Filos Comp Trad Din Ital in Eng

7/29/2019 Filos Comp Trad Din Ital in Eng

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C O M P A R A T I V EL E G A L PHILOSOPHY

Applied to Legal InstitutionsBY

L U I G I M I R A G L I AProfrnJcncf m . Vyr ; / n i f j /

M o d e r n L e g a l P h i l o s o p h > Se r i e sVol. I l I

H i k r R E P R I N T 1998 V- =G A L ' N T , l N C .


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T A B L E O F C O N T E N T SI N T R O D U C T I O N

1. Greek Speculat ion and R om an D ogm a 12. The P h i l o so p h y o f t h e M i d d l e Ages 73. The Renai s sance 124. B a c o n , D es Ca r t e s , a nd G r o t i us 1 95. Hobbes , S p in o z a , an d Leibn itz 2o6. Puf fendor f , Thom as i us . a nd W ol f f . Rousseau 337. Vico 418 . Kan t 469. Genovesi , Fi ch te , Speda l i e r i, a nd R om agnos i 50

10. The XVriters o f t h e R eact i o n a ry Pe r i o d . The His tor ica lan d Phi losophica! Schools - Sche l l ing and Schle ier -m a c h e r 60

11. HegeI 6612 . Ro sm in i , H er ba r t , T r ende lenbur g . a nd Krau s e . T h eva r i ous phases of ScheHing ' s p h i l o s o p h y . Stahl an dS c h o p e n h a u e r 7113. Mater i a l i sm, Posi t iv ism, and Cri t ic i sm 82

BOOK IG E N " E R A L PART

C H A P T E R ITHE l D E A OF THE P H I L O S O P H Y OF THE LAW 87P h i l o so p h y and t h e sciences. Th e character o f modernp h i l o s o p h y as foreshadowed by Vico. P h i l o s o p h y of the la wa s p a r t of p h i I o so p h y . Th e h u m a n idea of law acco r d i ngto ch e doctr ine of Vico, and the d e f i n i t i o n s of Kan t , H ege I ,T r ende lenbur g , R om agnos i , a nd R o s m i n i . The social a n dlega l theories. Law and p o s i t i v e p h i l o s o p h y .


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X X X J V C O N T E N T SCHAPTER II

THE lDEA OF LAW AND L O G I C A L METHODS 104I n d u c t io n and deduc t i on . Induction, observation, and ex -periment. The idea of natural U w and t h a t of the civilgood (of Ama r i ) as s h o w n by i nduc t i on . The importanceofthecomparativehistoricalmeihodusedbyVico,Amari,Post.and M a i ne . P a r a l l e l i s m i n t h e development o f l a nguagea n d l a w . Statistic i n d u c t i o n . The duty of deduction.The ab s t r a c t and conc r e t e un i ve r s a l s as principals.

CHAPTER lHTHE l N D U C T I V E lDEA OF LAW 119T h e study o f t h e e t h i c o - ju r id i c consciousness of variouspeop le s . The con t r i bu t i on o f t h e Aryan and Sem i t i c ra ce sto the h is to r> ' of civilization. T h e idea o f l aw a s t h e m e a s -ure of the Aryan r a ce . M e a s u r e based on t h e p hy s i c a lo r d e r , on po s i t i ve l aw , and reasoc.

CHAPTER IVTHETHEORETlCA^PRESUPPOSITlONSOF THE DEDUCTIVE

lDEA OF LAW 135T h e p r i n c i p l e o f p e r so n a l i t y . T h e o r g a n i c a nd s p i r i tua le lements of the per;on and their correspondence. The un -f o l d i ng o f m a t e r i a l i sm . T h e theory of e v o lu t io n . Th ecriticism of mechanical evolution.C H A P T E R V

COROLLARIESOFTHESETHEORETlCALPRESUPPOSmONS. . . 157The theory of evolution and psychology. Fundamentals e n t i m e n t and the $ensat ions . Consciousness and i ts or ig in .Sensible and cognitive representations. Thought and thecategories. Cognition a c c o rd in g to objective empi r ic i sm.Criticism of that theory.

C H A P T E R V IP R A C T I C A L F O U N D A T I O N S O F T H E D E D U C T I V E l D E A O F

LAW'. DEVELOPMENT AND DlVlSION" 178Instinct, desire, and wil l . Caprice and m or a l f reedom.The constancy of h u m a n acts as s hown by statistics.E n d o f m a n a n d happiness. H u m a n h a p p I n e s s a nd th e &w .The imperative, prohibitive,and permissive forms of law.L aw as a p r i nc i p l e of coercion or coexi ftence and of h a r m o n y ,The rational trindivision of l aw . The division of Gaius.

v_uiN i n - i > i ioC H A P T E R V II

CRlTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PRIXCIPAL DEFINITIONS OFL A W . 210

;

The doctrines that give p reference to the sensible contento f law: Hobbes , Spinoza , Rousseau, Stuart Mi l l , ahdSpencer. The doctrines that consider Uiw as an abstractra t iona l f o r m: Kant, Fichte, a n d Herbart. T h e defini t ionsof Krause and of Trendelenburg. Th e truth of the doctrinesexamined .C H A P T E R V I H

L A W , M O R A L S , AND SOC!AL S C I E N C E 342The l aw a s an e t h i c a l s tudy . The rektion between moraIsand law in h is to r y . Cri t ic ism of the confus ion an d separa-t ion o f the t*'O terms. T h e c o m m o n ba&es an d rea l di f f t r -ence . Eth i c a l an d social l i fe . Vico, Suesamilch , and thephysiocra t ic fo ren inners of social science. Com te ' s soci-ology and t h e va r i ous m o v e m e n t s . Spencer's sociology.Sociology as the p h i l o so p h y of the sociaI sciences. Th eanalogies between society and o r g an i s m . Th e r e l a t i o n sbe tween taw and the soc ia l sciences.C H A P T E R I X

LAW, S O C I A L E C O N O M Y , A _ N D POLITICS 267Th e social-economic r egu l a t i on s and t h e ancientand modern philosophers of I aw. Ethics, sociology based onbiology, pol i t ics , an d h i s t o r y as h y p o t h e s e s of economics .The character of the economic fact . The relations of lawand economics . Th e c o n c e p t of poiitics. Pottt ics . thesociaI sciences, ethics, and l aw . The f u U meaning of theState .CHAPTER X

R A T I O N A L A N D P O S I T I V E L A W . S O U R C E S A X D A P P L l C A T I O N . 295T h e dis t inct ion between ra t iona l and p o s i ti ve l aw in t h e i rn a t u re a n d i n h i s to r y . H ab i t an d pr imi r i%^ cus tom . Juris-prudence and i t3 office. Legis la t ion and the codes. T h eefficacy of s t a tu t e s in space. Th e efficacy of the statutesin t ime. The diverse theories of retroactivity.


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C O M P A R A T I V E LEGAL PHILOSOPHY

INTRODUCTIONA SU R V EY OF P H I L O S O P H I C A L SY5TEMS

IG R E E K S P E C U L A T I O N A N D R O M A N DOGMA

Th e fundamenta l principle of things and of knowledgeis to be f o u n d , acco rd ing to G r e e k speculation, alwaysouts ide th e m i n d in the o b je c t . T h e objec t fo r theIoNi c s is wa te r , th e p r imi t iv e material without deter-minate quality (that is, innn i t e) , and the air; for theP v T H A G O R E A N s , it is n u m b c r , th e essence of things;

, f o r th e EtEATics , it is p u r e , abstract, a n d immovablebeing , that has no be g inn ing , nor e nd , that is not divis-ible, that does not go from place to pIace, but isa l w ay s o ne a nd p e r f e c t . Th e or ig in of be ings , accord-in g to H E R A C L i T u s , is bt r t h or the p e r e nn i a l f low;according to EMPEDocLEs, it lies in the complexity of thefour elements, water , air , nre,and earth, originally differ-en t in qu a l i t y , f rom wh o s e u n i o n a n d separation thingsa r e bo r n a nd p e r i s h ; a nd f o r D E M O C R i T u s , it consistsin the indef ini te plurality of atoms without quaUtativedi f ference an d v a r i o us o n ly in form.A x . u c A G O R A S b u i l d s u p t h e W h o l e with p r imit ive e le -me n t s of d iverse na tu r e , called by h im "seeds" a n d later"homoiomerei," and with the Noos or inteUigence that


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2 I N T R O D U C T O R Y S U R V E Yg i ves t hem t he i r order. T h e SopHis rs sho w that truthcannot be f o u n d by natural kn o w led g e , because p h e -n o m e n o n is v a r i a b l e a nd contrad:ctory. Th e r e a l i t y o ft h i n g s is d i f f e r e n t f r o m o ur kn o w led g e , a n d t h e r e fo r et h o u g h t is o n l y a be l ie f , a n d h a p p i n e s s l i es m p l e a s u r ea n d u t iH ty . SocRATES discovers t he idea l ob jec t , andt e ache s that t r ue knowledge i s f o u nd e d on t h e con -cept o f t h i n g s , sepa r a t ed b y i n d uc t io n an d d e t e rm i n a t edby d e f i n i t i o n . P L A T O raises t he Socrat ic concept s (nowb ec o m e i d ea s ) a n d g i ve s t hem t he i r o rd e r by dia lec t ic s .BeI ie f , in h is m i n d , i s c o n n ec ted w i t h s en s ib l e ph e -n o m e n a , w h i l e th e concept corresponds t o t h e r e a I a n di m m ut ab le e s sen c e or !dea, a s a m e t a p h y s i c a I p r inc i p l e .A R i S T O T L E m akes th e P l a t o n i c I d ea th e form o f r e a l i t y ,b ec ause t h e r e ca n be no e s se n ce w i t h o u t p h e n o m e n a .A f t e r P l a t o a nd Aris tot l e came t h e p h i l o s op h e r s o fth e i d ea l ob j e c t i v i t y , w i t h t h e belief that th e p r i n c i p l eof t h i n g s i s no t yet f o u n d , a n d that, c o n seq uen t ly , i t isc o n v e n i e n t to l e t prac t ica l in t erest p r e v a i l a nd t o lu l lth e s p i r i t to s l eep w i t h i n t e rn a l sa t i s fact ions . SToicisM,E p i c u R E A N i S M , a n d ScEPTiciSM ex p re s s th e s a m et en d en c y o f t he sub j ec t to r en o un c e the pos s ib i l i ty ofs e l f - s a t i s f a c t i o n . T h e 5toics an d t he E pi c u rean s c o n -s i d e r k n o w l e d g e a s a m e a n s of practical l i f e , w ho se o b j ec ti s t he h a p p i n e s s a t t a i n ab l e o n ly by r e a so n freed f r o m p a s -s i o n , that i s , by v i r t u e , accord ing to the f i r s t , o r by sensea nd p l e a su r e a i d ed by calculation, accord ing to the sec-o n d . T h e Sceptics believe that th e sa t i s fac t ion o f t hesp i r i t i s not best attained by kn o w led g e b ec ause t h i n g sa re u n k n o w a b l e a n d ind if f e rent for us , fo r we can a t -t r i b u t e to t h e m d i f f e r e n t a n d contrad ictory predicates.If t h i n g s a r e i n d i f f e r e n t fo r us , t h e s p i r i t s h o u I d n o t o e dis-t u r b e d , w h a t e v e r h a p p e n s . S c e p t i c i s m i s t h e d e m o n s t r a -t io n t h a t t r u t h cannot be l e a rn ed b y r e a s o n ; d i f fe r ing f r o mt h e t e a c h i n g o f t h e S o p h i s t s , w h i c h i s t he d emon s t r a t i on

GKEtKb A M U k O M A N S 3that t ruth c an n o t be a t t a i n ed by n a t u r a l kn o w led g e o rsense. Therefore , Socrates opposes the Sophists an dsays that if truth c an n o t be learned by sense or bel i ef ,it is found in knowledge, or the concept s .Since w e c an n o t l e a rn t ru t h by reason , conc lude th eN E o - P L A T O N i S T S , it m u s t be h i g he r t h an r e a so n a ndm ust be r eg a rd ed a s a p r i n c i p l e t r an sc en d en t , supra-inte l l ig ible , inefTable, an object of f a i t h , ascetics, andecstatics. Th e sup r a - i n t e l l i g i b l e i n N e o - P l a t on i s m i sn o t h i n g m o re t h an t h e o l d G r e e k inte l l ect , w hi c h by i t sn a t u r e a lw ay s s eeks t he p r i n c i p l e o f t h i n g s w i t ho u ti tsel f , since it is w i t h o u t i t s own content ; that is , truthwhich is f e l t in an o b j ec ti v e m a n n e r .Th e Et h os , g iven such a c ha r ac t e r in Greek ph i l o so phy ,c an n o t fai l to be objec t ive and to be es tabHshed, there-

fore, in t he form o f a n a t u r a l o r g an i sm . I n suc h , t hep a r t is a lw ay s m ed i a l a nd ne v e r u l t ima te ; h e n c e th edefect o f an y t rue p e r so n a l an d p r i v a t e r i g h t i n Greeks oc i e t y . Py t h a go ra s sees in just ice a n u m b e r ; Socratesdiscerns the rneasure of a l l t h ing s in t he commonn a t u r e o f m e n , a ll e ag e r fo r h a p p i n e s s , w h o attain itin i t s t ru t h , t h ro ug h t he rea l iza t ion of t he concept s ,that r e p r e s e n t th e idea l ob jec t . Plato places th e Ethosui th e idea o f h a p p i n e s s , w h i ch cont rol s in t he spi r i tua lwor ld , h a v i n g ac t ua l sub s t an c e , a s s u p r e m e a s t h e sun ,which does n o t d e p e n d u p o n th e b eho ld e r but sheds itsl i g h t over a l l . Such an idea (wh ich h a s n o part inrea l i ty , a l t ho ug h r ea l i t y c an m o u ld it s e lf t he r eo n )c an n o t be bet t er i nc a rna t e d t h a n in a b e au t i fu l a n d ar t i -f ic ia l state, a ll c o m ple t e , a s M ine rv a , sp r i n g i n g fu l l yarmed from t h e h e a d o f J u p i t e r . T h e Pla ton ic state isideal, e x e m p l a r y ; it r ep r e sen t s m a n i n t h e abstract, a n dunites in itself th e v a r i e t y o f m div idu a l potentialiuesby that s am e force by w h i c h th e i n t e rn a l p r i n c i p l eo f H f e i n t e r pen e t r a t e s th e o rg an s .


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I N T R O D U C T O R Y S U R V E Yhuman nature; he reproduces the Aristotelean theoryof the State, bu t assigns it a mixed f o r m , proper to thepolitical organization of Rome. II

T H E P H I L O S O P H Y O F T H E M I D D L E A G E SThe empty subject, represented by the Neo-Platonists

as an o b j e c t , received in the Middle Ages all its concrete-ness and, in the terms of Christianity, was defined asthe Word or absolute mind. Philosophy, henceforth,became a subjective princip le. Man, the image of God,and the incarnation of the Word, came to his own; andthe ancient State, losing its h i g h s i g n i f i c a n c e , was con-stricted within closer bounds. The rnore intimate partof the i n d i v i d u a l was no l o n g e r subjected to the politicalpover, but rather to new beliefs that originally keptwithin the celestial r e a l m in which they were born andacted in opposition to the pagan regime. The Apostlecreated a c o n t r a d i c t i o n b e t w e e n the desires of the flesha n d the impulsesof the spirit. LACTANTius believed thattrue justice lay in the worship of the one God, unknownto the Gentiles. A u c u s T i x E speaks of a celestial city,the seat of truth and justice, in contradistinction to theterrestrial city, the den of thieves and the product oforiginal sin. The terrestrial city can acquire an ethicalvalue by g i v i ng i t s e l f over to the d e f e n s e of the Church,w h i c h had not at this time acquired its character ofruler or U s mundane interests.

The strugg!e between Christianity and the world wasm u c h diminished when, through the work of religiousphantasy, the celestial city was populated by an hostsubject to divine command, possessing an history, andthe earth became holy through contact with the Church;w h i c h , initsturn, becamea temporal instead ofaspiritualc o m m u n i o n . The conciliation was e f fec ted through anew conception of participation, of which


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8 I N T R O D U C T O R Y S U R V E YAouNAS w a s t h e f o u n d e r . Aristotle h a d s a i d t h a t th eun i ve r s a l s a re second sub s t an ces , a n d h e h a d f u r t h e rasserted that they were qual i t ies . R E A L i s M d eve lo pedt he s i d e o f t he A r i s to t e l e an sy s t em i n w h i c h t he un i ve r -sals appear a s separate f o rm s . N b M i N ' A L i s M was in i t sturn based o n that s ide in w h i c h p r i m a l r e a l i t y seem sp l ac ed in t he i n d i v i d u a l . N o m i n a l i s m , n o t b e i n g e a s i l ycorrela t ed wi th a n y d o g m as , was soon c o n d e m n e d ;R e a l i s m , b e i n g an a lo g o us t o t h e h e t e r o d o x t r a n s c e n d e n -t a l i sm o f t he A ra b i an c o m m e n t a t o r s , m et a s im i l a r f a t e .A q u i n a s , i n t h e f o o t s t ep s of A L B E R T u s M A G X u s , t r i ed ac o m p r o m i s e , c l a i m i n g that th e u n i v e r s a l s a r e m o d e l s o fc r ea t i o n befo re m at e r i a l ex i s t en c e , an d that in mater i a lexi s t ence t hey a re the sub s t an c e of ou r c o n c ep t i o n s .There i s , f o r A q u i n a s , o n e e t e rn a l l aw i n G o d ; a n a t u r a lI a w , w h i c h is a p a r t i c i p a t i on i n t he e t e rn a ! , t he l i g h t of

k n o w l e d g e a nd t h e no rm o f e t h i c a l a n d j u r i s t i c acts;a n d a h u m a n o r pos i t ive l a w , a s h a d o w of t h e n a t u r a l ,j u s t a s that in i t s t u r n is a s h a d o w of t h e e t e r n a l . B u th e d id n o t succeed i n h i s p r o j e c t o f co nc i l i a t i o n ; f o r t h es u p e r n a t u r a I r e m a i n e d in i ts t r an sc en d en c e i n t he d i v i n ei n t e l l ec t , an d t he s p he r e o f the k i n g (w h o m us t o b eyA r i s t o t l e ) r em a i n ed i n op p os i t i on t o t he s ph e r e o f t hep r i e s t (w h o m u s t o b ey t he B ib l e ) - Hence t he exi s t enceof c o n t r ad i c t o ry s en t en c es in St . T h o m a s . w ho n o wd e r i v e s t h e State f rom th e sociaJ n a t u r e o f m a n , a n da s s i g n s h a p p t n e s s for i ts objec t , a n d g en e r a l c o n sen t fo rit s b ase , a n d yet a t t he s a m e t i m e cons iders i t t h er e a l i z a t i o n o f t he d i v i n e k i n g d o m in i ts t e m p o r a l aspect.T h e a m a l g a m d i s s o l v e d, th e A r i s t o t e l e an e l em en t s f i n a I l yc o n c en t r a t ed in the po l i t i c a l d o c t r i n e s of MA R s iuus ofP a d u a , a n d t h e t r a d i t i o n a l i n t h e d y n a s t i c o - h i e r a r c h i c a ld o c t r i n e s of P E T E R of A n d lo . W h i l e E c i o j o C o L O N N A ,on t h e one h a n d , ex ag g e r a t ed th e re l ig ious p r i n c i p l e ,presenting th e type of h e rm i t - p r i nce lacking conf idence

MlDDLE A GE S 9in h i s o w n po w er an d love of g l o ry , a n d advised t he pu r -suit of h a p p i n e s s in Go d , o n t he o t h e r h a n d h e r ep ro -duced th e ideas ol the Stagirite a nd g a i n ed f r o m h iscontemporar i es th e t i t le of "doctor funda t i s s imus ."D x N T E conceived l aw as the pe rsona l and real relat ionbetween ma n a n d m a n , a nd there fore dis t inguished i tf rom m o ra l s , by w h i c h an ac t ion is good or bad of itselfwi th o u t re la t ion to the r igh t s of an o t he r . H e knewh ow to d is t inguish with n ne ac um en th e di f ferencebetween lega l f r e e d o m a n d un t r am m el l ed c a p r i c e ; be-cause th e f o rm e r , accord ing to h i m , i s t he p o w e r thatma k e s every i n d i v i d ua l com p e t e n t to w o r k in accord-ance with th e j u d g m e n t that h e htmseU h a s m a d e aboutth e rec t i tude of h i s acts w i t h o u t being d i s tu r bed byo t h e r s ; th e l a t t e r is o n ly g o ve rn ed by desire. Th e ob j e c to f clvil society, in h is m i n d , is th e inc rease of civUiza-

t ion, which l ies in t he g reatest poss ib le d e v e l o p m e n t ofth e m i n d , L a w s t r e n g t h e n s it ; otherwise , it does n o tdeserve it s g r e a t n a m e . T h e State looks to the attain-me nt of t he t r a n s i t o ry a im s o F hum an n a t u r e , w h i l e t heC h u r c h , concerned wi th non - t r a n s i t o ry objects , cannotexercise c ivi l dominion . D a n t e solved the politicalproblem by a system o f f ree an d i n d epen d en t m un i c i pa lSt a t es , each th e h e a d o f it s o wn territory, w i t h po w erto res i s t poss ib le d i scordant amb i t i on s vested in a kingor sup r em e m ag i s t r a t e o f the r epub l i c o f the States, w h owould govern accord ing to f un d a r aen t a l l aw s a nd bet he ag en t o f a l l t he States. T h e princip le o f un i ty isp r e s e n t J n th e m i n d o f D a n t e o n every s ide; because ofth e p r e d o mina t i ng d i v i n e a na l ogy , because o f t he classicr em em b ran c e of the E m p i r e , because of the constitu-t io n o f t he Ch urc h , equa l ly ca thol ic , an d because of hi spu rpo se of a v o id ing s t rug g l e s b e tw een n a t i o n s .B A R T O L U S , wh o deserves c red i t fo r h a v i n g extendedthe sp here of jur i sp ruden ce by co l lect ing analogies f rom


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10 I N T R O D U C T O R Y S U R V E Y T H E M I D P L P - 11th e cases d ec i d ed b y t he Ro m an j u r i sc o n su l t s an d f o rhaving f reed judges f r o m many d i fncult i es and accusedpersons f r o m corrupuon o n t he part of t he j u d g e s ,does not cons ider (because h e is a w r i t e r on pract ica ll a w ) t he h i s t o ry o f t he p h i l o s o p h y o f l aw . Fo- th e s a mer e a s o n a l I t he c o m m en t a t o r s d is rega rd it , h o we v e rkeen they may be in the discovery of equitable prin-cip les , an d i n th e a p p U c a t i o n o f t h e d ia lect ics o f A r a b i a nphilosophy to the treatment of various subjects. SoBa r to lu s d i s r e g a r d s i t i n t h e sphere of civil law (a sGravina has sa id ) . The Thomists and the Scotists,i r reconci lable in a l l e l se , ag r ee i n a d mi t t i ng a n i d e a l i s t i cand rea l is t ic d ua I i t y . OccAM destroys s u ch i n t e r -me d i a r i e s in t he o r d e r o f c o g m t io n an d recognizes directco mm u nio n o f s u b j e c t a nd o b j e c t ; o n th e p r a c t i ca lscore, he, the enemy of intermediaries, shows in a con-cise w a y th e ne ce s s i t y of t he s e p a r a t i o n o f State a n dC h u r c h , Occam separates a lso t heo lo g y f rom p h i l -o s o p h y , a n d d i >cu=se s th e c o n t r a d i c t i o n s of d o g m a a ndr e a s o n . Fo r h i m , r e a s o n i? i n su f n c i e n t , a nd t h e o n l ym e am s o f salvation is f a i t h . Theology, separated f romp h i l o s o p h y . i s t h o u g h t sa fe b ec ause its e n e m y i s nolo nge r by its side. and Philosophy becomes f reer .This i s t he m o m e n t of the d i s s o lu t io n o f S ch o l a s t i c i s m ,w hi c h h a d r ep r e sen t ed a progressive step f rom Patris-t i c i s m . P a t r i s t i c p h i l o s o p h y is t h e e l ab o r a t l o n o f d o g m aby p h i l o s o p h i c re f i ect ion . S ch o l a s t i c i s m i s t h e sy s t em a -t i z a t i o n o f d e f m i t e d o g m a s a nd t h e d e mo n s t r a t i o n o ft h e i r c o h e r e n c e . B o t h S ch o l a s t i c s a n d Patristics re lyon d o g m a , to wh ich the Scholastics a p p l y rationalisticmethods, d i s t i ngu i s h ing , t h e r e f o r e , bel i e f f rom fa i t h .Faith and reason. at first, are in accord, t h o u gh thel a t t e r d e p e n d s u p o n th e f o r m e r . La te r , t he t w o termsa re f o u n d in d i s a cco r d , a n d s e p a r a t e , r e s u l t i n g i n t h ed o w n fa l l o f Sc ho l a s t i c s . H e r e it is use fu l to r e me mbe r

that even from its b e g i n n i n g Scholasticism had twodive r se d i r e c t i o n s ; D u ns S co Tu s says that authoritycomes f rom reason, and AxsELM of Aosta teaches thatt here i s no ne e d of u n d e r s t a n d i n g in o rder to believe,bu t that belief is necessary in o r d e r to u nd e r s t a nd .ln the days of Scholasticism, other systems appeared,which , t h o u gh n o t ge ne r a l l y received , a re importantbecause they contained the germs of f u tu r e specula-t ion. These sys tems depen d a l so on the h y p o t h e s i s o ft r a n s ce nd e n t a l i s m , a l t h o u g h t h e y a r e n o t logicaI ly har-m o n io us t h e r e w i t h . R o g e r B A C O N r e c o m m e n d s th es tudy o f l a n g u a g e , t o u nd e r s t a n d t h e s o u r ce s, a nd h erelies greatly on mathematical and n a t u r a l sciences,a nd s t a te s t h a t w i t h o u t e xp e r i e nce no t h ing c an b e k n o w n ,a nd that exper ience a lone should contro l speculatives tu di e s . Bu t h e co nne c t s i n t e r na l e xp e r i e nce w i t h m y s t i -cism an d p l a ce s t h e o lo gy a bo v e p h i l o s o p h y ; teachingt h a t k no wI e d ge i s v a in i f i t h a s n o t t h e d iv ine f o r a nobject. R a y m o n d LuLLv co ns id e r s d e mo n s t r a t i o n m o r eimp o r t a n t than f a i t h ; in the "Ars Magna," a logicala nd m a t h e m a t i c a l m e t h o d of u n i f y i n g th e concepts a n dof resolving scientif ic problems, he tries to constitutean a p r i o r i sc ience a nd f a i t h . NicHOLAs o f C u s a admitst h a t th e m i n d ca n raise itself to i n f i n i t u d e a s a p r i n -ciple in w hi ch co n t r a d ic t i o ns co incide . Such co incidenceca nno t be u nd e r s t o o d by sc ience , a n d t h e r e f o r e there isa state o f l e a r ne d i gno r a nce . Fo r h i m , Go d i s t heabso lute g r e a tne s s i n w h i c h a l l b e i n g is b o u n d ; th e u n i -verse is the concrete greatness that contains explicitlyw h a t G o d co n t a in s impl ic i t ly .


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12 INTRODUCTORY SURVEY

II ITHE RENAISSANCE

Sc ho l a s t i c ph i l o so phy deprives th e m i n d o f truth(which i s con t a i ne d in t he d e f in i t i o n o f f a i t h ) , an d doesn o t i n c l ud e n a t u r e in i t s categories. T h e e n s u i n gp h i l o s o p h y , a com p l e t e crit icism of Sch olast icism, issc ep t ic b ec ause t ru t h p l a c ed above th e in te l lec t c a n n o tbe attained; and it i n c l i n e s to Natura!ism, because,accord ing t o t he t h i n k e r s o f t he Renai ssance, in n a t u r ea lo n e c a n b e seen th e t r a c e s a n d later t h e v e ry subst anceof truth, abstracted by m i n d a nd e ncora p a s s e d byd o g m a .T he c o n v i c t i o n o f t he d iv i ne w or t h o f t he world a n dof m a n arose a f t e r hu m a n i t y g r ew hun g ry i n i t s i n ab i l i t yt o f i nd God e i t h e r i n t h e C h u r c h (become to o t er rest r i a iw i t h i t s w ea l t h an d i ts g o ve rn m en t ) o r i n the Ho lyS e p u t c h r e ( t he a im o f t h e Crusades). This was th ecause of the r e n e w a l of c lass ic cul ture , w h ic h im p I i e da n attentive s t ud y o f ph en o m en a , a r e spect f o r w o r k ,a g e n e r a l n eed o f r e f o r m , a nd t h e e nd o f pol i t i ca l f e u d a l -is m ( so c lo se ly c o n n ec ted w i t h r e l ig i o n an d s p ec u l a t i o n ) .B y this c o n v i c t i o n , l a r g e l y , w ere c aused m an y o f t hei m po r t an t c ha r ac t e r i s t i c s o f t he n ew age, such a s t hei n c r ea se o f c o m m erc e ( fo l l owing th e C r u s a d e s ) , t h e v o y -ages fo r the d i s cov e ry o f ne w l a n d s a nd a ne w con-t i n e n t, t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e o f la y authority, a n d t h ef o r m a t i o n of ab so lu t e m o n a rc h i e s . These de s t roye dth e f e ud a l po w er an d l a i d t he f o un d a t i o n s t o n e o fn a t i o n a l i t y , o f Protestantism, an d o f t he Ca t ho l i cRes t o r a t i o n , w i t h t he d ec rea se in papal au t ho r i t y .T he i n ven t i o n o f p r i n t i n g ex p r e s sed t he f i r s t un i t y o fp o p u l a r t h o u g h t . So t he m an o f t he M i d d le A g es w a s

i

.

13t r an s fo r m e d into that n e w m a n w h o follows a thousandindus t r ies , who is t en ac i o us of h is p rofe s s ion , w h o con-cerns himsel f w i t h t he f a c t s o f this world in popularassembl ies , w ho n o lo n g e r ru ns to Ub*rate sepulchres,no r at t ends t o u r ne ys , but l a u g h s m his sleeve at thestories of the inves t i tu re o f popes a nd kings .In l t a ly , t he new man was i nc a rna t e in MACHLWELU.C o mp le t e l y do im na t e d by t h e spirit of h i s t ime, he didnot seek t he a id of metaphysica l and t heologica l ele-m e n t s for soc ia l reconst ruc t ion ; t h e s e he he ld up t oscorn w i t h f i n e i r o n y , w h e n he d i scoursed about th eecclesiastical p r i nc i p a H t i e s . H e went deep into th eef fectua l t ruth of t h i n g s , and was no t sa t is f ied with Ltsima ge . His p u r p o s e w a s to m ake Italy a State. Hesa w that, i n h i s d a y , this could not be a t t a i n ed by moral

m et ho d s ; a n d , h a v i n g b e fo r e h i s m i n d th e ine rTec tuala t t e m p t of S . A V O N A R O L A , h e f o u g h t a practical battlewi th o u t hes i t a t i o n o ve r the m o ra l i t y o f h i s m ean s . Heconce ived of t h e State a s a di st inc t inst i tut ion essen-t i a l ly c iv i l , an d ha v i n g i n i ts e l f a reason fo r existence,a nd s t rong in i t s own force . M a c h i a v e l l i d id not goou t of the circle of pol i t i ca l types des lgned by PoLYB-rcs; an d , l i ke P o ly b i us , he p r e f e r r e d t he mixed type( o f w h i c h P a r u t a l a t e r ac c u r a t e ly m easu red th e di f f icul ty) .P R O T E S T A v n s M was an act o f the new m a n . A f t e rs t a r t i n g w i t h ho n es t p r inc i p l e s , i t was not p e rv e r t e d b yLutHER (a s G u icc i a r d in i m a i n t a i n e d ) ; nor was i t t h eresu l t o f m ere o ppo r t un i t y ( a s t he J e su i t s an d Voltaireh a v e sa i d ) . P ro t e s t an t i sm d es t ro y ed th e h i e r a r c h y . Itvanted the divine W o r d to be i n t e rp re t e d by freean d i n d e p e n d e n t r e a so n , by the i n d i v i d ua l soul; itp roc la imed in c o nc ise m a n n e r th e i n d i v i d ua l i t y of con-science. In I t a ly , th e L u t h e r a n m o v e m e n t w a s n o tsuccessful , because I t a ly possessed a l i t era ture a n dp h i l o s o p h y great ly superior to the Protestant idea, as


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H INTRODUCTORV SURVEY THE RENAISSANCE 15pointed out . In Italy, th e l a n d of so m a n yreligious sects and of so many tentative reforms, the

recovery of Greek culture had a lready inspi red t he studyof Aristotle i n t he o r i g i n a l , w h i l e in G e r m a n y t h e y stiils tudied a t r an s l a t i o n of the 01d Testament. TheItalians were emancipated by the exclusively rationalcharacter of t h e i r s tudies . Ar a o ng Luther ' s com-p a t r i o t s P ro t e s t a n t i s m w a s a n a t i o n a l s l o g a n ; i t s i g n i -f i ed t he dest ruc t ion of Freder ick ' s foUowing, and by i t sre l ig ious character it became popular, B u t Protes-t an t i sm m i t s f i r s t mom ent s so exagg era t ed t h e i n t i m a c yof m an an d Go d a s t o m ake f a i i h , and not good wo r k s ,the only dispenser of salvation; ihe only means wasg r ac e , ex c lud i n g a ll h u m a n coopera t ion a n d f ree wil l .E t h i c s c a n n o t f a i l to be p r e ju d ice d by such a nex ag g e r a t i o n .In the glorious days of the Renaissance, there flour-i shed t he r en o w n ed followers o f Plato and Ari s to t le o r i g i n a t o r s an d re fo rmers o f p h i l o l o gy , all of w h o m h adm o re or less scept ica l t endenc ies a nd depended uponnature a n d experience. They h o n o r e d . fo r exam ple ,a m o n g t h e Aristotelear.5, P o M P O S A Z z i , a mo ng t h e ne wph i lo lo g i s t s , VivES. a m o n g t he r e former s , M E L A N C H -T H O N ; w h i c h i s a proof of what w e have stated.Pomponazzi believed that our kn o w led g e is o n ly as h a d o w a n d trace o f m i n d , that man i s but a fi gure oft he i m m at e r i a l an d kn o w s b u t little o f h i s n a t u r e ;that sense is more powerful than reason. On the otherhand, he.shows that man ca n in ac t ion attain that p e r -fec t ion w h i c h h e cannot attain w i t h t he m i n d , a n d thatt h e o re t i c a l a n d pract ica l in t e l lec t is imposs ible w i t h o u tthe body. Vives held that human science is Hmited ,that it only attains v e r i s im i l i t u d e , and that the pract ica le l em en t s ho u ld be p r e f e r r e d to the specula t ive . Thisf a m o u s ph i lo log i s t (not log ica l in hi s scept ica l pr inc iples)

made th e di st inct ion (which Vico made later) that inh u m a n af fai rs , a nd t he re fore in l aw , t he r e a re two e l e -ments , ab so lu t e t ru t h an d mere probabi l i ty , andobserved that th e t rue s ho u ld b e t he a i m of th e p ro b -able, established by the free will of men for commonutiIi ty. Such a dist in ct ion is f o un d in t he books ofPla to . In t r e a t i n g of t ruth a nd belief, Vives pIacedn a t u r a l I a w i n supe r i o r i t y t o d i v i n e l aw , an d r eg a rd ed t heformer as the sanction of the latter. He separated theo f f i c e of p h i l o s o p h e r f r o m that of jur i s t , and conse-quent ly r ecognized a l a w o f h u m a n i t y d i s t i n c t f r o m thatwhich is evolved from th e various ci rcumstances of time,p lace , a nd n eed . M e l a n c h t h o n , w h o wrote books ofmora l p h i l o s o p h y . a s O L E N D O R P a nd W i N K L E R wrotebooks o f n a t u r a I la w (full of p o s i t i v e re l i g ious data a n dwithout scientific base), t ho ug h t that man could notknow absoIute t r u t h ; t h a t h e s h o u l d r e m a i n w i t h i n th econfines of e x p e r i e n c e ; a nd t h a t h e s h o u l d foIlow not o n lyvirtue but also l i fe and t he good t hings of l L f e thati s , mat r imony, society, and the well-ordered pleasureswhich th e gods concede to m e n .In the f irst period of the R e n a i s s a n ce , G r e ek t h o u g h twas reconstructed by di rec t in t erpret a t ion f rom itssources, d i lu ted b y C h r i s t i a n e l e me n t s added in t heMiddle Ages . Mar ce l Io Fic ixo a nd t h e Florent ineA c ad e m y r e p r e s e n t th e r e t u r n to P l a t o . P o m pan az z irepresent s the return to Aristotle. The Latin com-me nta r y o n t he w o rks o f t he Stagirite was la id aside,and t he A r ab i an of A v E R R O E s and t he G r e e k of A L E X A X D E Ro f Ap h r o d i s i a s w ere used. The f i rs t t ends to t he trans-cendence of the intellect , to its existence separate andi n d e p e n d e n t of the body; th e sec o n d t o th e imm


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I N T R O D U C T O R Y S U R V E Y16o pen a new H f e to the speculative spirit- TELEsius, thef i rs t of t he new m e n , a s Bacon called h i m , d id no tfollow theological o r Aristotelean princip les bu t con-s idered the nature of th;ngs accord ing to pr inc iples ofh is ow n . For h im , a ll knowledge w a s a der iva t ive ofsense , which w a s connec ted wi th mot ion . E v e r y t h i n gin nature was reducible to matter a n d force. Force w a ss h o w n in the heat of the sun and the cold of the earth;h e a t w a s confused w i t h m o t i o n .B RUx o a n d C A M P A S E L L A a r e t he g r ea t e s t ph i l o so phe r sin this second pe r iod , a nd a re a u t h o r s of a new p h i l o s o p h yve r y d i f f e r e n t f r o m th e A r i s to t e l e an . B run o b ro ug h tto l i f e th e p r i n c i p l e of t he mf in i ty of nature . Accord-in g to h i m , a l l i s G o d - N a t u r e ; G o d outs ide th e w o r ldis l e f t t o t h e t h e o l og i c a l be l i e v e r s ; t h e universe i s thei n n n i t e c rea t u r e o f an i n n n i t e c rea t o r , w ho i s i n n n i t e inh i s com p l i c a i i ons a nd i n h i s s u m , w h i l e it is expUcit lybu t no t totally i n f i n i t e . l n d i v i d u a l t h i ng s a re m eref i g u r e s o r a c c i d en t a l s . T he e t h i c a l d o c t r i n e o f B run oi s l ig h t ed by th e d iv Jne i n t e U e c t ua l sun o f t ru t h , t he sub -stance o( moral ac t ion a nd o f m ora l i t y , w hi c h it p e n e -trates a s a t e m p o r a l p o w e r or p ru d en c e . Law sho u ldbe i n f o r m e d by reason a n d sho u ld r e su l t in ut i l i t y .G o v e r n m e n t i s s t r e n g t h ; t he act of the l aw i s j u d g m e n to r l e g a l p u n i s h m e n t , w h i c h s h o u l d no t c o n d em n w o rd so r acts that do n o t af fec t th e t r a n q u U i t y o f theState.C a m p a n e l l a , as a m e t a p h y s i c i a n , thinks that n a t u r e ,

if no t i tself God, is ce r t a in l y h is l iv ing i m ag e . As apsy cho log i s t , h i s mo t ive i s sense , an d h e recognizes it sfmal connect ion with m o t i o n . He dis t inguishes the"sensus abditus" f r o m th e "sensus add i tus , " i n that o n eis native and occult, and the other der ivat ive. Hesays that in te l lect i s l a ngu id a n d rarif ied sense. T h e"sensus additus," that is, concrete , determinate sense ,is f o u n d e d on t he or i g i na l , " s en sum abditum." H e

writes, "Nos C b s e et posse, scire et vel le , cer t iss imump r inc i p iu m p r im u m . " C a m p a n e l l a , however, recog-nizes th e d i v i n e more in religion than in n a t u r e . H ebelieves in progress , but in a theocratic m a n n e r , admit-t ing comm uni ty of possess ions a nd of women, t he gov -e rn m en t a l cont ro l of m a r r i a g e , and t he cont ro l ofsociety a s a n i n s t h u t i on (w hen c e th e f rugal i ty a n dpover ty of t he 5ola r l ) , an d he w o u ld govern t he w o r lda s a k i n d of universa l po n t i n c a l m o n a r c h y .Go d i s r evea l ed n o t o n l y in re l i g ion but in n a tu r e a swell , ac c o rd i n g t o t he N eo - P l a t o n i s t s ; a t w ho se head "isFicino. N a t u r e t h e r e fo r e is n o t o n ly t he m ean s f o r t heac ti o n o f Go d b u t c o m preh en d s d i v i n e v i rtues an d prop-erties, which are open to t he knowledge and ut i l i t y ofm a n . T h e o s o p h y i s t he kn o w led g e of Go d , in that itis f o un d e d o n a kn o w led g e o f n a t u r e . Na t u r e is t heg r a nd m y s t e ry , t he key to w h i c h i s t h e C a b a l a , Thisha s b een def ined as the Jewish gnosis. Th e gnosis(wh a t e v e r be i t s re l ig ious content ) considers f ac t a s aveil u n d e r w h ic h t he i d ea i s h i d d e n , an d t he v a lue o fsuch content i s i t s explanat ion of t he wo r ld , that i s fo rspecula t ive i n t en t . T h e Cab a l a attests th e presence

o f t he d iv ine force o f n a t u r e ; M a g i c i s t he s tud y byw hi ch man tends to c o n q u e r it . A l c h e m y studies th ee l e me n t a r y occult forces, a nd Astrology tr ies to d,eter-mine th e influence of t he s ta r s o n h u m a n acts.BoDix works to acqui re an exact kn o w led g e o f t hereal e l em en t s of Pol i t i c s and o f the ut i l i t y of socialorder w i t ho u t s e a r c h i n g o u t t he necessary f u n d a m e n t a l s .In hi s process of ex am i n a t i o n , h e fo l lows Aristotle-Gro t i u s po i n t s t h i s o u t , s a y i ng that B o d i n convertsm o ra l s an d l aw , a t h i s o w n f ree wiIl, into pol i t ics .He deserves, h o w e v e r , th e h o n o r of h a v i n g noted th ein f luence of c l imate on soc ia l inst i tut ions before MoNTES-T hi s d o es n ot sho w (a s F i l an g i e r i cla imed) that


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lS INTRODUCTORY SURVEYMontesquieu had no originality. Many have held thatthe wise legislator should note the infiuence of cHmate,and a m o n g them are Plato and Aristotle, as well asBodin; b u t no ne l ik e Mo nte s qu ie u made i t t he basiso fhis system.In this e p o c h , in wh ich th e criocism o f Scholastichypotheses was strengthened and h i g h considerationwas given to nature, the State was no longer lookedu p o n a s an en t i t y w i t h o u t e th ica l qua l i t ies , a s an i n s t i -t u t i o n o f f r a t r i c i d e a nd t h e r e s u l t o f s i n ; no r yet a s am e a n s a t t he disposition o f t he C hurc h f o r t he d e s t ruc -tion of heresy. Its object was not terrestrial virtue,d e p e nd e n t u p o n ce l e s t i a I v i r t ue , neither was it a body,in respect to the C h u r c h , w h i c h was ttkened to m i n d ;but was considered as an aggregate of forms , wh o s ecombination and disintegration was studied by M a c h i a -velH a s a n a t u r a l h u m a n institution, wh ich co n t a ine d initse lf that d i v i n e p r i n c i p l e exis t ing i n t h e wo r l d . T h eState existed o f i t se l f , and had n o need o f being con-ne c t e d w i t h the C h u r c h to become leg i t imate . It wasa complex o f fo rces , the centre o f wh ich wa s t h e k inga n d later civil society. It took the f o rm of an absolutemonarchy an d w as a f acto r i n t he development o f nation-a l i t y ; e x c e p t i n I t a l y , w h e r e those o b l i g a t i o ns i o w a rd st h e C h u r ch , wh ich Ma ch i a v e U i r e co r d s , we r e t o o s t r o ngfo r it .

:ARTES, CROTIL'S 10

IVB A C O N , DESCARTES, A N D GROTIUSMo d e r n p h i l o s o p h y , t h e d a u gh t e r o f t h e Renaissance,wa s born o f d o u b t . It s chie f f o u nd e r s , B A c o s an dDescARTEs, s o u g h t for a secure basis of knowledge, freef r om th e d o u b t of the a nc i e n t h yp o t h e s e s .B A C O N p l a ce d , ove r a g a i n s t th e Ar i s t o te l e a n O r ga n , th e" No v u m O r ga n u m, " i n wh ich i nd u c t io n , a s t h e p r i m a lf acto r , acquiresane%vexper imenta l character. Man,inhiso p i n i o n , could n o t c o n q u e r n a t u r e w i t h o u t a k no wle d geof h er l a ws , w i t h o u t i n t e r p r e t i ng h e r . A n d t h e inter-pretation of nature demanded experience. Experienceshould b e f ree f rom a ll that th e mind int roduced th ere ino f i t se l f ; that is , f r o m pre jud ices o r dogmas . I t shouldus e th e fo rm o f i nd u c t io n . based on f acts in which thela w o f t he ph en o m en a w as exempl i f ied ; such a f act iscal led by Ba co n a p r e r o ga t iv e i n s t a nce .DEscARTES to reconst ruc t sc ience turned to thought.He fol lowed a m o v e m e n t opposed to that of Bacon.Fo r Descartes, the senses are not true witnesses; theonly i n d u b i t a b l e kn o w l e d g e of exis tence itself is f r o mth e "cogito e r go sum." Thts knowledge , which is p r ima l ,is clear, because the ego is present to i tself; and is dis-t inc t , be ca u s e t h o u gh t i s t h e charac ter i s t i c by w h i c h

th e e g o di f fers f rom a ll o t h e r e n t i t i e s . From this p r i m a lkno%vledge, from th e knowledge of self^>dstence, are bornt h r o ug h d e d uc t i v e processes a ll cogni t ions . Sciencea lways exis ts where a c lea r and d is t lnct know ledge o ft h ing s can be h a d ; the mind doubts , because it is i m pc r -fect. If it believes itseIf imperfect, it must have theidea o f the p er f ect o r inn ni te . I f i t has the idea of theinfinite, it me a ns that a n in f in i t e cause h a s impressed it .


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20 INTRODUCTORY SURVEYT n h e r e n t a re the ideas o f t h e e go a nd o f God; acquiredare the ideas that man f o r m s , w h o s e cause He s outsideof h i m . The representations that refer to externalobjects are not entirely derivative f r o m bodies, becausethere is in them some o f our methods, fo r example,color , smell, sound, and taste. Extension alone is notone of our methods, bu t rather th e very essence of ex-ternal nature. Thought is spirit, extension is body;the spirit is active and the body inert.Bacon iyishes to transform by experience the naturaland moral studies; yet with the latter he occupies him-seH little. He inclines to the thought that the moraland political sciences are f o u nd e d on belief, and notdirectly on fact; and that the duty of public law is noto n l y to protect private law, but to take care of the edu-cation and welfare of the citizens. Bacon's politicaldoctrine, which foIlows a line between moral principleand legislation, and is contrary to an ideal type of abso-lute perfection of society, looks to mutual intercourse,trade, and the commonwealth. In his theory of mutualintercourse, there is a noticeable confus ion of the rightof society in its relation to law with the right of societyin its relation to education; in that of trade, there ismuch erudition and many maxims of prudence. In histhird book, he does not speak of the preservation of thekingdom and of the method of making it happy, but ofthe manner of extending its boundaries. It must not beforgotten that the book was dedicated to the King ofEngland. The Chancellor's treatise on the sources ofla w is a study not so much philosophical as practical.containing wise precepts for legislation and entirelydominated by a political principle. With this understood,it is manifest that Francis Bacon should not be ranked(as Lampredi ranked him) a m o n g the writers on naturallaw.

B A C O N , DESCARTES, GROTIUS 21Descartes considered God as the principle of thought,the extension of knowledge and motion. In man, the

unity of spirit and body is brought about in the passionsthat owe their origin to both. Ethics aim to free manf rom the sway of the passions. Freedom cannot begained wi th o u t a true knowledge and comprehensionof them. B r u n o had here foreshadowed this epoch byh is idea oE Ethics f o un d e d on reason, an d o E a freedomof th e soul (as mind) f rom its un io n of God.W i t h th e Cartesian p h i l o s o p h y , this n ew an d greatm o ve m e n t wh ich puts thought a t t h e head, f ree f r o me x t e r n a l a n d traditional e lements , a s t h e source o f t h eh o n e s t a nd t h e ju s t , a nd a s t h e m e as u r i n g rod o f theleg i t imacy o f social institutions, is brought to the fo reand given a c o n s p i c uo us position. This thought isabs t ract . I t i s f i r s t looked up o n a s a f a cu l t y o f t h e ind i -v id ua l man, a n d i n t e r p e n e t r a t e s with th e will o f others.Th e p r inc ip le of subject iv i ty is the founda t ion o fm o d e rn p h i l o s o p h y , wh o s e motive i s e i t h e r thought o rexper ience . Experience is resolved into e x t e r na l sen-s at ions , in to p l e a s u r e s an d p a i n s , into t he ut iHt ie s o fm a n , conceived a s an i n d i v i d ua l ; f o r t h e sensationsa re essen t i a l l y ind iv idua l . I n e x pe r i e n ce , t h e s u b je c tp r e v a i l s , as sense or t e n d e n c y t o p l e a s u r e , aidedby hedonistic c a l c u l a t i o n s , T h e p r inc i p l e o f subjec-t iv i ty w a s m a n i f e s t also in the Re f o rm a t i o n , whiche m an c i p a t e d th e r e l ig ious consciousness and recognizedthe r igh ts o f the i n d i v i d u a l soul. And i t i s seen in. a llth e series o f attempts ma d e by the ind iv idual to obtainat least his l i b e r t y , in these latter days. The indi-v i d u a l , abso rbed by t h e c o m m u n i t y , reasserts h im s e l f ,opposes i t , and bel ieves that he i s i t s origin a n d end;imagin ing even that h e h a s l ived without it (that is ,in a h yp o t h e t i c a l state o f n a t u r e ) . A t this point th ee th ico- jur i s t ic system begins, w h ic h is called th e

m


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22 INTRODUCTORY SURVEY"theory o f natural law"; for i t is f o un d e d o n t he reasonand experience of man more as an individual than as asociety.H u g o G no Ti^ s i s t he author o f this system. T h o u g hpartly f o r e s h a d o we d by B r u n o , he deserves credit fo rhis lucid conception of a primitive and natural juris-prudence founded on reason itself, immutable, thesource of every other j u r i s p r u d e nce . It w as a time w h e nth e 3urists v e n e r a t e d R o m a n L a w a s written r e a so n w h e n the poHutians publicly appealed to the right olmight when the Catholic theologJans hoped to destroyroyal p o we r in f a v o r o f divine papal authority, byd e r i v i n g t he f o r m e r f r o m th e people w h e n th eScholastics continued to weave subtletiesandwhenthe Protestant theologians endangered h u m a n freedom.Grotius developed the principles o{ the new science bytreating th e important subject o f peace a n d war. Hereth e sa d effects of an i gno r a nce of the l aw of nature a rem o r e deplorable than elsewhere. He begged those w h ocould r em ed y this miserable state of afTairs to read hisbook and learn his new ideas. The first writers on ther i g h t s o f w a r w h o h a d been i Uu rm n e d , as i t were , b y t helight of t he law of reason, were th e MU a ne s e Giov a nn iD i LiGNANo, Giovanni Lupo of Segovia (theologianswh o m G r o t iu s me n t io ns ) , M a r t i n o G A R A T i of Lodi,and Pietro B e L U X i (counselor of the Duke EmanueleFiliberto of Savoy, of Francis Ariasdemesa, and of t heN e a p o l i t a n Paris de l P o z z o ) , a ll four o f wh o m werej u r i s co ns u l t s , and, ab o ve a ll o t he r s , Alber ico GEKxiLE(of whom Grotius makes honorable mention). GentUewas the first to formulate a system of rules of w ar f a r e ,and to separate th e notion o f w a r an d re l ig ion, placingth e former within the rigorous t tmits of law. Ho w ever ,the law thought of by him is Roman and not rational.Furthermore, he keeps his eyes on the single fact of war

a n d p ay s little attention to p e a ce , t he n o rm a l conditiono f h um an i t y , s o that h e c a nno t p u t a just valuation o nth e former,Grotius dennes natural law as the sum of t he principlesof r igh t reason by which we d iscern the wrongness orrectitude of an act ion, t h r o u g h t h e d isco rdance or agree-ment of t he action itself with rational and social nature.Th e mo th e r o f natural l aw is h u m a n nature itself, whichp r o m p t s us to seek inte rcourse with ou r fe l low-be ings .Nat u r a l law is immutable; it would exist even on thehy po t he s i s of the non-existence of God (to conceive ofwhich is a horribIe crime ). Law in i ts broad sense em -braces m o ra l s ; and law in the strict sense mcludesimperfect a n d pe r f e c t r igh t , capaci t ies , and mer i ts - It isd is t inguished , h o we v e r , f rom th e art o f allotting justrewards to t h i ng s pleasant an d unpleasant, useful a n dh a r m f u l , present o r f u t u r e that is , f rom poHtics.T h i s d i s t inct ion , i n d e e d , between law and poHtics hadbeen m ad e clearly (akhough incompletely) some yearsbefore Grotius, by the Cosent ine , Giovanni DA . P A L A Z Z Oin h is book o n G o v e r nme n t a nd thetrue rationaleofth e State.N a t u r a l law, h o we v e r , is conceived by Grotiussolely as t he right of ind iv idua l man. Individual prop-er ty , a s fol lowing th e primitive co mmu ni ty of goods,isbased b y h i m o n an expresso r tacit ag r eem en t . Intes-tate inher i t ance is based on the natural estimate of thewiH of the deceased. From the field of private law i tente r s that o f t he State t h r o u g h contract. I t i s t he dutyo f natural law to protect agreements; those w h o con-stitute the State promise by express or tacit agreementto obey th e ma jo r i t y , to w h o m th e power is given.Obl igat ion by consent is the basi s of all civil law,according to the teachings of Grotius. The State, aperfect body of free persons, united for the purpose of


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24 I N T R O D U C T O R Y S U R V E Yen j o y i n g t he i r own r igh t s t h r o u g h a comm6n ut i l i ty ,i s t he peop le , a f f ect ing a stabiIity of powers and obl i -g a t i ons i n a r e p u bI i c o r a n e m p i re . Th e c o m m o n sub-ject of sovere ignty is th e State; pol i t ica l forms a rederived f rom common consent. From th e consent o fth e c r i m i n a l , g iv e n imp l i c i tI y by th e c r imina l act, arisest h e r i g h t o f p u n i s h m e n t . There a re l aws and powersm aki n g f o r t he ex c lus i ve advantage of certa in classes.There i s an i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w com m on t o a l l n a t i ons .T h e free development of the r igh t s of society de m a ndsf r ee t r a de ; t h e r e f o r e t he p ro h i b i t i o n o f t he e n t r a nceof a ny p r o d u c t i n t o a c o un t ry i s a j u s t cause o f w a r o nth e part o f t he im p or t i ng nation. A p e op l e c a nno tp r o h i b i t th e free transit o f f o r ei gn me r ch a nd i s e s inceit sho u ld not p l a ce obs tacles in th e t rade be tweenna t i ons . B ut t he cons e n t o f na t i ons jus t i f ie s th e restric-t i ons of c us t o m - ho uses or t he p r o h i b i t i o n of im p or t a -tion. The sea is f ree , for physical and mora l reasons.T h i s d o u b l e rea son ceases in t he case o f a body o f w a t e rl y i n g entirely.within o n e na t i on ' s bou nda r i e s .

H O B B E S , SPINOZA, LElBNlTZ 25

VH O B B E S , S P I N O Z A , A N D LEIBNITZ

HoBBEs ,LocKE, B E R t z L E v , a n d H u M E agrec wi th th eph i losophy of Ba con .H o B B E S a dm i t s o n ly m a t t e r a n d m o t i o n ; reducest ho ug h t t o s e ns e ; an d d e r i ve s sense f r o m m o t i o n . H eaccount s for the wh o I e l i fe of the spirit by the externaIIaws of a s s oc i a t ion ; t h u s he is looked u p o n by Ls wESan d th e m ode rn psy c ho lo g i s t s o f associa t ion a s t h e i rear l ie s t predecessor . L ike G r o t iu s , h e begins wi th th ena tu r e o f m a n ; bu t h e differs f rom Grot iu s in sayingthat it is founded on egoistical tendencies and not onth e socia l des ire for t he genera I good . Soclety is s o u g h tt h r o ug h se l f - l ove , no t t h r o u gh I o v e o f o t h e r s . T h eorigin of the g r e a t an d e nd u r ing sociecies is not rec ip -rocal benevo lence but reciproca l f e a r . I n t h e state o fn a t u r e , t h e re w a s a c o n s t a n t s t r u gg l e , e v e ry m a n a g a i n s th is n e i g h b o r , t h r o u g h cu p id i t y a nd t h e Jn te r -coI l i s ionof r i g h t s ; f o r each ma n h a d a r i g h t to e v e r y t h i n g . N o wt h e l a w o f na t u re i s th e i n s t inc t o f self-preservation;thuswas f e l t the need o f g r o w in g out of t h i s state of i n s e -cu r i t y and of f ind ing peace . U nI imi t e d f e a r forced m ento t r an s f e r by a g r e e m e n t a Il t h e i r r i g h t s an d powersto a civil co mmi t t e e ; t h i s i s t he orig in of t he civil con-tract. Thus a n absolu te empire was formed, destinedto de f ine t h e h one s t a nd t h e j u s t , a nd t o de c re e w h a tmu s t be bel ieved. Hones ty , jus t ice , a n d re l ig ious be l ie f sare t he p rodu c t o f social laws. Hobbe s, like Grotius,believes i n t h e p r i n c i p l e o f h u m a n n a t u r e in i t s i n d i v i d ua lform, a n d m a k e s e v e r y t h i n g d e p e n d o n c o n t r a c t t h ebeget t er of n a t u r a l l a w .L o c K E com ba t s th e i n n a t i s m o f Desca rtes . H e t n>^


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2S I N T R O D U C T O R Y S U R V E Ya n d effect. Causa l i t y , t he r e f o r e , h a s n o scientif ic va I ue ,a n d we m u s t doubt everything except mathematics,because eve ry t h i n g presupposes a cause, with that onesc ience excepted . Causality rests in habit, in d o g m a ,and in expectation. With the repetition of one fact inseq uen c e to a n o t h e r , w e b e l i eve , o r h a v e f a i t h that th efirst is the cause, th e l a t t e r th e effect, Ex-en if thisd o g m a or expec ta t ion has no theoretical va lue , it is am o r e t h a n suf f ic ien t n o rm fo r l i f e a n d conduct .M . A , L E B R A N C H E , $PisozA, an d LtiBNiTZ ar e followersof t he Ca r t e s i an p h i l o s o p h y . I n t he m m d o f Descartes,t he i d ea o f Go d w as i n n a t e i n t he hum an so u l. M a le -b r a n c h e , th e Car t e s i an A ve r ro e s , a g a i n p u t a t he orig inof t h o u g h t in a reg ion o u t s id e o f m an an d a f f i rms thatkn o w led g e is an intu i t ive i n f l u e n t , a vision of the ideaof Go d . E x t en s i o n , o ppo sed to t h o u g h t , is t h m k a b l ebecause it is seen in Go d . God is the sole cause thatw o r k s in r e a l i t y ; h is c rea t u r e s a re . occa s i ons o f d iv inea c t i o n . T h i n k i n g that t r u t h He s in God, we can lovea nd w ork w i t h H i m . M a n sho u ld take f o r a n o rm o fh is c o n d uc t th e r e l a t i o n s o f pe r f ec t i o n that exist in t h i n g s ;r e l a t i o n s c o n s t i t u t i n g th e c o n t en t of that love wi thw h i c h God loves H im s e l f .S p i N O Z A t r i es to reconc i le th e o pp o s i t io n b e t w een sub -stances of extension a nd o f thought (which Descartesa d m i t s , a n d w h i c h M a l e b r a n c h e beHeves e l i m i n a t edby t he i n t u i t i o n o f extensvon i n Go d ) b y t he p r e sup -p o s i t i o n o f a s i n g l e sub s t an c e of w h i c h t h o u g h t a ndex t en s i o n s a re a t t r i b u t e s . H e uni t es extension a n dt hought in a s ing le u n i t y , which is ind if f e rent of i t se l f ,in s u bs t a nce o r n a t u r e , a n d inc ludes a ll rea l i ty ( a s t heC a r t e s i a n p h i l o s o p h e r says that t he i d ea o f sub s t an c einvolves its existence). Substance is active, self-causal ,an d de v e l op s in t he two in f in i t e a t t r i b u t e s o f ex ten s i o nand thought. Each of the attributes expresses sub-

HOBBES. SPINOZA. LEIBNITZ 29stance of its own m o d e , t h r o u g h a n in f in i ty of methods.Each is un c o n n ec t ed wi th th e other. T h e modes o fth e tw o at t r ibutes have n o rec iprocal causa l i ty , butcorrespond and are parallel. Substance, with the twoat t r ibutes , is "natura na t u ra ns , " a nd t h e un i ve r se is" n a t u r a n a t u r a t a " and i s a lso i n f i n i t e , w h i l e t he pa r -ticulars are simple modes. Substance is not determinedby a n y t h i n g bu t itseH. It is f r e e ; ma n i s no t f ree becausehe i s a mode limited an d determined by o t he r modes.M a n is a n a t u r a l fo rce with th e i l lus ion of f r e e d o m.T he m o d es , p a r t i c u l a r objec ts , a re ideas a n d bod i e s .W e, Q t i a spi r i tua l , a re t he cause of ideas, and qua. cor-p o r e a l , are t he c ause o f p a s s i o n s . In r e spec t to i d ea s ,we are act ive, if they a re ad eq ua t e an d ful ly c o m prehen dt h e i r objec t ; in resp^ct to pa s s i o n s , w e a re passiveb ecause t hey a r e d e r i v a t i v e s o f o u r an d o t he r bod i e s ;and of ne i the r one nor the other have w e ful l conscious-ness. P a s s iv i t y con^ is is a l w a y s of i n a d e q u a c y , o b s c u-ri ty, an d confusion of ideas. M a n , q ua mind , i s f reef rom s e n t ime n t s , a f f ec t i ons , a n d pass ions , because h ekn o w s G o d a nd t h e necessa ry c o n n ec t i o n s of t h i n g s ,r e ach ing ad eq ua t e c o g n i ti o n by love o f Go d .Every e n t i t y s t r ives fo r the p r e se rv a t i o n of its exist-ence; man also has this tendency, in which the ethicalp r inc ip le is f o u n d . Law is the p o w e r of the n a t u r e of

m a n , t ha t i s , t he fo rce b y w h i c h he pe r s eve r e s i n h i sexistence. The law o f n a t u r e is th e v e ry p o w e r of n a t u r e .M a n ' s r i g h t is e qu a l to hi s p o w e r as a cause or force .T h e greater un ion gives greater force, a nd t hereforeg r e a t e r r i g h t ; w h e n c e th e g rea t po w er o f t h e State,th e r e su l t of the a l i e n a t i o n of the po w er s of m a n y . Th eobject oF the State is to stop the terrible struggle betweenme n d ue t o t he i r con f l ic t ing pass ions a n d interests-It is f o un d e d on agreement; but this does not result, asHobbes says, in the t ransference of all the rights of


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30 INTRODUCTORY SURVEYth e i nd iv id u a l t o t h e State; f o r w h a t e v e r i s no t subjec tto {orce does not become subject to the State (acts,t h e r e f o r e , ca n bc controlled, but neither opinions n o rcreeds).LEiBNiTZ tries to reconcile the Cartesian dua l i sm be-tween the substances of thought and extension (whichS p inoza a t t e m p t e d t o e l i m i n a t e t h r o u g h th e p r inc i p l eof o n e sub s t an c e with tw o i n f im t e attributes). H e s h o w sthat a l l sub s t an c es a r e f o r ce s , a n d t h e r e f o r e ac t i v e an dno t i ne r t . H e bel i eves that a ll subs tances a re r e p r e s e n -tative, in that they are the result of m ona ds , w hi c hare not physical atoms, but metaphysical points, unex-t e nd e d e l e me n t s , u nmo d e l l e d , ind iv i s ib le , i nd e s t r u c t ib l e ,imp e ne t r a b l e , a n d capable o f p e rce p t i on an d r ep r e -s e n t a t i on . E a c h m o n a d is a s imple force with a specia lo r i g ina l d e t e r mina t io n , n o t derived f r o m w i t h ou t ,h a v l n g w i t h i n itself th e representative scheme of t h euniverse. B r u n o , the author of the monad theory,k n o w n to Leibn i t z , s a ys that e a c h m o n a d is a contractedu n iv e r s e . A mo na d a s a n a c t i v e s u bs t a nce r e p r e s e n t si t seH, an d a s an i n d i v i d u a l a n d l imited substance itr e p r e s e n t s th e o t h e r s . In t he doctr ine o f Leibni tz ,t h e r e is not one substance but as m a n y subs tances asthere are forces.From substance, which is the whole , he contradis-t i ngu i s h e s t he s i m p le m o n a d , with it s representa t ive v i r-t u e , d e v e lo p ing t h r o u g h t h re e progress ive grades . Fo rr ep r e sen t a t i o n begins with s imple a n d obscure be ing ,"it b ec o m es c l e a r wh e n jo ine d with s e ns a t i o n , a nd distinctw h e n a c c o m p a n i e d by knowledge . T he po w er o f t hemonad to pass f rom one conception to another is con-nected with this graduation, This power is a specialactivity in l iv ing be ings , instinct in a n ima l s , will inm a n . ln t r -e m o n a d , t he re i s a c o n t i n u i t y o f states.In th e s p i r i t mo na d , th e state o f conscious knowledge

H O B B F S , S P T N O 7 A , L E I B N I T Z 31is a der ivat ive of the state of unconsc iousness an d there-fore th e will is determined by the unconscious statesan d cannot be caprice. The l ife of the spirit is that grad-ua l passage by inf ini tes imal steps frorn unconscious-ness to clea r an d d is t in ct knowledge . Each monadh a s a specia l d ispos i t ion p ecul ia r to i t f rom th e b e g i n m n g ;it contracts the universe in i t s own manner , and in con-formity with it s d ispos i t ion, it d e v e lop s t h r o u gh a con-t inuous success ion o f states. No mo na d i s born ofa no t h e r o r exerts a ny influence over another, bu t betweenthem there i s a f ixed ha rmony from God.Min d presupp oses ( teaches Le ibni tz) sens ible rep re -s e n t a t i o n , but is no t i t s c a u s e . I t is not a b l a nk t a b l e t ,bu t r a t h e r a c o n t a i n i n g e n e r g y v i r t ua l l y t h e p r i nc i p l e so f identity and o f suff ictent r e a s o n , di st ingui shed ascausa l i ty and finality. The identity looks to the monadin itse lf. T h e sufncient rea son has to do with th eh a r m o n y be twe e n a l l t h e mo na d s . Th e p r i nc i p l e o f t h esumcien t reason is the base of the concre te sc iences ,and t herefo re o f mo r a l s a nd l a w . Th e s p i r i t i s m ind a ndwi l l ; will is a conscious tendency a n d m akes fo r h a p p ine s s .Th r o u gh clear and distinct cogni t ion, the spirit feelsthat it is an e l em en t in a great w ho le and that it has theduty of acting so as to f u r t h e r th e common good. OnIyt h r o u gh clea r and di st inc t knowle dge comes the t e nde ncyto the g e n e r a l l y use fu l . La w i s f o un d e d o n t h e essenceand no t on the will of Go d , and is man ifes t in the fo rmo f r ig id law, o f e qu i t y . a nd p r o b i t y . The f i r s t consistsin commutat ive justice and i s founded on t h e precepto f " D o no wrong." Th e second is ba=ed on distributivejus t ice and on g iving each his due. The third is connotedby th e m ax im o f "Live h one s t l y . " T h e object of lawis per fect ion. Ev e ry kind of co mmu ni ty proposes th eh a p p i n e s s of m a n as its object . T h e State looks espe-cially to the good of ex t e rn a l security. Th e practical


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>U FFE N D O R F, W O L FF, R O U S S E A U32 INTRODUCTORY SURVEYidealism of the Leibnitzian system consists in a commun-it y of spi r i t s in immediate dependence o n God, placed inthe sphere of morals, with concentric circ les comprehen-s ive of rights. It resembles the Stoic R e p ub H c . Chris-t i a n p r i nc i p l e s i n t e r p e ne t r a t e with Greek p h i l o s o p h y ina n a t t r a c ti v e m a n n e r ; but we m u s t remember that Leib-n i t z b e g a n w i t h p u r e r a t i o n a l i sm an d then t u r ne d toeudemonism, a n d ended in t he confusion o f moralitya n d r e l i g i o n .

VIP U F F E N D O R F , T H O M A S I U S , A N D WOLFF

ROUSSEAUP u F F E N D O R F , wh o co u p l cd in a s o me wh a t arbitrarym a n n e r to t h e Cartesian p h i l o s o p h y h is theory o f naturallaw and of t he law of nat ions , makes clear th e psychologj-ca l bas is o f l aw and the theo ry o f imputa t ion (ers twhi leth e doctr ine o f Grotius). But hi s d e v e l o p m e n t of hi sd o c t r i n e is n e i t h e r p r o f o u n d nor exact ; because hep leads especia l ly fo r the inte rpre ta t ion o f the sociali n s t i n c t (admi t t ed by G r o t iu s ) , n o t a s be ne v o l e ncebut a s c o m m o n need , and because o f h is co n f u s i o nof morals and law (no t found in t he works o f Grotius)a nd h i s t r i -d iv is ion o f mo r a l i t y into dut ies towards

God , our ne ighbors , and ourse lves . P uf f e n d o r f ' s con-cept ion o f l aw is in fer io r to that oE Gro t ius , becausel a w a n d a ll that is h o n e s t d e p e n d , acco rd ing to h i m , o nth e wiIl o f Go d an d o n d i v i n e imposition. Leibnitzd o e s no t t h ink h i g h l y o f t h i s p h U o s o p h e r a n d veryseldom me nt io ns h im in hi s work o n natural l a w . T h efo l l owers o f Pu f f endor f a re B A R B E Y R A C , B c R L A M A Q L i ,a n d D E FELicE. Ba r be y r a c , a most e r u d i t e m a n (o fwh o m it was said, in looking at his notes on Puf fendor fand Gro t ius , that it was d i m c u l t to decide w h e t h e rgreater genius was required for the creation of thesystems t h a n fo r their a n n o t a t i o n ) is n o t clea r i n h i sun d e r s t an d i n g o f r a t i o na l l a w , t h o u g h h e g ives it ane w d e v e lo p me n t a nd i l l u s t r a t e s scientifical ly t h e d i f -f e rence be twe e n mo r a l s a nd la w . I n Bu r I a m a qu i ,we find traces of Barbeyrac, and a blind obsequiousnessto P u f f e n d o r f ' s ideas . D e Fel ice is d i s t i ngu i s h e d fo r h iswr i t ings o n p u b l i c Eu r o p e a n law and for hi s biblio-g r a p h ic no t e s o f t h e wr i t e r s o n t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f l a w ;


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34 INTRODUCTORY S U R V E Ybut he adds nothing to the system of his author ancp r i n c i p a l fo l lower s . H e was ignorant o f t h e a t t em pt rof the German philosophers to d i s t i ngu i s h moraIs andI a w , begun b e fo r e th e death o f Bu r I a ma qu i .T h e works o f Grotius a n d P u f f e n d o r f met oppositioron all sides. The Romanists, even more irate than thetheologians, accused th e philosophers o f a im ing t ocreate fo r equity a n i n t e l I e c t ua l d o m in io n over th ew o r l d ' s greaiest a c h i e v c m e n t that is , Roman law;ahhough t h e n a t u r e o f this ce r e b r ine equity w a s a t h i n gabout w h i c h they t he rn se I ves could not agree. Thetheologians, especiaI1y the Protestants, confuse r a t iona lresearch in I aw w i t h athelsm. Both make m u c h o fth e discords of the s cho o f s o f natural law. SsLDEN,not w i s h i n g to base natural Iaw on reason, states thatla w is a derivative of the nature of G o d ; that it is partlyobligatoryand partly p e r m i s s i v e ; and that the d iv i n el a ws , w h i c h a ll m u s t obey, a r e r e v e a l e d i n t h e Scrip-tures. P u f F e n d o r f , LECLERC, a n d Barbeyrac a r e a lm o s tu n a n i m o u s in t h e i r c r i t i c i s m o f S e l d e n , because hededucesth e p r i n c i p l e s o f l a w f r o m t h e D e ca l o gu e a nd espec iaI lyf r o m Judaic tradition. C o ccEiu s agrees w i t h Seldenfo r polemic reasons, bu t h a s a s u p e r i o r p r i n c i p I e , f r omw h i c h h e d e r i v e s j u r i d i c a l p r e c e p t s d i r e c t l y that is,thed i v i n e wil l , kn o w n f r o m it s acts o r i n f e r a b l e f r o m th ep e r f e c t i o n of th e d i v i n e essence, without reliance o nr e v e l a t i o n .

Tn o M A s i u s f o u n d s l aw o n reason, independent of a l lrevelation. H e admits a state o f nature, which w a sn e i t h e r a state of war nor one of peace, but was a chaos.H u m a n actions s h o u ld depend upon a n o r m ; and lawis thc norm fo r external actions a nd t h e g u a r a n t y o f socialpeace. T h o m a s i u s ava j l s h im s e l f o f t h e three gradesof Ia w made by Leibnitz t o s h o w t h e separation of I awf r o m morals in h is belief that moral duties a re incoer-

,^ WOL*^, ROU5atAU 3ot - ^ tL i^ ' cible or imperfect, a nd secure i n t e r na I peace, while th e'f jr ' ' legal duties a re coercible or perfect, an d secure externali ' : * ' peace. A consequence of this is that th e State should^ abandon the moral and religious sphere to free conscience.M - Thomasius, after indicating th e various meanings o fi;|: the phrase "the law of nations," observes that there

- ' - ' ' cannot be a true law among nations, because there isno h i g h e r authority that can enfo rce its obligations.It is c lear that in this h e di f f e r s f r o m Grotius a n d takesa backward step.WoLFF explains philosophy systematically fo r the useofth e $chools , an d fo l l ows th e doctrines o f Leibnitz. H edoes n ot accept a l l o f them, h o w e v e r , without somem o d in c a t i o n s ; for example, he does not beIieve thatal l the monads h a v e representative virtue (which accord-in g t o h im i s a n attribute only o f t h e spirit monad). H ise th ical p r i n c i p l e , th e result of an organic concept o f t h eworld an d o f t h e t e ac h i n g s o f Leibnitz, is perfection.Wolff speaks o f perfect a n d imperfect duties, bu t h e doesn o t def ine t h e i r d i rTerence . H e does n o t supply, likeTh o ma s iu s , acriterionfortheirseparationanddistinction.

> M o ra l s a n d law, t h e r e fo r e , ar e agaIn co n f u se d , an dsdence f r o m , t h a t point of v iew takes a retrogressive step.X V o l f F t h i n k s thathe d e r iv e s natural l a w f r o m th e humanessence by a rigorous deduction. The law of natureimposes the duty of doing all that tends towards thepe r f ec t a n d good. Natu ral law, founded o n t h e nature o fm a n , is the Iaw of what he should or should not do.N a t u r a l law has its ultimate foundation in God, becauseG od i s the author of the order of things or o f the order ofna tu r e , The W o l f Ra n principle should not be inter-.preted in a too individualistic sense. For it holdsthat good actions tend either to the preservation of es-sen t Ia l , or to the acquisition o f accidental perfectton, or toth e consummation a n d perfection o f mankind, more


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T

3G INTRODUCTORY S U R V E Yespec i a l l y of t h e f a m i l y , nation, o r State. Wol f f a nd h i sdi sc iple , V A T T E L ( fo l lowing t he way t rcxlden by Grotiusin t he f ie ld of i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w ) assign abso lute author-i ty to po s i t i v e l aw , but recognize th e natural l a w o fi n d i v i d u a l s and n a t i o n s as its source. Among theI t a l i an s , L A M P R E D i bel ieves that it owes its or ig in to thisso u rc e ( t hus foUowing W o l f f i a n doctrines). H e goes sofa r as to say that if a law between armies could bed e f e n d e d , h i s p e n w o u l d take up t he t a sk , an d c i te s n a v a lw a r f a r e i n tr e a t i n g o f t he g r ea t p r i n c ip l e s o f hu m a n i t y .L a m p r e d i ( l ike X V o I f f ) s u p p l i e s n o cri te r ion of the difTer-en c e b e t w een m o ra l s a n d l aw . H e c o n s i d e r s n a t u r a l la wa s t h e c o m p r e h e n s i v e f o r m u l a o f n a t u r a l l aw s , ten d i n gt o w a r d s h a p p i n e s s and p e r f e c t i o n , but he does nots h o w o f w h a t it consi s t s . H e i n t r o d uc es a n d di scusses ,i n t he sc i en c e o f l aw , h y p o t h e s e s an d t heo r i e s o f ethics,a s , f o r e x a m p l e , t h e h y p o t h e s i s o f a G o d w h o is j u d g eof ac t i o n s , an d t he an a ly s i s o f m o ra l i m p u t ab i l i t y .L a w , in L a m p r e d i ' s m i n d ( s i n c e h e isa follower o f W o l f f ) ,i s t he f a c u l t y o f a v a i l i n g o n ese l f of w h a t is necessary fo rth e f u l n l l m e n t o f o b l i g a t i o n s w h i c h m a y b e u n iv e r s a l ,p r i m i t i v e , a n d i n n a t e , o r p a r t i c u l a r , d e r i v a t i v e , a n dh y p o t h e t i c a l . O w n e r s h i p p r e s u p p o s e s , a c c o rd i n g toboth a u t h o r s , a po s i t iv e c o m m un i t y o f t h i n g s , an d o w esit s or ig in to t he appetites o f a n i m a l l i f e . Lam pred i d eve l -op s t h e doc t r ine of c o n t r ac t in ex ac t ly th e same m a n n e ra s W o l f f , i n t he d i scussion o f soc iety as a consensual con-tract, thus o p e n i n g t h e w a y t o t h e di scussion o f societyin g e n e r a l , w h i c h is f o u n d e d o n t h e c o n sen t o f h i r n w h oc rea t e s l aw s a n d g o v e r n m e n t . A n d h e r e L a m p r e d i ' sch ie f e r ro r is a p p a r e n t , that i s , h i s f a i l u r e to di st ingui sht h e p r i n c i p l e s o f p u b l i c f r o m p r i v a t e j u s t i c e ; an e r ro rin that t i m e c o m m o n to the g rea t e r n um b er o f writers o nn a t u r a l l a w .H u m e r e p r e s e n t s th e c o m p l e m e n t o f B ac o n i an p h i l o s -

PUFFENDORF, W O L F F , R O U S S E A U 37o p h y , a s Le i b n i t z r ep r e sen t s that of t h e Cartesian.French Sensua l ism a n d M at e r i a l i sm , th e g en e r a l consen-sus o f the Sc o tc h p h i l o so phe r s , an d Germ an Syncretismof th e past c en t u ry , ad d n o t h i n g n ew i n the s ph e r e o fs p e cu l a t i o n . F ren c h Sen sua l i sm orig ina ted i n t hedoctrine of G A S S E X D i , a c o n t em po r a ry o f B ac o n an d Des -cartes. Gassen d i says that th e o n l y source of ou r ideasis sense; that th e ce r t a i n t y o f o u r b e i n g i s n o t born o ft h o u g h t o n ly , bu t also o f sensib le fac t s ; but he can fo rmno no t ion o f sub s t an c e . La t e r , a f t e r Locke, CoNDiLLACreduces to mere sensat ion t he or ig in of consc iousness ,sensa t ion, and ref lect ion, a n d s h o w s that th e l ife o f t h espi r i t i s n o t h i n g b u t t r an s f o rm e d sen sa t i o n . B o sx E Ta n d H A R T L E Y la id stress u p o n t he sensat ions , in thatt hey a re r e p r o d u c e d , associa ted, and p r e se rved un d e r th el aws of m o t i o n . L A M E T R u 7 : and H o L B A C H ex p re s s th epr incip les o f m a t e r iaUsm i n a c l e a r an d p o p u l a r m a n n e r .T h e "I t h i n k , t h e r e f o r e I am" o f Descartes b ec am e th e"I f e e l , t he r e f o r e I am" o f S a i n t P i e r r e . I d e o to gy , t h r o u g hth e w o r k of T R A C Y , became confused with zoology.Th e moral sc iences a re considered by C A & A K A S ( w h ospeaks o f i n t r ac r an i a l r e f l ec t ion an d t ho ug h t a s s ec r e -t ions of t he bra in) as parts o f n a t u r a l history. Freedomis a s up r a - i n t e l l i g i b l e p o we r , a n d t h e w i l I wills as f i re burns.Locke m a i n t a i n s that m a n is urg ed to w o rk nott h ro ug h c o g n i t i o n b u t t h ro ug h i n t e rn a l d i sc o m f o r t .T h i s consists o f a fee l ing , a n d t h e r e fo r e w e m u s t alterth e f o un d a t i o n o f ethics. Et h i c s a r e n o lo n g e r based o nreason but on fee l ing , i n t he t e ac h i n g o f t he Englishmora l is ts . Em ot i ons and not ideas are the mot iveso f w o r k ; a n d t h e c r it e r io n b y w h i c h w e m e a s u r e a c t i o n sis a spec ia l sense th e m o ra l s en se . This sense i s notor ig ina l (say some of t he w ri t ers o f t he E n g l i s h school),bu t is derived f r o m certain externaI elements. It isformed s t ep b y step, an d i s r e f i n e d , a p p e a r i n g i n all


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38 INTRODUCTORY S U R V E Yits grades as a product of psychologica l associatlon.T h r o u g h association and habit egoistical acts becomem o r a l ; because one be g i n s by wishing a no t h e r ' s good fo rone's o w n ease a n d p leasure , but e n d s b y w i s h i n g i t fo ri t se l f wi thout other mot ive . To such concept ions(more or less) can th e theories of S H A F r s B U R V , B u T L E R ,H uT C H E s o N , H um e , a nd AoAM S M i T H be reduced. Smithsays (i n accord wi th Hume) that th e j u d g e of mora l -ity i s the i m p a r t i a l spectator, a n d that th e basis o fj u d g m e n t is s y m p a t h y . S y m p a t h y w i t h h im w h oreceives a good or bad action results not on l y f romparticipation in another's p l e a s u re s a nd p a i n s ( a cco rd ingto the wri t ing5 of Hume) , but a l so f r o m pa r t ak in g of thes t imulus o f r en d e r i n g good fo r good a nd evil fo r evi l .In t h i s He s th e p r i n c i p l e o f social just ice .H u m e says that in m ora l s th e subject ive e lement is 'f ee l ing , th e object ive e lement u t i I i ty . HELVETius f o u n d scondu c t o n eg o i sm , o n i n d i v i d u a l p l e a su r e a n d ut i l i ty .B E X T H A M ( w h o i s by nature no t a p h i l o s op h e r bu t al eg is l a tor) looks to the g en e r a l u t i l i t y a l one , a n d makesi t the basis o f e t h i c s , w i t h ou t that p s ych o l og i c a l a na l y s isof p r i n c i p l e s w h i c h Hobbes a nd t h e o t h e r EngHsh mora lp h i l o s o p h e r s make. Be l iev ing i nge nu o u s l y in t he orig -i n a l i t y o f h i s doctrines (which belief showed himu na cqu a i n t e d vdth p h i l o s op h i c a l t h o u g h t ) , th e p u r s u i tof p l e a s u re a nd t h e avo id an ce of pa in cons t i tu te in h i sm ind th e motives of action. In this, he is in accord with

Hobbes and Locke, t h o u g h he believes that such ap r i nc i p l e c a nno t be de m ons t r a t e d . Be n t h a m op -poses th e sy s t ems w h ich p l a ce the cr i te r ion of condu c touts ide th e ca lcuIa t ion o f consequences, and bui lds upa m ora l a r i t h m e t i c a n d social d y n a m i c s .The ScorcH p h i l o s op h e r s base certitude on inte rna l andi ne xp H ca b l e s u gge s t i on a nd m a k e com m on s ens e (theextens ion or am pl i f i c a t i o n of the m ora l sense) th e measure

, WUL*>, KOUbbbAUof truth. Th e G e R M A X p h i l o s op h e r s of t he Renaissance(the epoch of so-cal led sane or p op u l a r p h Uos op h y ,a l i t t le anter ior t o K a n t ) w aver between the empir ica lmovement of Locke and t he idea l i sm of Leibnitz, incUn-in g towards scepticism.RoussEAU ad m i t s a l l the p resup pos i t ions of the systemof na t u ra l la w that is, the basic f reedom of i nd i v i du a lman , the s t a te of na ture , t he format ion a nd destruc-t lon of t he State by con t r a c t , t he r ight s o f i nd i v i du a ld e f e ns e a nd u t i l t t y a nd t h e re fo re t h e m a xim o f p o p u l a rs o v e r e i gn ty . (T o these Sidney and Locke had a l readyad d ed th e r i g h t o f rebel l ion ; this had i t s or ig in in theb e l i e f in t he r i g h t s of t he C h r i s t i a n com m u ni t y in ec-clesiastical a f T a i r s , an d w as b r o u g h t to perfec t ion in t hep a p a l inte res t by the Je su i t s , who , in t he i r desire to over-t h row civil power , t a u g h t that i t was born of t he willof th e p e o p l e w h i l e pont i f ica l a u t h o r i t y c a m e f rom God.)Rousseau gives to the sys tem of na tura l l aw a newa t t r ibute , l ack ing in Grot ius and in l a te r writers ,t h a t i s , th e i n a l i e na b i l i t y of f reedom. He repudia tes theusua l view of i nd iv id u a l f reedom a nd does n ot hesitateto p lace Grot iu s together w i t h Hobbes a m ong t h ec h a m p i o n s o f h u m a n slavery. Accept ing th e princip leof ina l ienab le f r eedom, Rousseau , to solve th e p rob l e mraised by i t , d i scovers a k ind of pol i tica l un ion , in whichfreedom i s not aHenable . Every m a n , i n obe y ing t h e State,obeys h imse l f , wi th a f u l l a n d reciproca l renunc ia t ionof a l l i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s i n f a v o r o f t h e c o m m u n i t y ; h e n c eh is doctr ine of t he "genera l wi l l ," th e i n a l i e na b l e , in -divisible, a nd non - re p re s e n t a b l e s ov e re i gn t y , a nd h e nceh is criticism of the mechanica l , constitutional regime.Rousseau recognizes representative gove r n men t inthe exercise of execut ive power o n J y ; this, u n d e ra system of restraints, can be entrusted to a kingor commiss ion. The object of the activity of the


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4 0 I N T R O D U C T O R Y S U R V E YState is p ub H c good (unders tood in an a bs tr a c t m a nn e rand not in the sense of the gbod o f a l l) under va rious con-dit ions o f life, but in a un i fo r m m ode . Later ph i l o s -ophy ha s o f course shown us that Rousseau's state ofna t u re is an hypothesis contrary to reason and experi-ence ; that contract, its prerequisite, is not possiblewithout the State's guaranty; that law is and must beexis tent , whi le cont ract need not exist; that to obtaint h i s s u p p os e d un i fo r m i t y o f in teres t an d hy po t he t i ca le qu a l i t y , it wo u ld be necessary to r e m ov e n o t on l y th edi f fe r ence of l ega l condi t ions , but the indef ini te var ie tyof a l l t he e lements of H f e as wel l ; and that to admi t adistinction between the genera l will, and the will of all,would set the latter free from every rational bond .

The French Revolution real ized the system of naturallaw, as taught by Rousseau. It was not a sudden move-m e nt , bu t t h e r e s u l t o f a l ong p re p a ra t i on i n t o w h i ch .m a n y f a c to r s e n t e r e d . T h e n ew m an evo lved b y t h e M id-d le Age s , t he Ren a i s s an c e , t he B ac o m ' an an d C a r t e s i a nph i lo so ph i e s in a l l t h e i r p h a s e s , t h e religious w a rs ,the Engl i sh Revolut ion, the EngH sh ph i losoph ica l doc-trines, th e progress of the American government, th ea b u s e s o f t h e p a s t , an d t he Encyclopedia , a ll contributedt he i r quota . Similar elements in the less civilized na t ionsf o un d in Fra nce a f avo r ab l e p lace to concent ra te a nds t r i k e t h e g r e a t b l o w . W i th t h e " g e n e r a l xvill" s e p a ra t e dby R a u s s e a u frorn a ll e th ica l e s sence a n d l a w , th eRevo lu t i o n so ug h t l ibe rty (not w i t h i n b u t be yondal l l imits ) , a nd de s t roye d a ll secular obstacles opposedto the deve lopment o f men . Liberty , no w becomeunt rammeled caprice. soon felt th e need of re^stablish-in g limitations; and various reconstructions appeared inal l branches o f h u m a n activity. But a l l were th e tem-p o r a r y i llusions o f f a ncy .

V I C O 4i

VIIV I C O

Vico is the author of the only new movement (wi ththe exception of Kant's) smce the day s of Hume and Leib-nitz. Princip les (h e says) govern th e orig in , deve lopment ,and t erminat ion of facts. Providence, which i s , in t helast ana lys i s , mind or t h ou gh t , develops first in thena tu r a l a n d t h e n i n t he hum an o rd e r t h a t is, f i rsta s na tura l , t h e n a s h u ma n p r o v id e nce . Providence i snot a t r an sc en d en t or e x t r a mu nd a ne pr inc iple , but isimmanent and int r ins ic in cosmic rea l i ty an d history.Such a princip le deve lops first in na ture and t h e n in thespirit; f i rs t in the na tura l world, t hen in the world ofh u ma n r e a s o n ; wh e nce the dou b l e motion of entitiesf rom t h o u g h t , t h e i r be g inn ing , t ow a rds t ho ug h t , t h e i rend , a prog ress and regress , a double cycle. Scienceca nno t enter t he immediateness of t h o u g h t , a s Des-canes bel ieved , because th e na tu r e oi t h i ng s is n o t h i n gbut a stage in h is tory . The immedia teness of t h ou gh tdoes not reveal the cause of that relation of the certainan d th e t rue which science desires. From th e certam,step by s tep , comes th e t ru e ; th e min,d l ea rns th e truef rom th e c e r t a i n . T h e ce r t a i n is p a r t of t he t rue . It ison e of i ts ext r ins i f icat ions , and the re fo re th e t rue isconta ined in t he ce r t a i n . T h e t ru e i s t he i d e a , th e ce r t a i ni s the actua l o r rea l i ty .Th e co ncep t io n o f imma n e n t P ro v i d en c e , t o w a rd sw h i c hh is "Diritto L"niversale" pointed, is clearly shown in, th e"Scienza Nuova ," but not in "Dell ' Antichissima Sap-ienza degH Italiani," in which Prov idence i s supramun-da ne and ana lagous to the Platonic idea of the good.This book ( the first m a n i f e s t a t i on of h i s genius, w h ich


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42 lKTRODUCTORY SURVEYa i m ed a t t he reconstruction o f h i s t o ry f rom t he r ichfield of Lingmstics) contains two suppo s i t i o n s ,which Vico himself laterabandoned: Thewisdomofo ur an c i en t an c es t o r s , l a t e r called by him " t h e p r i d eof nations and the learned"; and the i n ven t i o n by man ofm at hem a t i c s a lo n e a restricted ap p l i c a t i o n o f t heimportant p r i n c i p l e o f t h e c o n ve r s i o n of the t rue w i t hthe actual. In the "Diritto Universale" and "5cienzaNuova" h e h o l d s that m a n i s t h e a u t h o r n o t o n l y o fm a t h e m a t i c s but of a l l t he sc i en ces , w h i c h d eve lo p withth e history o f h u m a n id e a s, that i s , o f t he civil w o r ld(w i t h i t s p r i n c i p l e s l y i n g in t he modif ica t!ons o f t hehuman mind i t se l f ) , and of re l i g ion (which changes withth e d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e m i n d ; f o r t h e an c i en t s , w i t hrobust senses and vast i m ag i n a t i o n , p i c t u r ed God ac-cord ing to t he i r i d ea ) .Ma n i s k n o w l e d g e , wil l , a n d p o w e r . H is p o w e r isb o un d ed o n ly by

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