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Effects of Mexican Drug Trafficking on Mexico & the US Relationships

Romina Mollo

Senior Thesis

Professor Swedberg

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The ongoing problems with Mexico and United States are caused by a number of

issues, one particularly, the continuing corruption that has occurred because of the war

on drugs, which has extended from border to border. 1 However, this has not been an

issue that has recently come about; it is an issue that international organizations have

debated for an extremely long time. In the beginning it seemed like a small problem,

which has tremendously grown, as Mexico’s “marijuana, heroin, and methamphine has

grown increased numbers in the north.” 2 Mexico claims that they as well as the United

States have attempted to control the drug epidemic. Nevertheless, many claim that

Mexico has completely failed at doing so, and so this has led them to now have strict

laws imposed by the United States on Mexico. 3 On the other hand, although this

ongoing drug issue originated in one geographical area, the effects it has had there and

across the border are inevitable; drug trafficking, has led to fire arm trafficking, with an

overall increase violence and consequences that have affected more than one nation,

forcing inevitable tensions to rise.

There is no denying the effects the Mexican drug war has had on both Mexico

and nation and its neighboring border, the United States, which has led to a number of

issues, both domestic, and internationally. Mexico’s war on drugs is not a recent

concern, thus, it is a problem that has been of concern for quite some time now.

However, in the mid-2000s the problem scaled out of control in many aspects.4

1 Chabat Jorge, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Mexico's War on Drugs: No Margin for Maneuver, (Sage Publications, Inc, 2002) , 1342 Recio Gabriela, Journal of Latin American Studies, Drugs and Alcohol: US Prohibition and the Origins of the Drug Trade in Mexico, 1910-1930, (Cambridge University Press, Feb, 2002) 21-223 Toro Maria Celia, Journal of Latin American Studies, Mexico's 'War' on Drugs: Causes and Consequences, (Cambridge University Press, Feb, 2002), 715-164 Chabat Jorge, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Mexico's War on Drugs: No Margin for Maneuver, (Sage Publications, Inc, 2002) , 134

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Nonetheless, it has not been until recently that the circulation around this problem has

escalated than it has in the past. Mexico claims they have tried to control the matter;

however, internationally the Mexican government is associated with the violence of the

drug cartels. Since Mexican drug trafficking has grown over the decades, other issues

have as well, which include: political disputes, fire arm trafficking, human trafficking,

overall increase of violence around the country, more in some specific areas than

others, and ultimately consequences that have affected their country and relationships

with other countries.5

Much of the media attention focuses on the violence in Mexico when the real

issue is “the weakness and pressure from the United the States.” 6 Mexico is the

biggest supplier of drugs in the country; the United States has not done enough to help

its neighbor. The United States does not give Mexico enough alternatives to fight or fix

the problem, as a result the Mexican government has “no alternatives than to continue

fighting the drugs with limited institutional and human resources” 7 However, the United

States is to blame as well, as we are presenting an issue as well. He blames the

problems with the two nations do not only go hand in hand with the drug problem but

with the “behavior and perspective of US officials.” Research that United States officials

have taken control in Mexico and it is the major cause between the “bitter” battles

between the United States and Mexico, which is real reason for the presenting fights

and issues over the past fifteen years.8

5 Recio Gabriela, Journal of Latin American Studies, Drugs and Alcohol: US Prohibition and the Origins of the Drug Trade in Mexico, 1910-1930, (Cambridge University Press, Feb, 2002) 21-226 Ibid.; 23 7 Chabat Jorge, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Mexico's War on Drugs: No Margin for Maneuver, (Sage Publications, Inc, 2002) , 1348 Toro Maria Cecilia, The Journal of American History, The Internationalization of Police: The DEA in Mexico, (Organization of American Historians, 1999), 623

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Although Mexico has tried to “gain” control over the spread of the cartels, these

organizations continue to spread. However, the question rises. How do these illegal

organizations actually organize? The Mexican government may have tried to combat

the cartels; nevertheless, the cartels continue to operate effectively despite the

government intervening. Many like the famous “La Familia Michoacana” use “a reward

and punishment scheme,” which in the end prevents defection from its members and

elicits cooperation from the community and government.9

Drug trafficking holds the biggest threat because of the corruption ties that lay

within and what they produce. The Mexican government has tried to combat the issue,

going by their constitution, as well as the pressure they have received from the United

States. Therefore, all these factors puts the Mexican government into a “very complex”

situation as they try to fight the drug problem; however, they have very limited

institutional and human resources, thus, with this problem Mexico has really no way to

change their tactics on their war on drugs. 10 Nevertheless, the issue of corruption

within the state has undoubtedly aided on the drug epidemic, as the issue cannot really

be fixed.

Mexico’s drug problem has affected the country as whole, as illegal drugs have

affected Mexico’s consumption and trafficking. It shocks many when they see or read

this, but although Mexico’s consumption rate has definitely increased over the years, it

still does not compare to those in industrialized countries. Thus, it leaves drug

trafficking as the biggest concern in Mexico, as it leads to corruption. The traffic in

9 Kostelnik and Skarbek, Public Choice, The Governance Institutions of A Drug Trafficking Organization,(Springler, July 2013), 95-10310 Chabat Jorge, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Mexico's War on Drugs: No Margin for Maneuver, (Sage Publications, Inc, 2002), 134

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Mexico has a very costly war which has erupted to contain these increased demands on

the drug exchange, as well as the pressure put on by the United States. However, the

costly war that has come about has become very hard and “endangers” the Mexican

transition into democracy. 11

Mexico has been fighting illegal drugs since the 1920’s, starting when Mexico

supported the Hauge International Opium Convention, in which the following years, the

Mexican government then banned the trade of illicit drugs such as; opium, cocaine, and

marijuana. Thus, during these first three decades of the twentieth century a new pattern

began. Mexico became a leading producer of heroin and marijuana, as a major provider

to the United States of these drugs. However, Mexico has been a producer of drugs

since the 1930’s, therefore, it must be noted that this is not a new issue these countries

are dealing with today. In the 1980’s, with the increase knowledge of drugs, the

Mexican drug trafficking issue, became increasingly controversial, now considered a

“social problem.” 12 However, one must take into consideration the development of illicit

drug trade in the US began in the 1920’s with the prohibition of alcohol, a control and

reduction which aided in overall violence, as well as corruption, connecting to modern

day society. 13 The ideology of prohibition was a decent concept, which in many

regards was a “fantasy idea,” which no one wanted to abide by. It began with the notion

that alcohol was causing social problems, which included unemployment, poverty,

business failure, slums, insanity, crime, and violence. Thus, a pattern of drug use

emerged, and as one drug is banned the use of stronger drugs increases.

11 Ibid.; 13512 Ibid.; 135-3613 Miron Jeffery, Violence and the U.S. Prohibitions of Drugs and Alcohol, American Law and Economics Review, (Oxford University Press, 1999) 76-88

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Nevertheless, people began to be involved in the business of drugs, especially drug

smuggling, such as from Mexico. 14

In the 1970’s, the Mexican government did try to take a step towards the right

direction; “Operation Condor” was implemented, which was done by the pressure that

came from the Nixon administration. The operation was actually efficient in many

regards. The United States used the Mexican government’s success on their behalf,

citing it as example of what a country can “achieve” in respect to the drug problems

occurring, and how they can fight it, as long as there is a “political will.” 15 The Nixon

Administration launched Operation Intercept, which was a “massive action,” done in

order to check vehicles and inspect them while crossing the US-Mexican border. This

operation caused an economic disruption and damage on both sides of the border,

which was then renamed, “Operation Condor,” how we all know to to be today. Thus,

this was the start on the US-Mexico’s “war on drugs,” which caused the problems we

that arose. 16

However, everything changed in the 1980’s, when the antidrug effort worsened.

Mexico once again became the biggest drug supplier to the United States of heroin and

marijuana, as well as becoming a point of transit for cocaine to South America, and the

friction between both nations once again rose, which has lasted until today. 17 In the

1980’s President Regan decided to assign both more financial and human resource

support to Mexico. Nonetheless, the problem began to be so big; many saw the US’s 14 Reinarman and Levine, From Prohibition to Regulation: Lessons from Alcohol Policy for Drug Policy, The Milbank Quarterly, (: Wiley on behalf of Milbank Memorial Fund, 1991), 465-46715 Chabat Jorge, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Mexico's War on Drugs: No Margin for Maneuver, (Sage Publications, Inc, 2002), 13416 Zedillo and Wheeler, Rethinking the “War on Drugs” Through the US-Mexico Prism, A Yale Center for the Study of Globalization eBook, (Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, 2012), 3617 Ibid.; 135-36

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response as being inadequate. Thus, since this time many also see the US as a main

supplier and aide of “deaths.”18

During the twenty first century, the Mexican cartels expanded their control of drug

supply chain throughout the regions, causing their supplies to “explode.” Since there are

no historical or written accounts of their actual revenue of business, it is unknown

exactly how much they produce and how much they make for their supplies, but it is

clear an enormous amount of money is made. In 2002, US Attorney General John

Ashcroft, reported that Americans had spent 62.9 billion dollars on drugs in the year

2000, 36.1 billion was spent on cocaine alone; 90 percent of transits went through and

came from Mexico. Later in 2009, the US Drug Intelligence Center estimated that the

Mexican and Colombian drug traffickers had generated between an estimated 17 billion

to 38 billion dollars annually on sales to the United States.19

However, another issue Mexico has seen is the geographical dispersion of

violence that has happened throughout the country. There has been an increase of

shooting, and overall harassment by crime organizations. The number of municipalities

with more of 12 organized-crime related deaths increased in 2007. Thus, in that same

year, a total number of 53 municipalities had 12 or more organized crime-related

deaths. Nevertheless, the number continued to increase, with the number reaching 200

in 2010. 20

18 Bagley Mitchell, The New Hundred Years War? US National Security and the War on Drugs in Latin America, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, (Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Miami, 1998), 173-7519 Kellner and Piptone, Inside Mexico's Drug War, World Policy Journal, (The MIT Press, 2010), 3020 Zedillo and Wheeler, Rethinking the “War on Drugs” Through the US-Mexico Prism, A Yale Center for the Study of Globalization eBook, (Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, 2012), 36

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The issues lie within the Mexican border, where along the streets the problem is

visible. In the last four years, nearly 35,000 people have been killed due to drug related

violence, mostly alongside the US border. 21 The Mexican cartels are also not backing

down and not weakening. In 2010; nearly 15,273 people were killed, known as the

“bloodiest year,” as many are seeking for a change in the country. Washington DC

firmly had supported former Mexican President Felipe Caledon’s policies, which

captured some high profiled drug barons.22

Fast forwarding from the early 2000’s to the mid 2000’s Mexico experienced a

change in presidency, which changed many things for the country. In 2006, Felipe

Calderon was inaugurated as president of the nation, and nearly a week after his

inauguration as president in December of that year, he sent 7,000 troops as well as

police to the state of Michoacán, in order to destroy marijuana plantations and set out a

search for drug traffickers. This became known as the “first deployment” on the “war on

drugs,” which increased radically within two weeks, a total 30,000 personnel had been

deployed to 32 states, and four years later it became a complete “murderous

catastrophe.” A total of 40,000 people died, over 6,000 of them in the first half of 2011,

which was equivalent to a casualty rate of more than 30 a day. However, the flow of

drugs and weapons continued to increase, and the killings, kidnappings and extortion

had spread even further. 23

21 Miglierini Julian, Mexico: Cracking Down, The World Today, (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2011) ,26-2822 Ibid.; 2623 Hernandez Isabel, Silver and Lead, Los señores del narco (Grijalbo: Mexico, 2010), 558

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Corruption accompanied Caledron’s entire presidency, including his race to the

National Palace, in which he won with the help of a large-scale fraud. 25 Many of

Caledon’s ballots were counted twice, while the ballots of his opponent were thrown

24 Zedillo and Wheeler, Rethinking the “War on Drugs” Through the US-Mexico Prism, A Yale Center for the Study of Globalization eBook, (Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, 2012), 3725 Ibid,; 558

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away, until the Federal Electoral Institute produced the “right result.” Caledron won the

election by 0.58 per cent, thus, resulting in street protests from the supporters from his

now former opponent Andrés Manuel López Obrador, who to this day continues to call

himself the ‘legitimate president’. From the beginning Caledron lacked many attributions

including legitimacy. Instead of trying to turn the corner from the rumors that dispelled

about him which his opposers had begun dispersing among the people, he deployed

thousands of troops on his “war on drugs.” 26 Corruption seems to be a common link

between all sources, as political corruption rules Mexico and its people, which inevitably

has led to the massive problems found in the country, which has “altered the equation.”

Thus, over the last two decades, the patterns of corruption have led to political

breakthroughs on efforts to deal with the problem of corruption, has strengthen the rule

of law and reigning in corruption.” 27 Unfortunately his crusade did little to undo the

damage of the drug traffickers, as he continued to make himself look bad, and

continued to increase violence throughout the country. By February 2010, 53,174

people had been arrested; however, only 941 involved actual members, as violence

grew, bodies were left on display through the streets.28

Calerdon was in office for six bloody years, in his so called “war on drugs.”

According to the Mexican Constitution, presidents are limited to one six year term,

therefore, the question rises, why not only create such disastrous policies, as well as

continue them, when he cannot be reelected? Could Caledron be tainted with cartel

26 Ibid.; 55827 Morris Stephen, The New Politics of Corruption, Corruption and the Mexican Political System: Continuity and Change, (Taylor and Francis Ltd, 1999), 62328 Hernandez Isabel, Silver and Lead, Los señores del narco (Grijalbo: Mexico, 2010), 558

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corruption? The question rises if Caledron had chosen a side between the cartels, and

had an alliance with the infamous Capo’s Sinaloa cartel:

“Described as his de facto backing for the Sinaloa cartel may be the product of a convergence between corruption and mistaken strategy…Government statements speak of a policy of ‘disarticulating’ the cartels, fragmenting ...” 29

Could he have based his thoughts on those of the PRI, which were that when there was

one cartel, which was manageable and the violence could still be controlled. 30

The American government completely supported Caledron’s strategies.

Nonetheless, they do note the lack of results that never came about during his six years

in office, calling the drug cartels, “an insurgency,” stating that cartels were taking over

the nation. They described the Mexican army as “slow and risk averse” and all federal

agencies, including the nation’s Army, Navy, and Federal Police were all corrupt,

causing an ultimate failure. Thus, this was a huge threat and concern for American

foreign policy if something was not done to stop the epidemic and the nation’s border

continued to be at risk. 31

Washington claims that Mexico had exceeded Colombia’s demand and the

power of their drug lords, and now being the main “principal drug market.” However, the

United States was and still continues to remains an openhanded source of weapons

towards the Mexican drug war. It is reported that an average of 70 percent of weapons

that are seized in Mexico in the last two years can be traced directly back to the United

States. Nevertheless, shockingly most of these weapons have actually been purchased

legally in the states north of the Mexican border. However, there is still a denial that the 29 Ibid.; 55830 Ibid.; 55831 Miglierini Julian, Mexico: Cracking Down, The World Today, (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2011) ,27

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drug problem is Mexico’s issue alone, and must be handled by the Mexican government

entirely alone. 32

Under both the Bush and Obama administrations a joint operation was held,

beginning in 2007, through the Merida Initiative. Mexico received millions of dollars

from the United States for equipment, training, and joint special operations. However,

the financial aid was not delivered at the rate in which many Mexican hoped it would be

delivered; although, because of the aide of the United States, drug lord Arturo Beltran

Leyva was captured in December of 2009.33 Many call the help received from the US as

“modest,” as the 1.4 billion dollars that were given under the Merida Initiative which

covered three years of help was not clearly enough for all the needs that had to be

covered. The US was involved itself help its Southern neighbor because they could not

afford to have a “narco-state as a neighbor,” according to former drug czar McCaffrey.

The US became involved under the Bush administration and implemented Merida

Initiative, as Washington felt the Mexican government had not done enough on their

part to “confront the dangerous of narco-terrorism.” 34

However, United States’ involvement is a main key, as the issues go back

decades. The Mexican drug issues, as well as the Mexican and American problems

with one another began in the 1980’s. It is a problem of both nations, one’s lack of

controlling what is occurring in their nation as well as what is leaving, and the other’s

lack of investigating what is entering its borders. The United States believes that

Mexico has lacked the ability to control the problem over the decades, which has

32 Hernandez Isabel, Silver and Lead, Los señores del narco (Grijalbo: Mexico, 2010), 33833 Miglierini Julian, Mexico: Cracking Down, The World Today, (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2011) ,2734 Kellner and Piptone, Inside Mexico's Drug War, World Policy Journal, (The MIT Press, 2010), 37

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ultimately led to the “friction” between the two countries. Each nation’s interaction with

drugs, has led to the fire that fuels this matter, especially Mexico’s security doctrine,

which came about in the late 1980’s. 35 These problems can also be tied to the

conflicts with the United States and the Mexican Revolution 91910-1920), in which the

“potential governmental income” which shows that it came directly from the trafficking of

drugs, thus, they are still to be resolved. 36

In 2007, violence in Mexico was reaching an ultimate high throughout

the entire country. The press named the killings that occurred in Aguascalientes, "Black

Thursday,” the first shootings of police officials, which until then had been a quiet area

compared to the rest of Mexico. After the fire attack occurred a search for the culprits

ensued. States Attorney Xavier Gonzalez Fisher attempted to calm the waters, and

reassured the public and media that the incident was an “isolated accident.” However,

the incident marked even bloodier period of violence, and increase of drugs, crime, and

corruption grew excessively along the Mexico-US border, even in regions that had not

been affected.37

It seems like the tensions between the United States and Mexico could not be

tamed, as the violence caused by the war on drugs continued to spread. In February of

2010, two US Immigration and Costumes Enforcement agents were shot in Mexico City

by two unknown assassins, one was fatally shot, while the other was injured. Both

Mexico and the United States agreed to work together and find those guilty of the crime.

35 Reuter and Ronfeldt, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Quest for Integrity: The Mexican-US Drug Issue in the 1980s, (Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Miami, 1992) 89-9036 Sandos James, The Americas, Northern Separatism during the Mexican Revolution: An Inquiry into the Role of Drug Trafficking, 1910-1920, (Academy of American Franciscan, 1984), 191-9337 Ibid.; 29

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Nevertheless, this was a different circumstance than in 1985, when a US Drug

Enforcement Official was killed and Mexico was accused by the United States of

protecting the killers, a situation, that caused extreme tensions between the two nations,

and the two countries. As a result, “bilateral relationship reached a historic low.”

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In order to combat this issue, the problem must be shared by the two nations in

order to figure out a solution. Thus, under the Obama Administration Mexico an

“important discursive milestone” was achieved. In recent years some US officials have

begun to admit that it is a “shared responsibility” to control the drug trafficking. The US

is the world’s biggest consumer of illegal drugs, and the American demand on narcotics

is an important and big part of the problem, not only Mexico producing the drugs, as

38 Miglierini Julian, Mexico: Cracking Down, The World Today, (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2011) ,28

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well as the United States aiding in aiding with firearm, which increases the overall

violence across the border, since 2006, more than 100,000 have been confiscated from

the cartels, which can be linked to the US. 39 Thus, the US also provides military

weapons that are used by the cartels.

Mexico once an authoritarian ruled nation, “peacefully” returned to its democracy

after seventy years of a dictatorship rule. However, Mexico became a one-party state,

led the Institutional Revolutionary Party also known as the PRI. The establishment of

the PRI gave little way for “control for a few parties,” still leaving Mexico in many ways

as an authoritarian ruled nation. Thus, this left much conflict in the nation, leaving things

in the air and a window open for a rise of violence and revolts, and new threats to

emerge. 40

Nevertheless, it is important to understand who exactly is fighting who, as well as

the cartels, and which older cartels have power, but there are new cartels rising today.

There are two major dominant Mexican cartels, whom have increased violence and

coercion to “unimaginable” levels. The Sinola cartel, also known as the “The

Federation” is country’s largest cartel, it is based on the amounts of drugs they move

and sell. The Sinaloa replaced all others cartel originated in Sinola, Mexico, the region

was once known for the poppy fields and opium gum produced by thousands of

Mexican campesinos, which are Mexican field workers. The Sinola Cartels operate from

Sinola all the way throughout Mexico’s Pacific Coast, as well as the US border,

including Tijuana, Cuidad Juarez, and Nuevo Laredo in the east. Each region has its

own sector of the cartel; each with their own chief, controlling each territory, but at the 39 Ibid.; 40 Ibid.;

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top of the hierarchy once sat El Chapo Guzman, once worth one billion dollars,

regarded as the most “powerful drug trafficker in the world,” until he was captured in

2014.41

The second cartel is Gulf Cartel, which was founded in the 1970’s, along the

northeastern border state of Tamaulipas, located alongside the Gulf of Mexico. The

Gulf Cartel grew drastically during the early 1990’s and expanded their territories, thus,

as they grew, conflict with El Chapo and Sinola grew as well, as The Gulf Cartel

became known for their “blood image.” Los Zetas, which originally was a small group of

deserters from the Mexican Special Forces hired in 2000 by the Gulf’s former chief

Guilen to serve as their body guards. However, Los Zetas were not content with their

roles as bodyguards, and when Guilen was captured in 2003, Los Zetas began their

own cartel, beginning to build power by drug trade, kidnapping, extortion, and killings. It

is not known who actually runs The Gulf Cartel anymore, but it is known that Los Zetas

play a crucial role. Today, much of the violence in Mexico is attributed to the war

between these powerful cartels, as well as the participation of other smaller

organizations. In 2003, a war exploded in Nuevo Laredo, concerning who would have

control of the city. The violence it produced is still prevalent today, with gun downs

between the cartels occurring and no truce happening along the US-Mexican border. 42

Today Mexico is run by “criminal-capital insurgency,” a country ran by drug

gangs who run the government, as violence has taken over, as well as an increase in

kidnapping has completely taken over the country. Nevertheless, what were once

regional problems has now turned into a nationwide epidemic. Although most drug 41 Kellner and Piptone, Inside Mexico's Drug War, World Policy Journal, (The MIT Press, 2010),3242 Ibid.;

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cartels do battle for drug routes into the United States, seeking the American demand,

drug smugglings happens throughout the country, as mountain, rural people are used to

do the job, known as “bronco,” meaning wild, and they became heroes. They leave their

rural homes and move into wealthy neighborhoods, where they can fire guns in the air

at fancy parties. Everyone wants to be a part of these gang groups and much more is at

“stake.” 43

Thus, as kidnapping seemed to become popular in the country, it spread across

the entire nation, as these gangs began to target the children of noticeable

businessmen. Los Zetas preferred this move more than any other gangs, as they

actually “perfected” the style of kidnapping, connecting it more to the style of drug

trafficking. For example, in May 2008, Nicholas Martinez Reyes, who was the son of a

wine distributor in Mexico, was kidnapped. He was at a seafood restaurant in

downtown in Aguascalientes, on a busy day, dinning with friends, when the incident

occurred. Reyes was held captive for 35 days, he was tortured, and his kidnappers cut

one of his fingers off, before his father finally agreed to pay his ransom. 44

In 2008, the biggest spike came when drug-related crimes jumped from 2,826 to

6,837 killings, a 142% increase with respect to the previous year. In 2009, the numbers

increased by more than 40%, reaching 9,614 victims and the following year records

when 15,273 were killed. Lastly, drug-related organized crime was responsible for 47%

of all intended homicides happening throughout Mexico. Homicides generally do occur

mainly alongside the border and US-Mexico crossing points the most profitable part of

drug trafficking business chain. 43 Ibid.; 44 Kellner and Piptone, Inside Mexico's Drug War, World Policy Journal, (The MIT Press, 2010),33-34

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45

Since violence has taken over most of Mexico, groups of Mexicans have tried to

stand up to the violence through “peaceful tactics.” In 2009, a 17 year old Mormon, Erik

La Baron was kidnapped by a group of armed kidnappers, in Galena in the state of

Chihuahua. The kidnappers demanded a one million dollar kidnap ransom. At the time

it was actually the eleventh Mormon kidnapping in eight months. The community had

only about 1,000 members, was well off, and therefore turned into a target.46

Violence has spread inevitably throughout the country because violence is an

“inherent feature of the trade an illicit drugs.” However, the violence associated with

Mexico’s drug trafficking organizations (DTO) s become increasingly ruthless. The

violent tactics include, mass killings, torture such as the dismemberment of body parts,

as well as the extreme use of car bombs. Analysts show that since 2006, 60,000

45 Matthew Hall, Emily Greenman and George Farkas Legal Status and Wage Disparities for Mexican Immigrants, Social Forces, (Oxford University Press, 2010), 546 Ibid.;

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homicides can be linked to organized crime, which in 2012 had reached an ultimate

plateau by the end of the presidency of Caledron (2006-2012). During those six years,

DTOs formed new criminal law organizations. Many DTOs and criminal gangs

operating in Mexico have “diversified” into other illegal activities such as extortion,

kidnapping, and oil theft and now pose a multi-faceted organized criminal challenge to

governance in Mexico.47

Mexico’s brutal violent drug trafficking-related violence has included more

than1,300 beheadings, public hanging of corpses, killing of innocent bystanders, car

bombs, torture, and assassination of numerous journalists and government officials. In

March 2012, head of the U.S. Northern Command, General Charles Jacoby, testified to

the Senate Armed Services Committee that Mexico had at that time succeeded in

capturing or killing 22 out of 37 of the Mexican government’s most wanted drug

traffickers48. Jacoby noted their removal had not had “any appreciable positive effect” in

reducing the violence, which continued to climb in 2011. At the end of President

Caldeon’s term in late 2012, several observers maintained that between 47,000 to

65,000 organized crime-related killings had occurred during his tenure depending on the

source cited, roughly 10,000 such murders a year.49

Studies have been conducted in the United States, as some Americans try to get

to the bottom of some issues in Mexico. Studies conducted at the Trans Border

Institute (TBI) at the University of San Diego have also began to report total intentional

homicides. These studies were drawn from Mexican government agencies, and

47 Beittel June, Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the Violence, Analyst in Latin American Affairs, (Congressional Research Service, 2013), 348 Ibid.; 349 Ibid.; 2

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concluded that between 120,000 to 125,000 people were killed, all killed in a homicides

during Caledron’s presidency. However, at the end the end of President Calderón’s

term in late 2012, several observers maintained that between 47,000 to 65,000

organized crime-related killings had occurred during his tenure roughly 10,000 murders

happened a year, and throughout Caledron’s presidency, between 120,000 to 125,000

people were killed, al homicides. 50

Homicides that are related to drug-trafficking operations in Mexico have

increased by exploring the devices through which this type of violence tends to

increase. Thus, studies have shown that drug-related violence can be understood as

the result of both, “homicides caused by traffickers whom are battling to take control of a

competitive market” as well as “casualties and arrests generated by law enforcement

operations against traffickers.” Nevertheless, violence interactions have caused Mexico

to be locked into a “self-reinforcing violent equilibrium.” 51

The wave of drug-related violence, which hit Mexico from December 2006 to

June 2010, which caused 41,648 killings have been officially linked to drug trafficking

organizations. It was ultimately a dramatic increase from all previous years, from 2001–

2006 when only 8,901 killings were linked to organized crime. In 2010, drug-related

homicides reached high numbers when it hit the figures of 15,273 victims, making

organized crime officially responsible for 45 % of all intended homicides in the country.

Thus, this resulted in Mexican cities, such as Ciudad Juárez, which is a trans-shipment

point for the introduction of cocaine into the US, to increase homicide rates from 216

50 Ibid.; 2-351 Ibid;, 5

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victims per 100,000 inhabitants in 2010. Studies show that these rates can be

compared to death tolls of those in war zones. 52

The drug-related violence in Mexico grew rapidly compared to other countries

due to “a self-reinforcing violent equilibrium caused by competition and enforcement.”

53 There are two variables that have helped aide this problem: an emergence of battle

over region, what gangs refer to as “competition,” as well as law enforcement when the

illegal drug industry changed from being “oligopolistic,” such as when a drug

organization goes from controlling only a single region to becoming competitive. Thus,

drug organizations refer to the term “competition” as two or more drug organizations

distributing and being present in one single region. Drug trafficking groups do not like

sharing regions, as it does have an effect, which includes, corruption, reduces the share

of the local market that it can supply throughout, and makes production inputs

uncommon. Competition also reduces the ability of the original criminal organization to

sell protection and rights within the region. Nonetheless, violence increases when a

new organization tries to overcome the region of another, or when an organization

divides into two which causes internal confrontation.54

Nonetheless, with almost 41,648 drug-related homicides in the country in

4 and 1/2 years Mexico has become even more dangerous than it once was. Cities

located close to the United States border have experienced an increase in violence that

transformed them into war zones not only Cuidad Juarez, but in Michoacán,

Guanajuato, and Guerrero as well. Since the country is indeed a huge supplier of drugs

52 Ibid., 3-453 Ibid;, 1054 Ibid.; 144

22

to the United States had once filled a “non-violent role” now are all drug-related crimes.

Thus, drug related crimes resulted when illegal markets became more “competitive,”

resulting in a change in Mexico’s drug-trafficking industry, which lacked a central

enforcement agency to deal with these changes, which led to violence “erupted.”55

Nonetheless, extortion has also taken over along with homicide. In the beginning

extortion was once used by criminals to target to form illegal businesses, such as

prostitution rings and casinos, industries. However, soon the extortion of business then

extended into the legal world. Some businessmen north of Mexico are part of the

association called “The Zeta Killers,” which refer the gang group the Zetas. The Zetas

Killers have assassinated hundreds of Zetas members. Zeta’s members’ body parts

have been found and have been regularly appeared around Mexico, such as Boca del

Rio, Benito Juarez, and Celaya. There are signs and messages along the streets that

read: “We are the new group of The Zeta Killers and we are against kidnapping and

extortion, and we will fight against them in all the states for a cleaner Mexico.” 56

During Caledon ‘s six years of presidency, all the brutal crimes carried out by not

only the drug gangs but by the DTOs also included attacks on drug rehabilitation

centers, they attacked parties of young people, firebombed a casino in Monterrey, killed

52 patrons and employees, and began targeting Mexican journalists and media

workers. After the Caledron administration, the government had dramatic successes in

capturing and arresting drug leaders. Thus, with 37 most wanted cartel leaders that

Mexico’s government identified in 2009, 25 were either captured or killed during the

course of President Calderon’s term in office. Nonetheless, there was an increasingly 55 Ibid.; 15356 Ibid.; 6

23

close collaboration between Mexico and the United States 2007 and 2012 Mexico.

Mexico later which then later extradited the issue to their neighbor the United States a

reported 587 suspects wanted on charges in the United States, most of them for drug

trafficking and related crimes. 57

The Mexican drug trafficking has had other effects, which has affected the US

Mexican relationships. In the recent years, research has shown that Mexican cities have

been “depopulating.” Most of the migration has been coming prominently from the US-

Mexican border, since acquiring residency is easier. Usually border cities tend to lose

an average of 35,255 inhabitants, while non-border counties tended to gain an average

of 1,297.86 inhabitants. In the last few years an estimated 8,103.63 people left

unexpectedly out of Mexico and moved into the United States due to what was

happening in Mexico.58

Migration, once see as seen as something positive wave during the industrial

revolution began to change with the increase Mexican immigration into the United

States, which has resulted in problems between the two countries. The issues that lay

between these parties include immigration, narcotics, and smuggling and

NAFTA/Tratado de Libre Comercio related trade issues explain the contemporary

political and media focus on the border; the problems between the two countries

“dominate” and stand on both sides. 59

57 Beittel June, Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the Violence, Analyst in Latin American Affairs, (Congressional Research Service, 2013), 1658 Ibid;. 59 Bersin Alan, Stanford Law Review, El Tercer País: Reinventing the U. S./Mexico Border, (Standford Law Review, 1996), 1413

24

Since most migration has come from border cities, such as Juarez, which lost

150.36 thousand inhabitants–about 11% of its population, other neighboring cities, with

considerably high violence levels like cities, such as Tijuana, Reynosa, and Matamoros

have lost between 6%, 9% and 4% of their population during the same period. Other

cities, such as Praxedis de Guerrero, Mier and Guadalupe have faced expected

unexpected outflows of more than 25% of their whole population. However, it is not

exactly known where all these people have migrated and relocated. Middle and upper

class Mexicans, whom live on the border is quite strong and rooted in historically

important but informal agreements. Thus, many bordering cities have divided

themselves and facilitated transportation between border-city inhabitants. Thus, there

were bordering cities have given “day border passes,” which is a form of a one-day visa

to Mexican border inhabitants that allow them to cross into the US without a formal visa

or passport. 60

The United States has not been the only place where Mexicans have relocated;

they have also gone to other cities within the country, such as Acapulco, Chimalhuacan

and Tlajomulco. Tlajomulco grew about 30% more than population predictions had

accounted for, Juarez and Bahia de Banderas also grew in more than 18%. Results

show Mexico’s migration flows are being driven by security concerns rather those than

by traditional economic variables. 61

The research project that was conducted to analysis that effects of drug-

trafficking especially on migration was called CONAPO, which by Mexico’s National

Population Council. CONAPO conducts research every year, they predicted county-60 Ibid.; 861 Ibid.; 9

25

level population figures considering demographic changes and expected immigration

outflows. CONAPO has also shown how important migration outflows to the US are as

predictors of population figures. Nonetheless, they use a very “sophisticated” method in

order to predict the total number of Mexicans that will change their residency to the U.S.

Thus, these predictions also take into account the economic conditions of both the

United States and Mexico; they look into surveys, polls, previous census figures, and

panel studies.62

However, looking at traditional economic explanations of migration flows, in

which the expected signs and are significant in all outflows specifications. It also

showed there was an increase of one point in employment rates or in the number of

college degrees per 100,000 inhabitants reduces migration outflows in 0.01 and 0.11

per 100,000 inhabitants. Nevertheless, neither employment nor education is

significantly correlated with migration inflows. Usually when deciding where to relocate

Mexicans do not go to cities with higher levels of education or lower unemployment.

Finally, CONAPO had at times faced some problems when measuring population flows

in some places more than others. 63

Some call the cause of migration as a “phenomenon,” as violence does indeed

create unexpected migration flows and refugees. In Mexico it was more of political or

social concerns that drove most migration decisions, rather than economic reasons.

Since there has been an increase on drug-related violence within Mexico, it has

changed the migration dynamics in the country. The average number of Mexican

migration that has occurred because of the drug violence is an estimated 230,000, who 62 Ibid.; 963 Ibid.; 9-10

26

have moved out of the violent cities, 115,000 of them to relocate at the US. However,

many do claim that the number may be underestimated as it does not account for

Mexicans who leave on a temporary basis, checking in at US hotels for short periods of

time, “to rest from the constant violence.” 64

The most shocking case would have to be the case of drug-violence migration

that has come about out of Juarez, Chihuahua, and its US-city counterpart, El Paso,

Texas. This migration epidemic has had impacts on the Mexican outflow, as they have

felt with such strength in El Paso that some have even claimed that “a sort of ’Little

Juarez, comparing Miami to “Little Havana.” Thus, all this migration has significantly

changed housing, schooling, business associations, and many other public entities. 65

Contraband has influenced Mexican culture as result as well, including gender

discrimination, as well “corridos,” which are Mexican ballads that record events and

subjects, including state-controlled records. These ballads have turned into

narcocorridos, a new sub-genre. These ballads do at times maintain“shady” and violent

relationships with the narcoculture and journalists. However, A “corrido actually does

offers a counter of “official history.” Many believe there has been a loss of journalistic

integrity, which has then led to a corrido being a representation of “pura vida,” meaning

pure life. 66 The group sang about gunfights with police officials- corruption, retribution,

and violence, and machismo. The group is seen as a modern story-teller of what is

happened and is happening. Many do believe that indeed corridos are a link between

64 Ibid.; 15-665 Ibid; 1666 Ramírez-Pimienta Juan Carlos and Villalobos Jose Pablo, Memory and Nation in Contemporary Mexico, "Corridos" and "la Pura Verdad": Myths and Realities of the Mexican Ballad, (The Johns Hopkins University Press on behalf of The South Central Modern Language Association, 2004), 130-131

27

the Mexican people, their culture, history, and what is occurring in their soil. In a video

that explain what a corrido is, a dark screen is shown, where the voices of two

anonymous men is heard, they state:

“I like corridos because they are the real deeds of our people.”

“Yes I like them too because they are the pure truth.” 67

Mexico also faces another issue known as, “Narco-propaganda,” which also

began to take major effect during President’s Caledron’s bloody six years. Narco-

propaganda is known as “a distinctive form of communication and discourse,” used

within the Mexican cartel culture. 68 Mexican cartels use this ideology as a crucial

format of controlling Mexico. It can be said that is very similar to the tactics used by

Middle Eastern terrorists groups. Narco- propaganda is geared and usually used as

cyber-communication. Narco-propaganda is not a political ideology; however some

cartels such as La Familia Michoacana, the Gulf Cartel, the Beltrán Leyva Cartel, and

the Zetas have documented manuals and go as far as military training members.

Today, narco-propaganda has become “the main face of public opposition to the

government today.” 69

Mexican organized groups threaten the national government. However, they do

originate from the roots of the Mexican government and find their way to corrupt the

state. Unfortunately, the government is not the victim of these groups it’s the Mexican

people. These groups have dispersed themselves throughout all local towns of the

country, with authorities not doing anything to stop them. These authorities have sat

67 Sierra Ramiro, Los Corridos Prohibidos, Los Tigees Del Norte, © 1989, by Fanovisa68 Campell Howard, Narco-Propaganda in the Mexican “Drug War,” An Anthropological Perspective, (Jourmal Citation Report, 2013)69 Ibid.;

28

back and watched these organized groups participate in abusing human rights,

completed drug deals, extortion, kidnapping, robbery, and murder. Thus, as the powers

of these cartels grow, they gain more and more power to control and overpower the

state officials. In cities such as, Tamaulipas, Veracruz, Michoacán, Chihuahua,

Durango, Sinaloa, and Guerrero, cartels act as the main political party. Some cartels

have so much power they are able to control the production and distribution illicit drugs

across the Mexican/US border, control the traffic of undocumented immigrants,

prostitutes, counterfeit DVDs and music CDs and other illegal “pirated” materials, and

even Pemex gasoline, as well as extortion, carjacking, and kidnapping. Lastly, in

Coahuila, the Zetas run and operate large grocery stores made available to the public.70

In areas such as Cuidad Juarez, completely ran by cartels and “devastated” by

organized crime, the local newspaper publishes editorials to the head of cartels fighting

to control the city. Thus, as these cartels have gained such a political and economic

power, they are seen as the city’s political force, and with that the organized groups also

holding free range to broadcast their ideologies to recruit new members, it makes things

easier for them. Narco-propaganda has full consequences as it captivates “multiple

audiences that include rival cartels, opponents and allies within law enforcement, the

military and the government, potentially disloyal cartel members, the general public, and

even the U.S. government.” 71

A decade after the “war on drugs” was declared the consumption has even

grown into a bigger problem. Today it is even greater problem than when it originally

originated. The Mexican government has stated they made a federal attempt to arrest 70 Ibid,; 71 Ibid.;

29

some of the major cartel groups in the last few years. There were law enforcement

actions on more than 2,600 members of the major drug cartel since December of 2006.

Analysis showed that the major number of arrests came from the Gulf-Zeta cartel, with

44 percent of defendants coming from them.

72

The drug world is not only a man’s world, as women drug smugglers have

increased dramatically in the recent years, with such an increase in numbers their

relationships with men have changed, as well as their positions in society. Most of the

women’s’ involvement in drug smuggling were caused by both economic and cultural

factors. However, there are different levels of female drug smugglers, which usually

depend on the woman’s social position and her place within the drug organization she is

a part of. Women drug smugglers who hold high-levels usually are attracted to the

power of drug trafficking and sometimes are able to “achieve an independence from

72 Burrnet and Penolza, Mexico Seems To Favor Sinaloa Cartel In Drug War, Mexico’s Drug Cartel Territory, (NPR, 2010),

30

male dominance.” Middle level women involved in drug trafficking usually have less

freedom from men; however, they can sometimes “manipulate” some gender

stereotypes to their own advantage in the drug smuggling world. Lastly, there are low

level mules; these mules usually perform the traditional roles of drug smugglers. 73

However, they receive less economic benefits as well as power; there are some

cases where there they do receive some forms of male independence. Nevertheless,

drug smuggling involving women causes female victimization, especially regarding low

and middle levels of classes of women, causing huge problems in cities in Cuidad

Juarez. Today woman play “key roles” in drug trafficking, women provide housing, they

are both buyers and sellers of houses, and have changed the “models of drug

trafficking.” Finally, these women have also been affected and victimized by these

crimes.74

In both the United States and Mexico the word “terrorists” have been used. Are

members of drug cartels terrorists? It is said that international trade in illicit drug does

indeed help to fuel terrorism. Terrorists groups have increasingly involved themselves

illegal drug trade and use drug revenues to expand their own activities. Thus, as drug

money increases, it allows these crime organized groups to be able to purchase

weapons, and equipment; it allows them to be able to recruit more members. It allows

terrorists groups, to “thrive” in politically disabled countries because of drug trade. 75

73 Campbell Howard, Female Drug Smugglers on the U-S.-Mexico Border: Gender, Crime, and Empowerment Howard Campbell, Anthropological Quarterly, (The George Washington University Institute for Ethnographic Research, 2008), 233-35

74 Ibid.; 75 Piazza James, The illicit drug trade, counternarcotics strategies and terrorism, Public Choice, (Springer, 2011) 296-97

31

These “terrorist” cannot be fought with the corruption that ties corruption and

government however. According to a media outlet, some high officers, the Salinas

administrations gave also been involved with drug traffickers, which it also included the

Salinas chief of staff Jose Cordoba, as well as his brother, Raul Salinas de Gotari.

Some American newspapers also suggested that some members of the Zedillo cabinet,

such secretary of defense, General Enrique Cervantes, as well as the private secretary

of the president, Liebano Saenz have been linked to drug traffickers as well. The

governors of the states of Sonora, and Moneros have also been linked to drug

trafficking in the past; as well presidential candidates have been involved with these

organized crime organizations. Nonetheless, no legal actions have been taken against

these men, it is said that “Mexican drug traffickers pose a hug threat to the Mexican’s

state’s ability to govern.” Although not all necessarily true, cartels do take power in a

majority of state regulated office, they govern the state.76

However, another pre-existing notion of the cartels influence on government

officials includes their ability to escape high security prisons. Before Joauqin “El Chapo”

Guzman had been captured in 2014, he had been previously captured in 2014. The

level of corruption that took place during his corruption was acknowledged by Mexico’s

Secretary of Public of Security Jorge Tello Peon. Drug money in political campaigns has

also been extremely popular. However, there is no clear evidence, which links these

two, there is no deny the influence political campaigns have had by them.77

76 Chabat Jorge, Mexico's War on Drugs: No Margin for Maneuver, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, (Cross-National Drug Policy, 2002) 138-3977 Ibid,; 139

32

The Mexican government claims they have been using human resources, as well

as economic resources to change this situation. They have been using the Federal

Judicial Police for years now, which have resulted in very disappointing results.

Corruption has also been extremely tied with national police, as they have also been

called “inefficient.” Lastly, the Mexican federal armies are the only federal officials who

have been collaborating to stop this ongoing issue with drug traffickers. The Mexican

federal armies have been getting work done, which is exactly why they were sent in the

“eradication” of illicit drugs. They have collaborated in the arrest of many drug

traffickers, although many people have mixed feelings on the army, and what they have

done over the past few years, they could possibly be a representation of a “change” in

Mexico and their counter efforts on their war on drugs. 78

Although many believe that Mexico has not been putting enough to fight

this issue, including the United States, this is not case. The Mexican government has

actually been dedicating large amount of money to this cause. In 1991, they dedicated

the first large amount of sum, an estimated 100 million US dollars. By 1994, Mexico had

spent 500 million US dollars on this cause. However, by 1997, the Mexican peso had

been devaluated, and by 1997, it was said that the budget for their war on drugs was at

an estimated one million dollars. Nevertheless, by the end of 1998, the antidrug money

represented one-third of the total budget of Mexico and the budget of the attorney

general’s office. 79

78 Ibid.; 139-140

79 Ibid; 141

33

However, despite all these effects from Mexico and some aide from the United

States the country is still suffering largely from both corruption and influences from drug

cartels. Many believe they are too weak to capture other powerful drug lords, and even

corrupt officers. Nevertheless, the inability to be able to stop many drug traffickers from

escaping prison and also brining many through trial, only to declare them “innocent.”

These cases show how hard it really has been over the past few decades for Mexico to

not only improve, but as well as maintain their performance of law enforcements

institutions throughout Mexico. However, it is important to note, the Mexican’s

government on fighting drugs, as well as the corruption abilities these crime organized

members do have over everyone in the country, the fear in Mexico is great, and there is

no true support coming from anywhere, not the Mexican government, nor the US

government, nor the international government. 80

In reality, drugs do not actually represent a true threat in terms of

consumption in domestic use in Mexico. What truly affects the Mexican people is the

corruption and violence that are tires with the drug world. However, the real issue is

Mexico’s inability to protect their own citizen, as well as the United States aide in this

problem, as high consumer of Mexican drugs. In retrospective what really needs to

happen is a better collaboration between the two nations, in order to strengthen their

alliance, and rid of the problem once and for all. If this problem can be dealt with in the

correct way, drugs can may become a “health as well as a public security problem that

does not challenge Mexico’s governance.” 81

80 Ibid.; 145 81 Ibid.; 146

34

Mexico’s war on drugs has not been nor will it ever be Mexico’s war on drugs. It

must be noted from the beginning where it all began, the rise of American demand

coming in from the United States in the early 1920’s. This demand has never stopped

growing. It is easy to say the problem has only escalated with time. Each decade as

the demand from the United States grows, the corruption in Mexico grows, as well as

the overall violence grows, which directly affects Mexico and its people. The effects the

Mexican cartel has had on both Mexican and US relationships have been great,

tensions have risen, the two nations cannot seem to meet eye to key on topic and that

is because it is evident that both know this is an American problem as well. Although

the United States has aided finances to Mexico, that is the least they can do help them

combat the problem they have help to form. Mexico’s war on drugs is also the United

States war on drugs, and war will not end until the US stop waging Mexico, stops

demanding drugs, and both nations can come to terms and deal with this issue on both

sides of the border.

35

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