FMEA Workshop...Alignment of the Severity, Occurrence, and Detection tables between AIAG, VDA, and SAE J1739 One set of tables for DFMEA and PFMEA A second set for MSR - …

FMEA Workshop Update on the AIAG-VDA FMEA

Harmonization Project September 19, 2017

Format of Today’s Workshop

• Explanation of the AIAG-VDA FMEA Methodology – Project Overview – Scott Gray - AIAG – The Six Step Process – Jose Avalos – ZF/TRW – New Form Sheet – Rhonda Brender – Nexteer – The S, O, D Rating Tables – Mary Beth Soloy – Ford – Action Prioritization (AP) - Dave Dalby – Honda N.A.

• Question and Answers – Panel Format

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AIAG-VDA FMEA Project

Why - ● Experience with warranty results, field failures, recalls are indicative of

opportunities to improve product and process risk analysis methodologies ● From the AIAG Current State of Quality survey, the number two industry

concern is Customer Specific Requirements, specifically, the number of redundant CSR’s

• A common set of FMEA requirements will enable suppliers to have a single FMEA business process, and associated methods/tools to produce a robust, accurate, and complete FMEA that would meet the needs of all of their customers

What ● Develop a single co-copyrighted AIAG - VDA FMEA Manual, that clearly

defines an improved methodology, that is aligned with SAE J1739 ● Take the best from VDA and AIAG and combine the processes so that they

will meet requirements for both Industry groups

Project Team Objective

Provide consistent direction, guidance to all automotive suppliers

Update to include: - Best Practices - Improved Examples - Functional Safety

AIAG-VDA FMEA Project Team

AIAG Work Group VDA Work Group

OEMs FCA US LLC, Ford, GM, Honda N.A., Daimler Truck NA

Daimler AG, Ford Europe, Volkswagen AG, Adam Opel AG

Suppliers Nexteer, Bendix, ON Semiconductor, ZF/TRW

Robert Bosch GmbH, Continental, Schaeffler AG, Knorr-Bremse, ZF Friedrichshafen AG

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FMEA Methodology Changes

Project Objectives Current Status

Alignment of the Severity, Occurrence, and Detection tables between AIAG, VDA, and SAE J1739

One set of tables for DFMEA and PFMEA A second set for MSR -

Alignment of Process A six step process New form sheet

Alignment of key terms and definitions One set of terms and definitions

Improved approach for documenting and reducing risks

Function focus 4M AP instead of RPN

Alignment with ISO26262 Definition of “Supplemental FMEA for Monitoring and System Response (MSR)”

Ensure the methodology can be completed using Excel

Being confirmed through validation testing

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Development Status

• Project is currently in the “Build” phase – Although we have pulled some elements from the

“validation phase” forward • We expect to release a draft manual for AIAG

Stakeholder Review/VDA Yellowbook in November. – 90 Day commenting period

• Release of publication targeted for early Q2 2018 – Common training is being planned

• Effectivity will not occur until after the IATF 16949 transition deadline of Sept. 14, 2018

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Six Step Process

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New – Six steps, a systematic approach to perform the analysis Purpose: • It is recommended that the failure mode and effects analysis to

be carried out in six steps to achieve good quality, reliability, safety in our products and processes. This six steps are applicable to Design and Process FMEA’s.

Current Situation – • There are two manuals with similar approaches for FMEA realization, some

customers require suppliers to have either the AIAG or VDA FMEA method.

• The quality of the FMEA analysis is often reported as poor, due to many factors such as lack of understanding on the subject, key positions turnover and so on.

Six Step Process

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System Analysis Failure Analysis and Risk Mitigation1st Step

Scope Definition2nd Step

Structure Analysis3rd Step

Function Analysis4th Step

Failure Analysis5th Step

Risk Analysis6th Step

Optimization

Project identification System structure for a product or elements of a process

Overview of the functionality of the product or process

Establishment of the failure chain (potential Failure Effects, Failure Modes, Failure Causes) for each product or process function (step)

Assignment of Prevention Controls (existing and/or planned) to the Failure Causes and Failure Modes

Identification of the actions necessary to reduce risks

Overview

• Project plan • Analysis boundaries • Lessons learned • Basis for the Structure Analysis step

• Visualization of the analysis scope • Identification of

interfaces & interactions

• Basis for the Function Analysis step

• Visualization of the analysis scope • Identification of

interfaces & interactions

• Basis for the failure analysis step

• Visualization of the failure relationships • Creation of failure

structures • Identification of

sources of variations

• Basis for the record of failures on the FMEA form

• Assignment of prevention / detection controls

• Rating of severity, occurrence and detection

• Collaboration between customer and supplier (severity)

• Basis for the optimization step

• Assignment of responsibilities

• Documentation of actions

• Implementation of actions

• Confirmation of effectiveness of the actions

• Continuous improvement of the product and process

• Basis to the refinement of controls

Six Step Process

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1st Step: Scope Definition

• Current - Definition of Scope says to consider all the production processes and to select which process or processes to apply FMEA analysis.

• New - Consider all processes within the plant that can effect the quality of the shipped product and select which process or processes to apply PFMEA analysis.

• This opens the door to allow data to drive which process should be analyzed, i.e. if bad lab testing processes allowed defective product to be shipped, then those process can be analyzed. New Scope Definition Opens The Thought Process To Consider All Plant Processes For Analysis

Six Step Process

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Important points in the scope steps are: 1.- Define what to include and exclude from the FMEA. 2.- FMEA project plan, such as important dates, FMEA responsible persons, potential team members, project timelines, etc. 3.- Define the boundaries of the analysis.

This information gathered should be captured in the FMEA header as a minimum

Six Step Process

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Example of tools used in scoping

5T’s, Boundary block diagram, Process block diagram

5T’s FMEA Team – Who needs to be on the team? FMEA Timing – When is this due? FMEA InTent – Why are we here? FMEA Tool – How do we conduct the analysis? FMEA Task – What work needs to be done?


Six Step Process

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2nd Step: Structure Analysis

The Structure Analysis transfers the information gathered in the scoping step to visualize the relationships and interactions between the design or process elements. The structure analysis is the basis for the next step (function analysis)

System Subsystem Product Component

2nd Step: Structure Analysis

Visualization of the structure analysis

Boundary diagram, Structure trees – Design / Process

Six Step Process

3rd Step: Function Analysis

• In this step the functionality of the product or processes are ensured by allocating a description of the activities, purposes or tasks intended for the product performance.


Vehicle: Safe Stop passengers

Brake System: Provide Vehicle Deceleration

Caliper: Convert fluid pressure to clamp force

Brake pad: Transfer friction to the rotor

Six Step Process

3rd Step: Function Analysis

Visualization of the function analysis

P-diagram, Function tree, Function Matrix

Six Step Process

4th Step: Failure Analysis

• The failures of the functions are deducted from the functions already identified in step # 3.

• Step # 4 is to identify failure causes, modes, and effects, and show their relationships to enable risk assessment.


Vehicle function: Safe Stop passengers

Brake System function: Provide Vehicle Deceleration

Caliper: Convert fluid pressure To clamp force

Brake pad: Transfer friction to the rotor

Failure of the vehicle function: • Unable to safe stop

passengers

Failure of the brake system function: • Unable to decelerate

vehicle • Delayed deceleration • Rapid deceleration

Failure of the Caliper function: • Caliper failed to convert

fluid pressure to clamp force

• Reduced conversion of pressure to clamp force

Failure of the brake pad function: • Inner brake pad width

designed too thin • Excessive friction

transferred to the rotor

Six Step Process

Visualization of the failure analysis

FMEA form , Failure Net

4th Step: Failure Analysis

Six Step Process

5th Step: Risk Analysis

In this step prevention and detection controls are assigned, as well as the rankings for severity, occurrence and detection. A new approach for action prioritization will be introduced. Note: RPN will disappear

Six Step Process

6th Step: Optimization

The primary objective of optimization is to develop actions that reduce risk and increase customer satisfaction by improving the design or process. The FMEA can be used as the basis for continuous improvement for design or process.

Six Step Process



FMEA TOOL USAGE

Change Points From Current AIAG

2017 Sample of tools used for FMEA during a training class at AIAG.

Recognize, but not require any certain software solution

Microsoft Excel will work – Microsoft Excel will work – Microsoft Excel will work

THE FMEA REPORT VIEW


SAMPLE REPORT OF A REPORT GENERATED BY FMEA DATABASE SOFTWARE

THE FMEA SPREADSHEET


SAMPLE REPORT OF A SPREADSHEET FILLED IN

6-STEP PROCESS AND SPREADSHEET


Change Points From Current AIAG Fill-in-the-Blanks Method

27 New manual & form sheet add structure to help drive team to a more complete analysis

FORM F

Return

Return

Return

We often fill out the FMEA from left to right during creation and change of the analysis

Change Points From Current AIAG Step Analysis Method

28 New manual & form sheet add structure to help drive team to a more complete analysis

2. STRUCTURE 3. FUNCTIONS 4. FAILURES

• How To Complete a FMEA – Current – “Fill in the blanks method” The current manual

explains what each column is for, leaving the team to fill in the blank spreadsheet cells with information.

• Slower for cross-functional teams due to switching from left brain and right brain thinking

– New – “Step analysis method” The new manual explains what each step is for, allowing the team to take into consideration items that might not have been considered using the current form.

• Faster for cross-functional teams due to focused agenda on one task which may be a left brain (S,O,D) or right brain (Failure Analysis) task


New manual & form sheet add structure to help drive team to a more complete analysis

Current AIAG 4th Ed FMEA New AIAG-VDA FMEA


DFMEA



PFMEA

New!



DFMEA



PFMEA

Functions are Positive! 1 – 2 – 3



The Failure ChaiN

DFMEA and PFMEA

Failures are Negative! 1 – 2 – 3



DFMEA

New!



PFMEA

New!



DFMEA and PFMEA

New!

Section Summary

• Multiple software tools can be used including MS Excel • The handbook will include Report and Spreadsheet views • Step Analysis replaces the Fill-in-the-Blank method • Structure, Function, and Failure Analysis sections promote

knowledge within and between the sections • New! Failure Chain supports the cause and effect hierarchy • New! PFMEA 4M Labels • New! DFMEA & PFMEA Action Status • New! Action Priority (AP)

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Rating Tables

Project Objective: Alignment of the Severity, Occurrence, and Detection tables between AIAG, VDA, and SAEJ1739 Each failure mode, cause and effect relationship (failure chain or net) is assessed for its independent risk

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Rating Tables

• Evaluation numbers from 1 to 10 continue to be used for S, O, and D respectively

• 10 stands for the highest risk contribution • By examining these ratings individually and in

combinations of the three factors the need for risk-reducing actions may be prioritized as High, Medium or Low

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Rating Tables - Severity

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The Severity rating (S) is a measure associated with the most serious failure effect for a given failure mode of the function being evaluated. The rating shall be used to identify priorities relative to the scope of an individual FMEA and is determined without regard for occurrence or detection.

DFMEA Severity


Split Rating Of 10 And 9 Allowing For Alignment With Functional Safety Groups

SEV Severity criteria Corporate or Product Line Examples

10 Affects safe operation of the vehicle and/or other vehicles, the health of operator or passenger(s) or road users or pedestrians.

9 Noncompliance with regulations.

8 Loss of essential vehicle function necessary for normal driving during expected service life.

7 Degradation of essential vehicle function necessary for normal driving during expected service life.

6 Loss of convenience function.

5 Degradation of convenience function.

4 Perceived quality of appearance, sound or haptics unacceptable to most customers

3 Perceived quality of appearance, sound or haptics unacceptable to many customers

2 Perceived quality of appearance, sound or haptics unacceptable to some customers

1 No discernible effect.

The table may be augmented to include

product specific examples.

Safety is 10 regardless of warning

PFMEA Severity


Manufacturing Effect Divided Into Two Columns. Rank 10 – Safety Rank 9 - Regulations

Rating Tables - Occurrence

Occurrence Of Cause For DFMEA Based On Incidents Per Items/Vehicles

DFMEA Occurrence

The Occurrence rating (O) is a measure of the likelihood of occurrence of the cause, which results in the failure mode during the design life of the item, taking into account the associated prevention controls.


Added Emphasis On Prevention Controls As Input To The Occurrence Rating

DFMEA Occurrence Product Design Newness Prevention Controls - Procedural Prevention Controls - Analytical

Expected Failure Occurrence(Design Newness and Prevention

Controls Best Fit)

OCC Novelty of Design, Application or Use Case

Best Practices, Design rules, Company Standards, Lessons Learned, Industry

Standards, Material Specifications, Government Regulations

Effectiveness of Prevention oriented analytical tools including Computer Aided Engineering, Math Modelling, Simulation Studies, and Tolerance

Stacks

Occurrence criteria for potential Failure Causes resulting in the Failure

Mode, considering Prevention Controls, rated for the intended

service life of the item(Qualitative rating)

Corporate or Product Line

Examples

10 First application of new technology anywhere without operating experience and / or under uncontrolled operating conditions. Use Case or operating conditions vary widely and cannot be reliably predicted.

Standards do not exist and best practices have not yet been determined.

Not able to predict field performance. Occurrence during intended service life cannot be determined at this time, no

preventive controls, or occurrence during intended service life is extremely

high.9 First use of design with technical innovations or materials within

the company. New use case, or change in duty cycle / operating conditions. Not previously validated.

Newly developed for this design. First application of new standards with no experience.

Not targeted to identify performance to specific requirements.

Very high occurrence during intended service life.

8765432 Almost identical mature design with long term field exposure.

Same application, with comparable duty cycle and operating conditions. Testing or field experience under comparable operating conditions.

Design expected to conform to Standards and Best Practices, considering Lessons Learned from previous designs, with significant margin of confidence.

Capable of finding deficiencies in the system/ component related to the failure.

Indicates confidence in design conformance.

Very low occurrence during intended service life.

1 Known system/ component with identical mature design. Same application, duty cycle, and operating conditions. Testing or field experience under comparable operating conditions, orMature system/ components with long, failure-free series production experience under comparable operating conditions.

Design proven to conform to Standards and Best Practices, considering Lessons Learned, which effectively prevents the failure from occurring.

Capable of ensuring with high confidence, that the failure can not occur.

Possibility of failure is virtually eliminated through preventative control

and history of failure-free series production.

Note: A 10, 9, 8, 7 can drop to a 5 or 3 after testing.


Occurrence Based On Process Maturity, Controls With A Summary

PFMEA Occurrence

Likelihood Of Detection Descriptions May Lead To Mixed Interpretation


DFMEA Detection

The Detection rating (D) is a measure of the effectiveness of the detection control to reliably demonstrate the failure cause or failure mode before the item is released for production. The detection rating is the rating associated with the most effective detection control.

Considers Capability To Detect And Timing


DFMEA Detection Detection Controls rated according to the best fit for each detection activity performed prior to delivery of the design for production Blank until filled in by user

DET Detection Capability Corporate or Product Line Examples

10 DETECTION CAPABILITY: No test or test procedure not capable of detecting failure prior to delivery of design for production.

9 DETECTION CAPABILITY: General test procedure not designed to specifically detect the cause and/or failure mode.

8 DETECTION CAPABILITY: Procedure is uncertain and/or there is limited experience with the new procedure. TIMING: Post technical release and prior to production launch.

7 DETECTION CAPABILITY: Procedure is uncertain and/or there is limited experience with the modified procedure. TIMING: Post technical release and prior to production launch.

6 DETECTION CAPABILITY: Proven product design and development verification procedure with new usage profile. TIMING: Post technical release and prior to production launch.

5 DETECTION CAPABILITY: Proven product design and development verification procedure with same usage profile as previous product. TIMING: Post technical release and prior to production launch.

4 DETECTION CAPABILITY: Proven product design and development verification procedure with new usage profile. TIMING: Prior to technical release.

3 DETECTION CAPABILITY: Proven product design and development verification procedure with same usage profile as previous product. TIMING: Prior to technical release.

2 DETECTION CAPABILITY: Detection of Causes (including Noise Factors) with physical testing with high confidence. TIMING: Prior to technical release.

1 Design proven to conform to Standards and Best Practices, considering Lessons Learned, which effectively prevents the failure from occurring.

Detection By Type & Detection Capability


PFMEA Detection



AP Table - Determining Action Priorities


Current Situation – • The manual acknowledges that with limitations of resources, a

method to prioritize must be established. • The manual offers logic on how to prioritize actions: * Review high Severity Ranks items first. * Make use of RPN, without setting thresholds. * Recognize that a higher RPN number may not be point to the correct item for the team to work on next. * An example of logic showing how a RPN of 90 should be prioritized over a RPN of 112.

The actual logic to drive prioritization is left to each company and is not on the form.

Determining Action Priorities


Current Situation – • Upside – * Manual explains how logic should dictate prioritize of actions using a combination of Severity, Occurrence, Detection Ranks and RPN. • Downside – * When is use, the spreadsheet itself, only shows the Rank Numbers and the final RPN. The direction of logic, is back in the manual. * Unless a company establishes its own procedure to give the team a method of prioritization, the highest RPN can be the easiest method for the team to fall back on.

The actual logic to drive prioritization is left to each company and is not on the form.

Action Priority Table is logic based and the results can be seen on the form

New – Action Priority (AP)


Action Priority – • A table was built, that is logic based. • The logic takes into consideration the level of Severity, the amount of

Occurrence and the Detection Controls being used. • All of these items are what the current manual advises to be

considered when prioritizing actions. • To make the table manageable, the table groups together categories

of S, O, and D, such as, Severity 9 / 10, Detection 2 ~ 4, etc. • The combination of each group is assigned a High, Medium, and Low

prioritization. The table covers the 1000 possible combinations. • The logic or justification is listed on the table for each H, M & L.

Action Priority shows the breakdown of S, O & D, the results and explains the logic

New – Action Priority (AP)


10 (Sev) x 4 (Occ) x 2 (Det) = 80 RPN

3 (Sev) x 8 (Occ) x 5 (Det) = 120 RPN

Severity then Occurrence then Detection followed by AP

Manual logic applied to the Table and shows the results to the users.


Action Priority – • Upside to New AP Table * The logic that is recommended in the manual is built into the table. * As the users use the spreadsheet or software in front of them, logic based prioritization drives the High, Medium or Low.



Questions and Answers

• Explanation of the AIAG-VDA FMEA Methodology – Project Overview – Scott Gray – The Six Step Process – Jose Avalos – New Form Sheet – Rhonda Brender – The S, O, D Rating Tables – Mary Beth Soloy – Action Prioritization (AP) - Dave Dalby

• Question and Answers – Panel Format

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Documents

FMEA Workshop...Alignment of the Severity, Occurrence, and Detection tables between AIAG, VDA, and SAE J1739 One set of tables for DFMEA and PFMEA A second set for MSR - …