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Flotsam and Jetsam: Towards EndingSomali Piracy on ShoreFrank Charles van RooyenPublished online: 08 Feb 2011.

To cite this article: Frank Charles van Rooyen (2011) Flotsam and Jetsam: Towards Ending SomaliPiracy on Shore, Strategic Analysis, 35:2, 237-247, DOI: 10.1080/09700161.2011.542921

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Strategic AnalysisVol. 35, No. 2, March 2011, 237–247

Flotsam and Jetsam: Towards Ending Somali Piracy on Shore

Frank Charles van Rooyen

Abstract: Since the overthrow of its last ruler Siad Barre in 1990, Somalia’s condi-tions have worsened and, barring a few islands of peace, are degenerating rapidly; itswaves of insecurity surge beyond its shores. Piracy off Somalia is a consequence ofits present volatile insecurity on shore, and 20 years of conflict resolution efforts havecome to naught. As piracy increases and anti-piracy operations intensify, efforts at find-ing lasting peace on shore have run aground. Based upon the successful process of theUnited Nations Conference of the Law of the Sea, the time is now ripe to jettison mori-bund processes and pursue viable alternatives, which the combined efforts of the nationsof world, corporate institutions and civil society can effect through a world conferencedesigned to address the issue of all failed states.

Introduction

P iracy off the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Aden has become a matter of perma-nent concern for the international community. Although attempts are being made

to eradicate it, it appears to be escalating in both regions. The Somali pirates, wellaware of the combined efforts of many navies to curtail their activities, are adaptingtheir methods to ensure that a steady flow of captive ships, crews and resultant ransommonies continues to come their way. On the other hand, the naval forces that combatpiracy in this busy highway of the seas have increased their numbers and capabilities.At the same time, the merchant ships that are being targeted have also adopted a rangeof measures, both active and passive, to protect themselves. Even so, merchant shipscontinue to be captured, crews and cargo held to ransom, and significant numbers ofseafarers killed or wounded. Some shipping companies now avoid the Red Sea/Gulf ofAden/Horn of Africa route altogether by rounding the Cape of Good Hope. The lattercourse of action and insurance premium increases means that, ultimately, consumersbear the brunt of the added cost of piracy.

There is recognition and agreement that it is the lack of government in Somaliathat is the ultimate reason for piracy. Yet, even the fact that at least 14 attempts havebeen made to re-establish a central functional government in Somalia1 shows that verylittle if any progress has been or is being made to turn the situation in Somalia around,so that the country can revert to be being an accountable state, able to manage itsown affairs and be a responsible member of world society. It would appear that a stateof stagnation has been reached, and it seems as though the international communityis passively waiting for what conflict prevention and resolution specialists so aptlyterm the ‘ripe moment’. Some factors suggest that present conditions can be made

Frank Charles van Rooyen is working towards a PhD in Africa studies through the University of theFree State. This article was written in July 2010 while Frank was a Visiting Research Fellow at IDSA.The Institute’s goodwill and hospitality is gratefully acknowledged.

ISSN 0970-0161 print/ISSN 1754-0054 online© 2011 Institute for Defence Studies and AnalysesDOI: 10.1080/09700161.2011.542921http://www.informaworld.com

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to induce a ‘ripe moment’ by taking a more pro-active approach. Accordingly, thisarticle proposes a way for the world at large to deal with such cases and not only thespecific case of Somalia as a failed state. Based on the process and attendant successof international collaboration in the 1970s and early 1980s, a case study may serve asan example to emulate.

Therefore this article will commence with a brief analysis of the United NationsConference of the Law of the Sea, which led to the adoption of the United NationsConvention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982. Somalia, then a functionalstate, ratified the convention, but soon afterwards collapsed into a failed state. Theconcept of failed states and their security impact in regions beyond them will be con-sidered, including, as in the case of Somalia, a focus on piracy. The world’s reactionto this specific case of piracy will be reviewed politically from the perspective of theUnited Nations, continental Africa, Arabia and other parties that are involved in theprocess. The article suggests that contemporary peace processes are not yielding div-idends. Instead, a sustainable resolution for Somalia needs to be debated, negotiatedand adopted by a world forum, which may be on the lines of the successful UNCLOSprocess. Yet the cause requires a credible diplomatic structure to champion its case,and the imperatives of the global South’s agenda will lead to an interesting proposal inthis regard. The article will conclude by briefly analysing the strategic advantages ofadopting a pro-active approach to Somalia.

The words in the title, ‘flotsam and jetsam’, have their origins in 17th century sail-ing terminology. Flotsam literally meant ‘wreckage or cargo that remains afloat after aship has sunk’. Jetsam meant ‘goods thrown overboard from a ship in danger of sinkingin order to give it more buoyancy’.2 Both literal meanings remain current, although thedistinction between them is often forgotten. In ways that will become clear, the use ofthese two nautical terms in the title of this essay is appropriate.

Another nautical issue that has faded from institutional memory is the third UnitedNations Conference of the Law of the Sea, so some historical perspective would serveto refresh memories. The principle that the oceans were subject to the freedom-of-the-seas doctrine had prevailed from the time it was proposed in the 17th century to wellinto the mid-20th century. The scramble by coastal and island states to extend theirclaims over offshore resources, the over-exploitation of fish stocks by long haul for-eign fishing fleets that employed new and devastating technology, offshore oil, marinediamonds, marine pollution and toxic cargo and the rivalry (including nuclear) betweenmaritime nations across the globe and under the sea were some of the issues that gaverise to escalating claims, counter-claims and sovereignty disputes. This jostling formaritime stakes served to escalate international tensions and threatened ‘to transformthe oceans into another arena for conflict and instability’.3 The time was ripe for anintervention.

It really started on November 1, 1967 when Malta’s ambassador to the UnitedNations, Arvid Pardo, asked the nations of the world to pay attention to the loomingconflict that could wreck the oceans—the lifeblood of human survival. In his passion-ate address to the United Nations General Assembly, he spoke of the Cold War that wasspreading to the oceans, the disparate maritime legal claims being made by increasingnumbers of states, the implications for ocean management security, and also of the richpotential of marine resources, including the seabed. Pardo’s urgent message was deliv-ered at a time when many nations and individuals acknowledged the need to re-alignthe mare liberum or freedom-of-the-seas doctrine with the political and technologi-cal changes that had transformed humanity’s relations with the oceans. He said that

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the conference proposed by him was ‘the only alternative by which we can hope toavoid the escalating tension that will be inevitable if the present situation is allowed tocontinue’.4

According to records, this started a process that spanned 15 years, a period thatrequired great perseverance from participating nations. Accordingly, after six yearsof petition and negotiation, the conference was convened in New York in 1973.Participation levels by sovereign states were impressive—representatives of manystates shuttled between New York and Geneva, applied pressure, used influence, nego-tiated, bargained and traded national rights and obligations. The conference completedits work in 1982 with the adoption of the United Nations Convention of the Law of theSea. This effort was a milestone in the evolution of international collaboration. Whatis also interesting is that what started as an exercise to regulate the seabed turned intoa global diplomatic effort to regulate and write international rules for all ocean areasand their resources, and in turn led to a comprehensive treaty for the oceans.5

In a speech entitled ‘A Constitution for the Oceans’, Tommy T.B. Koh of Singapore,the president of the third United Nations Conference of the Law of the Sea, said atthe final session in Montego Bay that UNCLOS, as it had become known, was anall-inclusive deal:

Although the Convention consists of a series of compromises, they form an integral whole.This is why the Convention does not provide for reservations. It is therefore not possible forStates to pick what they like and disregard what they do not like. In international law, as indomestic law, rights and duties go hand in hand. It is therefore legally impermissible to claimrights under the Convention without being willing to assume the correlative duties.6

Allowing for the UNCLOS international law protocols, the convention properlycame into force on November 16, 1994, one year after Guyana became the 60thstate to sign the accession to the agreement. In this address, Koh points to anumber of critical success factors that contributed directly to the successful man-agement of the conference,7 which could serve as leading lights for further, similar,processes.

Somalia duly signed the convention on December 10, 1982, and the formal con-firmation, accession and ratification followed on July 24, 1989.8 Somalia, however,broke ranks with the conference, and registered its claim to a 200 nautical mile terri-torial sea.9 Soon afterwards in 1991, Somalia became a ‘failed state’ after MuhammadSiad Barre was overthrown. As a failed state it was unable to ‘assume the correlativeduties’ in respect of its maritime domain.

It is important to be aware of the concept of a failed state, or what the author prefersto call a ‘shattered state’. A failed or failing state has a number of features, of which aninability to exercise physical control over territory and not having a monopoly over theuse of force are critical indicators. Also, not having legitimate authority to take deci-sions regarding the fate or fortune of its population, the non-provision of reasonablepublic services, and the incapacity to conduct meaningful diplomatic relations withother states or extra-governmental institutions are further indicators of a failed state.The ‘Fund for Peace’ lists 12 indicators that cover the entire range of failure risk ele-ments. These include: extensive corruption and criminal behaviour; inability to collecttaxes or otherwise draw on citizen support; large-scale involuntary dislocation of thepopulation; sharp economic decline; group-based inequality; institutionalised persecu-tion or discrimination; severe demographic pressures; brain drain; and environmental

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decay. States can fail at varying rates through explosion, implosion, erosion, or invasionover different periods.10

Select figures in respect of Somalia confirm this dismal state of affairs. Its estimatedgross domestic product (GDP) of $600 per person makes it one of the world’s poorestcountries.11 The Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit reports that although betterthan average rainfall has alleviated the drought conditions in Somalia’s northern andcentral areas, the protracted conflict continues to cause severe displacement, lack ofaccess to humanitarian aid and high levels of acute malnutrition.12 Thus, Somalia inits dismal present state has become the flotsam of the world, the ‘wreckage or cargothat remains afloat after a ship has sunk’.

The ‘protracted conflict’ and associated loss of control over Somalia’s offshore mar-itime estate had at least three consequences. Firstly the collapse of the central statecreated instability and insecurity that eroded legitimate forms of production includingits fishing industry—exacerbating levels of malnutrition and increasing food insecurity.Further, Somalia’s unpatrolled waters became a low-risk dumping area for indus-trial toxic waste, discovered when the devastating tsunami of December 2004 literallyexposed the hazardous waste containers on its shoreline.13

Piracy was the third effect, and may have had its roots among factors that includestate regulatory failure, poor living conditions that necessitated the adoption of des-perate survivalist methods, and encroachment of Somalia’s rich fishing waters byEuropean and Asian fishing companies. Somali fishermen attempted to protect thecountry’s waters from fleets of foreign poachers, and extract a ‘tax’ from the invaders.This function was then given over to private maritime security (private enterprise coastguards) firms which, due to funding issues, became unworkable. These in turn werereplaced by armed gangs that resorted to hijacking foreign trawlers for ransom. Thisenterprise proved to be not only lucrative but also a low-risk endeavour. The pirates’arsenal has now become more sophisticated, and tactics have improved. Nowadaysthey often launch fake attacks to draw naval forces away from the real target, and alsoemploy ‘swarming’ techniques whereby escape by merchant ships becomes well nighimpossible.14 Having rapidly moved ‘full steam ahead’, piracy off the coast of Somaliacontinues to be a high-growth industry, spiralling from hundreds to millions of dollarsin ransom money. It is often the only way for young men to secure livelihoods andenhance their social status. But this newfound power is also a sure way to disrupt thefabric of Somalia’s tapestry of clan and tribe hierarchy, which in turn exacerbates analready tenuous state of security.15

An international fleet has been stationed in the Gulf of Aden, off the Horn of Africaand in the Red Sea to counter the pirates. Although the figures change continuously, atany one time there may be about 30 warships from at least four alliances—the NorthAtlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO),the Australia-New Zealand-United Security Treaty (ANZUS) and the European Union(EU)—in this area. During the first week of July 2010, it was reported that the navalforces’ capability will be tactically improved by the presence of a Royal Netherlandsnavy submarine in the area to carry out reconnaissance,16 thereby significantly raisingthe stakes. Most warships carry marine commandos and a few have elite special forceson board. It is interesting to note that although the piracy is off the African coast,no African navies are represented in this international fleet. South Africa has beenrequested, by both the World Food Programme and the EU, to provide a warship. Froma maritime military perspective it appears that its navy is able and willing, but to dateSouth African politicians are still pondering the issue.17

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For the navies of the world these anti-piracy operations in the area are clear navaltasks. These operations are relatively low risk as the navies have overwhelming fire-power and the frequency of armed action is low. The navies also have excellentsurveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. Through the Djibouti Code of Conductmechanism18 there are high quality exchanges of intelligence over secure links in orderto augment maritime domain awareness. That this is taking place between disparatemaritime forces, which may otherwise often be quite hostile to each other, has addeda new dimension to 21st century naval diplomacy. In addition, they get to engage inlive operations such as maritime hostage rescue, and this exposure is invaluable forthem. The only Achilles heel for naval forces is the vast ocean expanse that needs tobe covered by a relatively few warships, which in turn is the great advantage that thepirates have—they are stealthily elusive in the vast space.

There can be little doubt that maritime forces derive a sense of achievement infulfilling this peacetime constabulary role, and justifiably so. From a political pointof view, though, the most important element is that their respective governments andalliances can be said to be occupying the moral high waters, by contributing to worldpeace and stability. They can righteously declare that ‘at least we are doing somethingabout the wretched situation’. This is also an indication of the frustration inherent inthe anti-piracy effort in the Gulf of Aden. Hypothetically, even if piracy is totally erad-icated off Somalia (and this is not an inconceivable notion), the situation in Somaliais not likely to improve. Au contraire, it will merely displace the criminal action toSomalia itself and foster greater instability within its neighbouring states as piratesseek other unlawful livelihoods.

There has already been a time when piracy was halted in Somalia. During the six-month rule of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in 2006, top Islamic leaders urged thepirates to cease their criminal activities, which was heeded to the extent that piracyattacks fell dramatically. Only after Ethiopian forces, backed by the United States—which regarded the ICU as a terrorist organisation—ousted the ICU, did piracy re-commence; and with it went the semblance of order and governance that had prevailed.The ideal is that this state of affairs be sustained, but on the basis of what all the peopleof the country desire.

Rear Admiral Peter Hudson, a recent commander of the EU anti-piracy task groupin the Gulf of Aden, said in an informal briefing to the United Nations GeneralAssembly in May 2010 that:

Military action taken to date has had a very positive impact but what is clear is that OperationATALANTA and the wider international military counter piracy efforts will not eradicate theproblem. This is a land operation which happens to have a maritime flank—piracy is a symp-tom whose cause rests inside a fractured and broken country that at present offers few lifeopportunities to large sectors of its population.19

And this factual statement is supported by many: ‘. . . the root causes of piracy and thegrievances of the Somali people have to be addressed. In particular, there is a need torestore law and order in Somalia’.20 The UN secretary-general Ban Ki-Moon stressedthat Somalia’s piracy problem cannot be divorced from the need to forge a comprehen-sive peace within the country. As Dumisani Kumalo, South Africa’s UN representative,told an October 2009 Security Council meeting, piracy in Somalia is ‘part of the largerproblem of the lack of peace and stability’.21 This list can continue ad nauseum.

Worthy of note, too, are the many research articles and papers as well as symposiaand conferences held by academic and research institutes on piracy (another growth

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industry). The great majority give erudite reasons for piracy, its effects, and the politicaland associated military maritime responses. Significantly, most of these end with ashort paragraph to the effect that ‘there is a need to facilitate a political settlement torestore law and order in Somalia’.22

The question then is what actions are being taken by the international communityto address the ‘root causes’, the ‘need to forge a comprehensive peace agreement’,‘the larger problem of the lack of peace and stability’ and ‘returning law and order’?Research indicates that the key facilitator for the international community—at theofficial political level—is the International Contact Group (ICG) on Somalia whichincludes representatives of the United Nations itself, the African Union, the EuropeanCommission, the European Union Council Secretariat, the Presidency of the EuropeanUnion, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the League of ArabStates, the Organisation of Islamic Conference, the World Bank, Canada, Djibouti,Egypt, Ethiopia, Italy, Kenya, Norway, Sweden, the UK and the US. The ICG meetsregularly under the chairmanship of the UN Special Representative for Somalia at dif-ferent venues in order to discuss the situation in Somalia. A recent focus has beenon ways to help implement the Djibouti Agreement signed between the TransitionalFederal Government (TFG) and the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS)concluded on August 19, 2008.23

A reading of the proceedings of ICG meetings reveals clichéd phrases such as‘continued support for political co-operation’; ‘renewed its commitment to support therule of law and security as well as the institutions’; ‘calls for more resources from theinternational community’; ‘condemns the continuing violence in Somalia’; ‘urges theParties to work through the Committees’; ‘deeply concerned about the growing number

of incidents of piracy’; and especially ‘the next meeting will be held. . .’.24 The over-all theme is one of bureaucratic continuance, even institutional tedium. The issue hasbeen with the international community for almost 20 years, and it will not be resolvedany time soon . . . but in the meantime have another meeting, or chase pirates—just dosomething! This is, however, not to decry the altruism of the efforts.

It was noted at the beginning of this article that since 1991 at least 14 seriousattempts have been made to resolve the issue of Somalia and restore its status quoante. Judging from the ICG and other reports about the state of affairs in Somalia, itbecomes clear that this is merely turning out to be attempt number 15. The good shipICG is becalmed, it has run out of steam. The whale in the room is being ignored.

There are clearly high levels of frustration at the lack of progress in Somalia, andthe impression that the international community is malingering—waiting for the issueto resolve itself—is all-pervasive. This passive approach has, at the very least and overalmost 20 years, caused indescribable suffering to the people of Somalia, a large outfluxof its people, and criminal activities such as piracy conducted with impunity in spite ofdesperate attempts at self- and semi-autonomy by the Somaliland and Puntland regions,respectively. The security vacuum has allowed radical elements time to sow theirseeds.

So, instead of acting decisively, we muddle through, passing high-minded resolu-tions at the United Nations and occasionally sending a few troops. It is this half-heartedapproach that allowed the genocide in Rwanda and Bosnia and lesser horrors fromLiberia to Haiti.25

Somalia deserves better. The absent condition—‘the ripe moment’26—may havepassed or it may need to be induced, but at the very least it needs to be worked for. I.

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William Zartman, a leading proponent of the ripeness or window-of-opportunity-for-peace theory, says that other factors such as valid representatives, third-party supportand local involvement may be necessary, even critical, to take advantage of the oppor-tunity to negotiate. Although ripeness theory is not predictive in the sense that it cantell when a given situation will become ripe, it is predictive in the sense of identify-ing the elements necessary (even if not sufficient) for the productive inauguration ofnegotiations.27

What constitutes the jetsam in the case of failed states like Somalia? What factorsin the conflict resolution management process can be like ‘goods thrown overboardfrom a ship in danger of sinking in order to give it more buoyancy’, in order to focusand deal in a lasting and decisive manner with this neglected issue?

To this end, Somalia and other shattered states deserve to be thrown a lifelineof an opportunity, such as the one that delivered the United Nations Convention ofthe Law of the Sea in 1982. Somalia and the others in the same boat are worthy ofbeing rescued from the pirates of insecurity, through a ‘World Conference on Somalia:Lasting Solutions’. The aim of such a conference would be to permanently resolvethe issue of Somalia, by ensuring participation by parties from every end of the spec-trum. The byzantine nature of the issues at stake will dictate that it ranks as a standingconference—not a one-off talk shop—only dissolving once ‘lasting solutions’ havebeen sustainably implemented. Quite critically, ‘the secret is proper sequencing of mili-tary, diplomatic, and development initiatives’.28 The former especially may be requiredto overcome the intransigence of some parties in Somalia—those who have vestedinterests in ensuring that Somalia remains ungovernable.

Although the situation is dissimilar, the UNCLOS process has at least severalelements that can be emulated. These are as follows.

In the first instance, the world’s attention was effectively drawn to an impending dis-aster of the oceans by the United Nations representative for Malta in 1967. Ironically,the issue of piracy has ensured that the ‘Somalia issue’ has remained on the world’sradar.

Secondly, warning signs regarding the deteriorating oceans management had beenbuilding up since 1945, and eventually a ‘call to arms’ was issued in 1967, while theLaw of the Sea Conference started in 1973—a period of almost three decades. Therehave now been nearly two decades of non-government in Somalia—an anniversary thatcould be used for the start of a new solution to an apparently intractable issue.

Thirdly, the member states of the United Nations responded to the call to assemblein order to deal with oceans governance in a pro-active manner, largely because itwas in their—even landlocked states’—national interests to be an active party in theinternational oceans management. In the same way, there are very few if any regionsin the world where a shattered state is not imploding. Problems of shattered states likeSomalia spill over into the backyards of more viable states, with effects ranging fromillegal migration and refugees, health insecurity, to criminality and incursion of radicalelements. Apropos the ripple effect of insecurity, the African Union leader Jean Pingrecently stated that this is ‘a clear indication of the further deterioration of the situationwith far reaching consequences for this country, the region and the larger internationalcommunity’.29

Although the Conference on the Law of the Sea was long and arduous, memberstates persevered, in large part due to the fact that they were responsible for and activelyinvolved in a new and exciting process that could be seen as heading for success. Inmany ways, a World Conference on Somalia could represent a new yet long overdue

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process, offering powerful incentives to states for achieving the common goal of humandevelopment—which could and should act as positive reinforcement for (another) longand arduous process.

Lastly, the Conference on the Law of the Sea started off with the aim of resolvingone issue, but its final outcome incorporated the whole gamut of oceans governance,to the extent that a convention became a rapid reality. In the same manner, a WorldConference on Somalia, if successful, could and should be utilised to develop commondenominators for shattered states, while at the same time recognising the unique ele-ments of each nation. In such a way, the issues can be engaged with in a holistic way,so that enduring solutions are developed and implemented.

There are some critiques of this notion, a primary one being that such a WorldConference on Somalia and other shattered states would merely join the tail end ofa long and weary queue of global issues awaiting resolution. The issues that areinherently global differ in their intensity and scope. The number may vary from 20(World Bank studies) to 60 (United Nations and other agencies and institutions likethe Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), according to author and economistJean-François Rischard.30 He notes that broadly three categories31 are discernible.The first is issues of the ‘global commons’ (transnational effects and management ofhumanity’s living space). The second relates to matters that have a universal effect(‘whose solution requires the critical mass that only global coalitions can achieve’).32

The third is classified as global legal and regulatory issues (it is axiomatic that theUnited Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea finds its place in this category).

It is the second category that is relevant for Somalia, and the reason is that human-ity’s politico-security management requires a global commitment. This issue operatesin the grand-strategic realm of human politics, making it the cardinal challenge withthe highest priority. The challenge in turn links two governance gaps. The first occurswhen policy and decision makers simply find ‘themselves lacking the information,knowledge and tools that they need to respond to the daunting complexity of pol-icy issues’.33 Related to the first is the participatory gap, which ‘manifests itselfas this same increasing complexity thwarts common understanding of, and thereforeagreement on, critical policy issues’.34 Both these operational and participatory gapshave ‘Somalia and other shattered states’ written all over them. This writing on thewall should propel Somalia and the other shattered states right to the front of thequeue.

The bridging action to initiate such a proposed World Conference needs to bedone by a body or a contemporary politico-human security construct that possessesa distinguishing trait—that of credibility. Considering the fact that Somalia and theother shattered states are, as a general rule, countries of the underdeveloped South, itwould be apposite for the three IBSA countries—India, Brazil and South Africa—toput such a proposal collectively to the United Nations. The IBSA countries are defini-tive and integral leaders of the networked South, and valued models of vibrant andliberal democracies in the developing world. The Brasilia Declaration, issued after theinaugural IBSA meeting on 6 June 2003, stated inter alia:

The Foreign Ministers of Brazil, South Africa and India gave special consideration to theimportance of respecting the rule of international law, strengthening the United Nationsand the Security Council and prioritising the exercise of diplomacy as a means to maintaininternational peace and security. They reaffirmed the need to combat threats to international

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peace and security in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and with the legalinstruments to which Brazil, India and South Africa are parties.

They agreed on the need to reform the United Nations, in particular the Security Council. Inthis regard, they stressed the necessity of expanding the Security Council in both permanentand non-permanent member categories, with the participation of developing countries in bothcategories. They agreed to combine efforts in order to enhance the effectiveness of the GeneralAssembly and the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.35

In June 2010, during a visit by the South African president, Jacob Zuma, the primeminister of India, Manmohan Singh, also asserted that both India and South Africa‘support each other’s candidatures for the non-permanent seats for the 2011–2012term’ on the UN Security Council,36 which tenure would be an ideal opportunity toraise and pursue a World Conference for Somalia and other shattered states. Such ademarche would fall within their unofficial mandate of being the ‘voice of the South’,and could have powerful ramifications not only for the betterment of the underdevel-oped and the downtrodden of the world, but also for IBSA, and indeed for the UnitedNations.

In order for the United Nations to move towards the achievement of its guid-ing purposes and missions, the secretary-general’s Millennium Report—We thePeoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century37 proposed to mem-ber states an enhanced shared values role, which draws on an expanded range ofresources:

Formal institutional arrangements may often lack the scope, speed and informational capacityto keep up with the rapidly changing global agenda. Mobilizing the skills and other resourcesof diverse global actors, therefore, may increasingly involve forming loose and temporaryglobal policy networks that cut across national, institutional and disciplinary lines. The UnitedNations is well situated to nurture such informal ‘coalitions for change’ across our variousareas of responsibility.

The ‘benign neglect’ status quo with respect to Somalia and other shattered statesis indefensible and instead needs deontological energy. When states move beyondthe limited vision of ‘national interest’ and muster the political will from nations,civil society organisations and corporate institutions, the United Nations can be theagency for this desired change. The end result may be the same as that envisioned bythe African Union, but the suggested process is different, and based on a successfulmodel.

In the case of Somalia, 20 years of effort have come to naught. Somali conditions,both ashore and offshore–barring a few islands of peace—are degenerating rapidly,and the waves of its insecurity are surging beyond its shores. Somalia’s human devel-opment indicator figures chronicle the dismal facts. It is perhaps the ripe time to negatemoribund processes and pursue viable alternatives, which the combined efforts of thenations of world, corporate institutions and civil society can effect through a sustainedWorld Conference, under the pro-active leadership of the United Nations. After 50years of independence there is no cause for Somalis to celebrate, except to hope thatthe future will bring redemption. Piracy as a symptom will only be defeated when thecausal factors on shore are cancelled out.

Cynics may view this proposal as naively optimistic. Yet, as the scholar Panglossproclaimed in Voltaire’s Candide, this can indeed be the best of all possible worlds.38

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246 Frank Charles van Rooyen

Notes1. See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1072592.stm (page updated May 27,

2010) (accessed 13 July 2010).2. See http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/flotsam-and-jetsam.html (accessed 3 September

2010).3. See http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_historical_perspective.

htm#Historical% (accessed 14 July 2010).4. U.N. Gupta, ‘Introduction’, in UN Gupta (ed.), The Law of the Sea, Vol. 1, Atlantic, New Delhi,

2005, p. 42.5. See no. 3.6. See http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/koh_english.pdf (accessed

14 July 2010).7. Ibid.8. See http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?&src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI∼6&

chapter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en (accessed 8 July 2010).9. See https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html (accessed 8

July 2010).10. See http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=102

&Itemid=891 (accessed 9 July 2010).11. See http://www.cid.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html (accessed 13

January 2011).12. See http://www.fsnau.org/in-focus/food-security-and-nutrition-quarterly-brief-focus-gu-

season-early-warning (accessed 12 July 2010).13. See http://www.unep.org.bh/Publications/Somalia/TSUNAMI_SOMALIA_LAYOUT.pdf

(accessed 16 July 2010), p. 134.14. See http://www.lloydslist.com/ll/sector/ship-operations/article172205.ece (accessed 13 July

2010).15. J.H. Ho, ‘Piracy around the Horn of Africa’, The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 21(4),

2009, p. 502–518.16. See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/europe/10382470.stm (accessed 13 July 2010).17. Christopher Szabo, ‘South African Navy Ready to Take on Somali Pirates’, Digital Journal,

April 17, 2009, at http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/271110 (accessed 14 July 2010).18. See http://www.imo.org/newsroom/mainframe.asp?topic_id=1773&doc_id=10933

(accessed 3 September 2010).19. Statement by Rear Admiral Peter Hudson CBE, Operation Commander European Union Naval

Force ‘Operation ATALANTA’ to an informal meeting of the United Nations General Assembly,New York, May 14, 2010, at http://www.un.org/ga/president/64/thematic/piracy/Peter.pdf(accessed 14 July 2010) (author’s emphasis).

20. J.H. Ho, no. 15, p. 501.21. See http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol22no4/224-piracy.html (accessed 14 July

2010).22. J.H. Ho, no. 15, p. 513.23. See http://www.norway.org.et/News_and_events/igad/ICG/ (accessed 14 July 2010).24. Ibid., author’s emphasis.25. Max Boot, ‘Shouldering the Load for Peace’, The Washington Times, 29 February 2004, p. B01.26. I. William Zartman, Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars, Brookings Institution,

Washington, DC, 1995, p. 343.27. I. William Zartman, ‘The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments’,

The Global Review of Ethnopolitics, 1(1), September 2001, quoted in Mark Stover, ‘CultivatingRipeness through UN Peacekeeping Operations’, Journal of International Affairs, 55(2), 2002,p. 509.

28. F.N. Nesbitt, ‘Al-Shabaab’s Wakeup Call’, Foreign Policy in Focus, July 26, 2010, Washington,DC, at http://www.fpif.org/articles/al-shabaabs_wakeup_call (accessed 14 July 2010).

29. Africa News, African Union Chief: Political Instability Feeds Somali Piracy, November 8, 2008,in http://www.monstersandcritics.com/news/africa/news/article_1443980.php/African_Union_chief_Political_instability_feeds_Somali_piracy (accessed 3 September 2010).

30. J.F. Rischard, High Noon: 20 Global Issues, 20 Years to Solve Them, Basic Books, New York,2002, p. 65.

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Strategic Analysis 247

31. Ibid., pp. 65–66.32. Ibid., p. 66.33. Wolfgang H. Reinicke and Francis Deng (eds.), Critical Choices: The United Nations, Networks,

and the Future of Global Governance, International Development Research Centre, Ottawa,2000, p. xii.

34. Ibid.35. See http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/2005/ibsa_brasilia.htm (accessed 14 July 2010).36. ‘India, South Africa Sign 3 Pacts’, The Hindu News Agency, 4 June 2010, at

http://beta.thehindu.com (accessed 7 July 2010).37. Wolfgang H. Reinicke and Francis Deng, no. 33, p. xix.38. Candide, ou’l’Optimisme is a French satire written in 1759 by François-Marie Arouet Voltaire,

a philosopher of the Age of Enlightenment.

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