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FIDEIZAM

Doktrina prema kojoj je vera nezavisna od razuma, fides lat.- faith + izam fideista se

oslanja na veru vi!e ne"o na razum, razum je uvek ateista, #jerke"orov

ira$ionalizam vere %&rtvovati razum radi afirma$ije sopstveno" ja, razum je

prepreka vere, tek prevazila&enjem razuma, &rtvovanjem, stradanjem,

odustajanjem od samokontrole i suo'avanjem sa apsurdno!(u &ivota smo u

pozi$iji apsolutno" odno!enja prema apsolutu).

*.*.* #ierke"aard

Any discussion of Sren Kierkegaard's thought is complicated by the fact that

he wrote pseudonymously, attributing most of his writings to a variety offictional authors whose views may or may not have corresponded to his own

!n The Point of View for My Work as an Author"one of the few works to

which Kierkegaard #$%$&$%(() was willing to append his own signature"he

e*plains his use of the pseudonyms by noting that philosophical and religious

confusion can be addressed only indirectly+ one must approach from behind

the person who is under an illusion #$%%, --() .e adds that the illusion

against which his pseudonymous writings are directed is an illusion about what

/hristianity re0uires, and that these writings, though employing philosophical

tools, thus subserve a religious intent According to this retrospective self1

assessment, the whole of Kierkegaard's work is related to /hristianity, to the

problem 2of becoming a /hristian,3 with a direct or indirect polemic against the

monstrous illusion we call /hristendom, or against the illusion that in such a

land as ours all are /hristians of a sort #$%%, (4)

Although it is a sub5ect of debate whether to take at face value Kierkegaard's

claim that his entire work serves a religious end"after all, it seems to be

contradicted by other remarks of his"it is nevertheless clear that combating

confusion, including illusions about faith, was central to his work

6(7Kierkegaard suggests that speculative philosophy contributes to thisconfusion by transforming /hristianity into a sort of philosophical theory or

system #.egel is fre0uently"if not always entirely fairly"parodied in this

connection) !n so doing, it imports into religion modes of in0uiry that distort

the essential nature of faith

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fideism/notes.html#5http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fideism/notes.html#5http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fideism/notes.html#5http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fideism/notes.html#5

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!t is perhaps tempting to imagine that the relation between evidence and belief

is purely epistemological, a 0uestion of 5ustification 8n this account, beliefs

mean what they do irrespective of their relation to the evidence9 what a

consideration of the latter reveals is whether or not they are 5ustified :ut one

of the implications of Kierkegaard's thought is that entitlement is a socialstatus, and that the various social practices within which it is conferred or

withheld contribute to the meaning of the beliefs in 0uestion ;here are

different kinds of beliefs, logically speaking, and different ways in which

entitlement to such beliefs is vindicated ;he basic error to which philosophical

systemati)

?ithin the sphere of the intellectual"eg, within scientific or historical

scholarship"in0uiry is conceived in terms of a process of appro*imation to

reality ?hen it comes to religion, however, what matters, according to

Kierkegaard, is not the ob5ect to which the knower relates himself but the

relationship itself+ the accent falls not on what is said but on howit is said

#$%4, $>> and -@-) or Kierkegaard, as for the so1called evangelical fideists,

faith is characteri

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Kierkegaard's point is not that it is somehow permissible to neglect one's

epistemic duties where belief in Bod is concerned, but that one cannot separate

the 0uestion of what is believed from the 0uestion of how it is believed

#or a contemporary defense of this point, see Strandberg #-@$$), especially

/hapters $ and ) .ere the how refers to the relationship sustained by thee*isting individual, in his own e*istence, to the contentof his utterance

#Anthology, -$) Eeligion, for Kierkegaard, is a matter of what one does with

one's life, a matter of inwardness !n this conte*t, to observe that religious

believers lack evidence for their beliefs is not to render a negative verdict on

their entitlement but to comment conceptually on the kindof beliefs they are

?as Kierkegaard a fideistF /ritics have argued that in recoiling from natural

theology, Kierkegaard transformed belief into a matter of will and emotion, and

that a decision as monumental as a leap of faith"made seemingly arbitrarily,

in the absence of any rational assurance"might 5ust as easily have disastrous

results GH Iackie, for instance, claims that what Kierkegaard himself is

advocating is a sort of intellectual Eussian roulette #-$4) So far, it might be

argued, Kierkegaard has done little to show that a leap in the direction of

/hristianity is a better bet than any of its alternatives, and that a wiser tack"as

.ume counseled in connection with alleged miracles"would be to proportion

belief #and passion) to the available evidence Kierkegaard's defenders might

reply that it is only from the outside"from the point of view, eg, of the

dispassionate pseudonyms"that /hristianity appears ungrounded and

absurd, and that Kierkegaard's point is really that those already in possessionof faith need not be embarrassed by the fact that it is not the ineluctable

outcome of reasoning from an imagined set of neutral and uncontested

premises

Although he relentlessly critici

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