health system must worktogether to respond to real or threatenedcontamination of drinking water supplies.

Water Utility and Public HealthSystem Responses to DrinkingWater Contamination

If an event involves an obvious security breachrelated to drinking water, the water utility wouldlikely be the first to uncover the possibility ofcontamination. Security breaches associated withvandalism such as cutting locks or fences, are notuncommon. However, recent terrorism events andincreased awareness of terrorist intentions havehighlighted the need to handle these situationsdifferently than in the past. As stated by the FloridaDepartment of Environmental Protection (DEP) ina letter to water plant owners and operators:“. . . we live in a new era. We must be much morevigilant and responsive about the security of our

water supply systems to protect the public. Incidents,that in the past may have been viewed as acts ofmischief and vandalism, now need to be fullyinvestigated and managed seriously” (Florida DEP2003a).

One element of managing these situations isinforming local and state health departments, andinvolving them in response efforts. This has notalways occurred in a timely manner. For example,in a recent drinking water system security breachin Florida that involved forced entry into watersystem facilities, 36 hours elapsed between whenthe utility discovered the problem and when theynotified the state health department (WaterTech2003). Events such as this prompted a change inpolicy in Florida to require water utilities to notify adesignated state emergency response hotline withintwo hours after any suspicious incident (Florida DEP2003b).

Health departments need to know about potentialdrinking water contamination because they may needto be involved in responding to potentialcontamination incidents. Important elements of aresponse in the public health system includeinvestigation of any unusual patterns of illnesses,dissemination of guidance to the public to safeguardhealth, and preparation of treatment for peopleaffected by contamination (Fig. 1). Therefore, waterutilities and the public health system must not onlycommunicate but also actively work together toeffectively respond to potential contamination eventsinvolving security breaches of water systemfacilities.




23Gelting and Miller

Health Care Facilities

(prepare for patients)

Public Health System

(investigate if illnesses

occurring; disseminate

guidance to public)

Water

source

Treatment

& Storage

Distribution

Users

Event Response

Public Health Arena

Event response

(Investigate if

contaminated)

Event Discovery

Security Breach

Water Utility Arena

Figure 1. Response to a Water Contamination Event: Detection in Water Utility

Water Utility ArenaW

ater

sour

ce Treatment& Storage

DistributionUsers

Event ResponseEvent Discovery

Public Health System(investigate if illnessesoccurring; disseminateguidance to public)

Health Care Facilities(prepare for patients)

Public Health Arena

Event Response

(Investigate ifcontaminated)

Security Breach

Although methods exist for real time detectionof some contaminants in drinking water distributionsystems, such diagnostic tools are neither welldeveloped for detection of multiple unknowncontaminants nor deployed in a widespread manner.Therefore, if contamination does not involve anobvious security breach of drinking water systemfacilities, the first indication of contamination maybe patients seeking medical assistance at health carefacilities. The patients themselves may not knowwhat made them sick. However, if multiple patientshave similar symptoms, health-care facilities wouldnotify public health agencies, which would begininvestigating the cause and source of the illness. Inthe case of potential drinking water contamination,effective responses will require collaborationbetween water utilities and public health agencies.Although the public health system may discover theinitial contamination, much of the response will takeplace in the water utility arena, including actionssuch as identifying likely locations where an agentmay have been introduced into the water system,decontaminating the drinking water distributionsystem, and disposing of contaminated water (Fig. 2).

Although it was naturally occurring,Cryptosporidium contamination of the Milwaukee

drinking water supply in 1993 provided an exampleof a contamination event discovered in the publichealth arena (Centers for Disease Control andPrevention [CDC] 1995). During a heavy rainfallevent, Cryptosporidium in the city’s surface watersource passed through the municipal treatmentsystem and into the drinking water distributionsystem. At that time, the city’s drinking watertreatment plant was not operating at optimal levelsfor treatment of Cryptosporidium, and high turbiditylevels caused by the rainfall as well as coldtemperatures contributed to the treatment system’slack of effectiveness against the organism. As peopleingested the parasite, many became ill withgastrointestinal symptoms, especially diarrhea.Public health officials discovered the contaminationbecause so many people sought treatment,especially over-the-counter anti-diarrhealmedications. However, long-term response to theproblem was the responsibility of the water utilitywho upgraded the drinking water treatment systemto make it effective against Cryptosporidium.

If a terrorist group announces real or threatenedcontamination of drinking water in the media ordirectly to a water utility or public health agency, asolid partnership between water utilities and public



Water Utility ArenaCovert Contamination

Wat

er so

urce Treatment

& StorageDistribution

Users

(Decontamination,Disposal)

Event Response Event Discovery

Event response(disseminate guidanceto public)

Public Health System(investigate illnesses)

Health Care Facilities(patient load up)

Public Health Arena

health agencies also would be required to dealeffectively with the event. To protect the public’shealth, decisions would need to be made quicklyabout, for example, whether chlorine is effectiveagainst the suspected agent, whether the affectedarea of the distribution system can be isolated, orwhether a boil-water notice should be issued. Publichealth authorities can often provide crediblemessages to the public, but will need criticalinformation from water utilities to craft the mostappropriate messages. Quickly disseminatinginformation to the public also will be an importantelement of a response, especially when terrorismmay be involved. Confusing and potentiallyconflicting messages need to be avoided, especiallyregarding actions the public should take to protectitself, highlighting the need for coordination.Communication problems were an issue for somecommunities during the widespread electricityblackouts in the Northeastern and MidwesternUnited States in 2003, when utilities and public healthagencies issued boil-water orders with conflictinginformation. The resulting confusion highlighted theneed for better coordination between water utilitiesand the public health system in responding toemergencies.

Barriers to Collaboration BetweenWater Utilities and Public HealthAgencies

Local public health agencies and water utilitieshave not always interacted and collaborated closely.Effective regulations and monitoring requirementshave prevented large-scale public health problemsin the United States related to drinking water exceptfor occasional failures in disinfection. In addition,many health departments are not involved in theregulation and monitoring of water supplies,especially for larger municipal systems. Stateenvironmental management or environmental qualityagencies (which generally are not part of state orlocal health departments) often monitor drinkingwater systems. Unless a disease outbreak involveswater, these groups have little need to interact.Differing technical language used by public healthagencies and water utilities also present barriers toeffective communication, especially if these groupshave not interacted in the past.

Private contractors operating water utilities maybe reluctant to engage with local public healthentities because disclosure of information may affectthe status of their contracts with local government.

Figure 2. Response to a Water Contamination Event: Detection in Public Health System


25Gelting and Miller

Additionally, funding is not targeted to facilitate andmaintain relationships between public health agenciesand water utilities. Both water utilities and publichealth agencies have limited budgets and lackresources to get involved with activities outside oftheir legal mandates.

Promoting Linkages Between WaterUtilities and Public Health Agencies

Because of the potential for intentionalcontamination of drinking water supplies, waterutilities and public health agencies are beginning todevelop closer relationships. At the federal level, theEnvironmental Protection Agency (EPA), inconjunction with other federal partners such asCDC, is developing a response protocol toolbox forresponding to drinking water contamination threatsand incidents. The toolbox contains information toassist both water utilities and public health agenciesin emergency responses related to drinking water(EPA 2003).

The Public Health Security and BioterrorismPreparedness and Response Act (Public Law 107-188) requires drinking water facilities to conductvulnerability assessments and prepare emergencyresponse plans. Implementing or updating theseemergency response plans will increase opportunitiesfor public health agency involvement in planning andresponses at the local level. EPA’s newly releasedResponse Protocol Tool Box also encouragesinvolvement and inclusion of public health agenciesin water utility response plans (EPA 2003). Inaddition, EPA is organizing water security trainingsessions to educate water utilities, public healthagencies, law enforcement, and local governmentsabout water security issues and the need forincreased communication and partnerships. CDCand the American Water Works Association arepiloting smaller workshops specifically designed tobring local health department and utility staff togetherto address problems related to water security.

Public health agencies in several major citiesthroughout the United States are implementingsyndromic surveillance programs designed to detectanomalies in disease patterns through the collectionand combination of multiple electronic data sourcesbefore confirmed diagnoses are made. Although notspecifically designed to detect waterborne events,the data gathered through these sources may help

increase the speed at which events are detectedand data are analyzed (Mandl et al 2003).

Conclusions and Recommendations

Water utilities and public health agencies needto develop stronger working relationships in orderto prepare for potential drinking watercontamination events. In some cases, thesegroups previously have collaborated to addressspecific problems such as Cryptosporidium inwater, and those efforts can provide a templatefor collaboration related to terrorismpreparedness, such as in the formation of localtask forces (CDC 1997). Continued opportunitiesto collaborate also should be provided throughongoing training, planning, and joint exercises.For example, tabletop exercises can be usefulfor both water utilities and public health agenciesin identifying gaps in preparedness,communication, and response.

Information sharing between utilities andpublic health agencies can enhance detection andresponse. For example, increased complaints towater utilities or public health agencies relatedto water could indicate a problem when coupledwith other public health surveillance data. Cross-referencing information, such as water-distribution maps and locations of illness cases,also could improve responses. However, suchsharing would require that agreements be in placeto allow for information exchange withoutcompromising confidentiality issues for patientsor utilities.

Establishment of formal agreements may helpensure regular exchange between utilities andpublic health agencies. In some cases,requirements, such as the Florida policy requiringnotification of security breaches at drinkingwater facilities, may need to be mandated. Theactual mechanisms will vary among locations, butstate and local governments should explore waysto ensure regular communication between theseentities.

Some efforts probably will require fundingdedicated to maintaining collaboration in planningand preparedness by water utilities and publichealth agencies. However, such collaboration willhelp ensure these entities are better equippedand trained to respond to both intentional and



naturally occurring drinking water contaminationevents.

Acknowledgements

The authors acknowledge Dennis Juranek and John (Jay) Watsonof the National Center for Infectious Disease at CDC for theircomments on this paper.


RICHARD GELTING, PH.D., P.E., currently works for the Centersfor Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta, and isinvolved in providing technical assistance to environmentalhealth programs at the state, tribal, and local levels. He hasworked in local public health programs with the Indian HealthService on the Navajo Nation in Arizona, New Mexico, andUtah and during his time as a Peace Corps Volunteer inHonduras, Central America. He holds Ph.D. and M.S. degreesin environmental engineering from Stanford University and isa registered Professional Engineer in the state of New Mexico.

MARK D. MILLER, RS, MPH, is a Senior Environmental HealthOfficer with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.He holds a Bachelor of Science in Environmental Health fromEast Central University in Ada, Oklahoma and a Masters inPublic Health from the University of Texas and is a RegisteredSanitarian with the state of Texas. His 19 years ofenvironmental health experience includes, water, wastewater,food safety, injury prevention and hazardous waste. He hasserved in positions with private industry, Indian HealthService, Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registryand is currently with the Centers for Disease Control andPrevention.

References

Center for Disease Control (CDC). 1995. Assessing the publichealth threat associated with waterborne cryptosporidiosis:report of a workshop. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report(MMWR). 44(RR-6).

Center for Disease Control (CDC). 1997. Cryptosporidium andWater: A Public Health Handbook. Atlanta, Georgia: UnitedStates Department of Health and Human Services, Centerfor Disease Control.

Florida Department of Environmental Protection (FDEP).2003a. Letter to Plant Owners and Operators, January 23,2003. Tallahassee, Florida: Florida Department ofEnvironmental Protection.

Florida Department of Environmental Protection (FDEP).2003b. Division of Water Resources Management,Permitting, Construction, Operation, Maintenance of PublicWater Systems, Rule Chapter NO: 62-555, Rule NO:62ER03-1, January 22, 2003. Tallahassee, Florida: FloridaDepartment of Environmental Protection.

Mandl, K.D., J.M. Overhage, M.N. Wagner, W.B. Lober, P.Sebastiani, F. Mostashari, J.A. Palvin, P.H.Gesteland, T.Treadwell, E. Koski, L. Htwagner, D.L. Buckeridge , R.D.Aller, S. Grannis. 2003. Implementing syndromicsurveillance: a practical guide informed by the earlyexperience. JA Med Inform Assoc. Electronically publishedahead of print Nov. 21, 2003 as doi:10.1197/jamia.M1356.Available at http://www.jamia.org/cgi/reprint/M1356v1.pdf

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA). 2003.Response Protocol Toolbox: Planning for and Respondingto Drinking Water Contamination Threats and Incidents,Interim Final–December 2003. Washington, DC:Environmental Protection Agency.

U.S. Public Law 107-188. 107th Cong., 1st sess., June 12,2002. The Public Health Security and BioterrorismPreparedness and Response Act.

Water Tech Online. 2003. Water security breach promptsstatewide security order. Available atwww.watertechonline.comNews.asp?mode=4&N_ID=37672


27Hasan, States, and Deininger

Safeguarding The Security Of Public Water SuppliesUsing Early Warning Systems: A Brief Review

Jafrul Hasan1, Stanley States2, and Rolf Deininger3

1US Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, DC, 2Pittsburgh Water and Sewer Authority, Pittsburgh, PA,3University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI

Water distribution systems are vulnerableto aqua-terrorism (terrorism attacks onthe water supply) because they are

extensive, relatively unprotected, accessible, andoften isolated (USEPA 2002, 2003a, Grayman, 2002;Mays, 2004). An emerging activity in the watersecurity arena is developing methods to minimizethe public health and economic impacts of a large-scale attack. An intense effort is currently underwayto improve analytical monitoring and detection ofbiological, chemical, and radiological contaminantsin drinking water systems as part of the overall effortto secure drinking water supplies (USEPA, 2003b).

One approach for avoiding or mitigating theimpacts from contamination of a distribution systemis to perform monitoring in the context of an EarlyWarning System (EWS). At present, federalagencies, academic communities, and privatecompanies are working together to develop practicaland effective early warning systems. The goal ofan early warning system is to reliably identify low-probability/high-impact contamination events in adistribution system’s finished water, or in sourcewater, in time to permit an effective local responsethat reduces or avoids entirely the adverse impactsthat may result from such an event. The core of anEWS is a monitoring technology that, ideally, woulddetect or screen for a variety of toxic substances orinfectious microorganisms (Brosnan 1999; USEPA2002).

This article briefly reviews the essential elementsof an EWS, the relevant plans for developing andimplementing an EWS, and the current status and

potential for an EWS to ensure the security of drinkingwater supplies and systems.

The Early Warning System Concept

Though early warning systems are frequentlyequated with the monitoring instrumentation used todetect contaminants in water, an effective EWS is,in reality, an integrated system for deploying themonitoring technology, analyzing and interpreting theresults, and utilizing the results to make decisionsthat protect public health while minimizingunnecessary concern and inconvenience within acommunity. Ideally, an EWS should be an integralpart of the operation of a water system. It should beable to be used to detect not only intentionalcontamination, but also contaminants introducedaccidentally or as the result or natural occurrences(i.e., dual use capabilities).

A recent American Water Works AssociationResearch Foundation (AwwaRF) study concludedthat an effective EWS should include the followingcomponents (Grayman et al. 2001):1. A mechanism for detecting the likely

presence of a contaminant in the finishedwater;

2. A means for confirming the presence of thecontaminant, determining the nature of thecontamination event and the intensity(concentration) of the contaminant in thedrinking water distribution system, andpredicting when the contamination will affectthe end users;



Safeguarding The Security Of Public Water Supplies Using Early Warning Systems: A Brief Review28


3. Communication linkages for transferringinformation related to the contamination;

4. Various mechanisms for responding to thepresence of the contamination in the finishedwaters in order to mitigate its impacts onwater users; and

5. An institutional framework, generallycomposed of a centralized unit thatcoordinates the efforts associated withmanaging the contamination event.

Characteristics of Early WarningSystems

The following guidance is provided for utilitiesthat may consider implementing an EWS usingexisting technologies, or technologies that will likelyenter the consumer market within the next fewyears. As various technologies and systems areconsidered, one may wish to evaluate how theycompare to the characteristics of an ideal EWS, asdescribed in a recent report by International LifeScience Institute (Brosnan 1999), as follows:(1) exhibits warning in sufficient time for action, (2)provides affordable cost, (3) requires low skill andtraining, (4) covers all potential threats, (5) identifiesthe source, (6) demonstrates sensitivity to qualitychanges at regulatory levels, (7) gives minimal falsepositive or negative responses, (8) exhibitsrobustness, (9) allows remote operation, and (10)functions year-round.

Currently, an EWS with all of these features doesnot exist. However, there are some technologies thatcan be used to build an EWS that can meet certaincore criteria: (1) provide rapid response, (2) screenfor a number of contaminants while maintainingsufficient sensitivity, and (3) perform as automatedsystems that allow for remote monitoring. Anymonitoring system that does not meet theseminimum criteria should not be considered aneffective EWS. Although an emphasis is placed onthese three features, the other issues discussed abovecannot be ignored in the design of an EWS. Forexample, consideration should be given to the rateof false positive/false negative results and methodsensitivity when interpreting the results. Furthermore,system costs, sampling rate, and reliability shouldalso be included in the design of an EWS (Graymanet al. 2001, 2004; USEPA 2002).

Design Considerations for an EarlyWarning System

An Early Warning System should be integratedinto the operation of a water system. Therefore, anoverall context for decision making relative to EWSmay be viewed as one of designing and operatingthe system to minimize the risks associated withdegraded drinking water quality, under various costand technology constraints. Designing an EWS isnot simple because there are many issues and watersystem characteristics that need to be considered.These EWS design considerations are discussed invarious sources (Brosnan 1999; Clark et al. 2004;Foran and Brosnan 2000; Grayman et al. 2001, 2004;USEPA 2002) and are briefly summarized below:

Planning and Communication. Before initiatingan early warning monitoring program, the objectivesof the program should be defined clearly, and a planshould be developed for the interpretation, use, andreporting of monitoring results. Furthermore, the planshould be developed in coordination with the waterutility, local and state health departments, emergencyresponse units, law enforcement agencies, and localpolitical leadership.

System Characterization. The first step in thedesign of an EWS is to fully characterize the systemto be monitored such as the distribution systeminfrastructure. The system should be characterizedwith respect to access points, flow and demandpatterns, and pressure zones. If not already available,a hydraulic model should be constructed. Finally,system vulnerabilities should be identified andcharacterized, preferably through a formalvulnerability assessment as described previously byEPA (USEPA 2002). An understanding of each ofthese characteristics provides the backbone for theproper design and development of an EWS. Inaddition, system characterization should consider bothwater demand and water usage patterns.

Target Contaminants. An ideal EWS should becapable of monitoring for all potential contaminants.However, even the most complex array of monitoringequipment cannot detect the entire spectrum ofagents that could pose a threat to public health viacontaminated water. Thus, the design of an EWSshould focus on contaminants that are thought topose the most serious threat. Many factors may gointo this assessment, including: the concentration ofa particular contaminant that is necessary to cause



harm, the availability and accessibility of acontaminant, the persistence and stability of acontaminant in an aqueous environment, and thedifficulty associated with detecting a contaminant inthe water. System vulnerabilities and the ability ofexisting treatment barriers to remove or neutralizespecific contaminants should also be considered inthe threat assessment.

A challenge in designing an effective EWS isstriking a balance between the screening functionof the system (i.e., the ability to detect a wide rangeof contaminants) and specificity (i.e., the ability topositively identify and quantify a specificcontaminant). One approach to resolving theseconflicting objectives is through tiered monitoring.In a tiered approach with two stages, the first stagemight provide a continuous, real-time screen for arange of contaminants that could pose a threat topublic health, utilizing a broad-based screeningtechnology such as assays designed to detectchanges in toxicity. A positive result from the firststage would trigger confirmatory analysis using morespecific and sensitive techniques, and a positive resultfrom the confirmatory analysis would trigger aresponse action. Additional discussions of tieredmonitoring are presented elsewhere (Daughton2001). A common misconception is that the screeningstage alone of a monitoring system constitutes anEWS. However, a properly designed EWS shouldinclude all elements of a monitoring programnecessary to inform the decision making of officialsresponsible for public health. Thus, confirmatoryanalyses used to verify a positive result from ascreening analysis, and the hydraulic modeling oranalysis that determines the sampling locations, shouldbe integrated into the overall design of the EWS.

EWS Technology Selection. Once targetcontaminants for the EWS have been identified, it isnecessary to select a monitoring technology for theparticular contaminant or class of contaminants, ifone that meets the core requirements of an EWSexists. The monitoring technology should be capableof dealing with complex water matrices. This mayrequire an extraction step to remove the materialfrom the water matrix and/or a concentration stepto enhance detection and quantification. Althoughtechniques for isolating, concentrating, and purifyingmicrobial and chemical substances have beendeveloped for many laboratory methods, they maynot necessarily be transferable to field deployable

monitoring devices. The technology considered foruse in an EWS should be evaluated to ensure thatall steps of the methodology perform correctly andcan detect the target contaminant(s) withoutexcessive interference.

Identifying a field deployable technology with anacceptable methodology is only the first step.Performance of the monitoring technology must alsobe adequate to meet the data quality objectives ofthe monitoring program. These data quality objectivesshould be defined during the design of the EWS andinclude: specificity, sensitivity, accuracy, precision,and recovery, as well as rates of false positives andnegatives. If the monitoring technology cannot meetthe data quality objectives, then another technologyshould be selected. If no technology can be identifiedthat meets the objectives, then either the EWS shouldnot be implemented, or the data quality objectiveswill need to be revised. If the later approach is taken,it will be necessary to modify the manner in whichthe results are used to be consistent with reviseddata quality objectives.

Alarm Levels and Response. Once the EWStechnology has been identified, it is necessary toidentify the concentrations at which the agents posea threat to human health so that alarms can betriggered at appropriate levels. The basis for settingalarm levels will depend on the capability of the EWSemployed. It should also be noted that the alarmshould be triggered by a combination of events, nota single detection, which may be a false positive.Many responses are possible when an early warningmonitoring system triggers an alarm. Responses mayinclude modification to the drinking water system(e.g., shutdown, addition of disinfectants, etc.),notification (e.g., boil water advisory) either to thegeneral public or to target communities orsubpopulations, additional data gathering ormonitoring, follow-on surveillance and epidemiologicstudies, no action, or some combination of these.The type of response will be dependent on the natureof both the threat to and the nature of the drinkingwater system, including the population it serves.Where an EWS is in place, credibility of the threatmay be judged by the performance of the EWS itself,when it is capable of detecting the contaminantsincluded in the threat. Additionally, law enforcementrepresentatives may provide insight into thecredibility of the threat (Foran and Brosnan 2002).If a false alarm leads to a decision to issue a notice



to the public to stop using the water, public health aswell as public confidence could be impacted.

Fate and Transport of Pathogens andChemicals. Chemical and microbial agents canbehave in a variety of ways as they migrate througha water system. Environmental conditions, thepresence of oxidants or other treatment chemicals,and the hydraulic characteristics of the system willaffect the concentration and characteristics of theseagents. If information is available on agentcharacteristics that affect their fate and transport, itshould be factored into the design of an EWS. Forexample, if a target agent is known to chemicallydegrade at a certain rate in the presence of freechlorine, it may be possible to use a hydraulic/waterquality model of the distribution system to predictthe concentration profile through the system. Thisinformation, in turn, can be used to design the EWSand select optimal locations for sensors.

Sensor Location and Density. The location anddensity of sensors in an EWS is dictated by the resultsof the system characterization, vulnerabilityassessment, threat analysis, and usageconsiderations. The size, complexity, and dynamicnature of distribution systems complicate theselection of sensor locations. Proper characterizationof the distribution system, including usage patterns,and the location of critical system nodes (e.g.,hospitals, law enforcement and emergency responseagencies, government facilities, etc.) is necessaryto design an effective monitoring network. Due totheir complexity and dynamic nature, it may bebeneficial to develop a hydraulic model of the systemto assist in the placement of sensors (see the paperby Uber et al, in this issue). Other methods arereported in the literature for optimal placement ofmonitoring stations (Lee and Deininger 1992; Uberet al. 2004). However, even if sensors can beoptimally located within a distribution system, theremay not be sufficient time to prevent exposure of aportion of the public to the contaminated water. Atbest, monitoring conducted within the distributionsystem will provide time to limit exposure, isolatethe contaminated water, and initiate mitigation/remediation actions.

Data Management, Interpretation, andReduction. The computer system infrastructureof a medium to large water utility typically includesits financial system, Human Resource (HR)system, Laboratory Information Management

System (LIMS), Supervisory Control and DataAcquisition (SCADA) system, ComputerizedMaintenance Management System (CMMS), etc.The financial, HR, LIMS, and CMMS systemsare considered to be part of the utility’sInformation Technology (IT) infrastructure run bya utility or local government IT group on a daily8-10 hour schedule. Cyber attacks to the ITinfrastructure (i.e., a computer-to-computer attackthat undermines the confidentiality, integrity, oravailability of a computer or the information itstores) may cause significant financial damageand disruption of the utility’s internal operations,but they are not expected to cause immediatewater supply disruptions. However, cyber attackson the SCADA system could have an immediatedetrimental impact on the water supply (Panguluriet al. 2004)

One of the challenges of a continuous, real-time monitoring system is management of the largeamounts of data that are generated. Use of dataacquisition software and a central datamanagement center is critical. This will requirethat individual sensors deployed in the system beequipped with transmitters, modems, direct wire,or some other means to communicate the data tothe acquisition and management systems.Furthermore, the data management system shouldbe capable of performing some level of dataanalysis and trending in order to assess whetheror not an alarm level has been exceeded. The useof “smart” systems that evaluate trends and candistinguish between genuine excursions and noisecould minimize the rate of false alarms.

A decision will also have to be made regardingthe action that is taken when the data managementsystem detects an excursion above the alarmlevel. At a minimum, the system should notifyoperators, public health agencies, and/oremergency response officials. If possible,redundant communication should be used (e.g.,notifying multiple individuals through multipleroutes such as page and fax). In some cases, itmay be appropriate to program the datamanagement system to initiate preliminaryresponse actions, such as closing valves orcollecting additional samples. However, theseinitial responses should be considered simpleprecautionary measures, and public officials should



make judgments regarding decisive responseactions.

Existing and Emerging MonitoringTechnologies

While laboratory technology exists to measure awide range of substances in the environment, theanalytical capabilities of monitors as part of an EWSare more limited. Currently available water qualitymonitors include physical, chemical, radiological, andmicrobiological analysis as well as bio-monitoringsystems that use living organisms as broad spectrumindicators of changes in water quality. The use ofbiosensors has to date been limited to chlorine/chloramines-free source waters. Efforts areunderway to adapt biosensors so that they can beemployed in public water supply distribution systems.References for commercially available rapid or on-line monitoring techniques for the water industryinclude AwwaRF and CRS PROAQUA 2002; Freyet al. 2000; Grayman et al. 2001.

Some of the more common physical and chemicalmonitoring methods proposed for use in EWS includesimple probes (e.g., turbidity, pH, temperature, odor,conductivity, dissolved oxygen, chlorophyll); relativelysimple batch tests (e.g., immunoassays forherbicides), and more advanced monitoring forchemicals (e.g., fluorescence for oils,chromatography for oil and petroleum constituents,volatile organic chemicals and phenols). Some ofthe primary contaminant surrogates include turbidity,dissolved oxygen, odor, conductivity, and generalmeasures of organic carbon content (e.g., oxidantdemand, total organic carbon). However, theparameters that are easily and inexpensivelymonitored via on-line probes (e. g., temperature,conductivity, pH) provide limited capability fordetection of specific contaminants of securityconcern. Advanced monitors are more expensiveand require more maintenance and expertise, buthave better capabilities for these applications. Basedon recent research in the food and chemical industry,electronic odor sensing technologies (“electronicnoses”) may be available in the future for use in theanalysis of water (Grayman. et al. 2001).

Conventional culture methods for detectingmicrobial contaminants require a relatively long timeperiod (hours or days) and many tests are specificfor a single species or class of organism. As such,

these analyses cannot be used as part of an EWS.However, numerous significant recent advances inmicrobial monitoring and related technology offerincreased sensitivity, specificity and/or more rapidanalysis, including DNA microchip arrays, rapidDNA probes and PCR, rapid hand-heldimmunoassays, cytometry, laser scanning, laserfingerprinting, optical technologies, and luminescence(e.g., bio- and chemi-luminescence) (Foran andBrosnan 2000; Grayman et al. 2001; Lee andDeninger 1999; Rose and Grimes 2001; States et al.2004; Venter 2000 ). More recently, concentrationof water samples by ultra filtration followed by PCRis carried out by Vince Hall at CDC and others(Gelting 2004). Most of these methods are still beingdeveloped or were only recently introduced. Theiruse, however, is likely to increase in the future.

An example of a promising approach forcontinuous monitoring of water for multiple pathogensis the Automated Pathogen Detection System(APDS) being developed by the LawrenceLivermore National Laboratory. This system trapsanalytes of interest onto antibodies conjactaed tobeads with subsequent identification throughfluorescence. While this immune separation assayhas been primarily designed for aerosol monitoring,it may be adaptable to pathogen detection in watersupplies if the aerosol monitor is replaced with alarge volume water concentration system.

In general, while prototype systems for monitoringairborne contamination are in use at various locationsaround the country, systems for detecting microbialpathogens in drinking waters supplies lag behind.

Research and Development Needs

A number of ongoing research projects ofAwwaRF and the Water Environment ResearchFoundation are investigating rapid and on-linemonitoring technologies. Many of the advances inmonitoring technologies occur from research in otherscientific fields (e.g., the food and beveragesindustry, analytical chemistry, the sensor industry,and the military), including biosensor and biochiptechnology, fiber optics, genetically-engineeredorganisms, rapid immunoassays, microelectronics,and others. Several U.S. government organizations,including the USEPA and the U.S. Army’s JointService Agent Water Monitor Program, areconducting research on rapid and/or on linemonitoring systems for a variety of contaminants.



A number of monitoring technologies and productsare available that could potentially serve as a corecomponent of an EWS, and a number of suppliersof conventional monitoring systems have begun toadvertise them as water security monitoring systemsin the wake of terrorist concerns. However, theperformance of these systems has not been fully orindependently characterized in most cases. Withoutbasic performance information (e.g., detection limits,sensitivity, selectivity, rate of false positives and falsenegatives), it will be difficult to interpret monitoringresults and derive the information necessary to makeappropriate public health decisions.

As promising technologies continue to bedeveloped and brought into the commercial market,there is a need for a mechanism, including fieldevaluation and testing sites, to verify systemperformance. Ideally, such testing should beconducted according to a standard protocol by anindependent third party, and the subject technologyshould be evaluated against standardized methods,if available. This would provide water utilities withthe data necessary to make informed decisionsregarding the implementation of a specific technologyin an EWS. EPA has established the EnvironmentalTechnology Verification (ETV) Program to provideindependent third party testing of environmentalmonitoring and treatment technologies. Under theAdvanced Monitoring Systems Center of ETV,monitoring technologies with the potential to serveas an EWS in water systems will be evaluated, andthe reports will be made available to the public.

Conclusions

An early warning system must reliably identifylow-probability/high-impact contamination events indistribution systems or source water in time to allowfor an effective response. The type of response andthe method of communication of the response willdepend on the nature of the threat, the capabilitiesof the EWS itself, and on the characteristics of theaffected population. Especially critical is thedevelopment of an emergency preparedness planthat guides the responses associated with a signalfrom the EWS and the communication of actionsbased on the responses (Foran and Brosnan 2000).

The resources necessary for the development,installation, operation, and maintenance of an EWSwill be substantial; therefore, virtually all of the

decisions regarding the EWS must be made at thelocal or regional level.

Implementation of some types of existingmonitoring technology will result in a false sense ofsecurity since there is no assurance that they arecapable of meeting the monitoring objectives. Inaddition, these systems could result in false alarmsthat would undermine the effectiveness of amonitoring program and result in a needlessexpenditure of resources to follow-up on the falsepositive and false negative results (USEPA 2002).

To ensure the full protection of drinking water, atechnology-based early warning monitoring systemshould be just one component of a comprehensiveprogram to protect the public from the threat ofintentional contamination. The program must alsoinclude physical, social, and economic steps toprevent the problem, as well as public healthmonitoring to ensure that early detection of diseasewill occur if a monitoring system or other steps fail(Brosnan 1999; Foran and Brosnan 2002; USEPA2002).

Acknowledgements

The authors gratefully acknowledge Jonathan Herrmann, RobertJanke, Jim Uber, Roy Haught, and Regan Murray of the NationalHomeland Security Research Center, and Grace Robiou of theWater Security Division, Office of Water, US EPA for theirvaluable advice, suggestions and guidance on early warningsystem for drinking water security.


JAFRUL HASAN has been a microbiologist with USEPA, Office ofScience and Technology, Office of Water in Washington, DC since2002. He is currently involved (half-time) with the NationalHomeland Security Research Center of USEPA with a focus onearly warning systems. Prior to joining EPA, Jafrul served as directorof research and development in two biotechnology companies for10 years and was involved with the development of various rapiddiagnostic test devices for biological threat agents, water and foodborne agents. He has a master’s degree in public health from theUniversity of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and a doctorate inmicrobiology from the University of Maryland at College Park.Address: 1200 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Mail Code 4304T,Washington, D.C. 20460; e-mail address: [email protected] STATES is the water quality manager for the PittsburghWater and Sewer Authority (PWSA). Over the past two years, hehas written and delivered a number of security courses for waterand wastewater personnel across the Unites States. He has a master’sdegree in forensic chemistry, and a doctorate in environmentalbiology, both from the University of Pittsburgh. Address: 900



Freeport Rd., Pittsburgh, PA 15238; e-mail address:[email protected].

ROLF DEININGER is a professor of Environmental Health Sciencesat the School of Public Health, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.Rolf’s research and teaching interests are focused mainly on drinkingwater supply systems. This encompasses the design of redundantdistribution systems, the design and location of monitoring stations,and the instrumentation and analysis tools for detectingcontaminants in the raw water intakes and the distribution system.Support from the American Water Works Research Foundationallowed the study of early warning systems on rivers worldwide.He has master’s and doctorate degrees in Environmental Engineering,both from the Northwestern University. Address: 109 SouthObservatory, 2506 SPH I, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-2029; e-mailaddress: [email protected]

References

AwwaRF and CRS PROAQUA. 2002. Online monitoring for drinkingwater utilities. Page 425 in E. Hargesheimer, O. Conio, and J.Popovicova (eds.) Denver, CO: AWWA Research Foundation andAmerican Water Works Association.

Brosnan, T. M. (ed.) 1999. Early warning monitoring to detect hazardousevents in water supplies. An ILSI (International Life SciencesInstitute) Risk Science Institute Workshop Report. Washington,DC: ILSI Press.

Clark, R. M., N. Adam, V. Atluri, M. Halem, E. Vowinkel, P. C. Tao, L.Cummings, and E. Ibrahim. 2004. Developing an early warningsystem for drinking water security and safety. Pages 8.01-8.19 inL.W. Mays (ed.) Water supply systems security. New York, NY:McGraw-Hill Companies.

Clark, R. N., and R. A. Deininger. 2000. Protecting the Nation’s criticalinfrastructure: the vulnerability of U. S. water Supply Systems.Journal of Continuous Crisis Management 8(2): 73-80.

Daughton, C. G. 2001. One proposal for a nation-wide approach toidentifying emerging nascent risks:pollutant fingerprint anomalies.Available at http://www.epa.gov/nerlesd1/chemistry/pharma/science-issues.htm

Deininger, R. A., and P. G. Meier. 2000. Sabotage of public watersupply systems. Pages 76-80 in R. A. Deninger (ed.) Security ofpublic water supplies. NATO Science Series. Dordrecht: KluwerAcademic Publishers.

Foran, J. A, and T. M. Brosnan. 2000. Early warning systems forhazardous biological agents in potable water. Environmental HealthPerspective. 108(10): 993-995.

Frey, M., L. Sullivan, and E. Lomaquahu. 2000. Practical applicationof online instruments in Proceedings of the AWWA AnnualConference and Exhibition, New Orleans, LA. Denver, CO:AWWA.

Gelting, R. L. 2004. Personal Communication.

Grayman, W. M., R. A. Deninger, and R. M. Males. 2001. Design ofearly warning and predictive source water monitoring systems.Denver, CO: AWWA Research Foundation.

Grayman, W. M., R. A. Deninger, and R. M. Clark. 2002. Vulnerabilityof water supply to terrorist activities. CE News 14:34-38.

Grayman, W. M., R. A. Deninger, R. M. Males, and R. W. Gullick.2004. Source water early warning systems. Pages 11.01-11.33 inL.W. Mays (ed.) Water supply systems security. New York, NY:McGraw-Hill and Companies.

Lee, J. Y., and R. A.Deininger 1992. Optimal locations of monitoringstations in water distribution systems. Journal of EnvironmentalEngineers. 118(1): 4-16.

Lee, J. Y., and Deininger, R. A. 1999. A rapid method for detectingbacteria in drinking water. Journal of Rapid Methods and Automationin Microbiology. 7:135-145.

Mays, L. W. 2004. Water supply security: an introduction. Pages 1.1-1.12 in Larry W Mays (ed.) Water supply systems security. NewYork, NY: The Mcgrow-Hill Companies.

Panguluri, S., W. R. Phillips, Jr., and R. M. Clark. 2004. Cyber threatsand IT/SCADA system vulnerability. Pages 5.01-5.18 in , L.W.Mays (ed.) Water supply systems security. New York, NY:McGraw-Hill and Companies.

Rose, J. B., and D. J. Grimes. 2001. Reevaluation of microbial waterquality:Powerful new tools for detection and risk assessment.Washington, DC: American Academy of Microbiology.

States, S, J. Newberry, J. Wichterman, J. Kuchta, M. Scheuring, and L.Casson. 2004. Rapid analytical techniques for drinking watersecurity investigations. Journal AWWA 96:152-164.

Uber, J., R. Janke, R. Murray, and P. Meyer. 2004. Greedy heuristicmethods for locating water quality sensors. Proceedings of theWorld Water and Environmental Resources Conference, Salt LakeCity, June 27-July1, 2004..

U. S. Environmental Protection Agency. 2002. Baseline threatinformation for vulnerability assessments of community watersystems, Washington, DC.

U. S. Environmental Protection Agency. 2003a. Planning for andresponding to drinking water contamination threats and incidents.Washington, DC.

U. S. Environmental Protection Agency. 2003b. Water security researchand technical support action plan (draft). Washington, DC.

Venter, S. N. 2000. Rapid microbiological monitoring methods: Thestatus quo in the Blue Pages, International Water association, London,UK. Available at http://www.iawq.org.uk.

Yates, D. G., D. O. Pitcher, and M. Beal. 2002. Implementing advancedearly warning systems to safeguard public drinking water, inProceedings of the AWWA Annual conference and Exhibition, NewOrleans, LA. Denver, CO: AWWA.

Systems Analysis to Assess and Minimize Water Security Risks34


Use of Systems Analysis to Assess and MinimizeWater Security Risks

James Uber, Regan Murray, and Robert Janke

U. S. Environmental Protection Agency



Drinking water systems are vulnerable tocontamination by toxic substances, whetherthe contaminants are introduced intentionally

during a terrorist attack, or unintentionally throughaccidental cross-connections or backflow incidents.In this paper, we discuss the particularcharacteristics of distribution systems that make a“systems modeling” approach useful and effectivein assessing, preventing, and mitigating water securitythreats, and we outline the research needed todevelop robust models for water security.

Water Distribution Systems and theWater Security Threat

Many characteristics of water distribution systemscontribute to a systems-level complexity: the largespatial extent, multiple flow paths, and time and spacevarying flow rates. Conceptualizing this complexityis fundamental to understanding and minimizingwater security risks.

Water distribution systems are spatially complex.Typically, they convey treated water to thousandsor millions of customers spread across tens tohundreds of square kilometers through a looped (asopposed to a branched) network of pipes. Thus,there usually exist multiple flow paths between anyset of “upstream-downstream” locations, with eachpath contributing a portion of the flow. Loopedsystems increase the reliability of the water supplythrough flow path redundancy, but also complicatenetwork hydraulic and contaminant transport

behavior, which is dominated by the network topologyand bulk water velocity.

Water distribution systems are also temporallycomplex. Water usage rates (demands) vary onhourly to monthly time scales. The ratio of peak hourto average system water demand over a one-dayperiod varies from three to six (Haestad Methods,2003). Most utilities use distribution system storagetanks to equalize demand, thereby economicallysatisfying the wide range of usage rates. Treatedwater is pumped to storage at a more-or-less constantrate, and excess demand or supply is accommodatedby fluctuating stored volume. Thus, flow rates aretime and space varying, and flow directionsfrequently reverse, corresponding to changes inpumping policy or water usage rates (e.g., storagetanks that were filling begin to drain, and vice-versa).

System Vulnerability and Network Flows.Source waters—rivers, reservoirs, and groundwatersupplies—are vulnerable to intentional contaminationbecause they are open and unsecured, and dilutionby large flow rates and volumes will likely limit publichealth effects or require extremely large contaminantvolumes. The impact of contamination at the watertreatment plant intake or a unit process is also limitedby dilution, since maximum flow occurs at the plant,and treatment processes themselves may also createa barrier for some contaminants. Distributionsystems may also be vulnerable to intentionalcontamination, though the level of vulnerability wouldbe system-specific.


35Uber, Murray, and Janke

Can distribution system flows support highconcentrations of contaminants? The followingcontaminant mass balance equation describes therelationship between the concentration of theintroduced contaminant (contaminant source), Cs,the contaminant volumetric flow rate, Qs, and thedistribution system pipe flow rate, Qp, and diluted(in-situ) concentration, Cp,

, ⎟⎟⎠

⎞⎜⎜⎝

⎛=

p

ssp C

CQQ or(1)

Note that there is an inverse relationship betweenthe pipe flow rate and the pipe concentration. If Cprepresents a concentration of health concern fordownstream consumers–for example, theconcentration such that an average adult drinkingone liter has a 50% chance of developing illness(ID50),

50pC , or the concentration at which no adverse

effects are expected to be observed(NOAEL), NOAEL

pC , then one can derivecontaminant-specific bounds on the pipe flow ratesthat could deliver such a dose:

( ) ( )⎟⎟⎠

⎞⎜⎜⎝

⎛≤≤⎟

⎟⎠

⎞⎜⎜⎝

⎛50

5050 maxmin

p

ssp

p

ss

CCQ

QC

CQ(2)

The above bounds should represent reasonableminimum and maximum values, given uncertainty inthe various factors, and ( )LWIDC p /50

50 ×= ,where W is the assumed body mass in kg and L isone liter.

Pipe flow rate statistics, thus, can be used as areasonable indicator of the vulnerability of distributionsystems to contamination. Figure 1 shows thecumulative frequency of the temporally averagedpipe flow rates for four different operating systems(the plots are truncated at 100 gpm to highlight detailat the smaller flow rates). (These four systems werenot subject to any form of pre-screening, and wedid not analyze any other systems.) Note thatbetween 60 and 80% of the average pipe flow ratesare less than 100 gpm.

If security is a concern, the potential of healthimpacts from an intentional contamination by a givencontaminant can be interpreted by computing theabove 50

pQ bounds. For a given contaminant, weassumed 11.0 ≤≤ sQ (gpm), 119 1010 ≤≤ sC

(cells/L), 550

3 1010 ≤≤ ID (cells/Kg) or, for a 70Kgbody weight, 6504 107107 xCx p ≤≤ (cells/L),which together yield maximum pipe flow bounds,

650 104.114 xQp ≤≤ (gpm).The above pipe flow rate bounds show that, in

the worst case, all four distribution systems may bevulnerable to contamination, as the upper boundson 50

pQ are large compared to, say, the 50thpercentile values of between 10 and 60 gpm. In thiscase, there remains a significant fraction (30-60%)of pipes with a flow rate less than the lower bound.We caution that this analysis is rough; it onlyindicates the potential for significant healthconsequences without fairly assessing their likelihoodor severity.

Storage Tanks, Flow Path Travel Times, andContaminant Detection. Travel time characteristicsin distribution networks affect the transport ofcontaminants from source to consumer, therobustness of contaminant detection schemes, andthe post-detection time window for effectiveprotection of public health. Time series of waterquality indices, like those for free chlorine residualshown in Figure 2 reveal the importance of traveltime characteristics. Figure 2 shows the variation infree chlorine residual at four distribution systemsampling locations at one Midwest utility. These datashow that the free chlorine residual can exhibitsignificant variability on hourly time scales, due inpart to the loss of process control at the treatmentplant, and in part to the interaction between traveltime and chlorine decay kinetics. Chlorine decaykinetics combined with large storage tank residence

Figure 1. Cumulative frequency of pipe average volumetricflow rates in four distribution systems.

sspp CQCQ =

Cum

ulat

ive

Freq

uenc

y (%

)

Average Pipe Flowrate (GPM)



time leads to large free chlorine loss within storage.When such tanks drain as a function of demandvariation or system operation, low chlorine residualconcentrations sweep across the storage tankservice area, and any particular location experiencessignificant temporal variation in chlorine residual.More precisely, these locations are supplied atdifferent times by distinct sets of flow paths havingdisparate travel time characteristics: a long traveltime set that includes the storage tank, and a shorttravel time set that excludes it.

A comprehensive understanding of travel timecharacteristics in typical distribution systems requiressystem simulation. Here, we simulated “water age”using models of three utility distribution systems.Water age at a location is an integrated measurerelated to path travel time: it is the volume-weightedaverage of all travel times, over all paths leadingback to a water source (where the age is zero).Typically, water age is simulated as a zero-orderreaction with unit reaction rate coefficient. We usedthis standard approach, but we also preparedsimulations where all water in storage used a zeroreaction rate coefficient to highlight the role ofstorage tanks in travel time variation. In this modifiedapproach, any water entering a tank stopped“growing old” until it left the tank and again enteredthe distribution system.

Water age histograms for the three networks arepresented in Figure 3, and graphs of node water agestatistics are presented in Figure 4. The latter figureis a scatter plot of water age standard deviation, ateach location, versus its median value. These same

statistics are also calculated for the water stored ineach tank, and they appear as squares to distinguishthem from consumer nodes. In each figure, graphson the left side exclude the effects of storage tankson travel time, while those on the right correspondto the same network but include the effects ofstorage.

The water age statistics show consistent trends:storage tanks increase significantly the median waterage throughout the network, and dramaticallyincrease water age variability. Indeed, if it were notfor storage tanks, the seemingly common perceptionthat distribution systems are relatively static, savefor slow (seasonal) fluctuations in water quality, mightbe close to correct. The large volume of finishedwater stored in tanks, combined with relatively smallreplacement rates, leads to high water ages instorage. The contrast between high age water instorage, and low age water delivered from the plant(when tanks are filling), is the source of largevariability in water age and travel times.

The water age statistics relate approximately tothe time available prior to consumption ofcontaminated water. A significant fraction of waterdelivered to consumers—perhaps up to one half ofthe total—arrives from the source within 24 hours.Yet a significant fraction of water requires days oftravel time, due primarily to flow paths that involvestorage tanks. These data provide at least order-of-magnitude time constraints on contaminant detectionand emergency response. Near complete protectionfrom intentional contamination may require rapiddetection and emergency response within hours, butprotection of a significant population fraction maystill be possible days after contamination. We cautionthat these observations are a rough guide; in additionto being system specific, they ignore chemical andmicrobiological processes, proximity of populationto contaminant source, disease pathology andtreatment, and time varying flow paths and traveltimes.

Real distribution systems exhibit variability in traveltime at all locations, and thus in water quality metricsaffected by chemical or biochemical reaction kinetics.A travel time standard deviation on the order of daysshould be expected within the service area of astorage tank. If not treated carefully, such variabilitycan affect the robustness of contaminant detectionsystems, specifically the frequency of false positiveand negative events. Work on such systems is just

Figure 2. Chlorine concentration variations over time at fourregulatory sampling locations in a Midwest utility.

335 340 345 350 355 360 365 370 375 380 3850

0.5

1

1.5

Time (hours)

Fre

e C

hlor

ine

(mg/

L)



Figure 3. Water age frequency histograms for distribution systems 1 (left), 2 (center), and 3 (right). The travel timeimpacts of storage tanks are excluded from histograms on the left, and included on the right.

100 200 300 400 5000

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

0.25

0.3

0.35

0.4

0.45

0.5

Age (hrs)

Fre

quen

cy (

%)

Tanks Excluded

100 200 300 400 5000

0.05

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0.3

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0.5

Age (hrs)

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cy (

%)

Tanks Included

50 100 150 200 250 3000

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50 100 150 200 250 3000

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%)

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50 100 150 200 250 300 350 4000

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%)

Tanks Included

50 100 150 200 250 300 350 4000

0.05

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0.2

0.25

0.3

Age (hrs)

Fre

quen

cy (

%)

Tanks Excluded

0 100 200 300 4000

50

100

150

Node Median Age (hrs)

Nod

e A

ge S

td. D

ev (

hrs)

Tanks Excluded

0 100 200 300 4000

50

100

150


Nod

e A

ge S

td. D

ev. (

hrs)

Tanks Included

0 50 100 150 200 250 3000

10

20

30

40

50

60

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80


Nod

e A

ge S

td. D

ev (

hrs)

Tanks Excluded

0 50 100 150 200 250 3000

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Nod

e A

ge S

td. D

ev. (

hrs)

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0 100 200 300 400 5000

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e A

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td. D

ev (

hrs)

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0 100 200 300 400 5000

20

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120

140


Nod

e A

ge S

td. D

ev. (

hrs)

Tanks Included

Figure 4. Node water age standard deviation (Ó2) vs. median (m) for distribution systems 1 (left), 2 (center), and 3(right). The travel time impacts of storage are excluded from plots on the left, and included on the right.



beginning, but one straightforward approach involveson-line sensors that measure broad water qualityindices, coupled with simple statistical measures ofsignal excursions from the expected value. Indeed,one existing sensor that could be used measures freechlorine, relying on its sensitivity as a sentinel todistribution system contamination. The large variationin normal free chlorine residual may, however,require large signal excursion thresholds to avoidfalse positives, and it may also reduce theeffectiveness of such simple statistical warningalarms.

The Role of Systems Analysis andSimulation in Safeguarding WaterSupplies

Systems analysis and simulation enable anintegrated analysis of the distribution system, bringingthe spatial and temporal complexities together into aflexible modeling framework. Systems analysis canbe used to understand the interdependencies of thesecomplexities, and thus to aid decision-making in theoperations of the system, and in the emergencyresponse to contamination incidents. Networkhydraulic models coupled with water quality modelscan be used to simulate threat scenarios to assessthe potential impacts of contamination, and to designand pre-plan for mitigation strategies.

To adequately simulate water securitycontamination scenarios, many improvements tocurrent modeling capabilities are needed. Theseimprovements fall in two categories: improvementsto the basic models and algorithms and improvementsto application methods. Algorithms are needed thatbetter reflect the following physical and chemicalprocesses: mechanisms behind contaminantadherence to pipe walls; contaminant interactionswith disinfectant residuals, disinfectant byproducts,and corrosion products; particles and biologicalagents transport ; and the true time-dependent flowcharacteristics (Uber 2004a). In addition, basicresearch is needed to gain a better understanding ofbiofilms and their role in protecting contaminants fromdisinfection.

Application to Networks. In the post-9/11environment, vulnerability assessments of waterutilities are considered highly sensitive and are notwidely shared. Distribution system networks maycontain specific information that should not be in the

public realm. (For a general discussion of securingpublicly available geospatial data, see Baker, 2004.)For researchers to improve modeling capabilities,however, it is essential for them to have access to abroad variety of network data. There are at leasttwo solutions to this problem. First, methods couldbe developed to transform networks visually so thatthey cannot be readily identified. Second, a databaseof “prototype” networks could be fabricated,adequately reflecting the hydraulics and water qualitycharacteristics of real systems, but not representativeof any single existing system.

Probabilistic Applications for Quantifying SystemVulnerability. Because one cannot predict thebehavior of terrorists, an assessment of thevulnerability of a drinking water system to intentionalcontamination must consider a large number ofpossible threat scenarios, or a threat ensemble(Murray 2004). These scenarios may includefactors such as the type of contaminant, theconcentration and quantity of the contaminant, andthe location of contaminant introduction. Systemvulnerability then is based on an assessment of theentire threat ensemble. It is not obvious, however,what constitutes a sufficient ensemble. How canone determine the minimal number of scenarios thatshould be simulated to obtain an accurateassessment of a system’s vulnerability tocontamination?

A probabilistic analysis (e.g. Monte Carlo) of thethreat ensemble facilitates an understanding of thelikely impacts of a contamination event, such ashuman health impacts (e.g., injury, disease, illness,death), economic impacts (e.g., costs to the waterutility, interdependent industry and infrastructure, andmedical costs), and environmental impacts (e.g., long-term remediation). Accurate and up-to-date modelsneed to be developed for estimating each of theseimpacts. There is a lack of reliable data on thebehavior of certain contaminants in water, includingchemical and biological warfare agents, and theirimpacts on humans from ingestion or other exposureroutes. For contagious diseases, dynamic modelsof disease transmission must be developed to assessimpacts accurately.

Applications for Assessing and MitigatingThreats. Table 1 shows the results of the probabilisticapplication of a hydraulic and water quality modelto three distribution systems to estimate the likelyhealth impacts from a terrorist contamination of a



Network/Population Avg % Received Avg % Received Worst Case ReceivedNonzero Dose Concentration Concern Concentration

of Concern of Concern

1 (< 10,000) 99% 17% 54%2 (> 100,000) 75% 1% 4%3 (>100,000) 60% 1% 6%

Table 1. Results from Monte Carlo analysis of three water distribution systems showing the average percentage of thepopulation receiving a non-zero contaminant concentration or an LD50 concentration at the service connection. The lastcolumn lists the worst case exposure scenario.

water distribution system. For each network,between 100 and 1,500 scenarios were simulated.Though the contaminant was the same for eachscenario, other parameters were varied to reflectthe uncertainty in the execution of the contamination.For each scenario, a 55-gallon drum of contaminantwas introduced into the system, resulting flow pathsand exposures were analyzed, and statistics weregenerated and examined. The contaminant wasassumed to behave like a tracer and to be resistantto chlorine residuals, or to quickly deplete theresiduals.

Preliminary results show that this approach hasthe potential to help water utilities assess thecontaminants to which they are most vulnerable,identify the most vulnerable regions of theirdistribution systems, and select the most appropriatemitigation strategies for their system. The results inTable 1 show that the same scenario applied tovarious networks can have quite different outcomes,thus the unique physical and flow-dependent featuresof each distribution system weigh heavily on healthoutcomes. However, the simulations show that “onaverage” a low percentage of the population will beseverely impacted by contamination events (1-17%).If particular nodes are protected, the vulnerabilityof the entire system can be dramatically reduced.

Applications for Contaminant Monitoring,Detection, and Warning. Early warning systemsconsisting of online sensors, remote communicationdevices, and data analysis tools are thought to holdgreat promise in protecting drinking water suppliesfrom contamination. Probabilistic applications canbe used to simulate early warning system responsesto contamination and to test real-time early warningsystem components under realistic conditions.Algorithms can be developed to optimize the locationof sensors to achieve various goals, such as the

minimization of public health impacts (Uber 2004b).Many basic questions about the feasibility of earlywarning systems remain unanswered and realisticsimulations of early warning systems would help tooptimize their design and to determine how long autility has to respond after detection of thecontamination.

Such systems level models could ultimately serveas emergency response simulators that could trainand test operators in their ability to rapidly respondto contamination events. Applications of modelscould also be used to design intervention strategies,such as the closure of valves to isolate portions ofthe network, or the superchlorination ordecontamination of pipes. Improved models wouldenable the more accurate prediction of the spreadof contaminant as well as its decay due to chlorineresidual or treatment/decontamination.

Summary and Conclusions

Because drinking water systems are vulnerableto intentional contamination by terrorists and toaccidental contamination from cross-connections,their contamination is becoming an increasingconcern. In this paper, the spatial and temporalcomplexities of distribution systems that make themparticularly vulnerable to contamination arepresented and discussed. In addition, the utility of asystems modeling approach in assessing, preventing,and mitigating water security threats is discussed.Research needs for better models and applicationcapabilities are highlighted.




JAMES UBER is an Associate Professor of EnvironmentalEngineering at the University of Cincinnati and is also with theWater Security Team at the USEPA National Homeland SecurityResearch Center. He received a B.S. degree in Civil Engineeringfrom Bradley University in 1983, and the M.S. and Ph.D.degrees in Environmental Engineering in 1985 and 1988 fromthe University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. His researchinterests are focused on the prediction and control of waterquality in water distribution networks, and on general techniquesfor optimal planning and design of environmental systems.Address: Dept. Civil & Env. Eng., PO Box 210071, Universityof Cincinnati, Cincinnati, OH 45221; e-mail address:[email protected].

REGAN MURRAY is a Mathematical Statistician for the U. S.EPA’s National Homeland Security Research Center. Herresearch focuses on modeling of distribution systems, and thefate and transport of contaminants. She received a Bachelor ofArts from Kalamazoo College in 1994, and PhD in AppliedMathematics from the University of Arizona in 1999. Address:U.S. EPA HQ, 1200 Pennsylvania Ave, NW (8801R),Washington, DC 45220; e-mail address: [email protected]

ROBERT JANKE has been with U.S. EPA, National HomelandSecurity Research Center, Office of Research and Developmentin Cincinnati, Ohio since June 2003, working on the WaterSecurity Systems Modeling Program. Prior to joining EPA. AsTeam Leader for the Fernald cleanup, he helped in the completionof multiple, multi-million dollar Records of Decision and wasinstrumental in the design, construction, and deployment of areal-time radiological instrumentation program that helpedshorten the soil cleanup schedule and significantly reduce costs.Rob has a Master of Science degree in Health Physics and aBachelor of Science degree in Chemistry from the University ofCincinnati. Address: 26 West Martin Luther King Dr., MailStop 163, Cincinnati, Ohio 45268; e-mail address:[email protected]

References

Baker, John et al. 2004. Mapping the Risks: Assessing theHomeland Security Implications of Publicly AvailableGeospatial Information. The RAND Corporation.

Haestad Methods. 2003. Advanced Water Distribution Modelingand Management. Waterbury, CT: Haestad Press.

Murray, Regan, Robert Janke, and Jim Uber. 2004. The ThreatEnsemble Vulnerability Assessment Program for DrinkingWater Distribution System Security. Proceedings of EWRICongress, Salt Lake City, UT. June, 2004.

Uber, James, Lewis Rossman, and Feng Shang. 2004. Extensionsto EPANET for the fate and transport of multiple interactingchemical or biological components. Proceedings of EWRICongress, Salt Lake City, UT. June, 2004.

Uber, Jim, Robert Janke, Regan Murray, and Philip Meyer.2004. Greedy Heuristic Methods for Locating Water QualitySensors in Distribution Systems. Proceedings of the EWRICongress, Salt Lake City, UT. June, 2004.


41O’Neill and Hais

Wastewater Security

Eileen J. O’Neill, Ph.D.1 and Alan Hais, P.E.2

1Water Environment Federation, 2U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

If one were to ask the “man or woman in thestreet” about security and water quality, it is likelythat he or she would be able to explain on some

level the potential danger associated withcontamination of the drinking water supply. Indeed,even before the tragic events of September 11, 2001,President Clinton issued Presidential DecisionDirective PDD 63, which designated the waterinfrastructure along with several other classes ofinfrastructure as “critical.” The U.S. EnvironmentalProtection Agency (EPA) was designated as thelead agency for the water sector and is responsiblefor developing plans to improve water infrastructuresecurity. The significance of potential vulnerabilitiesto wastewater infrastructure are less immediatelyobvious but potentially as catastrophic. This articleexplains the basis of security concerns forwastewater infrastructure, discusses currentpractices in the area of wastewater vulnerabilityassessment and mitigation, and highlights efforts toexpand the knowledge base of this emerging area.

Background

Contingency planning for extreme events has longbeen standard practice for designers and operatorsof wastewater and stormwater infrastructure. Fordecades, good practices have required considerationof the potential impact of severe natural events,including floods, hurricanes, blizzards, andearthquakes. These possibilities have been includedboth in wastewater and stormwater infrastructuredesign and in emergency preparedness and disaster

response planning. The potential consequences ofvandalism and employee misconduct may also havebeen considered. Today, there is a new focus ofconcern: the possible effects of intentional acts bydomestic or international terrorists.

As a result, forward thinking wastewater systemsare assessing and mitigating their vulnerabilities tothis new area of concern. These systems are,however, challenged by the fact that water andwastewater security is an emerging area of practicethat has evolved over just the last two years.Fortunately, rapid progress has been made inexpanding the knowledge base required to securewastewater infrastructure. The EPA, water andwastewater associations, utilities, and otherinstitutions have worked together to identify andaddress areas of need. In many cases, practicesand tools from other sectors for which security hasbeen a long-term concern are being adapted to waterand wastewater security. Finally, focused researchis being used to fill data gaps and addresswastewater-specific issues.

This is, nevertheless, an area of challenge forowners and managers of wastewater infrastructure.Currently, the assessment and mitigation ofvulnerabilities is voluntary. Unlike water systems,wastewater and stormwater systems are not facingmandatory requirements (see below). Wastewatersystems are, however, faced with other legalrequirements and other pressures, including thechallenges associated with maintaining aginginfrastructure that also requires substantialinvestments. As a result, water and wastewater



Wastewater Security42


Figure 1 Flow Diagram for Wastewater Treatment Plant

utility managers must balance external demands forsecurity measures with the internal resources todevelop and finance improvements.

Overview of Wastewater TreatmentSystems

Wastewater infrastructure consists of thecollection, conveyance, sewer, and treatment system.The collection system is comprised of a network ofpipes, conduits, structures, devices, andappurtenances for the collection, transportation, andpumping of wastewater. Some of the undergroundstructures, particularly those intended to containstormwater following heavy rainfall, can be quitelarge. While much of the collection system isunderground, some essential components (e.g.,pumping equipment) are above ground. There arethree basic types of sewers: sanitary, storm, andcombined. Sanitary sewers contain domestic,commercial, and industrial wastewater, which isconveyed to the treatment plant. Storm sewerscontain only stormwater and other runoff, whichusually goes directly to a water body, such as a riveror stream. Combined sewers are typically locatedin older metropolitan areas and are used to collectboth wastewater and stormwater, which is conveyedto the treatment plant. Typically wastewater andstormwater flows through the collection systemunder gravity or a combination of gravity andpumping, depending on topographic conditions.

Figure 1 shows the sequence of the unit processesused at a typical wastewater treatment plant in theUnited States. During preliminary treatment, the firststep in the process, large debris and a variedassortment of undesirable solids (e.g., grit, sand, andrags) and other components are removed usingscreens, shredding devices, grit removal systems,and possibly chemical addition. Preliminary treatmentis followed by primary treatment (sometimes termedprimary clarification), where gravity is used toseparate and remove suspended and floatingmaterial. In the secondary treatment phase,biological treatment is used to decrease theconcentration of dissolved, colloidal, and suspendedorganic material in the wastewater. The mostcommon process, the activated sludge process,utilizes aerated biological reactors or tanks containingan established mixed population of microorganismsin the presence of oxygen and trace amounts of

nutrients for treatment. Secondary treatment alsoinvolves secondary clarification, where solidsgenerated by the process are removed and sent tosolids handling. The liquid separated by thisclarification step may be subject to further chemical,physical, or biological treatment (advancedtreatment) and will very likely be disinfected todestroy pathogenic organisms before discharge. Themost common disinfection agent is chlorine. Othersystems use sodium hypochlorite, ultraviolet radiation(UV) or ozonation. Because the solids settled orotherwise removed during wastewater treatment areunstable and contain pathogenic organisms, theymust be treated before disposal. This solidstreatment is also a multi-step process. The first twosteps are thickening (volume reduction by removalof water using a variety of processes andequipment) and stabilization (anaerobic or aerobicbiological processing or chemical treatment todecrease levels of volatile materials and pathogens).Dewatering, composting, or thermal drying follow.The solids are then disposed of by either burial in alandfill, beneficial reuse (e.g., as a soil amendment),or incineration.

Assessing Wastewater SystemVulnerabilities

On June 12, 2002, President Bush signed thePublic Health Security and BioterrorismPreparedness and Response Act of 2002 (PL 107-188) into law. This Act requires community watersystems serving populations of greater than 3,300 toconduct and submit to EPA vulnerability assessmentsand to develop or upgrade emergency responseplans. All of these water systems were required toassess and report on their vulnerabilities by June2004. Although legislative initiatives have beenintroduced (e.g., S. 1039, The Wastewater



Treatment Works Security Act), there is currentlyno mandatory requirement that these be conducted.

There are unique security concerns related towastewater and stormwater infrastructure, and aspecific vulnerability assessment methodology hasbeen developed to address these concerns. Thismethodology, the Vulnerability Self Assessment Toolor (VSAT™), is a software program developed bythe Association of Metropolitan Sewerage Agencies(AMSA). It provides a structured approach forutilities to assess vulnerabilities and identifycountermeasures to reduce risks. The methodologywas subsequently adapted for combined water andwastewater utilities and is available free. Moreinformation is available at www.vsatusers.net. TheWater Environment Federation (WEF) has beenconducting free training workshops on conductingvulnerability assessments with this tool. Informationon these sessions is available at www.wef.org/watersecurity.

Vulnerability assessment methodologies for thewater/wastewater sector are now well-established.In addition to VSAT™, some wastewater utilitiesare utilizing RAM-W (Risk AssessmentMethodology–Water), which was developed bySandia National Laboratories and the AmericanWater Works Association Research Foundation(AwwaRF), to conduct vulnerability assessments.Combined water/wastewater utilities and stand alonewastewater utilities of various sizes are working toidentify and prioritize security concerns, conductvulnerability assessments, and develop security plans.

In the past, vulnerability assessments havetypically been used for facilities such as nuclear orchemical plants where the physical assets are usuallycentralized and have likely been laid out with securityconcerns in mind. Wastewater and stormwaterphysical infrastructure are often highly dispersedgeographically which presents challenges forensuring their protection. Furthermore, concernsregarding collection systems can involve theirpotential to provide unrestricted access togovernment buildings, financial centers, hospitals, andother sensitive targets. Large diameter gravitysanitary, storm, or combined sewers could beaccessed via manholes, inlets, or overflowstructures.These systems are large enough to allowindividuals using them to pass undetected beneathcity streets. Another specific concern relates to thepotential for destruction that could occur if highly

flammable or explosive substances are introducedinto the wastewater collection system of a majormetropolitan area. The level of destruction that hasresulted from accidental releases has beensignificant, including destroying streets and buildingswithin the vicinity of the explosion. Historicalaccounts of accidental releases of flammable orexplosive materials being deposited into wastewatersystems substantiate the potential for widespreaddevastation from an intentional act.

There are specific concerns related to thewastewater treatment as well as collection systems.Interruption of the wastewater treatment process,for example, by the introduction of substances toxicto the microorganisms in the treatment process, canshut down treatment for some time, potentiallycausing sewer backups and/or overflows. This canlead to widespread environmental and public healthimpacts, with subsequent economic impacts and anerosion of public confidence.

For drinking water systems, contamination waterhas been identified as the highest priority importantsecurity concern, and it is the subject of aconsiderable amount of research and development.Much of this research is focused on “early warningsystems.” Early warning systems will be designedto rapidly detect contamination events in drinkingwater systems, with the goal of avoiding orsignificantly reducing the most serious consequencesof such an event. The concerns for intentionallyintroduced toxic substances in wastewater systemsare different in many ways than those for drinkingwater systems and offer a unique set of detectionchallenges. However, there are certain parallelsbetween the reliable detection of intentionallyintroduced toxics in wastewater and drinking watersystems that will provide mutual benefits throughcontinued research and development. The benefitsof research and development on early warning ofpotentially disruptive toxic occurrences inwastewater systems will be improved process controlboth in “routine” operations, and in the event of aterrorist attack.

Hazardous chemicals used and stored atwastewater treatment plants could be used byterrorists or vandals in acts of sabotage. Chlorinecan be of particular concern, and some systems insensitive locations have elected to discontinue itsuse. However, a recent survey conducted by theWEF does not suggest that this practice is



widespread. Nearly 300 wastewater treatment plantsin the US responded to the survey conducted in late2003, and about 40% reported using chlorine gasfor disinfection. About one third of respondentsindicated that they were considering a change indisinfection practices. Of these facilities, over 60%cited regulatory or safety concerns as the reason,while only 5% cited security concerns as the mainreason for a change (WEF 2004).

The information technology systems ofwastewater utilities may also prove to be vulnerable.Most modern facilities include supervisory controland data acquisition (SCADA) systems–manydesigned to completely replace manual operation ofa facility. Hacking into these systems could be usedto cause overflows or interrupt treatment processescausing back-ups. The Water EnvironmentResearch Foundation (WERF) is responding to theseconcerns with a project to provide guidance to utilitieson how to secure and protect computerized andautomated systems using currently availabletechnologies to sense and correct security breaches.Initial findings from this work should be available towastewater utilities in early 2005.

Identifying and Prioritizing ThreatsTo Wastewater Systems

As more wastewater utilities have begun toperform vulnerability assessments, the need forguidance on which threats to consider during thisprocess has been identified. This type of guidancehas been available to water utilities for some time.EPA, under the direction of Congress, developed aBaseline Threat Document that provides water utilitysecurity teams with a way to identify the mostrelevant threats for their facility. EPA emphasizesthat the document was not designed as an exclusivelist of threats for a utility to consider and that theutility team should meet regularly with lawenforcement personnel, public health agencies, andother stakeholders in the community to develop asite-specific threat listing for their vulnerabilityassessment. Nevertheless, water systems havefound the guidance valuable and wastewater utilitiesare seeking a similar resource. EPA and WEF areworking jointly to develop similar guidance forwastewater utilities. This guidance should beavailable late in 2004.

Reducing Vulnerabilities

Many utilities have found that changingoperational practices can be a very cost-effectiveway of decreasing vulnerabilities. This requirestraining to build awareness and reinforce goodpractices such as consistent use of employee/contractor badges, pass codes, locks, and so forth.Rigorous chain-of-custody procedures should be usedfor the acceptance of chemical deliveries.Employees should be trained to identify and respondto suspicious behavior or to recognize indications ofthe presence of biological or chemical contamination.All employees should be aware of the existence ofthe facility’s emergency response plan and what theyshould do in the event that it is activated. Regulardrills and tabletop exercises can be helpful, and liaisonwith local emergency responders is essential. Somewastewater utilities are reaching out to local lawenforcement personnel who may be unfamiliar withthe nature of the operations and materials at thesite. USEPA Region 1 has developed a poster and avisor card that water treatment facilities can use toeducate their local police and the tips provided viathese products may also be helpful for wastewatersystems. (Copies of these materials can be obtainedat http://www.epa.gov/safewater/security/flyers/index.html. Samples of materials useful for publicoutreach and for distribution to the news media arealso available at this address.) It is important thatevery facility identify a single, trained spokespersonto communicate to the media should an event occur.Messages must also be coordinated with public healthauthorities to ensure that the informationdisseminated to the public is consistent and clear.

Wastewater systems are becoming aware of theneed to locate and secure critical business documentsand records, including “as-built” drawings,procurement records, legal documents, and a detailedcontact list of customers and employees. Some ofthese records may be deemed sensitive in nature,and access to them will be controlled. Others mayprove to be essential in ensuring a utility keeps runningin the face of a threat. These “knowledge baseassets” need to be organized and securelymaintained. In some cases, copies should be madeand kept off-site.



Other Areas of Development

Wastewater utilities have unique concerns relatedto the disposal of residues from the cleanup ofchemical, biological, or radiological incidents.Wastewater systems may be asked to acceptdecontamination residues or contaminants may bewashed into wastewater or stormwater systems bystorm events or by emergency-response personnelduring an incident. Treatment plant managers areseeking guidance on how to treat or dispose of theseresidues. EPA is working with AMSA to developguidance for wastewater utilities on the safe handlingand disposal of contaminated wastes. Thesecontaminated wastes could result from a directattack on the wastewater system or from acontamination/decontamination event on anothertarget in the system’s service area. The guidancewill better prepare wastewater utilities to effectivelyaddress worker safety, impacts on their treatmentsystems (including biosolids), and public health andenvironmental concerns. Progress on this study willbe reported at http://www.amsa-cleanwater.org/advocacy/security/.

The Water Environment Research Foundation isworking on a number of projects some of which arein collaboration with AwwaRF. The projects covera range of issues, including guidance to utilities onhow to interact with the public, develop contingencyplans, or evaluate “hardening” options (physicalsecurity measures). Other projects address specifictechnological applications, such as methodologies andtechnologies to identify, screen, and treat chemical,biological, and radiological contaminants inwastewater. The previously mentioned guidance forutilities on securing computerized and automatedsystems also is a collaborative effort of WERF andAwwaRF.

Finally, designers and managers of wastewatertreatment systems have expressed a strong needfor peer-reviewed information on best securitypractices for wastewater and stormwater systemdesign, operation, maintenance, retrofit, and upgrade.Water Environment Federation (WEF) is developingconsensus guidance materials that address how toinclude security and emergency responseconsiderations into the design, construction, operation,and maintenance of wastewater collection andtreatment facilities and stormwater systems.Considerations regarding minimizing effects of

natural disasters are also being addressed, and thisguidance will help systems of all sizes lower securityrisks and improve emergency response. Size-appropriate approaches and cost considerations willbe identified to address specific security concerns.It is anticipated that a draft will be available late in2004. WEF is working on this project in partnershipwith the American Water Works Association(AWWA), which is focusing on developing similarguidance materials for water utilities and theAmerican Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), which,in turn, is focusing on “methodologies andcharacteristics,” such as contaminant and flowmodeling.

The wastewater/stormwater security guidancematerials will reflect a consensus evaluation of soundsecurity-related practices. Examples of designconsiderations to be addressed include systemredundancy and back-up, location and hardening ofmission-critical assets, and design of hazardousmaterials storage/handling systems. Operations andmaintenance guidance will also cover a wide rangeof issues from employee screening and training;working with the public; coordination and outreachwith local emergency response personnel; use ofsensing and detection equipment, etc. Some of thesemeasures, though considered in the context ofsecurity and emergency response requirements, willalso have a positive impact on facility performance.For example, as previously mentioned, use ofadvanced sensing technology may allow for moreeffective process control as well as an enhancedcapability for the early detection and identificationof toxic substances. Special emphasis is being givento identifying and developing measures that will have“multiple benefits” as a means to increase thelikelihood that utilities will invest in securityenhancements. Once the project is complete, thethree project partners (ASCE, AWWA, and WEF)will consider developing consensus industry standardsbased on the guidance materials.

Research Needs

The current efforts described here should go along way toward making wastewater systems moresecure and better prepared for a variety of adversecircumstances. Both EPA and WERF haveundertaken efforts to identify additional securityneeds faced by wastewater systems. In 2002, EPA



initiated a process to identify drinking water andwastewater research and technical support securityneeds. EPA’s process relied on stakeholder inputfrom the outset and resulted in a final “action plan”in early 2004. WERF conducted a wastewatersecurity symposium in the summer of 2003 thatproduced a prioritized research agenda that also waspublished in early 2004. Both the EPA and WERFefforts identified a very similar set of research needs.The top two needs identified by WERF aredevelopment of security-related design standards forwastewater and stormwater facilities, and guidanceon the safe handling of contaminated materials andtreatment residuals. Efforts to address theseconcerns are already underway. The other highestpriority needs identified by WERF include: addressinginterdependencies with other critical infrastructuresthat could adversely affect wastewater systems;demonstration of ways to detect contaminants ofconcern in wastewater systems; and information onphysical security measures for wastewater systems.

Conclusions

While the issue of security is new to thewastewater sector, experience dealing with theimpacts of natural disasters and accidents on thesevital treatment systems has helped prepare utilitymanagers to cope with this new issue. Awarenessof the issue of security is growing, though managersmust balance competing pressures for scarceresources within their systems. New tools that arebeing developed and research that is being advancedhave and will continue to strengthen the basis forsound decision-making.


EILEEN J. O’NEILL is Managing Director for Technical andEducational Services with the Water Environment Federation. Inthis capacity she oversees WEF staff with responsibility for thetechnical content of WEF conferences, workshops, and trainingcourses; surveys of municipal and industrial practice; trainingmaterials including in print, video, CD-ROM, and web formats;and technical support to WEF’s committees. Dr. O’Neill overseesvarious projects in the areas of utility management and security.She has almost 25 years experience and holds a B.S. in Soil Sciencefrom the University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne (UK) and a Ph.D. inSoil Science from the University of Aberdeen (UK) and undertooka postdoctoral traineeship in Environmental Toxicology at theUniversity of Wisconsin at Madison. Her area of interest is thefate and transport of contaminants in the environment.

ALAN HAIS is a Senior Environmental Engineer with EPA’sNational Homeland Security Research Center. Mr. Hais servesas the EPA headquarters coordinator for water and wastewatersecurity research, and has the lead for EPA research onwastewater security and physical security of water systems.Mr. Hais has more than 30 years experience with EPA’s waterprograms. He has served in various technical and managementpositions, specializing in municipal wastewater treatmenttechnologies and standards, drinking water regulations andambient water quality criteria. Mr. Hais also worked for theDistrict of Columbia on the design and operation of theWashington’s Blue Plains Wastewater Treatment Plant. Hereceived bachelors and master’s degrees in civil/environmentalengineering from the University of Maryland and is a registeredProfessional Engineer.

References

Water Environment Federation. 2004. Disinfection ProcessSurvey Summary, Water Environment & Technology 16(7).

47

UCOWRJOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY WATER RESEARCH & EDUCATION

The Universities Council on Water Resources Board of Directors/Committee Chairs 2004-2005

President K arl Wood Water Resources Research Institute Box 3167 New Mexico State University Las Cruces, New Mexico 88003 (505) 646-4337; FAX: 646-6418 [email protected] President-Elect Tamim Y ounos Virginia Water Resources Res. Ctr. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University 10 Sandy Hall Blacksburg, Virginia 24061-0444 (540) 231-8039 FAX 231-6673 [email protected] Past President Mac McK ee Utah Water Research Laboratory Utah State University 1600 Canyon Road, UMC 8200 Logan, Utah 84322-8200 (435) 797-3188; FAX: 797-3663 [email protected] Executive Director Christopher L. Lant UCOWR Headquarters/Geography 4543 Faner Hall Southern Illinois University Carbondale, Illinois 62901-4526 (618) 453-6020 FAX: 453-2671 [email protected] COMMITTEE CHAIRS Awards Mac McKee Conference Program Lynne Lewis Steve Kahl Membership David DeWalle Website Karl Wood

BOARD OF DIRECTORS Michael Barber State of Washington Water Research Ctr. Washington State University PO Box 643002 Pullman, WA 99164-3002 (509) 335-5531; FAX: 335-1590 [email protected] David DeWalle School of Forest Resources 107 Land and Water Building The Pennsylvania State University University Park, PA 16802 (814) 863-0291; FAX: 865-3378 [email protected] Ronald D. Lacewell Agricultural and Life Sciences Room 301 Scoates Hall 7101 TAMU Texas A&M University 104 Jack K Williams Admin Bldg College Station TX 77843-7101 (979) 862-7138; Fax: 845-9542 [email protected] Lynne Lewis Department of Economics Andrews Road Bates College Lewiston, Maine 04240 (207) 786-6089; FAX: 786-8338 [email protected] Ari Michelsen Agricultural Research Center 1380 A&M Circle Texas A&M University El Paso TX 79927 (915) 859-9111; FAX: 859-1078 [email protected] Gretchen Rupp MSU Water Center Montana State University 101 Huffman Building Bozeman, Montana 59717 (406) 994-6690; FAX: 994-1774 [email protected]

David R. Shaw GeoResources Institute Mississippi State University Box 9652 Mississippi State, Mississippi 39762 (662) 325-9575; FAX: 325-9578 [email protected] John C. Tracy Idaho Water Resources Research Inst. 800 Park Boulevard, Suite 221 University of Idaho-Boise Boise ID 83712 (208) 364-9921; FAX: 364-4035 YEARS OF BOARD SERVICE July 2002 – July 2005 Lynne Lewis Gretchen Rupp Tamim Younos July 2003 – July 2006 Ron Lacewell David Shaw John Tracy July 2004 – July 2007 Michael Barber David DeWalle Ari Michelsen

48

JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY WATER RESEARCH & EDUCATIONUCOWR

MEMBERSHIPTHE UNIVERSITIES COUNCIL ON WATER RESOURCES, INC.

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N M New Mexico Institute of Mining/TechNew Mexico State UniversityUniversity of New Mexico

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OR Oregon State UniversityPA Pennsylvania State University

Drexel UniversityPR University of Puerto RicoSC Clemson University

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Tarleton State UniversityTexas A&M UniversityTexas Tech UniversityUniversity of Texas at AustinUniversity of Texas at El PasoUniversity of Texas at San Antonio

UT Utah State UniversityVA University of Virginia

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Affiliates

Asian Institute of TechnologyUniversity of CalgaryUniversity of New England

49


BENEFITS OF UCOWR MEMBERSHIP

The Universities Council on Water Resources (UCOWR) is an organization of over 80 member universities united incommon goals of research, education and service related to the wise use, protection and conservation of our nation’swater resources. Benefits from UCOWR membership include:

AdvocacyUCOWR is dedicated, through its membership, to the objectives of developing new science and preparing leaders andtechnologies for the use, management and protection of our water resources. UCOWR delegates act as advocates forincorporation of contemporary issues and methodologies in the classroom and research laboratories. Evolving academicprograms in water resources represent excellent examples of model curricula for other interdisciplinary programs.

LeadershipUCOWR’s officers and member delegates represent the nation’s leading academic professionals who are dedicated toproviding an expanding knowledge base and training water resource professionals. Graduates of UCOWR institutionsconstitute the majority of new professionals entering water resources careers each year. UCOWR encourages delegatesto assume leadership roles within their institutions and supports this role through electronic and personal networkingservices. In addition, the organizational structure of UCOWR provides opportunities for leadership developmentthrough participation in offices, committees and the Board of Directors.

AwarenessUCOWR is the only professional organization serving academic institutions and their faculties to embrace the entirerange of disciplines involved in water resources. This diversity sets UCOWR apart from discipline affiliated organizationsand provides a holistic view necessary to solve today’s complex water problems and to train the nation’s future waterresource leaders. As a forward looking organization, UCOWR promotes incorporation of cutting edge science andmethodology into the classroom through active programs of discussion, demonstration and publications. Through itswebsite (www.ucowr.siu.edu), UCOWR also enhances public awareness of the need for inclusion of a broad range ofviewpoints in providing sustainable solutions to water problems.

Professional GrowthUCOWR promotes the professional growth of member delegates in order to enhance their impact and effectivenesswithin the community of water resources professionals. The Journal of Contemporary Water Research & Education,our quarterly publication, provides opportunities for publication of research information and establishment of dialogon contemporary water issues to a degree not afforded by other water related journals. The annual meetings provide aforum for exchanges of information in an atmosphere conducive to open discussion and personal and institutionalnetwork building with professional organizations. Achievements of outstanding water resource professionals arerecognized through the UCOWR awards program that focuses attention on water research, education and service.Student awards recognize outstanding dissertations chosen in a national competition and encourage life long dedicationto careers in water resource fields.

ServiceThe variety of benefits described above promote and support opportunities for member delegates to provide servicesto their institutions and their various clienteles. As a member of UCOWR, delegates actively participate in nationaldebates that will determine future directions of water resources research, education, and public service. As activeparticipants, they will have access to and be responsible for the incorporation of new tools and ideas into the educationand training programs of their institutions to produce better prepared and more effective graduates. These same toolsand ideas are incorporated into life long learning activities for practicing professionals through UCOWR and universitysponsored programs, thus directly serving the public. Finally, active participation in UCOWR provides the stimulationnecessary for the advancement of science from which solutions to our nation’s complex water problems arise.

50


FRIENDS OF UCOWR

In appreciation of their vision and leadership in the advancement of Water Resources Research and Education, thefollowing individuals have been named “Friends of UCOWR.”

1987Wade H. AndrewsJohn D. HewlettGerard A. RohlichDan M. Wells

1988Merwin P. DougalJohn C. FreyDaniel J. Wiersma

1989Daniel D. Evans

1990Henry P. CaulfieldMaynard M. HufschmidtAbsalom W. Snell

1991Eugene D. EatonWilliam B. LordWillliam R. Walker

1992J. Ernest FlackGerald E. Galloway, Jr.John C. GuyonErnest T. SmerdonWarren Viessman, Jr.

1993Marvin T. BondGlenn E. Stout

1994Robert D. VarrinHenry J. Vaux, Jr.

1984Ernest F. BraterNorman H. BrooksVen Te ChowNephi A. ChristensenRobert E. DilsWarren A. HallJohn W. HarshbargerA.T. IngersollJohn F. KennedyCarl E. KindsvaterEmmett M. LaursenArno T. LenzRay K. LinsleyWalter L. MooreDean F. PetersonSol D. ResnickVerne H. ScottDavid K. ToddCalvin C. WarnickM. Gordon Wolman

1985Bernard B. BergerWilliam ButcherErnest EngelbertDavid H. HowellsWilliam Whipple

1986Leonard DworskyPeter EaglesonBenjamin EwingGeorge MaxeyGeorge SmithE. Roy Tinney

1995Jon F. BartholicM. Wayne HallWilliam L. Powers

1996L. Douglas JamesDavid H. MoreauHoward S. Peavy

1997Faye AndersonPatrick L. BrezonikTheodore M. SchadYacov Y. Haimes

1998Peter E. BlackHelen M. Ingram

1999John S. JacksonKyle E. SchillingRobert C. Ward

2000William H. Funk

2001Charles W. Howe

2002Duane D. Baumann

2003Lisa BourgetC. Mark DunningTamim Younos

WARREN A. HALL MEDAL HONOREES

William Butcher - 1993Warren “Bud” Viessman, Jr. - 1994

Gilbert White - 1995Richard S. Engelbrecht - 1996

Yacov Y. Haimes - 1997Neil S. Grigg - 1998

William W-G. Yeh - 1999 Daniel Peter Loucks -2000 Vernon L. Snoeyink - 2000

Miguel A. Marino – 2002Charles W. “Chuck” Howe – 2003

Robert A. Young– 2004

2004Ari MichelsenMargaret SkerlyWalter V. Wendler

51


2004 UCOWR AWARD WINNERS

2004 Warren A. Hall Medal Award WinnerROBERT A. YOUNG is a resource and agricultural policy economist with over 40 years of appliedresearch, teaching and consulting experience. He received degrees in Agriculture (1954) and AgriculturalEconomics (1958) from the University of California (Davis) and an Agricultural Economics doctorate fromMichigan State University (1963). Young was on the faculty at the University of Arizona and then for twoyears was a visiting staff member at the nonprofit research organization Resources for the Future, Inc. inWashington, DC. Since his retirement in 1992 after 22 years as a full-time Colorado State UniversityAgricultural Economics faculty member, Young has carried on his university research and outside consultingactivities. He continues to focus on: methods for economic evaluation of proposed public policies forinvestments in, and allocation of, water supplies and water quality improvements; concepts and methodsfor valuation of nonmarketed water-related goods and services; and developing interdisciplinary approachesto the modeling of water policy issues. He is the author or co-author of numerous articles, monographs,reports and conference papers.

2004 Friends of UCOWRARI MICHELSEN

MARGRET SKERLY

WALTER V. WENDLER

2004 UCOWR Dissertation Award WinnersKIM HAGEMAN, OREGON STATE UNIVERSITY

Measuring in situ reductive dechlorination rates intrichloroethene-contaminated groundwaterPATRICIA SACO, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

Flow dynamics in large river basins: self-similar network structure and scale effects

2004 Poster Competition Award WinnersERIK RICHARD STRANDHAGEN, UNIVERSITY OF OREGON

GUOBIN FU AND SHULIN CHEN, WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY

NATHAN EIDEM, SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY CARBONDALE

52


BIG Alaskan FactsAlaska has the BIGGEST…• Land Area in the U.S.: 586, 412 square

miles, 1/5 the size of the lower 48 states• Mountain in North America: Mount

McKinley (Denali) at 20,320 feet• State park in the nation: WoodTikchik State

Park, with 1.6 million acres of wilderness• Concentration of Glaciers: 29,000 square

miles or 5 percent of the state• Area per person: .92 square mile for each

Alaskan• King Salmon: 97 pounds, 4 ounces caught

on the Kenai RiverEWRI is looking forward to this BIGCongress!!

Plan to join EWRI in exciting Anchorage, Alaska to gaininsight into global climate change and its environmental andwater impacts. This Congress offers the rare opportunity toimmerse yourself in the grandeur of the Great Land, and alsoparticipate in discussing on of the biggest challenges to facethe world-wide professional community. Regardless of yourlocation, global climate change will impact you and your community.Four days of technical sessions will cover hydrologic impacts of changing climatepatterns, irrigation adaptation to changing water supplies, role of simulationmodels in adaptive management of environmental systems, and much more!Additional activities will include incredible one-day field trip adventures andnetworking & social events featuring Alaskan native themes and locales!Anchorage is a great city to plan your vacation before or after the Congress! Thespirited city of Anchorage sits perched on the shores of serene Cook Inlet, at thebase of the picturesque snow-capped Chugach Mountains. Driving just 10 min-utes south of town puts you at the breathtaking Turnagain Arm. Driving anoth-er five minutes down the road presents you face-to-face with vistas filled withmountain sheep in their natural state. Available tours through the region candeliver you to such storied points as Portage Glacier, Mt. McKinley, PrinceWilliam Sound, Kenai Peninsula, Chugach State Park, and many excellent muse-ums and exhibits on native culture, crafts, and artistry. Please consider submitting proposals for sessions, paper abstracts, andposters for next year’s Congress. Visit the 2005 Congress website athttp://www.asce.org/conferences/ewri2005/ for more information.

2005 World Water andEnvironmental ResourcesCongress

53


THE UNIVERSITIES COUNCIL ON WATER RESOURCES

Arizona State U.

Auburn U.

Bates College

Cal. State-Sacramento

Central State U.

City U. of New York

Clemson U.

Colorado State U

Cornell U.

Drexel U.

Duke U.

Georgia Institute of Tech.

Iowa State U.

John Hopkins U.

Kansas State U.

Louisiana State U.

MA Instit. of Tech.

Michigan State U.

Mississippi State U.

Montana State U.

National Tech. U.

NM Inst. of Mining/Tech.

New Mexico State U.

North Carolina State U.

Ohio State U.

Oklahoma State U.

Oregon State U.

Pennsylvania State U.

Purdue U.

Rutgers U.

South Dakota State U.

Southern Illinois U.

Southwest Texas State U.

State U. of New Jersey

State U. of NY-Brockport

State U. of NY-Syracuse

Syracuse U.

Tarleton State U.

Tennessee Tech. U.

Texas A&M U.

Texas Tech. U.

U.S. Military Academy

U. of Alaska

U. of Arizona

U. of Arkansas

U. of Cal.-Davis

U. of Cal.-Riverside

U. of Central Florida

U. of Cincinnati

U. of Colorado

U. of Delaware

U. of Florida

U. of Georgia

U. of Guam

U. of Hawaii

U. of Idaho

U. of Illinois

U. of Iowa

U. of Kansas

U. of Maine

U. of Massachusetts

U. of Michigan

U. of Minnesota

U. of Missouri

U. of Montana

U. of Nebraska

U. of New Hampshire

U. of New Orleans

U. of New Mexico

U. of Nevada System

U. of North Carolina

U. of Oklahoma

U. of Puerto Rico

U. of South Carolina

U. of Southern Cal.

U. of Tennessee

U. of Texas-Austin

U. of Texas-El Paso

U. of Texas-San Antonio

U. of Virgin Islands

U. of Virginia

U. of Wisconsin

Utah State U.

Virginia Polytechnic Inst.

Washington State U.

Yale U.

UCOWRSouthern Illinois University Carbondale

1000 Faner Drive, Room 4543

Carbondale, IL 62901-4526

Fax: 618-453-2671

www.ucowr.siu.edu

Christopher L. Lant, Executive Director

618-453-6020 or [email protected]

Rosie Gard, Program Admin. Assistant

618-536-7571 or [email protected]

Member Universities

Issue 128

June 2004

A Publication of theUniversities Council on Water Resources

Journal of Contemporary

Water Research & Education

Small Water Supply SystemsMeeting the Challenges of the Safe Drinking Water Act

Acknowledged by P. Boeckx

Formerly Water Resources Update

Recent Issues

RECENT CONFERENCE THEMES

The Journal of Contemporary Water Research & Education

#128 Small Water Supply Systems:

Meeting the Challenges of the

Safe Drinking Water Act

#127 Water Resources Sustainability

#126 Geographic Perspectives on

Water Resources

#125 Trans-Boundary Water Issues

#124 The Relevance of Climate

Change Information to Water

Resources Managers

#123 University-Based Water

Research: Relevant to Society?

#122 Universities’ Contributions to

TMDL ProgramDevelopment

2004 Allocating Water: Economics and the Environment

2003 Water Security in the 21st Century

2002 Integrated Transboundary Water Management

2001 Decision Support Systems for Water Resources Management

2000 Living Downstream in the Next Millenium: Reconciling Watershed

Concerns with Basin Management

THE UNIVERSITIES COUNCIL

ON WATER RESOURCES

RESOURCES

Universities Council on Water Resources (UCOWR) is an

organization leading in research, education, and service related to the wise use,

protection, and conservation of our nation’s water resources. For information

on becoming a member of UCOWR, visit our website at: www.ucowr.siu.edu.

All members of UCOWR receive a subscription to The Journal ofThe Journal ofThe Journal ofThe Journal ofThe Journal of

Contemporary Water Research & Education Contemporary Water Research & Education Contemporary Water Research & Education Contemporary Water Research & Education Contemporary Water Research & Education and are also eligible for

conference registration discounts.

The Benefits of UCOWR Membership

· Hardcopy and Electronic Subscriptions to The Journal of Contemporary

Water Research & Education

· Reduced Registration Fees at theUCOWR Annual Conference

· Increased Networking Opportunities with Water Resources Leaders in

Business, Government and Academe

· A Voice in the Governance of UCOWR (1 lead delegate and up to 7

additional voting delegates)

What is UCOWR?

54


RIVER AND LAKE RESTORATION is an applied science and anational environmental agenda in water resources management thatreflects changing landscapes – institutional, legal, infrastructural andgeographic. It takes different forms across North America

· Removing industrial revolution era dams in New England· Re-establishing historic meanders and flow regimes in the

KissimmeeRiver and Everglades in South Florida· Improving spawning habitat for native salmon in the Northwest· Replacing wetlands on the floodplains of major rivers and

reducing nutrient flux to lakes in the Midwest· Replacing water storage formerly held as snow in the

Rocky Mountains

The Universities Council on Water ResourcesUniversities Council on Water ResourcesUniversities Council on Water ResourcesUniversities Council on Water ResourcesUniversities Council on Water Resources and the

National Institutes for Water ResourcesNational Institutes for Water ResourcesNational Institutes for Water ResourcesNational Institutes for Water ResourcesNational Institutes for Water Resources invite you to Portland,Maine to participate in an exchange of research, policy analysis, andhands-on experience in improving the ecological functioning ofstreams, rivers, lakes, reservoirs, and wetlands through restorationefforts.

CONFERENCE THEME

PRESENTATION TOPICS

PORTLAND, MAINE

P ortland is bordered by Maine’s rugged, rocky

coast to the north, and miles of white, sandy

beaches to the south. The immediate area offers

hiking, sailing, sea kayaking, and fishing. Dozens of

nearby lakes and rivers offer swimming, boating, and

fishing. Parks, wildlife sanctuaries, and nature

preserves are found in the city or in other southern

Maine towns. Just a short drive to the north is the

world-famous LL Bean Company and the outlets of

Freeport. Nearly a dozen picturesque lighthouses dot

the coast between Portland and York.

SPONSOR LOGOSPRESENTATION TOPICS

ENVISIONED PRESENTATION

TOPICS INCLUDE

Biological Effects of Stream Engineering

Dam Removal

Economic Impacts of Restoration Projects

Endangered Species

Invasive Species

Restoration of Sea-Run Fisheries

Riparian Assessment / Restoration

River Flow Augmentation

The Holiday Inn By the BayHoliday Inn By the BayHoliday Inn By the BayHoliday Inn By the BayHoliday Inn By the Bay sits on the edge of

Portland’s Old Port, which has been restored to 19th

century splendor, with cobbled streets and beautiful

Victorian brick buildings housing an eclectic mix of

restaurants, microbreweries, and shops. Here you can

enjoy views of Casco Bay while savoring succulent

Maine lobster, or browse through the quaint shops

selling crafts, antiques and Maine-made products.

CONFERENCE HOTEL

CONFERENCE CO-SPONSORS

Holiday Inn By the Bay

88 Spring Street

Portland, Maine 04101

(207) 775-2311

www.innbythebay.com

TO ACCESS THE

ONLINE ABSTRACT

SUBMISSION FORM,

VISIT

WATER.MONTANA.EDU/UCOWR

55


River and Lake Restoration:

Changing Landscapes

The Universities Council on Water Resources2005 Annual Conference

Portland, Maine

July 12-14, 2005

UniversitiesCouncilOnWaterResources

Call for Papers Deadline:

December 1, 2004

Sponsored By

UCOWR

Websitewww.ucowr.siu.edu

Abstract

Submission Formwater.montana.edu/ucowr

UNIVERSITIES COUNCIL ON WATER RESOURCES

1000 FANER DRIVE, ROOM 4543SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY

CARBONDALE, IL 62901-4526

ISSUE EDITOR: REGAN MURRAY


CONTENTS

Water and Homeland Security: An IntroductionRegan Murray ............................................................................................................................................................................... 1

Water Security Research and Policy: EPA’s Water Security Research and Technical Support Action PlanJonathan Herrmann and Grace Robiou ........................................................................................................................................ 3

Assessing the Vulnerabilities of U.S. Drinking Water SystemsJeffrey Danneels and Ray Finley .................................................................................................................................................... 8

Responding to Threats and Incidents of Intentional Drinking Water ContaminationSteven Allgeier and Matthew Magnuson ..................................................................................................................................... 13

Water Treatment and Equipment Decontamination TechniquesKim Fox ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 18

Linking Public Health and Water Utilities to Improve Emergency ResponseR.J. Gelting and M.D. Miller ....................................................................................................................................................... 22

Safeguarding the Security of Public Water Supplies Using Early Warning Systems: A Brief ReviewJafrul Hasan, Stanley States, and Rolf Deininger ........................................................................................................................ 27

Use of Systems Analysis to Assess and Minimize Water Security RisksJames Uber, Regan Murray, and Robert Janke ........................................................................................................................... 34

Wastewater SecurityEileen J. O’Neill and Alan Hais ................................................................................................................................................... 41

2005 UCOWR ANNUAL CONFERENCE

RIVER AND LAKE RESTORATION:CHANGING LANDSCAPES

JULY 12-14, 2004PORTLAND, MAINE

HOLIDAY INN BY THE BAY

Documents

Formerly Water Resources Update Issue 129 October 2004 · 2017-10-25 · JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY WATER RESEARCH AND EDUCATION UCOWR Murray 1 Water and Homeland Security: An Introduction