Republic of the PhilippinesCOURT OF APPEALS

Manila

FORMER FOURTI-I DIVISION

qNrsroN oF FIVE

ATTY. ERNESTO L.SANTOS,

CA-G.R. SP NO. 128625

Members:

CARAN DANG, Clrairperson,BATO, JR.,GONZALES.SISON,BARRIOS, andSORONGON, JJ.

DELOS

Petitioner,

-VETSUS_

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OFBAGUIO CITY, BRANCH 60 ANDBRANGH 7, AND UNIVERSITY OFMANILA, REPRESENTED BYEMILY D. DE LEON,

Respondents

Prom u lgated:

'altG 2 fl 2015ltvv i

RESOLUTION

CARANDANG, J,:

This resolves private respondent University of Manila's (UM)Motion for Reconsideration of Our Amended Decision dated 21November 2014 which reconsidered the 30 July 2013 Decision ofthe Special Tenth Division of this Court denying petitioner'sPetition for Certiorari.ln the said Amended Decision, We set asidethe trial court's finding of probable cause against petitiotter for thecrime of qualified tlreft and quashed the warrant of arrest againsthim

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cA-G.R. SP NO. 128625RESOLUTION

UM's arguntents in its Motion for Reconsideration can besun'tmarized as follows: (1) the reversal by this Court of the trialcourt's finding of probable cause is beyond this Coud's certiorarijurisdiction as the trial court has the exclusive original jurisdictiottto try, hear and resolve conflicting factual issues; (2) as a fugitivefrom justice, petitioner has no personality to file the instant petition;(3) Our vote of 3-2 whiclr reconsidered the unanimous decision ofthe Former Special Tenth Division is tantamount to a "tyranny ofminority" because, in effect, the votes of tlrree Justices haveprevailed over those of tlre five Justices; (4) petitioner's defensesof owner's consent and lack of irrtent to gain are evidentiary innature which can only be heard and ventilated in a full blown trial;(5) tlris Court erred in ruling that the trial court gravely abused itsdiscretion as the latter's finding of probable cause is well-grounded.

We deny the Motion for Reconsideration.

The first argument lras no basis. The last paragraph ofSection 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 12.9, as amended, grants to theCourt of Appeals the power to resolve factual issues. Thus:

"l-he Courl of Appeals shall have the powerto try cases and conduct hearings, receiveevidence and perform any and all acts necessary toresolve factual issues raised in cases falling withinits original and appellate jurisdiction, including thepower to grant and conduct new trials or furtherproceedings. Trials or hearings in the Court ofAppeals must be continuous and must becompleted within three (3) rnonths, unless extendedby the Chief Justice."

Tlris Courl is expressly granted by law through Our certioraripowers to strike down any order that was issued with grave abuseof

CA-G.R. SP NO. 128625RESOLUTION

was too patent in the act of the trial courl in finding probable causeagainst petitioner despite the absence of the two elements of the.ri1^11e of qualified theft. Although it is true that a finding of probablecause needs only to rest on evidence showing tlrat more likelythan not a crime has been committed and was committed byaccused2 in this case, petitloner ably demonstrated the absence ofthe aforementioned elements. l-hus, petitioner need not besubjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trialbecause he clearly slrowed that the trial coutl gravely abused itsdiscretion when it overloot

CA-G.R. SP NO. 128625RESOLUTION

involved.a Thus, petitioner may any time assail the order which hedeems to have been issued by the trial court in excess of itsjurisdiction,s ln Peopte vs. Hu Ruey Chutt1, the Supreme Courtruled:

"The Court agrees with the respondent'scontention that he was not proscribed fromassailing the August 1, 2AAZ Order of the RTCbefore the CA on certiorari, even before his arrest'

petition. Uppn.repeipt .qf .a coBy.pfjhp -sa!d-qr,dqrirom the RTC, the re+pondqnt..already hasllhg-tighJto aspail the qame. in pn Sgpropriate pf.qcge,dittg {orthe said purposB.I (Underscoring Ours.)7

Moreover, petitioner's filing of pleadings seeking affirmativerelief is equivalent to voluntary appearance and submission to thejurisdiction of the court . ln Jimenez vs. Sorongons, the SupremeCourt held that:

"As a rule, one who seeks an affirmativerelief is deemed to have submitted to thejurisdiction of the court" Filing pleadings seekingaffirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearanae,and the consequent jurisdiction of one's person tothe jurisdiction of the court.

Thus, by filing several motions before theRTC seeking the dismissal of the criminal ca$e,respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to thejurisdiction of the RTC. Custody of the law is notrequired for the adjudication of reliefs other than anapplication for bail,"

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Guevara vs, Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos' 138792-804. March 31, 2005'rd.G.R. No. 158064. June 30, 2005.oited in the Decision renclered on .luly 30, 2013 by tlre Special Tenth Division'C.R. No, 178607, December 5, 2012'

void:

CA-G.R. SP NO. 128625RESOLUTION

lrr this case, petitioner filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion forJudicial Determination of Probable Cause, To Lift/Quash Warrantof Arrest, and To Defer/Suspend Arraignment And/Or AnyProceedings as well as a Motion for Parlial Reconsiderationseeking various reliefs from the trial court. lndubitably, hevoluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of that court.

The third contention is also bereft of merit, UM's claim thatthe promulgation of Atnended Decision is "odd", "absurd", and"unsensical [sic]" because the votes of three Justices ovefturnedthe votes of the five Justices is outrageous. UM erroneouslylumped together the unanimous votes of the three AssociateJustices in the Former Special Tentl'r Division with the dissentingopinions of the two Associate Justices in this Division to come upwith its own tally of five votes versLrs three votes of the majorityopinion. Any lawyer wortlr his salt can easily spot the absurdity ofthis argument. Contrary to UM's erroneous claim, the rules onlnhibition and the Cornpositiorr of the Special Division of Fiveunder the 2009 lnternal Rules of the Court of Appeals were dulycomplied with in this case. lt must be recalled that in a Resolutiondated 5 March 2014e, the menrbers of the Former Special TentlrDivision inhibited themselves from this case after they issued theOriginal Decision on 30 July 2.013. Accordingly, and while theMotion for Reconsideration was pending, the case was raffled tothis Division for tlre resolutiorr of tlre Motion for Reconsideration.The Special Division of Five was constituted when the unanimousvote of the members of this Division could not be attained in viewof the dissent manifested by the Chairperson. Thus, AssociateJustices Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and Manuel M. Barrios weredesignated by raffle as additional members of the Special Divisiortof Five. The conclusions in tlre Amended Decision were onlyreached after consultations by and among all the members of theSpecial Division of Five. The votes of the former Division cannotbe considered in resolving the Motion for Reconsideration.

As to the fourth and fiftlr arguments, the same are mererehashes of those presented and have already been passed uponin the Amended Decision, Nevertheless, We maintain Our positionthat the trial court gravely abused its discretion in finding probablecause against the petitioner for the crime of qualified theft and in

e Associate .Iustice Nirra C. Antonio-Valerrzuela inhibited herself from fuftlter participation in thecase on l9 Novernbet' 20 I3.

CA-G,R, SP NO. 128625RESOLUTION

lssulng a warrant of arrest against him despite the clear showipg ofthe absence of the elements of intent to gairr and the lack ofowner's consent. lt is fundamental that the concept of grave a[:useof discretion transcends mere judgmental error as it properlypertains to a jurisdictional aberration. While defying precisedefinition, grave abuse of cliscretion generally rerers' to a"capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as ls equivalent tolacl< of jurisdiction." corollary, the abuse of cJiscretion must bepatent and gross so as to amount to an evasion of a positive dutyor a virtual refusal to perform a cluty errjoined by law, or to act at allin contemplation of law.lo

Owner's consent was obtained bypetitioner.

Petitioner's use of the electricity and water supply of BpIwas with the consent of his father who was at that time themajority stockholder and Presiclent and Chairman of the Board ofTrustees of UM. virgilio Delos santos gave his consent to his son(herein petitioner) to use BpI's eleciricity and water suppry in2007 Thereafter, and until virgilio's death in 2008, the BoarcJ ofTrustees of UM did not object to or repudiate said consent.

The Board of rrustees of UM could have easily overruledand nullified Virgilio's cJecisiorr to allow the petitionei to use itselectricity and water supply in Baguio City. The fact that ttre Boardof rrustees of UM did not prevent the petitioner to continue toopenly use its electricity and water supply during the lifetime ofvirgilio, and even immediately thereafter lasting for four years,clearly manifests that it acquiesced to Virgilio's girTing of consent totlre petitioner. lt was only after a serious family/-orporate squabblethat happened between and among the corporate directors flratthe criminal case was filed agairrst petitioner.

It is well-entrenched that if a corporation knowingly permitsits officer, or any otlrer agent, to perform acts within thl-scope ofan apparent authority, holding him out to ilre public as possessingpower to do those acts, the corporation will, as against any pers oif ilwho has dealt in good faiilr wiflr the corporation through ,u"ffi

IM-' Ag,il-"rJ.p*,,-"to1'.rLrs1ice, er al., c.R. No. 197-522, septernber 11,2013. fll

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CA.G.R. SP NO. 128625RESOLUTION

agent, be estopped from denying such authority.ll

Apparent authority is derived not merely from practice. ltsexistence may be ascedained tlrrough 1) the general manner inwhich the corporation holds out an officer or agent as having thepower to act, or in other words, the apparent authority to act ingeneral, with wlrich it clothes hinr; or 2) the acquiescence in hisacts of a particular nature, with actual or constructive knowledgethereof, within or beyond the scope of his ordinary powers.12Virgilio's apparent authority to juggle the funds of UM with his ownfunds is clearly demonstrated by UM's own attached evidence", fowit:

"T'hey failed to appreciate tlre fact that it was evenmy father wlro slrouldered his grandchildren'sexpenses. This was evidenced by a certificationissued by the President arrd Chief of AcademicOfficerla, copy of whiclr is attached hereto as Annex"8" attesting that my brotlrer's second mistress hasbeen receiving monthty allowance from theUniversity in the amount of Nine Thousand EightHundred Twenty Five Pesos. Xxx."

By giving Virgilio an apparent authority, UM's Board ofTrustees cannot now deny and repudiate the legal effect ofVirgilio's consent given to tlre petitioner to use the electricity andwater supply of BPTI.

lntent to gain is wanting.

For a charge of crime to prosper, the accused must havebeen slrown to have acted with a genuine criminal intent.15 lf lrewas acting under a bona f,de belief that he has a claim or title to i tthe thing allegerlly stolen, the criminal intent is missing.'t Ll.

ilMltst,roller,G.R.No.|ll8444,.Tulyl4'2008,558SCRAll3.[12 People's Aircargo and Warehousing Co., Inc, vs. Cor"rrt of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 117847.October 7, 1998.rr Affidavit of Maria Corazon Ranrona Llanras Delos Santos, Annex "C" ofAnnex "6" of private

respondent's Comment dated 22 May 2013. Records, p. 760.'' Dr. Enrily D. De Leorr, who is the lepresentative of UM in this case.r5 US vs. Domingo Viera, G,R. No. 861. December 20, 1902.r6 Pit-og vs. People, et al., G.R. No. 76539. October I l, 1990.

CA-G.R. SP NO. 128625RESOLUTION

Petitioner's claim of riglrt on tlre basis of the permissiongiven by his father negates crimirral intent on his part. He openlyused BPTI's electricity and water supply under the bona fide beliefthat he was allowed and authorized by his father to use the same.His father owned majority of the shares of stocks of UM and wasat that time its President and Clrairman of the Board. He practicallycontrolled and ran the business affairs of the university. Asexplained above, the Board of Trustees had given Virgilio anapparent authority to do so as shown by the fact that it allowedVirgilio to treat the finances of UM as if they were his own personalproperty. lt did not revoke this authority while Virgilio was still aliveor even immecliately thereafter. The allegation therefore thatpetitioner had the intention to deprive UM of its personal propertyis negated by the fact that he relied in good faith on his father'sauthority to use BPTI's electricity and water supply.

WHEREFORE,University of Manila'slack of merit.

premises considered, private respondentMotion for Reconsideration is DENIED for

SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR:

ARI D. CARAAssociate Justice

L-^fr I 0;s'^tr ('f / ,ro:7 )'su^$&U.-^a-"n

MARLENE GONZALES-SISON - [

RAMON M. BATO, JR.Associate Justice

Associate Justice