IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT OF THE SUBJECT CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

A SUMMARY OF

CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

OF

COURTS IN THE PHILIPPINES

SUBMITTED TO:

ATTY. SAN PEDRO

SUBMITTED BY:

Carpio, PoliMores, Kent B.

Quinto, Vinilla GerminaPabilona, Jocet Concisa

Salgado, Mary Antonnete M.

I. Concept of Jurisdiction in General

a) Concept

In the case of People vs. Mariano (71 SCRA 604), jurisdiction is described as the basic foundation of judicial proceedings.The word “jurisdiction” is derived from two Latin words “juris” and “dico” (I speak by the law) which means fundamentally the power or the capacity given by the law to a court or tribunal to entertain, hear and determine certain controversies.

Jurisdiction is then the power to hear and determine matters in controversy according to established rules of law and to carry the sentence or judgment of the court into execution.

b) Jurisdiction distinguished from Venue

Venue, in one decided case by the Supreme Court, is described as the particular country, or geographical area, in which a court with jurisdiction may hear and determine a case. Simply put, it means the place of trial, the locality the suit may be had. Jurisdiction, on the other hand, treats of the power of the court to decide the case on the merits. It may therefore be stated that while venue is procedural, jurisdiction is substantive.

In civil cases, venue may be waived or stipulated by the parties. On the other hand, jurisdiction is granted by law or constitution and cannot be waived or stipulated.

c) How Jurisdiction is conferred

Jurisdiction is conferred by law or the constitution. In one case decided by the Supreme Court, the court said that Philippine courts are without common law jurisdiction or power but only those expressly conferred by the constitution and statute. Constitutionally viewed, apportionment of jurisdiction is vested in the legislature. However when the law confers jurisdiction, that conferment must be clear. It cannot be presumed. It must clearly appear from the statute or will not be held to exist.

Jurisdiction cannot be fixed by the will of the parties nor can it be acquired or diminished by any act of the parties. It is neither conferred upon by the accused, express waiver or otherwise, nor conferred by mere administrative policy of any trial court since it is conferred by law.

II. Concept of Jurisdiction in criminal cases (Criminal Jurisdiction)

“Criminal Jurisdiction” is the authority to hear and try a particular offense and impose the punishment for it. (People vs. Mariano, June 30, 1976, 71 SCRA 600, 604)

Elements of jurisdiction in criminal cases:

a) The nature of the offense or the penalty attached thereto;b) The fact that the offense has been committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the

court.

Requisites for a Valid Exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction

In the case of Arula vs. Espino (28 SCRA 540, 567), the Supreme Court laid down the three important requisites which must be present before a court can validly exercise its power to hear and try a case:

a) It must have jurisdiction over the subject matter or that the offense is one which the court is by law authorized to take cognizance of;

b) It must have jurisdiction over the territory where the offense was committed or that the offense must have been committed within its territorial Jurisdiction; and

c) It must have jurisdiction over the person of the accused or that the person charged with the offense must have been brought to its presence for trial, forcibly by warrant of arrest or upon his voluntary submission to the court.

III. Jurisdiction over the subject matter

a) Concept (Jurisprudence)

By jurisdiction over the subject matter is meant the nature of the cause of action and of the relief sought, and this conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court, and is to be sought for in the general nature of its power, or in the authority especially conferred. (Perkins vs. Roxas, 72 Phil. 517)

“Jurisdiction over the subject matter” is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong. (Reyes vs Diaz, 73 Phil. 484)

“Jurisdiction over the subject matter” refers to the authority of the court to hear and determine a particular criminal case (Riano, 2011). It mandates that the offense is one which the court is by law authorized to take cognizance of. (Antiporda, Jr. v. Garchitorena, 321 SCRA 551)

b) How jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined:

Jurisdiction over a criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. In order to determine such jurisdiction, the complaint or information must be examined for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the facts set out therein and the punishment provided for by law for such acts fall within the jurisdiction of the court in which the criminal action is filed.

The jurisdiction of the court is defined by the Constitution or statute. The elements of that definition must appear in the complaint or information so as to ascertain which court has jurisdiction over a case.

c) Statute applicable to a criminal action

General Rule:

The criminal jurisdiction to try a criminal action is determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action and not during the arraignment of the accused. (Palana vs. People, 534 SCRA 296, September 28, 2007)

The statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter and not at the time of its commission even if the penalty that may be imposed at the time of its commission is less and does not fall under the court’s jurisdiction. (People vs. Lagon, 185 SCRA 442; People vs. Magallanes, 249 SCRA 212)

Exception:

Where the statute expressly provides or is construed that it is intended to operate to actions pending before its enactment, in which case, the court where the criminal action is pending is ousted of jurisdiction and the pending action will have to be transferred to the other tribunal which will continue the proceeding.

d) Use of the imposable penalty

In determining whether or not the court has jurisdiction over an offense, we consider the penalty which may be imposed upon the accused and not the actual penalty imposed after the trial. (People vs. Purisima, L-40902, February 18, 1976)

The jurisdiction of the court is not determined by what may be meted out to the offender after trial, or even by the result of the evidence that would be presented at the trial, but by the extent of the penalty which the law imposes for the offense, on the basis of the facts alleged in the information or complaint. (People vs. Buissan, 105 SCRA 547)

e) Principle of adherence of jurisdiction or continuing jurisdiction

Once jurisdiction is vested in the court, it is retained up to the end of the litigation. It cannot be withdrawn by subsequent amendment of the Information, or subsequent statutory amendment of the rules of jurisdiction, unless the amendatory law provides otherwise.

f) Dismissal on jurisdictional grounds

The rule is settled that an objection based on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised or considered by the court at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal (Fukuzume vs. People). This is consistent with the rule that the jurisdiction of the court is vested by law and cannot be conferred or waived by the parties.

Exception:

A party may be estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the court for reasons of public policy as when he initially invokes the jurisdiction of the court and then later on repudiates that same jurisdiction (Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29)

IV. Jurisdiction over the territory

a) Concept

It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by the courts in criminal cases the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.

b) Exceptions to the rule that the offense must be prosecuted in the place where the same was committed:

Where the offense was committed under the circumstances enumerated in Art. 2 of the Revised Penal Code. This offense is cognizable before the Philippine courts. It is cognizable by the court where the criminal action is first filed.

Where the Supreme Court pursuant to its constitutional powers orders a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

Where the offense is committed in a train, aircraft, or other public or private vehicle in the course of its trip, the criminal action need not be instituted in the actual place where the offense was committed. It may be instituted and tried in the court of any municipality or territory where said train, aircraft, or vehicle passed during its trip. The crime may also be instituted and tried in the place of departure and arrival.

Where the offense is committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage, the criminal action may be instituted and tried in the court of the first port of entry, or in the municipality or territory where the vessel passed during the voyage. It shall be tried not necessarily in the place where the offense was committed.

Where the case is cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, the jurisdiction of which depends upon the nature of the offense and the position of the accused.

Where the offense is written defamation.

V. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused

a) Concept

Jurisdiction over the person is acquired upon his arrest or apprehension, with or without a warrant, or his voluntary appearance or submission to the jurisdiction of the court.

Unlike jurisdiction over the subject matter, jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be waived. Hence, if he fails to make seasonable objection thereto, the accused may be deemed to have waived it. Similarly, one who desires to object to the jurisdiction of the court over his person must appear in court for that purpose only, and if he raises other questions, he waives the objection.

Voluntary submission may be effected by:

Posting bail Filing a motion to quash Appearing at the arraignment Entering trial

Katarungan Pambarangay: Lupong Tagapamayapa

Under the Local Government Code of 1991 ( Republic Act 7160), which repealed PD No. 1508, The Katarungan Pambarangay Law, there is hereby created in each barangay Lupong Tagapamayapa referred to as the Lupon composed of Punong Barangay as Chairman and 10 to 20 members (Section 399, The Local Governemnt Code of 1991).

It is important to know the jurisdiction of the mediation of the Barangay Lupon because of its mandatory character as being a prerequisite before a case is filed in court.

1) Authority of the Lupon – The lupon of each barangay shall have the authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except:

a) Where one party is the government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof;

b) Where one party is a public officer or employee and the dispute relates to the performance of his official functions;

c) Offense punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a fine exceeding Five Thousand Pesos (P 5,000.00);

d) Offenses where there is no private offended party;

e) Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities or municipalities unless the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;

f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by appropriate lupon’

g) Such other classes of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of justice or upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.

The court in which non-criminal cases not following within the authority of the lupon under this code are filed may, at any time before trial, non proprio refer the case to the lupon concerned for amicable settlement (Section 408, The Local Government Code of 1991).

MORATA vs. GOG.R. No. L-62339 October 27, 1983

FACTS:

The complaint was filed by respondent Spouses Victor GO and Flora C. Go filed a recovery of the sum of money plus damages amounting to P 49, 400 against the Petitioners Marial Luisa P. Morata and Julius Morata. The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss citing as grounds that the failure of the complaint to allege prior availment by the plaintiffs of the barangay conciliation process required by P.D. 1508, otherwise knonw as Katarungan Pambarangay Law, as well as the absence of a certification by the Lupon or Pangakat Secretary that no conciliation or settlement had been reached by the parties.

The respondent Judge issued an order denying the motion to dismiss and also denying the motion for reconsideration on the ruling that the law applies only to cases congnizable by the inferior courts mentioned in Sections 11 and 12 of the law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the complaint should be dismissed for failure to comply with PD 1508?

HELD:Yes, because the case at bar is not under the exceptions mentioned in Sections 2 and 6 of

PD 1508. The law does not distinguish for defined in Section 2 of the said law employed the universal and comprehensive term “all”, in defining the Lupon’s authority. By limiting the authority of the Lupon to cases congnizable by the inferior courts defeats the objective of the law, which is to ease the congestion of court dockets and not only in inferior courts. For what would stop a party, say in an action for a sum of money or damages, as in the instant case, from bloating up his claim in order to place his case beyond the jurisdiction of the inferior court and thereby avoid the mandatory requirement of P.D. 1508? And why, indeed, should the law seek to ease the congestion of dockets only in inferior courts and not in the regional trial courts where the log-jam of cases is much more serious? Indeed, the lawmakers could not have intended such half-measure and self-defeating legislation.

Hence, the Court declared that the conciliation process at the barangay level, prescribed by P.D. 1508 as a pre-condition for filing a complaint in court, is compulsory not only for cases falling under the exclusive competence of the metropolitan and municipal trial courts, but for actions cognizable by the regional trial courts as well.

Gegare vs. CAG.R. No. 83907September 13, 1989

FACTS:

The petitioner and the respondent are co-owners of a said lot. Lot was owned and titled by one Paulino Elma and the dispute arose when the petitioner wants the whole lot while the respondent Armie Elma was content with one-half (1/2) of the share of the lot. But then, the registration of the lot was declared null and void by Office of Registry of Deeds of Cotabato City and as reverted as a mass of public domain.

The petitioner and the private respondent filed an application in the Board of Liquidators and were ordered to divide the lot between the parties by negotiated sale. Unhappy with the decision, the petitioner filed an annulment of the said decision, which was countered by the respondent by filing a motion for the dismissal of the complaint and one of those is the ground that lack of conciliation efforts pursuant to Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1508. The petitioner argued that it is inapplicable because one of the parties is the government or any subdivision or instrumentality, thus it is exempted from the requirement of Section 2 under th law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the conciliation effort pursuant to Section 6 of the Presidential Decree No. 1580 should be followed in the case at bar?

HELD:

Yes, the court held that it is that the Board is a government instrumentality but the petitioner and private respondent who are also contending parties in the case are residents of the same barangay so Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1508 should apply to them as it provides

---Section 6. Conciliation, pre-condition to filing of complaint. No complaint, petition, action or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in court or any other government office for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has been repudiated.

The purpose of this confrontation is to enable the parties to settle their differences amicably. If the other only contending party is the government or its instrumentality or subdivision the case falls within the exception but when it is only one of the contending parties, a confrontation should still be undertaken among the other parties.

(2) Venue of Settlement – The venue of the settlement to be conducted by the Lupon is provided for by Sec. 409, to wit:

“a) Disputes between persons actually residing in the same barangay shall be brought for amicable settlement before the Lupon of said barangay;

b) Those involving actual residents of different barangays within the same city or municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the respondent or any of the respondents actually resides, at the election of the complainant;

c) All disputes involving real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the real property or the larger portion thereof is situated;

d) Those arising at the workplace where the contending parties are employed or at the institution where such parties are enrolled for study shall be brought in the barangays where such workplace or institution is located.”

The objection to venue, as provided by the aforesaid Section 409, “shall be raised in the mediation proceedings before the punong barangay; otherwise, the same shall be deemed waived. Any legal question which may confront the punong brangay in resolving objections to venue herein referred to may be submitted to the Secretary of Justice or his duly designated representative whose ruling thereon shall be binding.”

However, the parties may go directly to the court in the following instances;

“1) Where the accused is under detention;

2) Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling for habeas corpus proceedings;

3) Where actions are coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property, and support pende lite; and

4) Where the action may otherwise be barred by the statue of limitations” (Section 412[b]).

Thus, except in the instances enumerated in Sec. 412(b), the Lupon has the authority to settle amicably all types of disputes involving parties who actually reside in the same city or municipality. The law, as written, makes no distinction whatsoever with respect to the classes of disputes that may be settled in the barangay level.

Confrontation or conciliation process not jurisdictional but only a condition precedent

Inasmuch as the Local Government Code of 1991 practically reenacted the provisions of PD No. 1508, the doctrines interpretative of the latter are still applicable. Example is the doctrine in Vda. De Borromeo vs. Pogoy, 126 SCRA 217, that the conciliation process at the brangay level is a condition precedent for the filing of action in those instances where said law applies, and that the failure to avail of the conciliation process does not warrant jurisdiction objections for it merely renders the complaint vulnerable to a timely motion to dismiss (Bever vs. Court of Appeals, 169 SCRA 566). So with the doctrine in the case of Royales vs. IAC, 127 SCRA 470, categorically reiterated in Ebol vs. Amin, 135 SCRA 438, that failure to observe the conciliation process is not jurisdictional (Guevarra vs. Almodovar, 169 SCRA 476).

Non-compliance with the condition precedent could affect the sufficiency of plaintiff’s cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on the ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity. The condition is analogous to failure of a party to exhaust administrative remedies, or lack of earnest efforts to compromise suits between close members of the family, lacking which case can be dismissed. (Peregrina vs. Panis, 133 SCRA 72; Galuba vs. Laureta, 137 SCRA 627).

Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courtsin Criminal Cases

Sec. 32 and 35 of Batas PambansaBlg. 129, as amended by RA No 7691

Section 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in criminal cases. – Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinances committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction; and

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.

Section 35.Special jurisdiction in certain cases. – In the absence of all the Regional Trial Judges in a province or city, any Metropolitan Trial Judge, Municipal Trial Judge, Municipal Circuit Trial Judge may hear and decide petitions for a writ of habeas corpus or applications for bail in criminal cases in the province or city where the absent Regional Trial Judges sit.

Jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courtsin Criminal Cases

Sec. 20-23, Batas PambansaBlg. 129 otherwise known as the “Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980”

Sec. 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter.

Sec. 21. Original jurisdiction in other cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise original jurisdiction:(1)  In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions; and(2) In actions affecting ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls.

Sec. 22. Appellate jurisdiction. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Such cases shall be decided on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Courts. The decision of the Regional Trial Courts in such cases shall be appealable by petition for review to the Intermediate Appellate Court which may give it due course only when the petition shows prima facie that the lower court has committed an error of fact or law that will warrant a reversal or modification of the decision or judgment sought to be reviewed.

Section 23.Special jurisdiction to try special cases.-The Supreme Court may designate certain branches of the Regional Trial Courts to handle exclusively criminal cases, juvenile and domestic relations cases, agrarian cases, urban land reform cases which do not fall under the jurisdiction of quasi-judicial bodies and agencies, and/or such other special cases as the Supreme Court may determine in the interest of a speedy and efficient administration of justice.

RTC JURISDICTION OUTLINE

I. Exclusive Original Jurisdiction - in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body.

A. All criminal cases wherein the penalty provided by law is higher than 6 years irrespective of the amount of the imposable fine;

B. All offenses where the prescribed penalty for the offense if fine only and the imposable fine exceeds P 4,000.00;

C. Cases involving government officers and employees, wherein the accused is not one of those falling under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan; and

D. Other laws which specifically lodge jurisdiction in the RTC.

i. Laws on written defamation or libel (RA No. 4363)

ii. Those provided in Section 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court

a) Continuing crimes; b) crimes committed on a railroad train; in an aircraft; or in any public or

private vehicle while in the course of its trip; c) crimes committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage; d) other crimes committed outside of the Philippines but punishable

therein under Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code

iii. Dangerous Drugs Cases, except where the offenders are minors (Morales vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126623. December 12, 1997)

iv. Violations of the Omnibus Election Code, except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote. (ComelecvsNoynay, G.R. No. 132365. July 9, 1998)

v. Those provided in Administrative Order No. 104-96 of the Supreme Court

a) Kidnapping and/or Kidnapping for Ransom;b) Robbery in Band;c) Robbery committed against a banking or financial institution, d) Violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, regardless

of the quantity involved;

e) Violation of the Anti-carnapping Act of 1972 as amended, and other heinous crimes;and

f) Violations of Intellectual Property Rights such as, but not limited to, violations of:1. Article 188 of the Revised Penal Code [substituting and altering

trademarks, trade names, or service marks];2. Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code [unfair competition,

fraudulent registration of trademarks, trade names, or service marks, fraudulent designation of origin and false description];

3. P. D. NO. 49 [Protection of Intellectual Property Rights];4. P. D. NO. 87 [An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board];

and5. R. A. NO. 165 as amended [The Trademark Law] shall be tried

exclusively by the Regional Trial Courts in accordance with the established raffle scheme except those covered by Administrative Order NO. 113-95 dated 2 October 1995.

II. Concurrent Original Jurisdiction

A. Issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions.

B. Actions affecting ambassadors, public ministers, and consuls (Article VIII, Section 5(1), 1987 Constitution)

III.Appellate Jurisdiction -pertains to the judicial review of adjudication. It is the power to take cognizance of and review proceedings had in an inferior court, irrespective of the manner in which they were brought up.(State vs Johnson, 114 P.2d 1034, 11 Utah 316)

A. All cases decided by Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective territorial jurisdiction.

IV. Special jurisdiction to try special cases

Morales vs Court of AppealsG.R. No. 126623. December 12, 1997

FACTS:

Ernesto Morales y dela Cruz was charged of selling and delivering 0.4587 grams of Metamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a regulated drug, in violation of Section 15 in relation to Section 20 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No. 7659.

The petitioner entered a plea of not guilty upon his arraignment and subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction to try the case contending that pursuant to Section 20 of R.A. No. 7659, the penalty imposable for the offense charged should not exceed prisioncorreccional or six (6) years and under R.A. No. 7691 it is the Metropolitan Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE:

WON Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction over violations of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, when the imposable penalty is not more than six (6) years.

RULING:

The Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction.

Sec. 32 of BP 129, as amended by RA No. 7691 provides:

Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. – Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

"(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinances committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction; and

"(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof."

The aforementioned exception refers not only to Section 20 of B.P. Blg. 129 providing for the jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts in criminal cases, but also to other laws which specifically lodge in Regional Trial Courts exclusive jurisdiction over specific criminal cases regardless of the imposable penalty.

COMELEC vs NoynayG.R. No. 132365. July 9, 1998

FACTS:

In its Minute Resolution No. 96-3076 of October 29, 1996, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to file an information for violation of Section 261(i) of the Omnibus Election Code against private respondents Diosdada Amor, a public school principal, and Esbel Chua and Ruben Magluyoan, both public school teachers, for having engaged in partisan political activities.  The COMELEC authorized its Regional Director to handle the prosecution of the cases.

Forthwith, nine informations for violation of Section 261(i) of the Omnibus Election were filed to the Regional Trial Court of Allen, Northern Samar.

However, respondent Judge Tomas B. Noynay, as the presiding judge,  ordered the records of the cases to be withdrawn and directed the COMELEC Law Department to file the cases with the appropriate Municipal Trial Court on the ground that pursuant to Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by R.A. No. 7691, the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction over the cases since the maximum imposable penalty in each of the cases does not exceed 6 years of imprisonment. 

ISSUE:

WON R.A. No. 7691 has divested Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction over election offenses, which are punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding six (6) years.

RULING:

No. Under Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, Regional Trial Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of the Code, except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote.

FAMILY COURTS JURISDICTION

The Family Courts are created under Republic Act No. 8369, otherwise known as the “Family Courts Act of 1997.”

Section 5. Jurisdiction of family courts.

The Family Courts shall have exclusive jurisdictions to hear and decide the following cases:

a) Criminal cases where one or more of the accused is below eighteen (18) years of age but not less than nine (9) years of age, or where one or more of the victims is a minor at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, That if the minor is found guilty, the court shall promulgate sentence and ascertain any civil liability which the accused may have incurred. The sentence, however shall be suspended without need of application pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the “Child and Youth Welfare Code”;

(i) Cases against minors cognizable under the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended;

(j) Violations of Republic Act. 7610, otherwise known as the “Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act,” as amended by Republic Act No. 7658; and

(k) Cases of domestic violence against:

(1) Women – which are acts of gender based violence that results, or likely to result in physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women; and other forms of physical abuse such as battering and other forms of physical abuse such as battering or threats and coercion which violate woman’s personhood, integrity and freedom of movement; and

(2) Children – which include the commission of all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, violence, and discrimination and all other conditions prejudicial to their development.

If an act constitutes a criminal offense, the accused or batterer shall be subject to criminal proceedings and the corresponding penalties.

If any question involving any of the above matters should arise as an accident in any case pending in the regular courts, said incident shall be determined in that court of justice.

xxx xxx xxx

In order to implement Section 17 of Republic Act No. 8369, otherwise known as the Family Courts Act of 1997, the Supreme Court designated among the branches of the Regional Trial Court at least one Family Court in each of the following cities:

Manila Olongapo Bacolod Ozamis Quezon Cabanatuan Dumagete Dipolog Pasay San Jose Tacloban Zamboanga Caloocan Angeles Cebu Pagadian Makati Cavite Mandaue Iligan Pasig Batangas Tagbilaran and such other Mandaluyong Lucena Surigao places where Muntinlupa Naga Butuan as the Supreme Laoag Iriga Cagayan de Oro Court may Baguio Legazpi Davao deem necessary Santiago Roxas General Santos Dagupan Iloilo Oroquieta

Additional cases other than those provided in Section 5 may be assigned to the Family Courts, when dockets permit: Provided, That such additional cases shall not be heard on the same day family cases are heard.

In cases where there are no Family Courts, the case falling under the jurisdiction of said court shall be adjudicated by the Regional Trial Court.

People vs. Dela Torre - YadaoG.R. Nos. 162144-54

November 13, 2012

FACTS:

The Philippine National Police’s Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (PNP ABRITG), Task Force Habagat, Traffic Management Command (TMC), Criminal Investigation Command and National Capital Region Command killed 11 suspected members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang. After investigation and review, the Office of the Ombudsman charged the all police officers with murder, which was later dismissed because of probable cause.

After years, the case was revived. The parents of the two of the victims submitted birth certificates showing that they were minors. Apparently reacting to this, the prosecution amended the information to show such minority and asked respondent Executive Judge Ma. Natividad M. Dizon to recall the assignment of the cases to Branch 81 and re-raffle them to a family court. The request for recall was denied.

An omnibus motion was filed praying for the re-raffle of the cases to the family courts which was also denied by one of the respondents Judge Yadao on the ground that Section 5 of R.A. 8369 applied only to living minors.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Judges gravely abused their discretion by denying the

recall of directing a re-raffle of cases to a family court pursuant to Section 5 of R.A. 8369?

HELD:No, the respondent Judges did not gravely abused their discretion. The court held that, the

two minor victims, for whose interests the people wanted the murder cases moved to a family court, are dead. As respondents aptly point out, there is no living minor in the murder cases that require the special attention and protection of a family court. In fact, no minor would appear as party in those cases during trial since the minor victims are represented by their parents who had become the real private offended parties.

Undoubtedly, in vesting in family court exclusive original jurisdiction over criminal cases involving minors, the law but seeks to protect their welfare and best interests. For this reason, when the need for such protection is not compromised, the Court is able to relax the rule. In several cases, for instance, the Court has held that the CA enjoys concurrent jurisdiction with the family courts in hearing petitions for habeas corpus involving minors.

The court is not impervious to the provision of Section 5 of R.A. 8369, that vests in family courts jurisdiction over violations of R.A. 7610, which in turn covers murder cases where the victim is a minor.

JURISDICTION OF SANDIGANBAYAN

The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is perhaps one of the most often amended

provision from the 1973 Constitution to RA 8249 of 1997. Before RA 8249, jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was determined on the basis of the penalty imposable on the offense charged. Then, it was amended such that regardless of the penalty, so long as the offense charged was committed by a public officer, the Sandiganbayan was vested with jurisdiction. Under RA 8249, to determine whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction, lawyers must look into two (2) criteria, namely:

The nature of the offense

The position occupied by the accused and the salary grade of the public official

Thus, Sec.4 of RA 8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan shall have original exclusive jurisdiction over:

I. Violations of:

R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)

R.A No. 1379 (An Act Declaring Forfeiture In Favor Of The State Any Property Found To Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any Public Officer Or Employee And Providing For The Proceedings Therefor)

Chapter II, Section II, Title VII, Book II of the RPC

Where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the Government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense.

1. Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 Republic Act No. 6758 specifically including:

a. Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the SangguniangPanlalawigan, provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other provincial department heads:

b. City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the SangguniangPanglungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers and other department heads;

c. Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

d. Philippine Army and Air force colonels, naval captains and all officers of higher rank;

e. Officers of the PNP while occupying the position of Provincial Director and those holding the rank of Senior Superintendent or higher;

f. City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants; officials and the prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

g. President, directors or trustees or managers of government owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations.

2. Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as grade 27 and up under the compensation and position Classification Act of 1989.

3. Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provision of the constitution

4. Chairman and members of the constitutional commissions; and

5. All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification act of 1989.

II. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed in relation to their office by the public officials and employees mentioned above

III. Civil and Criminal Cases filed pursuant to and in connection with EO 1, 2, 14 & 14-A issued in 1986

IV. Petitions for issuance of Writ of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunction and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction; Provided, jurisdiction is not exclusive of the Supreme Court

V. Petitions for Quo Warranto arising or that may arise in cases filed or that may be filed under EO 1, 2, 14 & 14- A

VI. OTHERS provided the accused belongs to SG 27 or higher:

Violation of RA 6713 - Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards

Violation of RA 7080 - THE PLUNDER LAW

Violation of RA 7659 - The Heinous Crime Law

RA 9160 - Violation of The Anti-Money Laundering Law when committed by a public officer

DETERMINATION OF JURISDICTION:

1. Nature of the offense

2. Position occupied by the accused/salary grade of 27 and above

SALARY GRADE OF “27: AND HIGHER

Those enumerated in Section 4(a)(1) from letters a-g of P.D 1606 are subject to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan regardless of their salary grade. Thus if the accused does not belong to the national and local officials enumerated, in order for the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the offense, the same must be committed by the officials classified as grade 27 and higher, aside from the officials expressly covered.

OFFICERS FALLING BELOW SALARY GRADE “27”

People of the Philippines vsSandiganbayan, G.R. No. 169004

The core issue in this case was whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member of the SangguniangPanlungsod whose salary grade is below 27 and charged with violation of the Auditing Law Code of the Philippines. The court held in the affirmative, citing the provisions of R.A. 8249 and those that are classified as grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayanprovided that they hold the positions thus enumerated in the same law.

Serana vs Sandiganbayan

A student regent of a state university is a public officer. The provisions of Sec. 4(a)(1)(g) of P.D. 1606 as amended, explicitly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over presidents, directors or trustees or managers of government owned or controlled

corporations,stateuniversities or educational institutions or foundations. The petitioner, as a student regent falls under this category. The Board of regents of the University of the Philippines perfroms functions similar to those of board of trustees of a non-stock corporation. By express mandate of the law, the petitioner declared the court, is a public officer as comtemplated by P.D. 1606. The court added that the compensation is not an essential element of a public office and is merely incidental to the public.

IN RELATION TO PUBLIC OFFICE:

The offense must be a constituent element of the crime as required in the statute.The test to determine if the offense is committed in relation to public office is whether the offence cannot exist without the office.

1. Public office as an element of the crime

2. Offense committed is intimately related to public office as charged in the information or complaint

People vsMontejo (108 Phil 613)

“Although a public office is not an element of the crime of murder in abstract, where the offense therein charged in the information is intimately connected with the respective offices of the accused and was perpetuated while they were in the performance, though irregular or improper, of their official functions and had no personal motive to commit the crime and would not have committed it had they not held their public office and merely obeyed the instruction of their superior , the offense may be said to have been committed in relation to their offense.”

However;

MontillavsHilario (90 Phil 49)

“Where the allegations in of the information, it does not appear that the official positions were connected with the offense charged, it cannot be said that they are charged of an offense committed in relation to their official position.”

A mere allegation that the crime was committed in relation to public office is not what determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is the specific factual allegation in the information that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of the discharge of the accuser’s official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to public office.

JURISDICTION MUST BE DETERMINED BY ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT:

It would appear from the reading of jurisprudence that if public office is a constituent element of the crime charged as provided for by a statue, there is no need for the information be to state the factual allegations of the intimacy of the office and the crime charged, or that the accused committed the crime in the performance of his duties. These crimes are those in which a public official is a constituent element as defined by statute and the relation between the crime and the offense is such that, in the legal sense, the offense committed cannot exist without the office like malversation of public funds or property defined and penalized by article 217 of the RPC, and the illegal use of public funds or property defined and penalized by ART. 220 of the same code.(Riano, 2011)

In those cases where the public office is not a constituent of the offense charged, the information has contain specific factual allegations showing the intimate connection between the offense charged and the public office of the accused, and the discharge of his official duties or functions – whether improper or irregular.

SANDIGANBAYAN VS OMBUDSMAN

The jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute PO for any illegal act or omission is not exclusive but shared concurrent authority in respect to the offense charged. The ombudsman primary power is dependent on the cases cognizable by Sandiganbayan. But the authority is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies. However, the Ombudsman may take over the investigation of such case at any stage from any investigative agency of the government. This is only directory.

PUBLIC OFFICIAL Charged as mere ACCOMPLICE OF PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL

If a public officer is charged as a mere accomplice or accessory with private individual, as principal, the corollary implication is that the former shall be tried jointly with the latter in the ordinary courts.