FISA NSA Surveillance 193 Countries

SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR,

,

,

,

NZL

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52 Dated: 20070108

Declassify On: 20340801 SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR NZL

T//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR NZL


Declassify On: 20340801 SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR NZL

Non-targetable 2nd Party Countries, Territories & Individuals

(U//FOUO) USSID 18 prohibits the targeting of the United States and its territories and NSA SIGINT Directorate policy prohibits the targeting of Second Party countries and territories.

(U//FOUO) USSID 18 prohibits the targeting of the United States and its territories and NSA SIGINT Directorate policy prohibits the targeting of Second Party countries and territories.

US & territories: US & territories: x "US" United States x "US" United States x "AS" American Samoa x "AS" American Samoa x "GU" Guam x "GU" Guam x "PR" Puerto Rico x "PR" Puerto Rico x "VI" Virgin Islands (US) x "VI" Virgin Islands (US) x also: Baker Island, Howland Island, Jarvis Island, Johnston Atoll, Kingman Reef, Midway Islands,

Navassa Island, Northern Mariana Islands, Palmyra Atoll, Wake Island x also: Baker Island, Howland Island, Jarvis Island, Johnston Atoll, Kingman Reef, Midway Islands,

Navassa Island, Northern Mariana Islands, Palmyra Atoll, Wake Island

AU and territories: AU and territories: x "AU" Australia x "AU" Australia x "CC" Cocos (Keeling) Islands x "CC" Cocos (Keeling) Islands x "CX" Christmas Island x "CX" Christmas Island x "HM" Heard & McDonald Islands x "HM" Heard & McDonald Islands x "NF" Norfolk Island x "NF" Norfolk Island x also: Ashmore and Cartier Islands, and Coral Sea Islands x also: Ashmore and Cartier Islands, and Coral Sea Islands

CA (no territories) CA (no territories) x "CA" Canada x "CA" Canada

UK and territories: UK and territories: x "UK" United Kingdom x "UK" United Kingdom x "AI" Anguilla Island x "AI" Anguilla Island x "BM" Bermuda x "BM" Bermuda x "FK" Falkland Islands x "FK" Falkland Islands x "GS" South Georgia & Sandwich Islands x "GS" South Georgia & Sandwich Islands x "IO" British Indian Ocean Territories x "IO" British Indian Ocean Territories x "KY" Cayman Islands x "KY" Cayman Islands x "PN" Pitcairn Island x "PN" Pitcairn Island x "MS" Montserrat x "MS" Montserrat x "SH" Saint Helena Island x "SH" Saint Helena Island x "TC" Turk & Caicos Island x "TC" Turk & Caicos Island x "VG" Virgin Islands (British) x "VG" Virgin Islands (British) x "GI" Gibraltar x "GI" Gibraltar x also: Guernsey, Jersey, Isle of Man, and Montserrat, Channel Is. x also: Guernsey, Jersey, Isle of Man, and Montserrat, Channel Is.

NZ and territories: NZ and territories: x "NZ" New Zealand x "NZ" New Zealand x "CK" Cook Islands (individual persons) x "CK" Cook Islands (individual persons)

SECR NZL

SECR NZL

ET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR,


Declassify On: 20340801

ET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR,

x "NU" Niue (individual persons) x "TK" Tokelau

(U//FOUO) In addition to these physical territories there are also the following Internet Country Top Level Domains (ccTLD) for protected entities:

x "AC" Ascension Island (UK, administered by the Saint Helena Island) x "GB" Great Britain x "UM" U.S. minor outlying islands x "NP" Northern Mariana Island (US) x "GG" Guernsey (UK) x "JE" Jersey (UK) x "IM" Isle of Man (UK)

Targeting Authorization Requirements

Country National in ...* National overseas Foreign national in ... Foreign national overseas Australia (DSD)

Warrant and Ministerial Authorization

Ministerial authorization

International comms OK; warrant if domestic

Lawful without specific authorization

Canada (CSEC)

Cannot target Canadians

Cannot target Canadians

Considered to be Canadian - CSEC cannot target

Lawful without specific authorization, but ministerial authorization needed if CSEC intercepts private communications of Canadians in relation to the activity or class of activities specified in the authorization

New Zealand (GCSB)

Cannot target unless Agent of a Foreign Power; if so, international comms OK; warrant required if domestic

Cannot do it unless Agent of a Foreign Power

International comms ok; Warrant if domestic


UK (GCHQ) Warrant STA Warrant Lawful without specific authorization

USA (NSA) FISA warrant and probable agent of a foreign power

FISA warrant and agent of a foreign power

Generally a FISA warrant, however rules depend on situation - very complex


(TS//SI//REL)

(TS//SI//REL)

SECRET

UNITED STATES

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT

WASHINGTON, D.C.

)IN RE DNI/AG CERTIFICATION 2010-A. )

)

ORDER

Docket Number 702(i)- 10-02

For the reasons stated in the Memorandum Opinion issued contemporaneously herewith,

and in reliance on the entire record in this matter, the Court finds, in the language of 50 U.S.C. §

1881 a(i)(3)(A), that the certification submitted in the above-captioned docket, as amended,

"contains all the required elements and that the [amended] targeting and minimization procedures

adopted in accordance with [50 U.S.C. § 188 la(d)-(e)] are consistent with the requirements of

those subsections and with the fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States."

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 188 la(i)(3)(A), that such

certification, as amended, and the use of such procedures, as amended, are approved.

ENTERED this ~day of August 2010.

JOHN D. BATESJudge, United States ForeignIntelligence Surveillance Court

I,Beverly C. Queen, Deputy Clerk,FISC, certify that this document

is a true and correct copy ofthe original ~

SECRET

TOP SECRET//NOFOPJq

EXHIBIT F

THE MATTER OF FO~IGN GOVEP~MENTS, FO~IGN FACTIONS, E~G~~~ If: 0 9ENTITIES, ~D FOREIGN-BASED POLITIC~

DNUAG 702(g) Cerfifieatio~ 2010-A

Foreign Governments or A_ny Components Thereof, V~hether or Not Recognized by theUnited States (50 U.S.C. § 180!(a)(1)):

Afghanistan; Albania; Algeria; Andorra; Angola; Antigua and Barbuda; Argentina;Armenia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Bahamas; Baba’ain; Bangladesh; Barbados; Belarus;Belgimn; Belize; Benin; Bhutan; Bolivia; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Botswana; Brazil;Bmnei; Bulgaria; Burkina Faso; Burma (Myamnar); Burundi; Cambodia; Cameroon;Cape Verde; Central African Republic; Chad; Chile; China; Colombia; Comoros; Congo,Democratic Republic; Congo, Republic; Costa Rica; Cote d’Ivoire; Croatia; Cuba;Cyprus; Czech Republic; Demnark; Djibouti; Dominica; Dominican Republic; EastTimor (Timor-Leste); Ecuador; Egypt; E1 Salvador; Equatorial Guinea; Efitrea; Estonia;Ethiopia; Fiji; Finland; France; Gabon; Gambia; Geor~a; Germany; Ghana; Greece;Grenada; Guatemala; Guinea; Guinea-Bissau; Guyana; Haiti; Honduras; Hungary;Iceland; India; Indonesia; Iran; Iraq; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Jamaica; Japan; Jordan;Kazakhstan; Kenya; Kiribati; Korea, Democratic Peoples Republic of (DPRK); Korea,Republic of (ROK); Kosovo; Kuwait; Kyrgyzstan; Laos; Latvia; Lebanon; Lesotho;Liberia; Libya; Liechtenstein; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Macedo~ia; Madagascar; Malawi;Malaysia; Maldives; Mall; Malta; Marshall Islands; Mauritania; Mauritius; Mexico;Micronesia; Motdova; Monaco; Mongolia; Montenegro; Morocco; Mozambique;Namibia; Nam-u; Nepal; Netherlands; Nicaragua; Niger; Nigeria; No~avay; Oman;Pakistan; Palau; Panama; Papua New Guinea; Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; Poland;Portugal; Qatar; Romania; Russia; Rwanda; Saint Kitts and Nevis; Saint Lucia; SaintVincent and the Grenadines; Samoa; San Marino; Sao Tome and Principe; Saudi Arabia;Senegal; Serbia; Seychelles; Siena Leone; Singapore; Slovakia; Slovenia; SolomonIslands; Somalia; South Afi~ica; Spain; Sri Lanka; Sudan; Suriname; Swaziland; Sweden;Switzerland; Syria; Taiwan; Tajikistan; Tanzania; Thailand; Togo; Tonga; Trinidad andTobago; Tunisia; Turkey; Turkmenistan; Tuvalu; Uganda; Ukraine; United ArabEmirates; Uruguay; Uzbekistan; Vanuatu; Vatican City (Holy See); Venezuela; Vietnam;Westeru Sahara; Yemen; Zambia; Zimbabwe. (TS//NF)

Factio~as of ~oreigrt Natf.ons, Not Substan{~aily Composed of United States Persons(50 UoS.C. § 1801(a)(2)):

Palestinian Authority; Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. (TSi/NF)

Classified by: The Attorney GeneralReason: 1.4(c)Declassify on: 15 July 2035

Entities Openly Acknowledged by a Foreign Government or Governments to be Directedand Controlled by Such Foreign Government or Governments (50 U.S.C. § !801(a)(3)):

United Nations; International Atomic Energy Agency; World Bank Group; IntenlationalMonetary Fund; Inter-American Development Ba~k; European Central Ba~k; EuropeanUnion; African Union; Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries; Afl-icanDevelopment B auk; Asian Development Bank; B ai~k for International Settlements;European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; Financial Action Task Force; GasProducers’ Forum; Islamic Development Ba~; League of Arab States; Mercosur.

Foreign-Based PoIitieal Organizations, Not SubstantiaIly Composed of United StatesPersorts (50 UoS.C. § 1801(a)(5)):

Areal; Bharatiya Janata Party; Bolivaria Continental Coordinator; Egyptian MuslimBrotherhood; National Salvation Front; Pakistan Peoples Party. (TS//NF)

Entities Directed and Controlled by a Foreign Government or Governments (50 U.S.C.§ I801(a)(6)):

Bolivarian Alternative office Americas’, PetroCaribe, S.A. (TSi/NF)

TOP SECRET/,qqOFORN2

SECRET//ORCON,NOFORN

CERTIFICATION OF T.E Dm CTOR OV NATIONA INTELLIGE C DT.EATTO~EY GENE~L PURSUANT TO SUBSECTION 702(g) OF T~E~R~G~,~

INTELLIGENCE SURVEILL~CE ACT OF 1978, AS ~E~~ ~ o ~,.~ ~: [~

~N THE MATTER OF FOREIGN GOVE~MENTS, FO~IGN FACT~0N’S; FON~IGN :’ENTITIES, ~D FOREIGN-BASED POLITICAL ORG~IZATi0NS’ ~ .....

DNI/AG 702(g) Certification 2010-A

Based on the representations made in the supporting affidavits of General Keith B.

Alexander, United States Army, Director of the National Security Agency (NSA), Leon E.

Panetta, Director, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and Robert S. Mueller, Ill, Director,

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in the above-referenced matter, the Director of National

Intelligence and the Attorney General, being duly sworn, hereby certify that: (S//OC,NF)

(1) there are procedures in place that will be submitted with this certification for approval

by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court that are reasonably designed to --

a. ensure that an acquisition authorized pursuant to subsection 702(a) of the Foreign

Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended ("the Act"), is limited to

targeting persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States; and

b. prevent the intentional acquisition of any comlnunication as to which the sender

and all intended recipients are known at the time of acquisition to be located in

the United States;

(2) the minimization procedures with respect to such acquisition --

a. lneet the definition of minimization procedures under sulosections 101 (h) and

301 (4) of the Act; and


Classified by: The Attorney GeneralReason: 1.4(c)Declassify on: 15 July 2035


b. wilI be submitted with this certification for approval by the Foreign Intelligence

Surveillance Court;

(3) guidelines have been adopted in accordance with subsection 702(f) of the Act to

ensure compliance with the limitations in subsection 702(b) of the Act and to ensure

that an application for a court order is filed as required by the Act;

(4) the procedures and guidelines refened to in sub-paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) above are

consistent with the requirements of the fourth amendment to the Constitution of the

United States;

(5) a significant purpose of the acquisition is to obtain foreign intelligence information;

(6) the acquisition involves obtaining foreign intelligence information from or with the

assistance of an electronic communication service provider; and

(7) the acquisition complies with the limitations in subsection 702(b) of the Act. (S)

As described in the above-referenced affidavit of General Alexander, the foreigna

intelligence information to be acquired pursuant to this certification concerns foreign powers as

defined in 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(1) ("foreign governments or any components thereof, whether or

not recognized by the United States"); 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(2) ("factions of foreign nations, not

substantially composed of United States persons"); 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(3) ("entities openly

acknowledged by a foreign govert~nent or governments to be directed and controlled by such

foreign government or goverm-nents"); 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(5) ("foreign-based political

organizations, not substantially composed of United States persons"); and 50 U. S.C. § 1801 (a)(6)

("entities directed and controlled by a foreign govermnent or goverrm~ents"). A list of foreign

powers satisfying these statutory definitions is attached herewith as Exhibit F. IfNSA seeks to

acquire forei~ox~ intelligence information concerning additional foreign powers as defined in

SECRET/iORCON,NOFOR_N2

S E CRET//ORC ON,NOFOPdN

50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(1), (2), (3), (5), or (6), NSA may target consistent with this certification

non-United States persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States who

possess, are expected to receive, and/or are likely to communicate foreign intelligence

information concerning those additional foreign powers, provided that NSA notifies the Attorney

General and Director of National Intelligence within five business days of implementing such

targeting. Such notification will include a description of the factual basis for NSA’s

determination that the additional government, faction, entity, or political organization is a foreign

power as defined in 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(!), (2), (3), (5), or (6). (S//OC,NF)

On the basis of the foregoing, the targeting of non-United States persons reasonably

believed to be located outside the United States to acquire foreign intelligence information, as

described above, is authorized, and such authorization shall be effective on August 17, 2010, or

on the date upon which the Foreign Intelligence Smweillance Court issues an order pursuant to

subsection 702(i)(3) of the Act, whichever is later. Such targeting is authorized for a period of

one year from the effective date of this authorization. This authorization reauthorizes DNI/AG

702(g) Certification 2009-A ("In the Matter of Foreign Governments, Foreign Factions, Foreign

Entities, and Foreign-Based Political Organizations"), which was authorized by the Director of

National Intelligence and Attorney Genera! pursuant to section 702(g) of the Act on July 29,

2009. (S//OC,NF)

Amendment 1 to DNI[/AG 702(g) Certifications 20~)8-A and 2009-A

Furthermore, in accordance with subsection 702(i)(1)(C) of the Act, the NSA, FBI, and

CIA minimization procedures authorized for use under DNI/AG 702(g) Certifications 2008-A

and 2009-A are hereby amended. Specifically, the use of the NSA, FBI, and CIA minimization

procedures attached herewith as Exhibits B, D, and E, respectively, in connection with foreign

SECRET//ORCON,NOFORN3

SECRET//ORCON~NOFORN

intelligence information acquired in accordance with DNI/AG 702(g) Certifications 2008-A and

2009-A is auttaorized.I Such authorization shall be effective on August 17, 2010, or on the date

upon which the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court issues an order concerning these

amendments pursuant to subsection 702(i)(3) of the Act, whichever is later. (S//OC,NF)

.... The remainder of this page intentionally left blank ....

1 As certified above, these ntinimization procedures aneet the definition of minimization procedures under

subsections 101 (h) and 3 01 (4) of the Act and will be submitted herewith for approval by the Foreign IntelligenceSurveillance Court. (S//OC,NF)

SECRET/!ORCON,NOFORN4


VERIFICATION (U)

I declare under penalty of perjury that the facts set forth in the foregoing certification in

the Matter of Foreign Goverm:aents, Foreign Factions, Foreign Entities, and Foreign-Based

Politica! Organizations, DNI/AG 702(g) Certification 2010-A, are true and COl~ect to the best of

nay knowledge and belief. I further declare under penalty of perjury that the facts set forth in the

foregoing amendments to the minimization procedures to be used in connection with foreign

intelligence information acquired in accordance with DNIiAG 702(g) Certifications 2008-A and

2009-A are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. Executed pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1746 on July ~4~ , 2010. (S)

Holder, Jr.Attorney General of the United S~at,

SECRET//ORCON~NOFORN

VERI[gI{CATI[ON (U)

I declare under penalty ofp~iury that the facts se~ fo~h in the foregoing certification in

the Matter of Groups Engaged in international Ten’orism or Activities in Preparation Therefor,

DNI/AG 702(g) Certification 2010-B, are true aad correct to the best of my knowledge and

belief. I fm~er declare under penalty of perjury that the facts set forth in the foregoing

amendme1~t to the minimization procedures to be used tn cormectton with foreign intelligence

info~>~ation acquired in accordance with DNI/AG 702(g) Cet~tifications 2008-B and 2009-B are

true m~.d correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. Executed pursuant ~o 28 U.S.C. § 1746

on July ~9~.., 2010. (S)

Dav(d C. GompertActing Director of National Intelligence

SE CRETi/ORCON,NOFON2°t6

TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20320108


Declassify On: 20320108 TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20320108

FISA Amendments Act of 2008 Section 702

Summary Document

Prepared by the Office of General Counsel (OGC) Formatting, Section Titles, and the Outline in the left margin added by ADET

23 December 2008


TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20320108 2

Table of Contents:

Introduction to FAA section 702 .........................................................................................................3 Compel Providers...................................................................................................................... 3 FISC orders for US persons or persons located inside the United States ................................. 3

Time sensitive targets and high volume of targets................................................................ 3 The means used:........................................................................................................................ 3

Certification details............................................................................................................... 3 Day to day Analysts’ attention.............................................................................................. 4

Certification 2008-A: Targeting Directed at Foreign Governments and Similar Entities ...................5

DIRNSA’s affidavit .................................................................................................................. 5 Targeting Procedures (Exhibit A)............................................................................................. 6

Part 1 – Location................................................................................................................... 6 Part 2 – Detecting target location or status changes ............................................................. 7 Part 3 – Identifying the foreign power.................................................................................. 7 Part 4 – Oversight and reporting........................................................................................... 7

Minimization Procedures (Exhibit B)....................................................................................... 8 The definitions section.......................................................................................................... 8 Section 3 – Acquisition and processing ................................................................................ 9 Section 4 – Attorney-Client communications....................................................................... 9 Section 5 – Domestic communications................................................................................. 9 Section 6 – Foreign communications of US persons .......................................................... 10 Section 7 – Foreign communications of US persons .......................................................... 11 Section 8 – FAA and collaboration with other governments.............................................. 11

The foreign government groups that are the subject of Certification 2008-A (Exhibit F) ..... 12

FAA Certification 2008-B - Counterterrorism ..................................................................................13 DIRNSA’s affidavit ................................................................................................................ 13 Targeting Procedures (Exhibit A)........................................................................................... 13 Minimization Procedures (Exhibit B)..................................................................................... 13 The foreign terrorist groups that are the subject of Certification 2008-B (Exhibit F)............ 13

FAA Certification 2009-C – WMD/Proliferation..............................................................................14

DIRNSA’s affidavit ................................................................................................................ 14 Targeting Procedures (Exhibit A)........................................................................................... 14 Minimization Procedures (Exhibit B)..................................................................................... 15

FAA Certification 2009-A Certification - Foreign Governments……………………..……………16

FAA Certification 2009-B - Counterterrorism ..................................................................................17



Introduction to FAA section 702

Compel Providers As described in the briefing accompanying this training, in July 2008, Congress enacted the “Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008” (FAA.) One of the primary purposes in enacting the FAA was the creation of a new way for the US Government to compel providers of electronic communications services to assist the Government in acquiring foreign intelligence information concerning non-US persons located outside the United States. This process is described in Section 702 of FAA. Almost all of the 1978 law remained intact, and Section 702 of FAA is best understood as an exception to FISA for such targets.

FISC orders for US persons or persons located inside the United States The definitions of “electronic surveillance” in FISA were not changed, so any collection that uses methods that fall within them and is directed at anyone inside the United States or at US persons abroad still requires a court order. The Government must give the court probable cause to believe that each target is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power before the court will issue an order compelling a communications service provider to assist with the targeting.

Time sensitive targets and high volume of targets Under section 702 of FAA, however, the Government may compel the same type of assistance in a way that is much more time-sensitive and more suitable for collection directed at a higher volume of targets.

The means used: The means used by the Government to compel this assistance is in the form of “certifications” issued jointly by the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence that are approved by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) and “directives” to the providers ordering them to assist the government.

Certification details In a “certification”, the DNI and AG certify that specific requirements of the law have been met, and describe how this has been done. When the collection is being done by NSA, DIRNSA also makes representations to support the certification. If the court determines that the statutory requirements for a certification have been met, it issues an order to this effect, and the collection may begin.

I. Introduction to FAA section 702 1. Compel Providers

a. Non-US persons

b. Outside the United States

c. FAA 702 = an

exception 2. Court Orders

a. FISA section F1-F4 did not change

b. Non-US persons & persons inside the United States need a FISC order

c. FISC orders need a probable cause case.

3. FAA 702 – for:

a. fast targeting and b. a high volume of

targets 4. The means:

a. AG/DNI certifications (certs) approved by FISC

b. Directives to providers

5. Certs

a. DNI & AG approve b. At NSA – DIRNSA

approves



Since this video was recorded in December 2008, a FAA Certification 2009-C – WMD/Proliferation certification has been approved. Refer to pg. 14 of this document.

For this reason, NSA personnel who are going to be involved in the collection, processing or dissemination of data gathered pursuant to Section 702 of FAA must understand the requirements and responsibilities associated with a certification to ensure they are acting in accordance with the representations made to the FISC by the DNI, AG and DIRNSA. In other words, the various parts of a certification lay out the rules of the road for collection and handling of data pursuant to FAA, and this training is designed to assist you in becoming familiar with their terms. (A certification may also contain representations made by other federal agencies that assist in the collection and/or are authorized to receive the proceeds of what NSA is collecting pursuant to FAA. Their terms are only of peripheral interest to most NSA personnel, so they will not be discussed in great detail.) Although Section 702 of the FAA provides a framework of requirements for issuance of a certification, it does not say how that framework must be used. To date, the AG and DNI have issued certifications that are topically based: a certification that authorizes targeting directed at foreign governments, factions, entities and foreign based political organizations (Certification 2008-A) and a certification that authorizes targeting directed at groups engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefore (Certification 2008-B). Each will be

discussed in turn.

Day to day Analysts’ attention As described in the briefing, on a day-to-day basis, most analysts will need to be particularly concerned with:

- the portions of the certifications that describe which foreign intelligence targets have been authorized for collection in general terms by the Attorney General and DNI (typically, “Exhibit F” to a certification),

- the procedures for determining that there is a reasonable belief that a particular target is a non-US person located outside the United States (typically “Exhibit A” to a certification) and

- the minimization procedures that govern handling of US person (USP) information acquired in the course of collection directed at non-US persons reasonably believed to be located outside the US who fit within the terms of the authorization (typically “Exhibit B” to a certification.)

Thus, at the end of this training, NSA personnel should know how to find out whether a proposed target fits within the terms of a certification,

I. Introduction to FAA section 702 cont’d

c. Individual certs have unique handling rules.

d. AG/DNI have issued topical certs

i. 2008-A = Foreign

Gov’t (FG)

ii. 2008-B = Counterterrorism (CT)

6. Analysts concern:

a. Authorized targets (Exhibit F)

b. Foreignness procedures (Exhibit A)

c. Minimization procedures (Exhibit B)

d. Trained to know when a target fits the cert



know where to find the rules for targeting, and know where to find the rules for handling the US person information they acquire. Because the certifications and the associated rules are subject to change, understanding where to find NSA’s responsibilities and restrictions is every bit as important as becoming familiar with the specifics of their terms at the current time. Certification 2008-A: Targeting Directed at Foreign Governments and Similar Entities

DIRNSA’s affidavit DIRNSA’s affidavit to Certification 2008-A states the following: NSA has adopted procedures that are reasonably designed to ensure that all targeting is directed at non-US persons reasonably believed to be outside the United States (“Exhibit A”, described below) This collection will be accomplished by a variety of means at switches and other parts of the infrastructure of companies that provide electronic communications services to people abroad from within the United States. The collection will seek to acquire foreign intelligence information concerning foreign governments, factions thereof and similar types of entities, and also states that a list of the entities that will be targeted is included as “Exhibit F” (described below.) It also states that if NSA wants to target a foreign government or other similar entity that is not on this list, it may do so, but it has to notify the AG and DNI within 5 days of implementing the targeting. When NSA personnel come across information concerning US persons, they will follow minimization procedures attached to the certification (“Exhibit B”, described below) NSA may disseminate to CIA unevaluated data that comes from collection pursuant to this certification and that CIA requests in order to carry out its clandestine espionage and counterintelligence activities abroad. NSA may also disseminate to FBI, at FBI’s request, unevaluated data that comes from collection pursuant to this certification.

II. Cert 2008-A Foreign Gov’ts

1. DIRNSA’s Affidavit

2008-A Affidavit

a. Non-US person b. Outside of the

United States

c. Using US electronic communications carriers

d. Purpose i. Foreign

intelligence ii. Concerning

Foreign Gov’t

e. Minimize US person info

f. CIA/FBI sharing



Targeting Procedures (Exhibit A) These procedures address one of the central requirements of the FAA: determination that the targeting is limited to non-United States persons outside the United States. It does so in four parts. Part 1 – Location Part 1 discusses how NSA will make a determination that a person being targeted is located outside the United States. It notes that the determination is made in light of the totality of the circumstances. NSA analysts look at lead information they have received on the target; they conduct research in NSA databases available reports and collateral information, and they conduct technical analyses of the email addresses or other facilities to be targeted. They can use information from any one or a combination of these categories of information to determine that the potential target is outside the United States. Part 1 addresses each of these categories in greater detail, with examples of how they are applied to targeting of phone numbers and email addresses. It also notes that when NSA is seeking to acquire communications about the target that are not to or from the target, it will employ IP filters or similar technology to ensure that the collection is directed at a party to communications reasonably believed to be outside the United States. Part 1 also provides similar guidance on assessment of a potential target’s status as a non-US person. It notes that information on a potential target’s location is frequently useful in determining his status as well. It notes that in the absence of specific information regarding a potential target’s status, if a person is reasonably believed to be located outside the United States, he will also be presumed to be a non-US person, unless/until he can be positively identified as a US person or the nature or circumstances of his communication give rise to a reasonable belief to the contrary. Because one of the things certified by the AG and DNI is that the purpose of the collection is to gather foreign intelligence, part 1 also addresses how NSA will assess whether the target possesses and/or is likely to communicate information of foreign intelligence value concerning a foreign power or foreign territory. NSA can not target someone merely because he is located outside the US; there has to be some reason to believe that the targeting will acquire foreign intelligence. This requirement, and most of the factors listed in this

2. Targeting Procedures (Exhibit A)

2008-A Exhibit A

a. Part I – Location i. Located outside of

the United States ii. Totality of

circumstances

1. Lead information

2. Seeking info “about” a target – requires filters

3. Presumption of status based on location

4. Target possesses and is likely to communicate foreign intelligence



section are intuitive to NSA analysts, and include information that indicates the target has communicated with someone associated with a foreign power or territory, information in public directories that link a phone number to someone associated with a foreign power or foreign territory.

Part 2 – Detecting target location or status changes Part 2 describes steps that will be taken by NSA after targeting has begun to ensure that it detects when a target has entered the United States, despite a reasonable belief to the contrary when targeting was initiated. These steps are designed to prevent NSA from collecting domestic communications as well as any targeting of persons who are inside the United States. NSA looks at registers of roaming cell phones, IP addresses of Internet communications and similar technical information, but in many cases, it will be the content of a communication that indicates that a target has entered the United States. If NSA determines that a target has entered the United States or that a target thought to be a non-US person is in fact a US person, it must terminate collection without delay and take additional steps described in Part 4 below. Part 3 – Identifying the foreign power Part 3 states that before collection can begin, analysts must document one or more citations to the information that led them to believe that a target was located outside the United States. They must also identify the foreign power or foreign territory about which they expect to obtain foreign intelligence so that people conducting oversight of NSA’s collection can see how the Agency is meeting the requirements established by the AG and DNI in their certification. Part 4 – Oversight and reporting Part 4 describes oversight and compliance responsibilities associated with collection done pursuant to Certification 2008-A. The SID office of Oversight and Compliance (O&C), together with the OGC, is required to develop training on the rules associated with FAA collection. O&C must also ensure that raw traffic from FAA collection is labeled and stored only in authorized repositories and accessible only to those who have had such training. O&C is also required to conduct periodic spot checks to ensure that NSA is meeting its responsibilities with regard to targeting, dissemination and other activities associated with FAA collection. The Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) also conduct independent oversight of NSA’s activities, with reviews at least once every 60 days.

2. Targeting Procedures cont’d

2008-A Exhibit A

b. Part II –Location change detection

i. Detect if a target enters the United States

ii. Or if the target is a US person

c. Part III – identify the

foreign power d. Part IV – Oversight

i. O&C/OGC

ii. DOJ/ODNI



NSA must report to DOJ, the ODNI Office of General Counsel and the to the ODNI Civil Liberties Protection Officer, any incidents of noncompliance with targeting procedures that result in intentional targeting of persons reasonably believe to be located in the United States or the intentional acquisition of domestic communications. These reports must be made within 5 days of NSA learning of the incident. Any information acquired by intentionally targeting a US person or a person nor reasonably believed to be outside the United States at the time of targeting has to be purged from NSA databases. Part 4 also repeats the requirement that if NSA targets someone in the reasonable belief that he is a non-United States person outside the United States and later finds out that the target is inside the United States or is in fact a US person (no matter where he is located), it must cease the targeting without delay. Any information gathered prior to determining that the target was a US person or located inside the United States has to be handled in accordance with the relevant minimization procedures (Exhibit B, discussed below.) In addition, NSA must report the incident to DOJ, the ODNI Office of General Counsel and the ODNI Civil Liberties Officer within 5 days.

Minimization Procedures (Exhibit B) The minimization procedures for Certification 2008-A are modeled on NSA’s Standard Minimization Procedures (Annex A to USSID 18), but contain some significant differences. It is important to keep in mind that they govern the processing/retention/dissemination of information concerning US persons that is collected in the course of targeting non-United States persons reasonably believed to be outside the United States. Any restrictions on the handling of data that does not concern US persons come from another source (e.g., concerns about the potential risk to sources and methods.) All of the requirements in the procedures will not be repeated verbatim here, but NSA personnel working with FAA data should review their terms closely. The definitions section is the first substantive portion of the procedures and should be reviewed carefully for obvious reasons. Restrictions on the handling of information concerning “US persons” can not be properly applied unless one understands what

2. Targeting Procedures cont’d - 2008-A Exhibit A

iii. Reporting incidentsto ODNI CLPO, DOJ, andODNI OJC for:

1. Intentional violations

2. Mistakes 3. Minimization

Procedures (Exhibit B) 2008-A Exhibit B

a. Govern info

concerning US persons obtained while targeting non-US persons

b. Definitions



falls within the definition of “US person.” The same is true for “foreign communication” and similar terms.

Section 3 – Acquisition and processing Highlights of section 3, which addresses acquisition and processing in general, include the following:

- inadvertently acquired communications of or concerning US persons can be retained no longer than 5 years (unless the Signals Intelligence Director authorizes a longer retention period in accordance with Section 5)

- computer selection terms used for scanning collected data to identify communications for analysis shall not include US person names or identifiers

- if NSA is targeting someone in the reasonable belief that he is a non-US person outside the United States and subsequently learns that either of these beliefs is incorrect, it must terminate the targeting without delay. Any communications collected through such targeting, prior to the determination that the person’s status or location was incorrect, must be handled in accordance with the procedures governing “domestic communications”, discussed in Section 5)

Section 4 – Attorney-Client communications Section 4 states that privileged attorney-client communications must be handled with particular care. Any proposed dissemination of information from privileged attorney-client communications must be reviewed by the NSA OGC Section 5 – Domestic communications Section 5 governs the handling of domestic communications. Generally, domestic communications shall be promptly destroyed. However, DIRNSA can authorize an exception to this requirement if he determines, in writing, that the communications in question fall within one of 4 specified categories:

- domestic communications reasonably believed to contain significant foreign intelligence shall be disseminated to the FBI,

3. Minimization Procedures cont’d

2008-A Exhibit B

c. Section 3 - Acquisition

i. Inadvertent

communications retained 5 yrs

ii. No US person names in querying

iii. Stop targeting of

US location or US status is identified

d. Section 4 –

Attorney- Client

e. Section 5 – Domestic Communications

i. Normally

Destroy ii. Waiver if:

1. foreign

intelligence



for possible further dissemination in accordance with its minimization procedures

- domestic communications that do not contain foreign intelligence information but are reasonably believed to contain evidence of a crime may be referred to the NSA OGC for possible further dissemination in accordance with procedures established within the Executive Branch

- domestic communications that do not contain foreign intelligence or evidence of a crime, but contain technical database information or information necessary to understand or assess a communications security vulnerability may be disseminated to the FBI and other elements of the US Government

- the communication contains information pertaining to a threat of serious harm to life or property

Section 5 also states that ordinarily the maximum amount of time that unencrypted domestic communications may be retained in technical databases is 5 years, unless the Signals Intelligence Director determines in writing that retention for a longer period is required to respond to authorized foreign intelligence requirements. Notwithstanding any of these limitations, if a domestic communication indicates that a target has entered the United States, NSA may advise the FBI of that fact. Section 6 – Foreign communications of US persons Section 6 governs the handling of foreign communications of or concerning US persons. Unencrypted foreign communications can be retained for up to 5 years, while they are being evaluated, unless the Signals Intelligence Director determines in writing that a longer retention period is required. They can also be retained if dissemination of the communications would be permissible with the US person information included or if they contain evidence of a crime. Ordinarily, reports based on foreign communications of or concerning US persons are supposed to be disseminated in a manner that masks the US person identities. However, US


2008-A Exhibit B ii. Waiver if: cont’d

2. Evidence of a crime

3. Technical database information

4. Threat of serious harm to life or property

iii. The ordinary

storage limit of raw data is 5 years

f. Section 6 - Foreign communications of US persons

i. The ordinary

storage limit of raw data is 5 years

ii. Ordinarily mask US person identities



person identity information may be disseminated to recipients requiring it for the performance of their official duties if the identity is necessary to understand or assess foreign intelligence information or otherwise fits within the criteria outlined in Section 6 (b). Section 7 – Foreign communications of Non-US persons Section 7 states that information from foreign communications concerning non-United States persons can be disseminated in accordance with NSA’s normal rules for handling intercept.

Section 8 – FAA and collaboration with other governments Section 8 provides the rules for handling information collected pursuant to Section 702 of FAA in the context of collaboration with foreign governments. It is distinct from the dissemination of reporting to foreign governments, which is governed by Section 6. NSA can share or exchange foreign communications with the governments of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and New Zealand, but only with their written assurance that they will use the communications subject to the limits on retention and dissemination within the procedures. Domestic communications may not be shared with them, and ordinarily, NSA analysts must remove US person identifiers that are not necessary to understand or assess the foreign intelligence contained within foreign plain text communications. Encrypted communications may also be shared, as may communications for which the Second Parties’ linguistic or technical assistance is required. However, there are significant limitations on what the Second Parties can do with such unevaluated communications and NSA has additional responsibilities with regard to ensuring that the material is handled properly.


2008-A Exhibit B

g. Section 7 - Foreign communications of non-US persons

h. Section 8 – FAA and collaboration

1. This is not sharing reports

2. NSA can share

raw data with Second Party partners

3. NSA may not

share Domestic Communications and ordinarily minimize data

4. Encrypted

communications may be shared unminimized with limitations



The foreign government groups that are the subject of Certification 2008-A (Exhibit F) The foreign governments, factions, foreign entities and foreign based political organizations that are the subject of Certification 2008-A (Exhibit F) In 2008-A, the DNI and AG state that the foreign intelligence information to be acquired pursuant to the certification concerns foreign powers as defined in specific parts of FISA. They also state that the entities listed in Exhibit F fit within these definitions. This means that NSA can target individuals reasonably believed to be non-US persons located outside the United States to acquire information concerning these entities. If NSA wants to target an individual who is reasonably believed to be a non-United States person located outside the United States in order to obtain information concerning a foreign power that fits within these definitions, but which is not on the list it may do so. However, it must notify the AG and DNI within 5 days of implementing such targeting. The notification must include a description of the factual basis for NSA’s determination that the additional government, faction, entity or political organization is a foreign power that fits within the specified definitions in FISA.

4. Target list (Exhibit F) 2008-A Exhibit F



FAA Certification 2008-B - Counterterrorism

DIRNSA’s affidavit The only difference between this affidavit and the affidavit for 2008-A is that it reflects that the certification concerns a different set of targets. The collection in this case will seek to acquire foreign intelligence information concerning groups engaged in international terrorism. Similar to 2008-A, the certification for foreign governments and similar entities, it states that a list of the terrorist groups that will be targeted is included as “Exhibit F” (described below). It also states that if NSA wants to target a foreign terrorist group that is not on this list, it may do so, but it has to notify the AG and DNI within 5 days of implementing the targeting.

Targeting Procedures (Exhibit A) These procedures are the same as those for 2008-A.

Minimization Procedures (Exhibit B) These procedures are the same as those for 2008-A.

The foreign terrorist groups that are the subject of Certification 2008-B (Exhibit F) In 2008-B, the DNI and AG state that the foreign intelligence information to be acquired pursuant to the certification concerns terrorist groups that are foreign powers as defined in a specific part of FISA. They also state that the groups listed in Exhibit F fit within this definition. This means that NSA can target individuals reasonably believed to be non-US persons located outside the United States to acquire information concerning these groups. If NSA wants to target an individual who is reasonably believed to be a non-US person located outside the United States in order to obtain information concerning a foreign terrorist group that fits within this definition, but which is not on the list it may do so. However, it must notify the AG and DNI within 5 days of implementing such targeting. The notification must include a description of the factual basis for NSA’s determination that the additional foreign terrorist group is a foreign power that fits within the specified definition in FISA.

1. DIRNSA’s Affidavit The only difference from 2008-A is the TARGET SET 2. Targeting Procedures (Exhibit A) 3. Minimization Procedures

(Exhibit B) 4. Target List (Exhibit F) The only difference from 2008-A is the TARGET SET

(Targeting Directed at Foreign Terrorist Groups)



(Targeting Directed at Persons, Groups and Entities Involved in the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Advanced Conventional Weapons, Disruptive

Technologies and their Deliver Systems)

FAA Certification 2009-C – WMD/Proliferation

DIRNSA’s affidavit DIRNSA’s affidavit for 2009-C is quite different from those for 2008-A and 2008-B. 2008-A and 2008-B contained lists of specific targets, in an “Exhibit F” attached to the certifications. 2009-C does not contain a similar list. Instead, DIRNSA’s affidavit describes the entities that can be targeted pursuant to this certification by giving examples of groups or persons that possess and/or are likely to communicate information concerning one or more of the following activities: (1) proliferating weapons of mass destruction (WMD), to include nuclear, radiological biological or chemical weapons, their deliver means, and related materials or technology by state or non-state actors (2) operating supplier networks used by state and non-state actors to acquire WMD capabilities, delivery means or related materials or technology, (3) developing, selling or purchasing emerging and disruptive technologies that pose a threat to the United States, its people or its allies, or (4) developing selling or purchasing advanced conventional weapons that pose a threat to the United State, its people or its allies. The examples that are included in the affidavit are not the only types of entities that may be targeted, but should be reviewed by analysts who are interested in conducting targeting pursuant to this certification. If a potential target falls clearly within one of the descriptions, it is clearly suitable for tasking. However, the key determinations are that the potential targets are reasonably believed to be non-US persons located outside the United States and that they possess and/or are likely to communicate information concerning the 4 categories of activities listed above.

Targeting Procedures (Exhibit A) These procedures are the same as those for 2008-A.

1. DIRNSA’s Affidavit 2009-C has no Exhibit F Instead of identifying target affiliations, 2009-C describes activities

1. Proliferating WMD

2. Supply of WMD parts

3. Sales of disruptive technologies

4. Sales of advanced conventional weapons

2. Targeting Procedures (Exhibit A)



Minimization Procedures (Exhibit B) These procedures differ in two relatively minor ways from the minimization procedures for 2008-A and 2008-B. Both of these differences appear in section 8. First, they make it clear that NSA may disseminate intelligence reports that contain properly minimized US person information to foreign governments, and that any dissemination of US person information to a foreign government must be done in a manner consistent with subsections 6(b) and 7 of the minimization procedures…essentially the same rules that govern dissemination of US person information to other federal agencies. Because NSA always interpreted this portion of the minimization procedures in this manner, this “clarification” has no meaningful practical consequences. Second, they expand NSA’s capability to obtain technical and linguistic assistance from foreign governments beyond the Second Parties. The conditions and limitations under which such assistance may be sought/provided remain unchanged, but as long as they are met, NSA may obtain the assistance from other foreign governments as well.

3. Minimization Procedures

(Exhibit B)

Focus on Section 8 1. NSA may

dissemination instruction

2. Expanded NSA capability to obtain technical and linguistic assistance



FAA Certification 2009-A - Foreign Governments

This certification replaced certification 2008-A. The list of governments/entities in Exhibit F is slightly different from that which was included in the 2008 version. As always, if an analyst wants to target a selector pursuant to this certification, he should make sure that the targeting concerns a listed entity. NSA may modify the list by notification to the Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence within 5 business days of implementing collection directed at an entity that does not appear on the list, but that is not a decision that can be made by an individual analyst. Questions about modifying the list should be addressed to the OGC. The only other somewhat significant difference between 2008-A and 2009-A is a change in the calculation of some requirements for notification. In 2008-A, NSA was required to notify the AG and DNI of additions to the list in Exhibit F within “7 days”. NSA was also required to inform DOJ and the ODNI of certain incidents of noncompliance with the targeting procedures as well as inadvertent targeting of persons located inside the US within “7 days.” All of these requirements have been changed to “5 business days” in 2009-A to ensure consistent calculation of the timeframes for notification.

Changes from 2008-A:

Exhibit F is updated

New method to update Exhibit F target list

Some notifications are changed from “7 days” to “5 business days”

(Targeting Directed at Foreign Governments and Similar Entities)



FAA Certification 2009-B - Counterterrorism

This certification replaced certification 2008-B. The list of terrorist groups in Exhibit F is slightly different from that which was included in the 2008 version. As always, if an analyst wants to target a selector pursuant to this certification, he should make sure that the targeting concerns a listed terrorist group. NSA may modify the list by notification to the Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence within 5 business days of implementing collection directed at a group that does not appear on the list, but that is not a decision that can be made by an individual analyst. Questions about modifying the list should be addressed to the OGC. The only other somewhat significant difference between 2008-B and 2009-B is a change in the calculation of some requirements for notification which mirrors the change made in 2009-A (discussed above). In 2008-B, NSA was required to notify the AG and DNI of additions to the list in Exhibit F within “7 days”. NSA was also required to inform DOJ and the ODNI of certain incidents of noncompliance with the targeting procedures as well as inadvertent targeting of persons located inside the US within “7 days.” All of these requirements have been changed to “5 business days” in 2009-B to ensure consistent calculation of the timeframes for notification.

Changes from 2008-B:

Exhibit F is updated

New method to update Exhibit F target list

Some notifications are changed from “7 days” to “5 business days”

(Targeting Directed at Foreign Terrorist Groups)

TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN\

FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY


Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52

Dated: 20070108

Declassify On: 20320108

TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN

AFFIDAVIT OF GENERAL KEITH B. ALEXANDER, UNITED STATES ARMY,

DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

IN THE MATTER OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS, FOREIGN FACTIONS, FOREIGN

ENTITIES, AND FOREIGN-BASED POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS

DNI/AG 702(g) Certification 2010-A

(S) Pursuant to subsection 702(g)(2)(C) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as

amended ("the Act"), and in support of DNI/AG 702(g) Certification 2010-A, I affirm that the

following is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief:

1. (U//FOUO) There are reasonable procedures in place that the National Security Agency

(NSA) will use to ensure that any acquisition under this certification is limited to

targeting non-United States persons reasonably believed to be located outside of the

United States. In addition, these targeting procedures are reasonably designed to prevent

the intentional acquisition of any communication as to which the sender and all intended

recipients are known at the time of the acquisition to be located in the United States.

These targeting procedures are attached herewith as Exhibit A.

2. (TS//SI//NF) As described below, NSA's acquisition of foreign intelligence information

pursuant to this certification involves obtaining foreign intelligence information from or

with the assistance of electronic communication service providers, as that term is defined

in subsection 701(b)(4) of the Act.

3-4 (U//FOUO) COMPARTMENTED

5. (TS//SI//NF) Pursuant to the above-referenced certification, NSA seeks to acquire foreign

intelligence information concerning foreign powers as defined in 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(1)

("foreign governments or any components thereof, whether or not recognized by the

United States"); 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(2) ("factions of foreign nations, not substantially

composed of United States persons"); 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(3) ("entities openly

acknowledged by a foreign government or governments to be directed and controlled by

such foreign government or governments"); 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(5) ("foreign-based

political organizations, not substantially composed of United States persons"); and

50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(6) ("entities directed and controlled by a foreign government or

governments"). A list of such foreign powers is attached herewith as Exhibit F. NSA





2

believes that the non-United States persons reasonably believed to be located outside the

United States who will be targeted for collection under this certification possess, are

expected to receive, and/or are likely to communicate foreign intelligence information

concerning these foreign powers. Thus, a significant purpose of the acquisition is to

obtain:

(1) information that relates to, and if concerning a United States person is

necessary to, the ability of the United States to protect against --

a. actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power

or an agent of a foreign power;

b. sabotage, international terrorism, or the international proliferation of

weapons of mass destruction by a foreign power or an agent of a

foreign power; or

c. clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network

of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power; or

(2) information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates

to, and if concerning a United States person is necessary to --

a. the national defense or the security of the United States; or

b. the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.

If NSA seeks to acquire foreign intelligence information concerning additional

foreign powers as defined in 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(1), (2), (3), (5), or (6), NSA

may target under this certification non-United States persons reasonably believed

to be located outside the United States who possess, are expected to receive,

and/or are likely to communicate foreign intelligence information concerning

those additional foreign powers, provided that NSA notifies the Attorney General

and Director of National Intelligence within five business days of implementing

such targeting. Such notification will include a description of the factual basis for

NSA's determination that the additional government, faction, entity, or political

organization is a foreign power as defined in 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(1), (2), (3), (5),

or (6).

6. (U//FOUO) With respect to the information NSA acquires pursuant to the above-

referenced certification, NSA will follow the minimization procedures attached herewith

as Exhibit B.

7. (S//SI//NF) NSA may provide to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) unminimized

communications acquired pursuant to the above-referenced certification. CIA will

identify to NSA targets for which NSA may provide unminimized communications to

CIA. CIA will process any such unminimized communications received from NSA in

accordance with the CIA minimization procedures adopted by the Attorney General, in

consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, pursuant to subsection 702(e) of

the Act.





3

8. (S//SI) NSA may provide to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) unminimized

communications acquired pursuant to the above-referenced certification. The FBI will

identify to NSA targets for which NSA may provide unminimized communications to the

FBI. The FBI will process any such unminimized communications received from NSA in

accordance with the FBI minimization procedures adopted by the Attorney General, in

consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, pursuant to subsection 702(e) of

the Act.

TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN\



(U) I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Signed this ______ day of July, 2010.

______________________________

KEITH B. ALEXANDER

General, U.S. Army

Director, National Security Agency

This affidavit was signed by DIRNSA on 15 July 2010

Documents

FISA NSA Surveillance 193 Countries