July-August 2000 Field Artillery6

Just after 0200 on 5 July 1943,Marshal of the Soviet Union GeorgiKonstantinovich Zhukov received

the call he had been waiting for. It wasGeneral Pukhov, commander of theThirteenth Army, reporting that he hadcaptured a German sapper. After some“persuasion,” the sapper stated that theanticipated German offensive againstthe Kursk salient would commence at0300, less than an hour away. Therewas no time to lose. Without hesitation,Zhukov turned to Marshal KonstantinRokossovsky, commander of the Cen-tral Front, and ordered the artillery coun-ter-preparation to begin immediately.1

(See the map.)At 0220, 10 minutes before German

preparatory fires were to begin, theCentral Front’s command post trembledas more than 600 Soviet howitzers,Katyushas2 and mortars opened fire onknown and templated German artillerypositions. This counter-preparationlasted for only 30 minutes but had adevastating impact on unsuspecting

First PlaceBy Captain Thomas J. Weiss II

from the First World War and alteredtheir fire support doctrine accordingly.The Germans discounted, for the mostpart, the firepower lessons learned andput their faith in the speed and maneu-verability of the tank. The Soviets, how-ever, anticipated the decisive role thatconventional artillery would play onthe battlefields of the next war. Theycorrectly applied the lessons learnedfrom the First World War—specificallythe effectiveness of massed, centralizedartillery fire, which enabled them toneutralize the attack at Kursk and, ulti-mately, seize the initiative on the east-ern front.

As young artillerymen learning ourtrade on the battlefields of Fort Hood,Texas, the National Training Center atFort Irwin, California, or the Joint Readi-ness Training Center at Fort Polk, Loui-siana, we scrutinize our actions to pro-vide insight as to how we can improveour performance. And when we turn tohistory, it is often exclusively withinthe American experience that we search

German forces preparing to attack. Ger-man artillery was unable to return firein any organized manner until 0445,delaying the attack until 0530—twoand one half-hours behind schedule.3

It was no accident that Zhukov waspoised to inflict such a devastating blowthat morning. The Soviet Army, likethe Germans, analyzed lessons learned

Field Artillery July-August 2000 7

for answers. But this battle, fought be-tween two nations that were both ouradversaries at one time, can providevaluable insight into the correct appli-cation of our fire support doctrine.

Kursk—The Build Up. The Sovietshanded the Germans a series of quickdefeats in the first two months of 1943.On 9 February, the Soviet 40th Armytook Belgorod. Seven days later, the ISS Panzer Corps disobeyed a directorder from Adolph Hitler and evacu-ated Kharkov just before Soviet forcesencircled the city. The Red Army wasmarching west, and it looked as if Stalinhad wrested the strategic initiative awayfrom Hitler once and for all.

But Germany was not about to rollover, and on 6 March, the Germanslaunched a counterattack. Nine dayslater, after decimating the Soviet ThirdTank Army, the I SS Panzer Corps re-captured Kharkov, the same city fromwhich it had fled less than a monthbefore. On 18 March, three days afterKharkov fell, the Germans once againtook Belgorod. The Soviets lost all theground they had captured during thewinter offensives.4

Field Marshall Erich von Manstein,commander of Army Group South andperhaps Germany’s most talented of-ficer, now planned a pincer assault fromthe Orel area in the north and theBelgorod area in the south to encircleand annihilate the Soviet armies in theKursk salient. However, he needed helpto complete the encirclement of Kursk,and it was here that the plan began tounravel. Field Marshall Gunther vonKluge, commander of Army GroupCenter, refused to let any of his batteredunits participate in the attack. Indeci-sion in the German high command andthe rasputitsa, or spring thaw, whichturned most of central Russia into animpassable quagmire, quickly squel-ched any notion that Manstein’s plan orany offensive operation would becomea reality that spring.5

At this point Manstein went to Hitlerwith two options. First, what Mansteincalled his “forehand” stroke, was theplan to encircle the Kursk salient withconcentric attacks from the shoulders.Manstein argued that this stroke shouldbe played at the earliest opportunitybefore the Soviets had a chance to re-cover from their losses or build up theirdefenses.6

Manstein’s “backhand” stroke was towait for what he felt was an eminentSoviet offensive in the south, cede the

entire Donets basin and launch a coun-terattack from the Kiev region, rollingup the Soviet’s extended northern flank.Hitler, fanatical in his insistence not toyield ground to the Soviets for any pur-pose, immediately rejected the “back-hand” stroke and gave the go-ahead forwhat would become known as Opera-tion Zitadelle (Citadel).7

On 15 April 1943, Hitler signed Op-erations Order Number 6 announcinghis decision to launch Citadel. As writ-ten in the order, his intent was quiteclear and indicative of the tactics of theGerman Army: “The objective of theoffensive is to encircle enemy forcesdeployed in the Kursk area by means ofan extremely concentrated thrust con-ducted mercilessly and swiftly by oneassault army each from the areas ofBelgorod and south of Orel, to annihi-late the enemy in a concentric attack.”8

Hitler did not begin the attack rightaway, as Manstein had urged, deciding,

instead, to wait until more armor couldbe brought to the region. Hitler hadgreat faith in the Tiger and Panthertanks and felt that they alone could“…restore the strategic balance in theeast.”9

At the same time Hitler was agonizingover when and how to launch Citadel,Josef Stalin was pondering a decision ofhis own. He knew the Germans wereplanning an attack that summer. In fact,both Stalin and Zhukov agreed this at-tack would come against the Kursk sa-lient. But each had a different opinionregarding how to handle the comingGerman attack.10

Stalin, initially, wanted to launch apre-emptive strike in the Belgorod area.His aversion to a defensive posture wasstrengthened by the “…uncomfortablefact that, up to the spring of 1943, noGerman strategic offensive had everfailed to achieve immediate tactical andoperational success.”11 Still reeling from

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Western Front

Moscow

Front Line 5 July 1943

Ninth ArmyOrel

Army GroupCenter

LuftwafLuftwaffe 6fe 6

LuftwafLuftwaffe 4fe 4

Luftwaffe 6

Luftwaffe 4

Kiev

KurskCentral Front

SoutherSouthern Front

Central Front

Army GroupSouth

Kharkov

Belgorod

South Western Front

RostovSouthern Front

Sea of Azov

CrimeaBlack Sea

Krasnodar

Fourth Panzer Army

Prokhorovka

Battle of Kursk. The battle occurred in the Kursk salient, part of the Russian Central Front,that jutted west into the German’s Army Group Center on 5 July 1943.

July-August 2000 Field Artillery8

the loss of Kharkov and Belgorod, Stalindid not want to risk the same fate onKursk.

Zhukov, on the other hand, saw thecoming German attack as an opportu-nity to deal with the mobile Panzerforces on terrain of his choosing andunder terms of his choosing. On 8 Aprilhe dispatched a report to Stalin follow-ing an extensive tour of the Kursk sa-lient in which he made it clear thatdefense would be their best option. Onlyafter the initial German attackhad been neutralized would aSoviet counterattack be most success-ful.

After much debate, Stalin finally de-ferred to Zhukov’s judgment and agreedto stay on the defensive at Kursk.

An interesting facet of this decision isthe means by which Stalin intended todefeat the German attack. According toZhukov, Stalin “…firmly decided tomeet the German attack with artilleryfire, with air strikes and withcounterattacks”[emphasis added]12

Stalin emphasized fires before maneu-ver. This decision set the stage at Kurskfor the convergence of two vastly dif-ferent doctrinal approaches to fire sup-port.

The Germans emphasized the speedand mobility of their armored forma-tions, at times sacrificing artillery firefor infantry mortar or Luftwaffe sup-port. The Soviets, on the other hand,held Field Artillery in higher regard andconsistently emphasized massed firesas a prerequisite to any armor or infan-try maneuver. In redesigning their firesupport doctrine after the First World

War, both armies came to radically dif-ferent conclusions. How did this hap-pen? Ironically, both conclusions canbe at least partially attributed to a Ger-man artillery officer, Colonel GeorgBruchmüller.

Bruchmüller Doctrine. Bruchmüllerwas easily the most influential artil-leryman of the First World War. Duringthis period, indirect fire was still in itsinfancy, and Bruchmüller was the firstto master the tactics and techniques of

its employment. The fire support planshe designed helped Germany win stun-ning victories on both the eastern andwestern fronts. He taught scores ofyoung German artillerymen the valueof centralization and combined armscoordination.

German Army tactics at the beginningof the First World War stressed decen-tralization. Prior to 1916, artillery wasnever controlled above the division le-vel. But Bruchmüller realized that de-centralized infantry tactics called forincreased centralization in artillery com-mand and control. He argued that thisarchitecture would allow the com-mander to place massed artillery at thedecisive point in time and space on thebattlefield.

Bruchmüller tested this concept in anattack against the Red Army at the Battleof Lake Narotch in early 1916. After thedramatic success of the German attack,senior military leaders began to takenotice of Bruchmüller and his ideas.13

Centralization and massing were notthe only concepts Bruchmüller helpedto develop. In an effort to provide bettercoordination between branches, he be-gan the now common practice of brief-ing the infantry on the fire support planbefore battle. The briefings includedthe locations of the batteries, the loca-tion and duration of the preparationfires and any other targets that would befired during the battle.14 As a result ofthe briefings, infantrymen “…went for-ward with a fuller sense of confidence”15

in the capabilities and knowledge of thelimitations of German artillery.

Tiger Tank—The Germans emphasized the speed and mobility of their armored forma-tions, at times sacrificing artillery fire for infantry mortar or Luftwaffe support.

German 150-mm field howitzers soften up the Soviet defenses to prepare for a panzerassault. During their offensive, the Germans deployed 10,000 artillery pieces—only half ofwhat the Red Army deployed.

Field Artillery July-August 2000 9

As the First World War drew to aclose, Bruchmüller was instrumental inthe fire support planning and executionof General Erich Ludendorff’s five greatoffensives. Ludendorff had great confi-dence in Bruchmüller and consideredhim “…one of the most prominent sol-diers of the war.”16 Employing Bruch-müller’s techniques, these offensivesachieved great tactical success for Ger-many, but, ultimately, the German Armycould not cope with the massive amountsof men and material the Allies pouredinto the theater. Germany succumbedto the materielschlacht (literally, war ofmaterials).17

German Artillery Stagnation. Follow-ing the war, the Versailles Treaty wasdevastating for the German artillery. Itprohibited Germany from having anyheavy artillery and limited it to a total of288 77-mm and 105-mm guns. This hada chilling effect on professional discus-sions of artillery tactics, techniques andprocedures (TTPs) due to the fact that“…all further practical work with thisarm [was] as good as forbidden.”18 Thelessons that Bruchmüller had taught hisarmy slowly began slipping away.

While artillery thought stagnated, therest of the German Army eagerly recon-sidered its entire doctrine in the inter-war period. German military thinkerscame to the conclusion that their armylacked the mobility to exploit the break-throughs they achieved in the latter partof the First World War. The way toavoid losing the next war, they claimed,was to design a force to win so quicklyit would not get bogged down in amaterielschlacht. The spearhead for thisnew force would be the tank.

Colonel-General Heinz Guderian wasthe most influential proponent of tankwarfare before the Second World War.In 1938 Hitler chose him to commandthe world’s first armored corps. But indesigning doctrine to complement hisnew command, Guderian had little timefor fire support. The Germans couldhave produced a self-propelled artillerypiece that would keep up with the ar-mor, but Guderian had another idea: theLuftwaffe “…was to be the blitzkrieg’sartillery.”19 As a result, the GermanArmy had plenty of fast tanks and evenfaster aircraft, but not much room forsluggish, horse-drawn artillery.20

Soviet Adoption of Bruchmüller Doc-trine. After the war, the Soviet militarywent through a similar period of identi-fying and analyzing lessons learned.Soviet military thinkers were also quite

aware of Bruchmüller and his ideas. Hiscentralized, violent artillery prepara-tions had savaged the Soviets on manyoccasions. However, the Soviet mili-tary didn’t eschew his tactics and tech-niques, but rather embraced them. Thereis evidence that as early as 1916 Sovietfire support plans began to closely imi-tate those of Bruchmüller.21

Bruchmüller’s writings after the warimmediately began to influence Sovietfire support doctrine. In his first book,translated into Russian by the first Chiefof Red Army Artillery General YuriMikhaylovich Sheydeman, he identi-fied three phases of fire support foroffensive operations: preparation, sup-port during the assault and follow-onsupport. Soviet doctrine subsequentlyidentified these exact three stages, al-though worded slightly differently: firepreparation, fire support and fire ac-companiment.22 This is indicative of theextent to which Bruchmüller’s conceptshad permeated Soviet military thought.

Soviet artillery focused on centraliza-tion and massing in the interwar period,concepts Bruchmüller pioneered in theFirst World War. In fact, near the end of1941, “the Soviets had centralized thedeep attack mission at field armylevel.”23 This kind of centralization wasfirmly rooted in Soviet military theorythat predicted the war with Germanywould be a “…stubborn, protracted,and bitter war…[which] would entailthe mobilization of the entire country

and its people in the war effort.”24 Theywelcomed the materielschlacht thatGermany was trying so desperately toavoid.

To this end the Soviets made the deter-mination that massed, centralized artil-lery would be the decisive factor. Thisproved to be crucial in the planning andexecution of fire support at Kursk.25

The Battle of Kursk. By 10 May1943, Hitler was still waiting for hisarmor on the Eastern Front. The Porschedesigned Tiger tanks and Ferdinand self-propelled guns were slow to arrive.Design and production problems haddelayed the delivery of new Panthertanks, considered by the army generalstaff before its fielding as the “finestweapon of its type ever produced.”26

Assured that more than 300 of theseweapons would arrive in early June,Hitler decided the attack would com-mence on the 13th of that month.

As the attack date drew near, tankcrews began to discover problems withtheir new machines. They complainedof poor performance in the drive, thetrack suspension and the optics. In ahurry to get these vehicles into the fight,the German Army never performed anyacceptance tests. Hitler decided to pushback the date for the attack once again.27

In the end, the attack that Mansteinwanted to prosecute in March wouldnot begin until early July. Consequently,the Soviets were given ample time toprepare and fortify their defenses in the

The Soviets made the determination that massed, centralized artillery would be thedecisive factor. This proved to be crucial in the planning and execution of fire support atKursk.

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Kursk salient. Personnel, armor and,most importantly, artillery poured intoKursk. At the start of the attack,Rokossovsky’s Central Front “…wasequipped with more artillery than in-fantry regiments.”28 Both Zhukov andRokossovsky place the number of artil-lery and mortar tubes at more than20,000. The artillery concentrationaimed at likely avenues of attack wasnearly 150 tubes per mile of front line.29

The conditions were set for the Sovietartillery to inflict a decisive blow onadvancing German artillery, armor andinfantry.

It should come as no surprise to learnthat the German fire support plan atKursk relied heavily on the Luftwaffe.On airfields surrounding Kharkov onthe morning of 5 July, more than 800aircraft waited wingtip to wingtip forthe go-ahead to take off. The plan wasfor each one of these aircraft to be aloftwhen the tanks started rolling forward.The Luftwaffe, like the rest of the Ger-man Army, believed it would achievetactical surprise that morning.30

But early warning radars soon pickedup the Soviet Seventeenth Air Armyheading toward Kharkov and its crowd-ed airfields. The Germans immediatelyscrambled their aircraft to deal with thethreat and ultimately claimed victory inthe massive air battle that followed.Although the Soviets failed to catch the

Luftwaffe on the ground, they succeededin diverting it from its mission of pro-viding fire support for attacking groundtroops. German artillery would have totake up the slack.31

At 0445 on the morning of 5 July1943, it looked as if a preponderance ofGerman artillery had recovered fromthe savage beating that took place twohours prior. They started to return firein a more concentrated manner whenRokossovsky decided to unleash an evengreater barrage, using nearly double theartillery pieces. For approximately 30minutes, more than 1,000 tubes androckets pounded the German lines.

The effect was immediate and nearlyfatal to the German attack. The barrageprevented German infantry and armorfrom moving to their attack positions.And German assembly areas were cutoff from their command and controlstructures. This second counter-prepa-ration was most effective in “…tearingup communications, as well as observa-tion and control systems ‘almost every-where’ within the German assemblyareas.”32

But the Germans were not about toquit. Recovering quickly from the bar-rage, they were able to commence theattack on both the northern and south-ern shoulders at 0530.

From the north, the initial probingattacks of the Ninth Army commanded

by Field Marshal Walter Model were“…beaten back by a hail of artillery fireat close range.”33 Model pulled his forcesback and preceded his next assault withan hour-long artillery preparation onthe left flank of the Soviet ThirteenthArmy. Begrudgingly, the Soviets be-gan to give ground. As they did, theyleft behind tank destroying teams indeep slit trenches that emerged onlyafter the German armor passed over-head. These teams, coupled with thehundreds of thousands of mines laid bySoviet engineers, accounted for the lossof more than a hundred of Model’stanks on 5 July.34

On the southern shoulder of the Kursksalient near Belgorod, General HermannHoth’s Fourth Panzer Army detected aweakness in the Soviet defenses. Bas-ing his decision heavily on aerial recon-naissance, Hoth decided to first attacknortheast, toward the land bridge atProkhorovka, before the Soviet’s“…massive armoured reserve pouredacross it to slam into [the German’s]right flank.”35 A German victory atProkhorovka would facilitate the de-struction of a large amount of Sovietforces in the southern half of the salientas well as open a route to Kursk.

As this attack commenced, the “…Rus-sian artillery did not waste its chance topound the unprecedented concentrationsof armour packed into Hoth’s attackfrontage.”36 A withering hail of artilleryfire battered German tanks bogged downby minefields and mud. A German tankgunner recalled the fighting that tookplace that day, stating that “…all aroundshells burst from the enemy artillery.‘Stalin Organs’ also join in. It’s a hell-ish concert.”37

During the next five days, Model’sArmy in the north continued to grindagainst the Soviet defenses only toachieve minimal advances. Early in theirpreparation, the Soviets concluded thatthe main attack would come from thenorth and, consequently, identified thisas their main effort. The Germans suf-fered casualties that would have “…bro-ken the back of any army….One regi-ment in its first hour of battle lost everyofficer killed or wounded.”38 By 10July, Model’s attack ground to a halt.The only chance for a German victoryat Kursk rested in Hoth’s Fourth PanzerArmy.

Hoth was doing well by comparison.During the same five-day stretch, hecreated a bulge in the Soviet line, butcouldn’t create the breakthrough he was

The screaming sound generated by the discharge of the Russian Katyusha rocket-launcher and its great firepower had a demoralizing effect upon German troops. Each ofthe eight launching ramps at the back of the truck held two rockets, one on top of the other;all 16 were fired simultaneously.

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Captain Thomas J. Weiss II won First Placein the US Field Artillery Association’s 2000History Writing Contest with this article. Heis the Fire Support Officer for the 3d Battal-ion, 8th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division, FortHood, Texas. His previous assignmentswere as the Assistant Operations Officer inthe 2d Battalion, 82d Field Artillery andBattalion Fire Direction Officer in the samebattalion. He also served as a Battery Ex-ecutive Officer, Fire Direction Officer andCompany Fire Support Officer for the 4thBattalion, 11th Field Artillery, which is indirect support of the 172d Infantry Brigade(Separate) at Fort Wainwright, Alaska.

Endnotes:1. Martin Caidin, The Tigers are Burning (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1974), 168.

2. The Katyusha, or Little Kate, was a rocket launcher mounted on a heavy truck that firedvolleys of up to 48 rockets nearly four miles. The Katyusha was infamous among Germantroopers who quickly learned to dread its distinctive scream. They named the Katyusha“Stalin’s Organ.”3. Robin Cross, Citadel, The Battle of Kursk (New York: Barnes and Nobel, 1993), 160-161.

4. Janusz Piekalkiewicz, Operation Citadel (Novato, California: Presidio, 1987), 31.

5. Ibid.

6. Cross, 86.

7. Ibid., 86-92.

8. Piekalkiewicz, 41-42.

9. Cross, 92.

10. Ibid., 112.11. Ibid.12. Ibid., 113.13. David T. Zabecki, Steel Wind (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1994), 28 and 37.14. Ibid., 45-46.15. Ibid., 29.16. Ibid., 27.17. Ibid., 97.18. Ibid., 106.19. Len Deighton, Blitzkrieg (New York: Knopf, 1980), 139-140. This doctrine was first testedin the Polish campaign of 1939. Echoing the sentiments of many senior German militaryleaders, General von Bock, commander of Army Group North, wrote in his diary, “The artillerymay not delay the infantry.” The message was clear: maneuver would win the war for Germany,not fire support.

20. Zabecki, 106. Even toward the end of World War II, a typical German infantry divisionartillery had 441 horse-drawn vehicles and 2,308 horses.21. Ibid., 126.22. Ibid., 131. These are the same three stages the Soviets identify even today, with theexception of a fourth stage added to the beginning of the attack: fire protection. The purposeof this is to protect troops moving into the attack position.23. Ibid., 130.24. S. A. Tyushkevich, The Soviet Armed Forces: A History of Their Organizational Develop-ment (Moscow: USAF, 1978), 249.25. J. B. A. Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower (Oxford: Military Press, 1989), 222.26. Caidin, 80.27. Ibid., 82.28. Ibid., 104.29. Ibid. and Cross, 140.30. Cross, 169.31. Ibid., 169-170.32. Caidin, 171.33. Cross, 162.34. Caidin, 186-187.35. Cross, 201.36. Ibid., 171.37. Ibid., 177.38. Caidin, 194.39. Cross, 204-210.40. Ibid., 213.41. Ibid.42. Ibid., 213-216.

looking for. He had penetrated farenough to allow the XLVIII PanzerCorps and the II SS Panzer Corps tomake a run for the land bridge atProkhorovka. But they would have todefeat the Soviet Fifth Guards TankArmy, also racing toward Prokhorovkato shore up its defense.39

At 0630 on 12 July, the two forcesmet. The battle began typically withGerman fighters pounding Soviet posi-tions. Soviet fighters arrived soon afterand drove their German counterpartsback to their bases. As Soviet and Ger-man bombers and fighters roared overthe battlefield at Prokhorovka, Soviet ar-tillery began its barrage. The Germanshad lost their air superiority and with it agood deal of their fire support. The advan-tage now shifted to the Soviets.40

Soviet howitzers and Katyushas ham-mered German armor formations andforced them to emerge from their hid-ing positions just as the Soviets begantheir attack. What followed was a“…head-on collision of armour whichhas become one of the great myths ofmilitary history.”41 German and Sovietarmor battled toe-to-toe for the rest ofthe day.

Ironically, in the last battle of a cam-paign decidedly influenced by the ef-fectiveness of fire support, the artilleryof both sides remained idle, unable todistinguish between vehicles in the con-fusion and obscuration of the battle-field. In the end, the Soviets’ brand newequipment and full complement of am-munition simply wore down their wearyopponents. By 2100 both sides estab-

lished defensive positions, but the Ger-mans were beaten.42 The battle of Kurskwas over. The Soviet Army would soongo on the offensive and remain there forthe rest of the war.

Kursk—Lessons Learned. The battleof Kursk pitted against each other twoarmies that had distinctly different doc-trinal approaches to fire support. UntilKursk, no adversary had been able toexpose a flawed German doctrine rootedin the aftermath of the First World War.The Soviets had correctly applied thelessons learned from that war and de-veloped a doctrine that survives largelyintact to this day.

In many ways, the United States mili-tary of today resembles the Germanmilitary of the Second World War. Fol-lowing a stunning victory over Iraq inthe Gulf War, we have considerablyreduced the size of our armed forces.Within the last year, we have begun theprocess of making our heavy forceslighter and more agile. We are attempt-ing to leverage technology to create asmaller, more lethal and deployableforce capable of quickly massing firesat the decisive place and time on thebattlefield.

Our Air Force, like the Luftwaffe, is apowerful asset. The near flawless cam-paigns in the skies over Iraq and Kosovoillustrate its destructive capability. How-ever, as the Germans found out at Kursk,our air power may not always be therewhen we need it.

We cannot let the incredible speed andagility of our maneuver forces and ourcomplete domination of the skies mis-

lead us into thinking that conventionalartillery is less relevant on the modernbattlefield. The Germans learned thatlesson more than 50 years ago. But,unlike the Germans, we have yet toencounter an enemy who values cen-tralized, massed artillery and has writ-ten its doctrine and designed its forcesaround this concept.

The battle of Kursk ultimately waslost on the battlefields of central Russia,but it may have been decided yearsearlier when Germany was writing itsdoctrine and determining how to struc-ture its forces to win the next war. Bythe same token, the lessons young artil-lery officers and NCOs learn today willinfluence our future artillery doctrine.With a perspective grounded in the hardlessons learned by other armies on dis-tant battlefields, we can ensure that theField Artillery remains the King ofBattle.