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Joon Young Park

Historical and Comparative Sociology

May 11, 2014

Professor Rosenberger

Final Paper

Shift of Social Identity in South Korea during the Park Regime: From the Economic to the Political

I

South Korea under the Park regime (1961-1979) is characterized by its commitment to

dramatic economic growth. However, it should not be ignored that South Korea was also

gradually, though neither dramatically nor dominantly, committed to the ideal of democracy

along with its economic growth. Clearly, at a certain point towards the end of the regime, the

nation’s political orientation surpassed its economic orientation. Otherwise, the Park regime

would not have collapsed at the peak of its economic growth in 1979. This apparently slow but

steady shift of social orientations in Korea was already predicted and officially recorded in the

historic speeches by the two political rival figures: the 1964 speech by the President Park Chung-

Hee and the 1969 speech by his political rival Kim Dae-Jung.

The two speeches are historically very crucial, each representing the ideology of South

Korea’s social orientations, economic or political. Targeted against the students’ anti-

government demonstration in the name of economic growth and national security, Park’s 1964

speech fundamentally insinuates authoritarian leadership, disapproving and debasing alternative

political opinions that can be seen in a positive venue as charismatic but in a negative view as

dictating. On the other hand Kim’s 1969 speech endorses the superiority of the people’s

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constitutional rights to anything else, as it should be, the supreme rule higher than any political

leader of the Republic: in order for South Korea to stand strong as a healthy democratic country,

regardless of the economic success achieved by Park’s prolonged leadership, reelection had to be

limited. The rising democratic spirit of the country against the declining popularity of Park’s

regime despite the economic progress is well expressed in Kim’s speech.

The historical fact is that South Korea adopted a commitment to dramatic economic

growth until the 1970s as proved to be a success. The drive behind this success is definitely

Park’s centralized leadership vis-à-vis competition with North Korea through his belief in the

capitalist ideology that effectively oppressed the minority opinions, its icon being Kim Dae-Jung.

However, Park’s leadership greatly owed to the stricken poverty Korea underwent after the

Korean War. In this sense he was clever enough to take advantage of both people’s desire for

wealth and nation security–red complex. Below this surface, the desire for democracy, though

effectively suppressed, existed as a persistent source of the nation’s identity shift, driving it

towards the 1970s social upheavals. Otherwise, Park did not have to make such a politically

calculated speech in advance. Neither did Kim have to show his serious concerns about Park’s

dictatorial governance, even risking his life. At least Kim must have trusted a rising political

identity that supported him.

To verify this, in the below, I am going to first look into the historical and political

contexts behind the two speeches, mainly focusing on the authoritative government and Kim’s

dissident struggles. Secondly, I am going to introduce and analyze the two historical texts using

the sociological method of analysis of primary documents to understand the broader society in

the historical social context. My objective is to use the two speeches as specific signs of shift

between economic and political orientations. Finally, I will look into, select, and show key social

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movements that are closely related with the effects of the two speeches and eventually

characterizing the social identity of South Korea under the Park regime. These three

investigations will serve evidence of my thesis that both the orientations competed with each

other according to the social contexts given, but gradually moved from the economic to the

political.

II

Park Chung-Hee, the third president of the Republic of Korea, believed that Korea

deserved and had the potential “to have its place in the world” besides China and Japan with the

right leadership and was willing to take his part in history. Park is written by mainstream history

as a military dictator who came to power in 1961, an authoritative figure who constructed the

foundation of the Korean economy. Park was a self-righteous man who had studied the history of

Korea stuck between China and Japan and went through colonialism in his youth who has been

trained in the Japanese military. He was strict to himself, which is evident in the frugality that he

practiced throughout his lifetime and expected the whole nation to live up to the same high

standard of values in order to “live well.” His economic plans were based on his adamant faith–

“We can do it” spirit; however, his confidence deteriorated his leadership in combining or

encompassing opposing opinions. For him, listening to absurd or premature opinions, while

knowing the truth to economic prosperity, seemed to be not only of little worth, but also an

obstacle to progress. He was a ready leader and a planner of the far future of the country

implanting the infrastructure for capitalism in Korea, even by means of dictatorship and minimal

democratic process, which lead to significant economic success.

Park demonstrated top-down leadership making decisions based on his economic plan.

One example of this autocratic leadership was normalizing the relationship with Japan. The

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treaty was one of the agendas to accumulate seed money of economic progress in Park Chung-

Hee’s mind despite public opposition. This is demonstrated through a speech given in 1964 to a

group of students who were protesting against the treaty. The speech demonstrates the kind of

authority that was the epitome of Park Chung-Hee’s ideology. Park and his cabinet had been

through the formation and stagnation of the country before taking power, and they concluded

that by simply listening to the ignorant public in a democratic way, the country could not break

out of destitution. He believed that the society was in chaos because the National Assembly spent

too much time listening and failing to take decisive action. He believed the country would never

make progress if the democratic process were too prolonged, because everyone had different

ideas and no resolution. Consequently college students with democratic enlightenment protested

against the government’s agenda for the right to actively engage in political movements, but

were rebuked by the President. From his authoritarian thoughts, his later political life as a

dictator and the downfall can be read. The evidence of the societal spirit is revealed in the speech,

both explicitly and implicitly.

As his political opponent, Kim Dae-Jung commenced his political career as a dissident.

He opposed the political power of the imperial presidency of Park, who put the economic success

over the democratic procedure of the republic. Kim started off his early life as a businessman but

entered politics to protest the dictatorship of founding father Rhee Syngman. From this point he

was opened to the harm of dictatorship and put this as his priority political agenda. Kim

predicted the future of Park’s twilight of his political career to be similar to Lee’s in the 1969

speech. He defended democracy and was a believer of the authority of the constitution. The two

speeches from Park and Kim implicate the two society of the era: one that stresses importance of

order and authority for economic achievement in early 1960s and the other that believed in

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protecting democracy, listening to various opinions later in the 1970s. The people approved of

Park in the early 1960s and later endorsed Kim’s spirit to fulfill his democratic ideal.

III

Park said in his speech, “I see college students here. I present the speech to them.” He

makes the point that he has a clear message just to college students. He proceeds by saying,

“Students! You all are protesting against the government without knowing the content of what is

going around in the national assembly. You have placards and opened rallies demonstrating,

‘The Treacherous Government Resign.’” By mentioning that the protest has no core reason just

than to protest, he worries that the politics resembles the previous chaos. Even though he gives

hope to the younger generation, Park states clearly that everything is under his control.

First thing to take notice in analyzing the speech is the assumption that the president has.

The president assumes the college students do not know the content of the treaty. They might

actually be ignorant of the reason behind the normalization of relations in 1964. They might be

blind sighted with the practical benefits. Nonetheless protesting is a freedom of expression

protected by the constitution. They have the rights to go against the government’s political plans.

This is obvious in the democratic society of Korea filled with rampant disgust and hatred

towards the government. The president never rebukes the protestors and the most the president

can express is pity of the situation. It is bewildering how the president who needs to observe and

protect the constitution is saying in public that he does not want a protest to the younger

generation. The younger generation Park refers is not a random, ignorant, underprivileged,

antisocial group as he expects. Evidence is one of the members in the protest, future President

Lee Myung-Bak who participated in the student demonstrations against President Park Chung-

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Hee. He was against the treaty, “taking issue with Japanese restitution for the colonization of the

Korean Peninsula” (Lim 2006). Lee a senior at the time was the president of the business-

department of Korea University, an elite school of Korea. This proves the assumption of

President Park that the college students have no knowledge of the treaty is wrong.

The president also stresses that it is “not their time to lead political affairs.” Park’s

supporters interpret this as an encouragement to the next generation. His message signifies that

their time will come. He in the latter part of the speech talks of what they should do instead of

protest. This advice can be read in two ways. First positively, it shows a division of

responsibilities within the nation. As Park was the planner and person in charge of the five-year-

economic-program, he stressed the division of responsibilities. He said there are duties of the

president that are apart from the students. Students have a noble responsibility to learn, to be

knowledgeable, and to pursue truth. He viewed the premature participation to be harmful for the

country. On the other hand negatively, the time can be explained, as an implication to his

perpetual time of power. After the Yushin Constitution, his true intent of time is revealed. In my

opinion there cannot be a time to participate or not to participate in a democratic society. In the

contemporary society, people with various intents start campaigns regardless of age. Not only is

there not a certain time to get things done in a political manner, uniformly and systematically but

also not a person of authority to interfere and guide one’s life. The 1960s situation in Korea is

drastically different. His words in the speech speak as if his plan is the truth and the only way.

Despite the fact that political leaders often criticize opposing opinions to win votes, Park’s

remonstration, considering the audiences and his power, is a rare occasion.

For his last remark Park shares his patriotism and early life. He tries to connect with the

students who are against the regime. “Students should not forget that we, the older generation,

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are concerned and worry as much as the students and are responsible for the actions we execute.

I am not ignoring you students. I too had my youthful twenties and looking back, in one’s

twenties you all need to still study, learn, practice, nurture, and cultivate one’s capability.” His

military background must have influenced his values. As a cadet and young officer he was

obligated to follow orders. He himself studied, learned, practiced, nurtured, and cultivated his

capability under senior officers. Therefore, he saw the early twenties to be a time of preparation

through learning not actual leadership.

The second text is a speech in 1969 by Kim Dae-Jung who opposed the third presidency

of Park. He pointed out how there are people who never get the chance to become lawmakers in

the country. The henchman of Park was joining the assembly at this time. The democratic

republic party, the party park was associated, had barely over the majority of number in the

assembly. Park changed the law of presidential election to an indirect election that decided the

president by the votes of the assemblyman, which showed the influence of his political power.

The National Congress of Unification, members elected by Park, took up a third of the National

Assembly. Kim stated, “Democracy is loosing the meaning of existence in Korea because the

country was a one-man-country lead by the words of Park. The economic prosperity Park was

ruling under was loosing faith and popularity as the people’s support was lowering as the

economic growth rate was declining. The Ministry of Home Affaris and the police put

workplaces under tight surveillance and weeded out dissident activists from company unions.

The check and balance system made for the division of power was not working. The only

bureaucratic power was inside the Blue House, Park and his presidential Secretariat and his lead

economic agency was in charge of the country not the National Assembly (Kim et al. 2011). Park

knew that he had the power to fight bureaucratic resistance with a long “stick”. Park was aware

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that the success of his economic projects as president had to do with a strong bureaucratic system

of power where his influence can be spread to even the lowest ranking civil service man for the

accordance of his goal.

Kim points out that lack of freedom of speech hinders the development of democracy.

The governments’ regulation of the press resulted in the people unable to see the full picture of

the political situation. The Park administration controlling the major newspaper and broadcasting

stations acted in an authoritative manner propagating dictatorship based on economic prosperity.

IV

The year 1964 was eleven years after the armistice of the Korean War. The country in

economic disparity lost political direction too. According to Byung-Kook Kim (2011), “the Third

Republic (1963-1972) possessed an unsystematically articulated but still distinctive set of

authoritarian norms and values that enabled society to grasp, however imperfectly and indirectly,

what he [Park] stood for and what he [Park] opposed.” The state possessed a Weberian sense of

corporate coherence, fitting under Greenfeld’s collective nationalism. Park lined up ministries–

and, by extension, their social constituencies and political allies–into an internally segmented

hierarchy of “core,” “strategic sectorial,” and ”auxiliary” groups with varying institutional

privileges and vulnerabilities. South Korea’s Weberian corporate coherence was a fundamentally

political artifact, historically created, maintained, and driven by Park Chung-Hee.

Looking into the actual content of the treaty, in 1965, diplomatic relations between Japan

and South Korea resumed after 20 years of silence–no international relationship through trade.

The national sentiment of Koreans towards Japanese was bitter. The former forced-laborers in

factories, forced draft soldiers were in need of compensation whether it be through individual-to-

individual payment or the Japanese government as a representative to repay the debts to

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individuals. Previous to the restoration of the diplomatic relationship, it took 1,500 official

meetings (Kazuhiko 2005) to start commerce. But college students thought the treaty was too

soon and thought it was advantageous to Japan and Korea had much to lose, giving up certain

rights. The president thought students were manipulated, serving the political adversaries plan to

disrupt the governments plan for economic prosperity. Koreans opposing the treaty had a stance

that these treaties were invalid in contrast the Japanese stance had that however much the Korean

side resent the treaties, they were lawful and concluded in accordance with the then existing

international law. The authoritarian Park government accepted the treaty for the purpose to earn

seed money for the five-year-economic program.

The authoritarian culture derived from Confucianism has set the autocratic culture of the

first president. The founder of the country Syngman Rhee had mismanaged the country and

corruption was prevalent. During his presidency, there was little significant effort to develop the

South Korean economy and Kohli (2004), a professor at Princeton, found it remained stagnant,

poor, and still based on agriculture. The dream of Park, at then a second tier army officer, was to

build a strong economy. He had in mind the five-year plan. Park who had negative views on the

founding president walked the same road of absolute governance later.

Park showed his authority by scolding college student’s lack of knowledge and

understanding of international situations. Yet, they were college students who were well

educated and had the right to vote. His authoritarian the top-down rural development known as

Samauel movement, the new village movement and the Yushin reform is an example of absolute

governance (Kim 2004).

Workers, the middle-class, the urban poor and small business owners, most hurt by the crisis and reform, had no alternative but to support their President. In this regard, President Kim is comparable to other leaders who have taken the 'populist road to market economy.'

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The Kim government has adopted a 'command and control' style in reforming the corporate sector.

The Kim government resembles the Park regime in dealing with the economical downfall of

Korea in the 1997 IMF crisis. The government is in close relation with the major corporations to

solve the economic problem through showing favoritism in policy matters for the large

corporations to save the overall economic size in times of downfall. In 1971 Kim ran for

presidency for the first time and probably won if the votes were legal. In December 1997 he ran

for the forth time and was elected. It took him 26 years after his first trial for the presidency. His

rise to presidency is significant because he was seen as the underdog throughout his whole

political career. He was abducted, sentenced to death, served prison, and exiled to be out of

country for political scheme from the former political figures in power. He was a symbol of

peace because he did not retaliate his political opponents.

Kim was from a province that was excluded from mainstream politics. The country’s

politics before the time of Kim’s rise was stigmatized to the division of geopolitics. The

relationship between Korea and Japan changed after the abduction of Kim in Tokyo by the KCIA

due to the potential danger of Kim because of his popularity and influence among the people of

Korea to revolt against the plans of the President Park, who believed he was the only one, the

chosen one to save the nation from stricken poverty. Kim was on false charges for both the Park

and Chun military regime again. Park and Chun viewed him as radical and having resemblance

of communism in the politics he propagated.

The two strategies of business rescue and monetary contraction was a logical outcome of

Park’s industrialization strategy of the country. The government flexibly adjusted its policy stand

over time for the benefit of the large companies to grow its size for the competitiveness of the

country from expansion to contraction as the South Korean business cycle proceeded. Moreover,

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as planners, EPB staff always put first the growth of South Korean economy to be the priority. A

new round of state-subsidized chaebol growth was on its way. The new hyper-growth drive was

launched in 1972 and the catalyst for the turmoil came from abroad.

Vietnam war was for military along with diplomatic reasons. The army needed practical

combat experience to be ready for unexpected North Korean combat. Park must have considered

the experience in the war field with actual opponents is a big help to protecting the country. The

U.S. aid would be possible only when South Korea abided by their rules and the U.S. requested

troops to help the Vietnam War. However, the popularity of the president declined as time

passed by with no apparent evidence of victory appearing. Eventually the Vietnam War was a

lost war and the opposing party in the United States won the presidential election, which gave

Park a hard time. The Carter administration that was against any military intervention was well

aware of the human rights abuse of Korea and threatened Park by dispatching the USFK out of

Korea unless human rights conditions improved. This pushed the shift of Korean democratic

yearnings thorough out the 60s.

The loyalists of Park take seriously his discourse of revitalization, portraying him as a

“Meiji revolutionary” who launched the Yunshin to catch up economically with the West,

modernized the armed forces in deterrence against the North, and ensure national survival in the

hazardous era of détente. The Park is a Nietzschian superhero tackling the impossible task of

transforming South Korea into a second Japan, modernizing the country in his lifetime in the

view of his loyalists, albeit through an authoritarian route. Park harnessed the triple structural

pressures to advance his vision of rich nation and strong army. Park felt limited by the existing

constitution in extending his rule.

V

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As seen from the two speeches Korea underwent a shift from importance in economic

prosperity to democratic participation. The two speeches communicate with each other to deliver

the progress within the 1960s of the issue. The leadership of the country shaped the national

spirit but the spirit itself grew to talk for itself. Park’s leadership focused on the economic

prosperity but Kim focused on democratic legitimacy. The national spirit founded out a

compromise through the shift. It is interesting to speculate how the spirit will find its place in the

21st century.