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FEDERAL SECTOR
BLACK SKY
PLAYBOOK Draft/Sector Reviewed on 15 June 2017.
ABSTRACT The Federal Sector Black Sky Playbook contains the
current framework for managing the risk associated
with long duration, multi-region power outages
associated with Black Sky Hazards. This document is
designed to comprehensively address Black Sky
resilience issues through all phases including
Preparation/Mitigation, Response, Restoration and
Recovery.
James R. Kish V 2.5
1
Describing the need for the EPRO Federal Sector Playbooks
The purpose of our Playbooks is to provide a summary of participants, priorities related to information
and resource needs, how sector organizations structure for operations, what communications methods
are used, operational timelines for response, and structures that exist for other sectors to gain insight
into all the above as well as to provide for greater interoperability during a BS event. Providing summary
documents that outline the current thoughts and concepts will directly impact the resilience initiatives
that define preparedness measures, response actions, restoration activities and recovery strategies to
bring the sector back to meet the community.
Each sector’s playbook is a constantly evolving document. For consistency and ease of sharing, EISC has
undertaken an approach to standardize the documents across all sectors in outline and format. However,
the information contained in each Playbook is specific to the appropriate sector. The baseline document
is the Version 2.0 format.
Keep in mind that playbooks are for use within the sector to build consensus and share ideas. Equally
important, they are also used to build the cross-sector understanding of the issues, decisions, priorities,
and information sharing needs, communications requirements and interdependencies.
2
Table of Contents Role of the EPRO Sector Black Sky Playbook ............................................................................................ 4
Sector Background (V2) ....................................................................................................................... 4
Sector Black Sky Environment (V2) ...................................................................................................... 4
Sector Model Overview (V2) .................................................................................................................... 5
Sector Model Graphic (V2) ................................................................................................................... 6
Sector Black Sky Strategic Mission Statement (V2/V3) ............................................................................. 7
Sector Black Sky Strategic Mission Priorities Matrix ............................................................................. 7
Black Sky Decisions Overview (V2/V2.5/V3) ............................................................................................. 8
Sector Black Sky Situational Awareness Overview (V2/V2.5/V3) .............................................................. 8
Priority Information Requirements Matrix(V2/V2.5/V3) ....................................................................... 9
Sector Initial Actions (V2/V2.5/V3) ........................................................................................................ 10
Sector Initial Actions Matrix (V2/V2.5/V3) ......................................................................................... 11
Internal Sector Requirements (V2/V2.5/V3)........................................................................................... 11
Internal Sector Requirements Matrix ................................................................................................. 11
External and Cross Sector Dependencies Overview (V2/V2.5/V3) .......................................................... 12
External and Cross Sector Requirements Matrix (V2.5/V3) ................................................................. 12
Sector Specialized Resource Requirements Overview (V2.5/V3) ............................................................ 13
Sector Commodity Specific List Matrix ............................................................................................... 13
Sector Black Sky Communications Overview (V2/V2.5/V3) ..................................................................... 14
Sector Communications Matrix (V2/V2.5/V3) .................................................................................... 15
Sector Black Sky Assessment Tool (s) Overview (V2/V2.5/V3) ................................................................ 15
Sector Black Sky Planning Requirements (On-going) .............................................................................. 15
Sector Best Practices Matrix (On-going) ............................................................................................. 17
Integrated and/or Shared Planning Actions (V3/3.5/V4) ........................................................................ 17
Planning Actions Matrix ..................................................................................................................... 17
Sector Black Sky Resilience Considerations Overview (V3/3.5/V4) ......................................................... 20
Resilience Initiatives Matrix ............................................................................................................... 20
Sector Black Sky Regulatory Impacts and Issues Overview (On-Going) ................................................... 21
Sector Regulatory Matrix ................................................................................................................... 21
3
4
Role of the EPRO Federal Sector Black Sky Playbook This Playbook is designed to provide an evolving framework for recommended guidelines to manage risks
of long duration, multi-region power outages associated with emerging “Black Sky” hazards.
This Playbook will be updated and reviewed using the EPRO Federal Sector Steering Committee process
through consultation with sector professionals and managers. This Playbook contains the latest
consolidated school of thought on the unique challenges posed by wide area, long duration outages. It
provides guidelines to help individual entities strengthen their won resilience measures, develop focused
operational plans and assess external support needed to address these severe hazard scenarios.
Sector Background The federal sector is comprised of the executive branch organizations that provide day-to-day operational
oversight of the Federal Government. In addition to ongoing activities, each organization operates under
independent statutory responsibilities that support and in some cases regulate operations of other
sectors. During emergency response and recovery activities, the federal sector operates under
established preparedness doctrine and utilizes existing ‘frameworks’ created under Presidential Policy
Directive #8 – National Preparedness. This doctrine specifies pre-event activities related to five mission
areas: prevention (DOJ), protection (DHS), response (FEMA), recovery (FEMA), and mitigation (FEMA).
Each mission area has a designated lead, as noted above. This document follows a standardized outline
for all BLACK SKY sectors and catalogs the initial priorities, identifies critical situational awareness needs
for information and resource allocation. Additionally the document attempts to provide a description of
how the federal sector is organized so that other critical partners can have a baseline understanding of
how and where to expect federal coordination to be conducted and more importantly how to ‘plug in’ to
those structures to aid in efforts to share timely, accurate, integrated information.
Sector Black Sky Environment During a Black Sky event, normal protocols and methods of communication that are used to support a
vertically integrated ‘chain of command’ will be at best strained and most likely disrupted. Without a
means to gather situational awareness, synthesize and share information, determine integrated time
based priorities that respond to the developing situation the federal sector will need to rely on pre-event
planning, standing orders or operational procedures. It will of necessity operate in a de-centralized
manner with decision making similarly devolved to the highest level supported by communications.
During early phase response efforts, it is therefore crucial for the various entities to have sufficiently
robust, well formulated plans and procedures and to have them understood such that the personnel are
capable of carrying them out during periods when information and communications are disrupted.
5
Sector Model Overview While the scenario of a Black Sky event begins as one that is energy sector specific, the impact will rapidly
extend across all sectors due to the interdependent nature of our society. As such the ederal sector must
take multiple - simultaneous actions. All Federal Departments and Agencies have statutory roles that can
contribute to preparing for a Black Sky event, in the broad sense However, , the organizing construct that
will guide the initial coordination has been developed through the National Response Framework. When
no alternative organizational approach has been specified, the NRF serves as the baseline for initial
response operations. The following graphic depicts the conceptual way in which information, decisions,
and resource allocation are organized:1
Thehe above model has been tried, tested and proven to befor identifying and adjudicating information
and resources when a disaster’s event involves State and some multi region integration or coordination.
However, the model has not been testedt for a catastrophic event. An approach to a unified command
(or coordination) structure needs to be developed, integrated into doctrine, resourced, trained and
practiced.
In the event of a large scale-long term power outage, CI Sectors will be impacted requiring public-private
partnerships to identify causes, define requirements (including use of mutual aid), establish priorities and
coordinate closely on restoration priorities and actions. The amount and level of coordination that will be
required is unprecedented and will stress all levels of management and decision making.
1 Extract from CIKR Support Annex to the NRF, June 2016
6
Sector Model Graphic Note that this sector is comprised of all three constitutionally mandated branches of the USG. This
playbook will focus primarily on the executive branch with the possibility of including similar levels of
detail for the legislative and judicial branches in future evolutions.
Attached are high-level depictions of the federal sector. Given the scale and complexity of each of the
primarily named Federal Sector Departments and Agencies we will develop further levels of detail (both
in writing and graphically) as the sophistication of the Sector Playbook matures.
In addition to the overall federal sector structure, there are also graphics that depict the relevant
structures for the following departments
Defense;
Energy
Homeland Security (including focus on DHS NPPD and FEMA)
Transportation
Health and Human Services (including ASPR, ACF, and CDC)
State (including Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance and the US Agency for International Relief)
Veteran’s Affairs
Environmental Protection Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center
Treasury
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attached is a depiction of the above organizational graphic in their own form as provided by their public
facing web sites.
In addition, the following graphic depicts the coordination structure for the US Government when
conducting operations under the National Response Framework. The primary operational coordination of
federal response efforts is focused on supporting local, tribal, and state needs. The coordination of these
assets occurs through the National Response Coordination Center, led by FEMA and is organized around
the defined Emergency Support Functions (ESFs). Each ESF has defined missions, named lead and
support departments and agencies and has developed protocols for how their particular mission
coordination will occur. Each ESFs operating protocols are informed by the Department and Agency
authorities and their various core capabilities. In addition to the ESF structure, the NRF also has both
capability specific support annexes as well as hazard specific annex’s that further define the manner and
process by which the Federal Government will act to resolve disasters. For a more thorough review,
refer to the National Response Framework, third edition, June 2016.
7
Sector Black Sky Strategic Mission Statement
During a Black Sky event the federal sector would execute three primary missions
1 - Ensure the continuity of government. Underlying all activities undertaken by all layers of government (and similarly for the various critical infrastructure sector partners) is the need to take steps to preserve viability of their respective structures so as to ensure ongoing operational viability.
2 - Provide for defense of the United States. Whether the Black Sky event was caused by a nation state or not, defense of the United States will be a priority mission and will likely lead to prioritized actions that can impact the ongoing efforts to support citizens and restoration/recovery activities. These activities can be externally or internally focused and will necessitate coordination within the nation’s internal security agencies.
3 - Supportefforts to effectively respond to and recover from the event. At its core, the federal sector’s response mission focuses on “actions to save lives, protect property and the environment, stabilize communities, and meet basic human needs following an incident”2. These objectives are consistent across all hazards and form the underlying criteria for gaining situational awareness; setting initial priorities; developing, coordinating and communicating informational updates for the American people and for allocating critical resources necessary to provide the most benefit to the greatest number of people.
Sector Black Sky Strategic Mission Priorities Matrix
2 Response as defined by the National Response Framework, June 2016
Phase Priority Mission
Ongoing 1 Preserve vontinuity of the US Government Departments. and Agencies, establish and operate necessary operational locations, establish and maintain communications, coordinate deployment of assets as required to meet missions #2, and #3.
Ongoing 2 Provide for defense of the Unites States. Provide effective command and control over US defense assets; identify, deploy and employ assets as required to meet missions as defined by the national command authority.
Phase 1 3 Support efforts necessary to effectively respond to and recover from the event. Departments. and agencies deploy and establish coordination elements necessary to identify assets that can facilitate USG response in support of prioritized missions that save lives, protect property and the environment and provide for basic human needs.
8
Black Sky Decisions Overview. During a Black Sky event, all aspects of the five mission areas will still need to be conducted – only under
much more challenging circumstances. Prevention efforts necessary to secure the nation from ongoing
attacks will remaina priority. Information sharing, analysis, and prioritized application of law enforcement
and defense assets will still happen. Support for those elements may necessitate sacrifice or delay of
other ongoing mission priorities. Protection efforts necessary to ensure the situation created by the Black
Sky incident cannot be exploited by hostile elements will require identification, deployment and support
of security assets. Coordination of information essential to sound decision-making, shared across both
time and space connecting all sectors of government and partner CI owners will be essential. Information
sharing with citizens to ensure orderly reaction by the populace and to minimize disruptive activities will
be crucial. Early considerations of recovery priorities – integrated into early and ongoing response efforts
must be considered with resources allocated in an efficient manner. Mitigation efforts will need to be
considered in order to prevent renewal of outages that can exacerbate ongoing response/recovery
operations.
Black Sky Decisions Matrix.
Sector Black Sky Situational Awareness Overview. Gaining and maintaining situational awareness requires that all levels of government and the CI owner
operators immediately institute a policy of information sharing. Protocols that currently do not exist (or
have yet to be tried under a response environment) must be developed, equipped, trained and practiced.
Government has the fundamental responsibility to provide for safety of the citizens as such developing
integrated, timely information that can help meet the fundamental needs of communities and citizens is
crucial. Systems that can operate in a power-constrained environment are essential to meet this
Mission Priority Decision
1, 2, 3 Allocate commodities necessary to facilitate USG operations
1 Determine status of defense installations and assets
1 Conduct operations necessary to stabilize situation and prevent further damage to national security needs of the country
1, 2, 3 Determine fuel priority between fixed nuclear power facilities, response assets, care operations, and military deployment needs
1, 2, 3 Allocate available communications assets to support health care, emergency management, public risk communications, government continuity, defense and civil defense needs
1, 2, 3 Identify and communicate modified standards of care essential to support ongoing defense and emergency management requirements
1, 2, 3 Identify lead federal agency for specified mission requirements
3 Identify areas within the US that must be supported and/or evacuated due to projected long term (>3 months) power outages
9
challenge. Without the presence of the ubiquitous internet, alternative strategies for communicating
must be envisioned, developed and implemented.
Priority Information Requirements Matrix.
Information Source Priority Confidence Level
Location and connectivity with key leaders
All
Cause of power disruption CI O/O
Extent of power outage CI O/O
Projection for restoration, by area
CI O/O
Status of military (bases, deployed, strategic forces)
DOD
Number and location of assets rendered inoperable by Black Sky event catalyst
ALL
Status of governmental agencies (fed/state/local)
ALL
Status of communications systems (voice/data)
CI O/O
Status interdependent CI (oil/gas; water; telecommunications; cable; etc.)
ALL
Transportation system status (rail, air, highway, maritime)
CI O/O; State DOT; US DOT
Security of critical assets (nuclear weapons, reactors, pipelines, chemical facilities, etc.)
DOD
Status of mass media/communications systems
CI O/O
Availability of emergency power generation capabilities
ALL
Availability of fuel required to operate emergency power systems
ONG Sector
10
Sector Initial Actions. The federal sector initial actions will be guided largely by standard operating procedures. Federal sector
entities all have pre-determined plans that will guide the activation of their contingency operations
including locations, personnel and emergency communications procedures. Similarly, the Department of
Defense will activate necessary command, staff, and capabilities necessary to recommend actions to the
Status of health care facilities
HHS/CDC
Identification of oil/chemical pollution events
CI O/O; DHS; EPA
Status of banking and market systems (in US and abroad)
Banking Sector; US Treasury
Status of prisons DOJ; State DOJ
11
National Command Authority based on the the causes of the event or that defend against those that may
seek to take advantage of the event. Federal agencies can help to gain and share situational awareness,
to identify critical resource requirements, to facilitate emergency declarations, to communicate essential
elements of information and to represent the sector in multi-level coordination elements. NOTE that a
challenge this large has never been envisioned. Federal coordination structures may initially be
overwhelmed by the impact. Understanding the scope and depth of the outage will be vital to early
decisions regarding how to support impacted citizens. Clear, unambiguous information transmitted via
damaged infrastructures will be essential in order to save lives. The information will begin with frank and
accurate assessments of the power system that will need to come from the owner operators. Diverse
information from highly decentralized, sourceswill need to be rapidly synthesized and transmitted to help
affected populations.
Sector Initial Actions Matrix.
Internal Sector Requirements. The first priority for the sector is to deploy personnel to pre-planned locations while utilizing
availablemeans of communications. Establishing communications connectivity and sharing status reports
provide the USG with a baseline from which to commit support assets when and where required.
Internal Sector Requirements Matrix.
Priority Initial Action Desired/Required Outcome
1 (Re)establish government wide operational connectivity Ability to coordinate/act
3 Identify lead federal agency Clarity of leadership
3 Obtain status of the affected critical infrastructure systems Situational awareness; focus on gaps
2 Ensure security of vital strategic systems Ensure no loss of capability
1 Convene National Command Authority Ability to decide/act
2 Communicate known information to the public Situational awareness of public
1 Identify potential additional threats, follow on attacks Security to meet Mission #2
3 Establish field and unified coordination in affected areas Ability to identify and prioritize requirements and to coordinate actions
Phase Priority Requirement
1 1 Establish/occupy operational coordination centers
1 1 Establish and test communications (internal to agency – and within agencies)
1 1 Locate and connect with senior leadership
1 2 Get accountability and communicate instructions to personnel
1 1 Determine and communicate operability status as required agencies and National Command Authority)
1 2 Identify emergency power generation, fuel, communications requirements
1 1 Establish initial operating capability
1 1 Deploy personnel to planned locations
12
External and Cross Sector Dependencies Overview.
The Federal Sector has two independent, primary missions essential to the ongoing viability of the nation
– continuity and defense. Both of these primary missions can only be conducted without significant
interdependent support. Power, fuel, transportation, water, wastewater processing, communications,
are just a few of the critically important interdependencies that must be addresed. If these are not
provided or planned for, the ability of the federal sector to be successful in its primary missions (defense
and continuity) will rapidly degrade.
External and Cross Sector Requirements Matrix Requirement Area Priority Requirement
Manpower 2 Each agency must ensure personnel status, and report for centrally managed coordination of deployment and employment.
Transportation 2 Gain and maintain situational awareness over air, rail, road, seas, and rivers. Identify emergency power, fuel, and security needs required to support application of the transportation system.
Backup Power 1 Targeted application of emergency power generation to operate critical facilities essential to meeting the defense, continuity and support missions, requires multi-level situational awareness and integrated decision making.
Security 1 Sector assets can self-sustain for a brief period but may need to be augmented in order to ensure viability of critical facilities and capabilities in support of response and restoration efforts.
Communications (Physical)
1 Identify and prioritize application of emergency power, fuel and security that provides the most significant impact on response and restoration operations.
Water 2 Support emergency generator (fuel, maintenance) and deployment of essential chemicals necessary to maintain supply of potable water
Waste-water 2 Support emergency generator (fuel, maintenance) and deployment of essential chemicals necessary to maintain waste water processing
Food 2 Identify and prioritize emergency power, fuel, and transportation capabilities to support mass shelter operations
Fuel 2 Gain and maintain situational awareness for availability and operability of oil and gas supply chains. Develop and implement priorities that support interdependent response and restoration efforts. Ensure priorities are coordinated with multiple layers of command and control.
13
Sector Specialized Resource Requirements Overview.
The Federal sector has both internal resource needs as well as being a resource provider and/or
facilitator for external whole community partners. When addressing internal needs of operating in a
long-term power outage the Federal sector will require back up power generation capabilities, basic
care capabilities, security, and communications for personnel necessary to provide continuous
operations of essential government services. Each agency develops and maintains an essential, mission-
driven plan that specifies in detail the personnel, locations, power needs (including back up power
generation, fuel and projected maintenance required) for operating in a power outage. The specifics of
these plans are restricted and will not be published in this document.
As a participant in a ‘whole community’ that are conducting response and restoration activities
the federal sector focuses resources to meet shortfalls identified by state, local, and tribal governments.
These S/L/T authorities are constitutionally empowered to provide for public safety and security and are
typically positioned to be the first line of support to citizens and the critical infrastructure owner-
operators. The needs identified by these jurisdictions make up the primary requirements the federal
sector mobilizes to support. To facilitate identification, deployment, and employment of resources
required for response and restoration needs, the federal sector participates with state, local, and tribal
leadership in joint coordination activities.
Typically these are conducted at joint field offices, emergency operations centers, and unified command
centers and need the full range of power, care, security, and communications necessary to effectively
gain and maintain situational awareness, track resources, and provide updates to field personnel and
operating elements. The assets needed to meet the requirement identified and prioritized by these
individual JFO’s, EOC’s and UCs are very situation specific. Providing federally directed support will
require communication of the various needs to a central location, compiling the list of required assets,
prioritizing the deployment of available resources, and communication of the status to the S/L/T
authorities that requested the capability.
Given the anticipated scale of needs created by a long term, large scale power outage, prioritization of
asset allocation will require application of the principle ‘provide for the greatest good to the largest
number of people’ as there will almost certainly not be enough assets to meet every requirement.
Planning estimates for emergency power generation support have been compiled and are included in
the draft POAI. These estimates presuppose no requirement for fuel transport for the first 72 hours
following an outage, assuming that onsite fuel will support those needs. The annex estimates 132 k
facilities will require emergency power generation support after 72 hours and estimates for the fuel
required range from 81 to 124 million gallons per day (or 9 to 14 thousand tanker truck loads per day).
A more detailed matrix that describes generator and fuel requirements by type of facility follows.
Sector Commodity Specific List Matrix*
Commented [Y1]: What do these initials mean? I think they need some explanation
14
*Source, Power Outage Incident Annex to the National Response Framework DRAFT
Sector Black Sky Communications Overview Federal sector connectivity is vital to ensuring ongoing government, conduct of defense missions (abroad
and at home) and to providing support to the response operations inside the US. To accomplish the
normal day-to-day operations the sector utilizes a combination of voice and data that predominately
rides over the commercially available systems. Some sector unique capabilities do exist (dedicated fiber,
cable, satellite, HF, UHF) but will likely be prioritized for defense and government-wide continuity needs.
For example, FEMA has a deployable emergency communications capability but it is designed to ensure
that FEMA coordination elements can connect with their deployed assets and is not designed for support
Phase Commodity Estimated Quantity
Potential Source
Pre-event Fuel for 72 hour backup generator at 378 thousand defined facilities
230 – 350 million gallons
Commercial vendors under localized contract for delivery
Pre-event Food supplies for emergency personnel TBE Commercial vendors under localized contract for delivery
After 72 hours
Fuel for 72 hour backup generator at 378 thousand defined facilities
230 – 350 million gallons
TBD
After 72 hours
Food supplies for emergency personnel TBE TBD
15
of the overall response communications footprint, nor is it sufficiently robust to provide support to
surviving citizens’ needs. In a Black Sky environment the amount of data that can be effectively shared
will also restrict the use of many of the tools that have become routine during response operations.
Graphics, maps, overlays, incident action plans, situational awareness reports, public messaging are all
‘band width heavy’ and will have to compete with other needs that are deemed to be vital to ongoing
response and restoration operations.
Sector Communications Matrix
Sector Black Sky Assessment Tool (s) Overview. • Sector Overall Resilience Assessment – Annex A -1
Sector Black Sky Planning Requirements (On-going).
In addition to the aforementioned mission areas specified by Presidential Policy Directive 8, National
Preparedness, the directive also mandates the creation of a national preparedness goal and a system to
achieve that goal. To meet this requirement, FEMA has developed and implemented standardized
preparedness doctrine, including the National Incident Management System (NIMS). The overall aim of
NIMS is to enhance the nation’s ability to manage the impacts of any hazard while improving the quality
and speed with which responding elements can achieve their missions. Companion to the doctrine of
NIMS is creation of a National Planning System that FEMA has promulgated and is utilizing to standardize
howplanning in conducted. The system specifies the following six steps when developing a plan:
1. Form a Collaborative Planning Team 2. Understand the Situation 3. Determine Goals and Objectives 4. Plan Development 5. Plan Preparation, Review, and Approval 6. Plan Implementation and Maintenance
The system categorizes planning at 3 distinct levels, strategic; operational; and tactical and further distinguishes planning as deliberate or incident action based.
Phase Communications Requirement Coordinated Cross Sector Element
Voice
Data
Satellite
16
The National Preparedness System also introduced the concept of ‘core capabilities’ that are used to organize planning and preparedness efforts. For discussion purposes and to facilitate good planning the core the relevant mission areas break down capabilities in the following graphic.
During Phase 1 (Pre-Incident), local, state, tribal, territorial, insular area, federal entities, and critical infrastructure owner/operators determine existing logistics and resource capabilities, develop deliberate plans and procedures, and conduct training and exercises to validate existing plans. In addition, continuity operations and planning need to be incorporated to facilitate the performance of response core capabilities during all hazards emergencies or other situations that may disrupt normal operations.
Phase 1 consists of three sub-phases, which range from steady-state operations to the positioning of resources prior to the occurrence of an incident. Actions taken during Phase 1 are focused on awareness, preparedness, mitigation, and protection. During a notice incident, there may be an elevated threat (Phase 1b) and credible threat (Phase 1c) for which response actions must be taken and will be detailed in incident- specific annexes, as warranted.
Phase 2 (Response) consists of the immediate response, deployment of resources and personnel, and sustained response operations. Phase 3a refers to recovery activities that occur as a part of the response mission area to facilitate the transition and support to the Recovery mission area. Phase 3a includes short-term recovery operations (e.g., repopulation of the impacted area) and long-term recovery operations (e.g., transition to ongoing recovery and mitigation activities). In many incidents, no clear transition exists from one phase to the next, and phases may run concurrently. As such, during incidents that affect multiple states and/or FEMA regions, different jurisdictions may transition through the phases at various paces depending on the impact to the respective geographical area.
Response operations require collaboration across the Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery mission areas to ensure proper integration. Across all mission areas, lifesaving and life-sustaining activities remain the priority during an incident response. When possible, federal interagency partners may utilize agency resources and authorities to prepare for an incident, as well as to initiate appropriate preparatory and mitigating measures to reduce vulnerabilities. Mitigation opportunities are evaluated throughout disaster operations, as decisions made during response and recovery operations can enhance or hinder subsequent mitigation activities. Once an incident occurs, the priority shifts from preparedness activities to immediate and short-term response activities to preserve life, property, the environment, and the social, economic, and political structure of the community. Recovery operations are initiated, as appropriate and per the Recovery FIOP, based on local, state, tribal, territorial, and insular area needs. The transition from response to recovery will not impede response operations. Both operations will closely coordinate to prevent duplicative activities and promote the efficient use of resources.
Activities conducted under the Response mission must be consistent with all pertinent statutes and policies, particularly those involving civil and human rights, such as the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
17
Sector Best Practices Matrix (On-going).
Integrated and/or Shared Planning Actions.
A federal team has been convened and has drafted a national level Power Outage Incident Annex (POIA) to the National Response Framework. This effort has been co-led by FEMA and DOE and provides an overview of priorities, facts and assumptions intended to guide federal agency efforts to prepare for, respond to and recover from a large-scale power outage. Further nearly every FEMA region has instituted a similar planning effort aimed at developing regional level planning that will identify available capabilities and project needs based on input from state, local and critical infrastructure owner operators. These planning efforts provide opportunity for pre-event preparedness as well as investment strategies that can help to mitigate the risks associated with the black sky hazard. A list of plans points of contact is at attachment XXX
Planning Actions Matrix
Prevention Protection
Mitigation Response Recovery
Planning
Public Information and Warning
Operational Coordination
Intelligence and Information Sharing
Community Resilience
Long-term Vulnerability Reduction
Risk and Disaster Resilience Assessment
Threats and Hazards Identification
Infrastructure Systems
Interdiction and Disruption
Critical Transportation
Environmental Response/Health and Safety
Fatality Management Services
Fire Management and Suppression
Logistics and Supply Chain Management
Mass Care Services
Economic Recovery
Health and Social Services
Housing
Natural and Cultural Resources
Screening, Search, and Detection
Area of Operations
Recommendation Expected Improvement
18
Mass Search and Rescue Operations
On-scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement
Operational Communications
Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services
Situational Assessment
19
20
Sector Black Sky Resilience Considerations Overview.
Resilience Initiatives Matrix
21
Sector Black Sky Regulatory Impacts and Issues Overview (On-Going) The sector is largely in charge of establishing most of the impacting regulations but ongoing dialogue
during ensuing planning activities with other sector partners will be essential both to understand what
regulatory impacts the federal sector is responsible for and how they can ameliorate those impacts
during a response operation. It will also be crucial to understanding how state and local regulations can
impact the federal response and thus to streamline the response by addressing them pre-event.
Sector Regulatory Matrix Area of Operations
Issue Recommended Solution/Resolution
22
Annex A – Assessments (On-going)
Sector Overall Resilience Assessment
There is limited, consolidated assessment information focused exclusively on the Federal Sector as such
characterizations are not routinely accomplished. FEMA does conduct assessments of National
Preparedness on an ongoing basis the last of which was completed in early 2016. Below is a matrix that
depicts assessment of cross-cutting core capability assessments, based primarily on inputs from state
and local jurisdictions, using Federal guidelines.
23
Annex B – Regulatory Issues Detail Statements (On-Going)
Under development in conjunction with Regulatory Sector Playbook development
24