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My client has received a show-cause summons alleging thathe owes a substantial amount of child support. He is to

appear before the juvenile court judge on a specified date toexplain why he should not be held in contempt of court, fined,imprisoned, or both, for failing to pay his child support as previ-ously ordered. My client asks why he can be subject to jail time,if he is not charged with a crime. In that question, he has summedup the perceived quasi-civil, quasi-criminal nature of many con-tempt charges in the context of family law cases. Unfortunately,there is no single test for distinguishing civil from criminal con-tempt and no simple answer to my client’s question.

In this article, I will attempt to provide you with an overview ofthe distinctions between civil and criminal contempt, the elementsnecessary for proving either case, the defenses thereto, the pro-cedures, and the possible sanctions in each type of contempt case.

Basis of the Court’s Contempt PowersBlack’s Law Dictionary defines “contempt ofcourt” as: [A]ny act which is calculated toembarrass, hinder, or obstruct the court inadministration of justice, or which is calcu-lated to lessen its authority or its dignity.Committed by a person who does any act inwillful contravention of its authority or dig-nity, or tending to impede or frustrate theadministration of justice, or by one who,being under the court’s authority as a party toa proceeding therein, willfully disobeys itslawful orders or fails to comply with anundertaking which he has given.1

Both the juvenile and the circuit courts of the Commonwealthare vested with inherent contempt powers. Additionally, thecourts are granted statutory contempt powers.2 Such powers aredesigned to vindicate the authority of the court and the rights ofthe parties.3

Types and Forms of ContemptThere are two types of contempt proceedings: civil and criminal.Civil contempt proceedings are utilized to enforce the rights ofprivate parties and to motivate an accused contemnor into doingwhat he is required to do by court order. Such proceedings areremedial in nature.4 Criminal contempt proceedings, on theother hand, are prosecuted to preserve the power and vindicatethe dignity of the court.5 Such proceedings are punitive innature. Oftentimes, however, the same act or failure to act by aparty can justify either civil or criminal contempt proceedings.

There are also two forms of contempt: direct and indirect. Directforms of contempt take place in the presence and hearing of thetrial judge.6 Such contempt may be punished summarily, withoutprior notice to the defendant.7 Indirect contempt is contempt atleast part of which takes place outside of the hearing and presenceof the trial judge.8 Such indirect contempt may be punished onlywith prior notice to the defendant.

Distinguishing Civil from Criminal Contempt

The best way to distinguish civil from criminal contempt is toexamine the penalty sought or imposed. If the defendant “holds

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Fines, Imprisonment or Both:Civil vs. Criminal Contempt

by Laura A. Thornton

Virginia Lawyer 35

the keys to the jail” and can purge himself from the contemptfinding by committing an affirmative act, the contempt is civil innature. An example of such civil contempt punishment is a judge’sruling that a defendant shall be incarcerated until he brings cur-rent his support arrearage. If the defendant brings his arrearagecurrent, he may be released. In this situation, the defendant hasan opportunity to purge himself of the civil contempt.

Conversely, if the defendant’s punishment is unmodifiable byaction from the defendant, then the contempt is criminal. Examplesof such criminal contempt are unconditional fines and fixedunconditional jail sentences.9

In the case of Kessler v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 14, 441S.E.2d 223 (1994), the court of appeals set forth the test for dis-tinguishing civil from criminal contempt. In that case, the trialcourt found the defendant in civil contempt for his willful failureto pay child support as ordered. The trial court then sentencedthe defendant to eleven months in jail without any provisionallowing the defendant to purge himself of such contempt bypayment of all or a portion of his support arrearages. On appeal,the court ruled that the contempt was criminal not civil sincethere was no opportunity for the defendant to purge himself ofthe contempt. The case was reversed and remanded to the trialcourt to provide the defendant with the procedural protectionsafforded a criminal defendant.

Elements of Civil ContemptUnder Virginia case law, to establish a case for civil contempt aplaintiff must prove: the existence of a court order either pro-hibiting or mandating an act by the defendant10; the defendant’sactual knowledge of such an order11; and violation of such orderby the defendant12.

In the case of Wilson v. Collins, 27 Va. App. 411, 499 S.E.2d 560(1998), the Court of Appeals reversed a finding of contempt onthe ground that there was no violation of the express terms of thecourt order by the defendant. In that case, the parties’ propertyagreement had been incorporated into their final decree of divorce.It provided that the husband would obtain a life insurance policy,as approved by the wife, naming the wife and children as bene-ficiaries at such time as the youngest child reached the age of23. The husband obtained such a policy six months after heshould have done so, and did not provide wife with a copy ofthe policy. The trial court found husband to be in contempt fornot providing wife with a copy of the policy. The court of appealsreversed, stating that there was no express requirement that thehusband provide the wife with a copy of the policy: such arequirement was only implied. The court said, “[b]efore a personmay be held in contempt for violating a court order, the ordermust be in definite terms as to the duties thereby imposed uponhim and the command must be express rather than implied.” Id.Quoting Taliaferro v. Horde’s Adm’r, 22 Va. (1 Rand.) 242, 247(1822).

There is no Virginia case directly related to the standard of proofin civil contempt cases. The Virginia Civil Benchbook for Judgesand Lawyers 1999 Edition cites the Leisge child custody case for

the proposition that the standard of proof is by a preponderanceof the evidence.13 However, such a standard is not plainly articu-lated in the Leisge case. In fact the necessary standard of prooffor civil contempt cases is not addressed at all in the Leisge case.Rather, the case focuses upon the necessity of proving intent fora civil contempt conviction.

In Leisge, a mother had been granted custody by the Virginiatrial court. The father removed the parties’ child to New Mexicofor a visit, and while there filed a petition for custody. TheVirginia court entered an order restraining the father from pro-ceeding with litigation in New Mexico. The father neverthelesscontinued his New Mexico litigation. The Virginia court foundthe father to be in contempt, and fined him $500 per day withimprisonment until he purged himself of the contempt. Eventually,the New Mexico Supreme Court granted a writ prohibiting theNew Mexico District Court from holding a hearing on the father’scustody petition and the mother regained custody. At trial inVirginia on the contempt charge, the father’s fines were remittedand his jail sentence suspended conditioned upon his goodbehavior. The father was also ordered to pay a substantial portionof mother’s legal fees. The father argued that he should not beheld in contempt because the Virginia custody order was voidand he did not possess the specific intent to violate the courtorder. The court of appeals held that the custody order was validand that because the charge was for civil, not criminal, contempt,specific intent was not necessary for conviction. “Since the purposeis remedial, it matters not with what intent the defendant did theprohibited act . . . . An act does not cease to be a violation of alaw and of a decree merely because it may have been doneinnocently.” Leisge at 309, quoting, McComb v. Jacksonville PaperCo., 336 U.S. 187, 191 (1949).

In Virginia federal case law, there are additional elements and aclearly articulated standard of proof. Under controlling federal caselaw, the elements necessary to prove civil contempt include: theexistence of a valid decree of which the alleged contemnor hadactual or constructive knowledge; a showing that the decree wasin the movant’s ‘favor’; a showing that the alleged contemnor byits conduct violated the terms of the decree, and had knowledge(at least constructive knowledge) of such violations; and a show-ing that the movant suffered harm as a result.14 Each of theseelements must be shown by clear and convincing evidence.15

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There is no Virginia case

directly related to the

standard of proof in civil

contempt cases.

February 200136

Elements of Criminal ContemptTo establish a case for criminal contempt, the Commonwealthmust prove an intentional or willful act by the defendant.16 Suchact may be a violation of a court order or be conduct that under-mines the integrity of the court, including those instances setforth in Virginia Code Section 18.2-456 (i.e., misbehavior in thepresence of the court, violence or threats to a judge or courtofficer, vile language, misbehavior of a court officer, disobedi-ence or resistance to court process or orders). The standard ofproof, as with any criminal case, is beyond a reasonable doubt.17

In a recent case, Michaels v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 601,529 S.E.2d 822 (2000), the court of appeals reversed a trial courtfinding of contempt on the ground that the court order uponwhich the contempt show cause was predicated did not expresslyimpose a duty upon the defendant, which the defendant failedto fulfill. In that case, the trial court, by order dated January 21,1999 continued an inmate’s trial pending a psychological evalua-tion at Central State Hospital. The order was received by the jail,but the inmate was not transferred. No separate order was entereddirecting transport or scheduling the psychological evaluation.Upon learning that the inmate had never been transferred, thetrial court issued a rule to show cause against the supervisor ofthe records for the city jail, and subsequently found him in con-tempt for failing to transport the inmate. The court of appealsreversed, stating that “[b]efore a person may be held in contemptfor violating a court order, the order must be in definite terms asto the duties thereby imposed upon him and the command mustbe expressed rather than implied.” Id. at 609.

Civil Contempt ProceedingsThere are two types of civil contempt proceedings: summary andplenary. Summary proceedings are instituted when a direct con-tempt has occurred. In this situation, the contumacious behaviorhas occurred in the presence of the trial judge and the trial judgemay take evidence and punish the contemnor in the same pro-ceeding. The contemnor, while not entitled to prior notice, isentitled to be advised as to the specific charge of contempt andshall be given an opportunity to be heard in his defense.18 If thetrial judge chooses to delay the contempt hearing until after theproceeding in which the contumacious behavior occurred, then,the contemnor will be entitled to notice and the judge shallallow another judge to preside over the contempt proceeding.19

Plenary contempt proceedings are more common in family lawcases. Plenary proceedings are conducted in cases of indirectcontempt when the contumacious behavior has occurred, at leastin part, out of the presence of the trial judge. Plenary proceed-ings require prior notice and an opportunity to be heard by thedefendant. The most common procedure in the juvenile courtsystem is for the petitioner to request the issuance of a showcause summons, or “rule to show cause.” The petitioner alleges,often by a form petition, that the defendant has violated anorder of a certain date and requests that the court issue a rule orsummons to the defendant directing that he appear on a datecertain and explain to the court why he should not be held incontempt for his failure to obey the order. The petitioner, orsomeone, must sign the petition under oath. The petition and

rule are then served on the defendant. Personal service of therule on the defendant is required.20 Service upon counsel ofrecord is insufficient.21

In the circuit court, a similar procedure is used to initiate a civilcontempt proceeding. If the contempt proceedings are ancillaryto the pending action, the petitioner shall proceed in the pend-ing action. If, however, there is no matter pending on the activedocket, it is necessary to reinstate the underlying case. VirginiaCode Section 20-112 (1950, as amended) requires service ofprocess of the motion to reinstate where the purpose of rein-statement is to request additional orders to effectuate previousorders entered pursuant to Virginia Code Section 20-107.3 (1950,as amended).

Once the matter is on the court’s pending docket, the petitionerfiles a motion requesting that the court enter a rule (order)directing that the defendant appear at a certain date and timeand show cause why he should not be held in contempt for hisfailure to obey the previous order. While it is not required bystatute or case law, many courts prefer that such motions besupported by the affidavit of the petitioner or be verified by thepetitioner under oath. If a rule is issued without an affidavit, butthe defendant appears and participates in the proceeding, he isdeemed to have waived objection to the rule.22 Once the courtenters the rule, the defendant must be personally served there-with.23 Service upon counsel of record is insufficient.24

At the hearing, the burden of proof rests with the petitioner toprove his prima facia case. Thereafter, the burden shifts to thedefendant to show justification for his actions or inactionsallegedly violative of the prior order.25 This principle of shiftingburdens was applied in the Alexander case. (See, Alexander v.Alexander, 12 Va. App. 691, 406 S.E.2d 666 (1991)). In that case,the mother sought to have the father held in contempt for failureto pay child support in a timely manner. Upon hearing the testi-mony of the mother that the father had not paid his child sup-port on time, the burden then shifted to the father to justify hisfailure to pay support. The court then heard from the father whotestified that from the time the mother filed her show-causemotion he had paid all of his child support payments. Basedupon the husband’s evidence, the court declined to hold him incontempt.

The defendant has the right to present evidence in his defense,to call witnesses, and to examine the opposing party.26 Examplesof a valid defense include the inability to obey the order due tono fault of the defendant, the defendant’s lack of notice of theorder, and lack of jurisdiction of the court to enter the underlyingorder (making the order void). (See Street v. Street, 24 Va. App.14, 480 S.E.2d 118 (1997), where the court of appeals reversedthe trial court for refusing to allow the defendant to present evi-dence of his inability to pay support as a defense to a contemptfinding for failure to pay child support).

In support cases, should the defendant fail to appear, the courtmay proceed with trial in his absence or continue the matter.27

Should trial proceed in the defendant’s absence in a supportmatter and judgment of conviction be entered against him, thedefendant may within thirty days make application to have the

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case reopened, and after due notice to the original petitioner, forgood cause, the court may reopen the case and enter such judg-ment or order as is right or proper.28

There is no Virginia case on whether defendants in civil contemptproceedings are entitled to court-appointed counsel. However,Virginia Code Section 14.1-183 gives the court discretion toappoint counsel for indigent defendants in civil cases. (See also,Virginia Code Section 16.1-266 (D), which grants juvenile anddomestic relations district courts authority to appoint counsel forindigent children, parents or guardians.)

In many family law contempt proceedings, the petitioner seeksenforcement of a separation agreement that was previouslymade part of the parties’ final decree of divorce. In this year’sShoup case, the Virginia Court of Appeals ruled that in caseswhere the petitioner seeks enforcement of a written agreementwhich has been incorporated into a court decree, such agreementsare enforceable even in the absence of a finding of contempt.Shoup v. Shoup, 31 Va. App. 621, 525 S.E.2d 61 (2000). In Shoup,the petitioner, husband, sought enforcement of the parties’ prop-erty settlement and modification agreement, both of which hadbeen affirmed, ratified, and incorporated into a decree of thecourt. The husband filed a rule to show cause requesting anorder compelling wife to comply and a money judgment. Uponinterpretation of the agreement, the court declined to find wifein contempt. The court did, however, enter an order requiringwife to comply with the agreement and to pay a sum certain tohusband. The wife asserted that when the trial judge ruled shewas not in contempt, the court lacked authority to grant anyrelief to husband. The court of appeals held that the trial judgehad the authority to enforce the personal obligations of the partiescreated by the agreements, which were incorporated into thecourt’s decrees.

Criminal Contempt ProceedingsIn all criminal contempt proceedings, whether summary or ple-nary, the court must advise the defendant of the criminal natureof the proceedings. The court must then transfer the case fromthe equity side of the court to the law side of the court. Next,the court must substitute the Commonwealth as a party in place

of the plaintiff, to prosecute the action.29 Summary criminal pro-ceedings are conducted just as summary civil proceedings,except that the Commonwealth must prove its case against thedefendant by a standard of beyond a reasonable doubt.30

The majority of criminal contempt proceedings require plenaryproceedings, including informing defendant that the proceedingis criminal,31 transfer to the law side, and substituting theCommonwealth as a party. The defendant in such case musthave prior notice of the proceedings, be personally served, andbe advised of the details of his alleged contumacious behavior.32

Such notice must advise whether the defendant is facing thepossibility of jail time.

In the case of Steinberg v. Steinberg, 21 Va. App. 42, 461 S.E.2d421 (1995) the defendant appealed his criminal contempt convic-tion for failing to comply with orders regarding child support andvisitation on the ground that the court did not follow the properprocedure for criminal contempt proceedings; in particular, thathe was not provided notice, nor was he indicted or arraigned.The court of appeals upheld the defendant’s conviction, pointingout that Mr. Steinberg had been provided with a show causeorder specifically setting forth the details of his alleged offense,that he had knowledge prior to the hearing that the case wasbeing tried as a criminal contempt, and that for due process pur-poses, he did not have to be indicted or arraigned. The courtdistinguished the facts in Mr. Steinberg’s case from the facts inthe case of Powell v. Ward, 15 Va. App. 553, 425 S.E.2d 539(1993) where a contempt conviction was reversed because thetrial court did not adequately articulate the nature of the pro-ceedings at the commencement of the hearing. The court ofappeals pointed out that Mr. Steinberg did not request a continu-ance and did not show that his defense was compromised byany lack of notice. He was able to prepare his defense and per-sonally appeared and fully presented his defense. Accordingly,his due process challenge was denied.

According to Virginia law, the defendant in criminal contemptcases has a right to counsel.33 Likewise under federal law, thedefendant has a right to counsel and the appointment of counselin a criminal proceeding in which he is facing jail time.34

Under federal law, if the defendant faces the possibility of morethan six months in jail or a ”serious contempt fine,” then thedefendant has a right to a jury trial.35 The Virginia Court ofAppeals has ruled similarly.36 (See, Kessler v. Commonwealth, 18Va. App. 14, 441 S.E.2d 223 (1994), wherein the Virginia Court ofAppeals overturned a defendant’s contempt conviction andeleven month jail sentence for his failure to pay support on theground that the defendant was denied a jury trial.) The federalcourts have not defined a “serious contempt fine.” In the Munizcase, $10,000 fine was held insufficient to warrant a jury trial. Inthe Bagwell case, however, a $52,000 fine was held sufficient towarrant a jury trial.37

The Virginia Court of Appeals has found that the Double JeopardyClause of the United States Constitution can apply in criminalcontempt proceedings as in other criminal proceedings. InCourtney v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 561, 478 S.E.2d 336(1996), the appellate court reversed the conviction of a defendant

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The Virginia Court of Appealshas found that the DoubleJeopardy Clause of the UnitedStates Constitution can apply incriminal contempt proceedingsas in other criminal proceedings.

February 200138

found in contempt for failure to comply with the trial court’sorder regarding visitation on this ground.

As with all criminal proceedings, the Commonwealth must firstestablish its prima facia case against the defendant. As part ofsuch case, the Commonwealth must prove that the defendantviolated an order or engaged in conduct that undermined theintegrity of the court. The Commonwealth must further provethat the defendant’s actions were willful and intentional.38 Thedefendant must then justify his behavior. He has an opportunityto present evidence in his own behalf and to cross-examine theCommonwealth’s witnesses.39 The Commonwealth of coursemust prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.

SanctionsA sanction imposed on a party held to be in civil contempt gen-erally may serve either or both of two purposes: to coerce thecontemnor into complying with the Court’s order, or to compen-sate the complainant for losses resulting from the contemnor’spast noncompliance.40 Moreover, “a court has broad discretion tofashion a remedy based on the nature of the harm and the prob-able effect of alternative sanctions.”41 Sanctions in a contemptproceeding are left to the discretion of the trial court, unlessspecifically mandated by statute. Such sanctions may include fines,imprisonment, or both. Virginia Code Section 18.2-456 sets forththe sanctions for “Class 1” misdemeanor contempt and limits suchsanctions to up to ten days in jail and/or a fine of up to $50.

In Brown v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 758, 497 S.E.2d 147(1998), the Virginia Court of Appeals reduced the fine imposedupon a defendant for a contempt conviction imposed pursuantto Virginia Code Section 18.2-456. In that case, an attorney washeld in civil contempt for interrupting the administration of justiceby failing to appear on time at a hearing that he scheduled. Thetrial court imposed a fine of $400 ($10 for every minute the courtfound the defendant to be late). The court of appeals found theevidence supporting the contempt conviction to be sufficient,but reduced the fine to $50, the statutory limit.

Other statutes set forth the particular sanctions for failure to payfines, costs, forfeitures, restitution or penalty42; jurors who fail to appear43, fiduciaries who fail to timely file their requiredreports44, and debtors who fail to appear and answer debtorinterrogatories.45 The only limitation for sanctions in a civil contempt proceeding, as in a domestic case, is that the sanctionbe reasonable.

Counsel FeesJudges presiding over contempt proceedings in divorce suits alsohave the discretion to award counsel fees.46 The recent court ofappeals case of Sullivan v. Sullivan, (Record No. 0027-00-4, Va.Ct. App., November 21, 2000), affirmed prior holdings that it isnot necessary for the defendant to be held in contempt for theplaintiff to receive an award of fees. In that case, the plaintiffsought to have the defendant held in contempt for his failure tomaintain life insurance pursuant to the parties’ property settlementthat had been incorporated. The trial judge did not find the

defendant in contempt, but instead ordered the defendant topurchase a life insurance policy or post a bond to ensure perfor-mance of the obligation and to pay the plaintiff’s attorney’s fees.The defendant argued that the fee award was not appropriatebecause the issues were close, and the trial judge made no spe-cific finding of contempt. The court of appeals upheld the trialcourt finding that the issue of fees is solely in the discretion ofthe trial court and will not be reversed unless there has been anabuse of discretion.

ConclusionVirginia circuit and juvenile courts are vested with inherent andstatutory contempt powers for the purpose of vindicating theauthority of the court and the rights of litigants. To determinewhether civil or criminal, one must examine the penalty soughtor imposed. It is up to the court and counsel to clarify the natureof the proceedings at the beginning of the proceedings. �

ENDNOTES

1 Black’s Law Dictionary 288 (5th ed. 1979).

2 See, Va. Code Section 18.2-456 (Summary Contempt for misbehavior in thepresence of the court, violence or threats of violence to a judge, juror, partyor officer of the court, vile language, misbehavior of an officer of the court,disobedience or resistance to court order); Va. Code Section 16.1-69.24 (grant-ing district courts the same authority as circuit courts to punish summarily forcontempt); Va. Code Section 8.01-271.1 (Bad faith in pleadings and motions);Va. Code Sections 8.01-407, 19.2-267, 19.2-267.1, 8.01-356, 8.01-401, 118.2-445, 19.2-215.7 (Failure to obey subpoenas and summonses and failure to tes-tify); Va. Code Section 16.1-278.16 (granting district courts contempt powersover persons failing to comply with orders regarding support obligations);Va. Code Sections 20-71 and 20-115 (granting circuit courts contempt powersfor pendente lite and permanent support orders and orders granted pursuantto Va. Code Sections 20-103 or 20-107.3); Va. Code Section 19.2-358 (Failureto pay fines, costs, or restitution in timely manner); and Va. Code Section 20-124.2 (Authority to effectuate and enforce custody and visitation orders).

3 Potts v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 855 (1946); Carter v. Commonwealth, 2 Va.App. 392 (1986); and Baugh v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 368 (1992).

4 U.S. v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947) cited in United Mine Workersv. Covenant Coal Corp., 12 Va. App. 135 (1991); Leisge v. Leisge, 224 Va. 303(1982); Carter v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 392 (1986).

5 Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co. 221 U.S. 418 (1911); Carter v.Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 392 (1986).

6 In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); Greene v. Tucker, 375 F. Supp. 892 (E.D. Va.1974); Davis v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 395 (1978).

7 Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821 (1994).

8 Greene v. Tucker, 375 F. Supp. 892 (E.D. Va. 1974); Burdett v.Commonwealth, 103 Va. 838 (1904); Davis v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 395(1978).

9 Richmond Black Police Officers Ass’n v. City of Richmond, 548 F. 2d 123 (4thCir. 1977); Steelworkers v. Newport News, 220 Va. 547 (1979); and MineWorkers v.Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821 (1994).

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Laura A. Thornton is a member of theFranklin R. Blatt Law Firm in Harrisonburg.She is a graduate of the University of Virginiaand the University of Richmond Law School,where she served as managing editor of theRichmond Law Review. She also served as alaw clerk to Judge Daffron of the Circuit Courtof Chesterfield County.

Virginia Lawyer 39

10 French v. Pobst, 203 Va. 704 (1962); Winn v. Winn, 218 Va. 8 (1977).

11 Kidd v. Virginia Safe Deposit & Trust Corp., 113 Va. 612 (1912).

12 Wilson v. Collins, 27 Va. App. 411 (1998).

13 Virginia Civil Benchbook for Judges and Lawyers (1999 ed.), citing, Leisge v.Leisge, 224 Va. 303 (1982).

14 Colonial Williamsburg Foundation v. Kittinger Co., 792 F. Supp. 1397 (E.D.Va. 1992).

15 Id.

16 Carter v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 392 (1986).

17 Nicholas v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 315 (1947); Salyer v. Commonwealth, 209Va. 662 (1969).

18 Virginia Code Sections 18.2-456 and 18.2-457 (1950, as amended); Taylor v.Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974) Greene v. Tucker, 375 F. Supp. 892 (E.D. Va.1974).

19 Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821 (1994); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400U.S. 455 (1971).

20 Virginia Code Section 19.2-11 (1950, as amended). Higginbotham v.Commonwealth, 206 Va. 291 (1965).

21 Virginia Code Section 8.01-314 (1950, as amended).

22 Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 4 Va. 408 (1824).

23 Virginia Code Section 19.2-11 (1950, as amended). Higginbotham v.Commonwealth, 206 Va. 291 (1965).

24 Virginia Code Section 8.01-314 (1950, as amended).

25 Alexander v. Alexander, 12 Va. App. 691 (1991).

26 Street v. Street, 24 Va. App. 14 (1997).

27 Virginia Code Section 20-66 (1950, as amended).

28 Virginia Code Section 20-66 (1950, as amended).

29 Powell v. Ward, 15 Va. App. 553 (1993).

30 Street v. Street, 24 Va. 14 (1997).

31 Powell v. Ward, 15 Va. App. 553 (1993).

32 Steinberg v. Steinberg, 21 Va. App. 42 (1995).

33 Steinberg v. Steinberg, 21 Va. App. 42 (1995).

34 Holt v. Virginia, 381 U.S. 131 (1965); Richmond Black Police Officers Ass’n v.City of Richmond, 548 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1977).

35 Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974); Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624 (1988);Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454 (1975); Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S.821 (1994).

36 Baugh v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 368 (1992).

37 Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454 (1975); Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S.821 (1994).

38 Carter v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 392 (1986).

39 Street v. Street, 24 Va. 14 (1997).

40 Colonial Williamsburg Foundation v. Kittinger, Co., 792 F. Supp. 1397 (E.D.Va. 1992).

41 Id., quoting, Connolly v. J.T. Ventures, 851 F.2d 930, 934-35 (7th Cir. [F. Supp.1407] 1988).

42 Virginia Code Section 19.2-358 (1950, as amended).

43 Virginia Code Section 8.01-356 (1950, as amended).

44 Virginia Code Section 26-13, 26-18 (1950, as amended).

45 Virginia Code Section 8.01-508 (1950, as amended).

46 Carswell v. Masterson, 224 Va. 329, 332, 295 S.E.2d 899, 901 (1982).

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