South Atlantic War II 1

South Atlantic War II

The Falklands/Malvinas ConflictSecond Edition

by Ed Kettler

Foreword by Admiral Sir John Woodward

published by

The Admiralty Trilogy Group

Copyright © 2002, 2014, 2015 by the Admiralty Trilogy Group, LLC, and Ed KettlerAll rights reserved. Printed in the USA. Made in the USA.No part of this game may be reproduced or used in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the pub-lisher.

Harpoon is Larry Bond’s and Chris Carlson’s trademarked name for their modern naval wargame system. The Admiralty Trilogy is Larry Bond’s, Chris Carlson’s, Ed Kettler’s, and Mike Harris’ trademarked name for their Twentieth Century naval wargame system.

The designers of Harpoon and South Atlantic War II are prepared to answer questions about play of the game system. They can be reached in care of the Admiralty Trilogy Group at adtrgroup@aol.com. Visit their website at www.admiraltytril-ogy.com.

This version of South Atlantic War II has been updated to include all corrections from errata through 30 December 2014.

Cover by Lou Drendel and Terry Leeds

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The Designer Ed Kettler got his start as a game designer with the original South Atlantic War in 1990. A wargamer since the age of twelve, his design credits are Command at Sea, in-cluding the Rising Sun scenario book and Referee’s Guide, editor of the High Seas Fleet scenario book for Fear God & Dread Nought, as well as contributing articles for the Naval SITREP. Ed is an active beta tester of computer war games, in-cluding the Harpoon family of games, where he also devel-oped battleset scenarios. He also volunteers at the Cava-naugh Flight Museum in Addison, TX, where he shares his aviation enthusiasm as a docent. He holds a private pilot rating, and also flies radio control planes.

Acknowledgments First edition: Special thanks to Brigadier General Martin F. Bonnet, military attaché, and Rear Admiral Os-car Jorge Callandra, naval attaché. Argentine Embassy, Washington, for providing materials reflecting the Argentine perspective on the war, and to Group Captain G. Thorburn, OBE, BA, RAF (retired) of the Ministry of Defence, London. Second edition: Dwayne Kaust’s research support is greatly appreciated. The new ground combat system rules are the work of Chip Sayers, Larry Bond, Chris Carlson and Ed Kettler. Thanks to Adrian Davis for contributing his expertise on the British Army. Thanks to Andy Doty and Jay Wissmann for their thorough scrub.

South Atlantic War was published in its original edition by Game Designers’ Workshop in 1990. This edition has been updated with information that has become available since the conclusion of the War, as well as revisions to make it usable with Harpoon4, also published by the Admi-ralty Trilogy Group. May 2002

Designers’ Notes to the Second Edition of South Atlantic War Twenty years have passed since Britain and Ar-gentina went to war over the Falkland/Malvinas Islands. The islands remain under British control, the minefields remain a legacy, and life has returned to some level of normalcy. The main events, which are outlined in the chronology and the scenarios, remain unchanged, but the level of detail available has grown considerably since this supplement was first published by GDW in 1990. The Harpoon game system has evolved into the Admiralty Trilogy, covering naval warfare from the birth of HMS Dreadnought in 1906 to the present day with Fear God and Dread Nought (World War I), Command at Sea (World War II) and Harpoon (modern). We learned from each game as it was developed, and continued to refine the game system Larry Bond first presented in 1980, now known as Harpoon4. This edition brings the original South Atlantic War up to date with Harpoon4 standards for rules, ship and aircraft forms. The major rules additions are for ground combat and movement, and a few new scenarios have been added. The original document has been reviewed against more authoritative publications, and where neces-sary, corrections have been made to provide an accurate picture of events. Personal remarks of the combatants have been added to give context and insight to the events as they unfolded during the campaign. I want to express my profound thanks to Admiral Sir John “Sandy” Woodward for his Foreword and his as-sistance in the preparation of this edition of South Atlantic War.

Dedication

to all those who participated in the South Atlantic War

and

to my wife, Mercy, for all her support.

and

to my nephew Jack, a courageous and inspiring little boy,whose smile and spirit enlivened the hearts of all who met him.

Rest quietly, my little warrior, your battle is over.

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South Atlantic War II 3

Foreword Twenty years ago I led a hastily assembled Task force eight thousand miles from home to recover a way of life and chosen form of government for the loyal British sub-jects of the Falkland Islands. The Argentine invasion came at a fortuitous time for the Royal Navy. The Nott Defence Review in 1981 required sweeping changes with commen-surate loss of capabilities as forces were drawn down to meet a reduced global role and budget. By year-end 1982, our ability to mount the Task Force would have deteriorated to vanishing point from sales and decommissionings of carriers, amphibious warfare ships, surface combatants and support vessels. Alone among her advisers, the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Henry Leach, was both the inspirational leader of the British response and also the saviour of the Royal Navy. When the Argentine invasion was announced, he went straight to Parliament in full uniform to convince Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher that the islands should be recovered. Admiral Leach told the gathered leaders “I can put together a Task Force of destroyers, frigates, landing craft, support vessels. It will be led by the aircraft carriers HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible. It can be ready to leave in forty-eight hours.” Against the odds the Royal Navy once again proved its relevance, and rescued the Prime Minis-ter’s political career by achieving a victory that many in the highest levels of the Government and the armed forces thought unobtainable. South Atlantic War provides a wealth of information on the conflict. Combat is not easily sliced up into discrete packets as shown in the scenarios. While these set-piece engagements are useful for examining tactical battles, to truly get an understanding of the commanders’ perspective one should start at the beginning of the conflict and ask these questions: • As the Argentine Commander, how will you dispose your available units? When will you commit them? • How can the British Force Commander achieve any level of surprise when he has given at least four weeks notice of his arrival? • With no amphibious assault capability, where are the British likely to land? • Where would you, as the Argentinian commander, lay your minefields? • How and where would you deploy your one and only submarine? • What are the weakest points in the British position, choose between.... • Their carriers? • Their very limited number of fighter aircraft [initially 15, finally 24]? • Their lack of an amphibious assault capability? • Their limited time on station in winter? • Bearing in mind that if you can break any one link in this chain, you have broken the whole chain, which one will you concentrate on, and how? The war was fought and won in phases. First, we had to neutralise the Argentinian Navy and Air Forces if the landing force was to have any chance of success ashore.  The sea war was settled by Conqueror sinking the Bel-grano  - it had been the intention from the start to use my Battle Group as the bait to draw them out and sink them with the three SSNs. The air war was finally settled in about

a week’s worth of hard combat over the amphibious operat-ing area as the landing took place, mainly by the enormous effectiveness of the Sea Harriers versus the A-4s and Mirages/Daggers  - it was nevertheless very close-run. On May 25th, I was on the verge of ringing up my boss in Northwood to tell him we were losing it, but delayed 24 hours and then found that they had largely shot their bolt. The sea and air war took hard fighting from 1 May and could have continued long after completion of the land battle, if necessary. The land battle was won by grim, hand-to-hand combat in the bleak Falkland hills. The well-trained marines, paras, special operations forces and soldiers were supported by the ships and aircraft of the Royal Navy, Royal Fleet Auxiliary, the STUFT ships and the Royal Air Force. Together, they brought the ground campaign to a success-ful conclusion in less than four weeks. Separately, failure of any one element could have spelled defeat so far from home.

Twenty years ago, as I prepared to leave the Task Force for the home, I penned these words: “As I haul down my South Atlantic flag, I reflect sadly on the brave lives lost, and the good ships gone, in the short time of our trial. I thank wholeheartedly each and every one of you for your gallant support, tough determination and fierce perseverance under bloody conditions. Let us all be grateful that Argen-tina does not breed bulldogs, and, as we return severally to enjoy the blessings of our land, resolve that those left behind for ever shall not be forgotten.”

These men are not forgotten by either us or the Argen-tines. The Falklands/Malvinas question remains unresolved today, and vigilance, steadfastness and diplomacy are required, lest another generation make the same sacrifices we made.

Admiral Sir John “Sandy” WoodwardChichester, England

May 2002

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Table of Contents

Dedication 2The Designer 2Acknowledgments 2Designer’s Notes 2Foreword by Admiral Sir John Woodward 3South Atlantic War 5Conflicto Malvinas 6The Falklands War 8Chronology 9The Theater of War 13 The Naval Campaign 14 Falklands Island Map 14 South Atlantic Map 15 The Land Campaign 16 The Air War 17 The Intelligence War 19British Order of Battle British Air Order of Battle 20 British Chain of Command Diagram 21 British Land Forces Order of Battle 22 British Naval Order of Battle Royal Navy 23 Royal Fleet Auxiliary 23 Ships Taken Up From Trade 24Argentine Order of Battle Argentine Air Order of Battle 25 Fuerza Aerea Argentine Organization Diagram 25 Argentine Chain of Command Diagram 26 Argentine Land Order of Battle 27 Argentine Naval Order of Battle 28Aircraft Losses in the Falklands Campaign 29

Scenarios 1. Invasion of the Falkland Islands 31 2. Invasion of South Georgia 34 3. Intelligence Gathering 36 4. Radar Contact! 37 5. Black Buck One 38 6. Air Strike Port Stanley 40 7. Lombardo’s Trident 41 8. Stalking Belgrano 43 9. Blockade Runner 45 10. Sheffield is Hit! 46 11. Surface Action, Guns! 49 12. The Lone Hunter 51 13. Pebble Island Raid 53 14. Operation Sutton 54 15. San Carlos Waters 57 16. Protecting the Buildup 59 17. Big Game Hunting 61 18. Battle for Goose Green 63 19. Dueling Electrons 68 20. Herky Bomber 69 21. The last Exocet 70 22. Disaster at Bluff Cove 72 23. Attack on Plymouth 74 24. Battle for the Hills 75 25. Argentine Ingenuity 79 26. The Final Battle 80

Aftermath 82

Data Annexes Annex Notes 83 List of Ship Classes 83 List of Aircraft 83 Annex A Ships (In Form 10 and 10s format) 84 Annex B Aircraft (In Form 20 format) 112 Annex C Surface Guns C1 Naval Antisurface Guns 123 C2 Naval Antiaircraft Guns 123 C3 Land-Based Antiaircraft Guns 124 Annex G Air Ordnance G1 Unguided Air Ordnance 125 G3 Aircraft Cannon 125 G4 Guided Air Ordnance 124 Annex J Search Radars J1 Naval Radars 125 J2 Land-Based radars 125 Annex K Weapons Directors 126 Annex L Airborne Search Radars 125 Annex M Sonars M1 Sonar Systems 126 M2 Sonobuoy Processors 126 Annex N1 South Atlantic Environment 127 Annex S Land-Based Surface-to-Air Missiles 132 Annex T Weapon GCS strengths 132

Ground Unit TOEs (Form 40s) 133

Bibliography 142

Sidebars Political Intrigue 8 The Alternative Campaign 12 Table of Equivalent Ranks 21 British Army Unit Organization 35 Monty Python Goes to War 47 A Nasty Surprise 50 The Stingray Torpedo 58 The Quest for Exocets 62 The SAS Raid on Rio Grande 71 The Final Secrets of the Falklands War 82

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South Atlantic War In 1982, two nations went to war over the possession of a few bleak islands off the coast of South America: one for economic and political reasons, the other for national pride, preservation of its navy, and political survival of the government. South Atlantic War is a compilation of histori-cal data and scenarios that provide a detailed examina-tion of the Falklands/Malvinas conflict between Argentina and Great Britain. This booklet is a supplement for the contemporary naval wargame Harpoon4. Even if you do not own Har-poon4, you will find that this booklet provides insight into the largest naval conflict since World War II. This is not a complete game; you will need Harpoon4 to play the naval scenarios. The supplement is separated into sections pro-viding historical background, scenarios and game support materials. Some of the scenarios involve troop units on the islands, and new rules for amphibious operations and land combat are provided. The scenarios can be used separately or as part of a campaign. The historical section provides an overview of the war from both the Argentine and British perspectives. The theater of operations portion contains information on terrain, climate, major bases and ports, and is keyed to the campaign map. The goals and achievements of both sides are contained in the theater of operations and analysis sections for the naval, land and air campaigns. The force lists provide the reader with the command structures and their associated ship, aircraft and troop units. The scenarios are organized in chronological order, and cover most of the major events of the war. Certain events of the war are still classified, and some license was used to tie the bits of speculation together to form a plausible scenario. Where this occurs, it is documented in the scenario. The official British documents may be declassified on January 1, 2013, so you will have to be content with Nigel West’s The Secret War for the Falk-lands if you are interested in the sensitive topics. One of the major sources for the details contained in this supple-ment is Conflicto Malvinas, the Argentine Army’s official history of the campaign.

The game support materials provide the reader with the detailed information required to play the scenarios. These materials include force lists, environmental data, land campaign rules, ship and aircraft forms and a rules supplement containing rules specific to this booklet. The ship and aircraft forms are a major improvement in playing Harpoon4, eliminating the time-consuming chore of creating each unit from all of the Harpoon4 annexes. These forms are specific to the South Atlantic War in loadouts and capabilities. Despite the amount of detail contained in this supple-ment, the material covered here represents only the major episodes in the campaign, and not the vast efforts required by the individual soldiers, marines, sailors and officers to fight this war. Where possible, I have identified individuals and used actual statements to let the reader experience the war from these individuals’ points of view. I do not feel that I could possibly do justice to the heroic efforts of these men in the limited space available, but recommend that you read several of the books in the Bib-liography to get a better understanding of this conflict. The more recent titles are much better than those published immediately after the war. Especially useful were Falk-lands: One Hundred Days, The Air War, The Royal Navy and the Falklands War and The Fight for the Malvinas. I would especially like to thank Larry Bond for his tremendous support in developing this supplement. This supplement started as a campaign for my wargaming group, and through Larry’s support has evolved into what you have in front of you today. While at Origins ’90 in Atlanta, I had the great fortune to meet Lieutenant Commander Dan McDonagh, USN, of the Naval War College. His professional insights, com-ments and critique of the manuscript were essential in putting the final touches on this project. If you have any questions regarding this supplement, please contact me through the Admiralty Trilogy Group (admiraltytrilogy@aol.com).

Ed Kettler

HMS Coventry capsizing off Pebble Island after being hit by three bombs. (IWM)Sa

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Conflicto Malvinas The South Atlantic War of 1982 was a war that should never have been fought. The breakdown in deter-rence took place over a period of decades and signaled Great Britain’s apparent unwillingness to protect its colony on the Falkland Islands. This “weakness” was viewed by the ruling military junta in Buenos Aires as an opportunity to easily acquire the Malvinas Islands and their untapped natural resources, and focus the citizens’ attention on something other than the poor economy. The Argentine claims to the islands date back to the early 1500s when the Papal Bulls divided the land claims of Portugal and Spain. The first occupation of the islands was by French settlers from Saint Malo, who called the is-lands the Malouines. This settlement lasted less than one year. The English established a settlement in 1765, which almost started a war with Spain. The French and Brit-ish closed their settlements in 1767. In 1833, the British frigate Clio, under the command of John James Onslow, landed on the Falklands and took permanent possession of the islands. Starting in the middle 1960s, the Argen-tines and the British conducted negotiations over the status of the islands for nearly 20 years, with little to show for their efforts. A further source of stress was the opposing claims over the Patagonian islands and Antarctica between Argentina and Chile. The dispute dated back to at least 1843, and despite several attempts and treaties the is-sues remained unresolved. In the 1970s, the area around the Beagle Channel was in dispute, with minor clashes and provocations from both sides. In 1971, both countries agreed to put the matter into arbitration by the Court of International Justice, which in May 1977 ruled in favor of Chile’s claims. Argentina rejected the ruling in January 1978, and by December both sides were rapidly ap-proaching war. Only the intervention of Pope John Paul

II on 23 December, a few hours before the scheduled Ar-gentine landings, prevented bloodshed. Mediations were still underway at the time of the South Atlantic War, and Argentine commanders elected to keep the cold weather trained troops in their positions and used troops from the borders with Brazil instead. The Argentine junta was well aware that 1983 repre-sented the 150th anniversary of the British occupation of the Malvinas Islands, and set about a yearlong campaign to sway world opinion to its side. The diplomatic offensive was to start with a new round of talks in February, with military action to occur in the October-November time period if these talks failed. Despite claims in the British press that the war was a result of internal politics, the war was for much more. The continental shelf on which the islands reside is one of the world’s last untapped sources of oil, natural gas and fishing. In addition to being a source of critical natural resources, the islands are a gateway to the Antarctic and sit astride the passages be-tween the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Argentina has land claims on the Antarctic continent, which are overlapped by British and Chilean claims. Possession of the Malvinas Islands by the Argentines would improve their political and strategic positions in possible future development of these key economic resource areas. The Argentine junta was not deterred from starting the war because of their perceptions of Great Britain’s military capability and its willingness to use force to defend her interests in the Malvinas. Some of the factors influencing their perceptions were: • Cutbacks in the Royal Navy and British Army forces deployed outside of the UK. • Cutbacks in the 1960s that reduced the mission capabilities of the Royal Navy, including cancellation of a new carrier, deactivation of the existing CTOL carriers, and transference of most of the tactical aircraft to the Royal Air Force.

Argentine Skyhawk Attacking HMS Broadsword on 25 May (IWM)

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