NIKE, INC., AND SWEATSHOPS

Jonah Peretti decided to customize his Nike shoes and visited the Nike iD website. The company

allows customers to personalize their Nikes with the colors of their choice and their own

personal 16-character message. Peretti chose the word “sweatshop” for his Nikes. After receiving

his order, Nike informed Peretti via e-mail that the term “sweatshop” represents “inappropriate

slang” and is not considered viable for print on a Nike shoe. Thus, his order was summarily

rejected. Peretti e-mailed Nike, arguing that the term “sweatshop” is present in Webster’s

dictionary and could not possibly be considered inappropriate slang. Nike responded by quoting

the company’s rules, which state that the company can refuse to print anything on its shoes that it

does not deem appropriate. Peretti replied that he was changing his previous order and would

instead like to order a pair of shoes with a “color snapshot of the 10-year-old Vietnamese girl

who makes my shoes.” He never received a response.1

THE PR NIGHTMARE BEGINS

Before Nike could blink an eye, the situation turned into a public relations nightmare. Peretti

forwarded the e-mail exchange to a few friends, who forwarded it to a few friends, and so forth.

Within six weeks of his initial order, the story appeared in the Wall Street Journal, USA Today,

and the Village Voice. Peretti himself appeared on the Today Show, and he estimates that 2

million people have seen the e-mail. At the height of the incident, Peretti was receiving 500 e-

mails a day from people who had read the e-mail from as far away as Asia, Australia, Europe,

and South America.2,3

Nike refused to admit any wrongdoing in the incident and stated that they reserve the right to

refuse any order for whatever reason. Beth Gourney, a spokesperson for Nike, had the following

to say regarding the incident: Clearly, he [Peretti] was attempting to stir up trouble; he has

admitted it. He’s not an activist. Mr. Peretti does not understand our labor policy. If he did, he

would know that we do not hire children; our minimum age for hiring is 18 . . . and we don’t

apologize for not putting the word “sweatshop” because our policy clearly states: “We reserve

the right to cancel any order up to 24 hours after it has been submitted.”4

Nike, Inc., is no stranger to sweatshop allegations. Ever since the mid-1990s, the company has

been subject to negative press, lawsuits, and demonstrations on college campuses alleging that

the firm’s overseas contractors subject employees to working in inhumane conditions for low

wages. As Philip Knight, the CEO and founder of Nike, once lamented, “The Nike product has

become synonymous with slave wages, forced overtime, and arbitrary abuse.”5

HISTORY OF NIKE, INC. Philip Knight started his own athletic shoe distribution company in

1964. Using his Plymouth Reliant as a warehouse, he began importing and distributing track

shoes from Onitsuka Company, Ltd., a Japanese manufacturer. First-year sales of $8,000 resulted

in a profit of $254. After eight years, annual sales reached $2 million, and the firm employed 45

people. However, Onitsuka saw the huge potential of the American shoe market and dropped

Knight’s relatively small company in favor of larger, more experienced distributors. Knight was

forced to start anew. However, instead of importing and distributing another firm’s track shoes,

he decided to design his own shoes and create his own company. The name he chose for his new

company was “Nike.”6

Nike’s Use of Contract Labor. When the company began operations, Knight contracted the

manufacture of Nike’s shoes to two firms in Japan. Shortly thereafter, Nike began to contract

with firms in Taiwan and Korea. In 1977, Nike purchased two shoe manufacturing facilities in

the United States—one in Maine, the other in New Hampshire. Eventually, the two plants

became so unprofitable that the firm was forced to close them. The loss due to the write-off of

the plants was approximately $10 million in a year in which the firm’s total profit was $15

million. The firm had a successful IPO in 1980, eight years after the company was founded. Nike

became the largest athletic shoe company in the world.7

Nike does not own a single shoe or apparel factory. Instead, the firm contracts the production of

its products to independently owned manufacturers. Today, practically all Nike subcontracted

factories are in countries such as Indonesia, Vietnam, China, and Thailand, where the labor costs

are significantly less than those in the United States. Worldwide, more than five hundred and

thirty thousand people are employed in factories that manufacture Nike products. On an earlier

website that is no longer available, the company gave the following as a rough breakdown of the

costs per shoe. With inflation ever with us, these figures increase over the years, but these data

give us an idea of total costs relative to selling price: Consumer pays: $65 Retailer pays: $32.50

to Nike, and then doubles the price for retail

Nike pays: $16.25 and then

doubles the price to

retailers for shipping,

insurance, duties,

R&D, marketing,

sales, administration,

and profits

The $16.25 price paid to the factory includes:

Materials: $10.75

Labor: $2.43

Overhead + Depreciation: $2.10

Factory Profit: $0.97

Total Costs: $16.258

Even in today’s high-tech environment, the production of athletic shoes is still a laborintensive

process. For example, for practically all athletic shoes, the upper portion of the shoe must be

sewn together with the lower portion by hand. The soles must be manually glued together.

Although most leaders in the industry are confident that practically the entire production process

will someday be automated, it will still be years before the industry will not have to rely upon

human labor. Other Firms in the Industry. Nike’s use of overseas contractors is not unique in the

athletic shoe and apparel industry. All other major athletic shoe manufacturers also contract with

overseas manufacturers, albeit to various degrees. One athletic shoe firm, New Balance Inc., is

somewhat of an anomaly, as it continues to operate five factories in the United States.9

Nike spends heavily on endorsements and advertising and pays several top athletes well over a

million dollars a year in endorsement contracts. In contrast, New Balance has developed a

different strategy. They do not use professional athletes to market their products. According to

their “Endorsed by No One” policy, New Balance instead chooses to invest in product research

and development and foregoes expensive endorsement contracts.10

THE SWEATSHOP MOVEMENT V S . NIKE One pivotal event is largely responsible for

introducing the term “sweatshop” to the American public. In 1996, Kathie Lee Gifford, cohost of

the formerly syndicated talk show Live with Regis and Kathie Lee, endorsed her own line of

clothing for Wal-Mart. During that same year, labor rights activists disclosed that her “Kathie

Lee Collection” was made in Honduras by seamstresses who earned 31 cents an hour and were

sometimes required to work 20-hour days. Traditionally known for her pleasant, jovial demeanor

and her love of children, Kathie Lee was outraged. She tearfully informed the public that she was

unaware that her clothes were being made in so-called sweatshops and vowed to do whatever she

could to promote the antisweatshop cause.11

Nike Is Accused. In a national press conference, Gifford named Michael Jordan as another

celebrity who, like herself, endorsed products without knowing under what conditions the

products were made. At the time, Michael Jordan was Nike’s premier endorser and was

reportedly under a $20-million-per-year contract with the firm.12

Nike, the number-one athletic shoe brand in the world, soon found itself under attack by the

rapidly growing antisweatshop movement. Shortly after the Gifford story broke, Joel Joseph,

chairman of the Made in the USA Foundation, accused Nike of paying underage Indonesian

workers 14 cents an hour to make the company’s line of Air Jordan Shoes. He also claimed that

the total payroll of Nike’s six Indonesian subcontracted factories was less than the reported $20

million per year that Jordan received from his endorsement contract with Nike. The Made in the

USA Foundation is one of the organizations that ignited the Gifford controversy and is largely

financed by labor unions and U.S. apparel manufacturers that are against free trade with low-

wage countries.13

Nike quickly pointed out that Air Jordan shoes are made in Taiwan, not Indonesia. Additionally,

Country Minimum Monthly Wage Average Monthly Wage at Nike

Factories

Taiwan 14,124 NT$ 25,609 NT$

South Korea Won 306,030 Won 640,000

Indonesia 115,000 rupiah 239,800 rupiah

China RMB 276 RMB 636

Thailand 2,950–3,150 baht 4,435 baht

Vietnam 331.050 VND$ 640.030 VND$

Nike asserted that the entry-level income of an Indonesian factory worker is five times that of a

farmer. The firm also claimed that an assistant line supervisor in a Chinese subcontracted factory

earns more than a surgeon with 20 years of experience.14 In response to the allegations

regarding Michael Jordan’s endorsement contract, Nike stated that the total wages in Indonesia

are $50 million a year, which is well over what the firm paid Jordan.15 Nike soon faced more

negative publicity. Michael Moore, the movie director whose documentary Roger and Me shed

light on the plight of laid-off auto workers in Flint, Michigan, and damaged the reputation of

General Motors chairman Roger Smith, interviewed Philip Knight for his movie The Big One.

On camera, Knight referred to some employees at subcontracted factories as “poor little

Indonesian workers.” Moore’s cameras also recorded the following exchange between Moore

and Knight:

Moore: Twelve-year-olds working in [Indone-

sian] factories? That’s OK with you?

Knight: They’re not 12-year-olds working in

factories...the minimumage is 14.

Moore: How about 14, then? Doesn’t that

bother you?

Knight: No.16

Knight, the only CEO interviewed in the movie,

received harsh criticism for his comments. Nike

alleged that the comments were taken out of

context and were deceitful because Moore failed to

include Knight’s pledge to make a transition from

a 14- to a 16-year-old minimum age labor force.

Nike prepared its own video that includes the

entire interview.17

Thomas Nguyen, founder of Vietnam Labor

Watch, inspected several of Nike’s plants in

Vietnam in 1998 and reported cases of worker

abuse. At one factory that manufactures Nike

products, a supervisor punished 56 women for

wearing inappropriate work shoes by forcing

them to run around the factory in the hot sun.

Twelve workers fainted and were taken to the

hospital. Nguyen also reported that workers were only allowed one bathroom break and two

drinks of water during each eight-hour shift. Nike responded that the supervisor who was

involved in the fainting incident has been suspended and that the firm had hired an independent

accounting firm to look into the matters further.18 Nike Responds. In 1997, Nike hired former

Atlanta mayor Andrew Young, a vocal opponent of sweatshops and child labor, to review the

firm’s overseas labor practices. Neither party disclosed the fee that Young received for his

services. Young toured 12 factories in Vietnam, Indonesia, and China and was reportedly given

unlimited access. However, he was constantly accompanied by Nike representatives during all

factory tours. Furthermore, Young relied upon Nike translators when communicating with

factory workers.19 In his 75-page report, Young concluded that “Nike is doing a good job, but it

can do better.” He provided Nike with six recommendations for improving the working

conditions at subcontracted factories. Nike immediately responded to the report and agreed to

implement all six recommendations. Young did not address the issue of wages and standards of

living because he felt he lacked the “academic credentials” for such a judgment.20 Public

reaction to Young’s report was mixed. Some praised Nike. However, many of Nike’s opponents

disregarded Young’s report as biased and incomplete. One went so far as to state the report could

not have been better if Nike had written it themselves and questioned Young’s

independence.21,22 In 1998, Nike hired Maria Eitel to fill the newly created position of vice

president for corporate and social responsibility. Eitel was formerly a public relations executive

for Microsoft. Her responsibilities were to oversee Nike’s labor practices, environmental affairs,

and involvement in the global community. Although this move was applauded by some, others

were skeptical and claimed that Nike’s move was nothing more than a publicity stunt.23 Later

that same year, Philip Knight gave a speech at the National Press Club in Washington, DC, and

announced six initiatives that were intended to improve the working conditions in its overseas

factories. The firm chose to raise the minimum hiring age from 16 to 18 years of age.

Nike also decided to expand its worker education program so that all workers in Nike factories

would have the option to take middle and high school equivalency tests.24 The director of

Global Exchange, one of Nike’s staunchest opponents, called the initiatives “significant and very

positive.” He also added that “we feel that the measures—if implemented—could be exciting.”25

COLLEGE STUDENTS, ORGANIZED LABOR, AND NIKE

Colleges and universities have direct ties to the many athletic shoe and apparel companies (such

as Nike, Champion, and Reebok) that contract with overseas manufacturers. Most universities

receive money from athletic shoe and apparel corporations in return for outfitting the university’s

sports teams with the firm’s products. In 1997, Nike gave $7.1 million to the University of North

Carolina for the right to outfit all of UNC’s sports teams with products bearing the Nike Swoosh

logo.26 Additionally, academic institutions allow firms to manufacture apparel bearing the

university’s official name, colors, and insignias in return for a fee. In 1998, the University of

Michigan received $5.7 million dollars in licensing fees.27 Most of these contract and licensing

fees are allocated toward scholarships and other academic programs. Today, these practices

continue and the amounts of money are much larger. Organized Labor. In 1995, the Union of

Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees (UNITE) was founded. The union, a member of

the AFL-CIO, was formed by the merger of The International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union

and the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union and represented two hundred and

fifty thousand workers in North America and Puerto Rico. Most of the union members work in

the textile and apparel industry. In 1996, UNITE launched a “Stop Sweatshops” campaign after

the Kathy Lee Gifford story broke to “link union, consumers, student, civil rights and women’s

groups in the fight against sweatshops at home and abroad.”28 In 1997, UNITE, along with the

AFL-CIO, recruited dozens of college students for summer internships. Many of the students

referred to that summer as “Union Summer.” For the students involved, it had the same impact

that “Freedom Summer” did for students during the civil rights movement.29 The United

Students Against Sweatshops (USAS) organization was formed the following year. The USAS

was founded and was led by former UNITE summer interns.30 University Organizations. The

USAS has chapters at dozens of universities across the United States. Since its inception, the

organization has staged a large number of campus demonstrations that are reminiscent of the

1960s. One notable demonstration occurred on the campus of UNC in 1997. Students of the Nike

Awareness Campaign protested against the university’s contract with Nike due to the firm’s

alleged sweatshop abuses. More than 100 students demanded that the university not renew its

contract with Nike and rallied outside the office of the university’s chancellor. More than 50

other universities, such as the University of Wisconsin and Duke, staged similar protests and sit-

ins.31 In response to the protests at UNC, Nike invited the editor of the university’s student

newspaper to tour Nike’s overseas contractors to examine the working conditions firsthand. Nike

offered to fund the trip by pledging $15,000 toward the students’ travel and accommodations

costs. Ironically, Michael Jordan is an alumnus of UNC.32

Critics of the USAS contend that the student organization is merely a puppet of UNITE and

organized labor. They cite the fact that the AFLCIO has spent more than $3 million on

internships and outreach programs with the alleged intent of interesting students in careers as

union activists. The founders of the USAS are former UNITE interns. The USAS admits that

UNITE has tipped off the student movement as to the whereabouts of alleged sweatshop

factories. Also, in an attempt to spur campus interest in the sweatshop cause, UNITE sent two

sweatshop workers on a fivecampus tour. They have also coached students via phone during sit-

ins and paid for regularly scheduled teleconferences between antisweatshop student leaders on

different campuses. According to Allan Ryan, a Harvard University lawyer who has negotiated

with the USAS, “[T]he students are vocal, but it’s hard to get a viewpoint from them that does

not reflect that of UNITE.”33 Many students have denied allegations that they are being

manipulated by organized labor and claim that they discovered the sweatshop issues on their

own. Others acknowledge the assistance of organized labor but claim it is “no different from

[student] civil rights activists using the NAACP in the 1960s.”34 John Sweeney, president of the

AFL-CIO, claims the role of organized labor is not one of manipulation but of motivation.

Others assert that the union merely provides moral support.35 Regardless of the AFL-CIO’s

intentions, the students have had a positive impact upon the promotion of organized labor’s

antisweatshop agenda over the years. According to the director of one of the several human

rights groups that are providing assistance to the students: At this moment, the sweatshop protest

is definitely being carried on the backs of university students. If a hundred students hold a

protest, they get a page in the New York Times. If a hundred union people did that, they’d be

locked up.36 By 2007, United Students Against Sweatshops claimed to have approximately 200

affiliated high schools, colleges, and universities, and contacts on more than 400 campuses.

USAS currently has four staff members and offices in Washington, DC, and New York City.

Today, USAS promotes The Sweat-Free Campus Campaign as a multifaceted, extremely

successful program in which students organize antisweatshop campaigns on their campuses,

mandating that the clothes bearing their collegiate logos be manufactured under fair and ethical

conditions.37

THE FAIR LABOR ASSOCIATION AND THE WORKER RIGHTS CONSORTIUM

In 1996, a presidential task force of industry and human rights representatives was given the job

of addressing the sweatshop issue. The key purpose of this task force was to develop a workplace

code of conduct and a system for monitoring factories to ensure compliance. In 1998, the task

force created the Fair Labor Association (FLA) to accomplish these goals. This organization is

made up of consumer and human rights groups as well as footwear and apparel manufacturers.

Nike was one of the first companies to join the FLA. Many other major manufacturers (Levi

Strauss & Co., Liz Claiborne, Patagonia, Polo Ralph Lauren, Reebok, Eddie Bauer, and Phillips-

Van Heusen) along with hundreds of colleges and universities have also joined the FLA.38 FLA

Requirements. Members of the FLA must follow the principles set forth in the organization’s

Workplace Code of Conduct. The FLA Workplace Code of Conduct sets member standards in

the following areas: forced labor, child labor, harassment or abuse, nondiscrimination, health and

safety, freedom of association, wages and benefits, hours of work, and overtime compensation.

Member organizations that license or contract with overseas manufacturers or suppliers are

responsible for ensuring that factory employees are paid either the minimum wage as required by

law or the average industry wage, whichever is higher. Additionally, the code of conduct sets

limits on the number of hours employees can work, allows workers the right to collective

bargaining, and forbids discrimination.39 Each member firm must conduct an internal audit of

every manufacturing facility on a yearly basis. Furthermore, members of the FLA must disclose

to the FLA the location of all subcontracted factories. This information will not be made public.

The FLA uses a team of external auditors to monitor the compliance of these factories with the

FLA’s code of conduct. These monitoring activities consist of a combination of announced and

unannounced factory visits, and results are made available to the public.40 The WRC

Alternative. The USAS opposed several of the FLA’s key components and created the Worker

Rights Consortium (WRC) as an alternative to the FLA. The WRC asserts that the prevailing

industry or legal minimum wage in some countries is too low and does not provide employees

with the basic human needs. They propose that factories should instead pay a higher “living

wage” that takes into account the wage required to provide factory employees with enough

income to afford housing, energy, nutrition, clothing, health care, education, potable water, child

care, transportation, and savings. Additionally, the WRC supports public disclosure of all factory

locations and the right to monitor any factory at any time. As of August 2007, 174 colleges and

universities had joined the WRC and agreed to adhere to its policies.41 Nike, a member and

supporter of the FLA, has opposed the Worker Rights Consortium. The firm states that a concept

of a living wage is impractical, as “there is no common, agreed-upon definition of the living

wage. Definitions range from complex mathematical formulas to vague philosophical notions.”

Additionally, Nike was once opposed to the WRC’s proposal that the location of all factories be

publicly disclosed. Nike also has claimed that the monitoring provisions set out by the WRC are

unrealistic and biased toward organized labor.42 The University of Oregon, Philip Knight’s alma

mater, joined the WRC in the year 2000. Alumnus Knight had previously contributed more than

$50 million to the university—$30 million for academics and $20 million for athletics. Upon

hearing that his alma mater had joined the WRC, Knight was shocked. He withdrew a proposed

$30 million donation and stated that “the bonds of trust, which allowed me to give at a high

level, have been shredded” and “there will be no further donations of any kind to the University

of Oregon.”43,44

NIKE COMES AROUND

In May 2001, Harsh Saini, Nike’s corporate and social responsibility manager, acknowledged

that the firm may not have handled the sweatshop issue as well as it could have and stated that

Nike had not been adequately monitoring its subcontractors in overseas operations until the

media and other organizations revealed the presence of sweatshops. We were a bunch of shoe

geeks who expanded so much without thinking of being socially responsible that we went from

being a very big sexy brand name to suddenly becoming the poster boy for everything bad in

manufacturing. She added, “We realized that if we still want to be the brand of choice in 20

years, we had certain responsibilities to fulfill.”45 Oregon Reverses Its Decision. In early 2001,

Oregon’s state board of higher education cast doubt on the legality of the University of Oregon’s

WRC membership, and the university dissolved its ties with the labor organization.46 In

September of the same year, Phil Knight renewed his financial support. Although the exact

amount of Knight’s donation was kept confidential, it was sufficient enough to ensure that the

$85 million expansion of the university’s football stadium would go through as originally

planned. In 2000, the stadium expansion plans suffered a significant setback when Knight

withdrew his funding. Many of the proposed additions, such as a 12,000-seat capacity increase

and 32 brand-new skyboxes, were made possible largely due to Knight’s pledge of financial

support.47,48 Nike released its first corporate social responsibility report in October 2001.

According to Phil Knight, “[I]n this report, Nike for the first time has assembled a

comprehensive public review of our corporate responsibility practices.”49 The report cites

several areas in which the firm could do better, such as worker conditions in Indonesia and

Mexico. The report, compiled by both internal auditors and outside monitors, also notes that

Nike is one of only four companies that has joined a World Wildlife Fund program to reduce

greenhouse admissions. Jason Mark, a spokesman for Global Exchange, one of Nike’s chief

critics, praised the report and stated that Nike is “obviously responding to consumer

concerns.”50 KASKY V . N I K E , I N C . Nike’s problems with fair labor issues continued on a

related front. Labor activist Mark Kasky had sued Nike in 1998, arguing that Nike had engaged

in false advertising when it denied that there was mistreatment of workers in Southeast Asian

factories. At issue was the question of whether Nike’s defense of its practices was commercial

speech, for which there are laws against making misleading claims, or political speech, for which

free speech protections apply. The California Supreme Court ruled that Nike’s statements about

labor conditions could be construed as false advertising. Nike appealed this ruling to the U.S.

Supreme Court, which sent it back to the California court without making a judgment on the free

speech issue. In September 2003, Kasky and Nike settled the case for a $1.5 million donation to

the Fair Labor Association.51 The settlement, however, left many questions unanswered.52

Many feared that the risk of lawsuits would have a chilling effect, causing firms to stop releasing

social responsibility reports, which unlike the SEC financial reports, are all voluntary. In 2001,

Nike issued a corporate social responsibility report, but the company announced that, due to the

California decision, they would not release a corporate social responsibility report in 2002–2003.

Nike released a “Community Investment” report detailing its philanthropic efforts instead.53 In

2004, the company did release a sustainability report.54

CRITICS QUIE TDOWN BUT DON ’ T GO AWAY

Nike’s critics have not gone away, but they have quieted down as the company has taken steps to

address many of the criticisms made over the years. Though the critics are less vocal today

compared to previous periods, there is still some ongoing opposition to the company. Typical of

the continuing opposition is the organization Educating for Justice (EFJ) that runs a continuing

Stop Nike Sweatshops campaign. In 2006, EFJ planned a film titled Sweat. The film, as

described on EFJ’s website, is the journey of two young Americans uncovering the story behind

the statistics about Nike factory workers. Through the lens of their experiences, they claim

viewers will discover the injustices of Nike’s labor practices in the developing world,

specifically in Indonesia, and how Nike's cutthroat, bottom-line economic decisions have a

profound effect on human lives.55

NIKE LATER GETS POSITIVE RECOGNITIONS

In spite of its controversial record on the issue of sweatshops and monitoring labor practices

abroad, Nike has been the recipient of a variety of CSR recognitions over the past several years.

For example, Nike claimed the only spot in its industry for the 2007 SustainableBusiness.com

list of the World’s Top Sustainable Stocks. In addition, in the Apparel category, Nike was named

to the 2007 World's Most Ethical companies list compiled by Ethisphere magazine. Finally, Nike

earned the No. 3 ranking on the 2007 “100 Best Corporate Citizens” list published by CRO

magazine. Nike’s ranking rose from No. 13 in 2006 and No. 31 in 2005.56

Questions for Discussion

1. What are the ethical and social issues in this case?

2. Why should Nike be held responsible for what happens in factories that it does not own?

Does Nike have a responsibility to ensure that factory workers receive a “living wage”? Do the

wage guidelines of FLA or WRC seem most appropriate to you? Why?

3. Is it ethical for Nike to pay endorsers millions while its factory employees receive a few

dollars a day?

4. Is Nike’s responsibility to monitor its subcontracted factories a legal, economic, social, or

philanthropic responsibility? What was it 10 years ago? What will it be 10 years from now?

5. What could Nike have done, if anything, to prevent the damage to its corporate reputation?

What steps should Nike take in the future? Is it “good business” for Nike to acknowledge its past

errors and become more socially responsible?

6. What are the goals of the AFL-CIO? Does the campus antisweatshop movement help or hinder

the AFL-CIO’s goals? Are the students being “used” by the AFL-CIO?

7. Regarding the Kasky v. Nike, Inc. case, is Nike’s defense of its practices commercial speech

or political speech? What are the long-term implications of your decision, not only for Nike but

also for business in general?

8. Conduct your own personal research on Nike’s response to sweatshop-type situations.

What are they doing now?

Case Endnotes

1. Copy of e-mail exchange found at Department of Personal Freedom website, http://

www.shey.net/niked.html.

2. Ibid.

3. ABC News website, http://abcnews.go .com/sections/business/DailyNews/ nike010402.html.

4. Ibid.

5. Bien Hoa, “Job Opportunity or Exploitation,” Los Angeles Times (April 18, 1999).

6. Philip Knight, “Global Manufacturing: The Nike Story Is Just Good Business,” Vital Speeches

of the Day, 64(20): 637–640.

7. Ibid., 637–640.

8. These data were presented on an earlier Nike website that is no longer available. The site was:

http://www.nikebiz.com/labor/faq .shtml.

9. New Balance website, http://www.new balance.com/corporate/aboutus/corporate_ about.php,

retrieved September 21, 2007.

10. New Balance website, http://www.new balance.com/.

11. David Bauman, “After the Tears, Gifford Testifies on Sweatshops—She Turns Lights,

Cameras on Issue,” Seattle Times (July 16, 1996), A3.

12. Del Jones, “Critics Tie Sweatshop Sneakers to ‘Air’ Jordan,” USA Today (June 6, 1996), 1B.

13. Ibid.

14. Nike Press Release, June 6, 1996.

15. Del Jones, 1B.

16. Garry Trudeau, “Sneakers in Tinseltown,” Time (April 20, 1998), 84.

17. William J. Holstein, “Casting Nike as the Bad Guy,” U.S. News & World Report (September

22, 1997), 49.

18. Verena Dobnik, “Nike Shoe Contractor Abuses Alleged,” Atlanta Journal-Constitution

(March 18, 1997), A14.

19. Simon Beck, “Nike in Sweat over Heat Raised by Claims of Biases Assessment,” South

China Morning Post (July 6, 1997), 2.

20. Matthew C. Quinn, “Footwear Maker’s Labor Pledge Unlikely to Stamp Out Criticism,”

Atlanta Journal-Constitution (June 25, 1997), F8.

21. G. Pascal Zachary, “Nike Tries to Quell Exploitation Charges,” Wall Street Journal (June 15,

1997).

22. Simon Beck, 2.

23. Bill Richards, “Nike Hires an Executive from Microsoft for New Post Focusing on Labor

Policies,” Wall Street Journal (January 15, 1998), B14.

24. Philip Knight, 640.

25. Patti Bond, “Nike Promises to Improve Factory Worker Conditions,” Atlanta Journal-

Constitution (May 13, 1998), 3B.

26. Allan Wolper, “Nike’s Newspaper Temptation,” Editor & Publisher (January 10, 1998), 8–

10.

27. Gregg Krupa, “Antisweatshop Activists Score in Campaign Targeting Athletic Retailers,”

Boston Globe (April 18, 1999), F1.

28. UNITE webpage, http://www.uniteunion .org/research/history/unionisborn.html.

29. Krupa, F1.

30. UNITE webpage.

31. Wolper, 8–10.

32. Wolper, 8.

33. Jodie Morse, “Campus Awakening,” Time (April 12, 1999), 77–78.

34. Krupa, F1.

35. Morse, 77–78.

36. Ibid.

37. USAS website: http://www.studentsagainst sweatshops.org//index.php?

option=com_content&task=view&id=16&Itemid=66, retrieved September 21, 2007.

38. Fair Labor Association website: http://www. fairlabor.org/participants/companies, retrieved

September 21, 2007.

39. http://www.fairlabor.org/conduct, retrieved September 21, 2007.

40. Ibid.

41. Worker’s Rights Consortium website, http://www.workersrights.org/as.asp, retrieved

September 21, 2007.

42. Nike website, http://www.nikebiz.com/labor/index.shtml.

43. Philip Knight Press Release (April 24, 2000) found at: http://www.nike.com/nikebiz/

news/pressrelease.jhtml?year=2000 &month=04&letter=g, retrieved October 14, 2007.

44. Louise Lee and Aaron Bernstein, “Who Says Student Protests Don’t Matter?” BusinessWeek

(June 12, 2000), 96.

45. Ravina Shamdasani, “Soul Searching by ‘Shoe Geeks’ Led to Social Responsibility,” South

China Morning Post (May 17, 2001), 2.

46. Greg Bolt, “University of Oregon Ends Relationship with Antisweatshop Group,” Register

Guard (March 6, 2001).

47. Hank Hager, “Frohnmayer: It’s a Very Happy Day for Us,” Oregon Daily Emerald

(September 27, 2001).

48. Ron Bellamy, “Nike CEO to Resume Donations to University of Oregon,” Register Guard

(September 26, 2001).

49. William McCall, “Nike Releases First Corporate Responsibility Report,” Associated Press

State & Local Wire (October 9, 2001).

50. Ibid.

51. Adam Liptak, “Nike Move Ends Case Over Firm’s Free Speech,” New York Times

(September 13, 2003).

52. For a more thorough discussion of this controversy, see David Hess and Thomas Dunfee,

“The Kasky-Nike Threat to Corporate Social Reporting,” Business Ethics Quarterly (January

2007), 5–32; and Don Mayer, “Kasky v. Nike and the Quarrelsome Question of Corporate Free

Speech, Business Ethics Quarterly (January 2007), 65–96.

53. http://www.srimedia.com; for detailed coverage of this case and its implications, see

http://www.reclaimdemocracy.org/nike/.

54. William Baue, “Gap and Nike Engage Stakeholders for Assurance Statements on

Sustainability Reports,” Nike website: http://www.nike.com/nikebiz/nikebiz.jhtml?page=59

&item=tppr&year=2005&release=07a, retrieved September 22, 2007.

55. Educating for Justice: http://www.educa tingforjustice.org/nikewages/sweat.html, retrieved

September 21, 2007.

56. Nikebiz.com, Company Overview, Awards & Recognitions, Corporate Social Responsibility:

http://www.nike.com/nikebiz/nikebiz.jhtml?page=3&item=awards, retrieved September 22,

2007.