Forecasting Zero: U.S. Nuclear History and the Low Probability of Disarmament

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STRATEGIC

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INSTITUTE

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FORECASTING ZERO:

U.S. NUCLEAR HISTORY AND THELOW PROBABILITY OF DISARMAMENT

Jonathan Pearl

November 2011

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and donot necessarily reect the ofcial policy or position of the Depart-ment of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Gov-ernment. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publicationsenjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose clas-sied information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepre-sent ofcial U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers themto offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the in-terest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared forpublic release; distribution is unlimited.

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Comments pertaining to this report are invited and shouldbe forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. ArmyWar College, 632 Wright Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5046.

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This project was facilitated by the generous nancial and in-stitutional support of the Stanton Foundation, Council on ForeignRelations, and the United States Institute of Peace. A special debtof gratitude is due to George Quester and Shibley Telhami fortheir guidance at all stages of this project. The author addition-ally wishes to thank Mohammed M. Hafez, Jane Pearl, RichardPearl, Amandine Weinrob, and Guy Ziv for their advice and sup-port. Special thanks also are due to Benot Pelopidas, whose invi-tation to present on the panel Forecasting Nuclear Proliferationand Disarmament: Theory and Policy at the 2010 InternationalStudies Association conference provided the initial impetus forthis project, as well as to all the members of that panel for theirconstructive feedback. Needless to say, the opinions expressedherein, as well as any omissions or errors, are the sole responsi-bility of the author.

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ISBN 1-58487-516-X


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FOREWORD

Over the past few years, a vigorous debate aboutthe wisdom and mechanics of nuclear disarmamenthas emerged around the world, particularly in theUnited States. Washingtons current wave of supportfor disarmament was ignited unexpectedly in 2007 bya bipartisan group of national security experts. Callsfor the elimination of nuclear weapons have existedfor almost as long as the weapons themselves. Butthese developments, coupled with President BarackObamas clear support for disarmament and the suc-cessful ratication of the New Strategic Arms Reduc-tion Treaty, have left American supporters of abolitionfeeling as if the scales may nally be weighted in favorof their goaleven though they acknowledge that itwill not be easily achieved.

In his monograph, Jonathan Pearl challenges thenotion that the probability of nuclear disarmament isincreasing. He argues that, contrary to popular belief,there is little new about the current push for disarma-ment, buttressing his claim with a historical overviewof the nuclear age that highlights important similari-ties between past and present disarmament efforts.Building on this historical analysis, Pearl surveys thecurrent political-strategic context, one that is markedby continuing proliferation, various forms of conict,and signicant conceptual and structural barriers toabolishing nuclear weapons. It is far from certain,Pearl provocatively concludes, whether Washingtonscurrent pro-disarmament efforts will produce mean-ingful or lasting results.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offerthis monograph as an important contribution to thedebate over nuclear disarmament. Whether readers


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are disarmament supporters or skeptics, Pearls con-tribution will serve as an important reference point for

debates on this critical subject.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.DirectorStrategic Studies Institute


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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

JONATHAN PEARL is a Ph.D. candidate in gov-ernment and politics at the University of Maryland.During 2010-11, he was a Stanton Nuclear SecurityFellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a Jen-nings Randolph Peace Scholar at the United States In-stitute of Peace. Mr. Pearl has previously worked at theRAND Corporation, and as a foreign policy advisor toformer U.S. Senator Christopher J. Dodd. In 2008, hewas a Nuclear Scholar at the Center for Strategic andInternational Studies (CSIS), and he presently sits onthe Board of Advisors for CSISs Project on NuclearIssues. Mr. Pearls current research focuses on nucleardisarmament, proliferation, civil nuclear cooperation,nuclear arms control, and strategic stability. His workhas been published by the Council on Foreign Rela-

tions, CSIS, and the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,among other national and international media outlets.He holds an MA in government and politics from theUniversity of Maryland and a BA in music from Flori-da Atlantic University.


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SUMMARY

When four luminaries of U.S. policymakingColdWarriors, allpenned a 2007 op-ed calling for globalnuclear disarmament, a shock wave emanated throughthe policy community in Washington and abroad.1Had age or the stress of public life nally taken itstoll on these elder statesmen? How could the goal ofdisarmament be practically achieved? Was their plea,in fact, a cynical ploy to strengthen a conventionallydominant United States? Were not communist sympa-thizers, nave world government types, or a periodi-cally randy anti-nuclear movement the only ones whotook disarmament seriously? Perhaps most important,did their statement reect a convergence of sentimentin the United States in favor of abolition? Might theUnited States abolish nuclear weapons in our lifetime?

President Barack Obamas open support for nu-clear abolition and his efforts to decrease the numberand role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national securitypolicy have led many to believe that the United Stateswill one day shed its nuclear arsenal. Yet the future ofU.S. nuclear weapons policy is uncertain. Contrary topopular belief, the general approach being advancedtoday by the Obama administration is strikingly simi-lar to mainstream proposals of the past 65 years: armscontrol and nonproliferation now, disarmament at anundetermined point in the future. Meanwhile, numer-ous factors continue to militate against abolition, in-cluding a growing Pakistani arsenal and new sourcesof instability in the Middle East. Indeed, just as theperceived need for abolition may be growing, so may

the difculty of achieving it.This monograph draws upon history and the pres-

ent context to argue that observers should temper


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their expectations about the prospects for U.S. nucleardisarmament. The rst section traces the rise, decline,

and rebirth of disarmament as a central focus of U.S.policy, from the immediate postwar period to the fallof the Soviet Union. The second section examinesthe steady decline of support for disarmament in thepost-Cold War era from 1991-2007. The third sectionexplores the period from 2007 to 2009, during whichdisarmament gained signicant political tractionamong American elites. The fourth section addressesthe Obama administrations nuclear policy, juxtapos-ing the Presidents lofty goal of disarmament with theremaining obstacles to its achievement. The fth sec-tion provides conclusions reached by the author.

ENDNOTE - SUMMARY

1. George P. Schultz et al., A World Free of Nuclear Weap-ons, Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2007.


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FORECASTING ZERO:U.S. NUCLEAR HISTORY AND THE

LOW PROBABILITY OF DISARMAMENT

AMERICAN ABOLITIONISM: NEW TRICKOR OLD PONY? (1945-91)

Limited Dissent for a Wartime Project.

The rst half of the 20th century was replete withdisarmament initiatives, including the VersaillesTreaty, the Five-Power Treaty on Naval Disarmament,and the World Conference on Disarmament. Indeed,[a]lmost every advance in weaponry, from the cross-bow to the bomber, has been accompanied by calls forthe weapons abolition.1 In this sense, nuclear weap-ons have fared similarly to their predecessors.

Anti-nuclear weapon sentiment in the UnitedStates extends back at least as far as the days of theManhattan Project. Some physicists, including Ger-man refugee Max Born, were so disgusted by thethought of atomic weapons that they refused to workon the Project at all. Others such as Leo Szilard joinedthe wartime effort but hoped that nuclear weaponswould be used only as a deterrent against a potentialNazi nuclear weapon.

By contrast, key U.S. policymakers warmed earlyto the prospect of gaining a decisive military tool.President Franklin D. Roosevelt ordered the initiationof the Manhattan Project and was allegedly commit-ted to using the bomb once ready, and President Har-ry S. Truman would eventually order the attacks on

Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan. The Franck Commit-tees 1945 report, which warned of the consequencesof nuclear use against Japan, and entreaties against


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nuclear use by leading scientists during the Rooseveltand Truman administrations, did little to derail this

pro-nuclear wartime mood in Washington.2

To be sure, there was some disagreement in policy

circles over the need to drop atomic weapons on Japan,including from then-General Dwight Eisenhower.3 Yetthere was little dissent over whether the United Statesshould develop and possess them. Secretary of WarHenry Stimson suggested that the bomb constituted aroyal straight ush in favor of U.S. power. Secretaryof State James Byrnes concurred that the bomb mightwell put us in a position to dictate our terms at the endof the war. By May 1945, 1 month prior to release ofthe Franck Commission report, a decision had beenmade to use the bomb against Japan.4

Support for the bombing of Hiroshima and Naga-saki was widespread in the immediate aftermath of

those attacks. Following the war, more than 86 percentof Americans polled viewed the attacks as legitimate.5With the exception of pacists, some religious gures,and a few scientists, objections to the use and contin-ued possession of nuclear weapons after the war ap-pear to have been subsumed by a general desire toensure a rapid Allied victory, as well as by hopes offavorably shaping the postwar global order.6

Shaping the Post-War World.

Interestingly, this same desire to shape the post-war world, in combination with a growing realizationthat nuclear technology was likely to spread, may havehelped generate the rst serious U.S. endorsement of

disarmament. Thus, at the same time that PresidentTruman was setting the stage for Americas nucleararms buildup, he and his administration were also at-


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tempting to establish domestic and international in-stitutions to address the problem of nuclear control.7

Until 1949, the goal of disarmament was front andcenter among the Truman administrations nuclearpolicy initiatives. In November 1945, Truman, alongwith British Prime Minister Clement Attlee and Ca-nadian Prime Minister William King, issued a jointcommuniqu explicitly supporting the eliminationof atomic energy for destructive purposes.8 Shortlyafter the establishment of the United Nations AtomicEnergy Commission (UNAEC) on January 24, 1946,the same Secretary of State James Byrnes, who had ex-pressed support for the bomb during the war and whowas attempting to diplomatically leverage the U.S.nuclear monopoly to gain advantage over the Soviets,created a special advisory committee charged withcomposing a report on atomic energy control. That

committees ndings, better known as the Acheson-Lilienthal report, was to be submitted by the U.S. Gov-ernment to the UNAEC. Presented to Secretary Byrnesin March, Acheson-Lilienthal did not set a date forU.S. nuclear disarmament, but it did express strongsupport for this goal.9

Yet Truman feared U.S. disarmament, absent guar-antees that the Soviet Unions bomb-making potentialwould be neutered. In the shadow of chilling rela-tions with the Soviets, he appointed Bernard Baruchas the American delegate to the UNAEC 1 day beforeAcheson-Lilienthal was to be submitted to it. Baruchproceeded to alter key elements of Acheson-Lilienthalin a way that addressed Trumans fears. He presentedUNAEC with a plan that would have guaranteed U.S.

disarmament, but only after the effective establish-ment of international controls. The Soviets rejected theplan, on the basis that it would have formally legiti-


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mized a temporary U.S. nuclear monopoly. When Ba-ruchs plan failed during a UNAEC vote on December

30, 1946, the rst era of U.S. disarmament efforts cameto a close.10 Indeed, serious efforts toward nuclearabolition would not return to the international agendauntil late in the Cold War.11

Three Important Shifts Move the United StatesAway from Disarmament.

Though the intervening years were not marked bythe complete absence of pro-disarmament sentimentin the United States, three important developmentsundermined the practical hopes of achieving abolitionafter the failure of the Baruch plan. First, the politi-cal situation changed. By 1949, the Truman Doctrinehad been issued and the North Atlantic Treaty Orga-

nization (NATO) had been established to contain andcounter the Soviet threat. In the shadow of growingantagonism and rapidly declining trust between theUnited States and the Soviets, the disarmament agen-da was increasingly appropriated for propagandisticpurposes, all but guaranteeing that no serious prog-ress could be made toward the goal. Limited Americanefforts to advance disarmament by the newly electedEisenhower administration were quickly rebuffed bySoviet leaders, whose intense focus on secrecy ledthem to reject the American insistence on conductingon-site verications. Moscow instead insisted on com-plete disarmament without verication.12

Second, the birth of the nuclear arms race in 1949dramatically altered the security situation. Thus, while

the United States would enjoy a signicant nuclear ad-vantage over the Soviet Union for many years to comeand while perceptions of a rapidly growing nuclear


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threat prompted President Eisenhower to call for theelimination of atomic materials for military purpos-

es, the emergence of a new and formidable enemygave impetus to a growing perception in Washingtonthat a political victory against communism requiredmilitary strength, not disarmament.13 Along theselines, the Eisenhower administration rejected Tru-mans distinction between nuclear and conventionalweapons, embarking instead on an ultimately unsuc-cessful decade-long campaign to legitimize nuclearweapons as weapons like any other.14 The 1950s alsosaw the implementation of Eisenhowers New Lookpolicy which, driven by economic and military con-siderations, increased Americas reliance on nucleararms. These developments are captured well in Eisen-howers October 1953 doctrinal guidance that [i]nthe event of hostilities, the United States will consider

nuclear weapons to be as available for use as othermunitions.15

The third major change that undermined disarma-ment efforts was what seems to have been an emerg-ing consensus among U.S. elites that America neededto refocus its attention on two more proximate andpressing matters: controlling an emerging arms racewith the Soviets, and containing the global spread ofatomic energy technology.16 The shift toward armscontrol was particularly consequential, since there isa fundamental tension between policies centered onarms control and those centered on disarmament. Bydenition, disarmament changes the nature of themilitary balance, whereas most forms of arms control(e.g., arms reductions, limitations, and test bans) are

directed at stabilizing an existing situation. This maybe in part why Thomas Schelling once quipped that. . . hardly anyone who takes arms control seriously


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believes that zero is the goal.17 At any rate, creating astable balance between the United States and the So-

viet Union became an overriding concern of Americanpolicymakers throughout the next several decades.Some hoped that by stabilizing this balance andregulating nuclear energy transfers, the stage mightbe set for a gradual transformation of East-West re-lations and, eventually, disarmament.18 But this goalremained consistently out of reach over the comingdecades.

From Kennedy to Carter: The Rise of Arms Control.

U.S. ofcials continued to offer rhetorical and per-sonal support for disarmament throughout the armsbuildups of the 1960s and 1970s. In 1961, for example,President John Kennedy argued before the UN Gen-

eral Assembly that:

The weapons of war must be abolished before theyabolish us. . . . Men no longer maintain that disarma-ment must await the settlement of all disputesfordisarmament must be a part of any permanent settle-ment. And men may no longer pretend that the questfor disarmament is a sign of weaknessfor in a spiral-ing arms race, a nations security may well be shrink-ing even as its arms increase.19

By 1962, Kennedy had resumed disarmament nego-tiations with the Soviets, authorizing a three-step dis-armament plan that would founder during the 1962-63Geneva disarmament conference.20 Indeed, there is nodoubt that Presidents Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson,

as well as leading members of their administrationssuch as Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara andSecretary of State Dean Rusk, harbored military and


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moral opposition to the use of nuclear weapons, andthat they feared nuclear war.21 Perceiving that contin-

ued increases in nuclear arms would produce little inthe way of security gains, these policymakers took ac-tions to stem the U.S.-Soviet arms race and establishinternational nonproliferation controlsefforts thatled to the ratication of the 1968 Nuclear Nonpro-liferation Treaty (NPT) and the 1972 Strategic ArmsLimitation Talks (SALT-I) under President RichardNixon.22 Article VI of the NPT embodied a commit-ment by nuclear-weapon states to work toward theelimination of their arsenals.

Notwithstanding policymakers personal senti-ments and incremental progress toward establishinggreater nuclear controls, however, the prospects fordisarmament became more remote during the 1960sand 1970s. First, Article VI of the NPT contained no

metrics or timetable for disarmament. Second, Ken-nedys 1962 disarmament proposal focused far moreon near-term arms limitations than on eventual disar-mament, and SALT-I similarly focused on stabilizingthe East-West arms competition instead of eliminatingthe weapons. These facts demonstrated that the logicof arms control and nonproliferation, not of disarma-ment, had come to dominate the nuclear narrativeamong the superpowers. Third, perceptions of thestructural situation prompted policymakers to buildtheir arsenals to absurdly high numbers. Only oneyear before conclusion of the NPT, for example, theU.S. nuclear weapons stockpile had reached its peakof 32,000 warheads.23 Any expressions of support fordisarmament by U.S. policymakers during these years

must be viewed in the context of these stunning in-creases, in both the quantity and quality of Americasarsenal.


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Not even the occasional burst of popular supportfor disarmament was enough to force the govern-

ments hand. To be sure, the disarmament movementenjoyed some successes: It helped push the U.S. Gov-ernment toward adopting a nuclear test moratoriumin 1958, and toward ratifying the Partial Test BanTreaty (PTBT) and the NPT. Indeed, the disarmamentmovement arguably helped create the structural con-ditions for the administrations of Presidents Eisen-hower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Jimmy Carter to pursue various arms control initia-tives.24 The movement was similarly instrumental inopposing the B-1 bomber and the so-called neutronbomb,25 and contacts between disarmament advocatesand presidential candidate Jimmy Carter clearly in-uenced Carters policy positions before he assumedofce.26 Evidence of this can be found in an October

1976 article of Carters in the Bulletin of the Atomic Sci-entists, in which he explicitly links the legitimacy ofnonproliferation efforts to progress toward disarma-ment. Carter wrote:

I believe we have little right to ask others to denythemselves such weapons for the indenite future un-less we demonstrate meaningful progress toward the

control, then reduction and, ultimately, elimination ofnuclear arsenals.27

But the impact of the popular disarmament move-ment that had begun in 1945 was often constrainedby popular fear of the Soviets and suspicions that thedisarmament agenda was a communist plotparticu-larly with respect to its ultimate goal.28 With the 1979

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the end of dtente, the1979 Iranian Revolution, and the taking of Americanhostages at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, even the lim-


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ited arms control achievements that the movementhad helped bring about became suspect. Such events

reminded Americans of the dangers beyond theirshores and helped usher into ofce a tough-talking,anti-SALT President who would at rst increase East-West tensions but ultimately help place disarmamentback on the U.S. agenda as a primary policy goal.

A Reagan-era Rebirth for Disarmament.

It is both ironic and not at all so that by the end ofRonald Reagans tenure, disarmament had regained aprominence on the U.S. agenda not seen since the fail-ure of the Baruch Plan. The irony of the matter rests inthe fact that when Reagan assumed ofce, his admin-istration dragged the previous 2 decades of nuclearweapons policy decidedly rightward. Rather than at-

tempting to rekindle an arms control process left tee-tering after the failure of SALT-II, Reagan up-endedthe principle of strategic parity enshrined in the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and SALT-I by launch-ing his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). He placeda particular focus on strategic modernization efforts,including pursuit of the MX Peacekeeper and Tridentmissiles, the B-1 strategic bomber, and cruise missileprograms. The Reagan administration also changedthe doctrinal thrust of nuclear weapons, planning toinclude not only deterrence but the ghting of bothlimited and prolonged nuclear wars. In fact, both heand his subordinates insisted in 1981 that any effortsto pursue arms control would have to wait until newweapons programs had progressed enough to give

the United States leverage in negotiations.29The return of disarmament during Reagans tenure

was also ironic because in moving away from arms con-


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trol and deterrence, he unwittingly tapped into publicfears about nuclear war that led to a shift in the politi-

cal opportunity structure. This shift, in turn, ended upplacing pressure on the Reagan administration to seekfar-reaching accord with the Soviets on nuclear mat-ters. The tenor and substance of his administrationsearly nuclear policies, for example, provoked consid-erable public unease and led to a previously unseenoutpouring of support for anti-nuclear protests in theUnited States and Europe. With millions of peopledemonstrating in European capitals against proposedNATO nuclear deployments, the nuclear freezemovement gained momentum in the United States.30Popular culture became increasingly sympathetic toabolitionist sentiment through such publications asJonathan Schells The Fate of the Earth and the NationalConference of Catholic Bishops October 1982 moral

critique of deterrence policy.31

Elite doubts about theefcacy of deterrence and utility of nuclear weaponsalso began to emerge with greater force.32 Such de-velopments produced reluctance in Congress, evenamong some Republicans, to fund Reagans defenseprograms, unless progress was made on the arms con-trol front. By late 1982, public and congressional pres-sure led Reagan to initiate Strategic Arms ReductionTalks (the practical successor to SALT-II) and the In-termediate Nuclear Forces (INF) discussions.33 Theseinitiatives were much farther reaching than the SALTagreements because their goal was, for the rst time,a reduction in the number of nuclear weapons pos-sessed by the superpower rivals.

Yet, the return of disarmament during Reagans

tenure is not entirely ironic. President Reagan longheld anti-nuclear sentiments, after all, beliefs thatwere rooted in his liberal past and religious convic-


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tions.34 Thus, despite offering justications of his ad-ministrations early hawkish policies, as early as 1982

one also nds Reagan suggesting in a radio addressthat a nuclear war cannot be won and must never befought.35 He would repeat and expand upon this sen-timent in a direct appeal to the Soviet people duringhis 1984 State of the Union address. Directly suggest-ing his desire for abolition, Reagan said:

People of the Soviet Union, there is only one sane

policy, for your country and for mine, to preserve ourcivilization in this modern age: A nuclear war can-not be won and must never be fought. The only valuein our two nations possessing nuclear weapons is tomake sure they will never be used. But then would itnot be better to do away with them entirely?36

By the October 1986 U.S.-Soviet Reykjavik summit,

Soviet Premier Gorbachev had also expressed supportfor eliminating all nuclear weapons, publicly present-ing an ambitious plan to achieve this goal in 15 years.Gorbachevs heartfelt support of abolition, which hepursued at the summit, struck a chord with Reagan,lowering some of the trust-related structural barriersto cooperation, and resulting in perhaps the rst seri-

ous discussion of the subject since the failure of theBaruch Plan.37 Both leaders attempted to capitalize onthe moment. Indeed, were it not for disagreementsover the implications of the ABM Treaty for SDI, Rea-gan and Gorbachev might have reached an agreementto mutually disarm, an outcome that just days beforethe summit had been all but unthinkable among U.S.policymakers.38 Although a formal agreement elud-

ed the leaders at Reykjavik, Reagan and Gorbachevreached an oral agreement that their two countriesshould eliminate all nuclear weapons, with Reagan


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saying that It would be ne with me if we eliminatedall nuclear weapons, and Gorbachev replying that

We can do that.39

SHAPING A NEW WORLD ORDER, OR SHAPEDBY IT? FROM REYKJAVIK TO ROGUE STATES

Looking back on Reykjavik, two things becomeclear. First, President Reagan spontaneously presidedover and almost secured an agreement on nucleardisarmament. This highlights the tremendous impor-tance of elite agency in what tends to be the highly bu-reaucratic realm of nuclear weapons policy.40 Second,with public support for disarmament at an all-timehigh, with a mobilized public, with elites increasinglyquestioning the practical utility of nuclear weaponsand the efcacy of deterrence strategy, and with U.S.-

Soviet relations thawing, the structural situation waschanging favorably for disarmament. Many of the ob-stacles that had prevented serious movement in thatrealm seemed to be fading away. The new phase ofarms control marked by deep reductions (e.g., the INFand Strategic Arms Reduction [START] Treaty41), ef-fectively broke the back of the nuclear arms race.42One might even say that the nuclear Cold War effec-tively ended in October 1986.43 The goal of abolitionappeared to be within reach.

New Risks and Uncertain Priorities in thePost-Cold War World (1991-2001).

For a brief period of time, it appeared that U.S.

and Soviet leaders were reaching for this goal. Dra-matic arms reductions captured headlines. The twosuperpowers intermediate-range nuclear forces were


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completely eliminated through the 1987 INF treaty.The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991 and 1992,

reciprocal but unilateral arms reductions, resulted inthe withdrawal from service by the United States andthe Soviet Union/Russia of as many as 17,000 tacticalnuclear weapons. Ratied in 1991, the START-I treatyprompted not only further reductions, but increasedtransparency. Gone were the days when a paranoidSoviet state refused to accept verication, a point thathad decades before dealt a mortal blow to disarma-ment.

Perhaps most consequentially, the Soviet Unionhad crumbled, dividing into 15 sovereign states. TheWarsaw Pacts demise soon followed, and a lonelyRussia entered a prolonged phase of economic de-cline and social instability. Further, by the end of theGeorge H. W. Bush administration, a revolution in

military affairsspecically, the development of ad-vanced conventional capabilitieshad provided theUnited States with an overwhelming conventionalmilitary advantage against all potential adversaries.44Such developments left the United States in an unpar-alleled position of global dominance, one in which itcould begin to shape a new world order.45

Part of this new world order could have includeda movement toward nuclear disarmament. Many ofthe cards seemed to be in placedecades of presiden-tial support, continued commitment to Article VI,increasing fears of proliferation, the collapse of theSoviet threat and a relatively weak Russia, and an in-vigorated anti-nuclear movement. But the other shoenever dropped. Why, with the end of the Cold War,

did disarmament largely fall off the political radar?Why did the Soviet collapse on the heels of Reykjavikfail to bring abolition to its logical conclusion?


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One might offer numerous explanations for whydisarmament stalled in the early 1990s, but at least ve

factors stand out. First, as the Soviet Union crumbled,U.S. policymakers turned to a variety of other mat-tersincluding the 1991 Gulf War, the Madrid peaceconference, the reunication of Germany and, eventu-ally, the expansion of NATO. Second, in the absenceof an arms race, the popular movement that had sweptthe world during the 1980s largely lost its urgency.Third, fears of nuclear war with the Soviet Uniontransformed over time into fears of loose nukes andhorizontal proliferation, all of which centered on theconcern that rogue states or terrorist organizationswould acquire nuclear weapons. This led to a gradualshift in U.S. policy focus away from arms reductionsand disarmament, a shift that was perhaps best em-bodied by the elimination of the Arms Control and

Disarmament Agency (ACDA) as an independent en-tity in April 1999, when the nearly 40-year old ACDAwas fully merged into the U.S. Department of State.46Though U.S. ofcials continued to speak periodicallyabout disarmament as a long-term goal, there were nowell-structured or concerted efforts by them in the de-cade after the Cold War to achieve this goal. Indeed,by late 2005, another round of government reorgani-zation had not only merged the State DepartmentsBureau of Arms Control with its NonproliferationBureau, but it had even resulted in the removal of thewords arms control from the name of the Depart-ments newly created Bureau of International Securityand Nonproliferation.

Fourth, initial attempts to adapt the U.S. nuclear

posture to meet new threats encountered heavy bu-reaucratic resistance, which ultimately resulted in aperpetuation of the status quo.47 Finally, U.S. policy-


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makers grew increasingly divided over how the soleremaining superpower should dene and address the

new international strategic context, as well as the rolethat Americas nuclear weapons should play in thiscontext. Were nuclear weapons still relevant for deter-ring past or emerging adversaries? Were they still rele-vant to extended deterrence commitments? Were theyuseful for dissuading states or terrorists from acquir-ing or using weapons of mass destruction (WMD)?48With the new millennium approaching, President BillClintons Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, poi-gnantly observed that the administration and Con-gress have not yet agreed on a common post-ColdWar strategy for responding to [the development andproliferation of advanced nuclear weapons].49

Thus, as Janne Nolan has argued, . . . it is nowa clich in Washington that the end of the ideologi-

cal struggle with the Soviet Union was not necessarilygood news.50 The predictable days (or at least theyseemed so in retrospect) of the bipolar rivalry hadended. In their place had arrived strategic uncertainty.While arms control would enjoy some success duringthe Bush and Clinton administrations (e.g., START-I,the Lisbon Protocol, the Open Skies Treaty, the AgreedFramework, and START-II), and while the NPT wasindenitely extended in 1995, the United States wouldneither reach nor ratify many agreements after theearly 1990s. Instead, in the absence of strong publicinterest in arms control or disarmament, uncertaintyof how to adapt to the post-Cold War world, and withcongressional and bureaucratic resistance to armscontrol initiatives and growing suspicion of Russia,

initiatives such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty(CTBT), the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT),and a third round of START oundered.51 A nuclearposture review launched by President Clinton in 1993


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and completed in 1994 seemed to reect this trend.Rather than reducing Americas reliance on nuclear

weapons,

The decisions that emerged from the 1993-94 NuclearPosture Review. . . reinforced the operational and po-litical importance of nuclear weapons. Taken together,these decisions ratied a triad of nuclear forces, withdiminished but still large numbers of strategic forces;renewed the U.S. commitment to initiate the use ofnuclear weapons against existing and potential newadversaries; and granted political approval for target-ing plans to develop nuclear options against regionaland nonnuclear contingencies.52

A 1997 Presidential Decision Directive providingguidance for nuclear weapons employment (PSS/NSC60), the rst such directive in over 15 years, similarly

called for retaining a wide range of survivable nucle-ar optionsfrom the ability to inict overwhelmingdamage against enemy assets to more graduated op-tions.53

Although U.S. policy failed to come into greaterfundamental accord with broad disarmament goals,some American elites expressed a contrary view. See-ing the evolving situation differently, they believed

that the Soviet collapse made abolition more, not less,important. A panel of experts brought together bythe Stimson Center in Washington, DC, for example,argued in a 1995 report that the growing prolifera-tion threat necessitated abolition on national securitygrounds. The recommendations of this panel, how-ever, largely fell on deaf earseven though its mem-

bers included General Andrew Goodpaster and PaulNitze, neither of whom could be considered shrinkingnational security violets.54 A similar fate would befalla paper authored by the well-respected chairman of


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the House Armed Services Committee, Les Aspin, aswell as a formal statement in favor of abolition by 58

generals and admirals, including 16 from the UnitedStates.55

To be sure, the United States had not suddenlylost its formal or rhetorical commitment to the goal ofdisarmament. The NPTs Article VI commitment wasstill in place, after all, and President Clinton from timeto time highlighted it as the overarching U.S. goal. InMarch 2000, Clinton argued that:

Remarkable progress in nuclear disarmament has oc-curred since the end of the Cold War. . . . The UnitedStates is committed to the ultimate elimination of allnuclear weapons. Achieving this goal will be neithereasy nor rapid. Accordingly, the United States re-dedicates itself to work tirelessly and expeditiously tocreate conditions that will make possible even deeper

reductions in nuclear weapons, and ultimately theirelimination.56

But Clintons assertion that the CTBT and otherinitiatives were steps toward disarmament is coloredboth by the lack of his articulation of a far-reachingdisarmament strategy and the reality of a NuclearPosture Review (NPR) and a Presidential Decision

Directive (PDD) that maintained the centrality ofnuclear weapons in U.S. security planning. Clintonslead and hedge strategy against the possibility ofa resurgent Russia or threats elsewhere, and his con-tinuation of the Bush administrations policy of cal-culated ambiguity, were practical manifestations ofthis continued centrality for nuclear weapons in U.S.

policy.57

Secretary of Defense William Cohen went sofar as to suggest, in an interview with the WashingtonPost, that those who believed the end of the Cold War


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opened the door for a swift move toward U.S. nuclearabolition had no home in the Clinton administration.58

Disarmament Continues its Retreat (2001-09).

That the Clinton administration was not preparedto rush toward disarmament did not make it excep-tional in the annals of American history. But this isexactly the point. While many U.S. administrationshave expressed a desire for abolishing nuclear weap-ons, none has been willing to race toward the goal(not even when the structural conditions seemed mostpermissive), and almost none have articulated a clearview of and demonstrated a sustained commitmentto disarmamentthe George W. Bush administrationperhaps least of all. Staffed by critics of traditionalarms control approaches and abolition opponents,

the Bush administration took a highly skeptical viewtoward international treaties and institutions gener-ally.59 The ascendant view in the halls of Washington,DC, in January 2001 was that treaties were not worththe paper they were written on, since states willingto sign treaties were often willing to take the actionsrequired by them even in their absence. Further, thisviewpoint held that American power could and shouldbe used to further its foreign policy objectives. Thosewho would follow along were welcome; those whowould not were against us and should be shuntedaside.60 These natural inclinations were exponentiallymagnied in the aftermath of the attacks of September11, 2001 (9/11), which led administration ofcials totreat terrorism as the primary U.S. national security

threat. Indeed, to the extent that the Bush administra-tion focused on nuclear issues after 9/11, its effortswere primarily directed toward lowering the proba-


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bility that a terrorist organization or a state sponsor ofterrorism would acquire nuclear weapons, rather than

toward concluding arms control agreements. None ofthis augured well for abolition.

These attitudes and events resulted in some sig-nicant departures from previous administrationsnuclear policies. One obvious departure was the Bushadministrations disdain for old-style arms controltreaties, with their intrusive and extensive vericationprovisions and strict limits on U.S. exibility. Alongthese lines, the administration decided in 2001 to with-draw from the ABM Treaty in order to free itself fromthe legal shackles impeding development of a nationalmissile defense (NMD) systema reversal of 30 yearsof nuclear policy that contributed to signicant deteri-orations in U.S.-Russian relations.61 The CTBT, widelythought to be a cornerstone of disarmament efforts,

was left in legislative limboopposed both for its for-mality and lingering concerns about veriability. Inplace of such agreements, a concerted effort was madeto shift course in favor of less onerous treaties and in-formal agreements. Thus, while the Bush administra-tion did conclude one signicant arms reduction trea-ty with Russia in terms of numerical reductionsthe2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT)the agreement contained no verication provisionsof its own.62 The 2003 Proliferation Security Initiative(PSI), although an important initiative in its own right,was not a treaty at all, but an informal agreement byinterested parties to stem the illegal ow of materialsthat could be utilized in WMD programs.63

Supporters of Bush-era policy might counter that

the SORT Treaty led to large reductions in strategicforces, and that the Bush administration actually re-duced the U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons through


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its enumeration of the so-called new triad in the2001 NPR and 2006 National Security Strategy, which

integrated nuclear and advanced conventional forcesfor the purposes of deterrence.64 These points couldbe used to suggest that, in effect, the Bush administra-tion continued the move toward deep reductions, andthat the unfavorable optics of the situation were dueto partisan political posturing.65 There is a measure oftruth to such statements. There was little new, afterall, about President Bushs emphasis on the centralityof nuclear weapons for hedging against current andfuture threats.66 Moreover, the move toward greaterintegration of advanced conventional capabilities inthe U.S. deterrent did represent a diversication ofU.S. deterrence policy.67 But one should not take thisline of argument too far.

Creating an expanded role for the U.S. conven-

tional arsenal and reducing the overkill capability ofU.S. nuclear forces is not akin to advocating abolition,even though some Bush administration ofcials occa-sionally alluded to it as such.68 Such actions notwith-standing, therefore, the Bush administration evinceda clear move away from established disarmamentgoals. This is particularly evident when one reviewsdevelopments at the 2005 NPT Review Conference,where the United States not only distanced itself fromthe 1995 and 2000 Conference decisions on disarma-ment (e.g., the thirteen steps) but intervened to haveremoved from a UN summit document references tononproliferation and disarmament.69 The move awayfrom abolition is also evident in the Bush administra-tions rejection of verication provisions in arms con-

trol treaties. It is widely accepted, after all, that intru-sive verication and tough enforcement are necessarycomponents of any move toward zero.70 Simply put:no verication, no disarmament.


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The Bush administration even endeavored to re-write nonproliferation rules by dividing proliferators

into two groupsthose who could be trusted withtheir nuclear weapons (India) and those who mustbe isolated or attacked for their real or suspected ac-tions (Iraq, Iran, and North Korea). Although theUnited States and India jointly pledged in June 2005to support nonproliferation, for example, the nucleardeal with India advanced by the Bush administrationcontained no provisions to constrain Indias militarynuclear program.71 While it is eminently reasonable tosuggest that a nuclear-armed Saddam Hussein wouldhave posed a far greater threat than does a nuclear-armed India, the relevant point here is that the Bushadministration seemed to consider disarmament apriority only insofar as it pertained to rogue statesand the possibility of terrorist acquisition of nuclear

weapons.72

If there was a general lack of concern vis--vis Indian nuclear weapons, one might ask, could U.S.disarmament have been a priority?

A NEW CENTER OR A RETURN TONORMALCY? THE FOUR HORSEMEN RIDETO TOWN

Thus, with the Bush administration entering itsnal years, disarmament seemed further away thanever. Moreover, by 2007, the post-Cold War world hadundergone some dramatic shifts that made structuralconditions decidedly less favorable for abolition, evenas they made abolition itself more urgent. North Ko-rea had built and tested its own nuclear weapons. Iran

continued to defy International Atomic Energy Agen-cy (IAEA) and United Nations (UN) Security Councildemands, and was increasingly suspected of pursuing


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a weapons program. The United States had further rei-ed the role of nuclear weapons in its national security

strategy and had pushed ahead with missile defenseplans to counter Iran and North Korea, providing anincentive for Russiawhich was already relying moreheavily on nuclear weapons for certain missionstofurther increase this reliance.73 At the same time, theSTART-I agreement was nearing expiration, with nosuccessor in sight, and the NPT seemed to be crum-bling under the weight of violations by Iran and NorthKorea and circumventions with respect to India. Fi-nally, with the United States strategically hobbled bywars in Iraq and Afghanistan and with its inuencedeclining globally, American leaders no longer ap-peared to be in a position to reshape the world dra-matically according to their desires, even should theyagain decide to pursue disarmament.

It was in this context that former Secretaries ofState George Schultz, William Perry, and Henry Kiss-inger, along with former Senator Sam Nunn, pub-lished their 2007 Wall Street Journal op-ed calling fora world without nuclear weapons.74 Their statementshave not necessarily been unique as an example of bi-partisan support for abolition, since such support hasnever divided evenly along partisan lines.75 More in-teresting is that these former Cold Warriors appear tohave had a signicant change of heart with respect tothe nuclear question, and that their arguments are, un-like most previous efforts, gaining political traction inthe United States. Not content to write opinion pieces,the so-called four horsemen have been actively en-gaging in efforts to build institutional and elite-level

support for disarmament. Their boldness has helpednot only to reintroduce abolition into the mainstream(albeit still as a long-term goal) but to set off a re-


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storm of debate among American elites about how toget to global zero.

One interesting question that suggests itself hereconcerns why the gang of fours efforts have been soconsequential in elevating discussions of abolition inthe United States. This is not the rst time that hawkishforeign policy and security luminaries have endorsedabolition.76 A possible answer is that by 2007 the per-ceived urgency of disarmament had again grown, asnuclear weapons spread to troublesome actors andfears mounted that they would continue to spreadperhaps even into the hands of terrorists. Indeed, ifone examines the logic behind the so-called gang offours calls for abolition, a prime motivator seems tobe that new nuclear states and terrorists may not bedeterrable. With the threat of proliferation to such ac-tors ever-present in a nuclear armed world, the four

argue that nuclear weapons have become more of aliability than an asset for the United States.77 Concernsover a recalcitrant Russia, the expiration of START-Iverication provisions, and the weakening of the NPTmay have similarly contributed to increasing the sa-liency of the pro-abolition argument among politicalelites. Perhaps the newfound excitement of elites overabolition also reects a certain post-reactionary desireto correct course after the Bush administrations de-viations from long-established norms.


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FORECASTING THE U.S. NUCLEAR FUTURE:YES WE CAN (EVENTUALLY?)

The Obama Administration: Pledges and Actions.

It is commonly believed that the election of Presi-dent Barack Obama has come at an opportune time,given the increasing pro-abolition sentiment of thepast few years. Obama has consistently offered clearrhetorical support for a nuclear-free worlda deepconviction that he has held since his undergraduatedays at Columbia University.78 His most completearticulation of this vision was during an April 2009speech at Hradcany Square in Prague, where he saidthat today, I state clearly and with conviction Amer-icas commitment to seek the peace and security of aworld without nuclear weapons.79

In addition to this personal commitment, onemight also note that several leading Obama adminis-tration ofcials have publicly endorsed the vision ofa nuclear-free world, including Robert Einhorn, RoseGotemoeller, and Ivo Daalder.80 Obamas combinationof presidential statements and his choice of ofcialsfor top nuclear-related posts are perhaps the clearestindication that abolition has returned to the Americanpolitical mainstream.81 Indeed, the fact that disarma-ment is again a mainstream concept in the UnitedStates becomes particularly evident when one consid-ers that during the 2008 presidential campaign, boththen-Senator Obama and Senator John McCainwhoagreed on little elseopenly supported a prudent,step-wise movement toward disarmament.82

President Obamas words have been backed upwith pledges to pursue several initiatives aimed atbringing disarmament closer to reality. Progress seems


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to be evident on multiple fronts. In September 2009, thePresident chaired a UN Security Council summit that

unanimously approved the vision of a world withoutnuclear weapons.83 The United States and Russia re-cently concluded a START follow-on agreement, NewSTART, which mandates bilateral warhead and stock-pile reductions and renews mechanisms for verica-tion. The 2010 NPR, which was released in April 2010,reduces somewhat the role of nuclear weapons in U.S.strategy and foreign policy; indeed, throughout thedeliberations over the NPR, the administration pri-vately insisted on this outcome.84 Also, in April 2010,the White House hosted a Nuclear Security Summitthat brought together senior ofcials from 47 nationsand won commitments for enhancing the safety andsecurity of nuclear material, as well as for preventingnuclear smuggling and terrorism. Approximately 60

percent of national commitments made at this sum-mit have been completed, and a follow-up summit isscheduled for 2012 in the Republic of Korea.85

Finally, the Obama administrations April 2010conclusion of the New START agreement with Rus-sia provided a strong foundation for reinvigoratingthe nonproliferation regime, which had been severelystressed after a decade of proliferation and politicaldisagreements. Indeed, although state parties to theNuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) had agreed in1995 to extend the agreement indenitely, the comingdecade placed such strain on the nonproliferation re-gime that by 2005 the NPT Review Conference wasunable to produce a nal consensus document, dueto disagreement over how to handle issues such as

Iranian nuclear malfeasance and a Middle East Nu-clear Weapon Free Zone. Non-nuclear weapon states(NNWS) had also become deeply skeptical that nucle-


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ar weapon states (NWS) were working in good faith toeliminate their nuclear arsenals, leading them to op-

pose strengthened nonproliferation activities withoutprogress toward disarmament.

With the April 2010 signing of New STARTtherst new U.S.-Russian arms reduction treaty in nearlya decadeprogress toward disarmament appeared tobe restarted. Partly because of this progress, the 2010NPT Review Conference was successful in producinga nal document that included, among other things, arecommitment by NPT parties to the nonproliferationregime and an action plan on nonproliferation. Somebelieve that this positive outcome at the 2010 ReviewConference had the ancillary benet of strengtheningthe Obama administrations hand in dealing with boththe Iranian and North Korean portfolios.86

Continuity, Not Revolution.

Despite this progress, however, the current pro-disarmament zeitgeist is not as revolutionary as it issometimes portrayed. To be sure, nuclear disarma-ment debates in the United States may now be occur-ring in more detail and in a more sustained way thanat most points in the past. But the step-wise, decades-long process advanced today by most advocatesonethat begins with formalized arms reductions, a ssilematerial production cutoff, a comprehensive test ban,control over the nuclear fuel cycle, intense vericationand enforcement, and gradual delegitimization ofweapons possession, and that ends with abolitionisin many respects the very same approach that has been

offered since the dawn of the nuclear age.Moreover, previous presidents have enjoyed arms

control and nonproliferation successes, and have


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viewed their efforts as paving the way toward aboli-tion. Yet, a variety of factorsfrom structural barri-

ers to a lack of sustained political willhave impededprogress toward that goal. Many of these factors con-tinue to obstruct the path toward abolition. Indeed,few mainstream proponents in the United States speakof abolition as achievable anytime in the foreseeablefuture. Im not nave, said the President in Prague,This goal will not be reached quicklyperhaps notin my lifetime.87 If one makes the reasonable assump-tion that, by modern standards of life expectancy,President Obama could live at least another 40 years,it becomes clear that the timeline envisioned by main-stream abolition supporters may be quite long50,60, 70, perhaps even 100 years or more.

Given all that might change in the interim, cansuch grand schemes . . . be carried forward by rea-

sonable people making demonstrable progress at asteady pace?88 Perhaps. Abolition is not on its faceunachievable, and the United States is not predestinedto sit atop a nuclear-armed world. Yet, numerous andsignicant roadblocks to abolition linger. One mightdivide these roadblocks into two broad categories:conceptual and structural.

Guarding Your Optimism: Conceptual Roadblocksto Disarmament.

The conceptual roadblock to disarmament mightbe best illustrated by paraphrasing the classic lm Dr.Strangelove. Simply put, the United States has learnedto love the bomb. Or better, one might describe it as

a love-hate relationship, one in which:


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Nuclear weapons are presented both as terrifying ob-jects that could destroy the nation in half an hour andas the ultimate guarantors of our security. Nuclearweapons are terrifying, but deterrence keeps us safe.89

In short, Americans hate the bomb for what it cando to us and to innocent people worldwide, but wecherish it as the mainstay of our national security.90Learning, or perhaps more accurately, realisticallyplanning and preparing to live without nuclear weap-

ons, will be an important step toward abolition. Yet,this is a step that U.S. policymakers, including thosein the Obama administration, have yet to take. Thisshortfall is reected in the open-source literature onthe subject, in which abolition proponents exploreevery conceivable question related to reaching globalzero but are generally silent on how to achieve whatmay be the most difcult task of allmaintainingstrategic stability while moving from low numbers tozero, as well as after arriving at zero.91 Where theseproponents do address the topic, they tend to suggestthat, ultimately, what will be needed for global zerois a world in which the nature of international politicalrelations is dramatically changed from what currentlyexists.92 Such proposals can at times seem a bit fantas-

tical, even for abolition supporters.Indeed, the words and actions of the Obama admin-

istration suggest that nuclear deterrence will remain acornerstone of U.S. national security for the foresee-able future, just as it has been for decades. Despitepartisan attacks to the contrary, Obama is not a Pol-lyanna President.93 He has stated unequivocally andin multiple venues, for example, that As long as theseweapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe,secure, and effective arsenal to deter any adversary,


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and guarantee that defense to our allies.94 Vice Presi-dent Joe Biden has similarly argued that this commit-

ment will extend, for as long as nuclear weapons arerequired to defend our country and our allies.95 Theirwords have been backed up by actions; most recently,the administration has sought large funding increasesfor the U.S. nuclear weapons complexa move thatenjoyed bipartisan support from leading national se-curity experts, including the so-called gang of fourand the members of the Strategic Posture Commission,a bipartisan panel headed by former Defense Secretar-ies James Schlesinger and William Perry.96

Other administration ofcials have similarly em-phasized the continuing importance of Americas nu-clear deterrent. In July 2009, Undersecretary of Statefor Arms Control Ellen Tauscher argued that while weneed an updated nuclear posture that more accu-

rately reect[s] the threat environment. . . . We mustdo this while continuing to deter any nuclear armedadversary and guarantee the defense of our allies.97It should be noted that Undersecretary Tauscherscomments were offered at a symposium on deterrenceat the U.S. Strategic Command in Omaha, Nebraska.Also revealing is the language of the 2010 Quadren-nial Defense Review (QDR), a document that simultane-ously asserts that new, tailored regional deterrencearchitectures will permit a reduced role for nuclearweapons in our national security strategy, and insiststhat:

Until such time as the Administrations goal of a worldfree of nuclear weapons is achieved, nuclear capabili-ties will be maintained as a core mission of the Depart-ment of Defense. We will maintain a safe, secure, andeffective nuclear arsenal to deter attack on the UnitedStates, and on our allies and partners.98


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Even the strongest mainstream advocates of deep

reductions and abolition seem to accept that the Unit-ed States will need to maintain its nuclear deterrentfor some time to come. Writers Hans M. Kristensen,Robert S. Norris, and Ivan Oelrich posit that:

While the ultimate goal is nuclear abolition, a mini-mal deterrence doctrine creates a stable resting spotthat minimizes the salience and danger of remaining

nuclear weapons and allows all the worlds nuclearpowers to come into a stable equilibrium before mov-ing to the last step of denuclearization.99

In short, mainstream abolition supporters may notbe conceptually prepared for a nuclear-free world,even if it is technically possible to reach zero. Seri-ous planning for maintaining security in a world with

small numbers, and for doing so in a world with nonuclear weapons, must occur before the United Statesmoves in that direction.100 The ascendance of such dis-cussions in the public sphere will be a better indicationthat the United States and the world are advancingsignicantly toward nuclear disarmament than talkof a second New START agreement, tactical weapon

reductions, or movement toward ratifying the FMCTand CTBT.

Guarding Your Optimism: Structural Roadblocks toDisarmament.

While conceptual roadblocks provide partial in-sight into the U.S. nuclear future, structural road-

blocks are at least as important to consider in thisrespect. During the Cold War, numerous structuralbarriers blocked the path toward disarmament. Even


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when the key structural barrier of East-West competi-tion disintegrated with the end of the Cold War and

the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, otherstook its place. What one nds today is a complex webof structural barriers to abolition, some of which havelong pedigrees, some of which are relatively new.While structural permissiveness does not guaranteepolicy outcomes, these barriers will also need to beaddressed if serious U.S. movement toward abolitionis to be realized.

One such barrier is a byproduct of the material andhuman support afforded to the American nuclear in-frastructure. Nuclear weapons-related programs con-tinue to receive appropriations that dwarf a varietyof other federal programs. In 2008, the United Statesspent more than $52.4 billion on nuclear weaponsprograms; Stephen I. Schwartz and Deepti Choubey

write:

By way of comparison, the 2008 nuclear weapons andweapons-related budget exceed[ed] all anticipatedgovernment expenditures on international diplomacyand foreign assistance ($39.5 billion) and natural re-sources and the environment ($33 billion). It is nearlydouble the budget for general science, space, and tech-nology ($27.4 billion), and it is almost 14 times whatthe U.S. Department of Energy has allocated for allenergy-related research and development.101

Reinforcing this commitment, the Obama admin-istration has consistently supported increased fund-ing for the U.S. nuclear complex and deterrent.102 Thisbudgetary support has been complemented by efforts

to incentivize job assignments related to the nucleardeterrent, particularly in the wake of concerns that thenuclear weapons infrastructure is decaying, and of se-curity fears emanating from high-prole mishaps of


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the past few years, including the unauthorized ightin 2007 of six nuclear-armed cruise missiles from Mi-

not Air Force Base in North Dakota to Barksdale AirForce Base in Louisiana.103

Such efforts are largely aimed at ensuring the cred-ibility and security of Americas nuclear arsenal, an en-tirely reasonable objective so long as the United Statespossesses and relies on nuclear weapons. Yet, theymay also have negative consequences with respect toabolition, including leading to a further entrenchmentof the nuclear mission in U.S. security policy. The bu-reaucracies supported and reied by todays decisionsare likely to prove resilient in the future as attemptsare made to advance broad changes in nuclear policysuch as abolition.104 The case of the 1994 NPR is a goodexample of how bureaucracies are adept at resistingchange.105 Unsurprisingly, the Obama administration

encountered signicant bureaucratic resistance by el-ements within the Department of Defense (DoD) andother agencies, during the writing of the 2010 NPR.106

A second structural barrier is the lack of publicmobilization in favor of abolition. Unlike in previ-ous decades, the most recent push for abolition is anelite-level phenomenon.107 Gone are the days wheremillions marched in European capitals, and a banthe bomb movement swept the United States. Theoutrage, fear, and sense of urgency that drove pub-lic involvement in the nuclear issuefrom the 1950sto the early 1990slargely faded with the Cold War.Polling over the past 6 years underlines this shift. In2007, only 38 percent of Americans (and 31 percent ofRussians) agreed when asked if our goal should be

to gradually eliminate all nuclear weapons throughan international agreement, while developing effec-tive systems for verifying all countries are eliminatingtheirs too.108


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While this polling was conducted before the latestpush for abolition reached full stride, its results are

still noteworthy. Since the question asked hews closelyto abolition proponents current proposals, includingthose of the Obama administration, the results dem-onstrate, at a minimum, the lack of public accord onwhat our nuclear future should be. Consider also thatwhen asked the same question in 2004, 55 percent ofAmericans responded afrmatively that disarmamentshould be the end goal. This precipitous decline, cou-pled with minimal public interest in ratication of theNew START Treaty in 2010, suggests that Americanpolitical leaders are not likely to face much domesticpressure to act on disarmament over the coming years.The absence of such pressure is important, becauseresearch demonstrates that popular mobilization hasbeen an important facilitator of substantive agree-

ments on nuclear weapons use and possessiononethat inuences politicians through direct pressure bychanging the political opportunity structure in whichthey operate.109

Indeed, it is hard to overstate the importance ofdomestic politics as a structural roadblock to disarma-ment, as was evidenced by the bitter debates over rati-cation of New START. Much to the surprise of theObama administration and expert analysts, SenatorJon Kyl (R-AZ), the Republican point man on nucleararms issues, led a protracted effort in opposition tothe Treaty, despite having been granted many conces-sions by the administration. Moreover, whatever theultimate reason for Senator Kyls oppositionwheth-er political or technicallegislative efforts continue in

Congress to place limitations on New START imple-mentation and delay reductions, efforts that could un-dermine the Treaty if enacted into law.110 To be sure,


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the New START debates placed arms control back onthe national stage and to an extent may have educated

a new generation of congressional staff about these is-sues, but the lingering efforts in opposition to NewSTART suggest that any follow-on arms control initia-tives, let alone initiatives that would substantially ad-vance the goal of disarmament, are likely to face stiffresistance on Capitol Hill.

Another structural barrier to Washingtons deci-sion to disarm is related to the conditions set by Amer-ican policymakers for moving forward with abolition.Like others before him, President Obama clearly statesthat the United States will retain its deterrent so longas there is a country with nuclear weapons.111 The2010 QDR insists that the DoD nuclear mission will besustained [u]ntil such time as the Administrationsgoal of a world free of nuclear weapons is achieved.112

The gang of four argues that as we work to . . .realize the vision of a world without nuclear weap-ons, we recognize the necessity to maintain the safety,security, and reliability of our own weapons.113 Onecannot help but think that this you rst approach isstrikingly similar to the Baruch plans insistence thatthe United States will disarm only once others havedone so. Yet, a U.S. nuclear monopoly is not likely tobe any more acceptable to other states in the futurethan it was to the Soviets in the late 1940s.

These issues point to a fourth structural roadblock.Put in the interrogative: If U.S. disarmament dependson the disarmament of others, will those others dis-arm? Despite the increased talk about abolition overthe past several years in Western capitals, global trend

lines do not match the rhetoric. Russia is arguably in-creasing, not decreasing, its reliance on nuclear weap-ons; some observers believe that Moscow is in the pro-


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cess of increasing its nuclear arsenal. While Russianrepresentatives deny this accusation, it nonetheless

proved a major stumbling block at last years GlobalZero talks in Paris.114 In the Middle East, Irans blatantdeance of UN Security Council and IAEA demandsunderscores suspicions that it is pursuing a militarynuclear capability. Faced with a potential nuclear-armed Iran and surrounded by largely hostile states,Israel is unlikely to disarm. More than 10 other MiddleEastern states are currently pursuing nuclear energyagreements with suppliers, cooperation that may bedriven in part by fears of Iran and that could lead tofuture proliferation.115

A similar situation obtains elsewhere. Indo-Pak-istani relations have improved somewhat over thepast several years, but the two states remain adversar-ies and show no signs of reaching a groundbreaking

nuclear or political accord. Reportedly, Pakistan hasnearly doubled its nuclear arsenal over the past fewyears and continues to increase its production of s-sile material. As a result, Islamabad may soon becomethe worlds fth largest nuclear power, ahead of GreatBritain.116 In East Asia, North Korea has already testedtwo weapons and, while it seems to be holding off on athird test, six-party efforts to promote a denuclearizedKorean peninsula remain deadlocked. Even France,which is situated in peaceful and prosperous WesternEurope, remains skeptical about disarmament. At the2010 Paris disarmament talks, French Foreign Minis-try Secretary General Pierre Sellal coyly offered thatFrances nuclear deterrent has protected our countryvery well for many years.117

What events would be required to bring thesestates closer to disarmament? The potential list is longand notoriously difcult to achieve, including a halt


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to NATO expansion and U.S. involvement in Russiasnear-abroad, Arab-Israeli peace, and resolution of

the Kashmir conict. With respect to North Korea andIran, the question is at least as complex, and wouldinvolve denuclearization of the Korean peninsula andbringing Iran into full compliance with IAEA and UNSecurity Council demands. Aside from the resolutionof all of these conicts, successful abolition might alsorequire the establishment of an international normagainst nuclear possession to undermine the legiti-macy of those who may in the future seek to acquireor retain nuclear arsenals. The key point here is sim-ply that a structural context favorable to disarmamentlooks little like the world in which we live today.

When discussing structural roadblocks to disarma-ment, one must also consider the role of the so-calledpower paradox. This concept describes a situation in

which a huge conventional military advantage makesnuclear disarmament possible and perhaps even pref-erable for the United States, however, that same con-ventional advantage may simultaneously make otherstates less likely to disarm.118 When weaker states lookthrough the lens of the power paradox, they may seeU.S. advocacy for disarmament as a cynical ployaimed at consolidating American power rather thanas a means toward establishing a safer world.119 Aforceful push for disarmament, in the context of over-weening U.S. conventional dominance, could thusbring about an equally strong anti-disarmament reac-tion from states seeking to hedge against U.S. power.

Even if agreement is reached among states to movein tandem toward zero, there remains the challenge

of establishing effective verication and enforcementof disarmament. Many states may be unwilling to ac-cept intrusive verication inspections or, after accept-


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ing them, seek to circumvent them or renege on theircommitments. North Koreas withdrawal from the

NPT and the international communitys impotence indealing with it are particularly illustrative here, but sois the case of the United States under the Bush admin-istration, since it not only withdrew from the ABMTreaty but willingly let agreements with importantverication provisions expire. Provided that verica-tion concerns are overcome, the challenge of enforce-ment will remain. To make restrictions effective, itmust be possible to punish violators, but setting up aneffective mechanism for doing so remains a difcultendeavor. One analyst has insisted that enforcementis perhaps the greatest challenge in nuclear disarma-ment, noting that the difculties associated with en-forcement are highlighted by the cases of Iraq, NorthKorea, Iran, Libya, and Syria.120

Verication and enforcement are important notonly with respect to the elimination of nuclear arsenalsbut to the spread of sensitive nuclear materials andtechnologies that can facilitate proliferation. Interna-tional agreement on strong measures to secure the nu-clear fuel cycle and nuclear materials generally wouldhelp to create a solid basis on which the United Statesand others could move toward disarmament. Yet, thechallenges here are long-standing and substantial. TheFMCT remains trapped in the UN Conference on Dis-armament, even though there are efforts underway tond alternative venues for its consideration. The CTBTis unlikely to be ratied by all the states necessary forit to come into force at any point in the foreseeable fu-ture. Securing nuclear materials and preventing pro-

liferation will likely also require internationalizationof the nuclear fuel cycle, making the Additional Pro-tocol (AP) a condition of nuclear supply, and banning


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the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR)technologies to any state that does not already possess

them. Notwithstanding some progress on multilateralfuel cycle facilities, nuclear suppliers remain dividedover whether to require the AP as a precondition forall types of nuclear assistance. Proposals to ban ENRtransfers are even more divisive, with few besides theUnited States supporting them, and with Washingtonitself divided over the idea.

One must also consider the impact of future casesof proliferation on U.S. behavior, as well as the impactof these actions on the prospects for disarmament.The case of Iraq in 2003 is instructive here. While amajority of Americans were supportive of moves to-ward general nuclear disarmament during the initialperiod in which charges of WMD possession wereleveled against Saddam Hussein, they seemed also to

have been inclined to respond to this perceived threatthrough the use of military force, particularly in thewake of the 9/11 attacks and the history of conictwith Husseins Iraq. Leaving aside the debate aboutthe Bush administrations motivations for going towar in Iraq in 2003, the relevant point here is that ag-gressive responses to proliferation may heighten thesalience of the power paradoxboth in the targetstate and among observersby highlighting the ex-tent of U.S. conventional military superiority and thesecurity fears of weaker U.S. adversaries. By exten-sion, these responses also may make achieving disar-mament more difcult. Consider, for example, that inDecember 2003, Libyan leader Muammar Gadda an-nounced his decision to relinquish all elements of Lib-

yas WMD program. In spring 2011, the United Statesand NATO launched military action against Gaddasforces in Libya under the banner of protecting civil-


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ian life. Future proliferators are likely to give carefulconsideration to the question of whether, if Gadda

had retained his WMD program, NATO might haverefrained from taking these actions. At the same time,there may also be risks to inaction in the face of weap-ons proliferation since, if proliferation is tacitly ac-cepted, it may gradually weaken the nonproliferationregime and undermine one of the key institutionalrequirements for successful abolition.

A nal structural roadblock to U.S. disarmamentthat must be considered is Washingtons continuedreliance on nuclear weapons as a cornerstone of itsnational defense, including its extended deterrentcommitments to allies. This is more than a conceptualproblem, because so long as nuclear weapons providethe central backstop for direct and extended deter-rence, it will be practically impossible to eliminate

them. Barring a dramatic reduction in the need fordeterrence strategies, therefore, a prerequisite to U.S.disarmament will be the deployment of conventionalalternatives that assuage fears about nuclear draw-downs held by U.S. policymakers and their allies,without antagonizing potential peer competitors suchas Russia and China or exacerbating the power para-dox.121 The activation of the U.S. Global Strike Com-mand in August 2009 represents some progress in theintegration of advanced conventional capabilities inAmericas deterrent posture. Conventional PromptGlobal Strike (PGS) may eventually help pave the wayfor a deep reduction in Americas reliance on nuclearweapons; indeed, as other states reduce their nucleararsenals, the efcacy of conventional capabilities for

deterrence is likely to grow. But this efcacy will de-pend on foreign space- and cyber-warfare capabilities,since the effectiveness of PGS depends in large part on


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the security of computer networks and the availabilityof satellite guidance, and it is precisely those capabili-

ties that are emerging as the major new threats to U.S.national security.

CONCLUSION

One might draw two tentative conclusions aboutAmericas nuclear future based on the present study.First, the Obama administrations advocacy of nuclearabolition and its efforts to move down this path are sig-nicant, but President Obamas support for disarma-ment is hardly a radical break from the past. Indeed,Obamas approach to the issue is overwhelminglycautious in nature, reecting as it does a widely sharedview among American policymakers that, althoughdisarmament is in the long-term American interest, it

must not be pursued at the expense of near-term na-tional security requirements. Moreover, substantialroadblocks remain on the path toward abolition. Someof these roadblocks will be particularly daunting toovercome and may require a dramatic evolution in theconduct and nature of international political relations.Thus, it is highly unlikely that Washington will makeany bold moves toward global zero in the foreseeablefuture. A more probable outcome is that the Obamaadministration will continue to move in step-wise mo-tion toward the long-term goal of abolition, a goal thatthe President acknowledges will not be achieved inour lifetimes.

The second broad conclusion one can draw is thathistory is an unpredictable handmaiden of events.

Throughout the U.S. nuclear past, support for aboli-tion as well as the barriers to it have ebbed, owed,and transformed. Ironically, when the barriers to


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disarmament seemed lowest, political and popularenthusiasm for this goal largely dissipated. It may

therefore be the case that when disarmament is mostneeded, it is least possible, and when it is most pos-sible, it is least desired. Whether this trend will hold inthe future, and what can be done to militate against it,remain open questions. If future administrations areless committed to nuclear disarmament, if elite andpublic support for abolition fails to coalesce, and if thestrategic context shifts in unexpected ways, the cur-rent push for disarmament could be derailed.

What does the future hold for the abolitionistagenda? From American shores, the mission has re-gained prominence. But the answer is as unclear as itever was.

ENDNOTES

1. Coit D. Blacker and Gloria Duffy, eds., International ArmsControl: Issues and Agreements, 2nd Ed., Stanford, CA: StanfordUniversity Press, 1984, p. 81.

2. Lawrence S. Wittner, Confronting the Bomb: A Short History ofthe World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, Stanford, CA: StanfordUniversity Press, 2009, pp. 2-4; Blacker and Duffy, pp. 95-96. TheFranck Committees warnings included the possibility of an arms

race with the Soviets and an inability to control the further spreadof nuclear weapons once used. See James Franck et al., Reportof the Committee on Political and Social Problems, ManhattanProject Metallurgical Laboratory of the University of Chicago,Franck Report, June 11, 1945, available from www.nuclearles.org/menu/key-issues/ethics/issues/scientic/franck-report.htm.

3. Wittner, Confronting the Bomb, p. 6; Nina Tannenwald, Stig-matizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo, International

Security, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2005; Nina Tannenwald, The Nuclear Ta-boo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use, International Organization, Vol. 53, No. 3, 1999.


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4. Wittner, Confronting the Bomb, p. 4.

5. Paul Boyer, Fallout: A Historian Reects on Americas Half-Century Encounter with Nuclear Weapons, Columbus, OH: OhioState University Press, 1998, p. 25.

6. Lawrence S. Wittner, One World or None: A History of theWorld Nuclear Disarmament Movement Through 1953, Vol. 1: TheStruggle against the Bomb, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,1993. On the shaping of the post-war order according to U.S. pref-erences, see G. John Ikenberry,After Victory: Institutions, StrategicRestraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars, Princeton,NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001.

7. Tannenwald, Stigmatizing the Bomb, p. 17. On how Tru-man administration actions contributed to a nuclear arms build-up, see Blacker and Duffy, pp. 96-99; David Alan Rosenberg, TheOrigins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy,1945-1960, International Security, Vol. 7, No. 4, 1983.

8. Harry S. Truman, C. R. Attlee, and W. L. Mackenzie King,Declaration on Atomic Energy by President Truman and PrimeMinisters Attlee and King, United States Treaties and Other Inter-national Acts Series, No. 1504, November 15, 1945, available fromwww.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/post-war/451115b.html. The language ofthe communiqu was drafted by Vannevar Bush, then the direc-tor of the Ofce of Scientic Research and Development. See Tan-nenwald, Stigmatizing the Bomb, p. 20.

9. Large parts of this document were reportedly written bythe former scientic head of the Manhattan Project, turned nu-clear critic, Robert Oppenheimer. See Blacker and Duffy, p. 96;David Lilienthal et al., A Report on the International Control ofAtomic Energy, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Of-ce, March 16, 1946, available from honors.umd.edu/HONR269J//archive/AchesonLilienthal.html; U.S. Department of State, TheAcheson-Lilienthal & Baruch Plans, 1946, U.S. Department ofState Ofce of the Historian, Timeline of U.S. Diplomatic History,1945-1952, nd.

10. The Acheson-Lilienthal & Baruch Plans, 1946.

Documents

Forecasting Zero: U.S. Nuclear History and the Low Probability of Disarmament