The Five Power Defence Arrangements and ASEAN Security Community:

Overlapping Interests or Stumbling Block?

Matthew Hanzel*)

ABSTRACT

Approaching a more comprehensive ASEAN Security Community, the member states are facing security options among themselves, which somehow show disbelieve to the ASEAN as an institution. One of such options taken is the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), which involves two ASEAN members and three other countries. Established during a very contentious time in the region in 1971, the threat seems to be altogether reduced, while the presence itself raises questions, whether it is at the best interests for the region, or that there is any concerns that the ASEAN will never be able to come in time if there is any security problem in the region. This paper will examine the presence of FPDA as a tool of interest for its members and how it stands today with the establishment of the ASEAN Security Community. Keywords: ASEAN, FPDA, Singapore, Malaysia, regional security

I. Introduction

Approaching the completion of ASEAN Political-Security Community, more

questions appear than answers on whether ASEAN can be a strong institution in

terms of maintaining security in the region. As the goal is closing by, it seems that

ASEAN is still far from such ideal. There are many reasons that can be attributed

to explain the problem, yet this paper will discuss one of the reasons, which is the

remaining distrust, through a security agreement known as the Five Power

Defence Arrangements (FPDA).

Even though ASEAN looks like a regional organization trying to maintain

stability in the region, the fact is far from perfect. There are in fact on-going

*) Matthew Hanzel is a fourth-year undergraduate student of Department of International

Relations, Universitas Pelita Harapan.

conflicts and disputes among ASEAN member states, to mention some, the armed

conflict between Thailand and Cambodia over the Preah Vihear Temple, and

border disputes between Indonesia and Malaysia. Thus, ASEAN’s security ideals

should be put under scrutiny. No wonder, with the on-going problems, there are

distrusts that lead sub-regional security arrangements to exist, such as the FPDA.

This paper therefore will use the FPDA as an example to discuss the distrust and

its impact to ASEAN’s ideals as a security community.

This paper will ultimately try to answer whether the existing presence of

FPDA will constitute an overlap of or a stumbling block to greater security

cooperation among ASEAN member states, which in turn may be problematic to

ASEAN’s dream of creating a Political-Security Community in the nearest future.

II. About the FPDA

The Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) was formed in 1971 to replace

the former Anglo-Malayan Defense Agreement (AMDA) formed in 1957. FPDA

consists of five countries: two of them are ASEAN member states Malaysia and

Singapore, two are neighboring regions Australia and New Zealand, and the last is

the United Kingdom.

The context of the establishment of AMDA is on the threat of

Confrontation between the Malaya Federation (who was planning an expansion)

and Indonesia (who was disagree with such expansion). Therefore, it was

considered a necessity for the young Federation to protect itself from possible

attacks, and the British troops were present in the territory at that period of time.1

FPDA was established to succeed AMDA due to the concern that the

withdrawal of British forces from the region will leave a gap to the Malaysian and

Singaporean defense, especially the air defense.2 When AMDA is succeeded by

1 How Son Khoo, "The Five Power Defence Arrangements: If It Ain't Broke...," Journal

of the Singapore Armed Forces, October 2000: 107-114. 2 Damon Bristow, "The Five Power Defence Arrangements: Southeast Asia's Unknown

Regional Security Organization," Contemporary Southeast Asia (Institute of Southease Asian Studies) 27, no. 1 (April 2005): 4.

FPDA, the arrangement changes from commitment to help the other parties

during times of attack to mere consultation. The consultation provided by the

three outer-regional partners was destined to provide psychological deterrence,

while also performing a confidence-building measure between Malaysia and the

newly independent Singapore.3 Meanwhile, the British power wanted to provide

both Singapore and Malaysia aid, “… for a few years as they developed their own

defence capabilities.”4

The existence of FPDA, while without potential existing military power

within the region, is not without rejection. Indonesia is one of the staunch

opponents of the presence of FPDA in the region, cited to be inappropriate and

demanded for its replacement with inter-regional partners in the 1990s, only to

soften the approach in the 1990s.5 Indonesia’s response to FPDA is described as

‘lukewarm’ following the repeated ‘behind-the-scenes objections.’6 FPDA also

faced skepticism, especially on the reason on why the British found it necessary to

form the FPDA, so much that FPDA was suggested to be a, “… temporary

arrangement to allow the British to get out of their commitments east of Suez.”7

In recent years, typically after the Cold War, FPDA is still considered as

relevant by the five members, in which member states regularly conduct high-

level meetings between the ministers of defense. One form of realization of the

cooperation within the arrangements is the joint military training known as the

Bersama Lima (five together) between the member states.8

The FPDA consists of three main pillars, which are the Integrated Air

Defence System (IADS), which remains the only standing component of the

3 Ralf Emmers, "The Role of the Five Power Defence Arrangements in the Southeast

Asian Security Architecture," RSIS Working Paper, April 2010: 7-9. 4 Allan Crowe, The Five Power Defence Arrangements (Canberra: Government of the

Commonwealth of Australia on behalf of the FPDA Consultative Council, 2001): 3. 5 Ibid.: 8-9. 6 Bristow, loc. cit.: 9. 7 Kin Wah Chin, "The Five Power Defence Arrangements: Twenty Years After,"

Pacific Review 4, no. 3 (1991): 193-203, as mentioned also by Bristow, loc. cit.: 5. 8 Olivia Siong, Five Power Defence Arrangement key to regional peace, security,

November 1, 2011, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporelocalnews/view/1162917/1/.html (accessed December 28, 2012).

arrangements; the military-political consultation, which becomes the main pillar

of the arrangements; and lastly the joint exercise between the member states.9

III. FPDA as a Tool of Interest

The role of FPDA can be seen through the perspective of realism in terms of

power and security. Being one of the great theories of International Relations,

realism focuses on national interest, power politics, military, and security.10

Realists believe that states will focus more on their national interests, and the

conduct of international relations is based for the benefit and fulfillment of their

national interests. Meanwhile, states’ behavior is determined by distribution of

power, and states must remain aware of the possible acquirement of additional

power by other states (especially the neighboring states) that may endanger their

own security.11

One of the evidences on how FPDA constitutes a realization of national

interest on the realists’ perspective is the way Singapore views the establishment,

role, and presence of FPDA in relations to the Singaporean defense. Through the

Singaporean perspective, FPDA is portrayed as a kind of ‘savior’ or ‘helper,’

especially during the establishment of Singapore Armed Forces after its

independence in 1965. The context is that during that period of time, Singapore

perceived numerous threats to its existence: Indonesia’s Confrontation through the

1960s, the fear of Malaysia’s political disagreement that may impact Singapore’s

existence, and the impending British withdrawal from the region by the 1970s.12

How can FPDA be helpful for Singapore in building the Singapore Armed

Forces (SAF) can be seen through the following statistics, regarding the number

of standing army. Bearing in mind that Singapore gains its independence in 1965

9 Bristow, loc. cit.: 1-20. 10 Marc A. Genest, "Realist Theory," in Conflict and Cooperation: Evolving Theories of

International Relations, 42-44 (Belmont, California: Thomson Wadsworth, 2004). 11 Richard W. Mansbach and Kirsten L. Rafferty, Introduction to Global Politics (New

York City, New York: Routledge, 2008): 19-20. 12 Lawrence Leong, "Rethinking the British Legacy – British Withdrawal and Origins of

the Singapore Armed Forces, 1966-1971," Pointer, Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces (Singapore Armed Forces) 37, no. 2 (2011): 22-31.

and that FPDA is formed in 1971, the following data, with careful observation of

the timeframe, may show that the SAF and the Singaporean national defense did

grow during the time of FPDA’s existence.

Year Active Duty Personnel13 Reserves

1967 50014

1970 14,000 6,000

1980 42,000 50,000

1989 Data not available 140,000 Table 1: Number of personnel on active duty and reserves from the decades of 1960s-1980s. Mind that FPDA is formed in 1971.

What is also interesting is how Singapore developed its arsenal with

amazing pace during its first decade of existence. In the 1970s alone Singapore

tripled its active duty personnel while multiplying its reserve eight times. At the

same time, Singapore started conscription (obligatory military service for

Singaporeans that are qualified), establishing flying school (for the Air Force)

with the help of the British military (!), establishing new maritime command,

renewing weaponry system, even producing own ammunition, small arms, and

purchasing tanks, armored vehicles, and aircraft.15 As a result, Singapore today

has greater ratio of active military personnel per total population compared to

Indonesia, once perceived as a threat to its existence.

13 Rodney P. Kats, Growth of the Armed Forces, Library of Congress Federal Research

Division, December 1989, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+sg0141) (accessed December 30, 2012).

14 An initial number of personnel first trained at Israel to form the Singapore Armed Forces. See ibid.

15 Ibid.

Singapore Indonesia

Number of active military personnel 72,000 (2011)16 438,410 (2011)17

Ratio of active military personnel per

total population 1.34%18 0.17%19

Ratio of active military personnel per

territory defended (in personnel per sq

km)

103.30 0.23

Table 2: A comparison between today's Singaporean and Indonesian military personnel

Aside from other variables that may contribute to Singapore’s military

growth, the great leap that happened after FPDA entered into force cannot be

easily dismissed. Singapore fulfills what matters most to its national interest,

which is to create a strong defense mechanism to ensure its national sovereignty

and existence.

In a theoretical, and interest-fulfillment perspective, how can Singapore

use FPDA as a tool of interest? The utilization of FPDA as a tool of interest to

provide a ‘psychological deterrence’ is true as an option of foreign policy making,

since a considerably weaker state (here, Singapore, newly independent, without a

developed military power) found it necessary to cooperate with stronger states

(such as the United Kingdom) to balance neighboring states that were stronger,

especially Indonesia.20

16 Global Fire Power, Singapore Military Strength, July 7, 2011,

http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=Singapore (accessed December 30, 2012).

17 Global Fire Power, Indonesia Military Strength, June 30, 2011, http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=Indonesia (accessed December 30, 2012).

18 Central Intelligence Agency, Singapore, December 5, 2012, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sn.html (accessed December 30, 2012).

19 Central Intelligence Agency, Indonesia, December 13, 2012, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/id.html (accessed December 30, 2012).

20 U.S. Army War College, Guide to National Security Issues, 3rd Edition, ed. J. Boone Bartholomees Jr., Vol. II (U.S. Army War College, 2008): 125-126.

Therefore, it is justified to think FPDA from a national interest

perspective, that FPDA is a useful instrument for member states (as shown by the

example of Singapore), that it is paramount for the Southeast Asian member states

to maintain their existence by cooperating with stronger states to deter other

(neighboring) states from overpowering.21 Thus, it limits the full purpose of

FPDA, in terms of interest, to the state-level perspective of fulfillment of national

interest of the member states.

IV. The Regional Situation Today: ASEAN

In a greater map, it is interesting to understand that both ASEAN and FPDA were

destined to create a regional balance of power – a tenet of realists that states

should prevent other states from being too powerful22 – especially considering

Indonesia as the de facto leader of the region.

The issues of sovereignty and national survival become the paramount

interests behind the establishment of ASEAN.23 During the same period of time,

the Cold War was around the height, Communism started to penetrate the

Indochina, typically Vietnam, while the United States and the British allies (such

as Singapore and Malaysia) tried to maintain security interests with the outer-

regional powers.24 Indonesia, on the same time, was one major problem, typically

during the Confrontation, and the close ties with Communist powers such as

China and North Vietnam. Only after President Sukarno was deposed, the

founding members can trust that Indonesia could be a peaceful regional leader that

would not be as threatening for the neighboring countries.25

21 States may cooperate as such to balance other states that are considerably stronger,

while there is a belief that usage (or development) of military power will be counterproductive. See U.S. Army War College, ibid.: 126.

22 Mansbach and Rafferty, op. cit.: 20. 23 Sheldon W. Simon, "ASEAN and the New Regional Multilateralism," in

International Relations of Asia, 195-214 (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2008):198.

24 Ibid. 25 Ibid.

FPDA has a similar origin: maintaining sovereignty. Indonesia’s

significant military power in the 1960s (significant due to the formation of

Malaysia and Singapore) could eliminate the two newly independent states. It was

really close: Indonesia did commit attacks (or, as one observer says, ‘terrorist

attacks’) to Malaysian soil.26 The establishment of FPDA was also signified by

the existing distrust, typically from the Singaporean government, to Indonesia,

inasmuch that Singapore was afraid that Indonesia would potentially become a

regional hegemon.27

ASEAN, as the larger regional framework where FPDA is located, is well

known for the distrust between the member states. The following statement may

summarize the above point:

The founding members of ASEAN were suspicious of models based on supranational institutions, such as those established in Europe, and instead favoured principles of informality (as distinct from formal institution-building), flexibility and consensus decision-making. These attributes have been described by both ASEAN leaders and commentators alike as the ‘ASEAN Way’.28

This ‘principle,’ embraced by the ASEAN members, should be put under

scrutiny when the organization puts the gear into a closer regional integration

through the ASEAN Charter, signed and entered into force in 2007. The goal of

creating three distinct communities that will involve ASEAN’s civil societies,

namely: the Political-Security Community, the Economic Community, and the

Socio-Cultural Community; is destined to somehow mimic the success of the

European Union (EU),29 typically as they successfully evolve from an economic

cooperation into a greater political cooperation.

26 Khoo, loc. cit.: 107-114. 27 Emmers, loc. cit.: 9. 28 Alison Duxbury, The Participation of States in International Organisations: The Role

of Human Rights and Democracy (New York City, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011): 192.

29 John McLean, Will ASEAN’s New Charter Bring Greater Cooperation?, April 2009, http://development.asia/issue03/cover-03.asp (accessed December 28, 2012).

Nonetheless, the problem of ASEAN favoring ‘informality’ compared to a

EU-style formality can be seen apparent in the ASEAN Charter. The informality

is evident through a number of issues, including the lack of governing

organization (with the ASEAN Summit taking deliberative role),30 relying on

consultation and consensus instead of institutional decision-making process,31 the

principle of non-interference, and especially no sanctions on violations of the

charter.

Further questions must be asked while observing the formation of ASEAN

Political-Security Community. A careful observation on the formation of the

Community will point out that the Community focuses more on finding ‘shared

values and norms’ instead of creating an institution with legal power to unite

ASEAN in a common goal.32 The shared values and norms, as ASEAN believes,

will deter conflict, instead of using an institution with proper power to do so (by

granting regional security).33 Even with such most non-obstructive, basic

requirement, member states still question the move with notable suspicion,

especially when the organization is seeking for a new or greater relevance (such

may be seen through the development of the three ASEAN Communities).34

In an even bigger picture, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is often

cited also to be a potentially ‘cooperative security arrangements’ to fulfill the

common interests of the region, especially for ASEAN member states.35 The

caveat is, however, as explained above, is that national interest takes precedent

over regional cooperation, as evident in ASEAN, that national security,

sovereignty, and existence, are more paramount compared to a multilateral

cooperation, which renders regional security system incapacitated.36 ASEAN, in

most cases, still considering balance of power (especially for Indonesia) to be the

30 ASEAN Charter, Article 7 (2). 31 ASEAN Charter, Article 20. 32 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Political-Security Community

Blueprint (Jakarta: Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 2009): 2-3. 33 Simon, op. cit.: 210. 34 Bristow, loc. cit.: 2. 35 Ibid. 36 Wibawanto Nugroho, "Pertahanan Negara Dikaitkan dengan Kemampuan Negara,"

Verity (Jurusan Hubungan Internasional, Fakultas Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik, Universitas Pelita Harapan) I, no. 1 (Januari 2009): 75.

main issue,37 instead of achieving mutual understanding between the member

states, which justifies also the worries, dissent, or even pessimism, that ASEAN is

not working for the good of the region.

Nevertheless, it will be a mistake also to forget ASEAN member states’

efforts in ASEAN level (regardless of its (in)significance) to protect the regional

peace and security. Three months after FPDA entered into force, the five founding

members of ASEAN signed the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality

(ZOFPAN), which promotes peace, neutrality, freedom from outside influence,

and to cooperate in the field of security. ASEAN then followed the ZOFPAN with

the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (1976), the Treaty on the

Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ, 1995), along with the

ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism (2001). Yet, real

measures are still difficult to be seen, which often stop at treaty signings, another

signal on ASEAN’s frequent failure to take real action to protect the interest of

the region.

V. Analysis: Overlapping Interest, Stumbling Block, or Both?

Many contemporary observers command FPDA as being helpful to support

ASEAN’s regional security interests. For instance, Emmers believes that FPDA

complements the regional security stability, and is able to follow the development

of contemporary security of Southeast Asia.38 Such relevance is even shared by

the Parliament of the United Kingdom, citing the importance of FPDA as, “…

basis for defence co-operation between the UK and Malaysia and for further wider

security interests in the region.”39 Bristow even went as far as claiming that FPDA

will counter the concern of Indonesia’s revival, and therefore FPDA is considered

to be possessing its ‘deterrent value.’40

37 Simon, op. cit.: 210. 38 Emmers, loc. cit.: 2-3. 39 Tom Rutherford, "Military Balance in Southeast Asia (Research Paper 11/79)," Social

and General Statistics Section, House of Commons-Library (2011): 19. 40 Bristow, loc. cit.: 11.

In this perspective, the Author cannot completely deny the role of FPDA

in maintaining peace and security, at least at the ‘mini-lateral’ level.41 In fact,

FPDA develops to tackle larger issues outside the traditional security problems,

especially on counter-terrorism. While this fact is undeniable, the Author prefers

to emphasize another side of the coin, which is on how FPDA proves that there is

a stumbling block for ASEAN to develop a more comprehensive ASEAN

Political-Security Community in the nearest future. The Author argues, therefore,

that a greater belief that FPDA works for the better for ASEAN should be taken

with a grain of salt.

When discussing the impact of FPDA, there seems to be two differing

sides, depending on the perspective, on how observers judge the success of FPDA

and its place within the ASEAN framework. On one side, FPDA is seen as

profitable to the member states, namely Malaysia and Singapore, as commonly

seen from the perspective of the member states themselves. On the other side,

FPDA is considered as complementary, if not overlapping, to ASEAN’s security

interests, only to follow and develop with the necessity and development of recent

times. A stronger case is more apparent to observe for the former, while further

scrutiny is necessary for the later.

Side One: FPDA for Malaysia and Singapore

For the former, a strong case can be seen from the example of Singapore, as can

be found at section (III) of this paper. The way Singapore accelerates itself on

building its military might – especially to balance its neighboring states during its

first decade of existence – will not be achievable without any support, in this case

from FPDA, which enters into force at the same period of time. The ‘consultative’

nature does not alleviate British influence in Singapore’s military development,

for instance in building Singapore’s armed forces.42

As shown also from statements shown previously, the member states of

FPDA does not seem to deny that fact. Observers and parties alike cite how FPDA

41 A term used by Emmers to describe FPDA, e.g. loc. cit.: 2-3. 42 Kats, op. cit.

helps the new born states to develop their military power in order to guarantee

their national defense.43 This, again, emphasizes the Author’s believe that FPDA

largely serves best the member states’ interests instead of projecting the influence

to the region.

Side Two: FPDA in ASEAN Context

For the later side, there should be questions when FPDA is being related to

ASEAN’s security interests. Just as what has been shown previously, apparently

FPDA’s impacts can be explicitly seen through the national interest of the

member states, while there is no definite argument on how FPDA can help

ASEAN maintaining its security and stability. This fact can be seen while

comparing the two ASEAN member states that are members of FPDA to ASEAN

in general.

The State of the World Atlas shows that Southeast Asia is volatile, with

level of peace ranging from high to very low, with some countries still brimming

with conflicts.44 While the same reference does depict Malaysia and Singapore to

be peaceful (which may due to the presence of FPDA for both countries), the

same is not shared by the entire region. Another observation can be done to the

issue of terrorism and counterterrorism. The FPDA is often cited to be ‘growing

in relevance’ due to more attention to terrorism (including conducting more

training to tackle terrorism),45 which may clear Malaysia and Singapore from

significant terrorist activities, yet does not give the same impact to the region (in

which Indonesia is among the center of the problem in the region).46

In that respect, ASEAN’s failure to internalize and consolidate is well-

known, which can be seen for example at the 2012 ASEAN Summit, where

ASEAN cannot even reach one consolidated voice regarding admission of Timor

43 For instance, see Leong, loc. cit.: 27-28. 44 Dan Smith, The Penguin State of the World Atlas, 8th Edition (London: Penguin

Books, 2008): 75. 45 Rutherford, op. cit.: 21. 46 For instance, as depicted by Smith, op. cit.: 63.

Leste and the South China Sea dispute.47 Of course, FPDA, to that extent, may

also be translated as a part of that division between the 10 member states. Bear in

mind also that ASEAN member states, more often than not, pursue a ‘mini-

lateral’ or self-fulfillment, aside from FPDA being one of the paramount

examples. Other instances, such as the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth

Triangle (otherwise known as ‘SIJORI’) highlights the fact that it is ‘my country

first’ or ‘our group first’ instead of ASEAN.

FPDA’s Presence Today

Then why FPDA still exists today? The answer lies again on the national

interests of both Singapore and Malaysia, and to a certain extent of the outer-

regional partners of United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. Regardless of

the growing attention of FPDA towards non-traditional security issues that plague

ASEAN member states today, the effort has not been serious enough to merit

command as being ‘for ASEAN.’ The FPDA, therefore, may still exist due to

distrust from the ASEAN member states (in this case Malaysia and Singapore),

that ASEAN will do good to fulfill their interests. As a matter of fact, until today

ASEAN seems to be too transcendent, way above the member states when dealing

with problem. ASEAN’s failure to decisively act in problems such as the

Indonesia-Malaysia dispute, southern Thailand conflict, the long dispute and

armed conflict between Thailand and Cambodia, the Rohingya and

democratization of Myanmar, and many others, give member states justification

to act on their own behalf.

The way FPDA still exist today may prove to be a stumbling block for

ASEAN’s idea of creating a consolidated Political-Security Community. While

ASEAN’s goal is to create a proper and strong regional integration, the region

itself is relatively divided by the sometimes-overlapping ‘mini-lateral’ sub-

regional cooperation, which purposes are to be served by ASEAN in a regional

framework. Logically, a strong regional institution will find sub-regional

47 Rizal Sukma, Insight : Good and bad news from the 20th ASEAN Summit, April 7, 2012, http://www2.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/04/07/insight-good-and-bad-news-20th-asean-summit.html (accessed December 30, 2012).

cooperation in a similar field redundant, otherwise the presence of such sub-

regional cooperation may suggest that the regional organization is actually weaker

or comparatively insignificant to the member states (especially of those who

participate in the sub-regional cooperation). Clearly, as mentioned previously,

FPDA is not the only sub-regional cooperation that exists with ASEAN, so the

emergence of such sub-regional cooperation can mean one thing: a question to the

strength of ASEAN as a regional institution.

The Author can then argue that no compelling case are built by many

observers to justify that FPDA is in fact influential to ASEAN. In fact, Bristow’s

observation on FPDA’s ‘strengths’ and ‘credits’ provide no direct, significant, or

strong impacts to ASEAN as a regional institution. Bristow observes such

strengths are considerably in favor to Malaysia and Singapore’s interests. Besides

the suspicion of Indonesia’s recent growth, FPDA is believed to be an

“unobstrusive” and non-threatening alliance, deterring “both practically and

psychologically an unidentified enemy” (which is Indonesia), becoming a

confidence building measure between Malaysia and Singapore, even helping

British defense companies to promote the military wares to potential buyers in the

region.48 Such benefits from the FPDA, can be logically and explicitly seen as

non-beneficial to ASEAN’s regional security in general, and in fact matters most

only to Malaysia and Singapore’s national interests.

Indeed, the presence of FPDA is faced also with suspicion, even when it

has developed itself to adapt with the current security necessities of Southeast

Asian region, from neighboring states, especially Indonesia. While the present-

day FPDA is without the principle of “collective security,”49 nonetheless FPDA is

perceived as threat by many members of Indonesia’s civil society, so much that

there is a belief that FPDA may push the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO) to act on behalf of the United Kingdom.50 Even though ASEAN has

48 Bristow, loc. cit.: 9-13. 49 Collective security, defined simply by Bristow as, “… an attack on one member as an

attack on all…” See Bristow, loc. cit., 16. 50 “If Indonesia enters into war with Malaysia, then Malaysia, a member of the Five

Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) will be aided by the other member states, which are Singapore, New Zealand, Australia, and the United Kingdom. Formed in 1971, member states of

pressed for stronger peace and security cooperation in the region, there are

distrusts even from member states of ASEAN outside of FPDA.

What Should ASEAN Do?

What can ASEAN do, them, to eliminate the distrust to ASEAN as a

regional institution? ASEAN needs to gain trust from the member states that it can

decisively guarantee the regional security, so as to push member states to pave

way for bigger portion of multilateral interests to be prioritized than solely the

national interests. As previously mentioned, as long as ASEAN member states

still consider their national interests to be significantly more important from the

multilateral interests, then ASEAN will go nowhere, let alone creating a strong

ASEAN Political-Security Community.

A complete trust from all member states may not be the easiest task to

accomplish with respect to ASEAN’s regional integration, however the necessity

cannot be more emphasized. As FPDA was born, in part, due to distrust against

the neighboring states in the region, even if FPDA’s relevance has developed,

shifted, or even altered, FPDA’s continuous existence from ASEAN’s tumultuous

past can only mean the same suspicion may still exist, and that its member states’

national interest still take paramount precedence.

VI. Conclusion

Judging from a larger perspective, it is easy to assume that FPDA is nothing but a

‘relic from the past.’ For certain, it is formed when countries in the region were in

conflict, when there were urgency to protect the states’ own existence, meanwhile

FPDA will cooperate if there is any aggression or threats to Malaysia and Singapore. Besides that, speculation appears that if the United Kingdom, a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) joins the war, then other member states of NATO will follow suit, thus attacking Indonesia en masse.” Quoted and translated from Renne R. A., Armandhanu, Denny Kawilarang, Inggris Dukung Diplomasi Damai RI-Malaysia, September 3, 2010, http://dunia.news.viva.co.id/news/read/175759-inggris-dukung-diplomasi-damai-ri-malaysia (accessed December 30, 2012). See also Elin Yunita Kristanti, Serang Malaysia, RI Bisa Dikeroyok 4 Negara, September 1, 2010, http://nasional.news.viva.co.id/news/read/174792-serang-malaysia--ri-bisa-dikeroyok-4-negara (accessed December 31, 2012).

ASEAN was established around the similar time frame, and while it has bigger

goals, its aim were shallower. When ASEAN enters the 21st century, with member

states are walking into a new level of relationship with the ASEAN Charter – with

all the setbacks – FPDA seems to lose its relevance. ASEAN member states

clearly no longer need to fear about their existence.

As stated previously, this paper does not completely dismiss the idea that

FPDA has created some constructive results that especially limited mainly to its

member states. Both Malaysia and Singapore, two founding members of ASEAN,

are significantly benefited from the presence of FPDA and their participation

within. Nevertheless, this paper also shows some evidences that it is a tall order to

deny that FPDA serves most – if not all – to the national interests of its member

states, and contributes very little – if any – to the development of regional security

in Southeast Asia. Readers will have already seen how Singapore, one of the

member states, benefited so much that it shadows its once potential threat (and,

evidently, an existing threat) in terms of active military personnel per population

ratio. It is just one of the evidences on how FPDA serves national interests best

and more than the regional security interests.

It can be concluded also that FPDA create more problems (even if it is

considerably behind-the-scenes rather than explicit) than solution for the creation

of ASEAN Political-Security Community in the nearest future. Not only the fact

that it creates a ‘soft’ fragmentation within ASEAN member states by creating a

sub-regional cooperation, FPDA is still perceived as threat by neighboring

member states, thus its presence may hinder a stronger ASEAN as an institution.

Meanwhile, it is an obligation from ASEAN’s side to strengthen itself,

especially to be more decisive, regarding dispute settlement and when answering

problems within the region. The current state of ASEAN is being ‘handcuffed’ by

the ASEAN Charter, which guarantees more of national sovereignty and non-

interference compared to a stronger regional cooperation. An improvement of

ASEAN’s decisiveness, even how gradual or even by the slightest of margin in

the nearest future, will give ASEAN member states confidence that ASEAN will

be able to guarantee the regional peace and security (which, of course, requires

the willingness of all member states, a lengthy discussion that will not be

elaborated here).

To conclude, regardless of FPDA’s evolving interest and continuing

(perceived) relevance to the regional security, there are even stronger evidences

that FPDA will be counter-beneficial to ASEAN Political-Security Community,

the way that it provides no strong benefits to ASEAN’s regional security.

Therefore, it is up to the question whether FPDA will evolve to more ‘Southeast

Asian’ cooperation or it dissolves into the ASEAN format of regional security

cooperation in the future.

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