Foriegn Policy Option 3

MIASS 617

NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY: a case study of the Obasanjo regime (1999-2007)

NIGERIAN DEFENCE ACADEMY PG SCHOOL

SYNDICATE ONE


SYNDICATE MEMBERS

I. Odum D.I (Syndicate Leader) 08035995501

II. Ibrahim Yusuf Mohammed 08035962422

III. Izegae Egbe Ebun 08033110221

IV. Nyam Shunom 08065322225

V. Adeniyi Yetunde 08035614136

VI. Onu Ocheje Adamu 08036607556

VII. Atuma Ernest 08036241797

VIII. Emmanuel Okoli 08038298750

IX. Angela Gani 08054058135

X. Suleiman Mohammed Jamiu 08036945655

XI.

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1.0 What is policy?

As much as there are different scholars of policy out there, there are different views to what policy means or the definition of policy, But for the purpose of this presentation and time, we shall look at the views of a couple of scholars.

Ladipo (1985) defines policy as “a course setting involving decisions of the wildest ramifications and longest time perspective in the life of an organization“. A.S Hornsby went further to say that “a policy is a plan action, statement of aims and deals made by a government, political party, business company and so on”. According to Holsti (1972: 21) a policy is the decision that defines goals, set precedents or by down causes of action and the actions taken to implement these decisions.

From all of the above definitions of policy we will discover that they all have something’s in common. They are determined course of action and /or setting of any organization and for which they aim at, as the ends at any given point in time. This is why Ray Ofoegbu defined it as “a course of action adopted by a government, group of person etc”.

2.0 Foreign PolicyWe should therefore agree that there is no universally acceptable

definition of foreign policy, though many scholars see it as having everything to do with what is to be done about external matters, diplomacy and how it affects their national interest. Francis Pyn defines foreign policy as “The projection abroad of a country’s values and aspirations”. While F.S. Northedge and D. vital define foreign policy as “a product of interaction between internal and external forces”.

Internal forces like political culture and process, political leadership, the state of the economy, military might and even the well being of the citizenry determine to a great extent the foreign policy of a particular country.

Foreign policies are designed to promote, protect and defend a nation’s vital interests such as the preservation of national sovereignty, the defence of territorial integrity, the promotion of economic, military, strategic and diplomatic interests. To pursue defined vital interest states in the international system whether rich or poor, small or big, strong or weak, democracies or totalitarian systems, within or outside established alliances, use various methods and instruments of foreign policy to influence, and sometimes even dictate the role orientations, objectives and actions of other states.

Following from the above, let us consider the Nigerian foreign policy from 1999 – 2007.

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3.1 IntroductionThe broad objective of Nigeria’s foreign policy is to promote and protect

the country’s national interest over which a national interest have clearly emerged. Prominent among these interests are: (Mbachu, 2008)

a. The defense of the country’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity / propinquity.

b. The restoration of human dignity to the black men & women all over the world.

c. The eradication of colonialism and terminate minority rule from the face of Africa.

d. The creation of the relevant political and Economic conditions in Africa and the rest of the world which will not only facilitate the preservation of the territorial integrity of all Africa countries, and

e. The Promotion of World peace with Justice.

The conduct of Nigeria’s foreign policy relations by numerous Nigerian governments since Independence in 1960 has been guided by the above principles which have acquired wide respectability and have almost become permanent and fundamental.

However, the pursuit of Nigerian foreign policy objectives/relations like other State actors rest on a tripod, namely:

Defence Deference or Recognition by other state Actors or Respect, Wealth creation and Economic ProsperityThere are also three (3) stages of relationship with other state actors,

namely: Co operation stage Competition stage and Conflict stageThese three stages require different foreign policy posture or approach.

“Nigeria is the most populous single unit in Africa… we are not going to abdicate the position which God Almighty has placed us… .The whole black continent is looking up to this country to liberate it from the thraldom”.

Jaja Nwachukwu

In contrast Olayide Aluko views it thus:

“Vast size and population, and abundance of resources do not guarantee in any automatic way the leadership of this (African) continent. Until we are able to establish a stable political order at home, industrialize and take – off technologically and improve the quality of life of our people, no country within and outside Africa will accept our claim to the leadership in Africa seriously

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except to flatter us”. 3.2 The Person & Profile of Obasanjo

Kofarmata in 2007 described, President Chief Mathew Okikiola Aremu Olusegun Obasanjo- So far, as the luckiest Nigerian (Leaving or dead). He is a traditional chief: a five star general; a civil war hero; a former federal commissioner (minister) and member of federal executive ruling council under two defunct military regimes, a former second in command under the defunct military government headed by General Murtala Muhammad, a former Head of state, commander –in-chief of the Armed Forces of Nigeria (1976 – 1979) after the assassination of General Murtala Muhammed; one time condemned political prisoner under the defunct military government of General Sani Abacha, a freed condemned prisoner; a two term Nigerian civilian President, Commander –in chief, Armed forces of the federal republic of Nigeria (1999 – 2007); a national and international statesman and a successful modern large – scale commercial chicken farmer and strategic investor, the list is endless.

“Apart from the fact that President Obasanjo enjoys tremendous personal clout abroad” but also that he continuously seeks to transfer that personal clout into a national, clout. Ogunbiyi (2002) presented his international profile Thus:1983 – 89. Member independent commission of disarmament and security, co-chairman, Common wealth eminent persons, group on South Africa. 1987 – 93. Director, Better world society, Washington DC. 1988 – 99. Member board of trustees, Ford foundation.1989 – 99. Advisory panel, United Nations World conference on women and development, etc.

3.3 Nigerian Foreign Policy before May 1999The Nigerian foreign policy will be reviewed under the theoretical frame

work of classical realism and neo liberalism, but in order to effectively analyse the foreign policy of Nigeria during the Obasanjo regime of 1999 – 2007, it has become pertinent to understand the kind of environment he met on ground, the state of affairs in the country and the perception of the international community of Nigeria.

Before May 1999, dictatorial stance and “Area Boy” diplomacy was what characterized the Abacha’s era which made Nigeria become a pariah state with which none except compliant African countries talked to (Ebenezer Okpokpo).

The violation of several human rights ranging from the hanging of the “Ogoni Nine” including Ken Saro wiwa, unjust imprisonment of civilians including ex-president Olusegun Obasanjo to the misuse of power was the order of the day. During this period witnessed the international press negative campaign against the country, many ambassadorial positions remained vacant and no diplomats were posted out helping to further tarnish the country’s Image. According to records, Nigeria was like a country without a foreign minister and a foreign policy.

Though Gen. Abubakar’s transition tenure after the untimely death of General Sani Abacha recorded some success in bringing Nigeria out of her pariah status, his stay was too brief to really create any significant impact.5 | P a g e


3.4 May 1999 – April 2007We are going to discuss this Era from 5 stand points;

3.4.1 Search and appeal for Foreign Investment:Following the international isolation of the Abacha regime, President

Obasanjo right from his Inauguration as Nigeria’s executive president on May 29, 1999, has shown an incurable optimism that the earliest and best way of developing the Nigerian economy is through attracting foreign investment into the country after a number of foreign countries shielded away from Nigeria. At this time, Nigeria was rated the 26th poorest country in the world. (UN Journal 2007).

President Olusegun Obasanjo believed that the best way to attract investors into the country was going to their various countries to appeal to them to come and invest in Nigeria. According to official sources, the Presidential as at mid August 2002, travelled out of the country for a hundred and thirteen times since he took over the leadership of the country at the end of May in 1999, and as June 2002 he had been out of the country for a period of 340 days (Akindele 2005). The implication of this is that, in a period of three years, the president has been out of the country for a combined period of a year less two weeks. This was termed “Ajala Diplomacy” by Akindele.

External affairs ministers at this time were nothing more than the presidents’ companions on foreign trips.

Despite Criticism, President Obasanjo believes that his approach is still in order. Thus he argues that “I have devoted much time and energy journeying virtually all corners of the globe in my personal effort to positively reintegrate our country into the international community and attract investment. We are happy to report that the results from these trips have been encouraging enough to confirm my personal belief and the advice of marketing experts, namely that personal contact is the best way to way to market your product, and my product is Nigeria (Obasanjo 2002).

3.4.2 Economic devaluation and privatisation:Obasanjo’s administration completely embraced the policies of economic

deregulation and privatisation as ushered by the IMF through a programme called the “Washington Consensus”. This phrase is a term in development policy proposed in 1990 by the Washington – based financial institution of the World Bank, the IMF and their subsidiary agencies. It signifies neo-liberal, neo – colonial, market economic policies which are not meant to provide an effective frame work for combating poverty nor for generating rapid economic growth. Rather, it is designed to tie perpetually the economies of client economies to the apron string of the metropolitan Western economies”. In its broad terms, the principles enunciated in the ‘Consensus’ were meant to continue to control and direct the economic policies of countries that have no independent economic policies of their own and was designed principally for the Latin American countries and not for African Countries, especially Nigeria. (Sam Aluko 2007).

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The original proponents of this consensus have however now admitted that the imposition of the propositions is harmful to developing economies, particularly currency devaluation, privatisation, trade liberalization, deregulation, market determined economic policies and dependence on the free flow of direct foreign investment(all of which characterized the Obasanjo’s regime).

Privatisation in Nigeria was handled by the Bureau of Public enterprises (BPE) aimed at privatising publicly owned enterprises and reduction of governmental inference and control in the economy, thus, leaving it to the prevailing market forces. It was inclined towards trade liberalization and free open markets with minimal governmental control. The BPE itself confessed it continued to enjoy the best support from World bank and its affiliates as partners in progress and that an arm of the World bank, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), has been serving as the sole adviser of the Federal Government with respect to the effective implementation of its privatisation programme since its inception in 1999, inspite the fact that such privatisation orgy has not succeeded in any part of the developing world.The major scandals during this period were the privatisation of NITEL, Nicon Noga Hilton Hotel and Presidential library.

3.4.3 Debt Relief for Nigeria:Apart from the search for foreign investment, the other key issue which

the Obasanjo administration sees as key instrument towards Nigeria’s economic revival is debt relief. As at when Obasanjo took over power, Nigeria owed N537.5 billion domestic debt and N633. 1 billion external public debts (Aluko 2007).

The Paris club had a meeting on the 29th June 2005 where the issue of Nigeria’s debt was discussed. Nigeria owed the club $31 billion. According to the deal, Nigeria will make an upfront payment of $6 million of existing arrears to the club thereby reducing the debt to $25 billion. Out of this, the club will write off 67% amounting to between $ 17-18 billion. This leaves a balance of $9 billion which the Nigerian authorities hope to buy back at a market related discount of $ 6 million.

As expected, the debt relief attracted a lot of interest and analysis by Nigerians. Initially, the majority believed it was really a good bargain. However, as the euphoria of the celebration reduced, the implications of the Paris club terms started sinking in and those who from the onset were uncomfortable with the deal won more converts.

Firstly, the announcement by the Paris club was not a debt cancellation; but a statement of intent which they hope to fulfil if Nigeria met certain conditions, which means Nigeria would first of all negotiate with the IMF and conclude a Policy Support Instrument (PSI).

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Secondly and more importantly, the debt relief terms simply implies that Nigeria will be making a down payment of $12 billion to be eligible for the cancellation. This was simply suicidal for a poor country like Nigeria.

The Irony of the Paris clubs demand becomes clear where one understands how the club rope nations into the debt trap. According to Dr. Abraham Nwankwo, the Director portfolio management in Nigeria’s Debt Management Office (DMO) Nigeria had in the past 38 years paid about $42 billion to the Paris club as interest and penalties on $ 15.5 billion loans to Nigeria. Despite this outrageous amount the country still owes the club $ 31 billion which is due mainly to accrued Interest. According to him the Paris club had become debt enhancing rather than debt reduction association (obi 205).

3.3.4 Relationship with the super Powers:Nigeria’s relationship with great powers since May 1999 has been

exceedingly warm; President Obasanjo has tried all in his powers to make sure that Nigeria’s remains in the good books of these countries.

The reason for this is not farfetched. First, as pointed out above, Nigeria is indebted to them so it simply makes sense to maintain a very cordial relationship with them so as to be able to get a listening ear and consequently sympathy for the Nigeria case. Secondly, as the African Union (AU) chairman the onus lies on him to try and maintain a good relationship with the western nations from whom Africa is demanding a lot of concession trade debt relief and many more from.

However, in maintaining such relation, there should be an objective analysis and balancing of the costs and benefits. In the case of Nigeria Akindele (2008) has asserted that it is arguable that Nigeria under President Obasanjo had no realistic alternatives to strengthening Nigeria’s trade relations with the U.S. which is the largest single buyer of Nigeria most important Commodity, oil, with Britain, a historically important trading partner and Nigeria’s largest creditor State and with European Unions, Germany and France which are also Nigeria’s major creditors and trading partners.

Because of President Obasanjo’s stance regarding Robert Mugabe’s human right abuses in Zimbabwe, Britain and U.S were glad to have an African ally when many other African nations (including South African) were taking a softer stance. This further enhanced Nigeria’s relationship with the big powers as they did not want to risk the nascent democracy in Nigeria and being among the world’s 10 biggest oil export as well as fears that as the continent’s most populous nation, Nigerian Internal divisions risked negatively affected the entire continent.

A further sign of the friendly relations between Nigeria and the U.S. is the military cooperation agreement signed by both countries in the year 2000.

The scheme is known as the military professional Recourses initiative (M.P.R.I). Under this scheme the U.S. undertook to send military institutions and help Nigeria to procure military and also assist Nigeria in retraining and re-

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equipping Nigerian soldiers to enable them perform their peace keeping roles in sierra Leone more efficiently and effectively and effectively (Asobie 2005).

Asobie (2005) went further to assert that two considerations informed the U.S. Policy in this regard. The first the resorting that regional military actors could be more effective than traditional united nations peace keepers for complex domestic wars such as the ones in Sierra Leone. The second was the conviction that Obasanjo’s Civilian regime needed to be secured and strengthened since Nigeria under a liberal democratic regime is the only country except South Africa that could be aided to some as a major force for stability in Africa.

3.4.4 Response/participation in the Developmental initiative of the Global System

If there is an area where president Obasanjo has really made a mark in his foreign policy pursuit, it is on the response to developments in the world. These developments are globalization, proliferation of intra-state conflicts in Africa and lastly response to international court of justice.

Globalization has been defined as the process of increasing interdependency and global enmeshment which occurs as money, people, images, values and Ideas flow ever more swiftly and smoothly across national boundaries (Hurrel and Woods 1995). Obasanjo’s administrative response to globalization was to deepen it’s commitment of continental and regional economic cooperation and integration in Africa and to make it a top ranking item in its foreign economic policy agenda in Africa and West Africa in particular.

On the continental scale, Nigeria has shown a strong determination toward the success of the New Partnership for African Development (N.E.P.A.D.). As the chairman of NEPAD implementation committee of head of state, President Obasanjo has been constantly in touch with the new partners of Africa toward the successful implementation of the scheme.

Because of the nascent nature of Nigeria’s Democracy at this time and president Obasanjo’s quest to pleasing the international community and attracting foreign investors to the country, the ceding of the battled Bakassi to Cameroun did not come as a surprise as President Obasanjo being the AU chairman had to lead by example by showing that he had respect for the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

4.0 Third Term AgendaAfter Presidents Obasanjo first two terms, he was embroiled in a

controversy regarding his “third term Agenda” a plan to modify the constitution so he could serve a third, four – year term as president. The bill was ratified by the National Assembly. Consequently, President Obasanjo stepped down after the April 2007 general elections. The third term Agenda not only succeeded in dividing the nation into anti and ‘pro’ third term but also succeeded in planting a seed of doubt in the minds of the International community as to the future of Nigeria.

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5.1 Criticism of President Obasanjo’s Regimea. The administration was criticized for spending billions of tax payers

money touring the global when all he had to do was to fix the economy of the country first then investors would come willingly. Foreign investors are core capitalist who have a sharp eye for profit and will only go to places where they are sure of their investment and their personal security and the risk of doing business in Nigeria in Nigeria was too high.

b. Presidential Obasanjo was criticized for refusing to pay domestic debt by paying pensions, gratuities and other domestic creditors in order to enhance a more rapid growth of the economy, he rather embarked upon the repayment of external debt. According to Sam Aluko (2007) “while some of the other debtors in Africa, Asia and Latin America, 42 of them, are obtaining complete debt write off, Nigeria paid such a huge ransom, because the Nigerian Government has more money than sense”.

c. Although Obasanjo made fighting corruption the stated aim of his first term and managed to pass some anti – corruption laws, critics both at home and abroad accused him of selectively targeting this drive against political opponents and ethnic militants, ignoring growing concerns about wide-scale corruption within his own inner political circle.

d. He was criticized by Conformation (2007) for Auctioning of choice companies, properties and businesses at ridiculously low prices to family members, friends and cronies of the presidency in a bid to implementing the privatization policy.

e. At home, the regime was marked by widespread criticism over the Nigerian government response to violent crises in the North – Kaduna and Kano as well as in the central eastern state of Benue and the Southern oil – rich Niger Delta.

f. The administration was also criticised by economists for the gross devaluation of the country’s currency from N68 to $1 when it assumed power to N130 when it handed over in 2007. This was due to the slavish adoption of the “Washington consensus”.

Conclusion and Future challenges:There is no doubt that president Obasanjo has really succeeded in re-

lunching Nigeria into the orbit of international politics, from her pariah status of the Abacha years. Probably his personal clout, contact and commitment helped a lot in this regard. However, it must be pointed out that the introduction of democratic rule in Nigeria was a critical success factor, which made the world very eager to welcome the country back into fold, in order to perform her natural role as a leader in the West African sub-region and indeed Africa. Though one may argue that much of the economic problems of Nigeria could be ameliorated through diplomacy by attracting foreign investment, aid, regional economic integration, debt relief and concessional trade terms but the truth of the matter is that with the amount of resources available to the country, especially since the Obasanjo regime, she should not be going cap in hand all over the globe a begging for sorts of concessions. If the president has devoted half the time and 10 | P a g e


energy he spent on his foreign travels on fighting corruption, Nigeria would have been better off, since most of these resources siphoned to foreign accounts by government officials would have been used in fixing the country.

Ebenezer Okpokpo (1999) posited that “The scope of Nigeria’s foreign policy should no longer be limited to continental affairs. It should be focused world-wide and geared toward the promotion of our cultural heritage, and scientific, economic and technical cooperation with viable partners. Its goal should aim at enhancing our national development, and military arrangements with NATO countries in order to give peace a permanent character in our societal needs and our sub-region.”

This argument is anchored on the fact that intimately what gives strength, confidence, respect and influence to the conduct of any country’s foreign policy is the vibrant existence of a politically, socially and economically healthy society under democratic governance. The president while paying heed to the problems of Africa must pay greater attention to the numerous problems militating against the Nigerian nation which he was elected to lead. Charity they say ought to and must begin at home.

After General Obasanjo handed over the reins of government to civilians in 1979 and eventually the sixteen long years of military rule, he resumed the presidency again in May, 1999 and remarked that Nigeria made no significant economic progress since he left office In 2007, President Obasanjo’s regime repeated the same mistake of 1979 by preventing the best candidates in the regime from seeking nomination for the presidency of Nigeria at the PDP convention. Instead, it hand-picked a very good and amiable Nigerian, whose highest political ambition was to be the Governor of Katsina State for eight years. So, if President Obasanjo lives long enough, for the next 20 years, and we pray for his long life, the same period between 1979 and 1999, he may again in 2027 moan that Nigeria had moved some steps backwards from when he handed over power on May 29, 2007; he prevented the most capable Nigerians from ruling Nigeria after him.

References

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Akindele, R.A (2003) Foreign Policy in Federal politics; a case study of Nigeria. World Press Incorporated, Lagos.

Aluko, O.E (1981) Essays on Nigerian Foreign Policy, Allen and unwin, London.

Dan Azumi Kofarmata (2007) Analysis of the Obasanjo regime: 1999-2007, Kano.

Mbachu O. (2008) Foreign Policy Analysis: The Nigerian Perspective, Joyce Graphic Publishers, Kaduna.

Morgenthau H. J, (2006) Politics among Nations: Struggle for Power and Peace.

Obi, E.A (2005) Political Economy of Nigeria. Book Point Ltd, Onitsha.

Ofoegbu, Ray. (2005) Foundation Course in International Relations for African Universities.

Ofoegbu, Ray. (1978), The Making of Nigeria Foreign Policy, The star Publishing Company Ltd, Enugu.

Okike O.O. (1982), International Legal Implications of Nigeria Cameroun Boundary Disputes, M.Sc. Thesis, University of Ibadan.

Okpokpo, E. (1999) The Challenges facing Nigeria’s Foreign Policy in the next millennium 3(2):4 (online) URL: http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v3/v3i3a16.htm.

Okpokpo, E. (1999) Nigeria’s Foreign Policy Ten Years Into The 21st Century.

Rosenau James N. (ed.), (2004), International Politics and Foreign Policy.

Sam A. Aluko (2007) Federal Government reform agenda and the economy: 1999-2007: A critical assessment, Akure.

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http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v3/v3i3a16.htm

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Foriegn Policy Option 3