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FMECA of PUMP pumping water from Coalescer to second stage recycler and degasser
Ref No
1 motor winding failure
2 bearing failure
3 seal leakage
4 unbalancing of rotors
5 structural failure
6 flow rate/ pressue loss
FMECA of BLOWOUT PREVENTER (BOP)
Ref No
1
Potential failure modes
Potential failure modes
Failure to close on drill pipe throughannular
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
FMECA of Crane
Ref No
1
2
Failure to close on drill pipe throughannular
Failure to close on drill pipe through pipe
rams
Failure to seal or partial seal on drill pipe
through annular
Unintentional closing / opening Annulars
Choke & Kill lines stack Mechanical failure
Tubing and piping Subsea Control Hydraulic external leak or
mechanical failure
SPM Valve Double acting Subsea Control Hydraulic External or Internal Leak or Mechanical
Failure
Potential failure modes
Insufficient strength toprovide structural
support for theforces inacurred
during craneoperation
Unable to carry andmanoeuvre the
fright in a risk free andeffective mannerusing the boom
hoist system.
2
3
4
5
6
7
Unable to carry andmanoeuvre the
fright in a risk free andeffective mannerusing the boom
hoist system.
Vibrations in the sling while hooking because of heave
Unintentional closing / opening Annulars
Choke & Kill lines stack Mechanical failure
Tubing and piping Subsea Control Hydraulic external leak or
mechanical failure
SPM Valve Double acting Subsea Control Hydraulic External or Internal Leak or Mechanical
Failure
FMECA of PUMP pumping water from Coalescer to second stage recycler and degasser
Potential causes Local effects of failure global effects of failure (P) Occurance
Over loading
2
Poor wire gradePower Supply Anomili
HumidityImproper Lubrication
Over heatingVibration
3
Improper LubricationCONTAMINATION
BrinellingMisalignment
CorrosionTight Fits
Accelerated seal face wear
4O-ring failure
Small leakageSeal embrittlement
pitting,3
cavitationdeposition
Impact loadingImmence leakage 1
Rustingimpeller degradation
Low Efficiency 3rotor missaligmentpoor lubrication
FMECA of BLOWOUT PREVENTER (BOP)
Potential causes Local effects of failure global effects of failure (P) Occurance
1
Instant stop of pumping
Water from the coalser will no more
be in closed loop rather it will be
flushed
Pressure/ Flowrate drop and can be
permanent shutdown
Before complete shutdown the
system would be very little effected
but on shutdown the recycling will
shutdown
Pressure/ Flowrate drop and process
area spillage
Process area can be dirty but negligible
effect on system cycle
Decrease in efficiency of pump, can result in overall
failure
Noise/vibration in process area
Complete stop plus spillage
Negligible effect on system/ access water
can be flushed
Failure of Control Signal to Annularor C&K Valves Oil Spillage,
Structure intergrity goes to plastic limit
state
Can result to messive oil spillage, field
shutdown for long time, platform fire
and sinking
1Inability to Operate C&K Valves
Failure to Close or open Annular
Failure to Close Pipe Ram
1
Failure to Open Pipe Ram on Demand
Failure of Annular to Seal on Demand1
Failure to Maintain Adequate Sealing
Unintentional Closing without control3
Impact loading1
RustingHydraulic sealing failure
3Diaphram leakageMechanical WearMechanical Wear
2Rusting
Seal Leakage
FMECA of Crane
Potential causes Local effects of failure global effects of failure (P) Occurance
1Weak anchoring
Loading above threshold
Hoist Winch brake failure
2Failure of locking mechanism
Failure of Control Signal to Annularor C&K Valves Oil Spillage,
Structure intergrity goes to plastic limit
state
Can result to messive oil spillage, field
shutdown for long time, platform fire
and sinking
Oil Spillage, Structure intergrity goes to plastic limit
state
Can result to messive oil spillage, field
shutdown for long time shutdown,
platform fire
Failure to Supply Hydraulic Fluid & Pressure to pipe ram
Messive Oil Spillage, Enviroment Pollution
Can result to messive oil spillage, field
shutdown for long time shutdown,
platform fire
OIl Spillage, Process hault
Production Stop, Hydrocarbons
spillage, EnvirnmentUnintentional Opening without any acquated signal from control system
Complete stop plus spillage
Huge maintenance involved, Production hault plus spillage
Relatively less oil spillage
Maintenance Involved and
production stop
Relatively less oil spillage
Maintenance Involved and
production stop
Framestructure fail because
of metal fatigue Frame, boom or anchor fracture and failure of load being
carried
Injury or fatality of the person on site,
platform facilities or equipment damage
multi-plate disc lock mechanism
that is used as locking brake
only, pawllock acctuated
mover is stopped
Platform deprived from rigging facility
2
Failure of Annular to Seal on Demand1
Failure to Maintain Adequate Sealing
Unintentional Closing without control3
Impact loading1
RustingHydraulic sealing failure
3Diaphram leakageMechanical WearMechanical Wear
2Rusting
Seal Leakage
multi-plate disc lock mechanism
that is used as locking brake
only, pawllock acctuated
mover is stopped
Platform deprived from rigging facility
Messive Oil Spillage, Enviroment Pollution
Can result to messive oil spillage, field
shutdown for long time shutdown,
platform fire
OIl Spillage, Process hault
Production Stop, Hydrocarbons
spillage, EnvirnmentUnintentional Opening without any acquated signal from control system
Complete stop plus spillage
Huge maintenance involved, Production hault plus spillage
Relatively less oil spillage
Maintenance Involved and
production stop
Relatively less oil spillage
Maintenance Involved and
production stop
FMECA of PUMP pumping water from Coalescer to second stage recycler and degasser
(S) Severity (D) Detectability Risk Level P*S*D
2 1 5
1 2 5
1 2 6
2 3 9
3 1 4 Scheduled Checks
1 3 6
FMECA of BLOWOUT PREVENTER (BOP)
(S) Severity (D) Detectability Risk Level P*S+D
6 6 36
Mitigation / Requirements
Circuit should be fused, Fully
insulated, Regulated Power Supply
Preventive Maintenance
Preventive Maintenance
Conndition Monitoring
Preventive Maintenance
Mitigation / Requirements
Designed with higher safety factors and
have redundency if possible
6 6 36
6 5 30
5 5 25
4 4 48
4 4 16 Scheduled checks
4 4 48 Scheduled checks
3 4 24
FMECA of Crane
(S) Severity (D) Detectability Risk Level P*S+D
6 5 30
4 4 32
Designed with higher safety factors and
have redundency if possible
Designed with higher safety factors and
have redundency if possible
Preventive Maintenance
Conndition Monitoring
Preventive Maintenance
Mitigation / Requirements
Fatigue life inspection of crane after two years and inspection of local
cracks
Scheduled inspection of internal parts, x-
ray immaging can be used for microscopic
crake detection
4 4 32
5 5 25
4 4 48
4 4 16 Scheduled checks
4 4 48 Scheduled checks
3 4 24
Scheduled inspection of internal parts, x-
ray immaging can be used for microscopic
crake detection
Preventive Maintenance
Conndition Monitoring
Preventive Maintenance