(FERM) Facility plan Guideline

HEALTH, SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENT GUIDELINEFERM Facility Plan

DOCUMENT ID - GU 230REVISION - 2.0DATE - - 15/07/02

HSE – GUIDELINE Recommending Best Practice

GU-230 REVISION 2.0 Page ii

Authorised for Issue by the HSE IC 15/07/02

Document AuthorisationDocument Authority Document Custodian Document Author‘dapo OguntoyinboRef. Ind: CSMDate: 15/07/02

Hamad KhalfeenRef. Ind: CSM/11Date: 15/07/02

Hamad KhalfeenRef. Ind: CSM/11Date: 15/07/02

The following is a brief summary of the four most recent revisions to this document. Details of all revisions prior to these are held on file by the Document Custodian.

Version No. Date Author Scope / RemarksVersion 2.0 Jul 2002 Hamad Khalfeen,

CSM/11Editorial changes, new format.

Version 1.0 Jul 1998 Original issue as HSE/97/13.

User Notes:

This document is a guideline only.

A controlled copy of the current version of this document is on PDO's EDMS. Before making reference to this document, it is the user's responsibility to ensure that any hard copy, or electronic copy, is current. For assistance, contact the Document Custodian.

This document is the property of Petroleum Development Oman, LLC. Neither the whole nor any part of this document may be disclosed to others or reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form by any means (electronic, mechanical, reprographic recording or otherwise) without prior written consent of the owner.

Users are encouraged to participate in the ongoing improvement of this document by providing constructive feedback.


ContentsABBREVIATIONS..................................................................................................... IV

1.0 INTRODUCTION............................................................................11.1 PURPOSE......................................................................................................11.2 SCOPE..........................................................................................................11.3 BACKGROUND................................................................................................1

1.3.1 Pre Fire Planning..................................................................................11.4 DISTRIBUTION AND TARGET AUDIENCE................................................................21.5 DOCUMENT REVIEW........................................................................................2

2.0 PREPARATION OF A FERM FACILITY PLAN......................................32.1 GENERAL......................................................................................................32.2 DOCUMENTS REQUIRED...................................................................................3

2.2.1 Area Facility FES and Fire Protection Equipment Description...............32.2.2 Fire Protection Systems Maintenance Plans.........................................52.2.3 Pre-Fire Plan/Operator Response Sheet...............................................72.2.4 Fire Responder Capabilities.................................................................32.2.5 Shortfall Listing....................................................................................5

2.3 FIRE SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT..........................................................................62.3.1 General................................................................................................62.3.2 Resource Levels for Scenarios.............................................................6

3.0 EXAMPLES...................................................................................83.1 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS MAINTENANCE PLANS.................................................83.2 FIRE SCENARIO WORKSHEETS.........................................................................10

ATTACHMENT I: BLANK FIRE SCENARIO WORK SHEET.................................29

ATTACHMENT II: BLANK PRE-FIRE PLAN/OPERATOR RESPONSE SHEET...........38

ATTACHMENT III: BLANK FIRE RESPONDER COMPETENCIES.........................43

GU-230 REVISION 2.0 Page iii


AbbreviationsAFFF Aqueous Film Forming FoamAFO Airport Fire Officer

BA Breathing ApparatusBLL BarrelsBLEVE Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour ExplosionBPD Barrels Per Day

CAA Civil Aviation Authority

DCS Digital Control System

EOM Emergency Operations ManualEP Engineering PracticeERD Engineering Reference DocumentESD Emergency Shut Down

FCP Field Change ProposalFERM Fire and Explosion Risk ManagementFES Fire and Explosion StrategyFMECA Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis

HSE Health, Safety and Environment

ICAO International Civil Aviation AuthorityIR Infra RedIT Information Technology

LEBC Local Emergency Base ControllerLEL Lower Explosive LimitLPG Liquefied Petroleum Gaslpm litres per minute

MAF Mina Al Fahal

NED National Emergency DirectorNGL Natural Gas LiquidsNFPA National Fire Protection Agency

oo out of (eg 2oo3 voting)ORC Oman Refinery CompanyOWS Oily Water Separator

PDO Petroleum Development OmanPPE Personal Protective EquipmentPS Production Station

QRA Quantitative Risk Asssessment

RCM Reliability Centered MaintenanceRFF Rescue and Fire FightingRFFS Rescue and Fire Fighting ServiceRMS Remote Manifold Station

GU-230 REVISION 2.0 Page iv


SCBA Self Contained Breathing ApparatusSIEP Shell International Exploration and Production

UL Underwriters LaboratoryUV Ultra Violet

VESDA Very Early Smoke Detection Apparatus

GU-230 REVISION 2.0 Page v


1.0 Introduction

1.1 PurposeThe prime objective of a FERM Facility Plan is to minimise the risk to life and assets by maximising the potential for risk mitigation with manual intervention, utilising available manpower and equipment.

It is intended that FERM Facility Plans be produced in a consistent manner for both new facilities and modifications to existing facilities. Presently, throughout PDO facilities there are differences in procedures, available equipment, manpower and capability. The purpose of this Guideline is to provide a consistent approach to identified fire hazards, by setting standards for the preparation of specific pre-fire planning documents for each PDO location.

This document supports the requirements provided in SP 1075, Specification for Fire and Explosion Risk Management, and provides examples where applicable.

1.2 ScopeThis guideline is focused on FERM Facility Plans.

1.3 BackgroundAutomated systems have the advantage of rapid response but are limited in terms of assessment and usually follow a single pre-determined pattern initiated by condition sensors. Only trained personnel can provide the necessary assessment of a situation but their performance is very much improved if all of the possibilities for escalation have been considered and fully understood prior to any occurrence.

By preparing specific action plans for manual response based on identified fire hazards and scenarios, simulated response exercises can be tested and practised. The testing aspect provides information regarding any weaknesses in the systems, or failures on demand; whilst the practice induces a level of familiarity with tasks which then become routine, and therefore more reliable. During an emergency, fire responders rely on their ability to use equipment safely and effectively.

1.3.1 Pre Fire PlanningPre-fire planning may be described as the advance preparation of documentation and practical rehearsals, based on potential credible fire scenarios, which can assist fire departments and line management personnel to respond to and control fire events within company facilities. Pre-fire planning addresses the nature of contribution from human intervention as a recovery measure.

Pre-fire planning sets plant control, safeguarding and fire fighting objectives and strategies so that in the case of a potential incident critical time is saved should hazardous events come about. It also identifies particular fire and explosion scenario resource requirements and hazards that may be encountered during an incident. The appropriate actions to be employed when applying mitigation and recovery measures are then developed.

GU-230 REVISION 2.0 Page 1


Pre-fire plans need to be scenario specific. They should not be overly detailed or inflexible since it is not possible to predict the precise events or impact that may occur from any given scenario. Having identified plausible fire scenarios and relevant control methodologies it is then possible to identify the role of contributing systems, for example:

Response times and capabilities of fire responders Physical site aspects including adequate access ways for the

assigned equipment taking wind directions into account Clear communication procedures and systems Availability of suitable quantities of foam, water or hand

extinguishers Convenient location of equipment such as hydrants, monitors and

fireman’s equipment.

1.4 Distribution and Target AudienceThis guideline has been developed for the use of PDO staff, contractors and consultants that are involved in the design of new facilities and modification of existing facilities.

It is also intended for use during the review of existing FERM Facility Plans as they are completed on a periodic basis.

1.5 Document ReviewThis Guideline shall be reviewed as necessary in line with any review and modification of the related Specification.



2.0 Preparation of a FERM Facility Plan

2.1 GeneralThis section provides guidance on how to prepare a FERM Facility Plan, and provides a list of documents for a typical plan.

In establishing facility plans it is necessary to prepare a list of company facilities, then list the processes, plants, operation, structures and personnel within the facilities. From this list the numbers and types of potential (moderate, serious and major fire) incident scenarios should be further listed. It is anticipated that company personnel in the vicinity would deal with minor or incipient fires and therefore such incidents should not be used for pre-plans.

After confirming the credibility of the draft fire scenarios with line management, supervisor actions to prepare for the event can be developed. These should be in line with an emphasis on the impact on operations, facility, plant and equipment to ensure accuracy of planning. A final list of scenarios should then be converted into fully prepared pre-fire plans with further investigative work on impact on the environment and the public.

Establishing a pre-fire plan for every single potential fire incident in all company facilities serves little useful purpose since it would take many years to exercise the response to these incidents. Operator’s pre-plans should be developed as well as those for fire fighters and the two should be coordinated on a scenario basis.

2.2 Documents RequiredThe following documents are required in order to complete a FERM Facility Plan:

1. Area Facility FES and Description of Fire Protection Equipment, for reference, information and possible inclusions in the HSE Case.

2. Fire protection systems maintenance plans, for inclusion in the site EPMARS.

3. Pre-fire plans/Operator response, for inclusion in the Site Emergency Procedures, Part III.

4. Fire responder capabilities, for inclusion in the Operator Competency Assurance Scheme and/or the Fire Brigade Training Programme.

5. Shortfall Listings, for inclusion in the EOM, Staff Training Plan and FCP as required.

2.2.1 Area Facility FES and Fire Protection Equipment Description

Area Facility FESThis should be in accordance with PDO’s FERM and FES levels assigned to the facilities. Include a description of each main area of the site being examined and list the strategy that is assigned.



An example might be:

Strategy Level 1 (Minor Incident Intervention Only)Remote manifolds 1 to nGathering station XCamps and offices

Level descriptionFire response is limited to trained personnel using portable extinguishers or other types of first aid fire fighting equipment. In addition, in critical areas, such as some areas of camps, automatic detection systems may be installed to provide fast alarm and personnel escape.

Strategy Level 2 (Dedicated Fixed Fire Protection Systems)Power station

Level DescriptionAutomatic actuation of a self contained extinguishing system, for a specific facility from detection systems.

Strategy Level 3 (Fixed Fire Protection Systems Plus Back Up)Production Station

Level DescriptionDedicated fixed fire protection systems and a fire water network with back up from manual intervention by trained personnel using fire fighting equipment.

Strategy Level 4 (Fixed Fire Protection Systems Plus Fire Brigade)Airstrip

Level DescriptionSimilar to strategy 3 with back up from a professional fire brigade.

Fire Protection Equipment

Each area identified above needs to have a description of the fire detection and protection equipment installed, together with a conclusion as to the adequacy, and applicability of the strategy level assigned.

An example might be:

Remote Manifold Stations – Strategy Level 1

The remote manifolds have the following fire protection equipment in place: 1 x 60kg dry powder trolley extinguisher 4 x 12kg dry powder extinguishers 2 x CO2 extinguishers

The extinguisher type and number are appropriate to the facilities. There are no fixed fire systems at any RMS in accordance with strategy level 1.

The following fire and gas detection is in place:



RMS 1 to 4 and 6 to 10 RMS 5 H2S gas detection (DCS building) Break glass units

(external) only Smoke detection (DCS building) Break glass units (external)

Actuation of any of these devices will alarm in the control room and ESD the respective RMS.

Conclusion: Strategy level 1 is applicable to the Remote Manifold Stations.

2.2.2 Fire Protection Systems Maintenance PlansThis section needs to identify the weekly, monthly, quarterly, 6 monthly and annual maintenance requirements for each of the fire protection systems at the site under consideration. It is intended for reference against the facility EPMARS to ensure testing of systems hardware is carried out.

An example of a Fire Protection Systems Maintenance and Testing system is provided below. Additional examples are provided in Section 3.1.

EXAMPLE 1. Fixed Semi-Sub Surface Foam Injection System (SSSFIS)

The following maintenance, inspections and tests and frequency applies to the SSSFIS hardware either in addition to the existing maintenance requirements or to enhance the requirements. The following considers the operating environment, water supply and materials in use for the SSSFIS.

The fire and gas detection testing frequency and methods have been checked and were generally found satisfactory:

1.1 Weekly Check all valves on the foam system and ensure they are all in the

correct stand-by positions; Inspect firewater supply system to ensure pressure and flow

required for the SSSFIS; Align valves to circulate foam concentrate back to tank, ensure

foam discharge to surge tank is fully isolated and run foam pump and verify the duplex gauge foam pressure indicator is working;

Check foam tank and fittings for leakage; Check storage temperature of foam concentrate to ensure it is

within manufacturers limits.

1.2 Monthly Inspect full system for physical wear and tear or damage; Remove, clean, inspect and reassemble foam concentrate line and

sensing line strainers; Check foam generators air inlet screens and clean if necessary; Align valves to circulate foam concentrate back to tank and ensure

foam discharge to surge tank is fully isolated then run foam pump and check for leakage, excessive noise, vibration or overheating in the pump or driver motor;

Ensure foam tank is isolated and water supply is isolated and cycle valves from the control room fire and gas control panel or by manual override at valves;



Inspect foam tank pressure/vacuum vent to ensure free movement and that screens are clean.

1.3 Quarterly Override solenoid switch for deluge valve operation Remove solenoid, inspect, clean and test operation Reassemble solenoid Reinstate actuation system to stand-by mode

1.4 6 Monthly Check complete system, all valves, fittings and connections for

leakage Check flange bolts for tightness Isolate and remove hose container from tank and inspect hose

condition, and return to service. Check system for any external damage to paint surfaces. Check supervision of control circuit and check air supply. Check low

air supply alarm and check for leakage/passing valve seats. Remove, clean, test and reassemble the pressure vacuum vent on

the tank. Remove, clean, test and recalibrate the duplex foam/water gauge. Check that proper control system indicators are present, check

supervision of all circuits, check alarm operation, check system operation and check that all indicators illuminate.

Isolate duplex foam/water gauge and clean water and foam lines to gauge. Flush and pressure test gauge for water and foam indications

1.5 Annually1. Carry out annual discharge test, ensuring discharge to surge tanks

is fully isolated and check foam solution proportioning, foam expansion and drainage in accordance with NFPA 11.

2. Check foam pump alignment in accordance with the manufacturers instructions

3. Check that proper voltage is available at pump motor.4. Check motor for proper rotation and rotate pump by hand to ensure

free movement.5. Check that foam pump can supply adequate pressure for the foam

supply system by observing the duplex water/foam gauge. The foam needle indicator (red) should be approximately 1 barg higher than the water pressure.

6. Remove water filter from line and clean, inspect for damage and reassemble.

7. Strip, clean, test and reinstall the system deluge valves in accordance with manufacturers instructions.

8. Check foam pump relief valve setting for proper operation.9. Take sample of foam concentrate and submit for analysis on

sedimentation, corrosion, dilution or contamination to an approved foam supplier.



2.2.3 Pre-Fire Plan/Operator Response SheetThis section of the FERM facility plan should contain pre-fire plans for each of the scenarios identified in the fire scenario development section.

In addition, an operator response sheet is also required for each scenario developed.

An example of a Pre-Fire Plan and Operator Response Sheet for a surge tank or full surface fire follows. Blank sheets with guidance notes, are shown in Attachment II.



PRE-FIRE PLAN FOR SURGE TANKS T-XXXX OR TXXX FULL SURFACE FIREFIRE FIGHTING STRATEGY : Operator confirms fire in tank - Tanks inlet/outlet ESD and hydrocarbon ESD - Actuation of fixed foam system - Fire brigade response - Fire brigade deploy portable water monitors for cooling adjacent tank roof - Fixed system foam application until extinguishment and thereafter until a secure foam blanket is achieved - Fire brigade deploys foam monitor in case foam system requires supplementary application - Fire brigade stand-by until incident is declared over. IMMEDIATE RESPONSE ACTIONS RESOURCES REQUIRED[ ] Control Room Operator [ ] Control Room Operator[ ] Control Room Operator[ ] Control Room Operator[ ] LEBC[ ] Control Room Operator[ ] Control Room Operator

[ ] LEBC

Request fire alarm fire confirmationVerify or activate site fire sirenAlert fire brigade to respond to incidentAlert LEBC and advise nature of incidentRequest emergency team responseCheck fixed foam system valves have activatedCheck ESD is initiated for tanks and station and inform LEBC of status of shutdownDesignate an OSC

Outside operator to confirm fire event.Use control room fire siren switch if necessary.Radio, telephone or pager call out.Telephone, radio or pager call out.Emergency pager call out button in control room or individual telephone numbers. Control room fire and gas panel Radio or telephone.

Radio contact or control room telephone. 1st RESPONSE ACTIONS RESOURCES REQUIRED[ ] OSC or designated person[ ] OSC or designated person

[ ] OSC or designated person

[ ] OSC or designated person

Check personnel evacuation status for missing personsVerify fire size/severity and any obvious immediate hazards and advise LEBCEnsure fixed foam system is operating correctly

Ensure both tank bund drains are closed.

Personnel Log Book in control roomRadio in vehicle with external loudspeaker

Fixed semi-sub surface foam system pump and valves. Manual pneumatic valves can be actuated at the foam skid if required. Foam system tank requires a minimum of 5880 litres foam concentrate for injection into one tank. 100% quantity should be available for refilling within 24 hours. Tank bund drains.

2nd RESPONSE ACTIONS RESOURCES REQUIRED[ ] Fire Brigade[ ] OSC

[ ] OSC[ ] Fire Brigade

Deploy/actuate cooling water monitors on next tank roof.Check foam system effectiveness in reducing and controlling tank fire and advise LEBC.

Ensure cooling water does not drift into tank being foamed. Deploy foam monitor in readiness to support foam system application in case some “fire traps” remain under tank shell folds which the foam system cannot fully extinguish.

2 x 3000 lpm water monitors, 24 x 70mm x 20m delivery fire hose.Visual assessment of fire size reduction. Foam system to be run for a minimum of 55 minutes. Should be signs of fire control after approximately 30 minutes. If no visible fire reduction after 55 minutes then foam system obviously not effective.

1 x 3400 lpm portable foam monitor, 12 x 70mm x 20 m delivery fire hose and minimum 2040 litres 3% foam concentrate for 20 minutes supply foam monitor.

OTHER ACTIONS/CONCERNS: Cooling of adjacent unaffected tank is necessary to prevent tank roof damage and protect tank integrity. To check if cooling is required, play a water stream on to the roof and if steaming occurs, the roof needs to be cooled. If foam system does not achieve extinguishment after 55 minutes then all personnel should evacuate the LPS and await boilover event. Crude oil and water pumpout from affected tank should be commenced as soon as it is obvious that foam extinguishment has failed. Pump out will not prevent a boilover but may reduce the fireball and fire spread extent.



ONGOING POTENTIAL HAZARDS : Crude oil boilover will occur if tank fire extinguishment is unsuccessful. Boilover event may overflow bund walls. Fireball may achieve heights of 100m with resultant high radiant heat levels dangerous to fire responders and observers.Probable escalation involving adjacent tank or separators once a boilover occurs. More than one boilover is possible . Personnel should not re-enter LPS after a first or second boilover. The fire incident will only be safe once the tank fire, or fires, are burned out.

OPERATOR RESPONSE FOR LPS SURGE TANKS T-XXXX OR T-XXXX FULL SURFACE FIREFIRE FIGHTING STRATEGYOperator confirms fire in tank - Tanks inlet/outlet ESD and hydrocarbon ESD - Operator confirms fire event - Actuation of fixed foam system - Fire brigade response - Fixed system foam application until extinguishment and thereafter until a secure foam blanket is achieved - Fire brigade deploys foam monitor in case foam system requires supplementary application - Fire brigade stand-by until incident is declared over.

CONTROL ROOM OPERATOR RESPONSE ACTIONS

1 Request outside operator to confirm fire in tank

2 Verify siren has activated or activate if necessary 3 Alert fire brigade to respond to incident

4 Alert LEBC and advise nature of incident

5 Alert Emergency Team if advised by

6 Check tanks foam system valves have actuated and advise LEBC

7 Check ESD operated for tanks and station - confirm to LEBC shutdown status.

8 Await further instructions from LEBC and act accordingly.



2.2.4 Fire Responder Capabilities

Fire Responder CompetenciesThe fire responder competencies should be identified through the use of the scenario worksheets. This will be in terms of the fire fighting or fire control strategy and tactics which fire responders will have to apply, and also in terms of the hardware they may or will have to utilise as part of the tactics. Fire responder competencies should be developed for each fire scenario identified.

A blank form for this is provided in Attachment III.

Fire Responder FitnessTo be analysed against the requirements laid down in EP 95-0351, Fire Control and Recovery.

An example of fire responders competencies for a surge tank or full surface fire follows.



FIRE RESPONDERS COMPETENCIES FOR: SURGE TANKS T-XXXX and T-XXXX FULL SURFACE FIREKEY ELEMENTS REQUIRED: Knowledge of operations emergency plan, emergency team composition, chain of command. Knowledge of firewater supply system for station .Understanding of the need and use of personal protective equipment (PPE) for firefighting and emergency incident response.Location of surge tanks within station, tanks construction and function and concept of pump out under emergency conditions. Knowledge of location and manual operation of surge tanks foam system, minimum duration of foam system application on a surge tank and reasons for this. Use of portable water and foam monitors, fire hose, fire hydrants and foam tanker for foam monitor concentrate supply. Use of water for cooling heat affected plant and equipment, correct foam application rates for foam monitor application and application methods. Knowledge of mechanisms of crude boilover and potential fire escalation by crude oil boilover and associated hazards

COMPETENCIESRESPONDER KNOWS: Area emergency plan, emergency team members and team call out system, emergency incident command structure and fire responder responsibilities. Station firewater system normal flowrate and pressures, the location of firewater system isolation valves, how to use a fire hydrant safely and how to avoid water

hammer. Function of surge tanks and basic tank design including roof-to-seam design and main gas and oil piping connections. Types of portable water monitor and foam monitor in use at the station in particular and the area in general. Types of delivery fire hose and connections in use at the station and the area. Types of fire hydrants and number of hydrant outlets on hydrants at the LPS. Types of foam in use at the station in the surge tank foam system and in the station fire cabinets and their correct proportioning ratio. Types of portable foam inductors and foam branches in use in the station and the station area and their respective flowrates and pressures. Hazards associated with crude oil boilover events.RESPONDER IS ABLE TO: Identify fire response personal protective equipment. Describe surge tank pump out under emergency conditions and how this may affect boilover damage. Identify all valves on fixed foam system to operate system manually at the foam station. Explain what is meant by the terms “boilover and pump-out”. Identify time before a 20 litre foam concentrate drum is empty using a given a portable foam branch. Deploy and actuate water and foam monitors in use at the station in a safe and stable manner as part of a two man team and as one man. Describe the objectives of cooling a fixed roof tank and explain where water streams should be directed to achieve maximum cooling protection. RESPONDER DEMONSTRATES: Method of wearing PPE for fire response. Method of delivery fire hose running, hose connection, disconnection, advancing/retiring a length of fire hose, connecting branches to fire hose and how to make

up fire hose. Method of supplying foam concentrate to portable foam monitors from a foam tanker. Method of setting up and stabilising portable water monitors using fire hydrants and fire hose as part of a two man team and as one man. Method of handling a charged hoseline with branch as part of a two man team and as one man. Method of setting up portable foam making equipment to produce foam from a foam branch as part of a two man hoseline team. At least two methods of gentle foam application from a portable foam branch.



2.2.5 Shortfall ListingThis section should list all shortfalls identified during the preparation of the pre-fire plan in comparison to the FERM Specification requirements. The listing should include statements regarding whether or not the shortfall is acceptable and that a waiver from the Specification should be obtained. In those shortfalls which are not acceptable, a priority shall be assigned, together with personnel designated for action.

Examples of shortfall listings are provided in the worked examples of Fire Scenario Worksheets in Section 3.2.



2.3 Fire Scenario Development

2.3.1 GeneralThis section needs to list the major fire scenarios identified after reviewing the facilities.

Those scenarios of a minor nature need not be listed individually if for these strategy level 1 types, the existing resources have been reviewed and are considered adequate. Minor fire scenarios are equated to a FERM strategy level 1. Minor fire scenarios are those which can reasonably be expected to be dealt with by operators or staff using available fire equipment. The equipment would not normally exceed 1 or 2 extinguishers or a trolley extinguisher. Such minor fires may be a limited hydrocarbon spill fire, refuse container fire, small office fire, or other easily contained fires.

Serious and major fire scenarios are those involving critical production equipment that present potentially serious consequences and require specific protection or response resources. Serious or major scenarios can be equated to a FERM strategy level 2, 3 or 4. The following procedure should be followed when filling out the work sheet (refer to Attachment I for a blank work sheet):

Identify the consequences from each Identify the existing FERM measures in place Compare existing and required FERM measures for each scenario Establish the fire response and training for fire response Identify shortfalls in resources and training for fire response.

The fire scenarios identified should then be listed. Section 3.1 of this Guideline provides examples of typical major fire scenarios. Guidance is provided below on how to complete the resource levels for scenarios.

A blank work sheet example showing the format and information requirement is shown in Attachment I.

2.3.2 Resource Levels for ScenariosThe Scenario Worksheets contain quantities of resources identified for the particular fire event described. The quantities should be based on the following information.

Foam ConcentrateCalculations to be based on NFPA minimum application rates plus foam blanket maintenance (top up) where required and considering foam capacity of foam monitors or foam branches.

Fire HosesReview the nearest hydrants which may be used, number of hose inlets in a portable water monitor or portable foam monitor or foam branch.



MonitorsJudgemental based on practical fire ground experience and/or surface area or number of exposure hazards to be cooled if for water monitors, or foam solution capacity if for foam monitors.

ManpowerBased on the number of monitors or handlines to be deployed or SCBA to be used. Typically, three men are needed for deploying a single monitor and fire hose to the monitor, maintaining the flow direction of the water stream or for maintaining the foam supply and direction of the foam stream. Where obviously practical, man power for monitors are also used to supply foam concentrate to foam hand lines if they are also in use.

For foam hand lines, typically, a minimum of 2 fire responders are needed for each hand line excluding foam re-supply.

VehiclesGenerally, there is only one fire truck listed although a foam tanker may also be used.

Specialist EquipmentMainly SCBA sets. Based on one set per person for scenarios where personnel may be exposed to smoke conditions or atmospheres.



3.0 EXAMPLES

3.1 Fire Protection Systems Maintenance Plans

EXAMPLE 2. Water Deluge System

Following maintenance, inspections and tests and frequency applies to the water deluge system either in addition to the existing maintenance requirements or to enhance the requirements. The following considers the operating environment, water supply and materials in use for the deluge system.

The fire and gas detection frequency and methods have been checked and generally found satisfactory:

2.1 Weekly Check all valves to ensure they are in the normal stand-by mode; Inspect firewater supply to ensure water supply will be operational

if required; Check water supply and air supply valves for leakage; Check deluge valve pressure gauges to ensure pressure differential

is maintained at the required settings.

2.2 Monthly Check for system hardware wear and tear or physical damage; Check for corrosion at drain/weep holes on discharge piping; Check low air supply alarm for deluge valve;

2.3 Quarterly Override or isolate executive actions on the fire detection and

alarm panel; Override Solenoid switch for deluge valve operation Remove solenoid, inspect, clean and test operation Reassemble solenoid Test solenoid actuator on deluge valve; Actuate the system (from different detection or manual device

each time) to check each nozzle water pattern; Remove and clean any blocked water nozzle; Flush the discharge piping and nozzles; Remove terminal nozzles from the discharge piping array; Run deluge system for minimum 2 minutes with terminal nozzles

and any blocked nozzles removed for flushing purposes; Close water discharge valve; Reassemble all removed nozzles; Reset the deluge valve; Reinstate the fire detection system to normal operation; Ensure discharge piping drain/weep hole is functioning correctly.

2.4 6 MonthlyRemove and clean water screen/filter and reassemble.

2.5 AnnuallyStrip, clean, test and reinstall the deluge valve in accordance with manufacturers instructions;



EXAMPLE 3 Turbine Enclosure CO2 System

3.1 Weekly Check all CO2 status lights are indicating outside the turbine

enclosures The following maintenance, inspections and tests and frequency

applies to the CO2 system for the power station either in addition to the existing maintenance requirements or to enhance the requirements. Check system is on automatic release at F & G panel and at enclosures

Check CO2 cylinders are in position and are securely fastened. Check slave cylinder is in position Check manual isolation device is available in the cylinder room Check there are no fault signals on the fire and gas panel for the

generators Test automatic/manual switch at enclosure and ensure this

indicates at F & G panel. Return switch to automatic.

3.2 Monthly Check general condition of heat detectors,flame detectors and gas

detectors in the enclosures. Check enclosure doors are properly closed and door seal is in good

condition.

3.3 6 Monthly Check cylinders CO2 content either by non intrusive level detection

or by weighing cylinders. Any cylinder showing a net loss of 10% or more should be refilled or replaced.

Check all piping and flexible hoses for wear and tear or damage. Ensure system is isolated if weighing cylinders Return system to service on completion of cylinder content checks. Check flame detectors positioning and ensure they are aimed in

accordance with design intent. Isolate or override flame detectors executive actions and test using

UV test lighting device. Reinstate UV executive alarms.

3.4 5 yearlyAll high pressure hoses should be removed and tested by hydrotest to a pressure of 175 barg. Pressure to be maintained for one minute. Any hose and/or coupling developing a leak during this time should be replaced



3.2 Fire Scenario WorksheetsExample worksheets are provided for the following typical fire scenarios:

Full Surface Fire - coned roof tank. Rim Seal Fire - floating roof tank. Gas Compressor.

SCENARIO WORKSHEET 1REFERENCE: XXX-1

FACILITY Crude Oil Dewatering

FERM STRATEGY LEVEL 3

PLANT/EQUIPMENTTank T-XXX. One of two surge tanks. No sparing. Tank is 27.5m diameter and 11.5m height. Tank maximum capacity is 6830 m3.

FUNCTION Surge/Dewatering Duty Tank. Normal duty is between 55% level and 80% level at approximately 45oC. Both tanks serve as buffer storage for approximately 5 hours.

SCENARIO Full surface “open can” fire occurs due to either internal explosion or overfilling of tank. Tank roof is either partly or wholly separated from tank shell.Adjacent dewatering tank T-2613 roof affected by radiant heat. Tank is full at time of fire event.

CONSEQUENCESImmediateLife safety – Personnel not normally on the tank roof. If internal explosion occurs, roof may totally separate resulting in spiralling heavy object. Personnel in the general area may be at risk from this event. Radiant heat at grade level should not present a life threatening condition from the full surface fire.

Environment – Initially, smoke pollution only. Some crude may have spilled into bund on roof separation but this will be retained in bund.

Business interruption – Immediate shutdown.

Asset Loss/Production Deferment – Involved tank damaged due to loss of roof and burning surface. Immediate production deferment, will be approximately 14,000 m3.

Escalation Route and Time EstimatesAdjacent surge/dewatering tank roof would be subjected to moderate radiant heat that may result in roof damage or failure in the order of 50/60 minutes if no cooling actions were taken. Radiant heat effects may increase if wind direction and speed causes flame to tilt toward adjacent tank and therefore time to failure may be much less than the above.



If fire is not extinguished within first 1 or 2 hours, boilover will result some time after this. Crude boilover may overflow tank bunds and then would involve adjacent surge tank and possibly some of the bulk and/or test separators outside the tank bund.

Post EscalationLife safety – Fire responders may be fatally or seriously injured if caught in the vicinity of a crude boilover.

Environment – Soil contamination will occur if crude overflowed bunds. Continued smoke pollution.

Business interruption – Prolonged station shutdown.

Asset Loss/Production Deferment – Loss of both surge tanks due to escalation. Production deferment would be approximately 14,000 m3/day.

EXISTING FERMDetectionProcess – Tank low and high level alarms. High level trips tank inlet and outlet and causes hydrocarbon ESD.

Fire Event – Fusible plug heat detection ring on tank roof rim with 3 pressure switches voting 2 out of 3 to cause tank ESD, hydrocarbon ESD, site fire siren, foam pump start and foam system valve to tank opened.

Gas Event – Not applicable for this event.

MitigationProcess Controls – Tank inlet/outlet valves, hydrocarbon ESD, Station ESD.

Containment – Tank acts as containment. Tank walls will fold inward during fire event. Bund acts as containment for oil spillage/release.

Drainage – Bund drains provided and normally closed.

Passive Fire Control – Single bund and intermediate bund between tanks.

Active Fire Control – Fixed automatic semi sub-surface injection foam system serving both tanks. Quantity of foam concentrate required in foam storage tank is not precisely indicated but appears to be in the order of 8,500 litres. (See section 2.2.5). Firewater system taken from water injection header but it is not known if the water pressure and supply can be increased under fire/emergency conditions.

Fire hydrants in the general area of the tanks. No fixed water monitors. 12 x fire boxes with typical contents as 6 fire hose, 120 litres 3% fluoroprotein foam concentrate, 1 x 225 lpm foam branch and inductor and 1 x 450 lpm water branch.

EFFECTIVENESS OF FIXED FIRE SYSTEMSApplicability of Type

Applicable for the type of tank and tank duty although a base injection system is the preferred foam system for such tanks. Use of a Universal foam concentrate is unnecessary as a standard approved fluoroprotein concentrate would be just as effective.



System/Hardware SuitabilityThe firewater supply is pressure governed and during a test with a water monitor only 3 barg was achieved. It was stated that the pressure would rise after a short time but on a later foam discharge test the pressure was again low. The foam discharged appeared to be weak although visual indications cannot prove inaccurate proportioning. It is therefore necessary to carry out tests as soon as practically possible to ensure correct proportioning across a range of pressures. The foam concentrate storage tank has had leaks and the tank level is difficult to read.

There is no clear level gauge and there is no information available as to the minimum operating foam concentrate quantity that should be maintained in the tank. There are 3 high backpressure foam generators (HBPG) but one of these is normally valve locked closed, acting as a stand-by for maintenance. Generally, the hardware is suitable but there are shortfalls as noted.

Reliability System has actuated in 1996 although cause was a spurious fire alarm. The design of the foam hose deployment inside the tank is unknown, i.e. is it vertical, horizontal or inclined ? Sludge build-up in the tank over the course of 5 years may prevent foam hose deployment and thus prevent foam application on the tank fire. The foam inlet is less than 1 metre from the tank base.

During a discharge test, the foam/water duplex gauge did not function, indicating blocked water and foam lines. The drain valves for the gauge did not work, indicating lack of effective maintenance.

Operability System is automatic from heat detection or remote at control room or locally by pneumatic switch actuation. System actuated during test when pressure was reduced in the fusible plug line. There are no instructions posted at the foam station for manual operation of the system or which valve to open for which tank. Also, the tank numbers cannot be seen from the foam station.

There are questions over the pressures available from the water injection supply header. The pressure regulators appear to be set at a maximum of 10 barg but on testing it was obvious that the pressure was much lower than this.

This scenario envisages use of water monitors and a foam monitor that will result in an obvious pressure drop. It is not clear if this will impact on the foam system and it is also not clear if the control valves on the water supply header can be altered to meet water demand under emergency conditions.

Survivability (in incident)Foam inlets are at lower tank area. Roof separation would not affect foam system operation unless roof blow-off descends and impacts on foam inlets or inlet piping.

FIRE PROTECTION & FIREFIGHTING STRATEGY OBJECTIVESHeat detection and alarm - Tank inlet/outlet ESD and hydrocarbon ESD - Operator confirms fire event - Actuation of fixed foam system to affected tank - Fire brigade response - Fire brigade deploy cooling water monitors on adjacent tank roof - Foam application until extinguishment and thereafter until a secure foam blanket is achieved - Fire brigade deploys foam monitor in case foam system requires supplementary application - Fire brigade stand-by until incident declared over.



Firefighting TacticsStage 1 – Heat detector alarms in control room. Operators confirm fire event and ensure tank ESD has initiated and foam system has actuated. Control room selects relevant pre-fire plan and ensures site alarm has activated and alerts fire brigade.

Stage 2 – Fire brigade selects relevant pre-fire plan and responds to incident.

Stage 3 – Control rooms alerts LEBC who designates OSC for the incident and requests call out of emergency team.

Stage 4 – Fire brigade deploys and actuates cooling water monitors on adjacent tank roof to prevent potential fire escalation.

Stage 5 – Fire brigade deploys foam monitor in event additional foam application is required.

Stage 6 – OSC monitors fire size and severity for foam system control impact and ensures water streams are not affecting foam application.

Stage 7 – Foam system application continued until extinguishment and thereafter to ensure a secure foam blanket is achieved on the liquid surface.

Stage 8 – Fire brigade actuate portable foam monitor if fire is controlled by foam system but not fully extinguished due to fire trap areas of folded tank shell maintaining minor fire pockets.

Stage 9 – Fire brigade checks to ensure fire is totally extinguished and a secure foam blanket is achieved.

Stage 10 – Fire brigade stand-by until incident is declared over and stand-down is announced.

RESOURCES REQUIRED TO MEET STRATEGY OBJECTIVESResources for Other than Fire Response Group

Detection

Process As Existing FERM measures

Fire Event As Existing FERM measures

Gas Event Not applicable.

Alarm system

For Operator Tank level alarms, Heat detection alarm and Site Alarm

For Fire Brigade Emergency Team Pager Call Out

Process Control As existing FERM measures

Passive Fire Protection As existing FERM measures

Active Fire Protection As existing FERM measures plus:-



Method and procedures for additional firewater

supply/pressure under emergency conditions.Instructions on manual operation of foam

system.

Fixed Syst. Firewater Flow 3457 lpm for affected tank from fixed foam system.

3500 lpm for propane accumulator water deluge system which will actuate on surge tank heat detection.

Total = 6,957 lpm

Resources for Fire Brigade

Procedures Pre-fire plansEmergency response procedures

Hose 12 x 70mm x 20m fire hose for water monitors.

12 x 70mm x 20m fire hose for foam monitor.

Total of 24 x 70mm x 20 delivery fire hose.

Monitors 2 x 3000 lpm water monitor1 x 3400 lpm foam monitor

Foam Concentrate 5880 litres 3% AFFF for T-26233060 litres 3% FP for foam monitor (if used)

Total = 5,880 litres 3% AFFF 3,060 litres 3% FP.

Specialist Equipment None

Manpower 6 fire responders for portable water monitors3 fire responders for foam monitor

Total of 9 fire responders

Vehicles 1 x fire truck1 x 9000 litre 3% flouroprotein foam tanker

Port. Equip. Water Flow 6000 lpm for water monitors3400 lpm for foam monitor (if used)

Total = 9,400 lpm

Fixed and Port. Total Flow 3,457 lpm for fixed foam system3,500 lpm for water deluge system6,000 lpm for water monitors3,400 lpm for foam monitor (if used)

Total = 16,357 lpm.



Total Water Quantity 190 m3 for fixed foam system (55 minutes)(fixed & portable) 105 m3 for water deluge system (30 minutes)

360 m3 for portable water monitors (60 minutes)

99 m3 for foam monitor (30 minutes - supporting

the foam system if necessary).

Total = 754 m3.

SHORTFALLS IN EXISTING FERM & STRATEGY LEVELThe following are listed as shortfalls in procedures, hardware or resources when compared to the facility FES Strategy Level or the FERM Specification SP 1075 as noted during the development of this scenario worksheet:

i) The operators do not have the necessary fire training to act as back-up for the fixed systems or to assist the fire brigade. Reliance for back-up rests solely with the fire brigade who may be on stand-by at the airstrip when this scenario develops.

ii) Fire cabinets and equipment within intended for operator use but operators are not trained to use equipment in boxes. (FES Strategy Level 3 Issue)

iii) A total of 9 fire responders are required for this scenario. There are only 5 fire brigade personnel to respond and the operators cannot back-up the fire brigade due to lack of training in use of monitors and hose handling etc.

iv) Firewater supply taken from water injection system. Pressure is controlled via pressure control valves (3 of) but there are no fire pumps. This is a deviation but may be acceptable provided pressure and flow can be maintained under emergency conditions.

v) The maximum firewater demand for this scenario is 16,357 lpm but the design firewater supply is listed as 12,000 lpm (720 m3/h) @ 10 barg. There is no known procedure or method for increasing firewater pressure/supply under emergency conditions where additional water is required. Although not listed in the Specification, this would be part of a requirement for fire water pumps.

vi) There are no instructions on the operation of the fixed foam system at the foam station. These should be provided.

vii) No labelling of main valve functions on the foam system.

viii) No sight glass on foam concentrate tank.

ix) It is understood that there is a sludge build up in the tanks over the course of 5 years. It is possible, given the low location of the foam injection system inlets, that depending on the design of the foam inlet within the tank (vertical bend or straight pipe inlet) sludge will prevent or obstruct the deployment of the foam hose in the tank. It is necessary to check the inside of a tank to ensure the foam hose can be deployed.



x) The foam system flexible hose inspection quoted as every 5 years when tank is down for maintenance but it is possible to remove the hose container and visually inspect the hose as there is a tank isolation valve downstream of hose unit and this should be done.

xi) An annual foam discharge is carried out but the necessary proportioning, expansion or drainage tests are not being carried out.

xii) There is no foam test kit for proportioning, expansion and drainage testing.

xiii) The minimum foam concentrate quantity to be maintained in the foam system tank is unknown. There appears to be approximately 8,500 litres but this is not confirmed and the design quantity is not listed in the foam system installation manual. Calculations (See below) illustrate that a minimum of 5880 litres should be in the tank and as per NFPA there should also be 100% of this quantity available within 24 hours. There is no exact heading for this in the Specification but generally this is covered under SP 1075 - Foam Systems.

xiv) Spare foam concentrate is located in drums at the foam station but there is no identification of the concentrate type or expiry date or UL approvals normally associated with approved foam concentrate supplies. The source of the foam concentrate is unknown. It appears to be a polymer AFFF (Universal type) but this cannot be confirmed without detailed analysis. It is possible that this concentrate is decanted from the original manufacturers drums but this is not confirmed.

xv) The original concentrate in the system was a universal 3 & 6% AFFF foam for use at 3% on hydrocarbon fires and 6% for polar solvent fuels. This is a polymer-based concentrate. It is unclear if the spare drums concentrate is the same type and if it has UL approvals etc.

CRUDE SURGE/DEWATERING TANK FULL SURFACE FIREFOAM/WATER CALCULATIONS SHEETUSING FIXED FOAM SYSTEM AND PORTABLE FOAM MONITOR

Fire Area (Tank Dia. 27.5m) 594 m2

Foam Concentrate 3% AFFF

System Design Application Rate 6 lpm/m2 (Taken from Installation Manual)

Total Application Rate 594 x 6 = 3564 lpm/m2. Foam Application Time 55 minutes

Total Concentrate Required 3564 x 0.03 x 55 = 5,880 litres

Total Water Required 3564 - 107 (3%) x 55 = 190 m3

Portable Foam Monitor Application

Foam Monitor Capacity 3,400 lpm



Application Time 30 minutes

Total Concentrate Required 3,400 x 0.03 x 30 = 3,060 litres

Total Water Required 3400 - 102 (3%) x 30 minutes = 99 m3




FACILITY Crude Oil Dehydration


PLANT/EQUIPMENT Tank T-XXXX. One of six floating roof tanks. No sparing. Tank is 29.2m diameter and 14.6m height. Tank maximum capacity is 8586 m3.

FUNCTION Crude Oil Dehydration Tank. Normal duty is between 55% level and 60% level at approximately 40oC. One of six dehydration tanks.

SCENARIO Rim seal fire occurs on tank T-XXXX. Tank is 60% (5140 m3) full at time of fire event. Overfilling of tank. Adjacent dehydration tanks are all almost full under normal operating conditions.

CONSEQUENCESImmediateLife Safety – Personnel not normally on the tank floating roof. Immediate life safety risk is considered low.

Environment – Smoke pollution only. Fire is contained in the tank rim seal area.

Business interruption – Immediate shutdown on detection of rim seal fire, plus all incoming oil MOV/ESDV from all areas will close-in.

Asset Loss/Production Deferment – Involved tank seal damaged due to fire. Production deferments from all gathering stations when surge tanks and storage tank high levels are reached.

Escalation Route and Time EstimatesRim seal fires have burned for several hours without escalation and in at least two known cases, for more than 24 hours without escalation. However, this was due to the high standard of effective maintenance of the tanks involved and it should not be assumed that these time frames would apply to every floating roof tank rim seal fire.

The main concern is that if the fire is unchecked it will continue around the full seal circumference and thereafter the flame impingement would affect the tank shell and roof. It is therefore prudent to expect escalation within a few hours if no fire control or extinguishing actions are taken. Escalation would occur if the roof tilted/jammed or sank, creating a full surface fire event.

Post Escalation

Life Safety – Fire responders on the gaugers platform may be injured by burns if they are at the tank top when the roof jams or tilts. Such an event should be noticeable and therefore the risk to responders is considered low.

Environment – Continued smoke pollution. Fire would still be contained.

Business interruption – Prolonged shutdown.



Asset Loss/Production Deferment – Loss of affected dehydration tank due to escalation. Production deferment for all areas will be approximately 70,000 m3/day.

EXISTING FERMDetectionProcess – Tank low, high and high-high level alarms. High-high level trips tank inlets and all incoming oil lines and causes Station ESD.

Fire Event – Halon fusible plug detection. New fusible plug heat detection ring provided around tank rim seal area with 3 pressure switches voting 2 out of 3 to cause total ESD. This new detection system is installed but not yet commissioned.

Gas Event – Not applicable for this event.

MitigationProcess Controls – Tank inlet/outlet valves, Station ESD remote from control room and automatic on rim seal point heat detection.

Containment – Tank acts as containment for rim seal fire.

Drainage – Bund drains provided and normally closed.

Passive Fire Control – The primary seal and secondary seal material specification could not be confirmed during the study. It is doubtful if the material is fire retardant.

Active Fire Control – Fixed automatic halon system provided for the rim seal area. Fixed manually operated rim seal foam pourer system using balanced pressure proportioning. Foam system concentrate tank holds 1370 litres of 3% fluoroprotein. Firewater system supplied from dedicated firewater tank. Fire hydrants in the general area of the 6 x fire boxes strategically located throughout the facility. Each box typically contains 1 x 250 lpm foam branch, 3 x 20 litre fluoroprotein 3% foam concentrate drums, 1 x 450 lpm water branch, 4 x 70mm x 20m delivery fire hose.

Effectiveness of Fixed Fire SystemsApplicability of Type

Halon is being phased out and the rim seal foam system is designed to replace the halon system. Foam system is applicable for the type of tank and rim seal. An automatic system would be more appropriate considering the low manning levels and the absence of fire crews (airstrip stand-by) during daylight hours.

System/Hardware SuitabilityFoam system hardware is suitable for a fixed manually operated system but better weather protection of the system is necessary to prevent foam concentrate deterioration and overall hardware wear and tear, especially valve identification and instructions.

Reliability Foam system has been commissioned in May 1998. With this type of system it is necessary to either regularly flush the foam pump with clean water (weekly) and maintain a dry foam pump or if pump permanently flooded with concentrate then



regularly turn the pump over and cycle the foam concentrate back to foam tank. Given the operating environment, it is important that a high frequency of foam pump flushing or circulation running is provided, otherwise this system will become very unreliable.

Operability Foam system is manual only and requires operators or firefighters to actuate during a fire event. There are no instructions on how to operate the system and there are no foam tank valve and system valve identification labels. The original labels have been damaged or the combination of sand and heat has erased them.

Survivability (in incident)Foam system pourers are above the rim seal and therefore above the fire area. If the tank roof is high and the rim seal fire is high the pourers may be subjected to radiant heat and damage. Therefore it is important that the foam system is actuated as quickly as possible to extinguish the fire.

FIRE PROTECTION & FIREFIGHTING STRATEGY OBJECTIVES

Heat detection and alarm and halon discharge - Tank inlet/outlet ESD, Station ESD - Operator confirms fire event - Actuation of fixed foam system to affected tank - Fire brigade response - Fire responders check if rim seal fire is extinguished and a secure foam blanket is achieved in the rim seal area - Portable foam application into rim seal to support fixed system application if required - Fire brigade stand-by until incident declared over.

FIREFIGHTING TACTICSStage 1 – Rim seal heat detection alarms in control room. Operators confirm fire event and halon discharge and ensure tank ESD and Station ESD has initiated. Control room selects relevant pre-fire plan and ensures site alarm has activated and alerts fire responders.

Stage 2 – Fire responders select relevant pre-fire plan and responds to incident.

Stage 3 – Control rooms alerts LEBC who designates OSC for the incident and requests call out of emergency team.

Stage 4 – Operator actuates the rim seal foam system for the affected tank.

Stage 5 – Fire responders don SCBA and ascend tank and check to ensure rim seal fire is extinguished and foam application covers all the foam dam area.

Stage 6 – Fire responders in SCBA run a foam handline to the tank top and apply foam into the rim seal to support the rim seal system if necessary. (This may require responders to move on to the roof as there is no wind girder (walkway) around the tanks)

Stage 7 – OSC verifies fire is extinguished and a secure foam blanket is achieved in the rim seal foam dam area.

Stage 8 – Rim seal foam dam blanket is topped up to ensure foam blankert is maintained effectively, acting as a vapour suppression blanket.

Stage 9 – Fire brigade stand-by until incident is declared over and stand-down is announced.




Detection

Process As Existing FERM measures

Fire Event As Existing FERM measures

Gas Event Not applicable.

Alarm system

For Operator Tank high and high-high level alarms, Heat detection alarm.

Site Alarm


Process Control As Existing FERM measures

Passive Fire Protection As Existing FERM measures

Active Fire Protection As Existing FERM measures and also removal of halon system for the tanks.

Fixed Syst. Firewater Flow 700 lpm for affected tank from fixed foam system.

Total = 700 lpmResources for Fire Brigade

Procedures Pre-fire plansEmergency response procedures

Hose 8 x 70mm x 20m fire hose for foam handline.

Total of 8 x 70mm x 20m delivery fire hose.

Monitors None.

Foam Concentrate 420 litres 3% fluoroprotein for rim seal.270 litres 3% fluoroprotein for handlines.

Total = 690 litres.

Specialist Equipment Minimum 4 x SCBA sets

Manpower 2 fire responders for foam handline2 fire responders for support/stand-by1 fire responder for foam concentrate supply

Total of 5 fire responders

Vehicles 1 x fire truck1 x 6300 litre 3% flouroprotein foam tanker



Port. Equip. Water Flow 450 lpm for foam handline.

Total = 450 lpm

Fixed and Port. Total Flow 700 lpm for fixed foam system450 lpm for foam handline

Total = 1,150 lpm.

Total Water Quantity 14 m3 for fixed foam system (20 minutes)(fixed & portable) 9 m3 for foam handline (20 minutes)

9 m3 for foam blanket top-up

Total = 32 m3.

SHORTFALLS IN EXISTING FERM & STRATEGY LEVEL

The following are listed as shortfalls in either procedures, hardware or resources when compared to the facility FES Strategy Level or SP 1075 FERM as noted during the development of this scenario worksheet:

i) The operators do not have the necessary fire training to act as back-up for the fixed foam system or to assist the fire brigade. Reliance for back-up rests solely with the fire brigade who stand-by for most of the daylight hours at the airstrip, about 17 km distant and may be there when this scenario develops. (Strategy Level 3 Issue)

ii) Fire cabinets and equipment within are intended for operator use but operators are not trained to use equipment in boxes. (FES Strategy Level 3 Issue)

iii) There are no instructions on the operation of the fixed foam system at the foam station and no valve labels or descriptions. These should be provided.

iv) Fire crews are not trained in the use of the fixed foam system.

v) Fire crews are not trained to use foam handlines on a rim seal fire or for moving on to a floating roof tank.

vi) The foam system is not fully protected against direct sunlight and sand erosion. This is leading to poor system condition.

vii) The temperature varations are causing water condensation on the tank inside cover that is affecting the foam concentrate. This is due to inadequate weather protection.

viii) It is understood that the commissioning tests for the fixed foam system did not include a foam proportioning, expansion or drainage test. This could not be confirmed during the study period.

ix) It is understood that there is no foam test kit for proportioning, expansion and drainage testing.



x) Foam was discharged from the valve manifold connection during a brief flow test (not to the tanks) and although there was no method of checking the quality or proportioning of the foam the visual observations raised doubts over the produced foam effectiveness for firefighting, mainly due to the firewater contamination.

xi) There is no clear responsibility for the maintenance of the hardware/mechanical components of fixed foam system.

DEHYDRATION TANK RIM SEAL FIREFOAM/WATER CALCULATIONS SHEETUSING FIXED FOAM SYSTEM AND PORTABLE FOAM HANDLINE

Tank Dia. 29.2 m

Tank Circumference 95 m

Foam Dam Distance 0.6 m

Foam Dam Area 95 x 0.6 = 57 m2

Foam Concentrate 3% Fluoroprotein

System Design Application Rate 12.2 lpm/m2 (NFPA)

Total Application Rate 57 x 12.2 = 700 lpm. Foam Application Time 20 minutes

Total Concentrate Required 700 x 0.03 x 20 = 420 litres

Total Water Required 700 - 21 (3%) x 20 = 13.5 m3

Portable Foam Handline Application

Foam Branch Capacity 450 lpm

Application Time 20 minutes

Total Concentrate Required 450 x 0.03 x 20 = 270 litres

Total Water Required 450 - 14 (3%) x 20 minutes = 8.7m3




FACILITY Gas Conditioning Unit


PLANT/EQUIPMENT Propane Compressor K-XXX. Single compressor. No sparing, no stand-by.

FUNCTION Propane compressor for refrigerant gas sweetening facilities. Normal discharge pressure is approximately 20 barg at 5oC. Loss of compressor would result in heavy flaring requirement and probable shut down in the long term but oil production could continue in the short term.

SCENARIO Propane release from the compressor or associated vessels/equipment on discharge side and ignition results in a jet fire in the order of 25 metres in length. Jet flame diffuses against compressor suction and interstage scrubber vessels. Heat detection on compressor activates compressor ESD, gas conditioning ESD and water deluge system for propane accumulator. No hydrocarbon ESD. A hole size of 25mm on the high pressure side would release in the order of 3 kg/second.

CONSEQUENCESImmediateLife safety – Personnel are not normally present in the gas conditioning area. Personnel in the general area may be at risk from radiant heat on ignition. Compressor is on upper level but two escape routes provided. Grade level Pumps area is open on all sides. Life safety risk is considered low.

Environment – Smoke pollution only.

Business interruption – Immediate propane compressor and gas conditioning ESD. No hydrocarbon ESD but operators would probably shut down the station for such an incident.

Asset Loss/Production Deferment – Damage to insulation and instrument fittings and cabling on compressor and associated equipment. Would shutdown immediately with resultant initial production deferment of approximately 14,000 m3/day.

Escalation Route and Time EstimatesEscalation would be caused by a prolonged jet fire or diffused gas fire impinging on adjacent gas containing piping or scrubber vessels or the propane accumulator vessel. For gas jet fires, time to failure of other equipment would typically be in the order of 10 minutes or less for piping and vessels if no cooling or control actions are taken. Gas jet flame impingement would involve radiant heat levels of up to 300 kW/m2. It should be noted that cooling must be effective where the flame impingement occurs rather than having a light water screen for radiant heat general protection.

Post Escalation



Life safety – Fire responders will be at serious risk if flame impingment occurs on gas containing piping or equipment and no cooling takes place. All non-fire responders should have evacuated the station.Environment – Air pollution only.

Business interruption – Total station oil and gas shutdown due to hazards presented by potential explosions and BLEVE’s.

Asset Loss/Production Deferment – Loss of propane compressor, vessels and piping would result in several months shutdown. Production may be permitted for several days or more without gas sweeting facility but wet gas export and heavy flaring would eventually impact on equipment and enviroment. Therefore, production would be halted. Production deferment for gas conditioning down time would be approximately 14,000 m3/day.

EXISTING FERMDetectionProcess Compressor has seal gas leak detection alarm, vibration monitor alarm, high temperature alarm, low pressure suction and high pressure discharge alarms as well as suction low flow alarms.

Fire Event – Single heat detector located over compressor will cause a compressor ESD and gas conditioning ESD, will activate the propane accumulator water deluge valve and site fire siren.

Gas Event – No gas detection provided.

MitigationProcess Controls – Compressor has seal gas leak detection trip, vibration monitor trip, high temperature trip, low pressure suction trip/high pressure discharge trip and suction low flow trip.

Containment – Not applicable.

Drainage – No spill drainage. Compressor base slab drains away from centres out to open ground areas.

Passive Five Control – Adjacent propane accumulator has fireproofing of vessel saddles/support. No passive protection on vessel or compressor associated vessels.

Active Fire Control – Firewater system taken from water injection header but it is unknown if the water supply can be increased under fire/emergency conditions. Fire hydrants in the general area of the export pumps. No fixed water monitors. 12 x fire boxes with typical contents as 6 fire hose, 120 litres 3% fluoroprotein foam concentrate, 1 x 225 lpm foam branch and inductor and 1 x 450 lpm water branch.

Effectiveness of Fixed Fire System (for Propane Accumulator Vessel)Applicability of typeWater deluge system is applicable for cooling gas vessels and protecting from radiant heat where no gas jet impingement is anticipated. Gas jet fires, being pressurised, can penetrate a water screen and cause vessel failure. The most effective method of protection where gas jet fires may impinge is passive fire protective coatings.



However, the location of the propane accumulator to the high pressure propane compressor is such that gas jet fire impingement is not likely. Any gas jet fire would diffuse on the suction and interstage scrubber vessels in between the compressor and the accumulator. These vessels will depressurise/blowdown but they should still be cooled if this scenario occurs.

System/Hardware SuitabilityThe fixed system hardware consists of open ended deluge nozzles with system kept normally dry. There are no terminal flushing connections on the branch lines to ensure solids are flushed out.

ReliabilityThe system failed to operate from a heat detector during a test requested by the study team. The control room fire and gas panel indicated the system was activated and this led the operators to believe the system was working since the panel was indicating this was the case.

The manual pneumatic valve had to be actuated at the deluge valve station to make the system work. The pneumatic valve release solenoid switch was defective. In addition to this defect, 10 of the 35 deluge nozzles failed to operate due to nozzle blockage by either corrosion particles or other solids. It is necessary to provide screw plugs or valves at the terminals of the deluge pipe branches to permit flushing after use. This will reduce, though not eliminate nozzle blockage.

OperabilityAutomatic, remote manual and local manual operation all occur by pneumatic release. However, from known jet fire potential, the manual actuation at the deluge valve station is within radiant heat levels of 37kW/m2 and above from a jet fire event on the propane accumulator vessel or associated equipment. The maximum radiant heat level allowed at a deluge station is 5 kW/m2 and therefore radiation protective screening is considered necessary.

Survivability (in incident)If a jet fire impinges on the system piping or valving for <5 minutes without water flow then system may fail.

An additional concern is that if a large propane liquid release occurs on the accumulator this may quickly migrate toward the deluge valve controls because the vessel slab slopes toward the water deluge valve. Calculations should be made to check if pool migration to the valve assembly is possible.


Heat detection and alarm - Compressor and gas conditioning ESD - Operator confirms fire event - Actuation of fixed water deluge for propane accumulator - Fire brigade response - Fire brigade deploy portable water monitor to cool any heat affected exposures - Cooling maintained until depressurisation - Fire brigade stand-by until incident is declared over.

FIREFIGHTING TACTICSStage 1 – Heat detector alarms in control room. Operators confirm fire event and ensure compressor and gas conditioning unit ESD. Control room selects relevant pre-fire plan and ensures site alarm has actuated and alerts fire brigade.

Stage 2 – Fire brigade selects relevant pre-fire plan and responds to incident.



Stage 3 – Control room alerts LEBC who designates OSC for the incident and requests call out of emergency team.

Stage 4 – Fire brigade arrive and ensure propane accumulator vessel water deluge is activated.

Stage 5 – Fire brigade deploy and actuate portable water monitors to cool heat/fire affected vessels and piping.

Stage 6 – Fire brigade evacuates to a safe distance to await gas depressurisation.

Stage 7 – Cooling operations maintained until depressurisation of gas fire. Any residual minor gas flame extinguished by dry powder extinguisher if considered safe to do so.

Stage 8 – Fire brigade stand-by until incident is declared over and stand-down announced.


Detection

Process As Existing FERM measures.

Fire Event As Existing FERM measures.

Gas Event Point flammable gas detection for propane compressor.

Alarm system

For Operator Low flow alarms, high pressure alarms, vibration alarms, high temperature alarms on compressor. Heat detection alarm. Site Alarm.


Process Control As Existing FERM measures.

Passive Fire Protection As Existing FERM.

Active Fire Protection As Existing FERM measures plus method and procedures for additional firewater supply and pressure under emergency conditions.

Fixed Syst. Firewater Flow Estimated at approximately 3,500 lpm based on a total of 35 spray nozzles @ 100 lpm.


Procedures Pre-fire plansEmergency response procedures.

Hose 12 x 70mm x 20m fire hose for water monitor.

Total = 12 x 70mm delivery fire hose.



Monitors 2 x 3000 lpm portable water monitors.

Foam Concentrate Not applicable for this scenario.

Specialist equipment Not applicable for this scenario.

Manpower 6 fire responders for setting up two water monitors.Total of 6 fire responders.

Vehicles 1 x fire truck.

Port. Equip. Water Flow 6000 lpm for water monitors.

Total = 6,000 lpm

Fixed and Port. Total Flow 3500 lpm for fixed water deluge system

6000 lpm for water monitors

Total = 9,500 lpm

Total Water Quality 105 m3 for water deluge system (30 minutes)180 m3 for water monitors (30 minutes)

Total = 285 m3.

SHORTFALLS IN EXISTING FERM & STRATEGY LEVELThe following are listed as shortfalls in either procedures, hardware or resources when compared to the facility FES Strategy Level or SP 1075 FERM as noted during the development of this scenario worksheet:

i) Existing fire response personnel limited to 5 only. A minimum of 6 responders are required for this scenario.

ii) The operators do not have the necessary fire training to act as back-up for the fixed systems. Reliance for back-up rests solely with the fire brigade who may be on stand-by or out on maintenance work or at the airstrip when this scenario develops.

iii) Radiant heat potential from a gas jet fire on the propane accumulator in the direction of the water deluge valve will exceed the limit of 5 kW/m2, there is no protection for personnel who may have to manually operate the deluge system.

iv) 10 of the 35 water deluge nozzles for the propane accumulator were blocked during a functional test of the system. The reduced water coverage was inadequate to provide protection under fire conditons. (Fire Equipment Maintenance).

v) No point combustible gas detectors at the propane compressor. Criticality of compressor and associated equipment for production is such that earliest possible gas release alarm should be considered.

vi) The water deluge valves on the discharge piping are correctly wire padlocked in the open position but the valve can actually be closed with this wire and padlock in place.



vii) Fire cabinets and equipment within are intended for operator use but operators are not trained to use equipment in boxes.

viii) No known procedure or method for increasing firewater pressure/supply under emergency conditions.

ix) No reference to gas detection in SP 1075 for propane vessels (propane accumulator).

x) The propane accumulator vessel slab slopes to allow drainage of a propane liquid release but the slope is toward the deluge supply piping and valve assembly and disable the system. The Specification does not have reference to the provision of sloping drainage under LPG vessels but this is an acceptable practice provided the slope is not directed to protective systems or potential escalation areas. This should be mentioned in the Specification.



Attachment I: Blank Fire Scenario Work Sheet

Notes:

1) The first worksheet contains guidance notes (4 pages).

2) The second work sheet is blank for copying for use (4 pages).



SCENARIO WORKSHEET (Guidance Notes)REFERENCE:

FACILITY Operation or process

FERM STRATEGY LEVEL For the overall station or facility

PLANT/EQUIPMENT Particular item or vessels or tank

FUNCTION Process performed, it’s criticality etc.

SCENARIO Credible description of a major or serious fire event and if any ESD will occur

CONSEQUENCES

Immediate

Life safety Any immediate impact on personnel

Environment On enviroment

Business interruption By ESD for fire event

Asset Loss/Production Deferment Immediate effects of fire

Escalation Route and Time Estimates

If any escalation, the method/route that this may take and the rough time frames in which the escalation may occur.

Post Escalation

Life safety Impact after escalation

Environment As above

Business interruption As above

Asset Loss/Production Deferment As above

EXISTING FERM

Detection

Process Means of detecting a leak or release through process alarms

Fire Event The type of detection provided

Gas Event The type of detection provided



Mitigation

Process Controls For mitigation (ESD, manual isolation, trips etc.)

Containment Once spill/release occurs, any physical containment (bunds etc.)

Drainage Process drains or OWS etc.

Passive Fire Control If any for vessel supports, structures etc.

Active Fire Control All fire systems and equipment, other than portable fire extinguishers.

Effectiveness of Fixed Fire Systems

Applicability of Type For the hazard

System/Hardware Suitability For the environment, operating conditions, type of system etc.

Reliability Any previous spurious alarms or discharges. Availability, additional maintenance, complexity of operation etc.

Operability Auto, remote, local functions and transparancy of operation.

Survivability (in incident) If required to survive the scenario immediate impact or scenario duration, can it survive.


Headings on what should occur and from what equipment or systems, and the fire fighting strategy necessary to effectively contain, control and if necessary, extinguish the fire event.

FIREFIGHTING TACTICS

Stage 1 Logical staged actions from the moment the alarm is raised or received.

Stage 2Stage 3 etc. RESOURCES REQUIRED TO MEET STRATEGY OBJECTIVES

Resources for Other than Fire Response Group

What hardware, systems and/or equipment is required for operations or other non fire brigade personnel to deal with the incident in accordance with the chosen strategy. To meet the strategy the requirements may be more than the existing FERM but should still be listed below. The short falls are itemised as part of the facility plan.



Detection

Process Either as existing FERM measures or the specific requirements over and above the existing.

Fire Event Either as existing FERM measures or the specific requirements over and above the existing.

Gas Event Either as existing FERM measures or the specific requirements over and above the existing.

Alarm system

For Operator Any specific alarms (process or fire) for the operators.

For Fire Brigade Any specific alarms (process or fire) for the fire brigade.

Process Control

Passive Fire Protection Either as existing FERM measurements or the specific requirements over and above the existing.

Active Fire Protection Either as existing FERM measurements or the specific requirements over and above the existing.

Fixed Syst. Firewater Flow Lpm for fire systems (water based systems only)


These heading apply only to the fire brigade (or fire responders) resources to combat the fire event.

Procedures What procedures or plans they should have for the response.

Hose Quantity and sizes.

Monitors Type, quantity and capacity.

Foam Concentrate Type and quantity.

Specialist Equipment Type and quantity.

Manpower Total for all actions required.

Vehicles Limited to the type available only.

Port. Equip. Water Flow Monitors, water or foam hand lines etc.

Fixed and Port. Total Flow Total including any fixed system flow plus the portable equipment flow.

Total Water Quantity Self explanatory.



(fixed & portable)


Some of these will be identified from the resources required to meet the strategy level but some may also be noted as short falls in maintenance or location of equipment or other deficiency during the development of the scenario. As far as possible, where a short fall item is listed, reference should be made to why, either by use of the SP1075 FERM or DEP or ICAO requirements.

SCENARIO REFERENCE:

FOAM/WATER CALCULATIONS SHEET

Fire Area m2

Foam Concentrate Type and ratio

Design Application Rate lpm/m2

Total Application Rate lpm/m2

Foam Application Time minutes

Total Concentrate Required litres

Total Water Required m3



SCENARIO WORKSHEETREFERENCE:

FACILITY

FERM STRATEGY LEVEL

PLANT/EQUIPMENT

FUNCTION

SCENARIO

CONSEQUENCES

Immediate

Life safety

Environment

Business interruption

Asset Loss/Production Deferment

Escalation Route and Time Estimates

Post Escalation

Life safety

Environment

Business interruption

Asset Loss/Production Deferment

EXISTING FERM

Detection

Process

Fire Event

Gas Event



Mitigation

Process Controls

Containment

Drainage

Passive Fire Control

Active Fire Control

Effectiveness of Fixed Fire Systems

Applicability of Type

System/Hardware Suitability

Reliability

Operability

Survivability (in incident)


FIREFIGHTING TACTICS

Stage 1

Stage 2

Stage 3 etc.

RESOURCES REQUIRED TO MEET STRATEGY OBJECTIVES

Resources for Other than Fire Response Group



Detection

Process

Fire Event

Gas Event

Alarm system

For Operator

For Fire Brigade

Process Control

Passive Fire Protection

Active Fire Protection

Fixed Syst. Firewater Flow


Procedures

HoseMonitors

Foam Concentrate

Specialist Equipment

Manpower

Vehicles

Port. Equip. Water Flow



Fixed and Port. Total Flow

Total Water Quantity (fixed & portable)


SCENARIO REFERENCE:

FOAM/WATER CALCULATIONS SHEET

Fire Area

Foam Concentrate

Design Application Rate

Total Application Rate

Foam Application Time

Total Concentrate Required

Total Water Required



Attachment II: Blank Pre-Fire Plan/Operator Response Sheet

Notes:

(1) The first pre-fire plan sheet contains guidance notes (2 pages).(2) The second pre-fire plan sheet is a blank for use (2 pages).



PRE-FIRE PLAN FORFIRE FIGHTING STRATEGY :

IMMEDIATE RESPONSE

ACTIONS RESOURCES REQUIRED

Typically, immediate actions will be for operations.

Operator actions in terms of reaction and procedures and call out etc.

The obvious hardware resources necessary to carry out the actions.

1st RESPONSE ACTIONS RESOURCES REQUIREDTypically this will involce the OSC or persons designated by the OSC.

What fire control or fire event related actions should be taken on arrival by the OSC or his designated personnel

As above

2nd RESPONSE ACTIONS RESOURCES REQUIREDTypically, this will involve the fire brigade or OSC or other identified person.

Normally, the fire containment or fire control or extinguishing actions required for the fire event.

These resources here should match the fire equipment, foam concentrate etc. listed in the scenarios.

OTHER ACTIONS/CONCERNS:

Any actions which could assist in the control of the incident of which the responders should be aware. Any concerns which may impact on the course of actions to control the incident.

ONGOING POTENTIAL HAZARDS :

Hazards which may endanger fire responders or non fire personnel, or the environment etc.



OPERATOR RESPONSE FORFIRE FIGHTING STRATEGY

A description of the strategy to be adopted for the fire, including the operator responses and fire brigade actions.


1

2

3

4

5

6



PRE-FIRE PLAN FORFIRE FIGHTING STRATEGY :

IMMEDIATE RESPONSE ACTIONS RESOURCES REQUIRED

1st RESPONSE ACTIONS RESOURCES REQUIRED

2nd RESPONSE ACTIONS RESOURCES REQUIRED

OTHER ACTIONS/CONCERNS:

ONGOING POTENTIAL HAZARDS :



OPERATOR RESPONSE FORFIRE FIGHTING STRATEGY


1

2

3

4

5

6



Attachment III: Blank Fire Responder Competencies

Notes:

(1) The first fire responder competencies sheet contains guidance (1 page). (2) The second sheet is a blank for use (1 page).



FIRE RESPONDERS COMPETENCIES FOR:KEY ELEMENTS REQUIRED: This should list the knowledge required by the fire responder for dealing with the particular scenario, including the emergency plan, team composition, chain of commond and specifics including knowledge of the equipment and locations.

COMPETENCIESRESPONDER KNOWS:Describe what the responder knows.

RESPONDER IS ABLE TO:What are the fire responders capabilities ?

RESPONDER DEMONSTRATES:To list what the responder can demonstrate, eg. wearing of PPE, method of running hoses etc.



FIRE RESPONDERS COMPETENCIES FOR:KEY ELEMENTS REQUIRED:

COMPETENCIESRESPONDER KNOWS:

RESPONDER IS ABLE TO:

RESPONDER DEMONSTRATES:
