Financing our future - Christian Aid · Financing our future: How development finance can drive the shift to a zero-carbon future 7 Overview: the need for energy transition There

Financing our future

How development finance can drive the shift to a zero-carbon future

September 2016

2 Financing our future: How development finance can drive the shift to a zero-carbon future

Christian Aid is a Christian organisation that insists the world can and must be swiftly changed to one where everyone can live a full life, free from poverty.

We work globally for profound change that eradicates the causes of poverty, striving to achieve equality, dignity and freedom for all, regardless of faith or nationality. We are part of a wider movement for social justice.

We provide urgent, practical and effective assistance where need is great, tackling the effects of poverty as well as its root causes.

christianaid.org.uk

Contact us Christian Aid 35 Lower Marsh Waterloo London SE1 7RL T: +44 (0) 20 7620 4444 E: [email protected] W: christianaid.org.uk Eng and Wales registered charity no. 1105851 Scot charity no. SC039150 Company no. 5171525 Christian Aid Ireland: NI charity no. NIC101631 Company no. NI059154 and ROI charity no. 20014162 Company no. 426928 The Christian Aid name and logo are trademarks of Christian Aid © Christian Aid September 2016 J5703

Authors:

Dario Kenner, Why Green Economy, and Alison Doig, Christian Aid

Financing our future: How development finance can drive the shift to a zero-carbon future 3

Contents Summary 5

Overview: the need for energy transition 7

Policy coherence: mixed signals 9

UK international energy investment 11

MDB energy investments 15

Comparing the MDBs’ energy investments 21

Opportunities for change 28

Recommendations 33

Appendix 1: Summary of DFID’s and the MDBs’ policy positions on fossil fuels and renewable energy 34

Appendix 2: How we ranked the banks 37

Cover: Wawan Rafi, northern Nigeria: These panels are part of a small scale solar energy project which provides energy to run the water pump in the village. Christian Aid/Sam Faulkner


Acronyms

AfDB African Development Bank

AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

AsDB Asian Development Bank

BECCS Bio-energy with carbon capture and storage

BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa

CDC The UK’s development finance institution, owned by DFID

CIF Climate Investment Funds

DFID UK Government Department for International Development

GCF Green Climate Fund

GHG Greenhouse gas

IDB Inter-American Development Bank

ICF International Climate Fund

IFC International Finance Corporation, the World Bank’s private sector arm

MDBs multilateral development banks

NDB BRICS New Development Bank

NDC Nationally Determined Contribution

PayGo Solar pay-as-you-go access to solar energy

PFI Public finance institutions

PPP public-private partnership

PV solar photovoltaic

SDGs Sustainable Development Goals

SE4ALL Sustainable Energy for All

UN United Nations

UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change


Summary There are two global energy crises, which often seem to have contradictory solutions: the urgency of tackling climate change through a rapid global shift to low-carbon energy; and the fact that more than 1.1 billion people continue to live in poverty because they have little or no access to modern energy. These two crises can and must be solved together, by investing in a sustainable energy future.

The urgency of responding to climate change was highlighted in December 2015 when governments at the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris delivered the Paris Agreement, promising to take action to keep the global temperature rise below 2°C and to pursue efforts to limit it to 1.5°C warming. Most countries proposed its own Nationally Determined Contribution to reduce carbon emissions in the coming decade.

In addition, in September 2015, the world agreed a new set of Sustainable Development Goals, including Goal 7 to ‘ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all’ by 2030. This means giving clean energy to the more than 1.1 billion people currently living in energy poverty. The outcome document of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in July 2015, agreed to step up all resources – public and private – for investments in many areas including for low-carbon and climate resilient development. 1

In the face of these global agreements, investment by the UK and by the multilateral development banks (MDBs) gives a contradictory picture.

On one hand they all are at the forefront of developing and delivering new renewable energy projects, many of which will deliver modern energy to the energy poor. The UK International Climate Fund is committed to delivering about £3 billion (approximately $4 billion) of funding to low-carbon energy from 2016 to 2021. Between 2010 and 2015 the World Bank Group, the Asian Development Bank, the African Development Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank spent $17.5 billion on clean energy ($10.5 billion by the World Bank Group).

However, they all continue to invest heavily in large centralised fossil fuel projects which have limited or no direct impact on poverty reduction in the countries where they are situated. UK Export Finance continues to heavily support investment in oil and gas projects internationally. The World Bank and the three regional MDBs between them invested more than $18 billion in fossil fuels between 2011 and 2015.

Low-carbon opportunities in the developing world2

The global energy market is changing rapidly. Technology advancement, regulation to control climate change, innovative finance and consumer choice mean that low carbon energy is now in the mainstream, competing with the old centralised fossil fuel energy systems. In 2015 global investment in solar and wind power combined ($270 billion) was more than double that in fossil fuels ($130 billion), and the trend is continuing. While high-income countries such as Germany and Australia led the way on renewable

‘Sustaining long-term poverty reduction means that it is essential to meet global climate objectives to keep average temperature increases below 2˚C, which in turn requires rapid global action to reach zero net emissions by the second half of the century.’ World Bank Group Climate Change Action Plan, 20161


energy, the middle- and lower-income countries are rapidly advancing, with more renewable energy investment in developing countries in 2015 than in developed ones. This transition will impact on businesses, job creation, urban development, service delivery and households.

There is an opportunity for UK investments and the MDBs to accelerate this low-carbon transition to deliver the Paris commitments, and to use it to ensure sustainable energy for all.

This report makes the case that the UK Government and the MDBs can play a catalytic role in the transition to equitable zero-carbon energy systems in the global south in line with the Addis Ababa commitments on financing for development. This must include an increased focus on renewable energy provision for those living in energy poverty, via grid connections, off-grid systems and modern cooking technologies.

The UK Government and the MDBs should:

1. Ensure better data on their energy investments and the carbon emissions of their funding portfolios is publicly available and set clear targets to reduce the carbon footprint of their investments and their exposure to climate risk

2. Support developing countries to achieve their greenhouse gas reduction commitments, by phasing out financing for fossil fuels, and instead prioritising financial support for delivery of the Nationally Determined Contributions.

3. Support developing countries to achieve universal access to energy, giving greater priority to decentralised and off-grid renewable energy technologies.


Overview: the need for energy transition There is a close correlation between access to modern energy and improvements in people’s wellbeing.3 Access to energy is crucial to reducing poverty in the global South, where more than 1.1 billion people have no electricity and more than 2.7 billion cook on open fires.4 Electricity can enable safe drinking water to be pumped and medicines to be refrigerated; it can provide light to enable study at home after the sun has set, it can power computers and charge mobile phones. Improved fuel for cooking reduces the amount of time women have to spend gathering firewood, and it curbs deforestation and cuts indoor air pollution.5

The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) agreed in September 2015 include one, goal 7, which aims at universal energy access by 2030, alongside targets for significant increases in renewable energy and energy efficiency. The outcome document from the Addis Ababa Financing for Development conference made a commitment to step up low-carbon and climate resilient investments.

And in December 2015, at the United Nations (UN) Climate Change Conference, the world’s governments adopted the Paris Agreement, including a goal to phase out fossil fuel emissions by the second half of this century. At the Paris climate negotiations, most developing countries presented Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) towards a low- or zero-carbon economy, which now need an agreed priority for public and private investment. Bangladesh’s NDC includes a Solar Homes Programme, and a target to have 10% of its total electricity from renewable sources by 2020. Kenya’s NDC aims to achieve a low-carbon, climate-resilient development pathway using geothermal, solar and wind energy, and seeks to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 30% by 2030. But this is all subject to international support, in the form of finance, investment, technology development and transfer, and capacity building.

Public sector institutions play a crucial role in determining the type of energy deployed in developing countries, and as public bodies they are bound by commitments by their member governments. This report assesses the role played by international investment, including by the UK Government’s Department for International Development (DFID), and by multilateral development banks (MDBs) including the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank (AsDB), the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) in the transition to zero-carbon energy and achieving universal energy access.

DFID and the MDBs acknowledge the threat of climate change and call for action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, which is why they call for increasing investment6 in off-grid renewable energy. However, at the same time they continue to justify investments in fossil fuels and large-scale projects on economic development grounds while ignoring long-term climate-related risks.

Assessments of DFID’s and the MDBs’ energy investment shows that a tiny portion of the finance they provide is aimed at reducing energy poverty, with only about 5% of fossil fuel projects having any energy access objective at all.7 Their fossil fuel investments have not

‘A reliable electricity supply is one of the most powerful tools for lifting people out of poverty and ending dependency on aid…..lack of reliable electricity access as a major constraint to doing business.’ DFID Energy Africa Campaign, 2015


made sufficient progress towards achieving universal energy access and many large scale projects have had a multitude of negative environmental and social impacts.

In this report, Christian Aid presents the case for the UK Government and MDBs to rapidly reduce their investments in fossil fuels and increase their investments in on- and off-grid renewable energy to reduce poverty and combat climate change. The NDCs and SDG7 should now frame how international public investment supports developing country governments to achieve their global commitments. Unless actors such as DFID and the MDBs push forward investment, there will not be, for example, a doubling of renewable energy by 2030 in line with SDG7.8

There are signs that the shift to renewable energy in the global south has started,9 with countries such as China and India – where an estimated 260 million people lack access to electricity10 – making significant efforts to increase renewable energy generating capacity.11 China is leading in solar energy innovation and green financing strategies. The cost of electricity generated from solar and wind has fallen dramatically in the past five years,12 with solar achieving grid parity in many countries.13 For example, the cost of solar photovoltaic (PV) panels was 75% lower in 2014 than in 2009.14 Investment in renewable energy (excluding large hydropower) is now larger in the global South than in the global North.15 With this push from the south, now is the time for DFID and the MDBs, which are already investing in successful renewable energy projects, to fully commit to renewable energy and help phase out fossil fuel use.

Box 1: Classifying energy investments16 The way the World Bank and other MDBs define renewable energy is contested because they include large hydropower and bioenergy (either biofuels or biomass or both) projects, which have significant negative environmental and social impacts that contradict their classification as ‘clean’ energies.17 This report uses the following definitions, prepared by Oil Change International, an NGO calling for the transition to clean energy.

Fossil fuel: Any project or policies supporting the exploration and extraction of fossil fuels, plus fossil fuel power projects including power transmission, including oil, gas or coal.

Clean energy: Projects that are both low carbon and have low environmental and social impacts. Includes energy efficiency and renewable energy from the sun, wind, rain, tides, and geothermal sources. It also includes any policy reforms that provide incentives for clean energy development and investment.

Other: The development of some renewable sources, such as large hydropower and bioenergy (biofuels and biomass), can have negative impacts on the local environment and on human populations. These energy sources, along with nuclear power, incineration, and other forms of power that are not fossil fuel but not 'clean’, are included in the 'other' category. Many transmission and energy sector policy reforms that are unable to be specifically linked to the source of energy are also classified as ‘other’.


Policy coherence: mixed signals DFID and the MDBs send mixed signals to developing countries by continuing to invest in fossil fuels, while backing successful renewable energy projects. They will not be able to keep up this contradiction in the long term. Governments around the world are beginning to legislate to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions in line with international commitments and rising climate change risks.18 Meanwhile, the costs associated with fossil fuels are expected to continue to rise while costs of renewable energies fall.19

Table 1: Mixed signals from DFID’s and the MDBs’ energy policies and investments

Continuing support for fossil fuels Support for renewable energy

Still investing in fossil fuels

DFID justifies investments in natural gas to meet increasing demand for electricity on economic development grounds.

Between 2010 and 2015 the World Bank Group, AsDB, AfDB and IDB spent $18 billion directly on fossil fuels ($13 billion by the World Bank Group).

Increasing investments in renewable energy

DFID and the MDBs acknowledge that renewable energies are an effective way to generate energy that also reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

They are already investing in successful renewable projects in developing countries. Between 2010 and 2015, the World Bank Group, AsDB, AfDB and IDB spent $17.5 billion on clean energy ($10.5 billion by the World Bank Group).

Justifying investments in coal

DFID justifies investments in coal where ‘no other economically feasible alternative exists’ and in natural gas when ‘these are more cost effective than renewable alternatives’.

The World Bank justifies investments in coal where there is a lack of ‘feasible alternatives’.

The AfDB and AsDB both say they will continue to invest in coal, using more efficient coal technology.

Recognising renewable energy is cost-competitive

DFID acknowledges that renewable energies such as solar, wind, hydro and geothermal are increasingly cost-competitive in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. Where renewable energy is more expensive, DFID concludes that there is a ‘case for investing in higher cost renewables to lay the foundations for a more secure and sustainable energy future’.

All the MDBs state that the costs of renewable energy have fallen substantially and are competitive with fossil fuels.

Arguing fossil fuels are needed to meet energy demand

The World Bank and IDB argue natural gas can provide the power needed to satisfy minimum demand (base load). DFID justifies continued investments in natural gas when there is ‘strong and unmet demand’.

Recognising decentralised and off-grid renewable energy are effective ways to increase energy access

DFID and the MDBs all say off-grid renewable energy is a good way to reach the 1.1 billion people who do not have access to energy.

DFID, the World Bank and the IDB are currently invested in decentralised and off-grid projects.

Source: DFID and MDBs climate change and energy policies.20 Data from Oil Change International.21

The figure below illustrates the mixed signals that DFID and the MDBs send out in more detail by comparing their policy positions on fossil fuels, renewable energy and climate change. DFID and each of the MDBs have many common positions. Broadly, they support investments in oil and gas on economic development grounds that ignore wider environmental and social dimensions of sustainable


development. Some place specific restrictions on coal power; none of the institutions have funded coal-fired power plants since 2013. However, they do not place a comprehensive exclusion on fossil fuel financing, including coal mining and extraction of oil and gas. They generally do not factor in the long-term climate change risk and associated portfolio risk into the cost-benefit analysis of fossil fuel investments.

In terms of renewable energy they all support solar, wind and geothermal. But they also back large hydropower and bioenergy, which can have negative social and environmental impacts including displacement, damage to ecosystems and agricultural production, and can lead to greenhouse gas emissions.22 While they all state the urgency of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, the only institution that reports on emissions associated with its portfolio of investments is the IDB.

Figure 1: Clean energy scorecard for the MDBs


UK international energy investment The UK Government continues to affirm its commitment to spend 0.7% of national income on aid. In addition it has been very proactive in delivering climate finance under its global commitments. In 2015 the UK Government played a constructive role in delivering the Paris Climate Agreement and the SDGs, including ensuring there was a ‘green thread’ through all the SDGs. The ambitious rhetoric on the SDGs and Paris now needs to be put into action, but this puts a sharp focus on the UK’s international investments in energy.

UK climate change policy The 2008 Climate Change Act commits the UK to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by at least 80% by 2050, based on 1990 levels. The government is to put in place policies to meet legally binding carbon budgets which place a maximum cap on emissions over a five-year period. Overall the government must ensure these proposals and policies contribute to sustainable development.23

At the Paris climate change conference, the UK made commitments as a member of the European Union to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 40% by 2030, compared to 1990 levels.24 As the UK moves to leave the EU it will have to establish and submit its own NDC. In March 2016, the UK Government announced it would pass legislation to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions to ‘net zero’ by the second half of the century to be compatible with the Paris Agreement. There are no details as yet on when and how this would be achieved.25

DFID’s position on climate change DFID states that: ‘tackling climate change and promoting sustainable growth and development are necessary to eliminate poverty: one cannot be achieved without the other’. It has made the following commitments:

¡ protect the lives and livelihoods of millions of poor people from the effects of climate change

¡ help millions of poor people secure clean energy ¡ protect forests and the 1.2 billion people who depend on them.26

DFID bilateral energy investments DFID’s overarching objective for energy finance is to support countries to develop energy sectors that will incentivise new investment and increase productivity and competitiveness throughout the economy, leading to inclusive economic growth.

There are a lot of positive signals from UK bilateral aid. DFID allocated £807 million for energy through bilateral aid between 2009 and 201427 (see Table 2). According to DFID’s website for the current financial year (2016/17), £90.0 million of its budget has been allocated to energy generation and supply, that is 1.15% of its total bilateral spend.28 The majority of this was for power generation from renewable resources (see Table 3).

However, greater transparency is needed over DFID’s energy spending. For example, there is no definition or criteria provided on


what DFID classifies as power generation from renewable sources, and whether it is predominantly new renewables or ‘clean energy’ (see Box 1). It is not always clear what type of energy is involved in the projects DFID funds as there is often a wider focus on infrastructure. For example DFID has allocated £36.9 million to a project which aims to improve access to affordable basic infrastructure services for the poor. The project is listed by DFID as delivering both power generation from renewable resources and also power generated from non-renewable resources, but with little detail on either type of energy investment.29

Table 2: UK bilateral aid 2009-201530

Year 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Energy generation and supply

£51.7m £79.8m £147.5m £284.4m £137.7m £105.7m £97.8m

Table 3: DFID’s spend on energy generation and supply, 2016/1731

Area Amount spent

Power generation/renewable resources £41 million

Energy policy and administrative management

£20.8 million

Electrical transmission/distribution £11.4 million

Energy research £11 million

Power generation/non-renewable resources £5.8 million

Total £90 million

International Climate Fund The International Climate Fund (ICF), set up in 2011, is jointly managed by DFID, the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs.32 Between 2011 and 2016, the UK provided £2.4 billion for projects including on renewable energy, climate change adaptation and protection of forests.33 A further £5.8 billion was pledged in Paris for the ICF for the period 2016-2021.34 In 2011 the government identified the ICF as a vehicle for increasing energy access and scaling up renewable energy generation.35

As of April 2015 the ICF claimed to have improved access to clean energy for 2.6 million people (projected to rise to 5.7 million by April 2016), created 39,000 jobs and avoided 2.3 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent emissions.36 However, given the importance of the ICF to the government and the significant amount of financing provided by DFID, more data is needed to be able to assess its impact in increasing energy access and renewable energy generation. There have already been calls for the ICF to publish more detailed information, including by the House of Commons Environmental


Audit Committee in 201137 and the Independent Commission for Aid Impact in 2014.38

DFID spending on energy via MDBs In 2014 DFID allocated £2.2 billion to the World Bank Group and smaller amounts to other MDBs including the AsDB (£31 million), AfDB (£7.3 million) and IDB (£2.4 million).39 In 2011 the government said: ‘DFID will continue to monitor closely the Multilateral Development Banks’ performance on shifting away from fossil fuel to clean energy lending’.40 As the section below demonstrates, the MDBs all continue to finance fossil fuels in a variety of ways. As a significant portion (almost one third41) of UK aid goes through this route, DFID should use its leverage as a key shareholder to push the World Bank and other MDBs to be part of the big shift to renewable energy. As the House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee noted: ‘The current scale of the World Bank’s lending to support fossil fuel-powered energy generation is unacceptable and counterproductive to efforts to reduce greenhouse gases’.42

UK international energy investment Research by CAFOD and ODI looked at overall UK official development assistance provided for energy between 2009 and 2013. This included aid given through bilateral channels such as DFID, the Department of Energy and Climate Change and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and multilateral channels such as the World Bank. CAFOD’s research also examined financing channelled through what was at the time the Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, in particular UK Export Finance, which provides export credits to underwrite UK exports. It found that of the £5.23 billion allocated to international energy investment, an estimated £2.25 billion (43%) went towards the production or consumption of fossil fuels (mainly via UK Export Finance) while an estimated £1 billion (19%) was spent on renewable energy. In total four of the UK’s top five overseas energy projects by value involved fossil fuels.43 44

Energy access It should be noted that it is difficult to accurately gauge how much the UK funds energy access because there is insufficient project information and no consistent definition of energy access used across the portfolio. The CAFOD/ODI study estimated that overall the UK allocated around £444 million for improved energy access in developing countries between 2009 and 2013. This was just 8.5% of the £5.23 billion total allocated for energy from all UK finance sources.45

DFID gives details on the number of people with improved access to clean energy as a result of its climate focused projects, including those with new connections to off-grid renewable energy sources and households with more efficient cook stoves, solar lanterns or clean energy technologies. Between 2011 and 2015 nearly 5 million people had gained ‘access’ due to DFID funding. The majority of these people live in Bangladesh (31%), India, (29%), Tanzania (10%), Nepal (8%) and Kenya (7%).46

‘DFID should make, and publish, an assessment that compares its aid expenditures and the extent of fossil fuel subsidies for each aid-recipient country, and UK Export Finance should similarly provide a comparative analysis of export finance support and fossil fuel subsidies.

‘DFID should then include these analyses in a revision of its Environment Strategy, along with the two departments’ assessment of why continued aid and export support in each case overrides the need for eliminating fossil fuel subsidies in those countries.’ House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee, Energy subsidies, 201344


In a positive move, DFID is supporting a number of decentralised and off-grid projects in Brazil, Bangladesh and rural areas in Africa.47 In 2015 it launched the Energy Africa campaign which will contribute to meeting the goal of ‘affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy by 2030’ for Africa.48 The campaign will focus on boosting the household solar market by overcoming the current lack of investment and policy and regulatory barriers. Ethiopia, Malawi, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Nigeria and Somalia have pledged to be part of the scheme.

While DFID’s efforts on energy access are laudable and go some way towards SDG7, overall the UK does not give sufficient funds to energy access, as shown by the CAFOD/ODI study. There is therefore a serious imbalance which must be addressed.

Summary While DFID is showing encouraging trends towards financing renewable energy and increasing energy access, the picture is not the same across UK international investment, for example in UK Export Finance. It is essential that the UK should aim to have cross-government coherence in supporting the NDCs and SDG7 internationally.

There is still a lack of transparency over DFID’s energy spend. Clear definitions should be provided for what constitutes clean energy and energy access. In addition to the Oil Change International definitions of clean energy, we recommend using the Sustainable Energy for All (SE4ALL) Global Tracker Framework (see Box 2) to monitor energy access more comprehensively.

Greater transparency of data would enable DFID to make informed decisions and manage risk, as well as enabling the public to hold the government to account. Additionally, ambitious targets should be set and publicly disclosed, based on delivery of NDCs and the SDG7 objective of universal access to affordable and clean energy.

Box 2: SE4All Global Tracking Framework It is crucial to move from simplistic measures of energy access, such as whether a household has an electricity connection or not, to look at what communities need energy for, including domestic use, small businesses, farming, health clinics and schools.49 This is the aim of the Global Tracking Framework.

This multifaceted measure of energy access is now part of the effort to track the impact of the United Nations SE4ALL initiative.50 It will go beyond binary measures – such as whether or not there is a connection to the electric grid – to a multi-tier framework that focuses on a range of issues such as quality, quantity, affordability, safety and reliability of the electricity that is supplied.51 The multi-tier framework also applies to the type of cook stove in use.

This broader definition of energy access is needed because the supply of electricity can be irregular; having electricity supply is not the same thing as having access to electricity services; and because it is important to track off-grid energy provision.52 The advantage of using this multi-tiered approach is that it will be more possible to track progress on equity, essential to achieving the SDG objective that no-one is left behind.


MDB energy investments The MDBs do not provide detailed information on their energy investments that is easily accessible and comparable between energy types. The data presented below is compiled from research by Oil Change International.53 The MDBs should have clear policies that identify their transition towards low-carbon energy, and gather better data from their energy investments as a step towards setting clear targets for reducing their support for fossil fuels. 54

World Bank Group The World Bank Group has consistently invested a significant portion of its energy investments in fossil fuels. Between 2011 and 2015 it invested $12.9 billion in oil, gas and coal. This compares to $10.4 billion in clean energy projects over the same period. The largest amount, $20.4 billion, was allocated to ‘other’ projects, which can include transmission as well as large hydropower, biofuels and biomass projects which are not considered to be ‘clean’ (see Box 1). A recent report by Oil Change International estimates that the World Bank Group invested more than $313 million in fossil fuel exploration in 2015 and a total of $1.7 billion between 2011 and 2015. 55 The logic of this is questionable given that the International Energy Agency estimates that no more than one-third of proven reserves of fossil fuels can be consumed prior to 2050 if the world is to achieve the goal of keeping the global temperature rise below 2°C.56

‘We must regain the sense of urgency we all felt on the eve of COP21. Inaction means we will not meet our targets set in Paris, and the global temperature will soar above 2 degrees Celsius. That would spell disaster for us, for our children, and for the planet.’ Jim Yong Kim, President, World Bank Group, at the 2016 Climate Action Summit54


Figure 3: World Bank energy investments 2011-2015

Table 5: World Bank Group energy investments by organisation 2011-2015

World Bank Group Fossil fuels Clean Other Total

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) $3,125,828,000 $3,632,540,000 $8,111,809,127 $14,870,177,127

International Development Association (IDA) $2,390,048,500 $2,039,954,000 $7,382,825,923 $11,812,828,423

International Finance Corporation (ICF) $5,089,356,000 $4,550,698,666 $3,215,605,000 $12,855,659,666

Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) $2,344,000,000 $270,000,000 $1,770,800,000 $4,384,800,000

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) $3,125,828,000 $3,632,540,000 $8,111,809,127 $14,870,177,127

Climate Investment Funds

In addition to its own portfolio of investment, the World Bank manages the Climate Investment Funds (CIF).57 With a total fund of $8.3 billion the CIF is providing 72 developing and middle-income countries with resources to manage the challenges of climate change and reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. These include four funds:

¡ The $5.6 billion Clean Technology Fund provides middle-income countries with highly concessional resources to scale up the demonstration, deployment, and transfer of low-carbon technologies in renewable energy, energy efficiency, and sustainable transport.

¡ The $1.2 billion Pilot Program for Climate Resilience is helping developing countries integrate climate resilience into development planning and offers additional funding to support public and private sector investments for implementation.

Clean 24%

Fossil fuels 29%

Other 47%


¡ The $780 million Scaling Up Renewable Energy Program is helping to deploy renewable energy solutions for increased energy access and economic growth in the world’s poorest countries.

¡ The $771 million Forest Investment Program supports efforts of developing countries to reduce deforestation and forest degradation and promote sustainable forest management that leads to emissions reductions and enhancement of forest carbon stocks.

The CIF arrangement has a ‘sunset clause’ written into it, and it was expected that once the Green Climate Fund (GCF) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was established, that the CIF would transfer funding and projects to the GCF. This has not yet happened and there is no indication as yet that the World Bank will sunset the fund.

Unlike the MDB-driven CIFs, the GCF was set up according to the principles of the UNFCCC. With a governance structure evenly split between developed and developing countries, the GCF is founded on a ‘country-driven approach’ accountable to institutions and people in developing countries, and has placed a premium on direct access to funds by developing country entities. The GCF promotes a gender-sensitive approach to its funding – the first climate fund to do so from the outset of its activities. While lessons learned from the CIFs should be applied to the GCF, efforts to spin the CIFs as complementary to the GCF would be counter to their proposed interim function.

Asian Development Bank

Between 2010 and 2015 the AsDB invested a substantial amount in fossil fuels. The majority of its investments over this time, $15.5 billion, were in ‘other’ energy projects. For nearly 60% of these investments (109 out of 183) it was unclear what type of energy the project was supporting as they were in areas such as transmission projects, which are often connected to fossil fuel-based power plants.

Almost a fifth (34 out of 183) of these investments were in large hydropower projects. Between 2010 and 2015 the AsDB repeatedly invested in hydroelectric projects in the Indian state of Himachal Pradesh, with cumulative funding reaching around $983 million.58 The projects have been heavily criticised by local communities who are concerned about the loss of biodiversity, crop damage, and water pollution.59 Large hydro has also been found to have risk of significant carbon emissions by the UNFCCC.


Figure 5: Asian Development Bank energy investments 2010-2014

African Development Bank

Over the past five years the AfDB has spent twice as much on clean energy projects as on fossil fuels. The majority of the AfDB’s energy investments, $3.3 billion, are in the ‘other’ category. Out of 59 projects a third (20) were in large hydropower, including a $68.9 million loan in 2011 for the Lom-Pangar hydroelectric project in Cameroon.60 This project has been criticised because it will potentially displace rural villagers and flood protected forests.61

The AfDB will be a lead player in delivering the Africa Renewable Energy Initiative, a partnership-driven effort with the aspirational goal of achieving universal access to energy in Africa by 2025.62 The Bank, however is primarily driven by its current energy strategy, which is framed by the ‘New Deal on Energy for Africa’ which aims at massive expansion of generation and energy access across the continent but is technology neutral, so will develop both fossil fuels and renewable energy in tandem.63 At the AfDB meeting in May 2016 an African Minister stated: ‘Let's use what we have. We have coal in Africa, let's use it.’64

Clean 16%

Fossil fuels 17%

Other 67%


Figure 7: African Development Bank energy investments 2010-2014

Inter-American Development Bank

The IDB stands out as the MDB with the smallest amount invested in fossil fuels. However, this does not necessarily mean it is mainly supporting the transition to a low-carbon economy, because it does not specify what type of energy the majority of its investments in the ‘other’ category involve. More detailed data is needed to be able to assess the full environmental impact of these investments. In addition, it is estimated that around a third of these projects are in large hydropower and bioenergy which are not considered to be ‘clean’ because of their local environmental and social impacts. For example, the IDB has invested $200 million in the controversial Alto Maipo hydroelectric power project in Chile, which it claims will provide low-carbon energy as an alternative to fossil fuel-based energy generation.65 Local communities continue to strongly resist the project which they say will threaten the water supply for millions of residents in Santiago and will damage local ecosystems and food production.66

Clean 24%

Fossil fuels 10%

Other 66%


Figure 9: Inter-American Development Bank energy investments 2010-2013

Box 3: Social and environmental impacts of large-scale hydropower and bioenergy

Not all types of renewable energy should be pursued. For example, large-scale hydropower has been criticised because it has displaced communities and destroyed biodiversity. The World Commission on Dams’ 2000 report found that ‘while dams have delivered many benefits and made a significant contribution to human development, in too many cases the price paid to secure those benefits, especially in social and environmental terms, has been too high and, more importantly, could have been avoided’.67 In project documents the World Bank has acknowledged that larger hydropower projects require greater land and water resources, which, it noted, could impact inter-basin resource sharing, vegetation, wildlife, wetlands, local microclimate and village resettlement.68

Meanwhile large-scale industrial bioenergy (including biofuels used in transport and the burning of wood for energy) has

been criticised for destroying ecosystems, polluting soils and water, and ‘[destroying] the livelihoods of many millions of people, particularly in the Global South’.69 These problems could be greatly exacerbated if the proposal to capture and store carbon emissions from biofuel refineries and biomass-burning power stations (referred to as bio-energy with carbon capture and storage, or BECCS) is put in place. Climate scientist Kevin Anderson argues that the Paris climate change agreement relies on BECCS as a ‘negative emissions technology’ and estimates that ‘an area of one to three times that of India’ would be needed to grow bioenergy crops to achieve the massive uptake of BECCS required to deliver on the Paris goals.70 In addition to impacts such as deforestation and displacement, this would increase the competition between crops for food and crops for energy.71

Clean 32%

Fossil fuels 10%

Other 58%


Comparing the MDBs’ energy investments The MDBs are sending mixed signals to developing countries through their energy lending. They are investing in many positive and effective clean renewable projects. However, they are simultaneously backing fossil fuels and problematic mega-projects. The progression of spending over time (2011 to 2015) shown above does not show any clear trend from any of the MDBs in the balance between fossil fuel and renewable energy spending (see Tables 4-8).72

Increasing finance for renewable energy projects World Bank: The World Bank’s recent projects include support for biogas as a clean cooking fuel in Kenya and access to renewable energy in Liberia.73 In the past it has supported wind power in South Africa, solar plants in Morocco, run-of-river hydropower in Uganda, and geothermal in Indonesia.74 The World Bank is investing in a number of off-grid projects. For example, it invested $190 million to support off-grid solar in rural Bangladesh. This project has seen more than 3.5 million solar home systems installed and in the process created 70,000 jobs.75 The Bank is looking to finance off-grid solar in Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya and Nigeria.

Box 4: The World Bank and solar power Examples of where the World Bank Group has been promoting solar energy in developing markets (both grid and off-grid) include:

¡ In 2016, it announced $1 billion in support of India’s solar generation plans,76 its largest financing of solar projects for any country in the world. The projects under preparation include solar rooftop technology, infrastructure for solar parks, bringing innovative solar and hybrid technologies to the market, and transmission lines for solar-rich states. The commitment includes an agreement for a $625 million grid-connected rooftop solar programme for financing the installation of at least 40 megawatts of solar photovoltaic installations.

¡ It is supporting the establishment of pay-as-you-go (PayGo) access to solar energy in Africa, and is working on better reporting and securitisation of PayGo solar schemes, with a goal of unlocking $5bn of commercial finance by 2020.77

¡ The International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Bank’s private sector arm, funds the Scaling Solar programme in Zambia,78 which brings together a suite of World Bank Group services under a single engagement aimed at creating a viable market for solar power. The programme aims to make privately-funded grid-connected solar projects operational within two years at competitive tariffs.

AsDB: Investments in renewable energy include a wind project in India.79 $1bn will be allocated to support grid expansion and upgrades in India, which will enable renewable energy generated in the south-west to be used in other regions.80

AfDB: Examples of projects that are reducing greenhouse gas emissions include geothermal in Kenya, wind farms in South Africa and Ethiopia, and Africa’s largest concentrated solar plant in Morocco.81 In addition the AfDB is the trustee of the Africa Renewable Energy Initiative which aims to install 10 gigawatts of

‘Research by Bank Information Center and the Sierra Club finds that “not one of the world’s main development banks is on track to help keep the world below 2°C” because they continue to fund fossil fuel projects in developing countries and do not have “a portfolio-wide target to reduce gross [greenhouse gas] emissions in their lending”.’ MDB Climate Change Scorecard 73


new renewable energy generation capacity by 2020 and contribute to an increase of 300 gigawatts by 2030.82

IDB: Investments in renewable energy have included wind power in Uruguay, solar PV in Chile, geothermal power plants in Costa Rica, a solar PV power plant in El Salvador, and off-grid solar for isolated rural communities in Ecuador.83

Continued funding for fossil fuels World Bank: Despite the World Bank’s efforts to present itself as a leader on climate change, between 2011 and 2015 it allocated $12.9 billion for fossil fuel projects and lacks a clear energy transition policy. Whilst it has reduced funding for coal projects, and in 2013 placed restrictions on further financing of coal power, it has continued to invest in oil and natural gas, and continues to finance exploration and extraction of all fossil fuels. In its 2013 Energy Sector Directions paper84 the World Bank placed a heavy emphasis on natural gas as a ’cleaner’ fossil fuel because it has half the emissions of coal. Support for natural gas projects in recent years include $400 million to develop the gas sector in Turkey in 2015, $395 million to support gas power in Nigeria in 2014 and $585 million for a gas power plant and pipelines in Egypt in 2013.85

It is interesting to note that the World Bank has given less profile to its financing for oil projects, with very few mentions of oil in its energy or climate focused documents. For example, there are virtually no references to oil in its Energy Sector Directions paper. Between 2011 and 2015 the World Bank invested $2 billion in oil projects in countries such as Colombia, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mauritania and Vietnam.

AsDB: Investments in fossil fuels include a $900 million loan in 2013 for the Jamshoro coal-fired power plant in Pakistan.86 This was despite the project not receiving support from key donors including the US and several Scandinavian countries.87 Construction is yet to begin on the plant.88

AfDB: Although an exclusion is in place on financing for exploration to find new oil and gas fields in Africa, the AfDB continues to fund oil and gas extraction projects on known sites. In 2014 it backed an oil refinery in Nigeria with a $150 million loan and a gas pipeline in Tunisia with a $75 million loan.89

IDB: While the IDB has significantly reduced spending directly on fossil fuels, in 2012 it provided a $200 million loan for a combined-cycle gas power plant in Uruguay which it claimed would ‘help diversify the country’s energy mix in an environmentally-sustainable manner’.90

Box 5: Dual problem: Centralised plants are part of the problem, not the solution Not only do centralised fossil fuel projects fail to increase energy access, they often have a multitude of negative environmental and social impacts too. For example, coal projects result in air pollution and water contamination.91 Below are examples that illustrate this failed approach:

The Camisea gas project in Peru has received support from both the World Bank and the IDB.92 The project has been heavily criticised for its


negative impact on local indigenous peoples’ health (in particular those living in ‘voluntary isolation’) and on biodiversity in this important area, including contamination of local rivers.93 Critics argue the project has prioritised the energy needs of business ahead of the general population.94

Critics of World Bank funding for gas pipelines in Nigeria observe that while there are currently around 20 gas projects in Nigeria, local ‘supply is still very erratic and energy prices have shot through the roof’ while many communities where these projects are situated are not connected to the electricity grid.95

In 2010 the World Bank allocated $3.7 billion and in 2009 the AfDB another $2.6 billion for the Medupi coal-fired power plant in South Africa.96 Still under construction, it is expected to be one of the largest coal power stations in the world and projected to add an estimated 25 million tonnes of CO2 emissions per year.97 It is unlikely to increase energy access for the poorest because the project is designed mainly to supply multinational mining and metals corporations. Critics say the plant will use huge quantities of water in a drought-prone area and will negatively affect people’s health by contaminating the land, water and air.98 Despite the controversy surrounding the project, the AfDB is reportedly considering providing additional financing, as it continues to see coal as a priority area.99

The IFC invested $450 million in the Tata Munda coal plant in India in 2008.100 The AsDB also invested $450 million in the same year.101 Since the project became operational in 2013, it has been repeatedly criticised by local communities, including fishermen, who have condemned the damage to fish stocks and the effects of air pollution on people’s health.102 In 2013 these complaints were upheld by the IFC’s accountability mechanism, the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman, and in 2015 the local fishing communities filed a lawsuit against the IFC,103 and will continue to pursue the case in the courts.104 The IFC continues to defend its involvement in the project. It has repeatedly rejected the claims and says it is helping these communities. It also says that this plant has lower emissions than older coal plants because it uses supercritical technology and an alternate grade of coal.105

Even when poor people do have the opportunity to access the grid, they do not necessarily benefit from new fossil fuel generating capacity because they cannot afford the connection costs. This leads to companies deciding not to extend access to the poor because they see it as unprofitable. For example, the parts of India with the highest concentration of coal plants also have the lowest rates of electricity access.106

The failure of the centralised model of generation and distribution also applies to large hydropower projects. Research by the NGO International Rivers has found that large dams often overrun costs, on average by 96%, making the electricity generated too expensive for poor consumers.107 The World Bank has recently been criticised for its plan to increase energy access for the poor in Africa via projects that would primarily provide energy for mining companies.108

The World Bank argues that as major energy users (‘anchor customers’) mines provide reliable demand for electricity which can enable power companies to scale up their infrastructure and energy provision to the national grid, which in turn will bring low-cost power to communities. The plans place a heavy emphasis on large-scale hydropower projects, which in the past have been criticised for damaging ecosystems and not increasing energy access (see Box 3). Planned hydropower projects such as the Inga 3 dam on the Congo river are criticised because they will ‘do almost nothing to provide access to the 90 per cent of Congolese who have no electricity’.109 Construction of the Lom Pangar dam in Cameroon has damaged local ecosystems and is unlikely to connect nearby villages to the grid because this is seen as prohibitively expensive.110


Danger of ‘lock in’ Continued investment in fossil fuels by DFID and the MDBs not only leads to increasing greenhouse gas emissions but also contributes to ‘carbon lock-in’. When carbon-intensive investments are made, fossil fuel dependence and associated carbon emissions can become locked in, making it more difficult to move to lower-carbon pathways.111 In many cases this infrastructure commits countries to a carbon-intensive existence for 20 to 50 years.112 For carbon lock-in to be avoided, investments in infrastructure should not support fossil fuels. In 2011, the House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee recommended: ‘UK aid should be helping developing countries to leapfrog high-carbon development and avoid locking in carbon-intensive infrastructure’.113

World Bank President Jim Yong Kim has observed that: ‘there will be more infrastructure built in the next 20 years than in the past 6,000’ and that ’with careful planning of transportation and land use, and the establishment of energy efficiency standards, cities can build in ways that avoid locking in unsustainable patterns’.114 Another reason to avoid investments in carbon-intensive electricity infrastructure is that they could become worthless (stranded assets) as the global economy shifts to renewable energy in line with the global climate change agreement.115

MDBs’ exposure to the carbon bubble

The MDBs are exposed to the carbon bubble because of their investments in publicly listed fossil fuel companies. There are growing warnings that to keep global warming below 2ºC, or even 1.5ºC, around two-thirds of known fossil fuels must never be burned. Companies listed on stock exchanges are exposed to a potential carbon bubble because if the majority of fossil fuels are not burned their investments could lose value. An estimated $3.4 trillion has been divested from fossil fuels by a range of actors including pension funds, insurers, private foundations and universities.116 In 2013, the Bretton Woods Project assessed the extent to which the IFC and AsDB were exposed to the carbon bubble. They identified that the IFC had $3.4 billion and the AsDB $324 million invested.117


Box 6: DFID’s and MDBs’ private sector policies and energy investments

DFID and the MDBs believe it is important to work with the private sector.118 The instruments they use to engage the private sector include grants, policy and regulatory work in technical assistance and incentives, as well as debt and equity finance. The overall rationale is:

Financing gap: Public finance will not be sufficient to cover the costs of the transition to renewable energy. Acting as a catalyst by using public funds to leverage additional private sector financing will maximise value for money. This can be done by reducing the risk for private sector actors and removing financial barriers.119

Capacity: The private sector has the expertise to meet the demand for a shift to a new renewable energy system.

Improved service provision: DFID argues there are ‘examples of public-private partnerships (PPPs) that suggest private sector participation can bring improved service delivery and fiscal contributions, as well as added benefits of improved productivity, efficiency and asset maintenance.’120 Meanwhile the World Bank states they ‘can contribute to improved basic service provision in areas that are essential for reducing poverty and boosting shared prosperity’ including in the area of climate change ‘where there is a clear justification for policy action to address a public good’.121

However there are concerns that PPPs lack the social and environmental standards and safeguards that are expected of other ODA funds, and the potential for incurring long-term fiscal costs that can create debt.122

Role of public finance institutions (PFIs) in private sector energy investments

DFID: The CDC group,123 the UK’s development finance institution, which is wholly owned by DFID, invests in private companies in Africa and South Asia. CDC’s climate change policy recognises that climate change undermines poverty reduction and sets out mitigation and adaptation as priority areas for investment.124 No information is available on the exact share of investments in renewable energy compared to fossil fuels.125 In recent years CDC has given support to a number of funds that are invested in renewable energy as well as to oil, gas and coal projects.126 The CDC investment policy covering 2012-2016 states that if an investment is likely to involve significant greenhouse gas emissions then measures should be put in place to ‘reduce emissions to the extent possible and mitigate adverse climate impacts.127 The UK’s announcement in 2013 that it would only fund coal-fired power plants in ‘rare circumstances’ also applies to CDC.128 To bring overall policy coherence, the CDC would need to develop a clear energy transition policy. In 2015 it was announced the CDC group would receive a capital injection of £735 million over three years from DFID’s budget.129

DFID has supported several initiatives to incentivise private sector renewable energy investments. These include:

¡ African Climate Change Challenge Fund, which stimulates ‘private sector investment in developing low cost, clean energy and climate change technologies and services, such as solar power, biomass energy, irrigation and crop insurance products for small holder farmers’.

¡ Green Africa Power, which aims to ‘increase private sector investment in renewable energy, by providing early stage finance to private sector renewable energy generation projects in Africa’.

¡ Climate Public Private Partnership (CP3), which aims to ‘demonstrate that climate friendly investments in developing countries, including in renewable energy, water, energy efficiency and forestry are not only ethically right but also commercially viable’.130

However more evidence is needed on how effective these investments are in delivering their objectives, and whether PFIs offer value for money for DFID in delivering either development or climate outcomes.131 World Bank: In 2014 the IFC funded investments in fossil fuels including $60 million for oil and gas exploration in East and Central Africa and a $65 million loan for oil exploration and production in Gabon.132 In July 2015, the IFC made a $50 million investment in oil and gas exploration and appraisal activities in Kenya, despite the US having voted against the investment.133

IFC renewable energy investments include off-grid solar in Tanzania, small-scale hydro in Kenya and Vietnam, and wind power in China.134 The IFC currently has more than $700 million invested in wind and solar in India.135 According to the recently released World Bank Climate Action Plan, the IFC will increase its climate investments from $2.2 billion to $3.5 billion a year, with the aim of leveraging $13 billion annually in additional private sector finance by 2020.136 This financing will be aimed at increasing grid-connected renewable energy as well as decentralised renewable energy and off-grid energy access.

AsDB: Private sector investments in fossil fuels include support for gas projects in Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, China, Myanmar and Pakistan.137 Meanwhile support for renewable energy includes loans to expand off-grid solar in rural India, wind farms in Thailand and the Philippines, and for the construction of a run-of-the river hydropower project in Pakistan.138

AfDB: Private sector investments in fossil fuels include a crude oil refinery in Nigeria, a coal-fired power plant and coal mine in Zambia, and a gas power station in Ivory Coast.139 Meanwhile investments in renewable energies include a loan for a solar plant in South Africa and a risk guarantee for a large wind farm in Kenya.140

IDB: The private sector arm has backed the distribution of fossil fuels in Jamaica and a natural gas plant in Dominican Republic.141 Investments in renewable energy include a solar plant in El Salvador.142


New banks: The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the BRICS New Development Bank The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) was launched in 2016 with an annual budget of $10-15 billion and is expected to begin operating in mid-2016.143 Its main shareholders are China (26%) followed by India (7.5%) and Russia (5.9%).144 The UK is a Prospective Founding Member.145 The Bank’s environmental and social framework states that it supports the aims of the Paris Agreement and will support clients to achieve their NDCs through mitigation, adaptation, finance and technology transfer.146

It says it ‘plans to prioritize investments promoting greenhouse gas emission neutral and climate resilient infrastructure, including actions for reducing emissions, climate-proofing and promotion of renewable energy’. It says it will promote the use of renewable energy where this is ‘technically and financially feasible’. While this is a better statement than most MDBs it falls short of being a full energy transition policy.

At the project level, the AIIB will support clients to evaluate the impact of each project on climate change, including in terms of emissions, and to identify opportunities to reduce emissions by implementing ‘technically and financially feasible and cost-effective options’. If clients request support with reporting on greenhouse gas emissions the AIIB may finance this work. However, it is still unclear whether the AIIB is willing to rule out funding for coal power.147

The BRICS New Development Bank (NDB) was created in 2014 by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Its key focus areas include sustainable development and infrastructure.148 The NDB began project financing in April 2016 with $811 million in loans for renewable energy generation and transmission.149 Civil society groups have criticised the lack of consultation and transparency around the NDB’s plans, operational policies and structures. The NDB is yet to define any social or environmental safeguards, transparency requirements or accountability mechanisms.

Civil society groups have called on the NDB to ensure that it improves on the operational framework of other MDBs by ‘placing people-centred sustainable development at the core of the NDB’s mission’ and by ‘moving beyond centralized, large-scale megaprojects to instead prioritize those transformational projects that serve the real needs of poor communities and marginalized groups’.150

In April 2016 the World Bank and the AIIB announced they would work on projects together via a co-financing framework agreement.151 Discussions centred around 12 co-financed projects in Asia in the sectors of energy, transport and water. According to the AIIB, the World Bank ‘will prepare and supervise the co-financed projects in accordance with its policies and procedures in areas like procurement, environment and social safeguards’.

The AIIB and NDB (which still needs to set up its safeguards framework) should establish ambitious and comprehensive safeguards which protect human rights and the environment. They need to achieve the right balance so that the ‘investment process can be significantly speeded up without sacrificing environmental and social standards’.152 The AIIB and NDB should have clear


poverty reduction impacts or contribute to combating climate change.

As new institutions, AIIB and NDB have the opportunity to focus on infrastructure investments that support renewable energy generation, storage and transmission – all of which would help expand markets for renewable energy.153 These investments in a low-carbon future will have long-term commercial benefits154 and will support developing countries to achieve the greenhouse gas reduction commitments they made in Paris in 2015.


Opportunities for change DFID and the MDBs are ideally placed to play a pivotal role in the transition to low-carbon equitable economies. They must update their energy policies to ensure they achieve these goals, and prioritise a transition to low-carbon energy that covers all of its instruments (financing and policy advice) including lending through intermediaries. They should:

1. ensure better data on their energy investments and the carbon emissions of their funding portfolios is publicly available and set clear targets to reduce the carbon footprint of their investments and their exposure to climate risk

2. support developing countries to achieve their greenhouse gas reduction commitments by phasing out financing for fossil fuels, and instead prioritising financial support for delivery of countries’ NDCs

3. support developing countries to achieve universal access to energy, giving greater priority to decentralised and off-grid renewable energy technologies.

DFID and the MDBs should update their energy policies to ensure they achieve these goals.

Ensure better data on their energy investments and the carbon emissions of their funding portfolios is publicly available and set clear targets to reduce the carbon footprint of their investments and their exposure to climate risk Why: DFID and the MDBs should address the important question of energy transition and in order to implement it start by quantifying the greenhouse gas emissions associated with their energy investments – both projects and whole finance portfolios – because this will enable them to make more informed decisions and manage climate risk. They should use this information to set strategic carbon reduction targets for their total portfolio.

Current context: There is currently a lack of data on the MDBs’ energy investments. A report by the Bank Information Center and the Sierra Club found that the MDBs do not comprehensively assess the climate change risks associated with their investments and technical assistance. Therefore there are no guarantees that adequate measures will be put in place to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.155 Apart from the IDB, the MDBs do not report on the total greenhouse gas emissions from their financing, which makes it difficult to evaluate whether each MDB is supporting the transition to low-carbon equitable economies. These findings are supported by a study by the World Resources Institute, which estimated that 75% of World Bank projects do not incorporate assessments related to climate change risks into their design, while 88% do not assess greenhouse gas emissions from project activities relative to a baseline.156

Good practice: DFID and the MDBs should follow the lead of the IDB, which has reported on the greenhouse gas emissions of its portfolio of direct investments since 2011. The focus has been on


investment projects that annually have emissions, or emissions savings, of over 25 kilotonnes CO2 equivalent. The majority of emissions are associated with energy, industry, agriculture, water and sanitation, transport, urban development, and tourism.157 The IDB notes that ‘portfolio reporting allows us to track the trends in our portfolio and to understand the implications of our investments.’158 However, it should be noted that this reporting has not stopped the IDB from investing in activities that have led to an increase in emissions. For example, the IDB’s figures show that while 0.6 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent were avoided in 2015, another 0.5 million tonnes were generated.159

In a positive move the World Bank is now screening projects that it funds in the world’s poorest countries through its International Development Association funds for climate risk.160 The World Bank has recently stated that this process will be ‘extended to other operations in early 2017’.161

Recommendation: DFID and the MDBs should update their energy policies to:

¡ create a clear energy transition policy ¡ assess the climate risks of their investments ¡ set a portfolio-wide target to reduce total greenhouse gas

emissions ¡ report annually against this target for the portfolio and for each

individual investment, across all modalities (policy lending, technical assistance, and financial intermediaries).

The World Bank Group and other regional Banks should follow the example of the IDB which requires the inclusion of greenhouse gas emissions in environmental assessments.

Support developing countries to achieve their greenhouse gas reduction commitments, by phasing out financing for fossil fuels and instead prioritising financial support for delivery of countries’ NDCs Why: 180 countries committed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in their NDCs at the Paris climate change conference in December 2015.162 Developing countries’ commitments are based on them receiving sufficient financial and technical support. It remains unclear if and when such support will be provided.163

Current context: In its 2015 aid strategy DFID commits to supporting ‘efforts to mitigate and adapt to climate change’ as part of its work to strengthen resilience and respond to crises.164

According to the MDBs, they are increasing their financing for climate-related activities. In 2014 they committed a combined $28.3bn for mitigation and adaptation, up from $23.8bn in 2013.165

In its Climate Change Action Plan, the World Bank commits itself to supporting countries to translate their NDCs into concrete action. It highlights the need to ‘deliver affordable and efficient services (especially energy) in a low-carbon manner and in a way that is consistent with their NDCs and global climate commitments’.166


Good practice: DFID, the World Bank Group and the IDB have said they will no longer fund coal-fired power plants in developing countries, except in rare circumstances such as when there is no ‘feasible alternative’ in very low-income countries. The AfDB and AsDB have not banned coal investments, but have said they will only invest in higher efficiency coal technologies. This shows the lack of an energy transition policy as even so-called ‘clean’ coal technologies fail to support a quick enough energy transition.167 It is a positive sign that most of the MDBs have not provided financing for new coal-fired power stations since 2013, though coal plants are currently under consideration for future financing including at the World Bank168. The Natural Resources Defence Council estimates that the MDBs provided $1.5 billion for coal-fired power plants between 2011 and 2014 compared to $12.2 billion between 2006 and 2010.169

There is scope to substantially strengthen the restrictions on coal lending so that they do not allow loopholes to be exploited. For example, there is insufficient clarity about how the restrictions apply to different areas, such as loans and financial intermediaries. Crucially these restrictions do not apply to coal mining or associated infrastructure.170 A report by the Bank Information Center and the Sierra Club highlights the case of an integrated paper mill in China that is to be powered mainly by coal. This project was funded by the IFC in 2014, despite the announcement of coal restrictions in 2013.171

Recommendation: DFID and the MDBs should embrace the age of renewable energy. One of the main arguments they use for continued investment in centralised fossil fuels and large hydropower is that these technologies are more reliable than renewable energy in providing a base load (delivering the minimum amount of electricity needed over a year) and peak load.172 This argument is losing credibility as smart technology and ever-improving energy storage (batteries) mean that supply and demand from renewable power can be effectively matched.173 A number of studies demonstrate that a combination of renewable energies can meet demand.174 Research by International Rivers argues that several countries in sub-Saharan African could use solar and wind energy to cover all their projected power needs instead of relying on coal and large hydroelectric power which are ‘riskier investments due to significant cost overruns, uncertainty in future fuel costs, and climate change’.175

The risk of continuing to finance fossil-fuelled base load power plants is that they could slow the transition towards renewable energy and ‘might cause ‘lock-ins’ for power systems dominated by reliance on conventional plants’.176

It is time for DFID and the MDBs to rule out any new investment in coal-fired power plants, including mining, power production, and associated infrastructure.

DFID, the World Bank and the IDB should follow the lead of the AsDB and AfDB who have both decided not to finance new oil and gas exploration.177

If DFID and the MDBs are serious about supporting developing countries to implement their NDCs they should update their energy policies to focus on energy transition by:


¡ phasing out all fossil fuel financing, with an immediate ban on coal projects and oil and gas exploration. There should be a rapid phase out of oil and gas investment by 2020.

¡ working with less developed and lower-middle-income countries to turn their NDCs into bankable projects, and provide effective financing to deliver these.

Support developing countries to achieve universal access to energy, giving greater priority to decentralised and off-grid renewable energies

Why: DFID and the MDBs are committed to supporting developing countries to achieve SDG7: to ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all. Progress towards universal energy access has been slow and there is still a lot more to do to ensure the SDG7 deadline of 2030 is met.178

Current context: The International Energy Agency predicts that to provide universal energy access by 2030 around 55% of new connections and 60% of investment will need to be off-grid.179 180

The MDBs’ large-scale, centralised investments in fossil fuels are unlikely to achieve universal energy access for the 1.1 billion poor people who live in energy poverty. A recent report by Oil Change International found that the MDBs’ fossil fuel investments ‘rarely addressed energy access for the poor in any meaningful way’ with only 5% having a clear energy access objective.181 The focus on a centralised model of generation and distribution often ignores the needs of the poorest and does not lead to them being connected to the grid. 182 Centralised power is not primarily built to provide reliable and affordable electricity services for poor people or the areas that they live in.

Investing in decentralised and off-grid renewable energy will be crucial to increasing energy access. The Bank Information Center and the Sierra Club argue that decentralised renewable energy, and not centralised fossil fuel projects, should be used to achieve universal energy access, because 84% of people who lack access to electricity are located in rural areas, often far away from the existing power grid.183

DFID and the MDBs acknowledge the benefits of decentralised and off-grid renewable energy and are already backing a number of these projects.184 For example, when DFID launched its Energy Africa campaign in 2015 it explained it was a good time to do so because of the significant fall in the price of solar PV panels, improvements in battery technology and efficient lighting such as LED lights, and the ‘spread of mobile payment systems which enable energy access for the poorest through micro pay-as-you-go’.185 The World Bank recognises the benefits, stating: ‘in rural, remote or isolated areas, off-grid solutions based on renewable energy combined with energy efficient technologies could be the most rapid means of providing cost-effective energy services’.186

DFID and the MDBs should be clear about how they measure energy access, to include criteria such as the reliability and affordability of the supply.187 For example, the World Bank says that between 2013 and 2015 it ‘brought new or improved electricity

‘The World Bank and other institutions are failing to allocate enough of their energy investments to projects that focus on delivering energy access to the poor.’ Oil Change International 180


supply to nearly 29 million people’, citing examples such as 43,000 households in Laos gaining access via the central grid and off-grid.188 However, it does not provide clarity on how it defines energy access or the poverty reduction impacts of providing electricity. DFID and the MDBs should measure progress against the SE4ALL Global Tracking Framework, which the World Bank was involved in developing, as a more comprehensive measure of the development benefit of energy provision.

Recommendation: DFID and the MDBs should update their energy policies to:

¡ commit to and facilitate the transition to a new model of energy delivery

¡ ensure energy access is a key objective of the majority of their energy portfolio

¡ scale up support for decentralised and off-grid renewable energy ¡ measure progress against the SE4ALL Global Tracking

Framework.


Recommendations The MDBs, DFID and other UK international investments should create energy transition policies to ensure a low-carbon energy transition is considered at all levels:

1. Ensure better data on their energy investments and the carbon emissions of their funding portfolios is publicly available and set clear targets to reduce the carbon footprint of their investments and their exposure to climate risk.

DFID and the MDBs should update their energy policies to: ¡ assess the climate risks of their investments ¡ set a portfolio-wide target to reduce total greenhouse gas

emissions ¡ report annually against this target for the portfolio and for each

individual investment across all modalities (policy lending, technical assistance, and financial intermediaries).

The World Bank Group and other regional banks should follow the example of the other IDB, which requires the inclusion of greenhouse gas emissions in environmental assessments.

2. Support developing countries to achieve their greenhouse gas reduction commitments, by phasing out financing for fossil fuels and instead prioritising financial support for delivery of countries’ NDCs.

DFID and the MDBs should update their energy policies to: ¡ phase out all fossil fuel financing ¡ adopt a comprehensive coal exclusion that covers all forms of

assistance and all types of coal projects, including mining, power production, and associated infrastructure

¡ end investment in oil and gas exploration immediately ¡ phased out rapidly all investment in oil projects is, with a

complete ban on all fossil fuel investments by 2020 at the latest ¡ work with less developed and lower-middle-income countries to

turn their NDCs into bankable projects, and provide effective financing to deliver these.

3. Support developing countries to achieve universal access to energy (SDG7)

DFID and the MDBs should update their energy policies to: ¡ commit to and facilitate the transition to a new model of energy

delivery based on decentralised and off-grid renewable energies ¡ ensure energy access is a key part of the majority of their energy

portfolio ¡ scale up support for decentralised and off-grid renewable energy ¡ measure progress against the SE4ALL Global Tracking

Framework.

As new banks, the AIIB and BRICS New Development Bank should: ¡ implement the above recommendations ¡ follow best practice in areas such as exclusion of fossil fuel

exploration, reporting on greenhouse gas emissions, and financing of decentralised and off-grid renewable energy.

‘Achieving global climate commitments will require a shift from business as usual…

‘The WBG will support countries in translating their NDCs into climate policies and investment plans into actions’ World Bank Group Climate Change Action Plan, 2016


Appendix 1: Summary of DFID’s and the MDBs’ policy positions on fossil fuels and renewable energy Table A1: Title: DFID and the MDBs’ policy positions on energy and climate change

Institution Policy on fossil fuels (oil, gas, coal)

Policy on clean energy/renewables/ energy access

Policy on large hydro and biofuels

Climate change/ low-carbon policy – including transparency of emissions

DFID189 Oil: Assumed support because no specific restrictions.

Gas: Support when more ‘cost effective than renewable alternatives’ and there is ‘strong unmet demand’.

Coal: Coal power only consider in ‘rare circumstances’.

Supports renewable energy including solar, wind and geothermal.

‘There is massive unrealised potential for renewable solar, wind, hydro and geothermal energy in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia’.

Has a positive strategy on energy access and clean cooking. Currently supports solar PV home systems.

Hydropower: Recognises that hydropower and bioenergy can be linked to ‘significant social and environmental risks’. For large-hydro these include: ‘forced resettlement, loss of livelihoods, the destruction of habitats and disruption of water supplies.’

Biofuels: Argues ‘well-planned bioenergy development can contribute to climate change adaptation as well as mitigation’.

Greenhouse gas emissions should be reduced.

Argues that ‘tackling climate change and promoting sustainable growth and development are necessary to eliminate poverty: one cannot be achieved without the other.’

No reporting on greenhouse gas emissions.

World Bank190

Oil: Assumed support because no specific restrictions and continued financing.

Gas: Support because gas is ‘the fossil fuel with the lowest carbon intensity’.

Coal: ‘Provide financial support for greenfield coal power generation projects only in rare circumstances’ such as ‘meeting basic energy needs in countries with no feasible alternatives to coal and a lack of financing for coal power’.


‘Renewable energy and energy efficiency are critical to stabilizing climate change and reaching universal access to energy, and require an integrated approach.’

Has a positive strategy on energy access and clean cooking. But only 10% of energy spending has access as an objective.191

Hydropower: Committed to scaling up hydropower of all sizes including ‘run of the river, pumped storage, and reservoir, including off-grid projects meeting decentralized rural needs’ in ‘an environmentally and socially sustainable manner’.

Bioenergy: Argues biogas and biomass energy ‘play useful roles’.


‘Climate change poses an enormous challenge to development’.

‘Without action climate change could push more than 100 million additional people into poverty by 2030’.


AsDB192

Exploration: Specific exclusion of finance for exploration of oil and gas.

Oil: Still provides finance for ‘modern, small, oil-based power plants for island communities, remote areas, and sparsely populated areas where other options are not feasible.’

Gas: Continues to finance natural gas-based power plants


Argues ‘renewable energy can help diversify the sources of energy supply, while providing energy that is clean, sustainable, and generates little or no greenhouse gases’.

Has a positive strategy on energy access and clean cooking. But only 27% of energy spending

Hydropower: Supports large, small, mini, and micro hydropower because it is ‘renewable, highly efficient, clean, substantially reliable, and flexible.’ However, recognises that large hydropower projects can ‘have many impacts on the surrounding ecosystem’ and some large reservoirs produce significant amounts of carbon dioxide and methane. ‘Projects will


‘Without proactive efforts to mitigate the causes of global warming’ and ‘help the region – especially its most vulnerable citizens in both rural and urban settings, the poor, women, children, and the elderly - to adapt to the impacts of climate change.’


‘because of their environmental benefit.’

Coal: Justifies continued investments ‘to meet the electricity needs of the region’.

has access as an objective.

‘AsDB’s Energy Policy prioritizes maximizing access to energy, especially for the rural poor, and ADB has worked across the region to improve access to clean cooking.’

comply with ADB’s social and environmental safeguards requirements’.

Bioenergy: Supports ‘further studies to assess the costs and benefits of sustainable biofuels development, particularly on food security, the net energy balance of crops, and environmental impacts. Where the benefits indicate it is appropriate, ADB will support their development’.


AfDB193 Exploration: Specific exclusion of finance for oil and gas exploration.

Oil and Gas: However, supports ‘environmentally and socially sound production, processing and distribution’ of oil and gas. Supports optimal use to ‘secure equitable and intergenerational long-term benefits.’

Coal Still plans to invest in all energy technologies, including coal, but says: ‘To invest in a greenfield or retrofit coal-fired power plant it should show how it would contribute to poverty reduction, increasing energy security, the transition to green growth, and use technology to reduce emissions.’


Has a positive strategy on energy access and clean cooking. But only 25% of energy spending has access as an objective.

‘The New Energy Deal for Africa will push for the establishment of a Bottom-of the Pyramid Energy Financing Facility for Africa. This should support some 700 million people to afford clean cooking energy stoves.’

Hydropower: Support for hydropower should comply with ‘social and environmental safeguards requirements’, takes ‘into account climate change implications’, and reflect ‘local and national needs for water and energy development’.

Bioenergy: Africa has ‘great potential’ for the development of liquid biofuels. Support is conditional on biofuels not undermining food security and biodiversity, and must achieve a net reduction in carbon emissions over the project lifetime.

Sustainable production and use of biomass ‘offers attractive opportunities to provide low-cost and locally available modern energy services’ and also ‘significant potential for reducing CO2 emissions through co-firing.’


Committed to reducing the continent’s greenhouse gas emissions and its vulnerability to climate change, such as severe drought and flooding.

Ensure that all investments financed by the Bank are ‘climate-proof’ to ensure they will be able to withstand climate change impacts.


IDB194 Exploration: Excludes finance to financial intermediaries for exploration of oil and gas

Oil and Gas: Continued support for oil and gas.

However, says gas is a ‘cleaner fossil fuel’ and acknowledges ‘environmental impacts such as air pollution and water contamination need to be managed carefully.’


Has a positive strategy on energy access and clean cooking. But only 5.6% of energy spending has access as an objective.

‘Energy access plays an important role in issues such as eradicating poverty, reducing infant mortality, improving education, promoting

Large hydropower: ‘Is technically mature and often economically competitive. However, they can require ‘moving populations and affect ecosystems and land use as well as the flow and quality of water downstream’.

There are concerns about methane emissions from reservoirs in certain conditions. New


‘Supporting the climate change adaptation and mitigation agenda and sustainable and renewable energy’ in the region is a high priority.’

IDB has reported on the greenhouse gas emissions of its portfolio of direct investments since 2011. The focus has been on investment


Coal: Continue to support coal-fired power plants that use high-efficiency and low-emissions technologies.

gender equality, increasing access to quality medical care, and attaining environmental sustainability.’

hydroelectric power plants must follow environmental, social and governance safeguards to have a positive greenhouse gas balance.

‘Small hydro (under 20MW) is often suited for rural areas; it can lower costs by avoiding the cost of fuel and can be maintained at low cost by a local community.’

Bioenergy: Sustainable biofuels can play a role in reducing emissions. However, there are challenges such as land use and competition with food production.

projects that annually have emissions, or emissions savings, of over 25 kilotonnes CO2-equivalent. The majority of emissions are associated with priority sectors including energy, industry, agriculture, water and sanitation, transport, urban development, and tourism.


Appendix 2: How we ranked the banks To rank the banks, we awarded points for various aspects of their energy investment policies, then compared these on a scorecard.

Balance of investment

The first stage compares the balance between clean energy and fossil fuel investments in each bank’s portfolio. (We did not include energy investments in the ‘other’ category). ¡ fossil fuel only (100%) - G ¡ fossil fuel heavy (75% to 99% fossil fuel) – F ¡ fossil fuel high (55% to 75% fossil fuel) – E ¡ near balance but tipped towards fossil fuels (51% to 55% fossil

fuel) – D ¡ near balance but tipped towards clean energy (51% to 55%

clean) – C ¡ clean heavy (55% to 99% clean energy) – B ¡ clean only (100%) – A

Table A2: Balance of investment

Fossil fuel investment

Clean energy investment

World Bank 55.3% 44.7%

AsDB 52.0% 48.0%

AfDB 31.3% 68.7%

IDB 22.6% 77.4%

Fossil fuel phase out ranking

Points were awarded as follows.

One point each for investment policy which substantially limits any future investment in each of the following: coal, oil, gas, fossil fuel exploration, fossil fuel extraction;

Total ban on fossil fuels: 6 points

Ranking: 0 points Red (G); 1 point Orange (F) 2 points Yellow (E); 3 points (D) 4 points (C); 5 points (B) 6 points (A)


Table A3: Fossil fuel phase out ranking

Significantly restricts investment in

World Bank Coal power

AsDB Exploration of all fossil fuels

AfDB Exploration of all fossil fuels

IDB Coal

Clean energy and access ranking:

We awarded one point each for investment policies which substantially ¡ positive policy to scale up new renewable ¡ prohibits investment in large hydro ¡ prohibits investment in industrial biofuels ¡ investment focused on electricity access (over 50% of projects

with access objectives?) ¡ positive on clean cooking ¡ strategy to scale up energy access.

One point for each – Ranking: 0 points Red (G); 1point Orange (F) 2points Yellow (E); 3 points (D) 4 points (C); 5 points (B) 6 points (A)

Table A4: Balance of investment

Policy to World Bank

AsDB AfDB IDB

Positive policy to scale up new renewable energy

Yes Yes Yes Yes

Policy to prohibit investment in large hydro

No No No No

Policy to prohibit industrial biofuels

No No No No

Investment focused on electricity access

Only 10% of energy spending with access objective.

Only 27% of energy spending with access objective

Only 25% of energy spending with access objective.

Only 5.6% of energy spending with access objective.

Positive policy on clean cooking

Yes Yes Yes Yes

Strategy to scale up energy access

Yes Yes Yes Yes


Transparency rating – Carbon/greenhouse gas footprinting, carbon reduction strategy and transparency ¡ no policy on climate change and no carbon/greenhouse gas

accounting (G) ¡ positive policy on climate change but no published

carbon/greenhouse gas accounting (F) ¡ positive climate policy plus carbon/greenhouse gas accounting

for most projects (D) ¡ positive climate policy plus carbon/greenhouse gas accounting

across portfolio (C) ¡ carbon accounting with strategy to reduce carbon/greenhouse

gas footprint (B)

¡ carbon/greenhouse gas footprinting, reduction strategy and disclosure of climate change risk of investments (A).


Endnotes

1 World Bank Group Climate Change Action

Plan, 2016, pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/677331460056382875/WBG-Climate-Change-Action-Plan-public-version.pdf

2 Will the UK economy succeed in a low carbon world?, Green Alliance, 2016. green-alliance.org.uk/UK_low_carbon.php

3 Global Tracking Framework, Sustainable Energy for All, 2013, undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Environment%20and%20Energy/Sustainable%20Energy/Sustainable%20Energy%20for%20All/0-GTF_full_report.pdf

4 The Evidence of Benefits for Poor People of Increased Renewable Electricity Capacity: Literature Review, Ana Pueyo et al, Institute of Development Studies, 2013, https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/2961/ER31%20Final%20Online.pdf?sequence=6

5 Renewable Energy to Reduce Poverty, Christian Aid, 2011, programme.christianaid.org.uk/programme-policy-practice/sites/default/files/2016-03/climate-change-adaptation-toolkit-decentralised-renewable-energy-may-2011.pdf

6 Where this chapter refers to investments, this includes grants, loans, equity, guarantees and technical assistance.

7 Still Failing to Solve Energy Poverty, Oil Change International, 2016, priceofoil.org/2016/04/14/still-failing-to-solve-energy-poverty-2/

8 Roadmap for a Renewable Energy Future, IRENA, 2016, irena.org/DocumentDownloads/Publications/IRENA_REmap_2016_edition_report.pdf

9 India, China led investments in renewable energy in 2015: UN, The Hindu, 26 March 2016, thehindu.com/news/international/india-china-led-in-renewable-energy-investments-in-2015-un/article8399245.ece

10 Progress Towards Sustainable Energy: Global Tracking Framework Summary Report, Sustainable Energy for All, 2015, se4all.org/sites/default/files/l/2013/09/GTF_2015-Summary_Report.pdf

11 Wind and solar records tumble as China and India accelerate energy transition, Renew Economy, 22 January 2016, reneweconomy.com.au/2016/69425

12 Wind and solar boost cost competitiveness versus fossil fuels, Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 5 October 2015, about.bnef.com/press-releases/wind-solar-boost-cost-competitiveness-versus-fossil-fuels/

13 Designing Low Carbon Electricity Futures for African and Other Developing Economies, International Rivers, 2015, internationalrivers.org/sites/default/files/attached-files/intlrivers_low-carbon_small.pdf

14 Renewable Power Generation Costs in 2014, IRENA, 2014, irena.org/DocumentDownloads/Publications/IRENA_RE_Power_Costs_Summary.pdf

15 Global Trends in Renewable Energy Investment 2016, Frankfurt School-UNEP and Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2016, fs-unep-centre.org/sites/default/files/publications/globaltrendsinrenewableenergyinvestment2016lowres_0.pdf

16 shiftthesubsidies.org/#methodology 17 Issue overview: World Bank and energy,

2015, Bretton Woods Project, brettonwoodsproject.org/2015/08/issue-overview-world-bank-and-energy/ World Bank call for hydropower to combat climate change challenged, 2016, Bretton Woods Project, brettonwoodsproject.org/2016/02/world-bank-call-for-hydropower-to-combat-climate-change-challenged/ Bioenergy Out: Why bioenergy should not be included in the next EU Renewable Energy Directive, Biofuelwatch, 2015, biofuelwatch.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/EU-Bioenergy-Briefing2.pdf

18 The Paris Agreement, unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php Nations sign historic Paris climate deal, BBC, 22 April 2016, bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-36108194

19 Fossil fuels could be phased out worldwide in a decade, says new study, Phys.org, 15 April 2016, phys.org/news/2016-04-fossil-fuels-phased-worldwide-decade.html#jCp Paul Gilding, Fossil fuels are dead – the rest is just detail, Carbon Tracker, 2015, carbontracker.org/fossil-fuels-are-dead-the-rest-is-just-detail/ The Energy Report: 100% Renewable Energy by 2050, WWF, 2011, assets.wwf.org.uk/downloads/2011_02_02_the_energy_report_full.pdf

20 DFID Energy Framework, DFID, 2015. World Bank Group Climate Change Action Plan 2016–2020, World Bank, 2016, worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2016/04/07/world-bank-group-sets-new-course-to-help-countries-meet-urgent-climate-challenges Toward a Sustainable Energy Future for All: Directions for the World Bank Group’s Energy Sector, World Bank, 2013, worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/SDN/energy-2013-0281-2.pdf Addressing Climate Change in Asia and the Pacific: Priorities for Action, Asian Development Bank, 2010, adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/32054/in112-10.pdf Energy Policy, Asian Development Bank, 2009, adb.org/documents/energy-policy Energy Sector Policy of the AfDB Group, African Development Bank, 2012, afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/Energy_Sector_Policy_of_the_AfDB_Group.pdf Climate Change Action Plan 2011-2015, African Development Bank, 2011, afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/Climate%20Change%20Action%20Plan%20%28CCAP%29%202011-2015.pdf Energy Sector Framework Document, Inter-American Development Bank, 2015, idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=40018070 Evaluating the IDB’s Climate Change Efforts in the Energy Sector, Inter-American Development Bank, 2014, iadb.org/en/office-of-evaluation-and-oversight/climate-change-in-the-energy-sector,18284.html

21 shiftthesubsidies.org/#institutions 22 Dammed Rivers, Damned Lives,

International Rivers, 2008, internationalrivers.org/files/attached-files/irfactsheet_dammed_rivers_lores.pdf A global boom in hydropower dam construction, C Zarfl et al, Aquatic Sciences, 2015, 77(1), pp161-170, link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs00027-014-0377-0#/page-1 See note 17. Bioenergy Out.

23 Climate Change Act 2008, The Stationery Office, 2008, legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2008/27/contents

24 European Union INDC https://unfccc.int/files/focus/indc_portal/application/pdf/adpeu.pdf Climate Action Tracker, climateactiontracker.org/countries/EU

25 Climate change deal: ‘Zero carbon’ laws promised by government, BBC, 15 March 2016, bbc.co.uk/news/uk-35809144 Zero carbon emissions target to be enshrined in UK law, The Guardian, 14 March 2016, theguardian.com/environment/2016/mar/14/zero-carbon-emissions-target-enshrined-uk-law

26 DFID Annual Report and Accounts 2014-15. Results Achieved by Sector: Climate Change, DFID, 2015, gov.uk/government/publications/dfid-annual-report-and-accounts-2014-15-results-achieved-by-sector-climate-change/dfid-annual-report-and-accounts-2014-15-results-achieved-by-sector-climate-change

27 UK Bilateral ODA: by Sector, DFID, 2015, gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/491509/table-A6a.ods

28 devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/sector 29 GPOBA Phase 2 - Window 3 Capital Grant

and Windows 1 & 2 Technical Assistance, devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-200155

30 Statistics on International Development 2015, DFID, 2015, gov.uk/government/statistics/statistics-on-international-development-2015 UK Bilateral ODA: by Sector, DFID, 2015, gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/491509/table-A6a.ods

31 Aid by Sector: Energy Generation and Supply Sector Breakdown, https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/sector/8/categories/230

32 The UK’s International Climate Fund, Independent Commission for Aid Impact, icai.independent.gov.uk/report/uks-international-climate-fund/

33 International Climate Fund – impact on the ground, DFID, 2015, gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/463954/ICF_Results_Note_Final.pdf

34 Policy paper: International Climate Fund, DFID, Department of Energy & Climate Change and Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs 2015, gov.uk/government/publications/international-climate-fund/international-climate-fund#background-information

35 The impact of UK overseas aid on environmental protection and climate


change adaptation and mitigation, House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee, Government Response, 2011, www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmenvaud/1500/1500.pdf

36 See note 34. 37 The impact of UK overseas aid on

environmental protection and climate change adaptation and mitigation. Fifth Report of Session 2010–12, House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee, 2011, www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmenvaud/710/710.pdf

38 See note 32. 39 UK ODA by Multilateral Organisation 2013-

2014, Statistics on International Development 2015, DFID, gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/491515/table-A11.ods

40 See note 35. 41 DFID Annual Report and Accounts 2015-

16, gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/538878/annual-report-accounts-201516a.pdf

42 See note 37. 43 UK support for energy in developing

countries, CAFOD, cafod.org.uk/About-us/Policy-and-Research/Climate-and-energy/Sustainable-energy/Analysis-UK-support-for-energy

44 Energy subsidies, House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee, 2013, publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmenvaud/61/61.pdf

45 Ibid. 46 See note 26. 47 ISA/CIR - Cruviana Project,

devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-CHC-285776-BRA534 Results Based Financing for Low Carbon Energy Access, devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-202957 Rural Electrification Development Project, devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-107368

48 Energy Africa campaign, DFID, 2015, gov.uk/government/news/energy-africa-campaign Hurd: Ethiopia agreement will help us transform Africa’s solar market, DFID, 2016, gov.uk/government/news/hurd-ethiopia-agreement-will-help-us-transform-africas-solar-market

49 Measuring what matters in the Energy SDG, CAFOD, Practical Action and WWF, 2015, infohub.practicalaction.org/oknowledge/bitstream/11283/556984/1/Energy%20SDG%20Indicators%20Mar%202015_PA.pdf Total Energy Access, Practical Action, policy.practicalaction.org/policy-themes/energy/total-energy-access

50 Tracking progress, Sustainable Energy for All, se4all.org/tracking-progress

51 See note 3. 52 See note 3. 53 See note 16. 54 Remarks by World Bank Group President

Jim Yong Kim at Climate Action Summit 2016, World Bank, worldbank.org/en/news/speech/2016/05/05/remarks-world-bank-group-president-jim-yong-kim-climate-action-summit

55 Stop Funding Fossils: World Bank Group

Funds Fossil Fuel Exploration Despite Calls for Climate Action, Oil Change International, 2016, priceofoil.org/content/uploads/2016/04/World-Bank-Brief-April-2016-FINAL2.pdf

56 World Energy Outlook 2012, International Energy Agency, 2012.

57 The Climate Investment Finds, www-cif.climateinvestmentfunds.org

58 ADB hydroelectric project funding in Himachal Pradesh, India: adb.org/projects/41627-043/main adb.org/projects/43464-013/main adb.org/projects/41627-053/main adb.org/projects/43464-026/main

59 Integrated Kashang Hydroelectricity Project, HP, India, Environmental Justice Project, ejatlas.org/conflict/kashang-hydroelectricity-project

60 Aménagement hydroélèctrique de Lom Pangar, African Development Bank, afdb.org/en/projects-and-operations/project-portfolio/project/p-cm-fa0-006/ Lom Pangar Hydropower Proj, World Bank, worldbank.org/projects/P114077/cm-lom-pangar-hydropower-proj-fy12?lang=en&tab=financial

61 Access for the poor?, Bretton Woods Project, 2012, brettonwoodsproject.org/2012/07/art-570795/

62 Africa Renewable Energy Initiative, arei.org/ 63 The New Deal on Energy for Africa, African

Development Bank, 2016 afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Generic-Documents/Brochure_New_Deal_2_red.pdf

64 Africa refuses to go green, wants fossil fuels, Berna Namata, The East African, 28 May 2016, theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Africa-refuses-to-go-green-wants-fossil-fuels-/-/2558/3222948/-/9jo9f8z/-/index.html

65 Alto Maipo Hydroelectric Power Project, Inter-American Development Bank, iadb.org/en/projects/project-description-title,1303.html?id=CH-L1067 idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=36773463

66 Alto Maipo Hydroelectric Project, Environmental Justice Project, ejatlas.org/conflict/alto-maipo-hydroelectric-project-pham-chile Salvemos el río Maipo, riosdelmaipo.cl Saving Santiago’s watershed from business as usual, International Rivers, 2014, internationalrivers.org/blogs/331-5 Alto Maipo project endangers Santiago’s water supply, IPS, 21 January 2014, ipsnews.net/2014/01/alto-maipo-project-endangers-santiago-water-supply/

67 The World Commission on Dams, International Rivers, internationalrivers.org/campaigns/the-world-commission-on-dams

68 Walking the Talk?, Brown University Climate and Development Lab and Institute for Policy Studies, 2015, ips-dc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Walking-The-Talk.pdf

69 See note 17. Bioenergy Out. 70 Talks in the City of Light Generate More

Heat, Kevin Anderson, Nature, 34/31 December 2016, nature.com/polopoly_fs/1.19074!/menu/mai

n/topColumns/topLeftColumn/pdf/528437a.pdf

71 Last-ditch climate option or wishful thinking? Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage, Biofuelwatch, 2015, biofuelwatch.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/BECCS-report-web.pdf

72 MDB Climate Change Scorecard: Do the MDBs pass the 2 degree test?, H Mainhardt, N Sinani, Bank Information Center and Sierra Club, 2015 bankinformationcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/MDB-Climate-Change-Scorecard-formatted.pdf

73 Promoting Biogas as Sustainable Clean Cooking Fuel for Rural Households in Kenya, World Bank, worldbank.org/projects/P153493/?lang=en&tab=overview Liberia Renewable Energy Access Project World Bank, worldbank.org/projects/P149683?lang=en

74 Energy Overview, World Bank, worldbank.org/en/topic/energy/overview#3

75 Lighting rural Bangladesh with rooftop solar & carbon credits, World Bank, 2015, blogs.worldbank.org/climatechange/lighting-rural-bangladesh-rooftop-solar-carbon-credits

76 India gets $1 billion loan from World Bank for solar mission, The Hindu, 30 June 2016, thehindu.com/business/india-gets-1-billion-loan-from-world-bank-for-solar-mission/article8792527.ece

77 Harmonized Metrics for PayGo Solar, youtube.com/watch?v=gTxgU-TyNUE

78 Scaling Solar, World Bank Group, ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/industry_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/industries/infrastructure/power/scaling+solar

79 Expanding the use of clean energy, Asian Development Bank, adb.org/themes/environment/climate-change/projects-clean-energy

80 India: Green Energy Corridor and Grid Strengthening Project, Asian Development Bank, adb.org/projects/44426-016/main

81 African Development Bank, afdb.org/en/topics-and-sectors/sectors/energy-power/knowledge-products/ Solutions for a Changing Climate: The African Development Bank’s Response to Impacts in Africa, African Development Bank, 2012, afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Generic-Documents/The%20Solutions%20for%20a%20Changing%20Climate%20The%20African%20Development%20Bank's%20Response%20to%20Impacts%20in%20Africa.pdf

82 AfDB to support electricity access for all by 2030 with African Renewable Energy Initiative, African Development Bank, 2015, afdb.org/en/news-and-events/article/afdb-to-support-electricity-access-for-all-by-2030-with-african-renewable-energy-initiative-15119/

83 Inter-American Development Bank projects: iadb.org/en/projects/project-description-title,1303.html?id=UR-L1104 iadb.org/en/projects/project-description-title,1303.html?id=CH-L1113 iadb.org/en/projects/project-description-title,1303.html?id=CR-L1070 iadb.org/en/projects/project-description-title,1303.html?id=ES-L1091


iadb.org/en/projects/project-description-title,1303.html?id=EC-M1063

84 See note 20. Toward a Sustainable Energy Future for All.

85 World Bank projects: worldbank.org/projects/P133565/gas-sector-development-additional-financing?lang=en&tab=overview worldbank.org/projects/P120207/nigeria-power-sector-guarantees-project?lang=en&tab=overview worldbank.org/projects/P117407/eg-helwan-south-power-project?lang=en

86 Pakistan: Jamshoro Power Generation Project, Asian Development Bank, adb.org/projects/47094-001/main

87 Pakistan Coal Power Plant to Get Public Funding, Jake Schmidt, Natural Resources Defense Council, 2013, nrdc.org/experts/jake-schmidt/pakistan-coal-power-plant-get-public-funding-will-be-last-coal-plant-funded

88 Jamshoro coal power plant: Work yet to begin as project delay enters third year, The Express Tribune, 16 February 2016, tribune.com.pk/story/1047551/jamshoro-coal-power-plant-work-yet-to-begin-as-project-delay-enters-third-year/

89 AfDB approves USD 300 million loan to boost fuel supply and fertilizer production in Nigeria, African Development Bank, 2014, afdb.org/en/news-and-events/article/afdb-approves-usd-300-million-loan-to-boost-fuel-supply-and-fertilizer-production-in-nigeria-13314 South Tunisian Gaz Pipeline - Tunisia, African Development Bank, afdb.org/en/projects-and-operations/project-portfolio/project/p-tn-fd0-006/

90 IDB supports environmentally sustainable diversification of Uruguay’s energy matrix, Inter-American Development Bank, iadb.org/en/news/news-releases/2012-12-19/environmentally-sustainable-energy-in-uruguay,10274.html Switch to natural gas won’t reduce carbon emissions much, study finds, National Geographic, 25 September 2014, news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2014/09/140924-natural-gas-impact-on-emissions/

91 FAQ: Coal, economic development and poverty reduction, I Granoff et al, ODI, 2015, odi.org/FAQ-coal-poverty-development

92 Peru LNG, IFC, ifcext.ifc.org/ifcext/spiwebsite1.nsf/0/ED68E0291CC7941A852576BA000E2AF3 Camisea Project, Inter-American Development Bank, iadb.org/en/projects/project-description-title,1303.html?id=PE0222

93 Criticism of the Camisea gas project: forestpeoples.org/tags/expansion-camisea-gas-project-peruvian-amazon amazonwatch.org/news/2014/0310-indigenous-leader-denounces-perus-camisea-gas-project-expansion oxfamamerica.org/press/world-bank-announces-funding-approval-for-peru-pipeline-project/ culturalsurvival.org/news/perus-camisea-gas-project-falls-short-world-banks-environmental-standards

94 World Bank energy directions: going for gas, Bretton Woods Project, 2013,

brettonwoodsproject.org/2013/10/world-bank-energy-directions-going-gas/

95 Ibid. 96 Eskom Investment Support Project, World

Bank, worldbank.org/projects/P116410/eskom-investment-support-project?lang=en Medupi Power Project, African Development Bank, afdb.org/en/projects-and-operations/project-portfolio/project/p-za-faa-001/

97 Medupi Timeline: Costs, delays spiralling – no completion in sight, Biznews, 6 August 2015, biznews.com/leadership/2015/08/06/medupi-timeline-costs-delays-spiralling-no-completion-in-sight/

98 Eskom, Bank Information Center, bankinformationcenter.org/feature/eskom/ Eskom loan blackens the World Bank’s name, Bretton Woods Project, 2010, brettonwoodsproject.org/2010/04/art-566122/

99 Coal or no coal: A balancing act for MDBs, Devex, 18 January 2016, devex.com/news/coal-or-no-coal-a-balancing-act-for-mdbs-87610

100 Tata Ultra Mega, IFC, ifcndd.ifc.org/ifcext/spiwebsite1.nsf/78e3b305216fcdba85257a8b0075079d/eab8e042d643a6ec852576ba000e2b15?opendocument Tata Mundra Power Plant, BIC, bankinformationcenter.org/feature/tata-mundra-power-plant/

101 India: Mundra, Asian Development Bank adb.org/projects/41946-014/main#project-pds Under the Rug, Natural Resources Defense Council, Oil Change International and WWF, 2015, nrdc.org/sites/default/files/int_15060201a.pdf Locked-In, Sierra Club, 2012, sierraclub.org/sites/www.sierraclub.org/files/high119_Locked-In_Coal_Whitepaper.pdf

102 On India’s coast, a power plant backed by the World Bank Group threatens a way of life, Huffington Post, 1 May 2015, projects.huffingtonpost.com/projects/worldbank-evicted-abandoned/india-uncounted

103 Fishermen and farmers sue World Bank lending arm over power plant in India, The Guardian, 10 November 2015, theguardian.com/global-development/2015/nov/10/fishermen-farmers-sue-world-bank-lending-arm-ifc-power-plant-india

104 District court rules World Bank can’t be sued, BIC, 2016, bankinformationcenter.org/district-court-rules-world-bank-cant-be-sued/

105 Frequently Asked Questions: Tata Mundra Project, IFC, ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/region__ext_content/regions/south+asia/countries/frequently+asked+questions

106 Electricity for all: Why coal is not king, Vasudha Foundation, 2015. http://www.vasudha-foundation.org/wp-content/uploads/Electricity-for-all-in-India-Why-Coal-is-not-always-king1.pdf

107 See note 68. 108 Mining Companies can help turn on the

lights across sub-Saharan Africa, says World Bank, World Bank, 2014, worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2015/02/09/mining-companies-can-

help-turn-on-the-lights-across-sub-saharan-africa-says-world-bank

109 World Bank pitches mining to drive energy investment in Africa, Bretton Woods Project, 2015, brettonwoodsproject.org/2015/03/world-bank-pitches-mining-to-drive-energy-investment-in-africa/

110 Ibid. 111 Carbon Lock-in From Supply Side

Infrastructure, Stockholm Environment Institute, 2015, sei-international.org/mediamanager/documents/Publications/Climate/SEI-DB-2015-Carbon-lock-in-supply-side.pdf

112 See note 72. 113 See note 37. 114 5 ways to reduce the drivers of climate

change, World Bank, 2015, worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2015/03/18/5-ways-reduce-drivers-climate-change

115 We could be witnessing the death of the fossil fuel industry—will it take the rest of the economy down with it? AlertNet, 22 April 2016, alternet.org/environment/we-could-be-witnessing-death-fossil-fuel-industry-will-it-take-rest-economy-down-it

116 Fossil-fuel divestment tops $3.4 trillion mark, activists say, Bloomberg, 2 December 2015, bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-02/fossil-fuel-divestment-tops-3-4-trillion-mark-activists-say

117 Multilateral Development Banks’ unburnable carbon, Bretton Woods Project, 2014, brettonwoodsproject.org/2014/09/mdbsunburnablecarbon

118 DFID works with the private sector through a range of initiatives including the CDC group, International Climate Fund, Climate Public Private Partnership, and the Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility. See note 20: Energy Sector Policy of the AfDB Group. See note 20: Energy Sector Framework Document.

119 AfDB and Climate Finance in Africa, African Development Bank, 2013, afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Climate_Change/Cfinance2013.pdf

120 DFID Energy Framework, 2015. 121 World Bank Group Strategy, World Bank

Group, 2014, openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/16095/32824_ebook.pdf?sequence=5

122 Public-private partnerships in Uganda cost the country dearly, Paul Harper, Jubilee Debt Campaign, 2015, jubileedebt.org.uk/blog/public-private-partnerships-in-uganda-cost-the-country-dearly

123 cdcgroup.com 124 Climate Change Policy, CDC, 2014,

cdcgroup.com/Documents/ESG%20Publications/CDC_ClimateChangePolicy.pdf

125 Fossil fuel exploration subsidies: United Kingdom, ODI and Oil Change International, 2014, odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/9245.pdf

126 cdcgroup.com/What-we-do/Our-Investments/CDC lists examples of investments in renewable energy including: Panama Wind Energy, Royal Tech in China (solar) and Olkaria III in Kenya (geothermal). Examples of investments in


fossil fuels include GMR Kamalanga Fund Energy in India (coal), Azura Power in Nigeria (gas) and PetroTiger in Colombia (oil).

127 Investment policy for the period from 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2016, CDC, 2012, cdcgroup.com/Documents/Transparency%20and%20reporting/CDC%20Investment%20Policy%202012_16.pdf

128 UK position on public financing of coal plants overseas, Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2013, gov.uk/government/speeches/uk-position-on-public-financing-of-coal-plants-overseas

129 UK boosts support for businesses to create jobs in the world’s poorest places, DFID, 2015, gov.uk/government/news/uk-boosts-support-for-businesses-to-create-jobs-in-the-worlds-poorest-places

130 African Climate Change Challenge Fund, devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-201575 Green Africa Power, devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-201931 Climate Public Private Partnership, devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-201733

131 Critical issues for channelling climate finance via private sector actors, Oscar Reyes, BOND Development and Environment Group, 2013. http://cafod.org.uk/content/download/9496/76572/file/Channelling%20Climate%20Finance%20via%20PS%20actors_April2013.pdf

132 Still Funding Fossils: World Bank Group Energy Finance FY 2014, Oil Change International, 2015, priceofoil.org/content/uploads/2015/04/world-bank-april-2015-FINAL.pdf

133 https://globenewswire.com/news-release/2015/08/18/761587/0/en/AFRICA-OIL-ANNOUNCES-US-50-MILLION-EQUITY-SUBSCRIPTION-FINANCING-WITH-INTERNATIONAL-FINANCE-CORPORATION.html

134 IFC summaries of investment: OffGrid Electric, ifcextapps.ifc.org/ifcext/spiwebsite1.nsf/78e3b305216fcdba85257a8b0075079d/d65d78de6d88622185257ca9006ceeea?opendocument GEC, ifcextapps.ifc.org/ifcext/spiwebsite1.nsf/78e3b305216fcdba85257a8b0075079d/3a92aadc61c2387385257f50005c576b?opendocument KTDA Small Hydro, ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/region__ext_content/regions/east+asia+and+the+pacific/news/china+windpower+group

135 Helping India Reach Its Energy Goals, IFC, 2016, ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/news_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/news+and+events/news/helping+india+reach+its+energy+goals

136 World Bank Climate Action Plan, World Bank, 2016, worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2016/04/07/world-bank-group-sets-new-course-to-help-countries-meet-urgent-climate-challenges

137 Asian Development Bank gas projects: adb.org/projects/48330-001/main adb.org/projects/44951-014/main adb.org/projects/48281-001/main adb.org/projects/48368-001/main

adb.org/projects/48307-001/main

138 Asian Development Bank renewable energy projects: adb.org/projects/49238-001/main adb.org/projects/49263-001/main adb.org/projects/48325-001/main adb.org/news/adb-supports-new-clean-energy-private-sector-power-project-pakistan

139 African Development Bank fossil fuel projects: afdb.org/en/news-and-events/article/afdb-approves-usd-300-million-loan-to-boost-fuel-supply-and-fertilizer-production-in-nigeria-13314/ afdb.org/en/news-and-events/article/afdb-approves-us-150-million-loan-to-support-access-to-reliable-electricity-supply-in-zambia-12334/ afdb.org/en/news-and-events/article/afdb-enhances-access-to-reliable-and-affordable-electricity-supply-in-cote-divoire-12150/

140 African Development Bank renewable energy projects: afdb.org/en/news-and-events/article/afdb-to-finance-its-first-renewable-energy-independent-power-producer-project-in-south-africa-13332/ afdb.org/en/news-and-events/article/first-adf-partial-risk-guarantee-approved-in-kenya-for-largest-african-wind-power-project-12324/

141 Fossil fuel projects: iic.org/es/proyectos/jamaica/ja3383a-01/gulfstream-petroleum-jamaica-s-de-rl iic.org/es/proyectos/rep%C3%BAblica-dominicana/dr3641a-01/boca-chica-sa

142 Renewable energy project: iic.org/es/proyectos/el-salvador/es3423a-01/parque-solar-cangrejera-sa-de-cv

143 China launches new AIIB development bank as power balance shifts, Reuters, 17 January 2016, reuters.com/article/us-asia-aiib-investment-idUSKCN0UU03Y

144 Seven stragglers leave AIIB crowd at an even 50, Wall Street Journal, 29 January 2015, blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2015/06/29/seven-stragglers-leave-aiib-crowd-at-an-even-50/

145 Signing and Ratification Status of the AOA of the AIIB, euweb.aiib.org/html/aboutus/introduction/Membership/?show=0

146 Environmental and Social Framework, AIIB, 2016, aiib.org/uploadfile/2016/0226/20160226043633542.pdf

147 See note 99. China-led bank to focus on big-ticket projects, Indonesia says, Wall Street Journal, 10 April 2015, wsj.com/articles/china-led-aiib-to-focus-on-big-ticket-projects-indonesia-says-1428647276 For India, China-backed lender may be answer to coal investment, Reuters, 5 November 2014, reuters.com/article/us-india-aiib-insight-idUSKBN0IP2S020141106

148 Our Purpose, New Development Bank, ndb.int/our-purpose.php

149 BRICS bank gives $811 million in first round green energy loans, New Development Bank, 2016, ndb.int/brics-bank-gives-811-

million-in-first-round-green-energy-loans.php New BRICS bank set to fund green energy projects, New Development Bank, 2016, ndb.int/new-brics-bank-set-to-fund-green-energy-projects.php

150 Letter to the BRICS New Development Bank, 2015, rightsindevelopment.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/BRICS-Open-Letter-Final-to-Bank1.pdf The rise of the infrastructure giants, Bretton Woods Project, 2014, brettonwoodsproject.org/2014/06/rise-infrastructure-giants/

151 AIIB and World Bank sign first co-financing framework agreement, AIIB, 2016, euweb.aiib.org/html/2016/NEWS_0414/99.html

152 The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: What Can It Learn From, and Perhaps Teach To, the Multilateral Development Banks?, Stephany Griffith-Jones, Li Xiaoyun and Stephen Spratt, IDS, 2016, opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/9701/ER179_TheAsianInfrastructureInvestmentBankWhatCanItLearnFromandPerhapsTeachTotheMultilateralDevelopmentBanks.pdf

153 What Can the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Learn from Other Development Banks?, Stephany Griffith-Jones, Li Xiaoyun and Stephen Spratt, IDS, 2016, opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/11170/PB113_AGID545_AIIB_Online.pdf

154 The AIIB and Investment in Action on Climate Change, ODI, 2016, odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/the_aiib_and_investment_in_action_final_20160413.pdf

155 Development Banks Failing in the Fight Against Climate Change, BIC and Sierra Club, 2015, bankinformationcenter.org/development-banks-failing-in-the-fight-against-climate-change/

156 Designed for the Future? World Resources Institute, 2014, wri.org/publication/designed-future

157 Greenhouse Gas Assessment Emissions Methodology, IDB, 2012, publications.iadb.org/bitstream/handle/11319/5515/ESG-TN_455-GHG-Emissions-Methodology-Assessment_31Aug2012.pdf

158 Inter-American Development Bank Sustainability Report 2015, IDB, 2015, publications.iadb.org/handle/11319/7532?locale-attribute=en

159 Safeguards and Sustainability, IADB, iadb.org/en/topics/sustainability/about-us,19563.html

160 World Bank Policies Include Screening for Climate Risks, 6 August 2014, www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/08/04/world-band-policies-include-screening-climate-risks

161 See note 136. 162 Intended Nationally Determined

Contributions, UNFCCC, unfccc.int/focus/indc_portal/items/8766.php

163 Paris agreement leaves climate funding in limbo, IPS, 14 December 2015, ipsnews.net/2015/12/paris-agreement-leaves-climate-funding-in-limbo/

164 UK aid: tackling global challenges in the national interest, DFID, 2015, gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads


/attachment_data/file/478834/ODA_strategy_final_web_0905.pdf

165 MDBs boost climate finance, but not for the most vulnerable, Devex, 26 June 2015, devex.com/news/mdbs-boost-climate-finance-but-not-for-the-most-vulnerable-86421 2014 Joint Report on Multilateral Development Banks’ Climate Finance, World Bank Group, 2015, worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/Climate/mdb-climate-finance-2014-joint-report-061615.pdf

166 See note 136. 167 See note 20: Addressing Climate Change in

Asia and the Pacific. See note 20: Energy Policy.

168 Why is the World Bank backing coal power in Europe's youngest country?, Karl Mathiesen, The Guardian, 20 July 2016, theguardian.com/environment/2016/jul/20/kosovo-coal-plant-power-world-bank-investment-dirty-technology

169 See note 99. 170 See note 108. 171 See note 155. 172 See note101: Locked-In.

The UK's power struggle: Private sector investment vs. traditional aid, Devex, 3 November 2015, devex.com/news/the-uk-s-power-struggle-private-sector-investment-vs-traditional-aid-87220 See note 20: Energy Sector Framework Document. See note 20: Energy Policy.

173 From Baseload to Peak: Renewables Provide a Reliable Solution, IRENA, 2015, irena.org/DocumentDownloads/Publications/IRENA_Baseload_to_Peak_2015.pdf

174 Dispelling the nuclear ‘baseload’ myth: nothing renewables can’t do better! The Ecologist, 2016, theecologist.org/News/news_analysis/2987376/dispelling_the_nuclear_baseload_myth_nothing_renewables_cant_do_better.html Can renewables provide baseload power?, Skeptical Science, skepticalscience.com/print.php?r=374

175 Designing Low Carbon Electricity Futures for African and Other Developing Economies, International Rivers, 2015, internationalrivers.org/files/attached-files/intlrivers_low-carbon_small.pdf

176 See note101: Locked-In. 177 See note 72.

See note 20: Energy Policy. 178 Global Tracking Framework 2015: Key

Findings, Sustainable Energy for All, 2015, se4all.org/sites/default/files/l/2013/09/GTF_2015-Key_Findings.pdf

179 Energy access: Key facts, Practical Action, policy.practicalaction.org/policy-themes/energy

180 World Bank failing to solve energy poverty, receives ‘F’ in new report, Oil Change International, 2016, priceofoil.org/2016/04/14/world-bank-failing-to-solve-energy-poverty-receives-f-in-new-report/

181 See note 7. 182 Energy for Development in South Asia:

addressing energy inequality sustainably, Christian Aid, 2015, christianaid.org.uk/Images/indian-energy-report.pdf

183 See note 155.

184 lightingglobal.org/launch-of-off-grid-solar-

market-trends-report-2016/ 185 See note 48.

Britain and US unite to power up Africa, DFID, www.gov.uk/government/news/britain-and-us-unite-to-power-up-africa

186 See note 20. Toward a Sustainable Energy Future for All.

187 UK support for energy in developing countries: Research Methodology, CAFOD, 2015, cafod.org.uk/content/download/27343/269691/version/2/file/UK%20support%20for%20energy%20in%20developing%20countries%20-%20research%20methodology.pdf See note 7.

188 See note 74. 189 Sources: See note 26.

DFID Energy Framework, 2015. UK Bioenergy Strategy, Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2012, gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/48337/5142-bioenergy-strategy-.pdf

190 See note 20. Toward a Sustainable Energy Future for All. See note 134. MDB Climate Change Policy Requirements and Other Measures (Annex), Bank Information Center and Sierra Club, 2015, bankinformationcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/MDB-Climate-Change-Scorecard-Annex.pdf

191 Still failing to solve energy poverty: International Public Finance for Distributed Clean Energy Access Gets another “F” http://priceofoil.org/content/uploads/2016/04/OCI-Sierra-Club-Energy-Scorecard-Apr-2016.pdf

192 See note 20: Energy Policy. See note 20: Addressing Climate Change in Asia and the Pacific. See note 99.

193 Climate change: Our strategy, African Development Bank, afdb.org/en/topics-and-sectors/sectors/climate-change/our-strategy/ See note 20: Energy Sector Policy of the AfDB Group. See note 20: Climate Change Action Plan 2011-2015.

194 See note 20: Energy Sector Framework Document. See note 20: Evaluating the IDB’s Climate Change Efforts in the Energy Sector IDB Integrated Strategy for Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation, and Sustainable and Renewable Energy, Inter-American Development Bank, 2011, idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=35802849 About us: Energy, Inter-American Development Bank, iadb.org/en/about-us/energy,6219.html Coal Fired Power Plant Guidelines, Inter-American Development Bank, 2009, idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=2242924 See note 72. See note 99.

Contact us

Alison Doig

[email protected]

England and Wales registered charity number. 1105851 Scotland charity number. SC039150 UK company number. 5171525 Registered withThe Charity Commission for Northern Ireland NIC101631 Company number NI059154 Republic of Ireland Charity Commission number 20014162Company number 426928. The Christian Aid name and logo are trademarks of Christian Aid © Christian Aid