Abordarea metodologica a filmelor lui Tarkovski

din perspectiva fenomenologiei perceptiei propusa de Merleau-Ponty

It is characteristic of the Husserlian system that consciousness is alwaysconsciousness of something. Husserl uses the term 'intend' or'intentional' to mark this relationship. 'Intention' in this sense is derivedfrom the Latin term intentio meaning extending or stretching outto. The real knight is intended as the object of the perceptual act ofrecognizing what the engraving represents. Noesis gives the intentionaldirection, the ofness of the act, to the sensa. Without this intentionaldirection, the sensa would not mean anything to the perceiver.`

Husserl introduces the method of reduction in order to promote understandingof the essential features of experience. It proceeds by turningour inquiry away from the objects of our acts and turning our attentiontoward the acts themselves in order that we may discover the structuresthat mediate intentionality. In bracketing, we bracket in the firstplace our natural standpoint toward objects, that is, the intentionalposture we usually assume in everyday life; we put aside presuppositionsand habitual ways of conceiving things that might otherwise obscureour understanding.

The method of reduction permits us to look, at the same time, atboth subject and object in the act of perception.

Every experience has an experience "horizon."... For example, there belongs toevery external perception its reference from the "genuinely perceived" sides ofthe object of perception to the "co-intended" sides - not yet perceived, but onlyanticipated— Furthermore, the perception has horizons made up of other possibilitiesof perception, as perceptions that we could have, if we actively directedthe course of perception otherwise: if, for example, we turned our eyesthat way instead of this, or if we were to step forward or to one side, and soforth. (CM, §19)

that will allow for a disclosure of its true sense. "2

Film. Consciousness From Phenomenology to Deleuze SPENCER SHAWMcFarland &. Company, Inc., Publishers Jefferson

Film Comciousness first attempts to understand the elements of the film

experience and its concomitant consciousness through the descriptive toolsof phenomenology.

Though it has rarely been applied to the film experience, phenomenologyis a perfect conduit, as it is a philosophy very much concerned withthe constitution of consciousness - the intentionality that comprises the subject/object correlation.

22. Film, like phenomenology, carries within it an intentional act of perception.

23. As a regional ontology, filming can never be categorized as a hermeticallysealed experience because the camera begins from the material world.As an embodiment in the lifeworld, it is an already involved constituent ofthe real. Consequently, any analysis of the film experience must bring to lightthe relationship of the lifeworld (the world of experience) to the film world,which constitutes its unique ontology. The phenomenology of film consciousnesswould take into account film's relation to concrete reality as well as explorethe spectator mindset. This is the equivalent of saying that it must use thecore principle of intentionality to look at the way consciousness is always aconsciousness of something, in the sense of being directed at an object. Bydescribing the way the subject, or the spectator, consciously experiences theintended object, the filmed representation, we can clearly isolate the specificform of consciousness involved in the film experience. We are also free to analyzethe structure of perception resulting from a unique rendering of the lifeworldthrough its filmed reproduction.

23. As a regional ontology, filming can never be categorized as a hermeticallysealed experience because the camera begins from the material world.As an embodiment in the lifeworld, it is an already involved constituent ofthe real. Consequently, any analysis of the film experience must bring to lightthe relationship of the lifeworld (the world of experience) to the film world,which constitutes its unique ontology. The phenomenology of film consciousnesswould take into account film's relation to concrete reality as well as explorethe spectator mindset. This is the equivalent of saying that it must use thecore principle of intentionality to look at the way consciousness is always aconsciousness of something, in the sense of being directed at an object. Bydescribing the way the subject, or the spectator, consciously experiences theintended object, the filmed representation, we can clearly isolate the specificform of consciousness involved in the film experience. We are also free to analyzethe structure of perception resulting from a unique rendering of the lifeworldthrough its filmed reproduction.

27. Film's recording is a recording of something j ust as essentially phenomenologicalconsciousness is a consciousness of Lived experience implies a proof

of the actual encountered world similar to photographic proof where the phenomenonof the appearing object is caught and attested to by a durationalflux on a "plate" of consciousness. Here, phenomenological description helpsmap out components of the film experience and its relation to film ontology, especially film's existential body as a pregiven encounter in the lifeworld.

35. The naive, scientific-realist description of film experience positions film'ssignificance entirely in its primary reproductive phase, ignoring what isprocessed in film, its secondary phase of reconfiguration and projection. Morethan this, it ignores phenomena-as-experienced by abstracting them fromexperience. The intricate bond between image and world or the relation offilm to its referent will always be interlaced with the segmentation and fragmentationof constructed expression. This is an expression that is not onlylinguistic but also visual and carnal . We are led to believe that the truth ofbeing is accessible through the objectively given, but for phenomenology thisis anathema. Husserl's own scientific project revolved around dynamic construction, discovery, constitution and the efforts of intentionality to conceiveconsciousness in a sensually perceived world.

„The aesthetic experience is not just one kind of experience among others,but represents the essence of experience itself.. .. In the experience of artthere is present a fullness which belongs not only to this particular contentor object but rather stands for the meaningful whole of life:

5. Michel Dufrenne, Phenomenology of the Aesthetic Experience (Northwestern University Press, 1967) . p. 227.

45. Intentionality

For Husserl, the analysis of the way mental states were structured inrelation to objects centered on intentionality. The meaning of an object asdistinguished from the object as such, the perceived as such from the thingperceived, the object as intended from the object that is intended. With intentionality we analyze the experience of objects and situations on both a carnaland reflective level where intentionality is a motor to thought thinking itself.

45. . Followingfrom this, film intentionality can be considered as duplication throughan experience that recaptures primal impression and then offers it up in aderived aesthetic experience with its own form of consciousness.

Understanding is still in the end an intentional act ofmeaning but one that is initially dependent on a gestalt arrangement of partand whole, foreground and background, aspect and totality.

49. Phenomenological Hermeneutics

By strictly adhering to its presuppositionless stance and search for essence,it has been said that phenomenology reaches its limit in a negative way. Itstops short of dealing with the ontological condition of understanding. Inthis respect, phenomenological hermeneutics completes the task . It looks tounderstanding in terms of primordial belonging in the world:The first declaration of hermeneutics is to say that the problematic of objectivitypresupposes a prior relation of inclusion which encompasses theallegedly autonomous subject and allegedly adverse object. This inclusive orencompassing relation is what I call belonging.45

45. Paul Ricoeur. Hermeneutics & the Human Sciences. trans. John B. Thompson(Cambridge University Press. 1981) . p. 105 (emphasis added)

Here there is no pretext of being able to escape from being-in-the-world. Thehermeneutic shift that takes place broadens the phenomenological projectwithout abandoning it . Indeed, both phenomenology and hermeneutics aremutually dependent, "phenomenology remains the unsurpassable presuppositionof hermeneutics. On the other hand, phenomenology cannot constitute itselfwithout a hermeneutical presupposition. "46

46. Ricoeur, ibid. , p. 101.

In this activity subjectivity is re-appropriated, "to understand is not to project oneself into the text; it is to receive an enlarged self from the apprehension of proposedworlds . . . . "53 Surrendering is a prelude to thought. 53. Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the HumanSciences, ibid. , p. 182

61. Expression to MeaningMerleau-Ponty made it clear that with embodied perception there isalways already meaning, "because we are in the world, we are condemned to; meaning, and we cannot do or say anything without it acquiring a name inhistory. " 1 1From its initial ground point, filming is bodily positioned in aworld to view things and bring them to life, "significance is revealed only ifwe look at them from a certain point of view, from a certain distance and ina certain direction (sens) . .. our collusion with the world." 1 2 Yet this is a viewthat, of necessity, becomes liberated in time and transcendence, "thus we arealways brought back to a conception of the subject ek-stase, and to a rela,tionship of active transcendence between the subject and the world. " 1 31 1 . Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. xix.1 2. Ibid. , p. 429.1 3. Ibid. , p. 430.

Walter Benj amin : The New Realmof Film Consciousness

"We may truly say that withfilm a new realm of consciousness comes into being . " ] 1 . Walter Benjamin , Selected Writings,Vol . 2, trans: Rodney Livingstone and Others, Edited by Michael W. Jennings, Howard Eiland, and Gary Smith (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999) , p. 17.

Bergson is much closer to Kant than he himself thinks . . . . Kant defined timeas the form of interiority, in the sense that we are internal to time. It isProust who says that time is not internal to us, but that we are internal totime , which divides itself in two, which loses itself and discovers itself initself, which makes the present pass and the past be preserved. 58 56. Deleuze, Difrence and Repetition, p.87.57. Ibid.58. Deleuze, Time-Image, p. 82.59. Ibid. , p. 158.

Phenomenology’s Material Presence:Video, Vision and Experience

Gabrielle A. Hezekiah

First published in the UK in 2010 by Intellect,The Mill, Parnall Road, Fishponds, Bristol, BS16 3JG, UKFirst published in the USA in 2010 by Intellect, The University of Chicago Press,1427 E. 60th Street, Chicago, IL 60637, USACopyright © 2010 Intellect Ltd

7. The task of constitutivephenomenology—a phenomenology which recognizes the role of subjectiveexperience in co-constituting objects in the world—is to analyze descriptivelythose acts of consciousness through which the object presents itself. Thephenomenological reduction aims, through a bracketing or suspension of theworld, to reflect on the acts of consciousness which bring the object into theworld for us. It aims to get at our purely subjective experience of the phenomenonstripped of the vision imposed on the experience through external prejudicesand assumptions. In this way, we aim to get at the “pure phenomenon”—at “thething itself ” as it exists for us—in an act of “pure seeing

8. Husserl and Heidegger are both interested in that which exists beyond

appearances, but their methods and emphases differ. Heidegger is concernedwith notions of concealment and unconcealment and with allowing the things to“show themselves.” His interest lies not in the probing investigation or referenceto consciousness that we find in Husserl, but in the condition of openness thatallows Being to come forward and make itself known. Husserl’s phenomenologyis concerned with epistemological questions about the possibility of knowledge,while Heidegger’s phenomenology is concerned with the ontology of Being orexistence.5 Lovitt (1977) suggests that subjectivity, in Heidegger, is a form ofreceptivity to the world. Ramesar’s work is grounded in an understanding of anunderlying presence, and he strives to create the conditions of possibility for itsappearance and for our reception of it. In his videos, the suspension performedby the phenomenological reduction opens a space into which essence and thenature of Being might be revealed.

Film. ConsciousnessFrom Phenomenologyto DeleuzeSPENCER SHAW

McFarland &. Company, Inc., PublishersJefferson, North Carolina, and London

25. We find that Merleau-Ponty's discussion of self-consciousness is particularlyappropriate to film in its usage of images of reflections and mirrors.This is not reflection in the sense of the self objectified under the system ofrepresentation. Merleau-Ponty's theory of the pre-self in the form of preconsciousor incarnate subjectivity is lived directly through the flesh in its adherenceto the world . The body is a perceiving subject-object. By touchingoneself, one expresses both objectivity and subjectivity and this is a form ofreflection , as touched and touching is an active-reactive echo of parts, ratherthan pure reaction. Film consciousness suggests the same process by its explorationof changing perspectives, narrative and dysnarrative, "both film and

the spectator are engaged in the act of seeing a world as visible, and bothinhabit their vision from within it - as the intrapersonal relation between'myself, my psyche' and 'my introceptive image.'"8

27.Film's recording is a recording of something j ust as essentially phenomenologicalconsciousness is a consciousness of Lived experience implies a proofof the actual encountered world similar to photographic proof where the phenomenonof the appearing object is caught and attested to by a durationalflux on a "plate" of consciousness. Here, phenomenological description helps

map out components of the film experience and its relation to film ontology, especially film's existential body as a pregiven encounter in the lifeworld. Film's mechanical reproduction receives shock 'as an insistent reminder that the film experience is founded on the cusp of the human and mechanical, neither wholly one nor the other.

28.Film consciousness, like human consciousness, has both a passive andan active condition. Passive presence in its primordiality corresponds to achanging, passive ego . It carries through the laws of its consciousness asreflected in film's viewing-view and the mirror of human perspective . Thisgives the parameters for the structure of what turns out to be reproduced,enabling specifications for perceptual reading after editing. The transcendentalpresence, the totality produced, is the overall vision of automatic recording,the pictured world-view. At the same time, filtered through thetranscendental viewpoint of film, there is an active "I," which is not passivesubjectivity but a machinic, serialized consciousness emerging through intervalsin imagery. In the phase of film reconfiguration, memory and virtualityare paramount in the intentional act that comprises the fusion of projectedand spectator vision. The spectator acts as the catalyst for the embedded virtualityof film to crystallize as temporalized, split imagery. Film consciousness,through the show of time, comprises the spectator; it takes up a subjectposition that is constantly changing, or fracturing, under a reading generatedby a productive "I. " The filmwork's own transcendent position ensuresthe pure form of this constant change in time, as a resource of pure recollection.This is the return of Bergson ian memory, where ontological unconsciousand film's spiritual automaton coincide to manifest indeterminate and noncausalsituations. Here there is constant fluctuation; the brain is like a filterthat lets emotions through to thoughts and the past collective into presentinstances.

The Address of the EyeA PHENOMENOLOGY OFFILM EXPERIENCEVivian Sobchack

Copyright c 1992 by Princeton University Press

New Jersey

3. WHAT ELSE IS A FILM if not "an expression of experience by experience"?And what else is the primary task of film theory if not to restoreto us, through reflection upon that experience and its expression,the original power of the motion picture to signify?

. Cinema thus transposes,without completely transforming, those modes of being aliveand consciously embodied in the world that count for each of us asdirect experience: as experience "centered" in that particular, situated,and solely occupied existence sensed first as "Here, where theworld touches" and then as "Here, where the world is sensible; here,where I am."2

Indeed, the cinema uses modes of embodied existence (seeing, hearing,physical and reflective movement) as the vehicle, the "stuff," thesubstance of its language. It also uses the structures of direct experience(the "centering" and bodily situating of existence in relation to theworld of objects and others) as the basis for the structures of its lan-Jguage. Thus, as a symbolic form of human communication, the cinemais like no other. At the end of his two-volume Esthetique et psychologicdu cinema (and sounding very much like Merleau-Ponty), JeanMi try articulates both the medium's privileged nature and the problemit poses for those who would discover the "rules" governing itsexpression and grounding its intelligibility:These [cinematic] forms are . . . as varied as life itself and, furthermore,as one hasn't the knowledge to regulate life, neither has one theknowledge to regulate an art of which life is at one and the same timethe subject and object.Whereas the classical arts propose to signify movement with the immobile,life with the inanimate, the cinema must express life with lifeitself. It begins there where the others leave off. It escapes, therefore,all their rules as it does all their principles.52 This manner of reference to the "centering" of embodied existence is used frequentlywithin the context of phenomenological inquiry but has a slightly differentemphasis than that currently used to discuss—and disparage—the notion of the "centeredsubject." For phenomenological usage, see particularly Maurice Merleau-Ponty,Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,1962); Erwin Straus, The Primary World of the Senses: A Vindication of Sensory Experience,trans. Jacob Needleman (London: The Free Press of Glencoe, Collier-Macmillan, 1963);and Richard M. Zaner, The Problem of Embodiment: Some Contributions to a Phenomenologyof the Body, 2d ed. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977).3 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 155.4 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Eye and Mind," trans. Carleton Dallery, in The Primacyof Perception, ed. James M. Edie (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964),p. 187.

5. In a search for rules and principles governing cinematic expression,most of the descriptions and reflections of classical and contemporaryfilm theory have not fully addressed the cinema as life expressinglife, as experience expressing experience. Nor have theyexplored the mutual possession of this experience of perception andits expression by filmmaker, film, and spectator—all viewers viewing,engaged as participants in dynamically and directionally reversibleacts that reflexively and reflectively constitute the perception of expressionand the expression of perception. Indeed, it is this mutual capacityfor and possession of experience through common structures of embodiedexistence, through similar modes of being-in-the-world, thatprovide the intersubjective basis of objective cinematic communication.

5. In a search for rules and principles governing cinematic expression,most of the descriptions and reflections of classical and contemporaryfilm theory have not fully addressed the cinema as life expressinglife, as experience expressing experience. Nor have theyexplored the mutual possession of this experience of perception andits expression by filmmaker, film, and spectator—all viewers viewing,engaged as participants in dynamically and directionally reversibleacts that reflexively and reflectively constitute the perception of expressionand the expression of perception. Indeed, it is this mutual capacityfor and possession of experience through common structures of embodiedexistence, through similar modes of being-in-the-world, thatprovide the intersubjective basis of objective cinematic communication.