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Talking Points
Forces for change The public’s view of defence
ContentsIntroduction 2
Trust in the Forces 3
Threats on the horizon 7
The purpose and value of the Armed Forces 12
Military capability 18
Conclusion 22
Methodology 25
Contacts 26
About PwC 27
© Crown copyright 2015
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© Crown copyright 2015
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Introduction
As we approach the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) period under a new government, this is an opportunity to reflect on the purpose and value of our Armed Forces. The Forces’ primary purpose might seem clear, and as our survey shows, their approval ratings are very high among the public.
At the same time, deficit reduction remains a political priority in this parliament as in the last, continuing the dichotomy between spending efficiencies and investment – to achieve the right balance of capability and capacity given current and future threats to the UK.
Over the past few years, our research has demonstrated the pressures that government departments are facing in the current economic climate and how this impacts their wider markets.1 Our Defence Matters2 report brings together current thinking from the sector and suggests ways it can adapt in times of uncertainty, risk, and complexity.
This survey adds a new dimension to this work by asking, for the first time, what the public thinks about the Armed Forces in 2015. Have the Forces made the country safer? Do they provide value for taxpayers? What kind of Armed Forces does the public want for the UK in the future?
As we enter the SDSR period, understanding the public’s view of these attributes can help those considering where military resources might best be focused going forward.
If the next five years follow the course of the last, tough decisions will be made that affect all British institutions, including the Armed Forces. This survey presents strong public support for the military today, but acknowledges that forces for change are to be expected in the coming years.
1 Under pressure, PwC, 2012 – www.pwc.co.uk/underpressure 2 Defence Matters, PwC, 2014 – www.pwc.co.uk/en_UK/uk/assets/pdf/defence-matters-spring-2014.pdf
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Trust in the Forces
Building trust between citizens and the governments, businesses and public institutions that serve them is crucial in ensuring a collaborative and engaged approach to tackling many of the issues that affect people’s everyday lives. Data shows, however, that the public and private sector alike have struggled to maintain trust in recent years.3 The aftermath of the financial crisis, the publication of parliamentary expenses, and recent scrutiny of the culture, practices, and ethics of the press have demonstrated both the vital importance of trust and the severe consequences to economic prosperity and faith in our public institutions when it is undermined.
Findings from the 2015 Edelman Trust Barometer,4 a survey of the general public in 27 countries, describe “an evaporation of trust across all institutions, as if no one has the answers to the unpredictable and unimaginable events of 2014.” It is important for any public institution to maintain popular support, but because the United Kingdom (UK)’s Armed Forces5 represent British citizens abroad, they have an extra responsibility.
So it is encouraging for the Forces that the public rated them most trusted from a list of British institutions: with 69% of people
rating them as trustworthy or very trustworthy and just 8%, untrustworthy (Figure 1). These results are similar to those of a 2012 Lord Ashcroft poll6 which asked people to rate how positive or negative their view was of British institutions; the Armed Forces was rated most highly. It is interesting to note that in both polls, the Forces were more trusted than the NHS, albeit by a slight margin. These findings have potentially
interesting implications in terms of who the public listens to in the debate on future defence needs.
Reported trust levels varied by age: 77% of those over 55 trusted the Forces, while among 18-34 year olds the figure was 58%. However, this finding was not just related to the military; younger people reported lower levels of trust in the majority of the institutions mentioned.
3 British Social Attitudes 32, 2015. 4 Edelman Trust Barometer, 2015, Executive Summary. 5 The British Armed Forces (“The Forces”) refers to the United Kingdom’s entire military including the Royal Navy, Royal Marines, the British Army, the Royal Air Force, the Army Reserve and all central command structures. 6 The Armed Forces & Society, Lord Ashcroft, 2012.
Figure 1: Percentage of respondents rating each institution ‘trustworthy’ or ‘very trustworthy’
Armed Forces
NHS
Judiciary (courts and judges)
The BBC
The civil service
Broadsheet newspapers
Parliament
Tabloid newspapers
69%
12%
23%
28%
33%
44%
53%
68%
Base: 2,007. Don’t know: 6%
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Forces of good?
Asked about their feelings towards the Armed Forces specifically, respondents were overwhelmingly favourable with 72% saying they have a positive view of them and with 51% being very positive (Figure 2). Just 8% had a negative view. Once again, older respondents approved more strongly (81% were positive) but 18-34 year olds still felt positively overall (61%).
When asked how the public thinks the British Armed Forces are viewed by people outside the UK, responses were less strongly positive (Figure 3). Overall, 47% of people think they are viewed positively and 17% negatively (less conclusive than the 72% vs. 8% reported for respondents’ personal views). For the 18-34 group, these scores are 35% positive and 27% negative – a narrowing of 20 points.
Figure 3: Overall, how do you think the British Armed Forces are viewed by people outside the UK?
12% 27% 20%5%
Base: 2,007. Don’t know: 16%. Neither negative nor positive: 19%
Strongly negative Slightly negative Slightly positive Strongly positive
Figure 2: Overall, how would you describe your feelings towards the British Armed Forces?
Base: 2,007. Don’t know: 3%. Neither negative nor positive: 16%
5% 21% 51%3%
Strongly negative Slightly negative Slightly positive Strongly positive
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Generations apart
These results reveal significant differences in opinion between young and older people. The younger ‘Net Generation’7 are accustomed to getting their data from many different sources – in particular user-generated content – which may weaken their interaction with, and trust in, traditional institutions, including the military.
In addition, whereas their parents will have lived through various different UK military campaigns, 18-34 year olds’ primary exposure will have been the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; polls8,9 consistently show that a large majority of people think the UK was wrong to engage in both.
Furthermore, while previous generations might have gained exposure to the military through active service, a reduction of almost 30,000 troops over the course of this parliament means that young people today are less likely than before to be in – or to know someone who is in – the military.
These factors taken together might explain some of the difference in opinions between the generations, and they highlight a need for the Forces to actively engage with young people, as a broader peer group.10
18-34 year olds provide substantive numbers of the regular and reserve forces – as well as comprising their peer group in civilian life. In a 2014 Ministry of Defence study, 56% of Army personnel were aged under 30, for example. Of personnel joining the UK Regular Forces (intake), 41% are aged under 20. With the exclusion of officers, within the other ranks, the majority of outflow also occurs between the ages of 20 and 30.11
The generational differences we have identified may have implications for talent management – if 18-34 year olds do not value the Forces or understand their purpose to the same degree as older demographics, this may impact on the ability of the defence sector to attract and retain top talent.
Young people who leave the Forces and believe their service has been of value have the potential to play a key role as ambassadors among this demographic. There may be opportunities to engage with the ‘Net Generation’, as a broader peer group – for example, by sourcing views of those leaving the Forces, using digital and data analytics to explore and harness their perspectives to reduce high voluntary outflow rates particularly in key areas.
Overall the survey highlighted the importance of successfully engaging with 18-34 year olds. Such engagement might focus on opportunities as well as commitments being undertaken to provide a better understanding of the value and purpose of the Armed Forces for the age group as a whole.
7 Educating the Net Generation, Oblinger and Oblinger, 2005. 8 British Social Attitudes Survey 29, “Support for the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan”, NatCen Social Research 2012. 9 YouGov Iraq, Syria and ISIS tracker, January 2015. 10 MoD, UK Armed Forces Annual Personnel Report, 2014. 11 MoD, UK Armed Forces Annual Personnel Report, 2014.
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Overstretched?
To capture the sentiments of people, we asked the public to write which three words spring to mind when they thought of the Armed Forces. The results are shown in Figure 4. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the words mentioned most often were ‘brave’ (22% of participants), ‘war’ (11%), ‘strong’ (11%), and ‘Army’ (9%).
However, creating joint categories involving five or six recurring words allowed public concerns to be observed. Most notably, a theme emerged including the words, ‘underfunded’, ‘overstretched’, and ‘unequipped’, among others – mentioned by 14% of participants.
Figure 4: Which three words spring to mind when you think about the Armed Forces?
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We asked the public’s views on potential threats the UK faces – and their confidence in the Armed Forces to anticipate and mitigate them. With instability on the rise in many parts of the world, and the ubiquity of smartphones, people have become more accustomed to seeing conflict – state and non-state – in mainstream and social media. At the same time, a prevailing climate of austerity across a number of countries has caused pressures on defence budgets, raising concerns about how well placed countries are to meet future threats.
With these dynamics in play, how confident is the public in the Armed Forces to keep them safe?
Safety, in numbers
We asked the public what type of attack – if any – they saw as the biggest threat to the UK in the near future. As shown in Figure 5, only 3% of individuals answered that they thought no threat was likely in the near future.
Threats on the horizon
Although this result seems to indicate a perceived high risk environment, other polls show that people feel safer now than in the past: YouGov12 continually asks people what they think the chances are of themselves or someone they know being a victim of terror: although still a
minority, the proportion saying ‘almost non-existent’ has more than doubled over the past 10 years (from 13% to 27%). This implies that either the public feel much safer than a decade ago, or feel that if there is an attack, they will not be affected.
12 ‘Britons keep calm in face of terror attack’, YouGov, 2015.
Figure 5: What type of attack, if any, do you perceive as the biggest threat to the UK in the near future?
Organised terrorism at home (e.g. July 7 bombings)
Conflict with non-state organisations abroad (ISIS etc.)
‘Lone-wolf’ attacks at home
Cyber-attack
Biological or chemical warfare
Nuclear attack from other state(s)
No threat likely in the near future
Conventional warfare with other state(s)
31%
2%
3%
4%
4%
11%
13%
23%
Base: 2,007. Don’t know: 9%. Other: 1%
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Modern threats
Meanwhile, other responses shed light on a changing modern defence environment.
More than half of the respondents (54%) thought terrorist and non-state groups constituted the biggest threat to the UK. Specifically, 31% thought organised terrorism at home (e.g. the July 7 bombings in London) was the biggest threat while around a quarter (23%) thought conflict with non-state organisations abroad (e.g. Islamic State, Taliban, Al-Qaeda) was the biggest direct threat to the UK.
While the public differentiated between domestic threats and those abroad, there is interplay between the two, for example, threats emerging from non-state organisations abroad can and are linked to threats within the UK. With almost one quarter of the respondents pointing to conflict with non-state organisations abroad as the biggest direct threat (and with threats of this nature indeed on the rise), it may be helpful to consider this dynamic as part of debate on the balance in future capability.
Other significant perceived dangers were so-called ‘lone wolf’ attacks (13%) when the perpetrator had no specific links to any terrorist and non-state group (e.g. the murder of Lee Rigby, the mass shooting by Anders Breivik in Norway), and cyber-attacks (11%).
In recent months international tensions have seldom been far from the headlines, with our recent CEO survey13 showing that 72% of Chief Executives are concerned that geopolitical uncertainty will impact the growth of their organisation.
Despite this, very few people in the UK feel threatened by the prospect of state-on-state war: 4% thought the biggest threat to the UK in the near future was nuclear war, and just 2% conventional war with another state.
These results show that the public is increasingly concerned by ‘modern threats’ – Figure 5 shows that more than ten times as many people (65%) think terrorist and non-state groups and cyber-attacks are the biggest threat to the UK as think it is war with another country (6%). This is in keeping with our Agile Defence report14 (see Box 1) which describes how defence organisations must adapt to meet the challenges of current and emerging threats.
13 PwC, 18th Annual Global CEO Survey, 2015 – www.pwc.com/gx/en/ceo-survey/2015/download.jhtml 14 Agile Defence, PwC, 2011 – www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/psrc/global/assets/pwc-agile-defense.pdf
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It is perhaps unsurprising that the public are more concerned about non-state and terrorist threats (54%) than the less visible effects of cyber-attacks (11%). However, recent work by PwC (see Box 2) is a reminder that the threat of cyber will only increase in the coming years. Those working in defence could do more to communicate these dangers to citizens – and understand their contribution to the UK’s cyber capability – not just in terms of cyber-attacks on the military directly, but also the wider defence sector – including the supply chain.
The public are only too well aware of the disruptive impact of cyber-attacks through well publicised events such as the recent attacks on Sony. Others are also aware in defence terms of the loss of F35 data.15
In light of these specific public concerns over modern threats, it is instructive to reflect on the themes of ‘underfunded’, ‘overstretched’, and ‘unequipped’ – which emerged when we asked the public for the three words that spring to mind when they thought of the Armed Forces – raising the question of what might be needed to boost military capability and capacity to meet the threats of the future (Figure 4).
Box 1: Agile Defence
‘Agile Defence’ builds on our existing knowledge of the government defence environment and draws on insights gathered through interviews of senior defence officials from nations, both large and small, around the world. It presents the overarching themes confronting government defence organisations and reveals how they are evolving to counter current and emerging threats.
These new challenges include:
• Increasing public and fiscal scrutiny
• A new range of adversaries – who constitutes ‘the enemy’?
• Rapid technological advances enhancing the lethality of potential adversaries
• Scarcity of natural resources makes conflict more likely
• Cyber-attacks and the ‘threat of the unknown’ – what will future warfare look like?
Our research suggests that defence organisations must become more agile to meet these challenges.
Agility involves: becoming more adaptable to changing mission requirements; increasing innovation and collaborating with partners to create new solutions to new problems; increasing visibility and transparency to enhance fact-based decision making; and displaying velocity in adapting to new circumstances and events.
We think that by adopting these approaches in a systemic manner across multiple areas, today’s defence organisations can be successfully transformed into agile enterprises – and it is agility that we believe will be the key to security in the long run.
The full report can be found here: www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/psrc/global/assets/pwc-agile-defense.pdf
15 ‘Theft of F35 design data is helping US adversaries – Pentagon’, Reuters, 19 June 2013
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Box 2: Cyber-attacks
Security breaches are on the rise. Survey respondents in PwC’s 2014 study of the ‘Global State of Information Security’ reported that the number of detected incidents soared to a total of 42.8 million, a 48% leap over 2013.
This increase comes at great cost: total financial losses attributed to security compromises increased 34% over 2013. Cyber risks will never be completely eliminated but organisations and governments must remain vigilant and agile in the face of a continually evolving threat.
As incidents proliferate, governments are becoming more proactive in helping organisations fight cybercrime. The US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), for example, notified 3,000 companies – including banks, retailers, and defence contractors – that they had been victims of cybersecurity breaches in 2013.
Sceptical about surveillance
The impact of cyber-attack on government is two-fold: as well as the clear danger of illicit hacking of government data and systems, public concerns about government intervention are also increasing: Globally about half (59%) of the respondents to our Global State of Information Security survey said that their organisations’ executives are worried about government surveillance, although these are markedly higher in China (93%), India (83%), and Brazil (77%).
Effective security, however, requires a certain amount of knowledge about existing and potential adversaries, which will not happen without a budget for threat analysis and monitoring, as well as a commitment of time and resources for collaboration between business, government agencies, peers, law enforcement, and other third parties to gain an understanding of leading cyber-security practices.
In order to both defend citizens and garner their support, governments and defence organisations should continue to develop their cyber-defence capabilities, while remaining transparent about their own role in surveillance.
Furthermore, as well its offensive use by external states or non-state groups, cyber is also an internal threat: defence organisations at all stages of the supply chain should expect stronger MoD oversight in the coming years to ensure their components are fully secure.
Our cyber-security updates provide the latest global news from this fast-moving field:
pwc.blogs.com/cyber_security_updates/
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Mission accomplished?
It is not clear from this survey whether these ‘new enemies’ are seen as more or less threatening than the more conventional enemies of days gone by. However, in order to find out how secure the public have felt over an era of evolving threats, we asked respondents to what extent they agreed or disagreed with this statement: “The British Armed Forces have made the UK a safer country, compared to 20 years ago?”
44% of respondents agreed that they had made the country safer while 17% disagreed (Figure 6). These scores were similar across age, gender and social group but interestingly, in Scotland, just 34% thought the Forces had made the country safer, with 19% disagreeing. The military was a prominent topic of debate in the recent independence referendum – with the presence of the Trident fleet a contentious issue.
Figure 6: “The British Armed Forces have made the UK a safer country, compared to 20 years ago?”
32%11% 28% 16%6%
Base: 2,007. Don’t know: 8%.
Strongly disagree Disagree Neither agree nor disagree Agree Strongly agree
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The purpose and value of the Armed Forces
The Forces’ primary purpose might seem clear, and as our survey shows, their approval ratings are very high among the public. At the same time, deficit reduction remains a political priority in this parliament and, with this in mind we turn to the purpose, and the social and economic value of the Forces.
Understanding the public’s view of these attributes can help those in the defence sector to consider where their resources might best be focused going forward
Not surprisingly, when we asked the public to sum up the purpose of the UK Armed Forces in their own words, the
vast majority (80%) of respondents pointed to the protection and defence of UK territory and citizens (Figure 7). Other responses included intervening abroad (10%), protecting British interests (8%) and humanitarian aid or disaster relief (5%). Less than 1% mentioned the economy or jobs.
Figure 7: Please tell us what you think is the purpose of the UK Armed Forces?
Protect / defend UK territory / citizens
Intervene abroad / peacekeeping
Protect British interests
Support / assist allies
Humanitarian / disaster relief
Other
Don’t know
No answer
Defend human rights / justice / values
None
NEGATIVE: exploit others / serve the rich / US
Employment / economy
Maintain UK’s global status
Fight / general conflict
80%
3%
2%
2%
2%
1%
1%
1%
3%
4%
5%
5%
8%
10%
Base: 2,007. Don’t know: 3%. Note that more than one purpose may have been suggested in each respondent’s answer so results do not sum to 100%
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The realm of defence
In order to examine these views further, respondents were given a list of specific functions and asked to rate them in terms of importance, as shown in Figure 8.
Overall, all of the functions listed were viewed as more important than not. Defending the UK from threats and attacks from the outside was deemed to be the most crucial by a large margin, with a net score of +88%, and fully 73% of
respondents viewing this function as very important – more than double that of the second-ranked response. Natural disaster management at home and abroad, and domestic security support were also viewed as necessary activities.
The top five functions included point to an overriding significance placed on defending the UK – with a clear difference appearing between intervening outside the UK to increase security at home vs increasing the security in other
countries through intervention. If these expectations are to be met, the Forces will need the capability and capacity to deliver. “Increasing security in other countries by intervening” was viewed as the least essential activity.
Reflecting upon this question, we are mindful that the public may lack a shared understanding of what security means – the term can be subjective. The defence sector needs to be able to articulate its meaning in clear, straightforward terms.
Figure 8: How important are these functions that the Armed Forces fulfil?
Base: 2,007. Don’t know: 4%
Defending the UK from threats and attack from outside
Natural disaster management at home – (e.g. flooding)
Domestic security support – (e.g. supporting police, deployment during Olympics)
Natural disaster management abroad – (e.g. Ebola crisis)
Increasing security at home by intervening in other countries
Creating jobs in the UK
Projecting British influence abroad
Increasing security in other countries by intervening
17% 73%1%
45% 34%1%
7% 42% 30%
9% 43% 22%5%
9% 38% 25%6%
8% 36% 25%6%
10% 39% 20%6%
15% 33% 14%9%
1%
4%
3%
Not important at all Not very important Important Very important
Net scores
88%
74%
62%
51%
48%
47%
43%
23%
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Gender gap
Female respondents were far more likely to stress the importance of all of the activities listed than males were. On average, they reported +12% higher net scores across all eight activities, in particular the Forces’ role in creating jobs in the UK (+22%) and managing natural disasters abroad (+19%). For the option deemed most important – defending the UK from threats and attack from outside – the gap was only 6%, suggesting that females are slightly more inclined to value the non-military roles of the Forces than males.
Geographically, the importance placed on the role of job creation in Northern Ireland was much larger than the national average; 71% of respondents in the region viewed this as important or very important, and just 9% as unimportant (net score +63%, compared with +48% nationally).
These results confirm that the public’s view of the Armed Forces is centred firmly around its primary purpose of defence of the realm, and much less around other roles – but that when pressed, the public views those other roles as important, or very important. This raises an interesting question – whether the public is highlighting what they perceive as the Force’s key priority in a spending climate when tough decisions are the order of the day.
Given the importance placed across these functions, the UK needs the appropriate balance of capability to deliver. In the current fiscal environment, this requires flexibility and agility across defence, with capability held at the necessary level of readiness to undertake these functions.
Defence and the economy
How much public awareness is there of the economic benefits generated by defence? Examples might include through MOD expenditure, wider domestic and employment impacts (including skills and training provision), defence exports and through policy decisions such as home-basing?
Recent evidence from King’s College London16 (see Box 3) suggests that there is a lack of official data collected by the Ministry of Defence (MOD) on the economic impact of the UK defence industry, and that this prevents rigorous analysis of the benefits of the domestic defence industry from being conducted.
16 “A benefit, not a burden: The security, economic and strategic value of Britain’s defence industry”, King’s College London, April 2015 – www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/policy-institute/publications/A-benefit-not-a-burden-v2.pdf
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Box 3: Data decommissioned?
A 2015 paper by King’s College London found that “there is an urgent need for detailed data on the impact of defence spending within the UK economy”, and that without this it is difficult for “government or independent analysts to conduct rigorous analysis on the implications of spending decisions on the UK economy and how best to use available resources to achieve the maximum benefit.”
This is particularly important as we approach the SDSR period as it raises the question of what data is available to support evidence-based decision making.
The authors report that in recent years, the MoD has significantly reduced the scope of statistics in three areas:
i. on MOD expenditure with the UK defence industry
ii. on the wider domestic economic and employment impact of that expenditure and
iii. on the security and economic benefits of defence exports.
They report that the wider employment, industrial or economic factors are not considered in departmental value-for-money assessments of procurement alternatives.
Measuring the value of buying British
In addition, in countries such as the United States and France, major projects entail a cross-departmental approach that focuses on cost and value to the nation as a whole and mechanisms are in place to measure the cross-governmental impact of defence contracts going overseas.
Without this data, they suggest, it is difficult to conduct rigorous analysis on how any economic benefits of a domestic defence industrial base can be fully identified.
Non-measurable values
The authors also report that there are significant security and political benefits to having a robust British defence industrial base. These include:
i. maintaining technological advantage over other states;
ii. enabling the UK to use its significant defence exports to gain leverage over other states, helping it to secure foreign policy and security goals; and
iii. allows the UK to signal its political approval of friendly nations and increase their levels of military capability and self-reliance – “exporting security relationships”.
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However, some aggregate data is available: a 2014 ADS Group economic impact analysis17 reported that the British Armed Forces create £22bn in revenues a year, and £10bn in exports, contributing to the employment of almost 300,000 people in the United Kingdom, many in high-tech industries.
Given the lack of official data, it is difficult to determine whether the complete picture is captured, raising the question of how you can measure the value of training provision or the local economic benefits of home-basing, for example.
To what extent is economic benefit visible, understood and appreciated by the public? In order to understand the public’s view on economic effects, participants were asked two questions– how much they thought the government spends on defence, and whether they thought defence spending was good or bad for the British economy.
In the first instance, respondents were given a list of government departments, ranked from highest to lowest spending, and asked to judge where defence falls on that list. The correct answer, based on 2014 spending figures was 6th place – more than policing or transport, but less than local government or education.
However, as Figure 9 shows, the results were spread evenly across all ten options: the same proportion of people (10%) thought that defence spending was the highest departmental budget – higher than health – as those who thought it was the lowest – lower than foreign aid – and 17% said they didn’t know. This suggests public understanding of
defence spending relative to other areas, is limited. This is reflected by a broader lack of understanding on how the public purse is spent: in 2010 we held two Citizens’ Juries as our contribution to the Spending Review consultation; the public were hungry for knowledge around deficit reduction but communications at that point were yet to hit the mark.18
17 ADS Defence Industry Outlook, 2014. 18 PwC Citizen’s Jury 2010 – www.pwc.co.uk/government-public-sector/issues/dealing-with-the-defict-full-report.jhtml
Figure 9: Where do you think defence spending falls in the following list of eight government spending areas? Proportion of people selecting each option
Highest spending area
2nd highest
3rd highest
4th highest
5th highest
6th highest
7th highest
8th highest
9th highest
Lowest spending area
10%
9%
4%
10%
8%
Correct placing 10%
11%
7%
7%
8%
Base: 2,007. Don’t know: 17%. The correct answer was 6th place, based on 2014 spending figures.
8 spending areas listed by actual size1. Health and Social Care2. Pensioner benefits3. Working age benefits4. Education5. Local government6. Transport7. Policing and borders8. Foreign aid
17
We were also interested to see if the public had any pre-determined opinions about whether maintaining the Armed Forces has a positive or negative impact on the UK economy.
Once again, 16% of respondents answered ‘don’t know’, while 29% thought the military had no net effect on the economy (Figure 10). Of those who did express an opinion one way or another, the results are broadly favourable for the Armed Forces: 37% think that they strengthen the UK economy, with less than half that number (17%) thinking they weaken it, giving a net positive score of +20%. However, this falls to just +7% among 18-34 year olds, and rises to +27% in those aged 55 and over.
These results reinforce the impression that young people either do not see the economic benefits of military spending themselves or are not aware of it more widely (see page 3).
Geographically, significantly stronger support for the economic benefits of the Forces was reported by the North East (+35%) and Northern Ireland (+38%) (+20% is the UK average). Until the early 2000s, Northern Ireland was home to more than double the amount of troops per head than the UK average, but is now below it,19 while the North East has the second lowest
number of troops per head in the country – so it is unlikely that perceived economic benefits are associated directly with active military personnel in the region.
Furthermore, neither region has a significant defence manufacturing base that would account for larger indirect employment. However, both Tyneside and Belfast were large centres for naval shipbuilding in the 60’s and 70’s. It is possible that this legacy is still remembered locally.
As previously discussed, there is a lack of official data on the economic impact of the UK defence industry, limiting the level of analysis conducted. The significant
economic benefits reported by ADS Group were not visible to the respondents of our survey.
While public support for the Forces remains very high overall, this does not appear to be driven by their perceived economic contribution. While more rigorous official data collection would help, more could be done across the defence sector to analyse and communicate the economic benefits of their activity. Each of the Armed Services is a multi-billion enterprise in their own right and need to make the case for the economic value they generate, particularly as this is likely to be net positive.
19 Location of all UK regular service and civilian personnel quarterly statistics, MoD 2015.
Figure 10: What do you think is the impact of maintaining the Armed Forces on the UK economy?
29%12% 24% 13%5%
Base: 2,007. Don’t know: 16%. Neither strengthens nor weakens the economy: 29%
Weakens the economy a lot
Slightly weakens it
Neither strengthens nor weakens it
Slightly strengthens it
Strengthens it a lot
18
20 Defence Matters, PwC, 2014 – www.pwc.co.uk/en_UK/uk/assets/pdf/defence-matters-spring-2014.pdf
Military capability
We also asked the public about the perceived capability or ‘strength’ of the military today, and preferences for tomorrow.
Respondents were asked whether they thought the British Armed Forces are stronger in 2015 than they were 20 years ago. More than half (53%) of all respondents thought they were either weaker or much weaker while 16% thought they were either stronger or
a lot stronger, and 19% thought they had stayed about the same (Figure 11).
Once again, there was disparity between the views of young and older people. Of those aged 55 or above, fully 72% thought the Forces had become weaker and just 9% stronger. Conversely, for those aged 18-34, more people thought they had become stronger overall (30%) than weaker (26%).
Given the lack of public consensus around defence spending reported (Figure 9), it is interesting to note how many people thought that spending has fallen since 1995. Recent years have seen stories involving the lack of equipment for soldiers in Afghanistan and government announcements around the need to cut defence spending. Could this have influenced the public’s view?
The results echo our earlier findings (Figure 4) where 14% of participants cited concerns about lack of equipment and underfunding.
Our Defence Matters publication20 discusses ways in which defence sector organisations can reorganise and reprioritise to make costs savings in this changing fiscal environment. These include:
• Upskilling core MOD teams;
• Co-sourcing with other departments;
• Adapting to new military operational structures; and
• Developing and monitoring robust baselines.
Figure 11: Would you say that the UK’s military in 2015 is stronger, weaker or at about the same level of strength as it was 20 years ago?
Stronger / a lot stronger
About the same
Weaker / a lot weaker
16%
9%30%
19%
14%24%
53%
72%26%
Base: 2,007. Don’t know (All): 11%
All 18-34 55+
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Future Forces
The public was asked whether they would like to see the UK’s military strength increase, decrease or stay the same over the next 20 years. 53% of respondents wanted to see the Forces’ strength increase slightly (33%) or a lot (20%), while just 16% said they would like it to decrease slightly or a lot and 21% would like it to stay the same (Figure 12).
Once again, responses varied by generation, though this was less marked: similar proportions of both groups wanted to see the military decrease in strength (18-34: 14%, 55+: 16%), but just 46% of young people wanted to see an increase, compared with 62% of plus 55s.
We asked the public to choose which of four scenarios, involving different sized militaries, they would most like the British Armed Forces to resemble (see Box 4).
Box 4:
Option Full wording asked to survey participants
Global Superpower Global military superpower, very large defence budget, large extensively trained conventional military with extensive naval fleet, air force and latest technology. Instant, large global deployment possible.
Large military force Large military budget, medium sized, well-trained military with naval and air capacity and modern technology. Global deployment possible with limited troop numbers.
Small to medium force Small to medium defence budget, small army with limited or no navy/air force. Ability to deploy abroad but not to contribute large numbers of troops or equipment.
No military force No military whatsoever
Figure 12: Would you like to see the UK’s military strength increase, decrease, or stay the same in the next 20 years?
Increase slightly / a lot
Neither decrease nor increase
Decrease slightly / a lot
53%
62%46%
21%
19%22%
16%
16%14%
Base: 2,007. Don’t know: 10%
All 18-34 55+
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The majority of respondents (58%) chose the ‘large military force’ option which best describes the UK’s current military capacity while 13% were attracted to a small to medium force and 15% chose global superpower status (Figure 13).
While these results show broad public support for current military capacity (i.e. globally deployable forces with the necessary balanced capability) it should be noted that other priorities are likely to feature much higher in the average voter’s mind. The British Social Attitudes Survey21 has asked people since 1983 to state their number one priority for government spending – those answering defence has averaged less than 5%; Health averaged 75%.
Taken together, the results in this section conclude that the British public sense military capacity has reduced over the past 20 years, which they would like to see reversed in order for the UK to maintain its current, extensive military capability. Defending the UK (including intervening overseas to increase UK security, managing natural disasters, at home and abroad and providing domestic security support) are seen as priority functions of the Armed Forces. The question is, will the future capability and capacity be there to deliver?
21 British Social Attitudes Survey, NatCen Social Research 2015.
Figure 13: Which of the following scenarios would you most like the British Armed Forces to resemble?
Global superpower
Large military force
Small to medium force
No military
15%
2%
13%
58%
Base: 2,007. Don’t know: 13%
21
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Conclusion
Our survey findings show that the Armed Forces top the list of the UK’s most trusted institutions and that the public wants to see an increase in their capabilities. While we know from previous work22 that the public value other areas of public spending above defence, over half of our respondents (53%) wanted to see the UK’s military strength and capability as globally deployable forces increase in the next 20 years.
Furthermore, this survey reveals that positive feelings towards the Forces may be driven by appreciation of the bravery of troops (see Figure 4) in keeping the country safe (Figure 6). When asked to articulate the purpose for the UK Armed Forces, the vast majority pointed to the protection and defence of UK territory and citizens (Figure 7). However, when provided with a list of broader functions and asked to rate them in order of importance, a wider remit was acknowledged as significant – particularly where a connection could be made to increasing security domestically as a result.
The survey findings suggests limited understanding of the actual roles the Armed Forces undertake – and their economic contribution. While the defence sector should be encouraged by these findings overall, there are also opportunities to grasp to engage the public in their modern role and purpose:
Modern threats
• The public is increasingly concerned by ‘modern threats’ – more than ten times as many people (65%) think non-state and terrorist threats and cyber-attacks are the largest threat to the UK as war with another country (6%).
• The respondents saw the case for intervention where UK security is threatened – both at home and abroad but they drew a clear distinction between intervening abroad where UK security is threatened, and intervening abroad for other reasons.
22 Living with Austerity, PwC, 2013 – www.pwc.co.uk/government-public-sector/spending-review/spending-review-2013.jhtml
• Those working in the military have to tread a fine line between observing state secrecy and maintaining the public’s confidence but the SDSR provides the opportunity to articulate to the public how the defence sector plans to mitigate these threats, deploying new technologies and becoming more ‘Agile’.
• In particular, evidence suggests that the impact of cyber-attacks will only grow in the coming years. As well its use by external states or non-state groups, cyber is a threat to defence organisations throughout the supply chain, which should expect stronger MOD oversight in the coming years to ensure they reduce their vulnerability to cyber-attacks.
23
23 “A benefit, not a burden: The security, economic and strategic value of Britain’s defence industry”, King’s College London, April 2015.
Non-military roles
• Today’s Armed Forces deploy considerable resource performing roles such as peacekeeping and natural disaster management both at home and abroad. The public perceives the Armed Forces’ broader functions, at home and abroad, as important, yet association with those roles is relatively weak in the public’s mind.
• Should the Forces continue to play this broader role in their mission to keep the UK safe and secure, their leadership should consider how best to communicate with and engage the public to improve understanding, explaining the value and benefits they bring, around these wider responsibilities.
• The SDSR is likely to focus primarily on the military role of the Forces; but our survey suggests that, based on public opinion, there is a case for incorporating a more detailed evaluation of their non-military roles.
Military capability and readiness
• The respondents perceived intervening abroad where UK security is threatened as very important. Yet we also found evidence that the public perceive the Forces to be underequipped, raising the issue of whether there will be the capability and capacity to deliver their broad range of roles given the stated significance placed on the various functions the Armed Forces provide.
• Taken together with their view that more should be spent on the military – and that their roles at home and abroad are important – this raises questions about how the actual readiness of the Forces squares with how ready the public wants them to be. Are the Forces ready for future military and non-military roles?
Economic disconnect
• Public awareness could be increased around the contribution defence plays in supporting the wider economy, training and skilling younger people and creating jobs directly and indirectly in the British defence supply chain and its large export base. While troop numbers are reducing, more are home based.
• Furthermore, there is evidence23 that the Ministry of Defence has cut back on the economic data it collects – reinstating this would help to substantiate the direct and wider benefits of the Forces to senior decision makers. The MOD, the individual Forces in particular and the broader defence sector all have a role to play to make and articulate the case for the costs and economic benefits of defence, particularly as these are likely to be net positive.
• We found that there is a disconnect in the public’s mind around how much is spent on defence and how much they feel should be spent – with no consensus on the former, and a majority favouring increased spending on the latter.
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Communications
We have observed a consistent difference in public opinion towards the Forces among different age groups – with approval ratings lower among young people in several areas.
• There are several reasons why this might be the case: the effect of a negative public view towards the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan; a natural scepticism towards traditional institutions amongst the ‘Net Generation’; and lower recruitment meaning fewer young people are in service than previously.
• Beyond recruitment, young people as a peer group should be a priority for the Forces – to explain their wider role, purpose and benefits, including economically – both nationally and locally. Social media and other digital channels are particularly recognised ways of reaching out broadly across society, particularly with this demographic.
• These findings have potentially interesting implications in terms of who the public will listen to in the debate around future defence needs.
Talent Management
• The generational differences in the responses we have identified in this survey may have implications for talent management. As previously mentioned, if 18-34 year olds do not value the Forces or understand their purpose to the same degree as older peers, this may impact on the ability of the defence sector to attract and retain top talent.
Those that leave the Forces – and leave valuing their service – have the potential to play a key role as ambassadors among their peer group, with opportunities to use digital and data analytics to explore and harness their perspectives.
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Methodology
In order to answer these questions, we designed this questionnaire in April 2015. Opinium Research carried out the online survey of 2,007 UK adults aged 18+ from 16-17 of April 2015. Results have been weighted to be nationally representative.
The purpose of the research was to better understand public views of the Armed Forces and some of the underlying reasons for those views – for example, do they feel more at threat than before? Do they think the military has increased or decreased in its size and scope? Do they trust the Armed Forces?
We also wanted to gain a better understanding of public perceptions of the purpose and value of the Forces, and specifically around their non-military role, including contribution to the economy.
Results were analysed by age, gender, region and socioeconomic group (see Box 5) to gain a deeper understanding of how views towards the Forces vary between different subsets of the population.
Box 5:
Socioeconomic group Gender Age groups
A C2 Male 18-34
B D Female 35-54
C1 E 55+
Regions
North East East Midlands London Wales
North West West Midlands South East Scotland
Yorks & Humber East of England South West Northern Ireland
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ContactsGovernment Defence
Roland Sonnenberg0207 804 5162 [email protected]
David Allen 07711 339 132 [email protected]
Tony Raper (Senior Defence Advisor) 07799 343 631 [email protected]
Strategy & Transformation
Steven Kershaw 07841 947 369 [email protected]
Diane Shaw 0207 393 6420 [email protected]
David Walters 0117 928 [email protected]
HR & People Change
Ian Tomlinson-Roe 0207 213 1644 [email protected]
Laura Manson-Smith0207 213 [email protected]
Technology
David Doyle 07738 845 [email protected]
Claire Reid07734 607 594 [email protected]
Finance & Commercial
Paul Brewer0131 260 [email protected]
Helen Milne 0117 928 [email protected]
Research
Dominic Boyle07813 903 620 [email protected]
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