FMFM 2-7

Fire Support in Marine Air-GroundTask Force Operations

U.S. Marine Corps

PCN 139 000137 00

Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVYHeadquarters United States Marine Corps

Washington, DC 20380-0001

26 September 1991FOREWORD

1. PURPOSE

Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 2-7, Fire Support in Marine Air-Ground Task Force Operations, setsforth the doctrine for fire support in Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) operations.

2. SCOPE

This manual addresses the fundamentals, the fire support means, the uses of fire support, and the doctrinefor fire support coordination in MAGTF operations. The manual is designed to be read, understood, andapplied when using FMFM 6-18, Techniques and Procedures for Fire Support Coordination.

3. SUPERSESSION

FMFM 7-1, Fire Support Coordination, dated 23 April 1981.

4. CHANGES

Recommendations for improvements to this manual are invited from commands as well as individuals.Forward suggestions using the User Suggestion Format to:

Commanding GeneralDoctrine Division (C 42)Marine Corps Combat Development Command2042 Broadway Street Suite 210Quantico, VA 22134-5021

5. CERTIFICATION

Reviewed and approved this date.

BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

M. P. CAULFIEL/Major General, U.S. Marine Corps

Director, MAGTF Warfighting CenterMarine Corps Combat Development Command

Quantico, Virginia

DISTRIBUTION: 13900013700

160—550 0 — 94 — 1 QL 3

User Suggestion Form

From:

To: Commanding General, Doctrine Division (C 42), Marine Corps Combat DevelopmentCommand, 2042 Broadway Street Suite 210, Quantico, Virginia 22134-5021

Subj: RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING FMFM 2-7, FIRE SUPPORTINMARINEAIR-GROUND TASK FORCE OPERATIONS

1. In accordance with the foreword to FMFM 2-7, which invites individuals to submit suggestionsconcerning this FMFM directly to the above addressee, the following unclassified recommendationis forwarded:

Page Article/Paragraph No. Line No. Figure/Table No.

Nature of Change: fl Add

0 Delete

O Change

O Correct

2. Proposed new verbatim text: (Verbatim, double-spaced; continue on additional pages asnecessary.)

3. Justification/source: (Need not be double-spaced.)

Note: Only one recommendation per page.

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Fire Support in MarineAir-Ground Task Force

Operations

Table of Contents

Page

Chapter 1. Introduction

Overview i-iDoctrine— i-iTechniques and Procedures—i-i

Fire Support 1-iFire Support Coordination—1-2Fire Planning— 1-2Deliveiy of Fires—i-2

Marine Corps Warfighting Concept 1-2Maneuver Warfare— 1-2Combined Anns—1-2MAGTF—1-3

Fire Support System 1-3Target Acquisition—i-3Weapons System—1-3Command and Control System—1-4

Fire Support Responsibilities 1-4Command—1-4Control— 1-5Coordination—1-6

Responsibility of the MAGTF and Subordinate Commanders 1-6MAGTF Commander— 1-6GCE Commander—1-6ACE Commander—1-7CSSE Commander— 1-7

vi FMFM 2-7

Responsibility In Amphibious Operations 1-8

Commander, Amphibious Task Force—i-SCommander, Landing Force—1-9FSCC—SACC Relationships— 1-10

Responsibility In Joint Operations 1-10

Chapter 2. Fire Support Means

Artillery 2-iMission of Marine Artillery—2-1Command and Control of Artillexy—2-1Tactical Mission—2-2Organization for Combat—2-4Artillery in Reserve—2-5Artillery Characteristics—2-5

Mortars 2-9Mission of Mortars—2-9Command and Control of 81 mm Mortars—2-9Command and Control of 60 mm Mortars—2-9Mortar Characteristics—2-10

Naval Gunfire 2-11Mission of NGF—2-11Command and Control of NGF—2-11NGF Characteristics—2-1 1Accuracy—2-12

Marine Aviation 2-13Mission of Marine Aviation—2-13Command and Control of Marine Aviation—2-13Characteristics of Marine Aviation—2-14

Chapter 3. Fundamentals for Employment of FireSupport

Firepower and Mobility 3-1

Firepower—3-1Mobility—3-1

Characteristics of Fire Support 3-1Targeting—3-2Allocation of Fire Support—3-3Mobility—3-3Continuity—3-3Fire Support Coordination—3-3Close Liaison—3-4

FIRE SUPPORT IN MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE OPERATIONS vii

Fire Support ContrIbutIon to Combat Power 3-4Fire Support Can Complement or Supplement a Supported Activity—3-4Fire Support Can Reinforce the Effects of Another Activity—3-4Fire Support to Create Opportunity—3-5Fire Support as an Extension of Maneuver—3-5Fire Support to Cause Enemy Reactions—3-5

TermInal Effects—the Basic. ConsIderatIon 3-5Destruction Fire—3-5Neutralization Fire—3-6Harassing Fire—3-6Interdiction Fire—3-6Illumination Fire—3-6Suppressive Fire—3-6Screening Fire—3-6

Other Considerations 3-7Target Selection—3-7Terrain and Weather—3-7Ability to Observe Impact of Rounds—3-7Stationary Target—3-7Provide Necessary Support With Least Possible Ammunition—3-7Fires in Support of the Offense—3-7Fires in Support of the Defense—3-8

Chapter 4. Fire Support Coordination

Princlpies of FIre Support Coordination 4-1Know and Understand the Commander's Intent—4-1Plan Early and Continuously—4-1Exploit All Available Targeting Assets—4-1Consider the Use of All Available Fire Support Means—4-1Use the Lowest Capable Echelon—4-2Use the Most Effective Means—4-2Furnish the Type of Support Requested—4-2Avoid Unnecessary Duplication—4-2Consider Airspace Coordination—4-2Provide Adequate Support—4-2Provide Rapid Coordination—4-3Provide for Flexibility—4-3Provide for the Safeguarding of Friendly Forces and Installations—4-3

Fire Support Piannlng 4-3

viii FMFM 2-7

Fire Support Planning for Amphibious Operations 4-4

Fire Support Requirements—4-4Special Considerations—4-4

Coordination in Operations 4-5

Fire Support Coordination Agencies 4-6

Fire Support Coordination Measures 4-8

Boundaries—4-8Permissive Measures—4-8Restrictive Measures—4-9

Fire Support Communications 4-9

Other Coordination Considerations 4-9

APPENDIXES:

A Glossary A-iB References B-i

Chapter 1

Introduction

Overview

The purpose of this book is to provide doctrinefor fire support in Marine Air-Ground TaskForce (MAGTF) operations. Chapter 1 of thismanual defines fire support, describes the firesupport system, and identifies the fire supportresponsibilities. Chapter 2 identifies andprovides information about each fire supportmeans essential to its effective employment. Themission, command, control, and characteristics ofeach resource are addressed. Chapter 3 presentsfundamentals for the employment of fire support.Chapter 4 provides an overview of fire supportcoordination.

Doctrine

FMFM 2-7 provides the doctrinal foundation foremployment of fire support in MAGTFoperations. Doctrine is the fundamentalprinciples by which the military forces orelements thereof guide their actions in supportof national objectives. It is authoritative butrequires judgment in application. (JointPub 1-02) As it is implemented, doctrinedemands the ability of one to think, teach, andlead.

Techniques and Procedures

FMFM 2-7 is intended as a preface to usingFMFM 6-18, Techniques and Procedures of FireSupport Coordination. Techniques are methodsof accomplishing a goal or mission. Techniquesenhance one's ability to accomplish a task. Forexample, the integration of artillery fires for

suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) in aclose air support (CAS) mission. Procedures area series of standardized steps for doingsomething. For example, the artillery call forfire, the 9-line CAS brief, and artillery gunnerycomputations.

Fire Support

Fire support is the assistance to elements of theground forces engaged with the enemy renderedby other firing units, including (but not limitedto) artillery, mortars, naval gunfire (NGF), CAS,and close-in fire support (CIFS). Fire supportentails the collective and coordinated use ofweapons. Fire support delivered by indirect-fireweapons and armed aircraft comprise oneelement of firepower; direct-fire weapons providethe other. The fires of indirect- and direct-fireweapons are integrated with each other, withother assets such as electronic warfare (EW), andwith maneuver to produce combat power.Combat power includes the destructive and/ordisruptive force a unit can apply at a given time.Combat power is optimized when it is deliveredat a decisive time and place.

The term supporting arms is often used whenreferring to fire support, particularly inamphibious operations. Supporting arms are theair, sea, and land weapons of all types employedto support ground units. (Joint Pub 1-02) Theterms supporting arms coordination andcoordination of supporting fires are also used.

Fire support is composed of three parts—firesupport coordination, fire planning, and delivery

1-2 FMFM 2-7

of fires. Proper application of these parts resultsin the employment of weapons for optimumeffectiveness, while providing safety to friendlyforces and installations.

Fire Support Coordination

Fire support coordination is the planning andexecuting of fire so that targets are adequatelycovered by a suitable weapon or group ofweapons. (Joint Pub 1-02) Fire supportcoordination has two subdivisions: fire supportplanning and coordination in operations. Firesupport planning is the continuous andconcurrent process of analyzing, allocating, andscheduling of fire support to integrate it with themaneuver forces to maximize combat power.Fire support planning results in a fire supportplan which outlines how the commander directsthe use of his available indirect-fire weapons andarmed aircraft. Battalion and company level firesupport planners coordinate the delivery of thesefires with the fires of direct-fire weapons.Coordination in operations is the process ofimplementing the fire support plan andmanaging the fire support available to combatunits. See chapter 4 for a discussion on firesupport coordination.

Fire Planning

Fire planning is the planning conducted bysupporting arms agencies for the employmentof their weapons so that the fires will becoordinated in support of the maneuvercommander's concept of operation. Fireplans are prepared to implement and extend thesupported commander's fire support plan.

Delivery of Fires

Delivery of fire is the execution of fire plans andnecessary coordination in operations. Fires aredelivered to produce a variety of effects.Chapter 3 discusses the contributions fires canmake to combat power.

Marine Corps WarfightingConcept

Maneuver Warfare

The Marine Corps warfighting concept is basedon rapid, flexible, and opportunistic maneuvercapabilities. Maneuver warfare is a warfightingphilosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy'scohesion through a series of rapid, violent, andunexpected actions which create a turbulent andrapidly deteriorating situation with which hecannot cope. (FMFM 1) Fire support inmaneuver warfare is applied through combinedarms.

Combined Arms

Combined arms is the tactics, techniques, andprocedures employed by a force to integratefirepower and mobility to produce a desiredeffect upon the enemy. Combined arms isaccomplished through the tactics and techniquesthat combat forces use at the lower levels andthrough the allocation of assets at the higherlevels. The tool used to generate combined armsis the MAGTF.

The purpose of using combined arms is toemploy units and weapons for mutual support toachieve complementary and reinforcing effectsthat neither could gain separately. The strengthsof one are used to compensate for the limitationsof, or to magnify the force of, another.

Combined arms is applied at all levels, from thefire team to the MAGTF command element(CE). FMFM 1, Warfighting, cites theapplication of combined arms with its discussionof the fire team's employment of the grenadelauncher and automatic rifle.

Supporting arms can be used to achieve acombined arms effect. An example could be theintegration of indirect fire with aviation. Toneutralize or destroy a mobile armored

FIRE SUPPORT IN MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE OPERATIONS 1-3

formation, indirect fires can be used to slow,canalize, and restrict the target until aircraft candeliver their ordnance onto the target. Indirectfires could not by themselves cause the desiredeffect on the target, but they can fix the targetfor the more effective means of fire support, inthis case, the aircraft.

At the MAGTF level, the application ofcombined arms continues. Marine Corps assetscould be integrated with external assets; i.e., jointand allied forces. An example would be theintegration of the capabilities of the U.S. MarineCorps aircraft and the capabilities of the U.S.Air Force aircraft. Further combined armseffects could be achieved using other means.

MAGTF

MAGTFs are task-organized for a specificmission. At the completion of that mission, thetask organization is dissolved in accordance withprearranged plans. The MAGTF includes a CE,one or more ground combat elements (GCEs),an aviation combat element (ACE), and acombat service support element (CSSE). TheMAGTF can function in an amphibiousoperation in support of a naval campaign, or insustained operations ashore as part of a largerjoint or combined land campaign.

In a MAGTF, fire support may be provided bythe GCE, the ACE, and by other supportingforces; e.g., the Air Force, Navy, Army, andallied forces. The fire support, while usedprimarily by the GCE, may be used to supportany element of the MAGTF or to support otherforces.

Fire Support System

Understanding the fire support system isessential to employing fire support effectively.(See fig. 1-1.) The system embodies threecomponents—target acquisition, weapons systems,and a command and control (C2) system. Whenfunctioning together, these components providethe firepower that a commander needs.

Figure 1-1. Fire Support System.

Target Acquisition

Target acquisition is the detection, identification,and location of a target in sufficient detail topermit the effective employment of weapons.(Joint Pub 1-02) Without accurate targetlocation data, indirect-fire weapons are of limitedvalue. Target acquisition is performed by allmeans available to the MAGTF. See figure 1-2for some of the target acquisition meansavailable.

Weapons System

A weapons system is the weapon and thosecomponents required for its operation. Thesystem includes a delivery vehicle and weaponcombination including all related equipment,materials, services, and personnel required sothat the system becomes self-sufficient in itsintended operational environment.

Weapons and ammunition provide the means toattack targets. A variety of weapons andammunition allows for the selection of the mostsuitable means to attack a target.

1-4 FMFM 2-7

CE GCE ACE

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) Foiward observers (FOs) Forward air controller (airborne) FAC(A)Deep reconnaissance units Forward air controllers (FAC5) Naval avIation observers (NAOs)Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) collectors Naval gunfire (NGF) spotters Other aircraft (including recon andPhotographic and satellIte sources Naval aviation observers (NAOs) electronic warfare (EWI)

Human intelligence (HUMINT) Ground Intelligence sensorsAdjacent units Weapons-locatIng radar

External sources Combat troops

Reconnaissance units

FIgure 1-2. Target Acquisition Means.

Weapons systems must be supported, sustained,and employed for survivability. Without support,the sustainment of firepower is threatened. Thissupport includes technical support and combatservice support (CSS). Technical supportenhances the delivery of accurate fires.Examples are the meteorological and surveysupport for artillery units; beacon support forNGF and CAS. CSS is essential to a weaponssystem. Equipment cannot move if it lacks fuelor there are no roads. Weapons cannot fire ifthey lack ammunition or if they are broken.Marines cannot move or shoot well if they donot have water or food for extended periods oftime. Finally, certain actions must be taken toincrease the chances for survival of weapons andthe personnel who operate these weapons.Active and passive defensive measures mustalways be considered and implemented to avoidenemy detection and position-fixing capabilities.Other actions include the avoidance ofpredictable actions and the employment ofdisciplined and trained fire control procedures,operations security, and electronic counter-countermeasures.

Command and Control System

The command and control system is the facilities,equipment, communications, procedures, andpersonnel essential to a commander for planning,directing, and controlling operations of assignedforces pursuant to the missions assigned. (Joint

Pub 1-02) The responsibility for theestablishment of the C2 system is vested in thecommander. The commander establishes C2agencies to assist in organizing, planning,directing, coordinating, and controlling firesupport. (See fig. 1-3.)

Fire Support Responsibilities

The commander is responsible for all thathappens or fails to happen within his command.This is especially true regarding the planning andcoordinating of fire support. To clearlyunderstand the commander's responsibilities, it isimportant to be familiar with the termscommand, control, and coordination.

Command

Command is the authority that a commander inthe military Service lawfully exercises oversubordinates by virtue of rank or assignment.Command includes the authority andresponsibility for effectively using availableresources and for planning the employment of,organizing, directing, coordinating, andcontrolling military forces for theaccomplishment of assigned missions. It alsoincludes responsibility for health, welfare,morale, and discipline of assigned personnel.(Joint Pub 1-02) The commander can delegateauthority but he cannot delegate responsibility.

FIRE SUPPORT IN MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE OPERATIONS 1-5

ATF

Supporting armscoordinationcenter (SACC)

Tactical aircontrol center(TACC)

CE

Fire supportcoordinationcenter (FSCC)

Figure 1-3. Agencies Established to Assist in Fire Support.

Control

Control is the authority which may be less thanfull command exercised by a commander overpart of the activities of subordinate or otherorganizations. (Joint Pub 1-02) Control, unlikeresponsibility, can be delegated. Control ofsupporting arms equates to the authority acommander has over certain activities, and it mayexist in several forms. The followingsubparagraphs discuss these forms of control.

Control Exercised by SupportedCommanders

A commander is given authority over allactivities, including the use of supporting armswithin his assigned zone of action or sectordefense. The commander exercises controlthrough his fire support coordination center(FSCC), forward observers, NGF spotters, andforward air controllers (FACs) as appropriate.

Control of Artillery

The commander of the force (GCE) or divisionexercises control of artillery in his organizationthrough the commander of that artillery unit.The higher artillery commander organizesartillery for combat to meet the needs of theforce as a whole and the needs of subordinateunits. He receives guidance from the com-mander of the force or division of which theartillery is a part. The selection of firingpositions, assignment of fire missions, resupply,etc., are controlled by artillery commanders;

however, the delivery of fires and positioningmust be cleared by the appropriate groundcommander who has control of that zone orsector.

Control of Naval Gunfire

Naval commanders are always responsible for theallocation, logistics support, and operationalcontrol (OPCON) of fire support ships. In thepostlanding phase of an amphibious assault, thecommander, amphibious task force (CATF) maypass control of NGF to the commander, landingforce (CLF). This control equates to theauthority to assign tactical missions to shipsassigned to the CLF. Prior to this passage ofcontrol, the assignment of tactical missions isdischarged by the CATF. When ships are giventactical missions, the selection of targets, thetiming of fires, specification of the line of fire(when not inconsistent with safe navigation), andthe adjustment of fires are functions of thesupported unit.

Air Control

Air control is the authority to direct the physicalmaneuver of aircraft in flight or to direct anaircraft or surface-to-air weapon (SAW) unit toengage a specific target. Air control isperformed when an air controller maneuvers anaircraft by directing the pilot, or a missilecontroller directs a SAW unit to engage aparticular target. Tasks dealing with the actual

GCE ACE

FSCCs

CSSE

Direct airsupport center(DASC)

Rear areaoperations center(RAOC)

Tactical aircommandcenter (TACC)

1-6 FMFM 2-7

maneuver of aircraft are air control tasks. Formore information on air control, seeFMFM 5-60, Control of Aircraft and Missiles(under development).

Coordination

Coordination is the action necessary to ensureadequately integrated relationships betweenseparate organizations located in the same area.Coordination may include such matters as firesupport, emergency defense measures, areaintelligence, and other situations in whichcoordination is considered necessary.(FMFRP 0-14) The responsibility forcoordination is always vested in the commander.Planning and coordinating the use of supportingarms requires close interaction among allorganizations involved.

Responsibility of the MAGTFand SubordinateCommanders

MAGTF Commander

The MAGTF commander exercises authority inthe planning and operational phases. TheMAGTF commander exercises his authorityduring planning and execution of operations tofocus his assets and accomplish his mission. Hehas three separate but possibly concurrentengagements: the deep battle, the close battle,and the rear battle. The deep battle lies beyondthe area of influence of the GCE commander(s).It is the battle on which the MAGTFcommander usually focuses. To execute thisdeep battle, the MAGTF commander retainsOPCON of all organic assets which can influencethe deep battle, including Marine aviation, andexercises priority of tasking aircraft. He alsoretains OPCON of long-range target acquisitionassets. If NGF assets are available, the MAGTFcommander may retain some of these assets tosupport the deep battle and allocate NGF assetsto subordinate commands as appropriate.Command, control, and coordinationresponsibilities in amphibious and joint

operations are discussed on pages 8 through 11of this chapter.

The MAGTF commander establishes an FSCC.The MAGTF FSCC is a task-organized facilitywhich includes the personnel, equipment, andcommunications links appropriate to the firesupport coordination functions to be performedand the tactical situation. The MAGTF FSCC isstaffed using the supporting arms representatives* (e.g., artillery officer, air officer, etc.) on theMAGTF CE's staff as a nucleus withaugmentation from USMC and external sources.USMC sources may include the thr/naval gunfireliaison company (ANGLICO) (if not otherwisecommitted); the GCE(s); assets of anuncommitted MAGTF; and/or non-Fleet MarineForce (FMF) assets. External sources caninclude representatives or liaisonpersonnel/teams from joint and allied forces.

The role of the MAGTF FSCC is to implementthe MAGTF commander's intent which will befocused on the deep battle. The preponderanceof the MAGTF FSCC's effort is in planning asopposed to the actual integration of the deliveryof supporting arms. The MAGTF FSCCcomplements and extends the fire supportcoordination efforts of other elements of theMAGTF. The MAGTF FSCC maintains closecoordination with the GCE(s) FSCC forintegration of the fire support plans of the deepand close battles. The MAGTF FSCC interfaceswith the ACE's Marine Air Command and Con-trol System (MACCS). Such interface is madeby collocation with a task-organized MACCSagency. For more on the MAGTF FSCC, seechapter 4 of this manual, and FMFM 2-7.1, FireSupport Coordination by the MAGTF CommandElement (under development).

* NOTE: These supporting arms representativeswere previously referred to as the supportingarms special staff.

GCE Commander

The GCE is a task-organized elementconstructed around an infantry unit and includes

FIRE SUPPORT IN MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE OPERATIONS 1-7

appropriate combat support and CSS units. TheGCE commander establishes the GCE FSCC toperform his fire support coordination functions.FSCCs are also established by subordinatecommanders of the GCE down to the battalionlevel. The GCE FSCC has sufficient targetanalysis and communications capability to planfires, perform targeting, integrate fires withmaneuver, and accomplish coordination duringoperations. The OCE FSCC plans andintegrates fire support within the GCE's area ofinfluence.

The OCE has organic artillery and mortarsupport. It also plans and coordinates thedelivery of other assets such as NGF, air support,EW, etc., as allocated by the MAGTFcommander. The delivery of aviation support isenhanced by tactical air control parties (TACP5)

• organic to the GCE. Depending on the size ofthe airspace to be controlled, the number andgeographical spread of units, the extent ofprojected air operations, communicationsrequirements, and mobility requirements, aDASC or liaison team thereof will be collocatedwith the GCE FSCC.

The GCE FSCC coordinates with the adjacentGCE's FSCC when the MAGTF has multipleGCEs, with other elements of the MAGTF (e.g.,CSSE), and with adjacent external forces on firesupport coordination matters. Matters whichcannot be resolved by direct coordinationbetween subordinate FSCCs are resolved by theMAGTF FSCC. Fires for the close and rearbattle are integrated and coordinated by theFSCCs of the GCE(s) who are supported byDASC.

ACE Commander

The ACE is a task-organized element comprisedof a headquarters and an aviation unit whichvanes in size from a helicopter squadron (—)(Rein) to one or more aircraft wings. Althoughnormally viewed as a supporting arm, the ACEmay be tasked as the focus of effort for theMAGTF. The ACE commander performs hisfire support functions through the MACCS.These functions include control and coordination

of aircraft supporting maneuver forces. Inamphibious operations, control and coordinationof aircraft is initially discharged by the CATF.When control of air operations has been passedto the CLF, the ACE coordinates air operationsin the objective area, including antiair warfare(AAW) and airborne EW, but excludingantisubmarine warfare, antisurface warfare, seamining, and mine countermeasure operations.The ACE manages the airspace within theMAGTFs area of responsibility. The ACEprovides all or a portion of the six functions ofMarine aviation in varying degrees based on thetactical situation and the MAGTF's mission andsize. The six functions of Marine aviation areoffensive air support, assault support, airreconnaissance, EW, AAW, and control ofaircraft and missiles. The ACE receives targetinginformation, targeting guidance, and the firesupport plan from the MAGTF. The ACE isresponsible for detailed aviation planning tosupport the MAGTF commander's fire supportplan.

CSSE Commander

The CSSE commander's responsibility in firesupport includes providing CSS for thesustainment of fire support, functioning as therear area security coordinator (RASC) whendesignated, and employing indirect fire assetswhen these means are allocated. The MAGTFcommander normally designates the CSSEcommander as the RASC. As the RASC, theCSSE commander will direct and control reararea security (RAS )through the rear areaoperations center (RAOC). The RAOC isstaffed using organic CSSE personnel, withaugmentation from—

• ANGLICO, if not otherwise employed in itsprimary mission.

• FMF assets.

• Assets from non-FMF organizations.

Fire support is used for RAS as required. Thefire support representatives in the RAOCcoordinate the delivery of fire support with the

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FSCC of the GCE. When there is more thanone GCE, the coordination is effected with theGCE closest to the projected/actual location ofenemy rear area activity.

Responsibility in AmphibiousOperations

Commander, Amphibious Task Force

As the overall commander, the CATF is chargedwith overall responsibility for an amphibiousoperation. The CATF commands all elements ofthe amphibious task force (ATF), including thefire support elements. Because these firesupport elements are organic to the componentcommanders, command of the fire supportelements seldom changes. The CATF'scommand of landing force (LF) fire supportelements is exercised through the CLF as acomponent commander. CATFs fire supportresponsibilities consist of planning, targeting,control, coordinating, and monitoring of firesupport activities.

The CATF establishes a SACC at the ATF levelof the amphibious organization. Subordinatenaval commanders also establish SACCs whenappropriate; e.g., attack group, advanced force.The SACC is a single location on board anamphibious command ship in which allcommunication facilities incident to thecoordination of fire support of the artillery, air,and naval gunfire are centralized. This is thenaval counterpart to the fire supportcoordination center utilized by the landing force.(Joint Pub 1-02) The SACC is staffed by thepersonnel from the ATF, with LF representativesassigned.

As the coordinating authority for planning, theCATF is responsible for preparation of theoverall plan for the amphibious operation.This includes the planning for the employmentof all aircraft, artillery, and NGF prior to thetransfer of control and coordinationresponsibility ashore. The CATF prepares acoordinated air and naval plan for all phases ofthe operation. Close interface between

the SACC and the ATF joint intelligence centeris essential for targeting.

Upon initiation of planning, the CATF preparesand publishes the ATF target list. The target listis a listing of targets maintained andpromulgated by the senior echelon of command;it contains those targets which are to be engagedby supporting arms, as distinguished from a "listof targets" which may be maintained by anyechelon as confirmed, suspect, or possible targetsfor informational and planning purposes. (JointPub 1-02) Since the ATF target list containsthose targets which are to be engaged, the ATFtarget list should consist of high-payoff targets.There is only one ATF target list. The ATFtarget list includes recommended targets from alllevels of the LF provided during concurrentplanning and coordination. The ATF target listis kept current by the promulgation of targetbulletins (TARBULS). TARBULS add newtargets as they are discovered, delete inactive anddestroyed targets, and assess the damage ontargets attacked.

Initially, the CATF exercises control over air andNGF, and through the CLF, artillery. (Seefig. 1-4.) Air control is exercised by variouscommanders as the operation progresses. Aircontrol may be delegated to an advanced forcecommander and to the attack group commanderin their respective landing areas. The CATFassumes control of all air operations upon arrivalin the objective area. Subsequently, control ofall or a portion of air operations may be passedto the CLF or the joint task force commanderconcerned. As the first LF elements reach theshore, that portion of control that relates to thefiring of specific missions in support of the LFshifts to those elements. Withthe commencement of on-call fires, the controlof supporting arms in the attack of specifictargets and target areas becomes an LFresponsibility when the target affects the LF.

The CATF exercises overall coordination for thedelivery of NGF, air support, and LF artilleryfire, including requests for the use of nuclear andchemical weapons. The extent of coordinationexercised by the SACC is primarily supervising

FIRE SUPPORT IN MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE OPERATIONS 1-9

responsibility if required. The CATF continuesto assist the targeting function by passingappropriate information to the MAGTF G-2ashore. This information is used by the G-2section in its liaison with the FSCC.

Commander, Landing Force

The CLF is the officer designated in the initia-ting directive to command the LF. In Navy!Marine Corps amphibious operations, theMAGTF commander is the CLF. The CLF hasresponsibility for the coordination of LF requestsfor fire support during all phases of theoperation. Air, artillery, and NGF requirementsof the LF are integrated with planned maneuveroperations. Consolidated requests for air andnaval gunfire support (NGFS) are presented tothe CATF for fulfillment. The CLF plans andcontrols artillery for the operation.

Figure 1-4. Control and CoordinationRelationships (Prior to Passing Any

Control and Coordination Functions Ashore).

the execution of a detailed fire support plan.Coordination of supporting fires is accomplishedby subordinate units within their own boundariesand with adjacent units, with SACC assistancewhen required. The actions of subordinateFSCCs usually do not begin until after theexecution of the overall ATF planned fires andafter FSCCs are established ashore. The SACCmakes appropriate coordination to achieve acombined arms effect, such as the inclusion ofEW support.

When LF command and coordination agenciesare phased ashore and operating effectively, theCATF normally passes the responsibility forappropriate fire support coordination andcontrol functions to the CLF upon request.Thereafter the CLF coordinates the fires of allsupporting arms with troop maneuvers. TheCATF's SACC assumes a standby or monitoringstatus, prepared to take control and coordination

Conditions permitting, the responsibility foroverall coordination of fires and the control ofair and NGF is normally transferred to the CLFwhen the CLF has established the necessaryfacilities ashore for control and coordination.However, this does not mean that they must betransferred simultaneously. In most cases, theresponsibility for overall coordination can bepassed earlier than control due to the morecomplex facilities required for control. Afterresponsibility for coordination and control hasbeen passed ashore, the CLF is responsible foroverall planning, coordination, and control of thefire support means available in the objectivearea. Responsibility for the maintenance of thetarget list is normally passed to the CLF whenthe CATF transfers control to the CLF.

Fire support is coordinated through FSCCsestablished at each echelon of the LF, frombattalion to MAGTF. In Navy/Marine Corpsamphibious operations, the MAGTF FSCC is theLF FSCC.

The LF FSCC provides LF representatives towork in the ATF SACC. Other LFrepresentatives may also be provided, such asrepresentatives from the GCE, ACE, CSSE, EW,

160—550 0 — 94 — 2 QL 3

MR7 NAVAL I

GUNFIREARTILLERY

OPERATIONAL CONTROL — OPERATIONAL CONTROL

COORDINATION — — A LIMITED DEGREE OF AUTHORITYCONCERNING THE ACTION OFSUPPORTING ARMS

* WOULD NOT APPLY TO ARTILLERY USED TO SUPPORTINITIAL LANDING, AS OPPOSED TO ARTILLERY LANDEDCONVENTIONALLY WITH THE LANDING FORCE. CONTROLWOULD THEN BE EXERCISED BY CATF.

1-10 FMFM 2-7

unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), etc. Theserepresentatives work in the ATF SACC duringthe period prior to the passage of coordinationresponsibility to the CLF. These representativesreview requests of LF elements ashore, monitorfire support activities, and plan additionalrequirements. They make recommendationsregarding troop safety and type and means ofdelivery. They also record all target informationfor future reference ashore. One of therepresentatives provided is the LF fire supportcoordinator (FSC). The LF FSC is provided bythe LF FSCC. The LF FSC keeps the SACCinformed of the use of artillery in order topermit overall coordination of supporting arms.The artillery headquarters keeps the LF FSCinformed of the artillery tactical situation usingthe LF artillery command/fire direction net.

When subordinate amphibious attack groups andcorresponding landing groups are formed, firesupport coordination agencies are formed forthem and employed in a manner similar to thoseof the CATF/CLF. The advanced force echelonof the FSCC is usually referred to as the FSCCdetachment with the advanced force SACC. TheFSCC detachment embarks with the necessarypersonnel and equipment required to conductoperations, while facilitating the subsequenttransfer to the ATF flagship. Personnel normallyinclude NGF, air, and target information officers(TIO) or their representatives. An experiencedindividual is appointed to head the FSCCdetachment. Functions of the FSCC detachmentinclude advising the advanced force commanderand his staff as to the priority of targets from theLF point of view, and the gathering, tabulation,and reporting of information of importance tothe CLF about pre-D-day operations. The FSCCdetachment, working with the advanced forceSACC, analyzes the results of pre-D-dayoperations and makes appropriate

recommendations to the advanced forcecommander concerning the execution of thelanding as planned.

FSCC—SACC Relationships

Upon receipt of the initiating directive for anamphibious landing, CATF and CLF establishthe SACC and FSCC, respectively. Since theCATF/CLF relationship is that of equals in theplanning stage, liaison between coordinationcenters should be established so that concurrentplanning can begin. They work together toaccomplish the overall fire support planning forthe assault and subsequent LF operations ashore.

After passage of control and coordinationresponsibilities ashore, the SACC performs amonitoring function. The SACC does thosetasks necessary to maintain the ability to resumecontrol and coordination responsibility shouldthe need arise. Additionally, the SACC willcontinue to control and coordinate thosefunctions not passed ashore, as required.

Responsibility in JointOperations

The MAGTF can operate as a subordinate to adesignated joint force commander (JFC). Insome operations, the MAGTF commander maybe designated as the JFC. The JFC isresponsible for the planning, coordination, andexecution of effective fire support in a jointoperation. Joint Pub 3-09, Doctrine for Joint FireSupport and FMFM 2-7.1, Fire SupportCoordination by the MAGTF Command Element(under development), provide detailedinformation for fire support coordination in jointoperations.

Chapter 2

Fire Support Means

This chapter appraises the fire support means available to the commander andprovides fundamental information conducive to their employment. Detailedinformation on each can be found in appropriate reference materials. See appendix Bfor references.

Artillery

Mission of Marine Artillery

The mission of artillery in the Marine division isto furnish close and continuous fire support byneutralizing or destroying targets which threatenthe success of the supported unit. To accomplishits mission, artillery conducts three tasks:

• Provide timely, close, accurate, and continuousfire support.

• Provide depth to combat by attacking hostilereserves, restricting movement, providing long-range support for reconnaissance elements,and disrupting C2 systems and logisticalinstallations.

• Deliver counterfire within the range of theweapons systems to ensure the freedom ofaction of the ground forces.

Command and Control of Artillery

The artillery regiment is the primary source offire support in the Marine division. Through aprocess referred to as organization for combat,artillery units are assigned a commandrelationship and receive a tactical mission whichdelineates their fire support responsibility.

The assignment of a command relationship isbased primarily on the factors of mission, enemy,terrain and weather, troops and supportavailable, and time available (METr-'I). The

organization may be modified as the operation orphases of an operation change. For example, incompositing two MAGTFs into a largerMAGTF, artillery units are normally reorganizedand placed under the command of the seniorartillery commander. Through commandrelationships, artillery is placed with anorganization. The commander exercises controlof artillery placed in his organization. Thecommand relationship given (or inherent) to anartillery unit may be organic, assigned, attached,OPCON, or administrative control.

Command Relationships

Organic means assigned to and forming anessential part of a military organization. (JointPub 1-02) The artillery regiment is the organicartillery component of the Marine division.

Assign means to place units or personnel in anorganization where such placement is relativelypermanent, and/or where such organizationcontrols and administers the units or personnelfor the primary function, or greater portion ofthe functions, of the unit or personnel. (JointPub 1-02) Artillery may be assigned in thestrategic tailoring of a force to meet specificrequirements of a theater of operation or acontingency plan.

Example: 1st Battalion, 12th Marines is assignedto 3d Marines.

Attach (NATO) means to place units orpersonnel in an organization where suchplacement is relatively temporary. Subject to

2-2 FMFM 2-7

limitations imposed in the attachment order, thecommander of the formation, unit, ororganization receiving the attachment willexercise the same degree of command andcontrol thereover as he does over the units andpersons organic to his command. However, theresponsibility for transfer and promotion ofpersonnel will normally be retained by the parentformation, unit, or organization. (JointPub 1-02) Supply and maintenance requirementsshould be specified in the attachment order interms of what the receiving unit will provide andwhat the parent unit will provide. Attachmentmay apply to artillery in several situations:

• Artillery is attached to a supported unit whenartillery requirements cannot be adequatelyprovided by the parent artillery organizationand control compels the establishment of acommand relationship between the supportedand supporting commander. Artillery unitsare not normally attached to battalion-sized orsmaller maneuver units unless distance,communications, or other factors do not allowthe artillery headquarters to exercise adequatecontrol over the artillery units. An example ofthe above is an artillery battery attached to theGCE of a Marine expeditionary unit (MEU).Attachment reduces the ability of the higherartillery commander to meet the needs of theforce or division commander. There is essen-tially no difference in quantity and responsive-ness of artillery whether a battalion is placedin direct support (DS) of a regiment orattached to it. However, from the higher artil-lery commander's point of view, there is a dif-ference. When an artillery unit is attached,the higher artillery commander loses C2 overthat unit. In contrast, if a DS mission isassigned to the unit, the higher artillery com-mander can use that unit's fires when it is notfiring for the supported unit, can repositionthe artillery unit if he so desires, and can evenchange the mission of the unit if necessary.

• Artillery may be attached to another artilleryunit for reinforcement. For example, an artil-lery battalion supporting a reinforced infantryregiment may have attached firing batteries,counterbattery radar platoon detachment, etc.

• When a suitable artillery headquarters isunavailable, an artillery battalion or batterymay be attached to another of like size toform an artillery groupment. Groupments aretemporary formations used when one unitmust exercise greater control over another unitthan is inherent in a reinforcing mission.Attachment is established for logistical andadministrative considerations. The seniorcommander of the two units is the groupmentcommander, and he assigns missions to thesubordinate unit.

Operational control is the authority delegated toa commander to direct forces assigned so thatthe commander may accomplish specific missionsor tasks which are usually limited by function,time, or location; to deploy units concerned, andto retain or assign tactical control of those units.It does not include authority to assign separateemployment of components of the unitsconcerned. Neither does it, of itself, includeadministrative or logistic control. (JointPub 1-02) OPCON has an occasional use inestablishing a relationship between artillery units;e.g., an artillery battalion may be given OPCONof a radar section. However, it is rarely used toestablish a relationship between an artillery unitand a supported unit.

Administrative control is the direction orexercise of authority over subordinate or otherorganizations in respect to administrative matterssuch as personnel management, supply, services,and other matters of the subordinate or otherorganizations not included in the operationalmissions. (Joint Pub 1-02) Administrativecontrol is used occasionally in establishingcommand relationships for artillery units.

Tactical Mission

Standard Tactical Mission

Infantry units are usually given mission-typeorders; e.g., prevent the enemy from crossing theriver. Artillery units are assigned tacticalmissions. A tactical mission defines the firesupport responsibility of an artillery unit,normally a battalion, to a supported unit or to

FIRE SUPPORT IN MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE OPERATIONS 2-3

support responsibility of an artilleiy unit,normally a battalion, to a supported unit or toanother artillery unit. These missions areassigned by the higher artillery commander,based on the guidance given by the commanderof the force or division to which the artillery is apart. An artillery unit assigned a tactical missionremains under the command of the higherartillery commander. Like commandrelationships, tactical missions may change in thecourse of the battle. There are four standardtactical missions for artillery, described byinherent responsibilities. (See fig. 2-1.)

When an artillery unit is assigned a tactical mis.sion of DS, the artillery unit designates how callsfor fire will be answered to fit the needs of thesupported unit. Each firing battery may have itsown conduct of fire (COF) net, each netmonitored by the battalion fire direction center(FDC); or the battalion FDC may establishmultiple COF nets and direct firing batteries torespond to calls for fire on a designated net andrespond to fire missions assigned by the battalionFDC.

TACTICALMISSIONS INHERENT RESPONSIBILITIES

ARTY UNITWITH

MISSION OF

ANSWERS CALLSFOR FIRE IN

PRIORITY FROM

ESTABLISHESLIAISON

WITH

ESTABLISHESCOMMUNICATIONS

WITH

HAS AS ITSZONE OF

FIRE

FURNISHESFORWARD

OBSERVERS

IS

POSITIONEDBY

HAS ITSFIRES

PLANNED BY

DIRECT

SUPPORT

1. SUPPORTED

UNIT

2. OWN

OBSERVERS

3. HIGHER

ARTILLERY

HEADQUARTERS

SUPPORTED

UNIT (DOWNTO BATTALION

LEVEl.)

SUPPORTED

UNIT

ZONE OF

SUPPORTED

UNIT

TO EACH

COMPANY-

SIZED

MANEUVER

ELEMENT OF

SUPPORTED

UNIT

UNIT

COMMANDER AS

DEEMED

NECESSARY OR

ORDERED BY

HIGHER

ARTILLERY

HEADQUARTERS

DEVELOPS

OWN FIRE

PLAN

REINFORCING 1. REINFORCEDUNIT

2. OWNOBSERVERS

3. HIGHERARTILLERY

HEADQUARTERS

REINFORCED

UNIT

REINFORCED

UNIT

ZONE OF

FIRE OF

REINFORCED

UNIT

UPON

REQUEST OF

REINFORCED

UNIT

REINFORCED

UNIT. OR

ORDERED BY

HIGHER

ARTILLERY

HEADQUARTERS

REINFORCED

UNIT

GENERAL

SUPPORT

1. HIGHERARTILLERY

HEADQUARTERS

NO INHERENTREQUIREMENT

NO INHERENT

REQUIREMENT

ZONE OF

SUPPORTED

UNIT

NO INHERENT

REQUIREMENT

HIGHER

ARTILLERY

HEADQUARTERS

HIGHER

ARTILLERY

HEADQUARTERS

GENERAL

SUPPORT

REINFORCING

1. HIGHER

ARTILLERY

HEADQUARTERS

2. REINFORCED

UNIT

3. OWNOBSERVERS

REINFORCED

UNIT

REINFORCED

UNIT

ZONE OF

SUPPORTED

UNIT TO

INCLUDE

ZONE OF

REINFORCED

UNIT

UPON

REQUEST OF

REINFORCED

UNIT

SUBJECT TO

PRIOR

APPROVAL OF

HIGHER

ARTILLERY

HEADQUARTERS

HIGHER

ARTILLERY

HEADQUARTERS

OR

REINFORCED

UNIT SUBJECT

TO PRIOR

APPROVAL BYHIGHER

ARTILLERY

HEADQUARTERS

HIGHER

ARTILLERY

HEADQUARTERS

Figure 2-1. ArtIllery TactIcal MIssions.

2-4 FMFM 2-7

Nonstandard Tactical Mission

When fire support requirements cannot be metor completely conveyed by one of the standardtactical missions, a nonstandard tactical missionmay be assigned. A nonstandard missionamplifies, changes, or limits one or more of theinherent responsibilities of a standard tacticalmission. The nonstandard stipulations shouldnot degrade the ability of a unit to accomplishthe inherent responsibilities of the standardmission. The DS tactical mission should not bemodified. The nonstandard tactical mission isnormally used when there is not enough artilleryto cover artillery requirements. An example of anonstandard mission is as follows:

1st Bn 10th Mar (155,T): OS, 2d priority incalls for fire (PCFF) light armored infantry(LAI) battalion (Bn) until 031600 AUG

(1st Bn is GS to the division, but 2d PCFF is

to LAI Bn.)

On-Order Missions

On-order missions serve as warning orders toalert units of anticipated changes to their tacticalmission. This enables the artillery commander toplan and initiate preparations for transition toanother mission. The assignment of an on-ordermission must take into account positioning andammunition requirements.

Organization for Combat

The organization for combat must make artilleryimmediately responsive to the needs of the frontline troops, while retaining some artilleryresponsive to the needs of the force or divisioncommander. This is accomplished in part by theestablishment of the organization for combat.For example, general support (OS) establishescentralized control while DS establishesdecentralized control. Other methods used toaccomplish this are by the assignment of priorityof fires and priority targets. The optimumdegree of control varies with the tacticalsituation. Regardless of the degree ofcentralization, the force or division commander

can exercise control of an artillery unit as long asthe unit remains under his control.

There are several guiding fundamentals whenorganizing for combat. These fundamentalsinclude: providing maximum feasible centralizedcontrol, ensuring adequate support forcommitted maneuver elements, providing weightto the main attack or most vulnerable area,facilitating future operations, and ensuringimmediately available artillery for the highercommander.

Maximum Feasible Centralized Control

Centralized control places artillery responsive tothe needs of the higher headquarters and theforce as a whole. Artillery is most effective whencontrol is centralized at the highest levelconsistent with its fire support capabilities andthe requirements of the overall mission.Centralized control permits flexibility in artilleryemployment ensuring effective support to theforce as a whole and its subordinate units.Centralized control is essential in defensivesituations where the force or division commanderwill need to use his artillery to respond to theenemy's initiatives. The OS and general support-reinforcing (GS-R) tactical missions provide forcentralized control.

Decentralized control makes artillery responsiveto the needs of the front line troops. Inoffensive situations, the commander possessesthe initiative. An organization for combat whichplaces artillery responsive to subordinatecommanders is favorable in these situations. TheD5 tactical mission accomplishes decentralizedcontrol.

Priority of Fires

When required, control of artillery can be furtherallocated by assignment of priority of fires.Priority of fires is guidance to a fire supportplanner to organize and employ fire supportmeans in accordance with the relative importanceof the maneuver units' missions. Priority of firesis normally used to strengthen the main effort orthe most vulnerable area.

FIRE SUPPORT IN MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE OPERATIONS 2-5

Priority Targets

Priority targets are a means of allocating controlof artillery to a supported unit. A priority targetis a target which when requested for attack takespriority over all other requests. Priority targetsare designated by the maneuver battalioncommander, who also provides specific guidanceas to when the targets will become priority,munitions to use, accuracy, and desired effects.When not engaged in fire missions, firing unitswill lay on priority targets, thereby Increasingresponsiveness.

Adequate Support for Committed ManeuverElements

Adequate fire support must be provided to unitscommitted in combat. What constitutes adequatesupport is determined by the commander,considering METI'-T. The minimum adequatefire support for a committed unit (e.g., infantryregiment or separate maneuver battalion) isconsidered to be one artillery battalion in DS.Some situations may require more artillerysupport; e.g., reinforcing or GS-R artillery. Thismay result in less support to one unit to increasethe combat power of another.

Weight the Main Attack or Most VulnerableArea

Weight must be added to support the mainattack or to strengthen the most vulnerable area.This fundamental can be accomplished in severalways:

• Reinforcing or GS-R missions.

• Assignment of positions and azimuths of fire.

• Allocation of additional ammunition.

• Assignment of priority of fires.

Facilitate Future Operations

Artillery must be responsive to unforeseen eventsand capable of smooth transition from onemission to another. Nonstandard and on-order

tactical missions, positioning, and allocation ofammunition facilitates this fundamental.

Immediately Available Artillery for the HigherCommander

The force or division commander must retainimmediately available artillery with which he caninfluence the action. GS and GS-R missionsfacilitate this fundamental.

Artillery in Reserve

Artillery is not held in reserve. Artillery with aunit assigned a reserve mission is given anothertactical mission within the division, or employedin support of another division if the parentdivision is in reserve. Liaison sections mayremain with the reserve unit for planningpurposes.

Artillery Characteristics

Artillery is the commander's principal means offire support in ground combat. It can yieldsubstantial firepower to the supported unit.There are fundamental considerations for theoptimum employment of artillery.

Weapons and Ammunition

Artillery weaponry includes cannons and rocketsthat can deliver accurate fires at extended ranges.Marine artillery cannons consist of light (120 mmor less) and medium (121 mm through 160 mm)weapons. Marine heavy artillery (161 mmthrough 210 mm) is currently located only onboard maritime prepositioning ships. There areno very heavy (greater than 210 mm) caliberweapons in the Marine Corps inventory. Avariety of munitions provide increased flexibilityin attacking targets.

Heavier caliber weapons produce greatereffectiveness from one hit than lighter calibers.A direct hit by a light caliber weapon is usuallyrequired to destroy a hard target such as anarmored personnel carrier. An impact within10 m by a light caliber weapon will destroy, or

2-6 FMFM 2-7

seriously damage, a medium target, such as atruck, radar station, or a missile launcher.However, a direct hit is not always required todestroy a target by a heavier caliber weapon.

Accuracy

Artillery weapons are area weapons rather thanpoint-target killers. The exception is guidedprojectiles such as Copperhead, which give theartillery a single shot kill capability againstmoving and stationary armored targets. Artilleryweapons can be employed using either direct orindirect delivery techniques. Fires can bedelivered without observation, but are deliveredmost effectively when observed.

Delivery accuracy is a measure of the ability of aweapon system to place munitions on an aimingpoint. Inaccuracy of a weapon system is causedby a number of factors including hardwareinaccuracies, environmental effects, and humanerror. Some of these errors are inherent to theartillery gunnery system and cannot beeliminated, thus resulting in natural dispersion.Dispersion must be understood by all concernedwith artillery fire.

If several rounds are fired under identicalconditions from a single weapon with the samefiring data, the rounds will not fall on the samepoint. The pattern on the ground will beroughly elliptical, with the long axis along theline of fire. Half of the rounds fired will fallwithin a predictable distance over or short of thepoint of aim. This distance is referred to as oneprobable error in range (PE/R). All rounds firedwill impact within four PEIRs of the aim point.The same procedure applies to deflection andheight of burst probable errors. (See fig. 2-2.)Generally, the closer the weapon is to the target,the more accurate the fire.

The dispersion of artillery impact is acharacteristic which can be regarded as either acapability or a limitation, depending on the typeof target under attack. Against area targets, thebursting projectiles in the dispersion patternachieve a wide area coverage. However, whenattacking small area or point targets, thedispersion phenomenon necessitates the firing ofmany rounds in order to expect one round tocause effect on the target.

Figure 2-2. Probable Error in Range.

MEAN POINT OF IMI

ONE PROBABLE ERROR

For an M.198 howitzer firing high explosive (HE) at a range of 6,000 meters (charge 5, Green Bag Propellant), 50%of the rounds will Impact within 9 meters over or short of the aim poInt. It Is possible for some rounds to impactup to 36 meters from the aim point. By contrast, If the PEIR is 20 meters, some rounds could Impact as much as80 meters over or short of the target. This data, provided by the FDC upon request, allows the commander to closewith his fires while being attentive to the probability of casualties to his troops.

FIRE SUPPORT IN MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE OPERATIONS 2.7

Massed Fires

Massing artillery fires on targets or critical pointsnormally results in maximum effectiveness with aminimum expenditure of ammunition andreduces vulnerability to enemy target acquisitiondevices. Successive volleys give the enemy timeto react and seek greater cover and increase theenemy's capability of acquiring friendly artilleryfires.

Massed fires are most important when engagingrelatively soft targets (e.g., personnel in open)which can quickly become hard (e.g., personnelwith overhead cover. Massed fires inflict damageand casualties on the enemy before the enemyhas time to react and seek cover). Massed firesdo not give increased effectiveness for targetsthat are hard and stay hard. In this case, anaccurate volume of fire is more important.

The capability of artillery units to mass fires isinfluenced by accurate survey and utilization of

gunnery techniques. Physical massing of artilleryunits is not required to deliver massed fires. Theorganization for combat must provide a singlecommander the ability to order all availableartillery to fire on high-payoff targets (HPTs)when required. (See fig 2-3.)

Mobility

Artillery units must be able to keep up with thesupported unit. Through mobility, artillery can—

• Displace quickly.

• Place the bulk of artillery fires where andwhen needed.

• Position itself to enhance accuracy.

• Ensure coverage of the supported unit's zoneof action.

Figure 2-3. Artillery Employment.

SECOND VOLLEY - ENEMY RADAR-LOCATES-

THIS NOT THIS

MAXIMIZE EFFECT MINIMIZE DETECTION FIRST VOLLEY - ENEMY RADAR-ORIENTS-.

THIRD VOLLEY -ENEMYARTILLERYATTACKS

ONE VOLLEY FROM THREE BATTERIES THREE VOLLEYS FROM ONE BATTERY

2-8 FMFM 2-7

Artillezy weapons are capable of rapid overland!sea transport or helicopter lift. They are alsocapable of rapidly shifting fires to expandcoverage to the supported unit.

In appraising the mobility of artillery, con-sideration must be given to its CSS. Otherconsiderations include—

• Artillery displacement must be correlated withthe maneuver and fire support requirements ofthe supported unit.

• Prudent positioning, route precedence, andengineer support contribute to artillery'smobility.

Responsiveness

A characteristic of artillery is speed in executingfire missions, regardless of weather, visibility, orsituation. This rapid action allows closeintegration with maneuver. Responsiveness canbe obtained through organization for combat,multiplicity in communications, and continuousCSS. To ensure responsiveness, FOs, liaisonofficers (LNO5), and artillery commanders mustknow, understand, and anticipate the supportedcommander's requirements and actions. Sup-ported commanders can enhance responsivenessby providing timely, definitive guidance tosupporting artillery commanders.

Vulnerability

Firing and communications signatures makeartillery vulnerable to detection. Artillery issusceptible to interference from enemy air,ground, and counterfire attacks, particularlyduring displacement. It is difficult for artilleryunits to defend themselves against ground or airattacks and still provide fires to the supportedforce with current tables of organization. Duringthe landing phase of an amphibious operation,artillery is particularly vulnerable.Considerations to reduce vulnerability include—

• Dispersed, defilade, and hardened positions,prudent and deceptive displacements,avoidance of stereotyped methods, applicationof proper gunnery techniques, and otherpassive and active measures increase thesurvivability of artillery.

• Attack guidance which allows for artillery firesat decisive times and places in sufficientvolume renders effective support whileenhancing survivability.

• Counterfire should not be perceived as anartillery duel. While the missiQn of artillery isto provide counterfire, effective counterfire isrendered when all means capable of deliveringthis support are used. Jamming of enemycounterbatteiy radars and artillery conduct offire nets can enhance the counterfire effort.

Continuity

Artillery is capable of providing close andcontinuous fire support. Except duringdisplacement, artillery can deliver observed andunobserved fires under all conditions of weatherand visibility. Artillery has the capability to usevarious techniques of movement (e.g., displace byechelon) for continuous coverage of thesupported unit. Continuous action is alsoenhanced by firing from widely dispersedpositions and passive and active defensivemeasures. Essential to continuity is the resupplyof ammunition. Extensive firing at sustainedrates creates a major logistics problem and maynecessitate the assistance of other units of theLF to move sufficient ammunition.

Effects of Weather and Terrain

Weather and terrain can influence the effects ofsome munitions (e.g., snow reduces theeffectiveness of family of scatterable mines.Terrain may dictate organization for combat,effect vulnerability of friendly artillery, andgovern CSS capability.

FIRE SUPPORT IN MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE OPERATIONS 2-9

Mortars

Mission of Mortars

The mission of mortars is to give closecontinuous fire support to the infantrycommander in offensive combat and in thedefense.

Command and Control of 81 mmMortars

The 81 mm mortar platoon is an organiccomponent of the weapons company of theinfantry (including LAT Bn). The battalioncommander directs the employment of theplatoon based on the mission and the assignedfrontage of the battalion. The platoon may begiven a tactical mission of OS or DS, or may beattached to a subordinate unit.

General Support

When the mortar platoon is in GS, it supportsthe entire battalion as directed by the battalioncommander. By keeping the platoon in GS, thebattalion commander retains flexibility, ease ofcoordination of fires, and the ability to massfires. Direct tactical control (i.e., selection andoccupation of firing positions), as well asadministrative matters remains with the platooncommander.

Direct Support

The mortar platoon, or an element thereof, maybe employed in DS of a specific unit of thebattalion; e.g., a company. Liaison is maintainedbetween the 81 mm platoon commander and thesupported unit through an FO. The platooncommander retains responsibility for the controlof the mortar unit/element's actions, to includepositioning and displacement. The supportedcommander controls the allotted fires. Thisrelationship is normally assigned for a specificmission or phase of an operation. DS may bewarranted when the mortar platoon cannotprovide the required support while its fires areunder battalion control.

Attached to a Subordinate Unit of theBattalIon

The mortar platoon, or an element thereof, maybe attached to a subordinate unit of thebattalion. Attachment is justified when themortar platoon cannot give adequate support toa unit by operating in a GS or DS role.Attachment is used when a subordinate unit isoperating beyond the effective range of themortar weapon; e.g., a patrol, an independentattack, or during the early phase of anamphibious operation. The subordinate unitcommander normally exercises C2 responsibilityto include logistics support for the attachedmortar unit/element. This is the least desirablemethod of employment.

Command and Control of 60 mmMortars

The 60 mm mortar section is an organiccomponent of the weapons platoon of the riflecompany. The company commander isresponsible for the tactical employment of themortar section. He assigns missions and priorityof fires, allocates priority targets, designatesgeneral firing locations, and approves fire plans.He determines the appropriate method ofsupport (OS, DS, or attached). He planslogistical support, determining the amount andcomposition of the ammunition load and itsdistribution and resupply. The weapons platooncommander is the primary advisor to thecompany commander on the tactical employmentof the mortar section. He recommendsemployment techniques, positions the section,and assists the commander in developing thecompany fire support plan.

General Support

When the mortar section is in OS, it supports allrifle platoons as directed by the companycommander. By keeping the section in OS, thecompany commander retains flexibility, ease ofcoordination of fires, and the ability to massfires. Direct tactical control of the sectionremains with the weapons platoon commander.Fires are controlled from the company command

2-10 FMFM2-7

post when observation of the entire companyzone of action is possible from that position. Ifnot, the mortar section leader mans anobservation post to control the fires. GS is thepreferred method of employment.

Direct Support

The mortar section may be employed in DS of aspecific unit of the company; e.g., a rifle platoon.The section leader establishes direct liaison withthe supported rifle platoon commander andconducts fire missions as requested by him. Theweapons platoon commander is responsible forthe control of the section's actions to includepositioning and displacement.

Attachment to a RIfe P'atoon

The mortar section, or an element thereof, maybe attached to a rifle platoon. Attachment isjustified when the mortar section cannot giveadequate support to a rifle platoon by operatingin GS or DS. Situations for attachment arisewhen a rifle platoon is—

• Operating as the advance party in an approachmarch.

• Operating as a patrol whose route takes it Outof mortar range.

• Conducting a withdrawal or is situated in aplatoon strong point.

When a mortar squad is attached to a rifleplatoon, the rifle platoon commander assumesthe tactical command, supply,. and administrativefunctions normally exercised by the weaponsplatoon commander. Attachment is the leastdesirable method of employment. Theemployment of separate mortar squads attachedto individual platoons lessens the destructivepower achieved by consolidating the section.Attachment also increases the problemsassociated with ammunition distribution andresupply, as well as fire control.

Priority of Fires and Priority Targets

As with artillery, priority of fires may be used todecentralize the control of mortars. Mortars canalso be assigned priority targets.

Mortar Characteristics

The mortar is the infantry commander's hippocket weapon. Understanding thecharacteristics of the mortar is critical to itssuccessful employment on the battlefield.

Weapons and Ammunition

The 81 mm mortar platoon employs eightmortars and the 60 mm mortar section employsthree mortars. Mortars can provide a heavyvolume of responsive, accurate fire with a varietyof ammunition. They are ideal for attackingclose-in targets, targets on reverse slopes, andthose targets in areas difficult to reach with low-angle fire. Mortars are particularly effective inproviding white phosphorous and illuminationsupport.

Mobility

Mortars are transported by vehicle, helicopters,or by man-pack. Mortars can be man-packed interrain where vehicular support is restricted.However, in a fast-moving operation, themobility of mortars, coupled with their limited-range capability, may be a restricting factor.Mortars also have the capability to be fired froma light armored vehicle.

Massing

Mortar fires can be massed on a target by theorganic unit. However, massing of mortar firesoutside the zone of action of the organic unit isdifficult due to the limited range of the mortar.

FIRE SUPPORT IN MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE OPERATIONS 2-11

Responsiveness

Responsiveness is an inherent characteristic ofmortars.

Vulnerability and Continuity

The high angIe trajectory and long time of flightcauses the mortar to be vulnerable to enemycounterfire. Active and passive measures areused to increase survivability. Becauseammunition for mortars may have to be man-packed, sustainment of mortars may be difficult.So mortars should be employed as animmediately available source of fire support forthe infantry commander. Other indirect fireweapons are used when they can achieve thedesired results.

Naval Gunfire

Mission of NGF

The general mission of NGFS units in anamphibious operation is to support the assaultby destroying or neutralizing:

• Shore installations that oppose the approachof ships and aircraft (pre-D-day);

• Defenses that may oppose the LF (D-day);

• Defenses that may oppose the post-landingadvance of the LF (post-D-day).

Command and Control of NGF

The task grouping of the ATF includes NGFSships organized into fire support groups,. units,or elements. A fire support group is a tern-porazy grouping of ships under a single navalcommander charged with supporting troop oper-ations ashore. A fire support group may be fur-ther subdivided into fire support units andelements. The CATF will normally control NGFduring debarkation and landing of the assault

waves. Thereafter, he may delegate this controlauthority to his fire support group commander.CATF will assign ships to provide support asdetermined by the NGFS requirements devel-oped by the CLF. The LF naval gunfire officer(NGFO) recommends tactical missions to meetthese gunfire support requirements. CATF as-signs individual ships tactical missions of eitherdirect or general support to specific LF units.Reserve support ships not assigned to supportspecific LF units are maintained in an on-callstatus directly under the gunfire support groupcommander or his subordinate unitcommander(s).

When the number of ships permits, each assaultbattalion will be assigned a ship in DS. The DSmission establishes a one-to-one relationshipbetween a NOFS ship and the supported unit.The ship delivers fires on planned targets andtargets of opportunity in her zone of fire, whichnormally corresponds to the zone of action ofthe supported unit. When possible, shipscapable of performing simultaneous missions(e.g., MK-86 gunfire control system-equipped)will be given a OS mission to allow for maximumfirepower to the forward units of the LF.

The GS mission requires a NGFS ship tosupport the force as a whole or that portion ofthe force to which the ship is assigned. A GSship attacks targets in her zone of fire whichcorresponds to the zone of action of thesupported unit. Prearranged fires are deliveredin accordance with a schedule of fires publishedin the ATF operation order and the NGFS planin the LF operation order. Fires may also beallocated to a subordinate unit for a specificmission(s). Upon completion of the mission(s),the ship reverts to OS. OS ships are assigned toregimental-sized units or larger.

As with artillery, the assignment of priority offires establishes the precedence of NGF deliveryto a designated unit. Movement and rotation ofships in the fire support area (FSA) make itdifficult to assign priority targets to NGF.

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NGF Characteristics

Weapons and Ammunition

The active fleet is armed with NGFS shipsequipped with 5-inch and 16-inch guns andmissiles such as Tomahawk. The 5-inch guns arefound on frigates, destroyers, cruisers, andbattleships. The 5-inchl54 caliber gun is theprimary weapon. It is versatile but lacks thedestructiveness of the larger caliber gun. The5-inchl38 caliber is found on some ships. The16-inch gun and Tomahawk missiles are foundon the battleships. Naval guns can fire a varietyof shell-fuze combinations.

Accuracy

NGF ships are equipped with automated firecontrol equipment for the calculation of firingdata. However, the firing accuracy of NGF isdependent on the ship's ability to fix herposition. If navigational aids (e.g., radarbeacons, landmarks) are not available, there willbe appreciable inaccuracies in unobserved firesand in the initial salvo of observed fires.

A characteristic high muzzle velocity and flattrajectory make the naval gun effective againstmaterial targets presenting a vertical face to thegun-target line (Gm). Such targets may beengaged at short ranges by direct fire usingoptical and electronic equipment aboard ship.

Due to the changing of the ship's positions andthe relatively large range probable error, NGFaccuracy decreases when attacking small targetsat long ranges using indirect fire techniques.The naval gun produces a dispersion pattern thatis elongated along the GTh, the size dependenton the gun and the firing range. For a 5-inchgun, rounds may impact up to 150 m over or

short and within 50 m left or right of the pointof aim at 21,000 m. The dispersion pattern forthe 16-inch gun is appreciably larger.

While NGF can deliver unobserved fires, thesefires are generally inaccurate and effectiveness isreduced. When fire is delivered in close supportof troops, adjustment by an observer or spotter isrequired.

Mobility

NGFS ships are capable of considerable mobilityalong a coastline within the limits imposed byhydrography and hostile action. In. operations onpeninsulas, islands, and inland areas whereground movement is often restricted, NGF canrange targets beyond that of other indirect-fireweapons.

Each NGF ship executing a tactical mission isassigned a definite sea area in which to operate.These areas are called FSAs. At times, it may beadvantageous to position a ship at an exactlocation within an FSA from which fire is to bedelivered. Such locations, referred to as fIresupport stations, are used when a specific GTL isrequired or maneuvering room is restricted. Theselection, location, and size of FSAs aredetermined during amphibious planning.

Mobility allows the firing ship to be positionedfor optimum support to the LF. The mostfavorable position is normally one which causesthe GTL to be parallel to the front line trace ofthe friendly force or along the axis of a target. Ifthe ship is firing underway, changes in the GTLmay necessitate cancellation of a fire mission topreclude danger to friendly forces. This situationmay be partially offset by restricting themovement of the ship. (See fig. 2-4.)

Figure 2-4. GTL Orientation.

FIRE SUPPORT IN MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE OPERATIONS 2-13

Massed Fires

NGFS are capable of delivering high volumes ofmassed fires. Several ships can mass fires on atarget. Power loading and mechanical hoistingequipment on ships enhance high rates of fire forshort periods.

Responsiveness

NGFS can respond rapidly to requests for firesupport in most situations. However, ships maybe underway on a course or in an area thatrequires a change in the GTL and its positioningin order to hit a target. Reliance on the radio asthe single means of communicating may limitresponsiveness during periods of interference,interruption, or equipment failure. NGFresponsiveness is enhanced through theassignment of DS missions and by positioningships for the delivery of fire on planned targets.

Vulnerability and ContInuity

Enemy defenses, such as attacks by enemyaircraft, surface-delivered fires, and minefields,may limit the availability of NGFS to the LF.Gunfire ships may be withdrawn from support tothe LF to resume their primary mission (e.g.,AAW or antisubmarine warfare) in defense ofthe ATF.

Adverse weather may affect the delivery of NGF.Hydrographic conditions for the ship andvisibility conditions for the spotter may restrictthe ship's ability to place accurate fires onto atarget. Radar beacons may be employed to offsetthis limitation.

The quantity of ammunition available for NGFSis dependent upon the ship's magazine capacityand the quantity needed by the ship for self-defense. Ships can be rotated for replenishmentto allow continuous NGFS.

The ability of NGF to support inland operationsis limited. Thus, maximum use should be madeof these fires while the LF is within NGF range.

Marine Aviation

Mission of Marine Aviation

The mission of Marine aviation is to participateas the supporting air component of the FMF inthe seizure and defense of advanced naval basesand for the conduct of such landing operationsas may be essential to the prosecution of a navalcampaign. A collateral mission is to participateas an integral component of naval aviation in theexecution of such other Navy functions as theFleet commanders may direct. The Marineexpeditionary forces (MEFs) and Marineexpeditionary brigades (MEBs) normally have theequipment and personnel to accomplish allaviation functions required by the mission, forcesassigned, and enemy threat. However, the ACEof a MEU normally will only be equipped toaccomplish a portion of these functions. Tacticalaviation, operating as part of the concerted air-ground effort, has a powerful and direct effect inensuring success in battle. It creates theopportunity for battle by deceiving, dislocating,and disrupting the enemy.

The ACE is the aviation arm of the MAGTF.The ACE is task-organized to assist the MAGTFcommander in accomplishing the MAGTF'smission. The ACE commander employs hisaviation assets to meet the priorities andrequirements established by the MAGTFcommander and his own requirements. ACEassets are best employed when available assetsare brought together in a coordinated manner toweight the main effort. Aviation assets are notnormally held in reserve.

Command and Control of MarineAviation

The MACCS is established for the control ofaircraft, missiles, and UAVs. The MACCS is atactical C2 system which provides the tactical aircommander (TAC), normally the ACEcommander, with the means to command,

2-14 FMFM 2-7

coordinate, and control all air operations withinan assigned sector and to coordinate airoperations with other Services. It is composedof C2 agencies with communications-electronicsequipment that incorporates a capability frommanual control through semi-automatic control.The two major categories of the MACCS are airdirection and air control. Air direction is theguidance and supervision which a commanderemploys to focus his resources on missionaccomplishment. It occurs in the followingsequence: apportionment, allocation, tasking,fragmentary order. Air control is the authorityto effect the maneuver of aircraft.

The tactical air command center (TACC) is thesenior air C2 agency in the MACCS. It is theagency from which the TAC manages all aviationassets to support the MAGTF. The TACallocates aircraft to offensive air supportmissions directly supporting the MAGTF's pointof main effort (POME). Additionally, aircraftare allocated to assault support missions for theGCE and CSSE of the MAGTF. The TACdecentralizes control of most of the offensive airsupport and assault support assets to the DASCfor coordination with the GCE and CSSE andfor procedural control within the DASC'sassigned area of responsibility.

Characteristics of Marine Aviation

Aircraft and Ordnance

Marine aviation units are equipped with a varietyof aircraft weapons and associated systems. Avariety of ordnance can be delivered, includingguns firing an assortment of projectiles, rockets,and guided missiles with diverse warheads andfuzing, laser-guided bombs of different weights,incendiary mixtures, chemical spray tanks (onlyin A-4 aircraft currently in USMCR), andnuclear and non-nuclear bombs in various yieldsand weights. This multiplicity of ordnance,coupled with a myriad of attack tactics, allowsfor selection of attack means best suited to thetarget.

Accuracy

The accuracy of attack aircraft is variable; manyfactors contribute to its delivery. Accuracy is ofprimary concern when engaging targets in theproximity of friendly troops. Timely andaccurate air support produces a positive effect onthe morale of supported troops and adetrimental effect on the enemy.

Mobility

The outstanding characteristics of aircraft aremobility and range. Aircraft can attack targets atgreater range than other supporting arms andcan overcome target disposition or environmentrestrictions. The speed of aircraft enablescommanders to concentrate overwhelmingfirepower in the objective area from distant anddispersed sources and to deliver surprise attacks.The speed and maneuverability of aircraft alsoprovide a measure of protection from enemy fire.

The ability to exploit the mobility of aircraft maybe dependent on the commander's emphasis ondegrading enemy air defenses. For example, inpreparation for a major offensive, the POMEmay initially be reducing/degrading enemy airdefenses which will allow for the increased use ofground attack aircraft as the battle unfolds.Increased dependence is normally placed on airsupport during periods when—

• Artillery is embarked during the amphibiousassault.

• Land operations have extended beyond therange of NGF.

• Artillery capability has diminished due toenemy counterfire, extended range of anoncoming threat, difficulties in ammunitionresupply.

FIRE SUPPORT IN MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE OPERATIONS 2-15

Responsiveness

The responsiveness of air support is a function ofmany factors. The primary factor is the distancethe aircraft must fly (from the sea base, airfield,holding point/area) to the target. Properlyemployed attack helicopters and short takeoff!vertical landing aircraft can reduce responsetimes considerably. Aircraft can respond morerapidly when it is positioned on station withproper ordnance and when pilots are familiarwith the battle situation. Aircraft can bemaintained in an alert status over designatedpoints during an assault or other critical phasesof a battle. This requires the forecasting of airsupport requirements and continuous liaisonbetween ground and air commanders. Thedegree of control and coordination required forthe delivery of airstrikes is reflected in responsetimes. This is affected by the placement of firesupport coordination measures; i.e., the firesupport coordination line (FSCL).

VulnerabIlIty

Enemy forces may employ air defense systemsthat can form a significant threat to friendlyaircraft. The availability of friendly aircraft andthe tactics that pilots use are contingent uponthe air threat. Aircraft should be selectivelyemployed against HPTs to reduce their exposure.The enemy's air defense capability can becurtailed through proper attack tactics andSEAD. Suppression of enemy air defenses isthat activity which neutralizes, destroys ortemporarily degrades enemy air defenses in aspecific area by physical attack and/or electronicwarfare. (Joint Pub 1-02) SEAD is conductedusing multiple means, including—

• Destructive means delivered by direct- andindirect-fire weapons, precision munitions,aviation ordnance, attack helicopters, andraids.

• Disruptive means such as EW, chaff, andflares.

• Combination of destructive and disruptivemeans.

ContInuity

Even though extremely heavy precipitation maydegrade all-weather aircraft, air support isavailable 24 hours a day. The most significantlimitation of aircraft is the difficulty in providingair support at night and during periods of badweather. The weather at the target rather thanenroute and home base weather are of primaryconcern. Poor weather at the target area createsdifficulty in locating the target and limits thetypes of attack which can be made. Theemployment of air support radar teams helps intarget identification and delivery during theseconditions. Also, the radar beacon forward aircontroller (RABFAC) can be used to provide areference point for RABFAC-compatible aircraft.The RABFAC provides an electromagnetic pulseon the aircraft's weapon system computer.RABFAC-compatible aircraft include thefollowing (to varying degrees): A-6, A-7, F-ill,F-4 (USAF), and F-16.

Air support requires the availability of suitableoperating sites/bases for servicing and rearmingaircraft. Initially, suitable land bases withinsupporting distance will be utilized untilexpeditionary landing areas and airfields areconstructed or captured in the objective area. Inthe absence of suitable theater airfields, airsupport will be provided by sea-based aircraftduring the initial phase of operations. In anantiair, threat-rich environment, the only CASmissions which may be worthy are those of anemergency nature.

Radio communications are of great importanceto air support operations. This is the onlymeans of relaying detailed instructions toairborne aircraft.

Chapter 3

Fundamentals for Employment ofFire Support

Firepower and Mobility

The MAGTF generates combined arms combatpower by attaining a balance between firepowerand mobility. Mobility assets are employed withsupporting firepower and firepower assets areorganized for mobility.

The MAGTF commander organizes his forces forthe most effective application of combined arms.Operational resources are organized under asingle commander for optimum employment.The focal point in the MAGTF for combinedarms is Marine Corps infantry. The infantry maynot always be the most significant, dominant, ordecisive element in the MAGTF combined armsteam. At times, or in given situations, otherelements may assume primary roles. Regardless,the infantry is the universal element of combinedarms because it will have an important role inalmost every operation and must be flexible andadaptable to generate combined arms combatpower.

Firepower

The Marine infantry battalion, the basicmaneuver unit of the MAGTF, has the capabilityfor generation of substantial firepower usingorganic small arms, direct-fire weapons, andindirect-fire weapons. Each element of thebattalion—from the fire team to thecompany—can engage the enemy withimmediately available weapons to gain firesuperiority and the initiative without delay. Thisresults in the enemy being hit hard and fast andbeing thrown off balance.

Fires delivered by organic weapons areaugmented rapidly by weapons too large for theinfantry to carry—supporting arms, and direct-fireweapons external to the supported unit. Tanks,artillery, NGF, armed helicopters, and ifnecessary, CAS project additional force tocounter the enemy. Both organic andnonorganic firepower is responsive to the needsof the Marines doing the fighting.

Mobility

Mobility is the quality or capability of militaryforces which permits them to move from place toplace while retaining the ability to fulfill theirprimary mission. (Joint Pub 1-02) Marine Corpsinfantry are general purpose, each unit capableof multiple forms of mobility—foot mobile,motorized (truck-mounted), mechanized(supported by assault amphibious vehicle, tanksand LAI Bns) and helicopterborne. Mobilityallows the infantry the ability to position muchof its firepower where and when it is needed.Firepower assets that lack true mobility are oflittle tactical or operational value.

Characteristics of FireSupport

Fire support is an essential component inmaneuver warfare doctrine. Successful firesupport requires one to understand thefundamentals of maneuver warfare.Understanding the fundamentals of maneuverwarfare will enable fire support personnel toprovide effective fire support in operations

3-2 FMFM 2-7

characterized by flexibility, mobility, and agility.FMFM 1, Warfightiiz describes thesefundamentals. Briefly, these fundamentals are asfollows:

• Focus on the enemy instead of terrain.

• Act more quickly than the enemy can react.Decentralized decision making allowscommanders to implement operational andtactical decisions more quickly than the enemy.Such quickness allows commanders to dictatethe course of the battle to the enemy.

• Support maneuver by fire. Firepower supportsmaneuver by creating gaps for maneuver,suppressing and disrupting enemy forces, orphysically destroying the remnants of enemyunits whose cohesion has been destroyed.

• Issue mission-type orders. Mission-type ordersspecify what must be done without prescribinghow it must be done. Commanders providetheir intent to help subordinates anticipaterequirements as the battlefield changes.

• Avoid enemy strength and attack enemyweaknesses.

• Exploit tactical opportunities. Highercommanders should maintain the flexibility andagility to react quickly and decisively tofleeting opportunities created by subordinates.

• Designation of POME. The main effort is themost important operational task to beaccomplished, that task on which the overallsuccess of the operation depends at thatinstant. In the offense, the main effort isnormally the main attack. Through the maineffort, the commander provides focus to thedecentralized efforts of his command. Allelements of the command must understand andsupport the main effort. The main effort shiftsas the battlefield changes.

• Avoid set rules and patterns. The enemy mustnot be allowed to anticipate tactical events orhe will seize the initiative.

• Act boldly and decisively. Commanders mustbe able to deal with uncertainty, take prudentrisks, and use initiative within theircommander's intent to seize fleetingopportunities.

• Command from the front. Commandersposition themselves well forward to makeeffective and timely decisions based on first-hand knowledge of the situation.

Targeting

Targeting is the process of selecting targets andmatching the appropriate response to themtaking account of operational requirements andcapabilities. (Joint Pub 1-02) The purpose oftargeting is to select for attack those enemyinstallations, units, or equipment which are mostvulnerable and the attack of which best supportsthe accomplishment of the mission. In maneuverwarfare, the focus is on a mobile, evasivetarget—the enemy. Enemy targets must bedetected, accurately located, identified, andprioritized for effective attack. This is not to saythat terrain is unimportant. Rather, terrain mayfacilitate the detection, location, and engagementof the enemy. Target acquisition is essential inthe formula for firepower. Vital to targeting is aresponsive means of reporting and disseminatingtarget information and intelligence.

In some situations, accurate target locations mayinitially be scarce, and, as a result, they must bedeveloped as the battle progresses. In thesesituations, fire support must be positioned torespond to those targets as they are uncovered.

Targeting is based on the scheme of maneuverand/or tactical plan, with an assessment of theweather, terrain, and enemy situation. Thetargeting effort is focused on the commander'sintent through such processes as intelligencepreparation of the battlefield (IPB) and targetvalue analysis (TVA). IPB is the systematic andcontinuous process that integrates the enemy'sdoctrine with the weather and terrain, themission, and the specific battlefield environment

FIRE SUPPORT IN MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE OPERATIONS 3-3

to systematically determine his capabilities andlimitations for a specific geographic area. WAis a process which links the effects of attacking atarget to the target's function. Through TVA,those targets whose attack will provide thegreatest tacical benefit are identified. Areas ofinterest, decision points, and attack guidance arealso identified in the targeting process.

Well thought-out targets can contribute to thetargeting process. Targeting can be conductedanalytically and selectively by applying theknowledge of the enemy order of battle and histactics. For example, a specific target may beplotted on the forward slope of a hill—vice thetop of the hill, as this is the position where theenemy is more likely to be.

Allocation of Fire Support

The battlefield may become extended as combatunits are employed against enemy formations inwidely-separated areas. The commanderallocates fire support for the generation ofcombined arms combat power for multiplecommitted units. This allocation is founded onthe factors of METT-T and the commander'sintent.

Circumstances may dictate that more fire supportis needed for a specific unit(s) or that a certainsupporting arm would be more appropriate.Such may be the case in the allocation ofsupport to the POME. Adequate support isprovided by allocation of means, the assignmentof tactical missions, priority of fires, positioningof fire support, and by allocating ammunition tofire support means. The potential forces ofother combined arms are considered indetermining the requirements of adequatesupport.

Mobility

Mobility is a necessary function for achieving andmaintaining combined arms combat power.Supporting arms assets must be able to keep upwith the supported unit. They must be capableof delivering fire support which exploits thebenefits rendered by mobility. Commanders can

enhance the mobility of their supporting armsthrough several means—

• Establishing continuous liaison to facilitateforecasting of and preparation for battle needs.

• Assigning basic loads commensurate with thefire support needs and the unit's organicassets. Augment with external transportationsupport when required.

• Establishing priorities (route precedence,positioning, etc.)

• Utilizing engineer activities (roadconstruction/clearing, airfield construction).

• Maintaining freedom of movement throughfriendly air superiority (when possible), airdefense coverage, and provision of counterfire.

• Seizing and securing lines of communications.

Continuity

Continuity of firepower is as important asgenerating firepower. The requirement ofcontinuity must be uppermost in the supportedand supporting commander's thought process inplanning and during the delivery of fire support.Continuity in fire support equates to adequatecommunications, positioning of resources,responsive logistical support, and survivability.In the event that an FSCC should become acasualty, the commander must have plans to re-constitute an FSCC or to replace the personneland equipment in order to resume fire supportcoordination and planning activities.

Fire Support Coordination

The unit that can react the quickest will be themost effective and probably win the battle. Thus,fire support planning and coordination inoperations must be responsive. This requiresforecasting of fire support requirements. Acomplex plan, overlaid with numerous targetsymbols, redundant or unnecessary fire supportcoordination measures, and sophisticatedschedules of fire, may appear thorough but in

3-4 FMFM 2-7

reality will not be very flexible. Commandersmust avoid employing this type of fire supportplan as a sense of security. Instead commandersshould look at fire support plans as tools thatare easy to understand, simple to execute, andreadily amendable. This does not reduce theimportance of planning. On the contrary, plansmust be well thought Out, closely integrated, andcoordinated. Each component-preplannedtargets, fire support coordination measures, andschedules of fire must serve a specific role in thegeneration of combat power. While the resultmay appear less voluminous, the plan will befunctional—as a tool should be. Commanderscan contribute by clearly projecting their intentthrough attack guidance and by establishingpriorities. Coordination must be simple anddirect, making use of standardized proceduresand techniques, where possible.

Close Liaison

Close liaison at each echelon—company throughMAGTF CE—is essential. Supporting armsrepresentatives and commanders must know,understand, and anticipate the supportedcommander's actions and requirements. Theymust read the battle with him, think ahead, andproject fire support assistance; not wait to betold what support is needed. The supportedcommander concentrates on the enemy,anticipating his actions and reactions to gain anadvantage on him. His orders are likely to bebrief, formed as he is seeing and reading thebattle. Responsiveness of fire support isdependent on the ability of supportingcommanders to react to the commander's needs.

Fire Support Contribution toCombat Power

The value of fires is determined-by how well theycontribute to the supported activity. Firesusually have little value in and of themselves.While fires can kill or wound individuals, destroyindividual pieces of equipment, or destroyindividual structures, fires rarely, if ever, destroyentire forces. Rather, fires disrupt, delay, ordamage forces. Most forces, if left alone, can

quickly reorganize, resume movement, or repairdamage. Thus, disruptions, delays, and damagecaused by fires are valuable only if they facilitatesome other actions by friendly forces. Firescontribute to combat power in a variety of ways,often in combination. Some of these ways areprovided below as aids for thinking about how toemploy fire support.

Fire Support Can Complement orSupplement a Supported Activity

Fire support can be integrated with a supportedactivity to create combat power. Fires may bedelivered before, after, or simultaneously with asupported activity. These fires can be used tosoften the enemy, create gaps, provide screens,obscure the enemy observers, or affordprotection.

Fires may be delivered to complement theactivities of the force. For example,counterbatteiy fires may be delivered to suppressthe enemy artillery while the infantry attacks ordefends against an attack by the enemy.

Fires may be used to suppress one fortifiedenemy position while the infantry attacksanother.

Fires may be delivered on the same object whichthe supported unit is attacking. For example, afortified position may be attacked by supportingfires while the infantry attacks it.

Fires can be used to lead supported units ontoan objective. For example, artillery fires aredelivered onto and beyond the objective, thenshifted beyond the objective as the infantrycloses. Mortars deliver fire on the reverse slope;tank and other direct-fire weapons fire on theobjective. Infantry advances under a canopy offire.

Fire Support Can Reinforce theEffects of Another Activity

Fires can be employed to magnify the effects ofanother combined arms activity. This

FIRE SUPPORT IN MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE OPERATIONS 3-5

multiplicity adds to the total combat power,produces another dimension with which theenemy must contend, and affords backup inpotential breakdowns which are certain to occuron the battlefield. Example: artillery firesplanned to cover a minefield. The minefielditself will slow the enemy. But as the enemymoves to overcome the effects produced by theminefield, he is hammered by artillery fires.

Fire Support to Create Opportunity

Fire support can be employed as a means toallow another activity to occur. Examples: aconcept of operation's success may be contingenton the availability of CAS. This prerequisitemay necessitate creating an environment inwhich CAS can be used. The planning andexecution of SEAD creates an opportunity forair operations in support of the maneuver force.Another example is the delivery of fires tohamper and disrupt the employment of firesupport by the enemy, making friendly firesupport more effective; e.g., counter-OP fires.

Fire Support as an Extension ofManeuver

Fire support may be exploited by attackingenemy positions, units, or installations notaccessible by maneuver forces, or to further theattack initiated by maneuver forces. Examples:attacking enemy reserve forces to prevent themfrom reinforcing forward units engaged withfriendly forces; attacking fleeting targets duringexploitation and pursuit; isolating enemy forcesfor defeat in detail. Fire support can be used toestablish/maintain battle momentum; e.g.,countermechanized fires.

Fire Support to Cause EnemyReactions

The effects of fires can cause the enemy to dosomething such as slow down, displace, deploy,change direction, communicate, fire. This oftenmakes him vulnerable to the force of anothersupporting arm. For example, reconnaissancefire delivered on a suspected enemy position may

cause him to disclose his presence by movementor return of fire.

Terminal Effects—the BasicConsideration

The effectiveness of fires is determined largelythrough their terminal effects produced on atarget. Fires are particularly effective whencombined with other assets such as EW to attaincombined arms effects on a target. EW canaugment fire support in destruct!n,neutralization, harassing, suppressidn, andscreening missions. Such employment canreduce ammunition expenditure and furtherconfuse the enemy.

Destruction Fire

Destruction fire is fire delivered for the solepurpose of destroying material objects. (JointPub 1.02) Defining the word destruction iseasy, defining what it is and determining when ithas been achieved is difficult, particularly for anarea target. To achieve destructive effects on atarget, it is not necessary to completely destroy(e.g., demolish) the target. A target may beconsidered destroyed if it cannot perform itsprimary mission, such as a tank or artillery piecethat cannot shoot or a radar site that cannotacquire. The determination of when a target hasbeen destroyed is situational dependent. Someunits and positions can sustain casualties anddamage and still accomplish their mission.Destructive fire can be delivered by aircraft,artillery, mortars, and NGF. Artillery, mortars,and NGF are area weapons. Therefore toachieve destructive fire with these area weaponsrequires a heav expenditure of ammunition,considerable time, and a means of observation.The type and composition of the target maydictate what type fire support means is employed.For example, destruction of a fortified bunkermay dictate attack by aircraft while destruction ofan enemy position in the open can be achievedby an indirect-fire weapon.

3-6- - FMFM 2-7

Neutralization Fire

Neutralization fires are delivered to render thetarget ineffective or unusable. (Joint Pub 1-02)The fires are used to temporarily hamper themovement and/or the firing of the weapon. Forexample, artillery fires may destroy an enemybattery's FDC. For the time it takes the enemyto rearrange their operations so the battery has afire direction capability, the battery isneutralized. Like destruction, the effectsrequired to render a target neutralized aresituational dependent. Neutralization fires canbe delivered by aircraft, artillery, mortars, andNGF.

Harassing Fire

Harassing fire is fire designed to disturb the restof the enemy troops, to curtail movement and, bythreat of losses, to lower morale. (JointPub 1-02) These fires are delivered occasion-ally, usually at night or during periods of reducedvisibility. Harassing fires can be deliveredintermittently to deceive the enemy as to whatfriendly maneuver is doing or preparing to do.Ammunition constraints and the threat may limitor make unfeasible the use of these fires.Harassing fire missions are normally conductedat division or higher levels. Harassing fires arewell suited to aircraft, particularly against deeptargets, and artillery and mortars. NGF cannotdeliver unobserved fire with sufficient accuracyfor harassing small targets; however they aresuited for harassment of large area targets thatare not close to friendly lines.

Interdiction Fire

Interdiction fire is fire placed on an area orpoint to prevent the enemy from using the areaor point. (Joint Pub 1-02) Roads, railways,routes, and other lines of approach orcommunications may be interdicted to prevent,reduce, or disrupt the enemy forces, supplies, andcommunications. Like harassing fires,interdiction fires are delivered by division orhigher levels when adequate resources exist.Aircraft are the most effective in the execution

of interdiction missions. Artillery can delivereffective interdiction fires. Mortars have limitedutility in interdiction due to range. NGF candeliver interdiction fires with limitedeffectiveness due to its dispersion pattern.

Illumination Fire

Illumination fire may be used to observe enemyoperations and movements, to adjust observedfire during hours of darkness, and to provideassistance to friendly night operations. Aircraftpossess an excellent capability for illumination.Tactical aircraft can provide illumination forshort periods (15 minutes each) while theKC-130 aircraft can provide continuousillumination for up to 6 hours. Artillery andmortars possess the best ability for the deliveryof point illumination. NGF can deliver effectiveillumination; however, the quantity provided maybe limited by the magazine capacity of the ship.

Suppressive Fire

Suppressive fires are fires on or about a weaponssystem to degrade its performance below thelevel needed to fulfill its mission objectives,during the conduct of fire mission. (JointPub 1-02) The effects are only temporary.Suppressive fires facilitate maneuver by stunningthe enemy and keeping his head down. Theeffects are rendered only while the firing isoccurring. When the firing stops, the enemyreturns to action. To be effective, the supportedunit must accomplish something while thesuppressive fires are being delivered—bypass,maneuver to assault the target or attack it withdirect- or indirect-fire weapons for neutralizationor destructive effects. Suppressive fires can bedelivered by all indirect-fire weapons and aircraft.

Screening Fire

Screening fires are fires using smoke projectilesto obscure the enemy's observation of friendlyforces and their movement. Screening fires canbe delivered by artillery, mortars, and to alimited extent, NGF.

FIRE SUPPORT IN MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE OPERATIONS 3-7

Other Considerations

Target Selection

Fire support should not be wasted onunprofitable or unnecessary targets, nor shouldcombat elements be used to do what fire supportcan do quickly. Targets should be attacked onlyif their attack contributes to the accomplishmentof the mission. The commander directs/guidesthe selection and attack of targets by establishingtarget selection standards and attack guidance.Target selection standards are used to classify atarget as either a "target" or a "suspected target,"based on accuracy requirements. Attackguidance is specified by the commander andmagnified by his operations staff and FSC toexplain how and when targets should be attacked.It includes any restrictions on engagement, use ofmunitions, or use of fire support means.

Terrain and Weather

Terrain and weather may limit the use of firesupport, or may improve the effectiveness ofsupporting fires; e.g., restricting the enemy'smovement and providing points with goodobservation.

Ability to Observe Impact of Rounds

When observation (which includes sensors, radiointercepts, and for fixed installations, aerialphotographs as well as observers) is possible,fires can be adjusted to provide the best possibleeffect and continued only so long as they yieldbeneficial results.

Stationary Target

For fires to seriously destroy or damage a target,the target must usually remain stationary ormove very little while the fires are hitting it. Foran area target, such as a tank or infantrybattalion, individuals and pieces of equipmentmay move, but the unit is considered a stationarytarget if a portion of the unit remains in thedispersion pattern of the incoming rounds. For

example, if fires are delivered on a tank battalionwhen it starts through a narrow pass, individualtanks will rapidly pass through the impact area.Since a part of the battalion will continue to bein the impact area, it is essentially a stationarytarget and, therefore, susceptible to damagingfires. The tanks that become damaged may blockthe incoming tanks which have not yet enteredthe pass.

Provide Necessary Support WithLeast Possible Ammunition

In some circumstances, fire support is best usedto neutralize or suppress a target rather thandestroy it. Because neutralization andsuppression requires less ammunition and takesless time, more targets can be attacked with thesame assets when firing neutralization orsuppressive fires rather than destructive fires.

Fires in Support of the Offense

In the offense, fires may be delivered duringpreparation for an offensive action. Such firescan be delivered prior to the leading elements ofthe attacking force crossing the line of departureor when ground contact is made with theenemy—whichever comes first. These fires maybe delivered prior to or delivered as preparationfires.

Fires are delivered during the conduct of anattack. Such fires are delivered from the timethe leading elements cross the line of departureuntil after the assault on the enemy andconsolidation by the friendly force. Positioningof weapons, range, and GTL orientation inrelation to leading assault units should providethe most accurate fires so that assault troops canlean into supporting fires.

Fires are delivered during exploitation. Suchfires are delivered following the assault on theenemy force and involve supporting operationsto exploit success of initial gains. These firescontinue into the pursuit.

3-8 FMFM 2-7

Fires in Support of the Defense

Fires in support of a specific defensive operationor phase of operation are generally characterizedby heavy, on-call concentrations.

Fires are delivered to place the enemy underincreasing volumes of fire as he approaches adefensive position. Long-range fires aredelivered by aircraft and long-range indirect-fireweapons. Fires are planned along expectedenemy routes. Kill zones are planned aroundobstacles and barriers or natural terrain in whichthe enemy may become delayed or canalized.

Fires are delivered within the battle area. Suchfires may include fires in support of acounterattack and barrage fire. Barrage fire isfire which is designed to fill a volume of space or

area rather than aimed specifically at a giventarget. (Joint Pub 1-02) They are prearrangedbarriers of fire designed to protect friendlytroops and installations by impeding enemymovements across defensive lines or areas.

As the enemy approaches the defensive position,indirect- and direct-fire weapons, crew-servedweapons, CAS and CIFS, and small arms areintegrated into close defensive fires. Finalprotective fires (FPFs) are immediately availableto provide a barrier of fire designed to impedeenemy movement across defensive lines or areas.FPFs consist of final protective lines (FPLS),principal direction of fires (PDFs), and barrages.FPLs and PDFs apply to small arms; artillezy andmortars normally fire barrages. NGF is notassigned FPFs because of its dispersion pattern.

Chapter 4

Fire Support Coordination

Principles of Fire SupportCoordination

Fire support coordination is a continuousprocess of evaluating fire support needs ormissions, analyzing the situation, and planningand orchestrating the implementation of the firesupport plan while in a continually changingenvironment. The process enables thecommander to use his available firepower toinfluence the action while ensuring the safety ofhis troops.

The goal of fire support coordination is toaccomplish coordination in a timely manner toallow for the responsive delivery of fires. Themaximum effectiveness of fire support is achievedby applying the principles of fire supportcoordination. These principles serve as a mentalframework for fire support coordination. Whilesome of these principles are more applicable toeither planning or coordination, all must beapplied to furnish effective fire support.

Know and Understand theCommander's Intent

Commander's intent must be understood at thelowest practical level of command. It is thecommander's responsibility to provide his intent.It is the commander's staff and supportingcommanders and their representatives' (e.g.,LNOs, observers) responsibility to ensure theyunderstand it.

The commander's intent establishes theframework within which fire supportcoordinators and supporting arms commandersand their representatives can conduct firesupport coordination. The commander's intentis the basis to make fire support decisions during

planning and during the battle, to determinewhen and how fires will be delivered, todetermine requirements, and to project assistanceto the commander.

As automated equipment is fielded, it isimportant to remember that people must makedecisions. If people rely on computers to makefire support decisions, the enemy will be able toanticipate our actions.

Plan Early and Continuously

Fire support planning is a component of battleplanning. Both begin upon receipt of themission and the commander's intent and endwith mission accomplishment. Planning must becontinuous to meet the needs of the presenttactical situation and to prepare for the next.Warning orders and reverse planning assistsubordinates and supporting units in anticipatingrequirements and conducting their own planning.Time must be allowed for fire support means toreposition and resupply. Time must be allowedfor preparation, dissemination, and review(rehearsal as appropriate) of fire plans.

Exploit All Available Targeting Assets

Targets can be effectively attacked only if there isan accurate and responsive target acquisitionsystem. Target information from all availableassets must be rapidly evaluated and routed tothe appropriate fire support delivery agency.

Consider the Use of All Available FireSupport Means

All fire support means—organic, assigned,attached, and supporting—are employed to makeuse of their potential contribution to the

4-2 FMFM 2-7

achievement of combat power, consistent withresponsiveness, economy, and priorities. Aconcerted effort is made to use all fire supportmeans in a coordinated manner, ensuring theycomplement each other and that thecoordination process permits simultaneousemployment to the maximum extent possible. Insome situations, it may be required to use themost available means even though it is not themost effective.

Use the Lowest Capable Echelon

This principle has two applications:coordination and delivery means. Coordilnationis accomplished at the lowest echelon capable ofcoordinating effective support. For example, inregimental operations, if two battalion FSCCscan effect the required coordination directly, theregimental FSCC will monitor and intercede onlyif the action affects the regiment as a whole.Similarly, if two subordinate elements of theMAGTF (e.g., two GCE5) can effect the requiredcoordination, action by the MAGTF FSCC maynot be required. Effective coordination can beenhanced if senior commands encourage andpermit subordinate commands to coordinatewithout undue interference from above, if theother principles of fire support coordination areadhered to, and if fire support coordinationmeasures are used properly. Fire support isdelivered by the lowest echelon with the meansavailable to achieve the desired results. Ifartillery in direct support can achieve the desiredresults, there is no need to risk an aircraft forthe mission.

Use the Most Effective Means

Fire missions are assigned to or requested fromthe agency that can deliver the most effectivefire. The most effective means varies with thenature and importance of the target, thelikelihood of the target staying in its currentlocation, the availability of observers, theavailability of attack means, and the resultsdesired. It may be necessary to temporarily fixthe target until a more effective means can

attack it. For example, indirect fire can fix amobile target until aircraft can arrive.

Furnish the Type of SupportRequested

The requesting agency is usually in the bestposition to determine its immediate fire supportrequirements. However, existing conditions,(e.g., availability of ammunition, tacticalconsiderations, or higher priorities) may make itimpractical to provide the type of fire supportrequested. In these cases, an alternate type offire support will be provided, using the type offire support requested as a basis. When a firesupport request is disapproved, the originalrequest is stopped, an alternate agency assignedthe mission, and the requester notified of thetype of support he is to receive. Whenappropriate and permitted by the tacticalsituation, the requester should be informed as tothe nature of the disapproval to avoid similarfuture delays.

Avoid Unnecessary Duplication

Fire support should not be wasted byoverkilling" targets. However, economy shouldnot be practiced to the detriment of the mission.Unnecessary duplication should not be confusedwith effective employment of combined arms.

Consider Airspace Coordination

Because all fire support uses airspace,coordination must be effected to reduceinterference between users. The extent ofairspace coordination is dependent on the timeavailable. It may consist of a prearrangedairspace coordination area (ACA) or make useof lateral, altitude, or time separation plans.

Provide Adequate Support

The factors of METT'-T and the commander'sguidance determine the amounts and types of firesupport needed for success.

FIRE SUPPORT IN MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE OPERATIONS 4-3

Provide Rapid Coordination

Procedures for rapid coordination must beestablished and practiced in order to attacktargets within the shortest possible time. Adelay in the delivery of fires on a target mayjeopardize the success of the entire force.

Provide for Flexibility

The fire support plan and its method ofexecution must allow for changes in any of theelements of METF-T.

Provide for the Safeguarding ofFriendly Forces and Installations

Providing safeguards to friendly troops, vessels,aircraft, and installations is a basic tenet of firesupport coordination. Several measuresaccomplish this principle. Some of them are theuse of fire support coordination measures,restricted firing positions to eliminate or reducefiring signatures, and the consideration of thelocation of friendly forces during target analysis.

Fire Support Planning

Fire support planning encompasses thoseactivities that are essential to the development ofa fire support plan that optimizes the availablefire support means. The purpose of fire supportplanning is two-fold: To achieve maximumeffectiveness and efficiency from fire supportmeans in meeting fire support requirements ofthe force as dictated by METI'-T and todetermine the allocation of fire support. Ifdelivery is too slow, the fires may be efficient butmay likely be ineffective. Rigidity in fire supportwill allow the enemy to get the upper hand. Ifthe enemy is allowed to get into thecommander's decision-making loop, he will beable to anticipate and counter the commander'sactions.

The fire support planning process is dictated bythe tactical situation. Fire support planning isfounded on the commander's intent, the factors

METf-T, and guidance received from higherheadquarters. In situations where time isavailable and a clear picture of the enemy can bedrawn, the fire support planning process tends tobe deliberate and detailed. Commanders athigher, lower, and supporting echelons workclosely to develop the fire support plan. Targetsare analyzed in detail to determine the type andquantity of fires needed to achieve the desiredresults. The higher echelon coordinates the firesupport planning to ensure effectiveness andefficiency in the attack of these targets. Insituations where the friendly force is in contactwith the enemy, however, planning time may belimited and the enemy situation less defined dueto the dynamics of the battle. Thus fire supportplanning must be expedited. The plan must bedeveloped in sufficient detail to support theoperation, yet timely enough to be read,understood, and executed. Less time will beavailable for the evaluation of targets. In moreextreme situations, the commander may have toallocate fire support assets to a lower echelon.The lower echeLon then develops and executesthe fire support plan. This latter method isreferred to as quick fire support planning.

Fire support planning includes many facets suchas estimates of supportability, the determinationof requirements, allocation of resources,targeting, coordination, and preparation anddissemination of the fire support plan. Theplanning may span from very formal writtenproducts to informal, oral briefings, or shortmessages. Detailed techniques and procedures offire support planning are discussed in chapter 5of FMFM 6-18, Techniques and Procedures forFire Support Coordination.

Fire support planning is accomplished under thedirect supervision of the FSC as a commander'sdesignated head of his fire support coordinationagency which is the FSCC. He is assisted bysupporting arms commanders and theirrepresentatives and the commander's staff.

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Fire Support Planning forAmphibious Operations

Amphibious operations are the most complex ofall military operations. The amphibious firesupport planning process is characterized as adetailed, concurrent method conducted by ATFand LF staffs. Amphibious planning isconducted by the ATF (SACC) and LF (FSCC).The relationships and roles of these agencies arediscussed in chapter 1. Details of amphibiousplanning can be found in NWP 22-2 (Rev. B)!FMFM 1-7, Supporting Arms in AmphibiousOperations.

Fire Support Requirements

LF requirements are developed by everysubordinate tactical unit, approved andintegrated at successive higher levels, and finallyapproved and consolidated at the LF level forsubmission to the CATF. Initially, fire supportplanning is general in nature, but it becomesmore detailed and specific as tactical plans arerefined, intelligence and target information isacquired, and fire support means are allocated.

Overall requirements are determined early in theplanning sequence. These requirements consistof the number and type of aircraft, artillery units,NGFS ships, and respective munitions needed.The requirements are reviewed and revised asdetailed planning progresses. Similarly, artilleryrequirements are submitted to the CLF bycommanders of subordinate elements of the LF.The CLF submits his consolidated air and NGFrequirements to the CATF and these areconsolidated with the Navy requirements. TheCATF compares the consolidated overall firesupport requirements with the available firesupport means. If requirements cannot befulfilled or adjusted, additional air and NGFSmeans are requested by the CATF from Navysources, and if necessary, additional artillery isrequested by the CLF from FMF sources. If therequested additional fire support means cannotbe made available by higher authority, thepreliminary plans are adjusted by the CATF in

consultation with the CLF. Accordingly, aircraftand NGFS ships are allocated as available.

Detailed requirements represent a refinement ofthe overall requirements prepared initially.Concurrent and parallel planning and continuousliaison between Navy and Marine staffs ensuresufficient information is developed on which tobase the approval or modification of LFrequirements and the allocation of necessaryaviation and NGF units prior to completion ofdetailed fire support planning. The detailedrequirements are similar to the overallrequirements, but are more complete. Whereappropriate, specific targets to be attacked arelisted and described, ammunition expendituresfor targets are estimated, and schedules fordelivery of fire support recommended. Withinthe framework of fire support planning, air,artillery, and NGF plans are prepared withreference to the ATF target list. Wherepracticable, these plans are based on fire supportrequests received from subordinate echelons.Combined lists of targets received fromsubordinate echelons are integrated andaugmented by other targets whose destruction orneutralization is vital to the success of the LF asa whole. This planning constitutes the basis forthe detailed requirements submitted to theCATF and is divided into three phases—pre-D-day, D-day, and post-D-day.

Following the submission of the detailed LF firesupport requirements to the CATF, the air andNGF requirements are incorporated in the ATFair and NOF plans, respectively, These plans,along with the nuclear and chemical require-ments are incorporated in the applicable por-tions of the ATF fire support plan as tabs to thefire support appendix to the operations annex.They become a basis for similar tabs and appen-dixes to the operation plans of the LF and itsorganic elements.

LF fire plans for air, artillery, and NGF arepublished as separate supporting tabs toAppendix 12 (Fire Support) to the operationsannex to the operation order. Chemical fireplans and the fire support coordination plan will

FIRE SUPPORT IN MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE OPERATIONS 4-5

be included as separate tabs to Appendix 12.Nuclear plans will be included in Appendix 1(Nuclear Operations) to the operations annex tothe operation order.

Special Considerations

Because air and NGF ordinarily cany the burdenof fire support until organic LF means areinstalled ashore, special consideration is renderedto the requirements for these arms in the initialphase of the amphibious assault. Otherconsiderations which influence requirements areas follows:

Helicopterborne Assaults

Major dependence is placed on air support andhelicopter-transported artillery to ensurecontinuous support of the attack if objectives arebeyond the range of NGFS ships. This requiresthat plans be made for a greater number ofaircraft and larger amounts of aviation ordnanceand artillery ammunition over a longer period.

Llmfted Availability of NGFS Ships

In situations where other supporting arms arenot available or when NGFS ships areinsufficient to provide adequate support, theATF may place major dependence on air supportfor prelanding bombardment.

Early Artillery Employment

In situations where artillery can be emplaced onoffshore islands or landed with helicopterborneassault forces on objectives inland and withineffective range of the landing beaches, it canassume an important role in providing firesupport for the surface landing, thereby reducingair and NGF requirements.

Over-the-Horizon Assaults

The over-the-horizon assault is an operationalconcept for positioning amphibious forcesfurther offshore in the execution of the ship-to-shore phase of an amphibious operation which isintended to enhance the survival of the ATF.

The employment can increase the likelihood ofachieving tactical surprise at the point of powerprojection ashore. In these situations, plannersmust be attentive to the ability to establish andmaintain communications between elements ofthe ATF. The availability of fire support to theassault must be considered. Air will likely beavailable to support the assault element. NGFcan provide fire support using Tomahawkmissiles, and as ships are moved within range ofthe assault, using its guns. As artillery is landed,it too becomes available.

Coordination in Operations

The coordination of fires is continuousthroughout the operation. The planningresponsibility of the FSCC for fire supportcoordination extends through the execution ofprearranged fires contained in fire plans to theunscheduled fires requested by tactical units.The coordinating responsibility includes therequirement to disseminate timely fire supportinformation and to institute coordinationmeasures as required. Such action is provided asa part of the planning of fires or it fulfillsrequirements arising from the tactical situationashore.

The FSCC coordinates fires on targets ofopportunity and planned targets that are beyondthe coordination capability of the supportingarms control agencies; e.g., FAC/DASC, NGFspotter/combat information center, FO/FDC.This generally requires coordination andintegration of the activities of two or more firesupport agencies, troop elements, and adjacentunits affected by the fires.

A target of opportunity (NATO) is a targetwhich appears during combat and which can bereached by ground fire, naval fire, or aircraft fire,and against which fire has not been scheduled.(Joint Pub 1-02) Targets of opportunity whichinvolve a single supporting arm, under positivecontrol and cleared by a responsible agency, maynot require specific clearance by the FSCC.Internal coordination exercised by supportingarms control agencies is generally sufficient towarrant immediate attack of targets of

4-6 FMFM 2-7

opportunity, but battalion-level FSCCsmonitoring supporting arms request nets canexercise the supported commander's prerogativeto cancel or modify fire requests as necessary.These fires are not normally interrupted orinterfered with except when additionalcoordination is necessary or when an emergencyexists. If coordination is necessary, the FSCCdelays the firing as necessary, while appropriatecoordination is accomplished. The overridingprinciple relative to delaying fires is to anticipaterequirements and establish standing operatingprocedures which keep delays to an absoluteminimum.

In artillery and naval gunfire support, a plannedtarget is a target on which fire is prearranged.Preplanned air support is air support inaccordance with a program, planned in advanceof operations. (Joint Pub 1-02) Targets areplanned at all echelons. Targets may be plannedby higher echelons and disseminated tosubordinates along with taskings for the attack ofcritical targets. Lower echelons plan targetsconcurrently to meet their commander'srequirements and submit these targets asrefinements to the targets planned by the higherechelon. Preplanned air support, requests forGS fires, and special requirements are referred tothe next higher echelon for further coordinationand approval.

The battalion FSCCs have responsibility for thecoordination of the majority of the fires insupport of tactical operations. Since themajority of DS fires are delivered in thebattalion and regimental zones by the firesupport means available to those units, most ofthe coordination is accomplished withoutreferring to higher echelons. Fires whichendanger friendly troops or interfere withoperations of adjacent or higher units must becoordinated with the headquarters concernedprior to execution.

During the early stages of the amphibiousassault, control and coordination will bedecentralized until higher echelon controlelements are ashore and functioning.Communication plans should permit lower

echelons to enter higher echelon nets whenrequired during this period.

Fire Support CoordinationAgencies

The fire support coordination center is a singlelocation in which are centralized communicationsfacilities and personnel incident to thecoordination of all forms of fire support. (JointPub 1-02) Facilities, equipment, and materialare provided by the headquarters to which theFSCC belongs. Supporting arms units providerepresentatives and equipment necessary forconducting coordination, targeting, andcommunications functions for their respectivearms.

The FSCC functions under the general staffsupervision of the G-3/S-3. Since the FSCC isan advisory and coordinating agency only, it isnot vested with command functions. It is notcharged with actual control or direction of firesupport missions; however, these functions maybe performed when required.

FSCCs are established at each echelon—MAGTFCE, division, regiment, and battalion.Companies do not have FSCCS as such. Thecompany commander, assisted by his supportingarms representatives, performs the fire supportplanning and coordination necessary at thecompany level.

The FSC is the officer in charge of the FSCC.He is the direct representative of the commanderfor planning and coordination of all available firesupport. The FSC is responsible forimplementing the fire support coordinationpolicies of the commander. The FSC'sresponsibility is only for the coordination of firesupport plans and recommendations. The air,artillery, and NGFOs each have special stafffunctions with individual access to thecommander and his staff; nevertheless, theyoperate under the direction and guidance of theFSC in accordance with proper staff functioning.

FIRE SUPPORT IN MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE OPERATIONS 4-7

The MAGTF FSCC's effort is primarily inplanning for the deep battle. The MAGTFFSCC gathers information, makes liaison withother elements of the MAGTF and externalagencies as required, and coordinates those firesupport matters influencing the MAGTFcommander's mission accomplishment. InMAGTF FSCC operations, it is important toremember the principle of coordination at thelowest echelon. The MAGTF FSCC coordinatesthose matters that cannot be coordinated by theGCE FSCC(s), those matters that affect theMAGTF as a whole, and coordinates withhigher, adjacent, and external commands.Examples of fire support coordination tasks ofthe MAGTF FSCC include targeting withemphasis on the deep battle, and interface withexternal agencies on such matters as fire supportcoordination measures and procedures fordeconfliction of airspace for the deep battle.

The MAGTF FSCC allocates fire support assetsto other elements of the MAGTF and assiststhese elements to obtain fire support; e.g.,coordinating the provision of an Air Forceairstrike for the GCE. The MAGTF FSCCworks closely with the GCE(s)'s FSCC fortransition of the deep to close battle. Thesefunctions complement and extend the firesupport coordination efforts of other elements ofthe MAGTF. FMFM 2-7.1, Fire SupportCoordination by the MAGTF Command Element,provides a detailed discussion of the MAGTFFSCC and its functions. As stated in chapter 1,the MAGTF FSCC is task-organized. TheMAGTF commander designates his FSC.

At the division level, the FSC is the divisionartillery officer! commanding officer of theartillery regiment. The senior artillery officerpresent (assistant FSC) performs the duties ofthe FSC when the artillery commander isrequired to be absent from the combat operationcenter or is occupied with the direction of hiscommand. The division P5CC is staffed bypersonnel from the headquarter battery, artilleryregiment, and from the headquarters battalion,Marine division. The division FSCC has a keyrole in targeting and plans and coordinates fireson targets of interest to the division. The

division FSCC assists the regimental FSCCs infire support coordination.

At the regiment level, the infantry commander isresponsible for designating his FSC. Theregimental FSCC is staffed by personnel fromthe headquarters company, infantry regiment,and from the headquarters battery, artillerybattalion in DS. Regimental FSCCs play a keyrole in planning and using fire support.Regiments are usually the lowest echelonallotted enough fire support to influence thebattle significantly with fire support. Theregiment attempts to influence future operations,normally 24 to 48 hours in advance of thecurrent battle. Regimental FSCCs assistbattalion FSCCs in fire support coordination andclear fires which will impact in the regiment'szone of action beyond the battalions' zones.

The FSC for the infantry battalion is theweapons company commander, infantry battalion.The battalion FSCC is staffed by personnel fromthe weapons and headquarters and servicecompanies, infantry battalion, and from anartillery battery of a DS artillery battalion. Mostcoordination in operations is performed inbattalion FSCCS. Fire support planning effortsof the battalion FSCCs are relatively limited incomparison to the detailed and extensiveplanning of the regiment and division.

An overriding consideration for employingsupporting arms representatives (e.g., FOs,LNO5) is cohesiveness in battle. Cohesiverelationships can be achieved by habituallyassociating the same supporting armsrepresentatives with the same supported unit intraining and employing and keeping thesepersonnel with the same supported unitthroughout the battle. Such action may requirethat these personnel remain with the supportedunit even though their parent artillery unitreceives another tactical mission.

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Fire Support CoordinationMeasures

When used properly, fire support coordinationmeasures enable the commander to open upareas of the battlefield for rapid engagement oftargets or to restrict and control fires. The useof fire support coordination measures isgoverned by the tactical situation and should notbe rigidly applied. With the exception ofboundaries, fire support coordination measuresfall into two broad categories—permissive andrestrictive. The following paragraphs present anoverview of fire support coordination measures.For more detailed information about the usageof fire support coordination measures, seeFMFM 6-18, Techniques and Procedures for FireSupport Coordination.

Boundaries

In land warfare, a boundary is a line by whichareas of responsibility between adjacentunits/formations are defined. (Joint Pub 1-02)Boundaries are used to designate the geographiclimits of the zone of action of a unit. Unlessotherwise restricted, a unit commander enjoyscomplete freedom of fire and maneuver withinhis own boundaries. No unit may fire acrossboundaries unless such fires are coordinated withthe unit to whom the area is assigned, or unlesssuch fires are beyond the coordinated fire line(CFL) or appropriate coordination measure ofthe affected unit. The restriction applies to bothconventional and special ammunition and theireffects. The attack of targets with conventionalweapons requires that the commander, his FSCC,and/or the supporting arms control agencyensure that no more than negligible effectsextend beyond the unit boundaiies, unlessapproved by the commanders concerned.

In combined arms, boundaries aid thecommander and his subordinates in structuringthe battlefield to facilitate rapid, flexible, andopportunistic maneuver (movement incombination with fire). To achieve this, theestablishment and subsequent adjustment ofboundaries must receive deliberate and

continuous attention by the establishingcommander. If employed improperly, boundariescan impose a rigidity on operations whichimpede rather than facilitate rapid, flexible, andopportunistic maneuver.

Permissive Measures

The purpose of permissive measures is tofacilitate the attack of targets. When established,permissive measures permit the engagement oftargets beyond the line or into an area withoutfurther coordination.

Coordinated Fire Line

The CFL is a line beyond which conventionalsurface fire support means (mortars, artillery,and NGF) may fire at any time within the zoneof the establishing headquarters withoutadditional coordination.

Fire Support Coordination Line

The FSCL is a line established by theappropriate ground commander to ensurecoordination of fire not under his control butwhich may affect current tactical operations. Thefire support coordination line is used tocoordinate fires of air, ground or sea weaponssystems using any type of ammunition againstsurface targets. The fire support coordinationline should follow well defined terrain features.The establishment of the fire supportcoordination line must be coordinated with theappropriate tactical air commander and othersupporting elements. Supporting elements mayattack targets forward of the fire supportcoordination line, without prior coordinationwith the ground force commander, provided theattack will not produce adverse surface effectson, or to the rear of, the line. Attacks againstsurface targets behind this line must becoordinated with the appropriate ground forcecommander. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Free Fire Area

The free fire area (FFA) is a specific designatedarea into which any weapon system may fire

FIRE SUPPORT IN MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE OPERATIONS 4-9

without additional coordination with theestablishing headquarters.

Restrictive Measures

The primary purpose of restrictive measures is toprovide safeguards for friendly forces. Whenestablished, a restrictive measure imposes certainrequirements for specific coordination prior tothe engagement of those targets affected by themeasure.

Restrictive Fire Line

The restrictive fire line is a line establishedbetween converging friendly forces (one or bothmay be moving) that prohibits fires or effectsfrom the fires across the line withoutcoordination with the affected force.

Restrictive Fire Area

The restrictive fire area is an area in whichspecific firing restrictions are imposed and intowhich fires that exceed those restrictions will notbe delivered without coordination with theestablishing headquarters.

No-Fire Area

The no-fire area (NFA) is an area in whichneither fires nor the effects of fires are allowed.Two exceptions include—

o When the establishing headquarters approvesfires (temporarily) within the NFA on amission basis.

o When an enemy force within the NFA engagesa friendly force, the commander may engagethe enemy to defend his force.

Airspace Coordination Area

The ACA is a three-dimensional block ofairspace in which friendly aircraft are reasonablysafe from friendly surface fires. The ACA acts asa safety measure for friendly aircraft whileallowing the other supporting arms to continuefires in support of the maneuver force. ACAs

can be prearranged or instituted as separationplans during the dynamics of the battle.

Fire Support Communications

Reliable communications are essential foreffective control and coordination of supportingarms at all echelons within the MAGTF.Various means of communications are used,including radios, wire, digital and automatedsystems, and messengers. Detailed descriptionsof the communication circuits and systems arecontained in FMFM 3-30, Communications. Inplanning, the net composition required to meetthe needs of the operation is determined.

Other CoordinationConsiderations

Coordination of nuclear, chemical, andconventional fires which involve troop safety andtactical considerations affecting adjacent orhigher units is accomplished by the commandersconcerned. The responsibilities of troopcommanders involved extend to coordinating theeffects of their organic and supporting weaponsby personal or representative liaison and throughtheir FSCCs. Some of the followingconsiderations are necessary in coordinating firesupport with other units:

o In the case of smoke and illumination firesextending into adjacent unit areas, thecommander, his FSCC, and/or artillery FDCcoordinate with adjacent and higher units priorto execution. The use of illumination shouldbe coordinated with the use of nightobservation devices.

o The employment of chemical weapons iscarefully coordinated with higher and adjacentunits. Consideration is also given to theweather and the characteristics of the area ofoperations and their influence on the chemicalweapon employment. In an amphibiousoperation, the CATF has responsibility for theemployment of nuclear and chemical weapons.

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• Nuclear and chemical warnings are issued prior • Rules of engagement must be fully understoodto delivery of the weapon in order to provide by all personnel and incorporated into the firetime to implement normal protective support coordination process, as appropriate.measures.

• The observation requirements of the MAGTFand its subordinate elements must becoordinated.

Appendix A

Glossary

Section I. Abbreviations and Acronyms

AAW antiair warfareACA airspace coordination areaACE aviation combat elementANGLICO air/naval gunfire liaison companyATF amphibious task force

Bn battalion

C2 command and controlCAS close air supportCATF commander, amphibious task forceCE command elementCFL coordinated fire lineCIFS close-in fire supportCLF commander, landing forceCOF conduct of fireCSS combat service supportCSSE combat service support element

DASC direct air support centerDS direct support

EW electronic warfare

FAC forward air controllerFAC(A) forward air controller (airborne)FDC fire direction centerFMF Fleet Marine ForceFO forward observerFPF final protective fireFPL final protective lineFSA fire support areaFSC fire support coordinatorFSCC fire support coordination center

GCE ground combat elementGS general SupportGS-R general support-reinforcingGTL gun-target line

HPT high payoff targetHUMINT human intelligence

IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield

JFC joint force commander

LAI light armored infantryLF landing forceLNO liaison officer

MACCS.... Marine air command and control systemMAGTF Marine Air-Ground Thsk ForceMETT-T mission, enemy, terrain and weather,

troops and support available-time availableMEU Marine expeditionary unit

NAO naval aviation observerNFA no-fire areaNGF naval gunfireNGFO naval gunfire officerNGFS naval gunfire support

OPCON operational control

PCFF priority in calls for firePDF principal direction of firePE/R probable error in rangePOME point of main effort

RABFAC . radar beacon forward air controllerRAOC rear area operations centerRAS rear area securityRASC rear area security coordinatorRein reinforced

SACC supporting arms coordination centerSAW surface-to-air weaponSEAD suppression of enemy air defensesSIGINT signals intelligence

TAC tactical air commanderTACC tactical air command center (USMC)TACC tactical air control center (USAF/USN)TARBUL target bulletinTVA target value analysis

UAV unmanned aerial vehicleUSAF United States Air ForceUSMCR United States Marine Corps Reserve

A..2 FMFM 27

FIRE SUPPORT IN MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE OPERATIONS A-3

Section II. Definitions

A

adminIstrative control — (DOD, NATO) Direction orexercise of authority over subordinate or otherorganizations in respect to administrative matters such aspersonnel management, supply, services, and other mat-ters not included in the operational missions of the sub-ordinate or other organizations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

air liaison officer— (DOD) An officer (aviator/pilot)attached to a ground unit who functions as the primaryadvisor to the ground commander on air operationmatters. (Joint Pub 1-02)

airlnaval gunfire liaison company—A Fleet MarineForce unit composed of Marine and naval personnel spe-cifically qualified to provide ground control and liaisonagencies for the planning and employment of naval gun-fire and USN/USMC air support for allied or U.S. Armyforces of division size or less operating alongside aMAGTF in joint or combined operations; or in otheroperations where forces other than a Fleet Marine Forceare provided U.S. Fleet naval gunfire and naval air sup-port, or for such other supporting arms control and liai-son functions as the Fleet Marine Force commander maydirect. The air/naval gunfire liaison company is comprisedof a command element, an operational element (air/NGFteams), and a support element (e.g., administrative, sup-ply, maintenance).

airspace control area—(DOD, NATO) Airspace whichis laterally defined by the boundaries of the area of oper-ations. The airspace control area may be subdivided intoairspace control sub-areas. (Joint Pub 1-02)

artillery groupment—Temporary formations used whenone unit must exercise greater control over another thanis inherent in a reinforcing mission.

attach — (NATO) lb place units or personnel in an orga-nization where such placement is relatively temporarySubject to limitations imposed in the attachment order,the commander of the formation, unit, or organizationreceiving the attachment will exercise the same degree ofcommand and control thereover as he does over the units

and persons organic to his command. However, theresponsibility for transfer and promotion of personnel willnormally be retained by the parent formation, unit, ororganization. (excerpt from Joint Pub 1-02)

B

barrage fire — (DOD, NATO) Fire which is designed tofill a volume of space or area rather than aimed specif-ically at a given target. (Joint Pub 1-02)

boundary—(DOD, NATO) In land warfare, a line bywhich areas of responsibility between adjacentunits/formations are defined. (Joint Pub 1-02)

C

close air support—(DOD, NATO) Air action againsthostile targets which are in close proximity to friendlyforces and which require detailed integration of each airmission with the fire and movement of those forces. (JointPub 1-02)

close.in fire support—Air action unique to attack hel-icopters against hostile targets which are normally incloser proximity to friendly forces. CIFS requires detailedintegration with the fire and movement of friendly forces.(FMFM 5-4A)

coordinated fire line —A line beyond which conventionalsurface fire support means (mortars, field artillery, andnaval gunfire ships) may fire at any time within the zoneof the establishing headquarters without additionalcoordination. (FMFRP 0-14)

counterfire—(DOD, NATO) Fire intended to destroy orneutralize enemy weapons. (DOD) Includes counter-battery, counterbombardment, and countermortar fire.(Joint Pub 1-02)

D

defilade—(DOD, NATO) 1. Protection from hostileobservation and fire provided by an obstacle such as ahill, ridge, or bank. 2. A vertical distance by which a

A-4 FMFM2-7

position is concealed from enemy observation. 3. lbshield from enemy fire or observation by using naturalor artificial obstacles. (Joint Pub 1-02)

destruction fire — (DOD) Fire delivered for the sole pur-pose of destroying material objects. (Joint Pub 1-02)

direct air support center—(DOD) A subordinate oper-ational component of a tactical air control systemdesigned for control and direction of close air supportand other tactical air support operations, and normallycollocated with fire-support coordination elements. (JointPub 1-02)

direct fire— (DOD) Gunfire delivered on a target, usingthe target itself as a point of aim for either the gun orthe director. (NATO) Fire directed at a target which is vis-ible to the aimer. (Joint Pub 1-02)

direct support — (DOD) A mission requiring a force tosupport another specific force and authorizing it to ans-wer directly the supported force's request for assistance.(Joint Pub 1-02)

dispersion — (DOD, NATO) A scattered pattern of hitsaround the mean point of impact of bombs and projec-tiles dropped or fired under identical conditions. (excerptfrom Joint Pub 1-02)

F

final protective fire—(DOD, NATO) An immediately avail-able prearranged barrier of fire designed to impede enemymovement across defensive lines or areas. (Joint Pub 1-02)

fire plan—(DOD, NATO) A tactical plan for using theweapons of a unit or formation so that their fire will becoordinated. (Joint Pub 1-02)

fire support—Assistance to elements of the ground forcesengaged with the enemy rendered by other firing units,including (but not limited to) artillery, mortars, naval gun-fire, close air support, and close-in fire support.

fire support area—(DOD, NATO) An appropriatemaneuver area assigned to fire support ships from whichto deliver gunfire support of an amphibious operation.(Joint Pub 1-02)

fire support coordination — (DOD, NATO) The planningand executing of fire so that targets are adequately covered

by a suitable weapon or group of weapons. (JointPub 1-02)

fire support coordination center—(DOD, NATO) A sin-gle location in which are centralized communicationsfacilities and personnel incident to the coordination ofall forms of fire support. (Joint Pub 1-02)

fire support coordination Iine—(DOD, NATO) A lineestablished by the appropriate ground commander toensure coordination of fire not under his control butwhich may affect current tactical operations. The fire sup-port coordination line is used to coordinate fires of air,ground, or sea weapons systems using any type of ammu-nition against surface targets. The fire support coordi-nation line should follow well defined terrain features. Theestablishment of the fire support coordination line mustbe coordinated with the appropriate tactical air com-mander and other supporting elements. Supporting ele-ments may attack targets forward of the fire supportcoordination line, without prior coordination with theground force commander, provided the attack will notproduce adverse surface effects on, or to the rear of, theline. Attacks against surface targets behind this line mustbe coordinated with the appropriate ground force com-mander. (Joint Pub 1-02)

fire support coordinator—The officer in charge of the firesupport coordination center. He is the direct representativeof the landing force commander for the planning and coor-dination of all available fire support. (FMFRP 0-14)

fire support group—(DOD, NATO)A temporary group-ing of ships under a single commander charged with sup-porting troop operations ashore by naval gunfire. A firesupport group may be further subdivided into fire sup-port units and fire support elements. (Joint Pub 1-02)

fire support planning—The continuous and concurrentprocess of analyzing, allocating, and scheduling of firesupport to integrate it with the maneuver forces to max-imize combat power.

fire support station—(DOD) An exact location at seawithin a fire support area from which a fire support shipdelivers fire. (Joint Pub 1-02)

forward air controller— (DOD) An officer (aviator/pilot)member of the tactical air control party who, from a for-ward ground or airborne position, controls aircraft inclose air support of ground troops. (Joint Pub 1-02)

FIRE SUPPORT IN MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE OPERATIONS A-5

forward observer— (DOD) An observer operating withfront line troops and trained to adjust ground or navalgunfire and pass back battlefield information. In theabsence of a forward air controller the observer may con-trol close air support strikes. (Joint Pub 1-02)

free-fire area —A specifically designated area into whichany weapons system may be fired without any additionalcoordination. (FMFRP 0-14).

G

general support — (DOD, NATO) That support which isgiven to the supported force as a whole and not to anyparticular subdivision thereof. (Joint Pub 1-02)

general support-reinforcing — (DOD) A tactical artillerymission. General support-reinforcing artillery has the mis-sion of supporting the force as a whole and of providingreinforcing fires for another artillery unit. (Joint Pub 1-02)

group of targets—(DOD, NATO) Two or more targetson which fire is desired simultaneously. A group of tar-gets is designated by a letter/number combination or anickname. (Joint Pub 1-02)

H

harassing fire—(DOD, NATO) Fire designed to disturbthe rest of the enemy troops, to curtail movement and,by threat of losses, to lower morale. (Joint Pub 1-02)

hardened site — (DOD, NATO) A site constructed to pro-vide protection against the effects of conventional andnuclear explosions. It may also be equipped to provideprotection against a chemical or biological attack. (JointPub 1-02)

illumination fire—(NATO) Fire designed to illuminate anarea. (Joint Pub 1-02)

immediate air support—(DOD, NATO) Air support tomeet specific requests which arise during the course ofa battle and which by their nature cannot be planned inadvance. (Joint Pub 1-02)

indirect fire — (DOD) Fire delivered on a target that is notitself used as a point of aim for the weapons or the direc-tor. (NATO) Fire delivered at a target which cannot beseen by the aimer. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Intelligence preparation of the battlefield—A contin-uous, systematic approach to analyzing the enemy,weather, and terrain in a specific geographical area. Threatcapabilities axe evaluated and the enemy courses of actionwith respect to specific battlefield conditions are pre-dicted. (FM-6-20-10)

Interdiction flre—(NATO) Fire placed on an area orpoint to prevent the enemy from using the area or point.(Joint Pub 1-02)

L

landing force—(DOD, NATO) A task organization oftroop units, aviation and ground, assigned to an amphib-ious assault. It is the highest troop echelon in the amphib-ious operation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

M

Marine air command and control system — (DOD) AUS Marine Corps tactical air command and control sys-tem which provides the tactical air commander with themeans to command, coordinate, and control all air oper-ations within an assigned sector and to coordinate airoperations with other Services. It is composed of com-mand and control agencies with communications-electronics equipment that incorporates a capability frommanual through semiautomatic controL (Joint Pub 1-02)

marking fire—(DOD, NATO) Fire placed on a target forthe purpose of identification. (Joint Pub 1-02)

massed fire — (DOD) 1. The fire of the batteries of twoor more ships directed against a single target. 2. Fire froma number of weapons directed at a single point or smallarea. (Joint Pub 1-02)

N

naval aviation observer—A specifically trained, quali-fied, and duly designated officer who, from an aircraft,performs utility and liaison, observation, and directs sup-porting fires to include artillery, naval gunfire, close airsupport, and close-in fire support. (FMFRP 0-14)

neutralization fire—(DOD) Fire which is delivered torender the target ineffective or unusable. (Joint Pub 1-02)

no-fire area —A designated area into which neither firesnor effects of fires will occur. P.vo exceptionsoccur: (a) the establishing headquarters asks for or

A-6 -- FMFM 2-7

approves fire or (b) an enemy force takes refuge in thearea, posing a major threat, and there is insufficient timeto clear the fires needed to defend the friendly force.(FMFRP 0-14)

nonstandard tactica' mission—A mission that ampli-fies, changes, or limits one or more of the inherentresponsibilities of a standard tactical mission.

0

on-cafl target--(DOD, NATO) In artillery and navalgunfire support, a planned target other than a scheduledtarget on which fire is delivered when requested. (JointPub 1-02)

on-order missions—Missions that serve as warningorders to alert units of anticipated changes to their tac-tical mission. (FM 6-50)

operational control — (NATO) The authority delegatedto a commander to direct forces assigned so that the com-mander may accomplish specific missions or tasks whichare usually limited by function, time, or location; todeploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tacticalcontrol of those units. (excerpt from Joint Pub 1-02)

organic—(DOD) Assigned to and forming an essential partof a military organization. (excerpt from Joint Pub 1-02)

over.the-horizon —An operational concept for position-ing amphibious forces further offshore in the executionof the ship-to-shore phase of an amphibious operationwhich is intended to enhance the survival of the amphib-ious task force. The employment can increase the like-lihood of achieving tactical surprise at the point of powerprojection ashore. (FMFRP 0-14)

p

planned target—(DOD, NATO) In artillery and navalgunfire support, a target on which fire is prearranged.(Joint Pub 1-02)

prearranged I ire—(DOD, NATO) Fire that is formallyplanned and executed against targets or target areas ofknown location. Such fire is usually planned well inadvance and is executed at a predetermined time or dur-ing a predetermined period of time. (Joint Pub 1-02)

preparation I ire—(DOD, NATO) Fire delivered on a tar-get preparatory to an assault. (Joint Pub 1-02)

priority of fire—Guidance to a fire support planner toorganize and employ fire support means in accordancewith the relative importance of the maneuver unit'smissions. (FMFRP 0-14)

priority target—Target on which delivery of fire takesprecedence over all the fires for the designated firing ele-ment or unit.

procedural control—(DOD, NATO) A method of airspacecontrol which relies on a combination of previously agreedand promulgated orders and procedures. (Joint Pub 1-02)

R

reconnaissance by I ire—(DOD, NATO) A method ofreconnaissance in which fire is placed on a suspected enemyposition to cause the enemy to disclose his presence bymovement or return of fire. (Joint Pub 1-02)

reinforcing — (DOD, NATO) In artillery usage, tacticalmission in which one artillery unit augments the fire ofanother artillery unit. (Joint Pub 1-02)

restrictive fire area — An area in which specific restric-tions are imposed and into which fires that would exceedthose restrictions will not be delivered without coordi-nation with the establishing headquarters. The purposeof the restrictive fire area is to regulate fires into an areaaccording to the stated restrictions. (FMFRP 0-14)

restrictive fire line — A line established between converg-ing friendly forces that prohibits fires, or effects from fires,across the line without coordination with the affected force.The purpose of the restrictive fire line is to prevent inter-ference between converging friendly forces. (FrvIFRP 0-14)

rules of engagement—(DOD) Directives issued by com-petent military authority which delineate the circumstan-ces and limitations under which United States forces willinitiate and/or continue combat engagement with otherforces encountered. (Joint Pub 1-02)

S

scheduled fire — (DOD, NATO) A type of prearrangedfire executed at a predetermined time. (Joint Pub 1-02)

FIRE SUPPORT IN MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE OPERATIONS A.7

screening fire—Fire delivered to mask friendly maneuverelements and to conceal the nature of their operations.

supporting arms coordination center— (DOD) A sin-gle location on board an amphibious command ship inwhich all communication facilities incident to the coor-dination of fire support of the artillery, air, and navalgunfire are centralized. This is the naval counterpart tothe fire support coordination center utilized by the land-ing force. (Joint Pub 1-02)

suppression of enemy air defenses—(DOD, NATO)That activity which neutralizes, destroys or temporarilydegrades enemy air defenses in a specific area by phys-ical attack and/or electronic warfare. (Joint Pub 1-02)

suppressive fire—(DOD) Fires on or about a weaponssystem to degrade its performance below the level neededto fulfill its mission objectives, during the conduct of thefire mission. (Joint Pub 1-02)

T

tactical air commander (ashore)—(DOD) The officer(aviator) responsible to the landing force commander forcontrol and coordination of air operations within thelanding force commander's area of responsibility whencontrol of these operations is passed ashore. (JointPub 1-02)

tactical air control center— (DOD, NATO) The prin-cipal air operations installation (land or ship based) from

which all aircraft and air warning functions of tacticalair operations are controlled. (Joint Pub 1-02)

tactical air direction center— (DOD) An air operationsinstallation under the overall control of the tactical aircontrol center (afloat)/tactical air command center, fromwhich aircraft and air warning service functions of tac-tical air operations in an area of responsibility aredirected. (Joint Pub 1-02)

tactical fire direction —The control of one or more unitsin the selection of targets to attack, designation of the unitor units to fire, selection of the method of attack, and selec-tion of the most suitable ammunition for the mission.

tactical mission — Defines the fire support responsibil-ity of an artillery, naval gunfire, or mortar unit to a sup-ported unit.

target bulletin—An information message, used by thecommander responsible for maintaining the target list,to keep interested commanders informed of all changesin the target list. (NWP 22-2)

target of opportunity—(NATO) A target which appearsduring combat and which can be reached by ground fire,naval fire, or aircraft fire, and against which fire has notbeen scheduled. (Joint Pub 1-02)

target value analysis—A method for providing a sys-tematic determination of which targets out of the entiretarget array should be attacked for the greatest tacticalbenefit. (FMFM 6-18)

Joint Publications

Appendix B

References

Joint Pub 1-02Joint Pub 2-0Joint Pub 3-0Joint Pub 3-01.4Joint Pub 3-03Joint Pub 3-05Joint Pub 3-09Joint Pub 3-09.1Joint Pub 3-10Joint Pub 3-11Joint Pub 3-12Joint Pub 3-52Joint Pub 3-55Joint Pub 5-00.2

DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated TermsDoctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint OperationsDoctrine for Unified and Joint OperationsJTTP for Joint Suppression of Enemy Air DefensesDoctrine for Joint Interdiction OperationsDoctrine for Joint Special OperationsDoctrine for Joint Fire SupportJoint LASER Designation ProceduresDoctrine for Joint Rear Area OperationsDoctrine for Joint Chemical OperationsDoctrine for Joint Nuclear OperationsDoctrine for Joint Airspace Control in a Combat ZoneDoctrine for Joint Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA)Joint Task Force (JTF) Planning Guidance and Procedures

Fleet Marine Force Manuals

FMFM 2-7.1

FMFM 3-1FMFM 3-21FMFM 3-30FMFM 5FMFM 5-1FMFM 5-40FMFM 5-41FMFM 5-45FMFM 5-60FMFM 6-18FMFM 7-4

Fire Support Coordination by the MAGTF Command Element (underdevelopment)

Command and Staff ActionMAGTF Intelligence OperationsCommunicationsMarine AviationOrganization and Functions of Marine Aviation (under development)Offensive Air Support (under development)Close Air Support and Close-In Fire Support (under development)Suppression of Enemy Air DefensesControl of Aircraft and Missiles (under development)Techniques and Procedures for Fire Support CoordinationField Artillery Support (to be revised as FMFM 6-9, Marine Artillery Support)

Fleet Marine Force Reference Publications

FMFRP 5-43FMFRP 5-44FMFRP 5-85

Multi-Service Suppression of Enemy Air DefensesMulti-Service Air Attack Team OperationsAviation Equipment and Systems

B-2 FMFM 2-7

Naval Warfare Publication

NWP 22-2 B/FMFM 1-7 Supporting Arms in Amphibious Operations

Allied Tactical Publication

ATP 37 Supporting Arms in Amphibious Operations

U.S. Army Field Manuals

FM 6-20 Fire Support in the AirLand BattleFM 6-20-10 Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting ProcessFM 6-20-30 Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for Corps and Division

OperationsFM 6-20-40 Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for Brigade Operations

(Heavy)FM 6-20-50 Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for Brigade Operations

(Light)

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1994 0 — 160—550 QL 3