Final Report Structural Review, Oct. 19, 2011

Embed Size (px)

Citation preview

  • 8/20/2019 Final Report Structural Review, Oct. 19, 2011

    1/92

     A FRAMEWORK FOR RESULTS

    Systemic and Structural Reform

    Government of Nunavut

  • 8/20/2019 Final Report Structural Review, Oct. 19, 2011

    2/92

    TABLE OF CONTENTS

    Execut ive Summary………………………………………………………….. I-IX

    1. Introduct ion………………………………………………………………….… 1

    2. Methodology…………………………………………………………………... 1

    3. The Current Structure Of Government – How It evolved……………… 2

     A) The Or ig inal Structure……………………………………………….. 2B) The Current Structure………………………………………………... 4

    C) Lessons Learned……………………………………………………... 4

    4. Why Change The Structure Of Government?........................................ 5

     A) Typical Drivers Of Struc tural Change……………………………. 5B) Practices to Avoid………………………………………………….….. 5C) Achieving Tamapta Priori ties ……………………………………….. 6

    5. The Financial Context…………………………………………………………. 6

     A) Planning for sustainabil it y…………………………………………… 7B) The Financial Situation in Plain Language……………………….. 7C) The Question of Borrowing Capacity……………………………... 9D) The Impl icat ions of Reaching the Debt Ceiling………………….. 10E) Are Simple Solut ions Possible?.................................................... 10

    6. What We Were Told…………………………………………………………... 11

    7. Auditor General’s Concerns………………………………………………… 12

  • 8/20/2019 Final Report Structural Review, Oct. 19, 2011

    3/92

    TABLE OF CONTENTS

    9. Consis tent Public Communications – An Urgent Necessi ty…………… 20

    10. Human Resource Capacity – The Root of the Problem…………………. 21

     A) The Vacancy Rate………………………………………………..…….. 22B) Lack of Reliable Information………………………………..………… 22

    11. Are Structural Changes Needed?…………………………………………… 24

    Overview………………………………………………………………………… 24

     A) Health and Social Services – Part of a Larger Network………… 25a) HSS - The Current Structure………………………………… 26b) Qikiqtani General Hospital…………………………………… 26c) Social Services………………………………………………… 27

    B) Human Resources…………………………………………………….. 28a) Labour Relations…………………………………………….... 29b) Recrui tment……………………………………………………. 29c) Job Evaluation………………................................................ 29d) Organization Design…………………………………………… 30

    C) Executive and Intergovernmental Affairs……………………….… 31

    a) Cabinet Office…………………………………………………… 31b) The Social Advocacy Divis ion………………………….…… 32c) The Energy Policy Division & Executive Director URRC. 32d) Statistics Division Pangnirtung…………………………….. 32

  • 8/20/2019 Final Report Structural Review, Oct. 19, 2011

    4/92

    TABLE OF CONTENTS

    12. Recommendations……………………………………………………………. 36

     A) Foundational Requi rements…………………………………………. 36

    a) Enabling Legislation………………………………………….. 37b) Enabling Policy………………………………………………… 37c) Letters of Expectation…………………………………………. 38

    B) Structural Recommendations……………………………….….….. 39

    a) Guiding Principles………………………………………….…. 39b) Departmental Restructuring………………………………… 39

    i) Department of Family and Cultural Services……. 40ii) Human Resources…………………………………….. 41ii i) Finance…………………………………………………. 43iv) Executive and Intergovernmental Affairs…………. 44v) Department of Health…………………………………. 46

    C) Systemic Change…………………………………………………….. 46

    a) Communicat ions……………………………………………… 46b) Executive Decision Making…………………………………. 47c) Human Resource Processes……………………………….. 47d) Government Staff Housing…………………………………. 47

    e) Management Report ing……………………………………… 48f) Spending Database…………………………………………… 48g) Automated Budgeting System ………………………………. 48h) Leave Management…………………………………………… 48

  • 8/20/2019 Final Report Structural Review, Oct. 19, 2011

    5/92

    TABLE OF CONTENTS

    14. Implementation………………………………………………………………… 53

    15. Conclus ion……………………………………………………………………… 53

    16. List of Recommendations………………………………………………..…. 55

     APPENDICES

     APPENDIX “ A” Terms of Reference APPENDIX “ B” Li terature Review

     APPENDIX “ C” Project Contacts APPENDIX “ D” Establishment Policy - Finance APPENDIX “ E” Streamlining of the Staffing Process APPENDIX “ F” Implementation Plan

  • 8/20/2019 Final Report Structural Review, Oct. 19, 2011

    6/92

      Systemic and Structural ReformEXECUTIVE SUMMARY

    I. INTRODUCTION

    In his 2011/12 budget address, the Honourable Keith Peterson, the Minister of Financeraised the question of whether the Government should reassess its current structure bysaying “I suggest that we take a thoughtful look at the number of departments andagencies, their mandates, and organizational designs. We should ask whether thecurrent government structure is appropriate, considering our priorities and goals.”

    The Department of Executive and Intergovernmental Affairs subsequently contracted

    with Millenium Partners in June 2011 to conduct the review, so that Minister Peterson’scommitment could be fulfilled.

    II. METHODS 

    The project began with a literature review to understand the context and to be sure thatany recommendations benefited from a clear understanding of the realities of theGovernment of Nunavut and its needs. A variety of internal documents were reviewedincluding the government’s administration manual, the relevant legislation, all relevantpolicies, Government strategy documents and the reports of the Auditor General ofCanada. Research was also completed to review organizational structures ofgovernments across Canada to ensure that the resulting recommendations benefitedfrom lessons learned in other jurisdictions.

    Interviews were conducted with all Deputy Ministers, a variety of government staff and

    politicians to gather their views on the issues associated with the current governmentstructure and systems. The Minister of Finance also wrote to MLAs asking them toprovide input if they felt change was needed.

  • 8/20/2019 Final Report Structural Review, Oct. 19, 2011

    7/92

      Systemic and Structural ReformEXECUTIVE SUMMARY

    since grown to over 4000 positions.

    Major changes were made in the structure at the beginning of 2004 to bring the currentorganizational structure into being. However, there is no record of the rationale forthose decisions so it is difficult to determine what prompted the changes and whetherthe desired outcomes were achieved.

    IV. WHAT WE WERE TOLD 

    There was no reluctance on the part of those who were interviewed to discuss the state

    of the Government and the potential need for change. The comments received duringthis phase of the project were constructive and aimed at making the organization moreproductive.

    There were many suggestions for organizational change, but suggestions werebalanced by a caution that the Government cannot handle huge amounts of change in ashort period of time. It was emphasized that recommendations must be practical andshouldn’t cripple the organization by diverting many program staff to bureaucraticprocesses. Elected officials were concerned about whether the Government’s currentstructure is the best way to deliver programs and services in communities.

    Comments were not limited to structural change. Respondents also highlighted theproblems with existing information, decision making and support systems and identifiedmany of these as barriers to success.

    V. WHAT WE FOUND 

    i) The Fundamental Issues

  • 8/20/2019 Final Report Structural Review, Oct. 19, 2011

    8/92

      Systemic and Structural ReformEXECUTIVE SUMMARY

    While the Government of Nunavut can solve some of its financial problems

    simply through spending restraint, major efforts are still required to makeoperations sustainable. Nunavut’s infrastructure shortfall will inevitably requiremajor stimulus. It will not be possible to continue to limit capital spending tobalance the budget. Continued population growth and growth in demand forprograms and services will place additional strain on the budget.

    Unfortunately, there is a serious lack of meaningful program and financialinformation to allow for effective decision making when those difficult decisions

    have to be made. The organization also has an extremely high historicalvacancy rate. To complicate matters further, many employees currently occupypositions for which they do not have the required skills. This serious capacityshortfall is common to all organizations in Nunavut and requires the Governmentto take a strategic and holistic approach to solving the problem in the bestinterests of all the parties.

    ii) Structural Problems Requiring Solutions 

    The analysis, supported by the recent reports of the Auditor General of Canada,revealed that there are serious problems with the ability of the organization tofulfill statutory obligations in Children and Family Services. The Government hasalso experienced major difficulties in attracting and retaining public servants. Thiscapacity shortfall has had a detrimental effect on the organization as well as thepublic it serves. These are serious problems and must be the focus of structural

    solutions. However, the solutions must be implemented in a strategic fashionand should, therefore, involve changes in a variety of departments.

    The Social Services Branch of Health and Social Services does not receive the

  • 8/20/2019 Final Report Structural Review, Oct. 19, 2011

    9/92

      Systemic and Structural ReformEXECUTIVE SUMMARY

    is made, the functions that make up the Department are essential to the successof the Government and they cannot be permitted to fail.

    The Department of   Executive and Intergovernmental Affairs has taken onsome functions that properly belong in other departments. These extraneousfunctions have detracted from the organization’s ability to carry out its coremission. Some critical functions of EIA (Statistics Bureau/Evaluation) are locatedin communities outside the capital where it is not possible for them to succeed.

     Additional analytical resources are needed to effectively support Cabinet. Thiswould free the Policy and Evaluation Division from Cabinet support and allow

    them to coordinate strategic planning and establish the framework forgovernment-wide program evaluation.

     Additional resources are also needed in the Office of the Premier to ensure thereare enough resources for day to day political advice and for the satisfactoryanalysis of the political implications of strategic directions. It will also benecessary to provide additional resources to ensure sound political analysis andadvice with regard to advancing the relationship between the Government ofNunavut and the Government of Canada.

    The Department of  Finance needs additional resources to provide more effectiveanalytical support to the Financial Management Board. This will free theExpenditure Management Branch from FMB support responsibilities to allowthem to effectively coordinate government-wide budgeting and to carry out theanalytical work needed to support financial planning.

    The Department of Culture Language Elders and Youth   currently includesfunctions that are not a natural fit with its mandate. With the approval oflanguage protection legislation, the Department has established a foundation for

  • 8/20/2019 Final Report Structural Review, Oct. 19, 2011

    10/92

      Systemic and Structural ReformEXECUTIVE SUMMARY

    department where single window access to a full range of social and incomesupport programs is possible.

    iii) Systemic Problems 

     A wide range of systemic issues were identified that must be resolved if thegovernment is to function effectively:

      There is no specific authority in legislation for the Executive toestablish/disestablish departments; 

      Executive Council are often involved in making decisions that are processrather than policy oriented. This increases volumes and slows downdecision making; 

      Human resource support systems in recruitment and job evaluation act asbarriers to success; 

      Government does not have an overall communications strategy. Publicinformation is hard to access; 

      The Government suffers from a serious human resource capacity shortfall

    and there is no cohesive strategy to improve it; 

      The Government lacks credible, reliable and easily accessible informationon program results and spending. The planning culture in the organizationneeds major improvement. 

    VI. WHAT WE RECOMMEND 

    Our structural recommendations have been developed to deal with the criticalorganizational design needs of the organization. That is not to say that other changesare not needed. However, the Government cannot deal with an organization widerestructuring at this time. These proposals can be implemented as they are proposed,

  • 8/20/2019 Final Report Structural Review, Oct. 19, 2011

    11/92

      Systemic and Structural ReformEXECUTIVE SUMMARY

    ii) Structural

    The Government would continue to consist of 10 departments. In spite of calls forits dissolution, Human Resources would be retained as a separate departmentwith some of its functions transferred to Finance and a major reform of residualfunctions. The Departments of Health and Social Services, and Education wouldbe streamlined to enable them to concentrate on their primary mandates.

    The Departments of Economic Development and Transportation, and Communityand Government Services would be the recipients of program transfers from

    other departments that are proposed for transformation. The majortransformative initiative would be the creation of a department of Family andCultural Services. Over 300 positions would be directly affected by theserecommendations. Here are some of the details of the structuralrecommendations:

    a) Family and Cultural Services 

    This department would bring together social programs from HSS and avariety of other departments along with income support functions fromEducation. The transformed department would also include the coreprograms from CLEY after the Official Languages Division is transferred toEIA and the Public Libraries and Sport and Recreation Divisions aretransferred to CGS.

    b) Executive and Intergovernmental Affairs

     At least two additional positions should be provided to the Office of thePremier to enable the Office to provide a satisfactory level of political

  • 8/20/2019 Final Report Structural Review, Oct. 19, 2011

    12/92

      Systemic and Structural ReformEXECUTIVE SUMMARY

    government-wide authority needed to implement the Inuit LanguageProtection Act.

    c) Finance

    The Finance Department would accept the transfer of the LabourRelations function from Human Resources as collective bargaining,collective agreement administration and HR information systems shouldbe under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Finance. A separate FMBSecretariat would be established to free up the Expenditure Management

    Division for budgeting and financial analysis.

    d) Health

    The Department of Health would be streamlined to deliver its health caremandate following the transfer of social services programs. The QikiqtaniGeneral Hospital should be placed at arms length from Government underthe direction of a Board of Management.

    e) Human Resources

    The Department of Human Resources would remain in its currentconfiguration with the exception of the Labour Relations function thatwould transfer to Finance. However, it would undergo a process of reformto streamline its key service functions resulting in simplified, more userfriendly processes that would improve the level of client service and getbetter results. This would require the hiring in some cases of specializedtalent in the critical areas of responsibility.

  • 8/20/2019 Final Report Structural Review, Oct. 19, 2011

    13/92

      Systemic and Structural ReformEXECUTIVE SUMMARY

    of a program performance measurement system aimed at helping to assess theperformance of programs compared to their expected results. Scheduled and

    consistent management reports should be provided to all departments to allowfor management decision making. These standard reports would include bothhuman resource and financial management information.

    The Government staff housing policy should be revised by the Nunavut HousingCorporation to include initiatives aimed at increasing home ownership andincreasing the supply of staff housing through the most cost effective methods.Finally, detailed recommendations have been made to address the human

    resource capacity problems. A structured process has been proposed forconcentrated recruitment initiatives, standardizing levels within job categories topromote consistency amongst similar occupational groups across government,and the design of standardized training programs to increase skill levels.

    VII. IMPLEMENTATION

    It will be important for the Government to implement any approved changes in a

    thoughtful and structured manner. Ideally, all the approved changes should be in placewith new structures fully operational by the end of the 2012 calendar year. The budgetsfor 20012/13 are already in the final stages of preparation. Therefore, it is not practicalto make the associated budget changes until after the current main estimatesdevelopment process is complete.

     Affected departments would have the remainder of the 2011/12 fiscal year to preparetheir new organization designs for Executive approval. It would then make sense toprovide these Departments with an interim supply of money (3 months) to enable themto restructure their budgets to conform to the new departmental designs. A detailedimplementation plan is shown in Appendix “F”.

  • 8/20/2019 Final Report Structural Review, Oct. 19, 2011

    14/92

      Systemic and Structural ReformEXECUTIVE SUMMARY

    staff to implement the reforms and to establish the systems needed to support effectivedecision making.

  • 8/20/2019 Final Report Structural Review, Oct. 19, 2011

    15/92

      Systemic and Structural Reform

    1. INTRODUCTION

    In his 2011/12 budget address, the Honourable Keith Peterson, the Minister of Financeraised the question of whether the Government should reassess its current structure bysaying “I suggest that we take a thoughtful look at the number of departments andagencies, their mandates, and organizational designs. We should ask whether thecurrent government structure is appropriate, considering our priorities and goals.”

    The Department of Executive and Intergovernmental Affairs subsequently contractedwith Millenium Partners in June 2011 to conduct the review, so that Minister Peterson’s

    commitment could be fulfilled. The review was designed to assess currentorganizational structures to determine whether alternatives might provide better results.

     As well, the contractor was asked to identify change opportunities with the potential toreduce costs. The full text of the Terms of Reference for the study is attached as

     Appendix “A”.

    It has also become clear that in order to avoid major cutbacks to essential programsand services, the Government must consider some alternatives to current work methods

    and organizational structures.

    2. METHODOLOGY

    The work on this project was overseen by a steering committee consisting of theMinister of Finance, the Deputy Minister of Finance and the Deputy Minister ofExecutive and Intergovernmental affairs. The steering committee met 4 times in Iqaluitto agree on objectives, approve work plans and review progress.

    The starting point for this project was a literature review to ensure that proposalsreflected the realities of Nunavut. A variety of internal documents were reviewed

  • 8/20/2019 Final Report Structural Review, Oct. 19, 2011

    16/92

      Systemic and Structural Reform

    proposals. A draft report was submitted in late September and the document wasfinalized on September 30 after taking steering committee feedback into account.

    3. THE CURRENT STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT - HOW IT EVOLVED

    The Government of Nunavut has a unique organizational structure. However, it wasinfluenced by the structure of the Government of the Northwest Territories and, to someextent, other governments across Canada. Many of the original departments wereidentical to those in the NWT, while others represent unique combinations of programsand functions.

     A) The Original Structure 

    The initial organization was recommended by the Nunavut Implementation Commission(NIC), in the reports entitled Footprints in the Snow and Footprints II. In a 1995 letterfrom the Chairman of NIC, John Amagoalik transmitted the action plan to the parties.One of the main elements of the plan was an organization design for the newgovernment. This was updated in 1996 after the decision was made to designate Iqaluit

    as the capital of Nunavut.

    Two of the key guiding principles in the recommended design were:

      The administrative structure of the Nunavut Government should be as simple aspossible in keeping with the relatively small population of Nunavut; 

      “Central Agency” type functions of the Nunavut Government should beconcentrated in the capital of Nunavut. 

    Initially, both the GNWT and DIAND contracted with Coopers & Lybrand to provideadvice on the projected cost of the proposed government in Nunavut. The consulting

  • 8/20/2019 Final Report Structural Review, Oct. 19, 2011

    17/92

      Systemic and Structural Reform

    For a period of time after 1999, the GN contracted with the NWT to manage somefunctions to give Nunavut the time needed to staff and implement home grown

    operations. The most notable examples of this were in the management of someelements of social housing and the provision of electrical power to Nunavut residents. Itis useful to give a brief overview of the original departmental structure so thatrecommendations for change can be understood in relation to the founding concepts:

    Executive Council of

    Nunavut

     

    Public Works

    Telecomm. &

    Technical Services

    Finance

    Education

    Sustainable

    Development

    Health & Social

    Services

    Commun. Gov’t

    Housing &

    Transportation

    Justice

    Human Resources

    Executive &

    Intergovernmental

     Affairs

     

    Culture Language

    Elders & Youth

    GOVERNMENT OF NUNAVUT Orig inal Structure 1999

    Figure 1  

    The Departments of Culture, Language Elders and Youth (CLEY), SustainableDevelopment (SD) and Community Government Housing and Transportation (CGHT)were interesting as they were unique in Canada. CLEY, in particular was notable. The

  • 8/20/2019 Final Report Structural Review, Oct. 19, 2011

    18/92

      Systemic and Structural Reform

    B) The Current Structure 

    The Government still has 10 departments as shown in figure 2 below, but theconfiguration of departments was changed in 2004/05. It has not been possible to locatea rationale for the changes that happened at that time, in spite of a thorough review ofavailable records. Therefore, it is not possible to determine whether the currentstructure has been successful in achieving the objectives of the decision makers of thetime. The following changes were made on April 1, 2004:

      The Sport and Recreation function in CGHT was transferred to CLEY along with

    The Public Library system from Education;  The Employee Housing function was transferred from CGHT to the Nunavut

    Housing Corporation;  The Transportation function was transferred to the new Department of Economic

    Development and Transportation. This followed the splitting of the Department ofSustainable Development into two separate departments;

      The Environmental protection, Wildlife Management, Fisheries and Parksfunctions in Sustainable Development were transferred to a new Department of

    the Environment:  Municipal and Community Affairs, and the functions of Public Works

    Telecommunications and Technical Services were combined in a newdepartment of Community and Government Services.

    THE CURRENT STRUCTURE Implemented Apri l 1, 2004

    Executive Council

  • 8/20/2019 Final Report Structural Review, Oct. 19, 2011

    19/92

      Systemic and Structural Reform

     Although decision makers assume the Premier has the authority to approve theestablishment or disestablishment of departments, there are no explicit provisions in

    Nunavut legislation to authorize this action. Simple legislative changes will resolve thatmatter and eliminate doubt.

    With minor exceptions, Nunavut legislation does not define the mandates ofdepartments or specify which minister has responsibility for administering legislation.The only documents that specifically outline the mandate of departments are thedepartmental business plans and budgets. This shortcoming could be resolved bydefining departmental mandates through policy. This would avoid confusion and specify

    accountability.

    4. WHY CHANGE THE STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT?

     A) Typical Drivers Of Structural Change

    The purpose of this review is to determine whether it is necessary to change existinggovernment structures to enable the organization to achieve the objectives of the 3 rd 

     Assembly, while being sufficiently adaptable to serve the needs of successorgovernments. This must be done within the context of the government’s Tamaptaobjectives, its continuing obligations for responsive public services and the capacity ofthe organization as it is currently structured, to achieve those objectives.

    Structural change is the tool of choice for governments across the country and aroundthe world to resolve systemic problems and signal change. Governments in allCanadian jurisdictions have been doing this since their inception and the changes havehad mixed results. We can learn from some of these initiatives and benefit from bestpractices across the country.

  • 8/20/2019 Final Report Structural Review, Oct. 19, 2011

    20/92

      Systemic and Structural Reform

    2. Lack of funding:  New departments are seldom allocated sufficient budgets tocover the set-up of corporate overhead costs;

    3. Overloaded staff: once departments are live, top officials and transition teamsfind themselves with a double workload, running day-to-day operations whilealso undertaking the strategic planning needed for new or reorganizeddepartments;

    4. Little central support:  The Cabinet office and the Treasury do not have theresources to provide effective support to new departments during the transition.

    The difficulties noted above are very similar to those experienced by the NunavutGovernment when the last round of structural changes were implemented in 2004.Fortunately, the 3rd  Assembly did not rush structural change and implement a newdesign before gaining an understanding of the complexities of GN operations. Almosttwo years of the current mandate are left to decide on the right structure and to fullyimplement it before the mandate ends.

    C) Achieving Tamapta Priori ties 

    The Government of Nunavut’s political priorities are described veryeffectively in Tamapta. These priorities are varied, and range fromimproving educational outcomes through poverty reduction toincreasing housing stocks and supporting sustainable economies.

    The Government has also identified five major priorities fromTamapta on which they will focus over the remainder of theirmandate:

    TAMAPTA PRIORITIES2009-2013

    - Improve education &training outcomes;- Reduce poverty;

    - Increase housingoptions;- Increase culture/artssupport;

  • 8/20/2019 Final Report Structural Review, Oct. 19, 2011

    21/92

      Systemic and Structural Reform

    considerations of affordability and sustainability. The design of the organization shouldpromote accountability, resulting in structures with good management controls and

    positive program results. What follows is an outline of the financial picture for Nunavut.This should be kept in mind when considering alternatives to the current structure.

     A) Planning For Sustainabil it y

    The Government of Nunavut is not alone in the struggle to deliver programs andservices with limited operating resources. All governments are examining currentspending patterns with a view towards identifying efficiencies and program reductions

    that will make their operations more sustainable. The Federal Government’s mediacommunications on the subject of Canada’s economy consistently reiterate theelimination of the national budget deficit as one of the key underpinnings for a strongeconomic recovery. Most analysts promote a planned approach utilizing a combinationof initiatives aimed at increasing revenues (taxes) and cutting costs.

    Nunavut faces many challenges in its movement towards affordability. Over 90% of GNrevenues flow from the Federal Government. However, with a limited population, an

    underdeveloped economy, and high rates of poverty, Nunavut cannot simply raise taxesto increase revenues. Nor can it significantly cut social programs given highunemployment rates and limited prospects for job growth in the short term.

    B) The Financial Situation in Plain Language Decision makers in Nunavut’s Legislative Assembly are presented with a sometimesconfusing array of financial documents when they are asked to vote for the GNoperating budget (main estimates) and to approve additional money throughout the yearwhen the original budget was insufficient (supplementary appropriations).

     A complete picture of the Government’s financial performance over the course of each

  • 8/20/2019 Final Report Structural Review, Oct. 19, 2011

    22/92

      Systemic and Structural Reform

    Source: GN Public Accounts  Figure 3

    This information is very misleading. It would appear that these major surpluses meanthe Government had more money than it needed to do the work. In fact, it only meansthat the government did not spend all the money that was voted (approved).

    When considering the real financial health of the government, it is more appropriate toassess how much money was available to spend (assets/revenues) compared to howmuch was actually spent or owed (liabilities) by year-end. In figure 4 below, you will

    see that the real financial picture is much less positive. For all three years there was, infact, a growing operating deficit.

    Fiscal Yr.Original BudgetCapital & O&M

    SupplementaryFunding

    Total approvedfunds Total Spending

    Surplus(Deficit)

    Nature ofSurplus

    2007/08 1,026,320$ 215,862$ 1,242,092$ 1,136,857$ 105,235$ 79% capital

    2008/09 1,134,369$ 257,483$ 1,391,852$ 1,278,563$ 113,289$ 73% capital

    2009/10 1,131,803$ 149,275$ 1,281,078$ 1,157,720$ 123,358$ 85% capital

    Accounting Surplus 2007/08 - 2009/10 (000's)

    Category 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10

    Financial Assets

    Cash 392,751$ 325,464$ 250,327$

    investments 14,395$ 14,917$ 15,541$

    Due from Federal Government 60,209$ 73,617$ 85,750$

    Other receivables 76,708$ 61,380$ 88,249$

    Inventories for resale 51,043$ 93,646$ 93,243$

    OPERATING DEFICIT (DEBT) 2007/08 - 2009/10 (000's)

  • 8/20/2019 Final Report Structural Review, Oct. 19, 2011

    23/92

      Systemic and Structural Reform

    The government’s cash position has declined dramatically over the three year periodfrom a total of $392,751,000 in 2007/08 to $250,327,000 on March 31, 2010. This is a

    reduction of $142 million, or 36% over the 3 year period. If historical spending patternscontinue, cash reserves will continually decline over the foreseeable future.

    C) The Question of Borrowing Capacity 

    The Government has a current debt ceiling of $200 million. As shown in figure 4 abovethe long term debt as of March 31, 2010 was $85.6 million. This does not mean that theGN is borrowing money. At this time, the makeup of the Government’s long term debt

    does not actually result from borrowing. Instead, it represents a guarantee of the longterm debt for the Qulliq Energy Corporation (QEC) and the NHC. There is also a smallgovernment mortgage. However, the $85.6 million figure for long term debt shown inthe public accounts is not complete. Other amounts must also be considered whenlooking at debt. Specifically, the QEC bank overdraft and Nunavut DevelopmentCorporation (NDC) credit facilities bring the total long term debt to $96.2 million. Wemust also add the maximum guarantee for QEC of 26.3 million. With these additions,the actual long term debt at March 31, 2010 was $122.6 million.

     As a result, on March 31, 2010, the GN had the ability to borrow $77.4 million beforereaching the current debt ceiling of $200 million. If historical spending patterns were tocontinue unabated, the cash reserves would be exhausted by the end of 2012/13. Atthat point, it would not be possible to follow past practice and use the reserves to paydown the deficit. In this scenario, it would be necessary to start borrowing to finance dayto day operations by the beginning of the 2013/14 fiscal year. As a result, the availableborrowing capacity would be used up at the very latest by March 31, 2014. If thishappens, the combination of loan and interest payments would continually erode theresources available for programs and services.

  • 8/20/2019 Final Report Structural Review, Oct. 19, 2011

    24/92

      Systemic and Structural Reform

    more likely that cuts to line departments such as Education and Health would beneeded as they represent approximately 45% of the entire budget.

    E) Are Simple Solutions Possible? 

    While the Government of Nunavut can solve some of its financial problems simplythrough spending restraint, major efforts are still required to make operationssustainable. Nunavut’s infrastructure shortfall will inevitably require major stimulus. Itwill not be possible to continue to limit capital spending to balance the budget.Continued population growth and growth in demand for programs and services will

    place additional strain on the budget.

     A comprehensive sustainability plan is needed to reduce expenditures to affordablelevels going forward.

    This review is not the best mechanism to recommend a sustainability plan. Such a planmust be done internally and hard, politically difficult choices have to be made. Theareas that have the most potential for significant savings are outlined below:

    Capital 

      Place tighter controls on the capital project management process to limit theproject overruns and attempt to bring projects in within budget;  

      Do not publish the capital funding allocated to each project in the capitalestimates. It encourages potential bidders to tailor submissions to the publishedceilings; 

      Consider the adoption of standard models for major building projects such asschools and for public housing. Nunavut’s current standards may beunaffordable for structures such as schools. Standard designs will not eliminate

  • 8/20/2019 Final Report Structural Review, Oct. 19, 2011

    25/92

      Systemic and Structural Reform

      In the end, options would be presented to Executive Council for their decision. Ifa program is to be reduced/eliminated, associated program staff would also be

    laid off. 

     A continuation of historical spending patterns will inevitably result in long termunsustainable debt. A gradual approach to restraint will provide the government withexperience in managing change and help avoid a situation where massive anddestabilizing cuts to programs and services become necessary.

    6. WHAT WE WERE TOLD

    In-depth discussions were held with all deputy ministers, some program and supportstaff, and those politicians who requested input. There was no reluctance on the part ofthose who were interviewed to discuss the state of the Government and the potentialneed for change. The comments received during this phase of the project wereconstructive and aimed at making the organization more productive.

    Deputy Ministers, in particular, had many suggestions for organizational change, but

    their comments were balanced by a caution that the Government cannot handle hugeamounts of change in a short period of time. They warned that recommendations mustbe practical and they shouldn’t cripple the organization by diverting many program staffto bureaucratic processes. Deputies want to avoid having staff tied up for months intime consuming amendments to organization charts and job description re-writing whenthey should be delivering programs and services.

    Comments were not limited to structural change. Deputy Ministers also highlighted theproblems they face with existing information, decision making and support systems andidentified many of these as barriers to success. As a result, this report is not restrictedto making structural change recommendations. It includes a range of recommendations

  • 8/20/2019 Final Report Structural Review, Oct. 19, 2011

    26/92

      Systemic and Structural Reform

      Cabinet and FMB decision making processes are too complicated. It would beuseful if more things could be decided by managers;

      The financial system makes us work too hard. There are few consistentmanagement reports and we have to do too many things by hand;   We need an automated budgeting system and an automated leave management

    system, otherwise it all has to be done by hand;   We have too many committees. I’m having a hard time doing my job because

    I’m always in meetings. 

    7. AUDITOR GENERAL’S CONCERNS

    Since Nunavut’s inception, the Auditor General of Canada (AG) has completed severalreviews of the Government’s financial and program management practices. All thesereviews cite the issue of limited human resource capacity as the underlying cause of theGovernment’s failure to the address the AG’s concerns.

    However, two recent reports by the AG are of more immediate concern with regard tostructural reform. They highlight problems so serious that their solutions must be the

    top priorities of this review:

     A) Chi ldren Youth and Family Programs and Services 

    This comprehensive report tabled in 2011 highlighted major problems withthe manner in which HSS is managing these programs and services. Withregard to program management, the Auditor General’s Office indicatedthat, in their opinion, the Department of Health and Social Services isfailing to fulfill its mandate under the Child and Family Services Act. The2011 report goes on to say that “Because it lacks sufficient informationabout the children in care, the Department cannot adequately track their

    “HSS is notadequatelymeeting its keyresponsibilities

    for theprotection andwell-being ofchildren, youthand their

  • 8/20/2019 Final Report Structural Review, Oct. 19, 2011

    27/92

      Systemic and Structural Reform

    and Social Services and those departments managing other elements ofthe social safety net to determine whether structural reform could improve

    performance in this critical area of government responsibility. A more in-depth review is currently being conducted as a separate project aimed atidentifying gaps in the social safety net.

    B) Human Resource Capacity 

    The AG’s 2010 report on Human Resource Capacity observed that theGovernment continues to experience problems in fulfilling its mandate due

    to high vacancy rates. The report stated that “filling positions in the publicservice is an ongoing challenge for the Government, with 800 positions(23 percent) vacant at the end of March 2009.” The Auditor General foundthat the staffing process was not timely with an average of 318 daysrequired to fill positions. The report indicated “almost ½ of the staffingcompetitions undertaken by the 5 departments in the 2007-08 and 2008-09 fiscal years were unsuccessful.” The AG observed that theDepartment of Human Resources has not been proactive in determining

    the reasons for the lack of recruitment success and the extent to whichsome of the problems could be related to the process that is used.

    The Department of Human Resources, according to this report has notexercised any leadership in the coordination of system-wide humanresource planning. Thus, very little is known about the Government’s skillneeds and the reasons why people leave the organization. The AG noted“The Department has received 386 exit survey responses over the years,but the responses are neither analyzed nor communicated to thedepartments.”

    “A lack ofcapacity has

    hampered theGovernment’sability to deliversome programsand performcertain tasks.”

    …AuditorGeneral of

    Canada 2010

    “Department ofHR does notconduct anyanalysis towhether and to

    what extent thelack of successis caused bysystemicproblems ”

  • 8/20/2019 Final Report Structural Review, Oct. 19, 2011

    28/92

      Systemic and Structural Reform

    Government. We looked at the critical systems and processes used by all departmentsto assess the health of Government operations.

    We found that the Government of Nunavut is hampered by some internal processes thatare slowing progress and making it difficult to achieve results. These processes allshare the same flaw. They are too complicated. The Government has adopted anapproach to doing business that is very similar to the Government of Canada. Such alabour intensive and very structured approach is sometimes necessary in a large, highvolume organization, but in a government such as the GN, the staff sometimes havedifficulty with such a degree of sophistication.

    The business plans of the Government are the best example of this complexity.Departments are required to complete a new business plan each year when eachsuccessive plan adds little value to the previous versions. The spending projections inthe plan are not rigorously developed and are, therefore, not credible. A better approachwould be to develop a business plan during the first or second year of the Government’smandate which covers the entire mandate and takes into account the strategicobjectives of each new government.

    Some key processes requiring early attention are outlined below:

     A) Legislative Development

    The current legislative process is unnecessarily cumbersome and complex. The timedelay between the point where a decision is made to develop legislation and the pointwhen it is approved in the House takes far too long. The complexity of the currentprocess may be one of the contributing factors to the absence of any new andmeaningful legislation at this point in the mandate of the current government:

  • 8/20/2019 Final Report Structural Review, Oct. 19, 2011

    29/92

      Systemic and Structural Reform

    B) Executive Council Decision Making Processes

    Efficient decision making processes are essential to the functioning of goodgovernment. Cabinet and Financial Management Board meetings are generally heldevery two weeks. Meetings are sometimes held more frequently during sessions of theLegislative Assembly or to deal with major issues such as budget development or theneed for supplementary appropriations. Work has been underway for the past fewmonths to improve the administrative process surrounding Executive decisions. Sincethese improvements do not represent policy changes, they can be approved within theauthority of the Deputy Minister of the Executive and do not need to be discussed in this

    report.

    However, there is a problem with the kind and quality of submissions that are beingforwarded for Executive Council review and approval. A review of some recentdecisions makes it clear that Cabinet and FMB are often asked to make decisions thatare administrative rather than political.

    Cabinet should avoid making some decisions which properly belong in the mandate of

    the public service specifically those which deal with human resource management.Human resource decisions should be made by managers within the policy direction setby Cabinet.

    Unfortunately, the status of human resource policy is non-existent other than thecontents of The Public Service  Act. The GN web page apparently shows four humanresource policies, but they have all expired and are no longer in effect, including thepolicy which specifies the approvals necessary for restructuring:

      Workforce Harassment Policy - Expired April 20, 2010; 

  • 8/20/2019 Final Report Structural Review, Oct. 19, 2011

    30/92

      Systemic and Structural Reform

    leading a council of appointed members. Although changes have been made over theyears to recognize the existence and the role of ministers and to recognize the right of

    employees to strike, no in-depth action has been taken to normalize the roles andresponsibilities of elected officials vis-a-vis those of the leaders in the public service. Asa result, Cabinet has a more hands on role in public service human resourcemanagement than any other jurisdiction in Canada. The obvious exception of course, isthe NWT which shares similar legislation.

    This includes such things as Executive Council approving direct appointments of publicservants, and the Minister responsible for the Act having final authority for some

    dismissals and for ruling on the subsequent appeals. Some of these anomalies can bedealt with through delegation from the Minister to Deputy Ministers for things such asdirect appointments. For matters that the Minister cannot delegate, the resolution is tochange the legislation to reflect 21st century practices. A review of the Nunavut PublicService Act  has been underway to do just that, but relatively little progress has beenmade on legislative changes.

    The researchers reviewed a variety of requests for Executive approval. Many of the

    documents are extremely detailed and often include a combination of policy andprocess issues. These kinds of very detailed decision documents can contribute to roleconfusion between deputy ministers and ministers. At a minimum, they are energysapping for ministers and detract from their key role of approving effective public policy.In preparing for Executive meetings, Ministers should have the time to reviewdocuments and prepare themselves for discussion. The Secretary to Cabinet and theSecretary of FMB are hard pressed to deal with the volume of decision making requeststhey currently receive, therefore, they are not able to give the Executive the lead timethey need to absorb the content of the requests. As a result, decisions are oftenrushed.

  • 8/20/2019 Final Report Structural Review, Oct. 19, 2011

    31/92

      Systemic and Structural Reform

    a) Recruitment Process

    Section 7 of this report reiterated the concerns of the Auditor General in her 2010review of human resource capacity. Changes to the current system should bemade to correct these problems. Our assessment of the recruitment processidentified the following practices as problematic:

      Human Resources has historically required all departmental recruitmentrequests to be reviewed by the Job Evaluation Division who, in the pasthave significantly delayed recruitment with unnecessary analysis of

    positions that have already been rated; 

      Methods of sourcing are often confined to limited distribution newspaperadvertising. This is the least effective sourcing method used byprofessional recruiters; 

      The employing department has not been permitted to review applicationsas they are received; instead they must wait to see resumes until the

    competition has formally closed; 

      Staffing has taken on the role of the enforcer of the Inuit EmploymentPolicy, instead of recognizing that the employing department isaccountable for achieving beneficiary targets. Staffing enforces rules thatdo not allow any other applicants to be interviewed if any beneficiaryappears to be qualified. By the time the first lengthy, and oftenunsuccessful round of interviews is over, many qualified candidates havefound other jobs with more flexible employers;

     

      Departments in the past, have not been permitted to vary the composition

  • 8/20/2019 Final Report Structural Review, Oct. 19, 2011

    32/92

      Systemic and Structural Reform

      Job evaluators have insisted in the past, that all jobs of a casual nature berated through the system. This is an unnecessary delay in hiring staff for

    temporary work especially since casual pay rates are already shown in thecollective agreement; 

      Job Evaluation has not been historically receptive to the practice ofbenchmarking positions. Benchmarking allows one job description to berated for all positions that do the same level of work. There are many jobssuch as finance officers and social workers which are identical from onedepartment to the next and they do not have to be individually rated. To

    put it into perspective, there may only be 750 to 1000 discrete (different) jobs in the organization as compared to the 4029 positions shown in themain estimates. Rating 1000 positions would be a drastic reduction in thereview time; thus improving the level of service to clients; 

      The position description form used to rate each position is unnecessarilycomplex and time consuming. Efforts to simplify the document and makethe process more user friendly have not been successful in the past; 

      Very little (if any) pay research has been completed by the Government inthe 12 years of the government’s existence. Therefore, it is difficult todetermine whether pay rates are competitive. Ongoing pay research isessential to keep pay rates competitive within similar occupations. Thismay be a contributing factor to the government’s lack of hiring success; 

      The Department has not been receptive to introducing flexibility into thesystem by allowing for “labour market supplements.” These payadjustments allow for the payment of higher salaries for occupations thatare temporarily in high demand across the country and are therefore hard

  • 8/20/2019 Final Report Structural Review, Oct. 19, 2011

    33/92

      Systemic and Structural Reform

    automated leave records. Currently, there are over 4000 positions andthe problem persists.

    d) Human Resource Planning 

    In order for any organization to be successful, it has to be able to attractand retain skilled workers. Most effective organizations are supported byhuman resource plans with 3 essential components:

    Recruitment 

    This component of the plan identifies the positions where staff will bebrought into the organization through recruitment. Ideally, in a matureorganization, recruitment efforts will focus on entry level jobs andspecialized occupations where it is not feasible to train employeesinternally for transfer and promotion;

    Training and Development This component of the plan identifies the training mechanisms that will be

    used to prepare employees to take on greater responsibility. Aperformance management system is an essential tool for maximizing theperformance of employees. This is complemented by a combination ofinternal courses and post secondary professional development. Trainingplans, career development plans and succession plans are part of theprocess of identifying employees with potential;

    Transfer and Promotion

    This part of a human resource plan identifies those positions that will betargeted for transfer and promotion of existing employees.

    None of thedepartmentsaudited havedevelopedstrategies to fill

    ongoing gaps inskill sets andqualifications.Where gaps aregovernment wideHR has notdeveloped overallstrategies.

    …Auditor General

    of Canada 2010

  • 8/20/2019 Final Report Structural Review, Oct. 19, 2011

    34/92

      Systemic and Structural Reform

    are needed to provide homeownership incentives to increase the stock ofhousing. At the same time, additional staff housing units should be built or

    leased in the most affordable manner to increase staff housing stocks so thatemployees currently in public housing can move out and make room for thosewhose need is greater.

    D) Automated Budgeting System

    The Auditor General has observed that budgets for most departments do not representa plan for spending money. For example, departments know they will not spend their

    full compensation budget on wages and benefits each year, yet they continue to budgetas though all the jobs were filled. As shown in Figure 5 below, over the period 2005/06to 2009/10, an average of almost $18 million per year was diverted from Compensationto Other O&M as a direct result of these vacancies.

    Source: GN Public Accounts  Figure 5

    The Expenditure Management Division should lead the development of an automatedbudgeting system to support effective budget planning and reduce the need for onerousmanual work by all departments Expenditure Management also needs to do more

    Fiscal Year Main Estimates Actual Spending Under Main Est. % Diverted to Other O&M

    2005/06 298,971,000.00$ 281,167,000.00$ 17,804,000.00$ 6%

    2006/07 318,373,000.00$ 302,247,000.00$ 16,126,000.00$ 5%

    2007/08 322,146,000.00$ 299,996,000.00$ 22,150,000.00$ 7%

    2008/09 340,892,000.00$ 322,960,000.00$ 17,932,000.00$ 5%

    2009/10 371,564,000.00$ 355,918,000.00$ 15,646,000.00$ 4%

    GOVERNMENT OF NUNAVUT - COMPENSATION SPENDING

  • 8/20/2019 Final Report Structural Review, Oct. 19, 2011

    35/92

      Systemic and Structural Reform

    The Government’s main website is another key element of the GN “image.” Anybodywho accesses the site develops a perception of what the Government is about on the

    basis of the messaging that appears. Unfortunately, the site suffers in comparison toGovernment websites across the country. The website is not live. For example, everyother province in Canada had a message posted on the government website about howto access social assistance during the recent mail strike. No reference was made onthe website to the strike or government plans to minimize its impact on Nunavut.

     Another major failing on the website is the staff phone directory. Researchers areconstantly seeking information from government employees. Residents of Nunavut

    have questions about government programs and services. However, unless you knowthe exact name, or title of a person, you cannot find them on the website from outsidethe government system. If you ask for a departmental listing, you are given analphabetical listing which is not broken down by division or section. It takes inordinateamounts of time to locate a telephone number and people often give up in frustration.The Government needs a professional webmaster who can develop and maintain aninteresting, communicative and useful website.

    There is also inconsistency in the Government’s media releases. Releases often fail totake into account the need to communicate consistent messages that referencegovernment-wide strategy. This reflects the fact that departmental communications staffare usually single person operations. It is not always possible to attract candidates forthese jobs who are sufficiently seasoned to add value to departmental public relationsinitiatives. As a result, Deputy Ministers do not often have the quality of advice neededto respond effectively to situations requiring sound media relations, particularly in timesof crisis management. In order to ensure consistency and to help the staff develop their

    skills it may be useful and necessary to bring them together in one department so thatthey can benefit from collegiality with more experienced practitioners and be under thesupervision of skilled media relations experts.

  • 8/20/2019 Final Report Structural Review, Oct. 19, 2011

    36/92

      Systemic and Structural Reform

     As indicated earlier in this report, the researchers were hampered by a lack of reliabledata in all areas. However, the data shown is from the best sources available and

    provides at least a snapshot of the situation.

     A) The Vacancy Rate

     As of April 1, 2011, the total number of budgeted positions was 4029.6. Figure 6, belowshows that, in August 2011, 1043 positions were vacant for a vacancy rate of over 25%.

    DURATION OF JOB VACANCIES – August 2011 

    Length of Vacancy # of Positions Value of VacanciesPositions never filled 297 $30,591,000Less than 6 months 279 $28,737,0006 months to 1 year 100 $10,300,0001 to 3 years 269 $27,707,0003 to 5 years 71 $7,313,0005 years or more 27 $2,781,000

    TOTAL  1043 $107,029,000

    Source: Dept. of Human Resources  Figure 6

    This vacancy rate is consistent with the historic average for vacant positions. TheGovernment of Nunavut has always struggled with attraction and retention ofemployees.

     A surprising revelation of the vacancy analysis is that a total of 297 funded positions

    were never filled. This could be the result of a failure in the recruitment process, but withthe limited information available, it is not possible to assign a reason for the vacanciesin this category. Needless to say, it appears that Departments are often so anxious toproceed with new initiatives they fail to recognize that they are failing to achieve earlier

  • 8/20/2019 Final Report Structural Review, Oct. 19, 2011

    37/92

      Systemic and Structural Reform

    work. This lack of reliable data will make it very difficult for theGovernment to make decisions about financial restraint when it is no

    longer possible to offset operating deficits through cash reserves. Asstated in Section 6, this could occur by 2014. The most seriousdeficiencies include:

      Human Resource information that is not sufficiently reliable to generate reportsfrom the E-Personality database. This is a direct result of poor data entry;

      Unreliable data on spending due, in large part, to poor financial coding of

    invoices. This data shortcoming makes it impossible for financial analysts to drilldown into spending records to obtain detailed information for trend analysis;

      Virtually no credible program performance measurement indicators areconsistently collected to provide managers with information about theperformance of programs and to support evaluators who are gathering data todetermine whether programs are providing effective and efficient services toresidents.

    Neither the Department of Finance nor Human Resources supply departments withstructured management reports that provide reliable data for variance reporting, InuitEmployment Plan monitoring or budgeting. Instead departments have access to rawdata from the central information systems that is subsequently manipulated andanalyzed independently by each department. This lack of central agency directioncontributes to inconsistent decision making as departments interpret different data in adifferent fashion. Little wonder that variance reporting is weak and the quality of

    financial projections is suspect.

    The Government of Nunavut has not yet reached the stage where it is operating like a

  • 8/20/2019 Final Report Structural Review, Oct. 19, 2011

    38/92

      Systemic and Structural Reform

    MANAGEMENT CAPABILITY MODEL

    Source: Adapted from Office of the Auditor General of Canada’s financial management capability model

    Figure 7

    It is important to note that the existence of acceptable accounting controlsis not the only obligation of a public government as provided for in Article 4

    of the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement. Accounting controls may ensurethat the Government has the necessary systems in place to documenthow money is being spent. What is equally important, and vitallynecessary for any organization accountable to the public, is the availabilityof credible, easily accessible information about the results that are beingachieved through the spending of public funds.

     At the time this report was prepared, results information was not available

    and very little work was underway to establish government-wide systemsto capture these data.

    11 S C C G S ?

    The Gov’t o fCanada willrecommend to

    Parliament …..anew NunavutTerritory, withits ownLegislative Assembly andpublicgovernment,separate from

    the GNWT.

     Arti cle 4 NLCA

  • 8/20/2019 Final Report Structural Review, Oct. 19, 2011

    39/92

      Systemic and Structural Reform

    Those were huge accomplishments in a relatively short period of time, but now thegovernment has to move beyond the creation stage in its evolution and on to the stage

    of effective operations. This evolution will require improvements to human resourcecapacity, as well as financial, human resource and data management. A new focus isneeded to emphasize planning and evaluation. These improvements are essential if theorganization is to be sustainable.

    This section of the report focuses on the issue of structural reform. However, it will besupported by recommendations for systemic change to support more effectiveoperations by providing managers with the tools they need to efficiently and effectively

    manage programs and services.

     A) Health and Social Services – Part of a Larger network 

    In dealing with the need to examine options for improving the success of Children andFamily Services, it is important to recognize that Health and Social Services is part of amuch larger network of social programs to support residents who need intervention.The Nunavut Department of Health and Social Services follows the NWT design model

    in most respects. The Government of the Northwest Territories decided in 1995 tocombine the departments of Social Services and Health. The foundation for thedecision to combine the departments was a perception that health care workers andsocial service workers would benefit from being in the same department working inmulti-disciplinary teams.

     At the same time, the NWT Cabinet decided to transfer the responsibility for socialassistance from Social Services to the Department of Education, Culture and

    Employment to be utilized as part of a larger income support program designed toprepare people for more productive life through employment. The Nunavut Governmentdecided to use a similar model for the breakdown of functional responsibility between

  • 8/20/2019 Final Report Structural Review, Oct. 19, 2011

    40/92

      Systemic and Structural Reform

    a) HSS - The Current Structure

    Health and Social Services has the largest budget in Government with acurrent budget of over $300 million and 943 positions. Since it wasestablished in 1999, it has struggled to provide health care and socialservices to a jurisdiction with some of the most urgent needs in Canada.The health status of Nunavut residents is amongst the lowest in thecountry. High levels of unemployment and poverty, coupled with a severeshortage of housing, and very high rates of suicide makes the job of frontline workers very demanding.

    With only one acute care hospital in the Territory, Nunavut must dependheavily on southern facilities to provide services unavailable territorially.This results in heavy usage of airlines for medical transportation andmedevacs. The Department struggles to balance the budget in anenvironment where costs are escalating far beyond those experienced byother programs and services. The Public Accounts show that over theperiod 2005/06 - 2009/10, HSS saw spending increases averaging 7.6%

    per year compared to an average of 4.9% per year over the same periodfor all other departments. The budget for 2011/12 exceeded the 2010/11budget by 12%. First quarter variance reports for 2011/12 predict a deficitof over $19 million for the department by year-end. The Departmentappears to be under such intense pressure simply to deliver services thatit does not have the time or inclination to develop a long term plan toaddress the issue of sustainability.

    The Department struggles with high vacancy rates in its community healthand social service operations as well as the hospital in Iqaluit. Agency(contract) nurses and social workers are heavily used across Nunavut.

    HSS does notdevelop budgetwork plans, nor isthere adepartmental longterm plan.

    ….AuditorGeneral ofCanada 2009

  • 8/20/2019 Final Report Structural Review, Oct. 19, 2011

    41/92

      Systemic and Structural Reform

    situations without reference to outside authorities. The Board ofManagement is ultimately accountable to the public and the government

    for effective operations. They would have the flexibility to do publicfundraising given their ability to obtain status as a charitable organizationfor tax purposes.Hospitals are very complex and demanding businesses. Government, byits very nature, is not equipped to run a business and they are not able toprovide quick turnaround in decision making. The Qikiqtani GeneralHospital has been hampered by its current status as a government runoperation, and this should be corrected by placing it at arms length from

    government.

    The Government of Nunavut eliminated Health and Education Boards in1999 on the recommendation of the Nunavut Implementation Commission.It was felt that with a consensus oriented government and a variety of neworganizations which could conceivably provide input on governmentdecision making, there was no real need for regional boards. It isimportant to differentiate between the former Regional Health Boards and

    the kind of management board needed to direct the efforts of a hospital.

    Regional Health Boards were organizations that focused on bringing theircommunity or regional concerns to the forefront to ensure the issueswould be addressed. On the other hand, a hospital board of managementoversees the operation of the hospital and makes management decisionsvery similar to the way a town or city council operates. They are muchmore hands on than the former health boards. The existence of a Board

    of Management also aids in the accreditation process as the Boards arethe recognized form of governance for Canadian hospitals.

  • 8/20/2019 Final Report Structural Review, Oct. 19, 2011

    42/92

      Systemic and Structural Reform

    intentions, the Department has simply not had the time to devote to SocialServices since Nunavut was created. Operational employees have

    suffered from a lack of direction and the absence of a long term plan. Inaddition to the many issues identified by the Auditor General in theChildren and Family Services report, there has been a continuing demandfrom the public to establish child welfare practices that are more inkeeping with Inuit tradition and culture.

    There is no doubt that Social Services is understaffed, with mostcommunities having only one social worker. However, when the

    organization has to compete with higher priority funding needs such ashealth treatment, it inevitably loses. According to main estimatesdocuments, Social Services has grown by only 7 positions since 2008/09,whereas Health has grown by 35 over the same period. Social Servicescannot succeed in an organization such as HSS where life and deathdecisions around health treatment inevitably trump child welfare.

    Social workers also suffered a separation from their clients when the

    social assistance function was placed in the Department of Education.Having responsibility for issuing social assistance ensured that socialworkers saw their clients at least monthly and allowed them to gaugeproblems in needy homes. Social Services would have much bettersuccess if it were part of a department where it had all the tools it needs toprovide effective programs and services and where its priorities get thenecessary attention.

    The current review of the social safety net by the Social Advocacy unit andthe concentrated effort to reduce poverty are important priorities for theGovernment. In that context, it makes sense to bring together the most

    “The Governmentof Nunavut willrespect Inuitvalues. Inuit are85% of thepopulation…The

     Agreement isprotected by theConstitution ofCanada. TheGovernmentmust work inways that respectInuit rights.”

    …PlainLanguage Guideto the NLCA

  • 8/20/2019 Final Report Structural Review, Oct. 19, 2011

    43/92

      Systemic and Structural Reform

    a) Labour Relations 

    The labour relations responsibility rests with the Employee Relations Division ofthe Department of Human Resources. Labour Relations includes the criticalresponsibility for negotiating with bargaining agents for unionized employees andadministering the provisions of the collective agreements on behalf of theemployer. A collective agreement represents a contract between the bargainingagent and the employer covering employee terms and conditions of employment.If the government is lax in its administration of the agreement, it can be verycostly for the employer.

    The responsibility for labour relations in most governments rests with TreasuryBoard which is closely akin to the GN Department of Finance. The Ministerresponsible for Finance should be the Minister responsible for administering thePublic Service Act; thereby ensuring that there is appropriate financial control ofprograms and human resources. A more important reason for this ministeradministering the legislation is that the Nunavut Public Service Act, is the labourlegislation that guides the Government in its management of the public service

    and the Labour Relations Division is the only structure in government establishedwith a mandate to deal with internal labour matters.

    b) Recruitment

    The staffing process within the GN has not satisfied the organization’sneeds. The Auditor General’s (2009) observations about the inordinateamount of time it takes to fill jobs and the 50% failure rate in competitions

    are characteristic of the failures of this process since 1999. The processis rigid, unnecessarily complex and it takes away the rights of managers tomake hiring decisions. Managers appear to have become so

    “We found thatalmost ½ of thestaffing

    competitionsundertaken bythe 5departments……

  • 8/20/2019 Final Report Structural Review, Oct. 19, 2011

    44/92

      Systemic and Structural Reform

    positions transferred to the Nunavut Government from the Government of theNWT.

     Although the system is perceived to be rigid and inflexible; it does not have to be.There have been many calls over the years for the system to be replaced withsomething simpler, but in reality, these bureaucratic problems result from theinflexible approach taken to operating the system; not from weaknesses in thesystem itself.

    While it is important for Job Evaluation to be service oriented, it is not possible to

    ignore the need for strong central controls on job ratings. With a $420 millioncompensation budget, it is not hard to visualize how costs would skyrocketwithout effective controls on the rating process.Human Resources is now beginning to make efforts to solve these problems, butit appears to be solely as a result of the AG’s report. The Department of HumanResources has consistently failed to recognize that their primary reason forexisting is to serve the needs of other departments. Instead, they have focusedon the need to control departments in the way they manage their human

    resources. As stated earlier, this approach deprives program managers of theirbiggest responsibility; that of recruiting, hiring and managing their humanresources to deliver quality programs and services.

    The Department of Human Resources does not appear to be able to provideeffective human resource support to the Government of Nunavut utilizing existingprocesses and systems. It is time to consider how their important work can becarried out in a more efficient manner if some elements are transferred to other,

    more appropriate departments and existing processes are reformed.

    d) Organization Design

  • 8/20/2019 Final Report Structural Review, Oct. 19, 2011

    45/92

      Systemic and Structural Reform

    C) Executive and Intergovernmental Affairs

    Executive and Intergovernmental Affairs (EIA) is critically important for the effectiveoperation of government. The Department provides high level analytical support toCabinet in the same manner as the Department of Finance provides analytical supportto the Financial Management Board (FMB). The Deputy Minister of the Executive (alsoSecretary to Cabinet) is the senior bureaucratic advisor to Cabinet and, although theauthority is not defined in legislation, the position is widely recognized as the head ofthe public service in the same way as the Clerk of the Privy Council is the head of theFederal Public Service.

    The Department also coordinates liaison amongst all Governments in matters wherethere is shared interest. EIA takes the lead on government-wide initiatives requiringintergovernmental negotiation. The best example of this is the negotiation process fordevolution. EIA also coordinates the policy development and program evaluationfunctions across government and manages the Nunavut Statistics Bureau whichrepresents a major source of information to support government planning and decisionmaking.

    EIA must be streamlined and efficient in order to focus on its key areas of responsibility.Otherwise, Cabinet will not have the level of policy and analytical support needed toachieve the primary objectives of its mandate. Unfortunately, the current organizationalstructure of the Department does not lend itself to excellence. There are too manyunrelated functions in place which have a tendency to divert the Department from itsmission.

    a) Cabinet Office 

    The Cabinet Office is made up of the Premier and Ministers, plus the Principal

  • 8/20/2019 Final Report Structural Review, Oct. 19, 2011

    46/92

      Systemic and Structural Reform

    b) The Social Advocacy Division 

    This Division was established to coordinate a review of the social safety net forthe purpose of identifying gaps in the system that result in hardship for clients. Itwas also established to develop the framework for the Child Advocate’s Office.These functions clearly belong in the Department responsible for Social Services.

    c) The Energy Policy Division and Executive Director URRC 

    The Government has a legitimate mandate for developing Nunavut energy policy.

    However, this mandate belongs in the Department of Economic Developmentand Transportation which has a strong role to play in encouraging energymanagement initiatives as part of the larger economic development strategy.EDT is also the counterpart to the Federal Department of Natural ResourcesCanada which controls the minerals and energy portfolios for Canada. Thecurrent reporting relationship of the Executive Director (ED) of the Utility RatesReview Council (URRC) to EIA is primarily due to the fact that the funding for theposition is paid by EIA. The ED’s real responsibility is to provide administrative

    support to the URRC. Because the URRC mandate is energy regulation, thisfunction could also be resident in EDT.

    d) Statistics Division Pangnirtung 

    The decision to decentralize the Statistics Division from Iqaluit to Pangnirtungwas made in the early days of the Government before decision makers realizedthat the work of the Division was so critical to the Government’s operation. The

    Statistics Division in a more mature government, is an extremely valuable andwell used resource because the data generated and obtained by this Division arepart of the foundation for effective planning and intergovernmental negotiations.

  • 8/20/2019 Final Report Structural Review, Oct. 19, 2011

    47/92

      Systemic and Structural Reform

    e) Policy Planning and Evaluation Division 

    The Policy and Evaluation Division is one of the busiest Divisions in Government.The staff are challenged to coordinate planning for major government policyinitiatives such as Tamapta, they are accountable for the central evaluation of allgovernment programs, and finally, they must provide effective analytical supportto Cabinet. The volume of planning initiatives and requests for Cabinet decisionsmakes it difficult for this Division to operate proactively.

    To make matters worse, the Evaluation section of the Division is located in

    Pangnirtung. The comments made earlier about the Statistics Bureau havingdifficulty in attracting specialized staff apply equally to this Section. Over time,this Section must relocate to Iqaluit as there is almost no work being done in theGovernment to measure program results and determine whether expendituresare justified in all areas. This work will become even more critical asGovernment spending increases and it becomes necessary to borrow to fundoperations. At that point, when borrowing capacity has been exhausted, therewill be a need for reliable analytical data to support difficult discussions around

    cutbacks and possible reductions in service levels.

    This Division must be co-located in Iqaluit and freed up to do the planning andevaluation work that is critical to the Government’s success. The best way tofree the Policy and Evaluation Division from Cabinet support duties is to establisha new Division (Cabinet Secretariat) with additional staffing resources.

    f) Intergovernmental Affairs

    This is currently a department within a department. It is headed up by a separateDeputy Minister even though there is already a deputy minister in the Executive.

  • 8/20/2019 Final Report Structural Review, Oct. 19, 2011

    48/92

      Systemic and Structural Reform

    a) Expenditure Management

    This Division is accountable for coordinating the development of budgets for theentire government. The Division coordinates variance reporting, and rolls up theexpenditure projections for the entire government for FMB review. The Divisionalso contributes to the Three Year Fiscal Plan. In addition, this group providesanalytical support to the Financial Management Board in the same fashion as thePolicy Planning and Evaluation Division in EIA provides analytical support toCabinet. FMB relies heavily on this analytical advice to make decisions onstrategic initiatives.

    The Division does not have the resources to do all this work. As a result they dothe best they can in all areas, but they have difficulty being proactive. Thebudgeting area needs a great deal of attention.

    This Division has more than enough important work to do with the responsibilityfor budgeting and financial forecasting. To free them up for this function, aseparate Financial Management Board Secretariat should be established in

    Finance to provide analytical support to FMB.

    E) Culture Language Elders and Youth

    CLEY was established at the outset of Government in 1999 to assist in thetransformation of Government from a Eurocentric orientation to one which reflected Inuittraditions and values. It was also envisioned that CLEY would lead the effort to makethe Inuit language the working language of government. The Department has struggled

    with this mandate for many years. Although it seems like a fairly straightforwardconcept, it has often been difficult to achieve unanimity on issues such as values andtraditions. To complicate matters, in 2004, the Sport and Recreation Division from CGS

  • 8/20/2019 Final Report Structural Review, Oct. 19, 2011

    49/92

      Systemic and Structural Reform

    strengthen the language. On September 1, 2011, Taiguusilluqtit (Inuit Language Authority) will be established at arms length from government to monitor theimplementation of the Act. The creation of the Act was a major accomplishment.

    However, CLEY has done as much as it can to support the Inuit Language bydeveloping the legislation and the independent monitoring mechanism. TheDepartment does not have a lot more to offer in strengthening the language asthey do not have a program delivery function, nor do they have any perceivedauthority to compel government departments to comply with the requirements ofthe new law.

    This function continues to be a major priority for Government as a whole. Thatpriority should be emphasized by placing it under the jurisdiction of the Premieras part of the Department of EIA. This would ensure that it has sufficient centralagency authority to enforce regulatory requirements. Consideration should,therefore be given to transferring the Division to EIA.

    c) Piqqusilirivvik – Inuit Cultural Facility – Clyde River  

    This facility is budgeted at over $4 million with 14 positions. It was established toallow for the transfer of traditional Inuit culture, heritage, lifestyle and values toindividuals based on Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit guiding principles. Fulfilling thismandate will require a similar approach to that used by adult training institutions.This involves curriculum development, instruction, student assessment,institutional management and the control of a co-ed residence.

    CLEY has done a good job with the foundational work of building this facility andpreparing it for operation. However, the Department does not have the residentskills to operate the institution and deliver on its cultural and educational

  • 8/20/2019 Final Report Structural Review, Oct. 19, 2011

    50/92

      Systemic and Structural Reform

    F) Education

    The Department of Education has one of the most important mandates in government.It has the responsibility for educating residents so that they can lead fulfilling andproductive lives. However, they are also accountable for delivering Education in theInuit language. This will require a massive effort to educate teachers who have theskills to teach in Inuktitut and Innuinaqtun. Language competency targets must bedeveloped along with a full range of supporting curriculum.

    The Department is hampered in some ways, from carrying out their primary mandate by

    being responsible for the management of employment and career developmentprograms aimed at preparing adults for the world of work. Education also managesNunavut income support programs which provide support for basic living as well astraining allowances. These programs would work much more effectively in aDepartment which provides complementary social service supports. By bringingtogether these employment development and income support systems in thedepartment responsible for social services, it would be possible to integrate the incomesupport mechanisms to promote seamlessness and improve accessibility. It is a reality

    in Nunavut that most residents take advantage of these supports over the course oftheir lives as they move towards employment and self reliance.

    Education would then be freed up to fulfill its primary mandate of capacity developmentthrough education.

    G) Other Departments 

    The Departments of Justice, CGS, EDT and Environment were also assessed in thisreview . However, given the short time left in the mandate of the 3rd Assembly, it wouldbe counterproductive to consider the less urgent changes that might be useful in these

  • 8/20/2019 Final Report Structural Review, Oct. 19, 2011

    51/92

      Systemic and Structural Reform

    a) Enabling Legislation

    Currently, even though there is a perceived authority for the Premier to makestructural change, there is no specific legislative authority to permit that action.To correct that problem and to provide certainty, it is recommended, subject toreview by the Department of Justice and advice from the Legislation Division ofthat Department, that amendments be made to the Legislative Assembly andExecutive Council Act. 

    It is recommended that simple changes to section 67 of the Legislative Assembly

    and Executive Council Act be drafted for consideration by the Legislative Assembly along the lines of the following:

    67.1 (1) The Commissioner in Executive Council, on the advise of the Premier,may determine the organization of the Executive Government and the variousdepartments.

    (2) For the purposes of subsection (1), the Commissioner in Executive Council,

    on the advise of the Premier, may do one or more of the following:

    (a) establish, vary or disestablish a department;

    (b) determine the department that will exercise any of the dutiesor functions under an enactment;

    (c) transfer duties and functions from one department to

    another;

    (d) determine or change the name of a department.

  • 8/20/2019 Final Report Structural Review, Oct. 19, 2011

    52/92

      Systemic and Structural Reform

    The Government Organization policy that expired on April 30, 2009 satisfies theneed for Executive direction in this area with one shortcoming. That shortcomingcould be corrected with the insertion of the following wording at the beginning ofthe policy:

    “The authority, responsibilities, and functions of departments and agencies of theGovernment of Nunavut shall be established through DepartmentalEstablishment Policies.”

    It is therefore recommended that the Government Organization Policy be

    reinstated with the inclusion of the wording shown above.

    The Department of Justice is alone in having its mandate specified in legislation.In the absence of specific foundational legislation, most organizations developpolicies which specify the mandate for departments, the breakdown ofaccountability and authority, and the overriding authority of Executive Council.The Government of Nunavut does not have establishment policies and, as aresult, there is no clear policy foundation for any