6
26922 Federal Register / Vol. 56, No. 113 / Wednesday, June 12, 1991 / Rules and Regulations (d) The contracting officer's determination that an option offers no subcontracting opportunities must be explained either on GSA Form 3584 or as an attachment thereto, before it is forwarded to the SBTA and the SBA/ PCR for review. (e)(1) Before determining the responsibility of an offeror on a contract requiring a subcontracting plan, the contracting officer shall review the offeror's compliance with previous subcontracting plans, if any, approved by the GSA contracting activity, including the contractor's performance in submitting subcontracting reports in a timely manner. The findings must be documented on the GSA Form 3584, Checklist for Review of Subcontracting Plan, in the "Remarks" block or on an attachment to the GSA Form 3584 before forwarding it to the SBTA and the SBA/ PCR for review. (2) In addition to (e)(1) of this section, PBS contracting officers must check the quarterly list of PBS contracts with plans provided by AU and contact all other'GSA contracting activities holding contracts with the same contractor concerning compliance with the previous year's plan. (3) When an offeror has consistently failed to submit SF 294 and SF 295 reports in a timely manner or has failed to make a good faith effort to meet its subcontracting goals on previous contracts with plans, the contracting officer shall include on the GSA Form 3584 in the "Remarks" block or in an attachment to the GSA Form 3584 the basis for finding the offeror responsible including the steps the offeror proposes to take that were not included in previous subcontracting plans to ensure compliance with the subcontracting program requirements on the proposed contract. 3. Section 519.706-70 is amended by revising paragraph (e) to read as follows: 519.706-70 Monitoring contractor compliance with subcontracting plans. (e) Before determining that a contractor's failure to achieve the subcontracting goals was occasioned by bad faith, the contracting officer shall analyze the explanations required by paragraph (b) above or provided pursuant to FAR 19.706. Dated: May 23, 1991. Richard H. IHopf, III, Associate Administrator forAcquisition Policy. [FR Doc. 91-13740 Filed 6-11-91; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 6820-61-M DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Research and Special Programs Administration 49 CFR Part 195 [Docket No. PS-1 12, Amendment 195-45] RIN 2137- AB72 Transportation of Carbon Dioxide by Pipeline AGENCY: Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), DOT. ACTION: Final rule. SUMMARY: This final rule establishes new safety regulations governing the transportation by pipeline of carbon dioxide in a supercritical state. The regulations for carbon dioxide are similar to the regulations for hazardous liquids. Section. 211 of the Pipeline Safety Reauthorization Act of 1988 (Pub. L. 100-561) requires that the DOT regulate carbon dioxide which is transported by pipeline facilities. EFFECTIVE DATE: The effective date of this final rule is July 12, 1991. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT. Cesar De Leon (202) 366-1640, regarding the contents of this final rule; or the Dockets Unit (202) 366-5046, regarding copies of this final rule or other information in the docket. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Background Federal regulations in 49 CFR part 195 prescribe safety standards and reporting requirements for pipeline facilities used in the transportation of hazardous liquids, which are defined to include petroleum, petroleum products, or anhydrous ammonia. Section 211 of the Pipeline Safety Reauthorization Act of 1988 (Pub. L. 100-561) enacted on October 31, 1988 (49 U.S.C. 2015) requires that the Department of Transportation regulate carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) which is transported by pipeline facilities. On March 16, 1989. the American Petroleum Institute (API) petitioned the Department to amend part 195 to include the regulation of pipelines that transport CO 2 . The recommendations contained in the petition are the product of a task force consisting of representatives of nine companies that own or operate CO 2 pipelines. The API recommended that OPS amend existing part 195 rather than write a new part for CO 2 pipelines only, and RSPA adopted this approach. On October 12, 1989, the RSPA published a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) (54 FR 41912) proposing to amend these regulations to also apply to the transportation of CO 2 in the supercritical phase. The NPRM described the physical properties of CO 2 . At normal temperatures and atmospheric pressure, CO 2 is an odorless and colorless gas, not flammable, with a density 1.5 times the density of air. It will not support combustion nor will it sustain life if inhaled. Carbon dioxide may exist simultaneously as a gas, liquid, and solid at its triple point which is -69°F and 60.43 psig. Below the triple point, it may be either a solid or gas depending on temperature and pressure. Dry ice for refrigeration is a common use of CO 2 in solid form. Dry ice at a temperature of -109°F and atmospheric pressure will sublime, that is, pass to the gas phase without going through the liquid state. The critical temperature of CO 2 is 87.8°F. When pressure reaches 1200 psig, CO 2 enters what is called the supercritical phase (also referred to as a dense vapor phase). Pipeline transportation of CO 2 in the supercritical phase is more desirable than transportation in the gaseous phase. As a dense vapor in the supercritical state, CO 2 can be transported more economically and efficiently using smaller pipelines and pumps because greater volumes of fluid can be transported as a dense vapor than as a gas. In addition, CO 2 would be difficult to transport as a gas because it would enter into two-phase flow at a lower pressure than that required for the efficient pipeline transportation of the CO 2 . Carbon dioxide has been used for many years to aid in the production of crude oil. Because of its high degree of solubility in crude oil and abundance from natural sources, CO 2 became a. natural candidate for use in enhanced oil recovery (EOR) projects. Under favorable conditions of pressure, temperature, and composition, the CO 2 mixes with the crude oil. The CO 2 that dissolves in the crude oil increases the volume and decreases the viscosity making the oil more mobile. It also exerts an acidic effect on some types of reservoir rocks and vaporizes some of the oil. There are a number of sources of CO 2 . It can be produced commercially in natural gas plants, ammonia plants, and recovered from power plant stack gas. A better source is from underground reservoirs where CO 2 under pressure occurs naturally. There are various modes of transportation for CO 2 , but for the large volumes required in EOR projects, pipeline transportation is the most reliable and economical. Generally

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26922 Federal Register / Vol. 56, No. 113 / Wednesday, June 12, 1991 / Rules and Regulations

(d) The contracting officer'sdetermination that an option offers nosubcontracting opportunities must beexplained either on GSA Form 3584 oras an attachment thereto, before it isforwarded to the SBTA and the SBA/PCR for review.

(e)(1) Before determining theresponsibility of an offeror on a contractrequiring a subcontracting plan, thecontracting officer shall review theofferor's compliance with previoussubcontracting plans, if any, approvedby the GSA contracting activity,including the contractor's performancein submitting subcontracting reports in atimely manner. The findings must bedocumented on the GSA Form 3584,Checklist for Review of SubcontractingPlan, in the "Remarks" block or on anattachment to the GSA Form 3584 beforeforwarding it to the SBTA and the SBA/PCR for review.

(2) In addition to (e)(1) of this section,PBS contracting officers must check thequarterly list of PBS contracts withplans provided by AU and contact allother'GSA contracting activities holdingcontracts with the same contractorconcerning compliance with theprevious year's plan.

(3) When an offeror has consistentlyfailed to submit SF 294 and SF 295reports in a timely manner or has failedto make a good faith effort to meet itssubcontracting goals on previouscontracts with plans, the contractingofficer shall include on the GSA Form3584 in the "Remarks" block or in anattachment to the GSA Form 3584 thebasis for finding the offeror responsibleincluding the steps the offeror proposesto take that were not included inprevious subcontracting plans to ensurecompliance with the subcontractingprogram requirements on the proposedcontract.

3. Section 519.706-70 is amended byrevising paragraph (e) to read asfollows:

519.706-70 Monitoring contractorcompliance with subcontracting plans.

(e) Before determining that acontractor's failure to achieve thesubcontracting goals was occasioned bybad faith, the contracting officer shallanalyze the explanations required byparagraph (b) above or providedpursuant to FAR 19.706.

Dated: May 23, 1991.Richard H. IHopf, III,Associate Administrator forAcquisitionPolicy.[FR Doc. 91-13740 Filed 6-11-91; 8:45 am]BILLING CODE 6820-61-M

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Research and Special ProgramsAdministration

49 CFR Part 195

[Docket No. PS-1 12, Amendment 195-45]

RIN 2137- AB72

Transportation of Carbon Dioxide byPipeline

AGENCY: Research and Special ProgramsAdministration (RSPA), DOT.ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This final rule establishesnew safety regulations governing thetransportation by pipeline of carbondioxide in a supercritical state. Theregulations for carbon dioxide aresimilar to the regulations for hazardousliquids. Section. 211 of the PipelineSafety Reauthorization Act of 1988 (Pub.L. 100-561) requires that the DOTregulate carbon dioxide which istransported by pipeline facilities.EFFECTIVE DATE: The effective date ofthis final rule is July 12, 1991.FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT.Cesar De Leon (202) 366-1640, regardingthe contents of this final rule; or theDockets Unit (202) 366-5046, regardingcopies of this final rule or otherinformation in the docket.SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

Federal regulations in 49 CFR part 195prescribe safety standards and reportingrequirements for pipeline facilities usedin the transportation of hazardousliquids, which are defined to includepetroleum, petroleum products, oranhydrous ammonia. Section 211 of thePipeline Safety Reauthorization Act of1988 (Pub. L. 100-561) enacted onOctober 31, 1988 (49 U.S.C. 2015)requires that the Department ofTransportation regulate carbon dioxide(CO2) which is transported by pipelinefacilities. On March 16, 1989. theAmerican Petroleum Institute (API)petitioned the Department to amend part195 to include the regulation of pipelinesthat transport CO2 . Therecommendations contained in thepetition are the product of a task forceconsisting of representatives of ninecompanies that own or operate CO 2pipelines. The API recommended thatOPS amend existing part 195 rather thanwrite a new part for CO 2 pipelines only,and RSPA adopted this approach. OnOctober 12, 1989, the RSPA published anotice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM)(54 FR 41912) proposing to amend theseregulations to also apply to the

transportation of CO 2 in thesupercritical phase.

The NPRM described the physicalproperties of CO 2. At normaltemperatures and atmospheric pressure,CO2 is an odorless and colorless gas, notflammable, with a density 1.5 times thedensity of air. It will not supportcombustion nor will it sustain life ifinhaled. Carbon dioxide may existsimultaneously as a gas, liquid, andsolid at its triple point which is -69°Fand 60.43 psig. Below the triple point, itmay be either a solid or gas dependingon temperature and pressure. Dry ice forrefrigeration is a common use of CO2 insolid form. Dry ice at a temperature of-109°F and atmospheric pressure willsublime, that is, pass to the gas phasewithout going through the liquid state.The critical temperature of CO2 is 87.8°F.When pressure reaches 1200 psig, CO2enters what is called the supercriticalphase (also referred to as a dense vaporphase).

Pipeline transportation of CO2 in thesupercritical phase is more desirablethan transportation in the gaseousphase. As a dense vapor in thesupercritical state, CO 2 can betransported more economically andefficiently using smaller pipelines andpumps because greater volumes of fluidcan be transported as a dense vaporthan as a gas. In addition, CO2 would bedifficult to transport as a gas because itwould enter into two-phase flow at alower pressure than that required for theefficient pipeline transportation of theCO2.

Carbon dioxide has been used formany years to aid in the production ofcrude oil. Because of its high degree ofsolubility in crude oil and abundancefrom natural sources, CO 2 became a.natural candidate for use in enhancedoil recovery (EOR) projects. Underfavorable conditions of pressure,temperature, and composition, the CO2mixes with the crude oil. The CO2 thatdissolves in the crude oil increases thevolume and decreases the viscositymaking the oil more mobile. It alsoexerts an acidic effect on some types ofreservoir rocks and vaporizes some ofthe oil.

There are a number of sources of CO 2.It can be produced commercially innatural gas plants, ammonia plants, andrecovered from power plant stack gas. Abetter source is from undergroundreservoirs where CO 2 under pressureoccurs naturally.

There are various modes oftransportation for CO 2, but for the largevolumes required in EOR projects,pipeline transportation is the mostreliable and economical. Generally

Federal Register / Vol. 56, No. 113 / Wednesday, June 12, 1991 / Rules and Regulations

these pipelines originate in thereservoirs of the four corners area andterminate in the Permian Basin oil fieldin Texas where most of the EORprojects exist. An exception is theChoctow Pipeline which originates nearJackson, Mississippi, and terminatesnear McComb, Mississippi. A list of CO 2pipelines was included in the NPRM.

Pipeline Safety Reauthorization Act of1988

There have been Congressionalconcerns regarding the transportation ofCO 2 by pipeline over a number of years.The report on the Pipelines SafetyReauthorization Act of 1988 from theHouse Committee on Energy andCommerce in the 1987 session ofthel00th Congress points out that .....The Committee has for sometimerecommended the safety regulation andinspection of CO2 pipelines." TheCommittee further notes that:

* * * The CO2 pipeline industry has a goodsafety record and performs an essentialservice for enhanced oil recovery, but it is avery new industry. It is not a question of itssafety record that caused the requirement forsafety regulation, but rather the uniquepotential for disaster if there were ever abreak in a CO2 pipeline * * *

* " * A recent event demonstrated justhow lethal CO2 can be. On August 21, 1986, acatastrophic release of gas dissolved in LakeNyos in Cameroon, Africa. killed 1,700people. At the time, the news mediacharacterized the gas as 'toxic,' 'poisonous'and 'lethal.' Subsequent investigation provedthe gas was carbon dioxide.

* * The Committee believes that sinceCO2 is deadly, CO2 pipelines should haveappropriate Federal safety regulations. (H.R.Rep. No. 100-445; 100th Congress; 1st Session(1987).)

Consequently, the requirement toissue regulations for the pipelinetransportation of carbon dioxide wasincluded in section 211 of title II of thePipeline Safety Reauthorization Act of1988, 49 U.S.C. 2015.

Comments to the NPRM

Five commenters responded to thenotice: The Railroad Commission ofTexas, Exxon Company, U.S.A.,American Petroleum Institute (API), theU.S. Department of the Interior (DOI,and the Public Utility Commission ofOregon. In addition, the NPRM waspresented in draft to the TechnicalHazardous Liquid Pipeline SafetyStandards Committee (THLPSSC) inWashington, DC, on September 14, 1989.The THLPSSC voted unanimously thatthe draft proposed rules weretechnically feasible, reasonable, andpracticable. A transcript and report ofthe THLPSSC meeting are in the docket.

Exxon stated that the list of existingCO2 pipelines is incomplete in that itdoes not include Amoco's 20-milepipeline from Bairoil to the Lost Soldierand Wertz fields. Exxon further statedthat the La Barge, Wyoming, area is amajor CO2 supply source for Wyomingand has the potential to supply EORprojects as far north as the WillistonBasin (North Dakota) and Canada. TheRSPA appreciates this additional dataand has made these corrections to itsrecords.

The Public Utility Commission ofOregon commented that althoughOregon has no CO pipelines at thepresent, it supported the adoption of theproposed rules for CO2 pipelinesbecause it believed that pipelinesoperating at pressures in excess of 1200psig present a potential public hazard.

The Railroad Commission of Texascommented on the proposal under§ 195.1(b}[8) to exclude CO2 distributionlines in oil production fields. TheRailroad Commission disagreed withRSPA's assumption that the CO2facilities exempted under § 195.1(b)(8)are typically located in rural areas.Also, the Railroad Commission statedthat in Texas, many of these linesoperate up to 1400 psig, and they shouldbe covered by the regulations when inpopulated areas.

RSPA did not propose to regulate C02distribution facilities in oil productionoperations because those lines werethought to be so closely involved inproduction as to be production facilitieswhich are generally considered asoutside of the scope of thetransportation of hazardous liquids.However, a closer scrutiny of the issueshows that CO2 distribution lines shouldbe regulated. Although CO is used inthe production of hazardous liquids, it isnot itself produced at those sites. ThusCO2 lines are not "production facilities"within the meaning of the HazardousLiquid Pipeline Safety Act. Furthermore,RSPA agrees with the RailroadCommission that those lines aresometimes in populated areas and areoperating at high pressures. Therefore,the definition has been revised to morenarrowly limit the exception totransportation of CO2 "downstreamfrom a point in the vicinity of the wellsite at which carbon dioxide is deliveredto a production facility," rather than a"production field distribution system." Aproduction field distribution system isnot currently defined in the regulations.The Manual of Oil and Gas Terms,Williams and Myers 7th Edition (1987),defines the term "field" very broadly toinclude a general area underlain by oneor more pools of oil and gas. TheManual further states that the term has

a meaning which is usually determinedfrom the context in which it is used. Itmay refer to a certain geographical areafrom which oil is produced, or it may berestricted to a particular reservoir. Sucha broad definition would result in manyCO2 distribution lines, which couldencompass more than a county in Texas,being excepted from the rules. Insteadthe exception in § 195.1(b)(8) is limitedto lines downstream of where carbondioxide is delivered to a productionfacility in the vicinity of a well site,rather than excepting all the CO2 lines inthe broad expanses of a productionfield.

The DOI observed that while they areunaware of the occurrence of largevolumes of CO2 in the Outer ContinentalShelf (OCS) that might be developed, itmay be timely to include OCS pipelinesin the CO2 rules. RSPA agrees with DOIand, in fact, under § 195.1, the scope ofthe NPRM covered such offshore lines.Part 195 applies to pipeline facilities onthe OCS. Nothing in proposed § 195.1[b)excepted the applicability of part 195 to'carbon dioxide pipeline facilities on theOCS; therefore, the final rules apply toany offshore pipeline that carries CO2 ina supercritical phase downstream fromproduction.

The DOI further commented that thedefinition that carbon dioxide is " * *a fluid consisting predominately ofcarbon dioxide molecules compressed toa supercritical state" is too limiting if therule is to apply to all pipelines carryingCO2. RSPA agrees with DOI'sobservation that the Department hasauthority under section 211 of theReauthorization Act to regulate allpipeline transportation of CO2.However, RSPA has chosen to limit theregulations in part 195 to CO2 in asupercritical state. At present, foreconomic reasons, CO2 is transported bypipeline in a supercritical state, i.e.,dense vapor state. In the future, if CO2 istransported other than as a dense vaporwhere the part 195 regulations areinappropriate for such transportation,RSPA will issue additional regulationsfor such transportation.

Exxon was concerned with thedefinition of "carbon dioxide" inanother context. Exxon thought thatbecause "predominant" means morethan half and because of the difficulty indetermining the super critical point on amixture of gases, the definition shouldbe changed as follows: "Carbondioxide" means a fluid consisting ofmore than 90 percent carbon dioxidemolecules, compressed to a supercriticalstate. The RSPA agrees with Exxon thatthe definition of "carbon dioxide" needsto be more precise than the proposed

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26924 Federal Register / VoL 56, No. 113: / Wednesday, June 12, 1991 / Rules, and, Regulations-

definition in the NPRM. Exxon'sdefinition is more precise. and wouldpreclude the problems identified-by thatcompany. Therefore, the definition of"carbon dioxide" has: been revised tomean a fluid consisting of more than 90percent carbon dioxide molecules.

The DOI also questioned the:requirement in § 195,50(b) that, requiresan accident report for' each, failure in apipeline system when there is a releaseof CO2 that results in the loss of 50 ormore barrels of CO2. The DOI points outthat carbon dioxide is conventionallymeasured in its gaseous form in whichthe unit of measure is thousandstandard cubic feet; The DOI furtherpoints out that in the event of a pipelinerupture, the, CoG released would flash toa solid or gaseous phase depending.upon controlling conditions and anaccurate estimation, of the loss in barrelswould. be very difficult.

The DOI is, correct that the throughputof CO in pipelines is, most. oftenmeasured in thousand standard cubic.feet. However,. as petitioned by API, theloss of carbon, dioxide due to a ruptureis better reported ia barrels. because thatresults in consistent failure reportingcriteria with other commoditiesregulated in part 195 and consistentfailure statistics in the RSPA pipelinefailure data base. An operator can makethe conversion to barrels withoutdifficulty knowing the characteristics ofthe CO2 and the pressure andtemperature of the CO,2 at the time of thefailure . Therefore, RSPA did not adopt'this recommendation.

Another-DOI comment was that thefinal rule should exempt pipelines on theOCS from the "line marker"requirements in § 195.410(a) because itwould be impractical to marksubmerged offshore pipelines. Anexemption is not required becausesection, 195.410(b) exempts buriedpipelines' located offshore' or atcrossings. of'or' under waterways. orother bodies of water firom having.to-place and maintain line markers, Thisexemption, would include CO2 lines.

Both the API and Exxon wereconcerned about the proposed change- in§ 195.102 "Design Temperature."' Exxoncommented that operating procedurescan be implemented which avoidextremely low temperatorest duringfilling and blowdown, making itunnecessary to, consider lowtemperatures in. selecting material forCO lines. The API commented that theproposed revision to. § 195.102 could beinterpreted to mean that all portions, of a:carbon dioxide system must be made ofmaterials suitable. for low temperatures.because any portion of a carbon. dioxidesystem could develop a leak and the.

area around the leak would be subjectedto a low temperature because of. therapid reduction of pressure. RSPAintended. § 195.102 in the NPRM to applyonly to locations of the pipeline that areintended to be subjected to rapid.reduction of'pressure" during normaloperation. Therefore, RSPA has revisedthis section to limit the selection ofpipeline materials forow temperaturesto apply to components of CO2 pipelinesthat are subject to low temperaturesduring normal operation because ofrapid reduction of pressure such asduring blow-down, or during the initialfill of the line.

The API commented' that they think itis inappropriate to require valves, oncarbon dioxide pipeline systems at allwater crossings greater than 100 feet inwidth as required by § 195.206. The APIargued that carbon dioxide is notpolluting and the potential for anasphyxiating cloud from a pipeline at awater crossing would not be any greaterfor an underwater pipeline than for aburied or aboveground pipeline asasserted by RSPA. The RSPA believesthat valves are needed at watercrossings greater than 100 feet becauseof the hazards of a large vapor cloud incase of a large catastrophic failbreunder a stream. While the release ofCO2 (from a volcanic source) under LakeNyos, in Africa was. eight times largerthan a release that can, be expected froma pipeline rupture, it is significant tonote that it resulted in a vapor cloudthat caused 1,700 deaths. Thecharacteristics of the release of a largequantity of CO2 from under a body ofwater are not yet clearly understood.Therefore, RSPA has retained thisrequirement in the final rule.

The'API also suggested that thedefinition of "production facility"include "other facilities where CO isproduced and prepared fortransportation" in addition to facilitiesused: in the process,-of extracting carbondioxide from the ground. The RSPAagrees that CO2, is. sometimes obtainedfrom. industrial facilities in addition tobeing produced from. the ground and hasamended' the definition. of"productionfacility" in § 195,2 accordingly.

The API also; suggested, that theproposed definition of "production.facility" include piping or equipmentused! in gathering of CO thereby 'excluding the CO2 gathering lines fromthese regulations pursuant to- theproposed § 195.1(bl(6]. The RSPA hasnot adopted this su8ggestion because thedefinition of "productibn' facility" was,intended to be. limited to productionfunctions and' was not intended. to,include the piping or equipment used in,the gathering of carbon dioxide or

hazardous liquids. The proposed rules inthe NPRM applied to gathering. linesused to collect and transport COi fromCO2 production facilities. RSPA was notpersuaded by the comments to excludethese gathering, lines in the final rule. Itshould be noted that the definition of"gathering line" is not applicable tocarbon dioxide pipelines nor is there anexception forGCO2 gathering lines under§ 195.1(b)(4).

Paperwork Reduction Act

The reporting requirements in subpartB and recordkeeping requirements undersections 195.5(c), 195.266, 195.310,195.402 and, 195.404- have been approvedby the Office of Management andBudget (OMB) under the PaperworkReduction Act. The addition of CO2pipelines to part 195 results inapproximately 2,000 miles, or about onepercent of additional pipelines subjectto the reporting and recordkeepingrequirements in part 195. This willminimally increase current reportingand recordkeeping burdens and,therefore, RSPA has sought no-furtherapproval from OMB.

Impact Assessment

These regulations extend the part 195pipeline safety regulations to pipelinesthat transport CO,. which are few in.number. Pipelines under constructionbefore the effective date of the final ruleare subject only to the accident andsafety-related condition reporting andoperation and maintenancerequirements of these regulations. Thisfinal rule is consistent with industrysafety practices; the fiscal impact ofthese rules is minimal. No commentersraised any cost implications. Therefore,,this final rule is considered to be non-major under Executive Order 12291, andis not considered significant under DOTRegulatory Policies and Procedures! (44FR 11034, February 26, 1979). Since thefinal rule requires minimal complianceexpense, it does. not warrant preparationof a Draft Regulatory Evaluation. Also,based on the facts available concerningthe. impact of this final rule; I certifyunder section 605 of the Regulatory'Flexibility Act that: it does not have asignificant economic impact on asubstantial number of small entities.This action has been analyzed under thecriteria, of Executive Order 12612 (52 FR41685). and found not to warrantpreparation of a FederalismAssessment.

List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 195

Carbon dioxide, Pipe, Pipeline safety.

Federal Register / Vol. 56, No. 113 / Wednesday, June 12, 1991 / Rules and Regulations

In consideration of the foregoing,RSPA amends 49 CFR part 195 asfollows:

PART 195-[AMENDED]

1. The authority citation for part 195continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 App. U.S.C. 2001 et seq.; 49CFR 1.53.

2. Section 195.0 is revised to read asfollows:

§ 195.0 Scope.

This part prescribes safety standardsand reporting requirements for pipelinefacilities used in the transportation ofhazardous liquids or carbon dioxide.

3. In § 195.1, paragraphs (a) and (b) (5),(6), and (7) are revised, and paragraph(b)(8) is added to read as follows:

§ 195.1 Applicability.

(a) Except as provided in paragraph(b) of this section, this part applies topipeline facilities and the transportationof hazardous liquids or carbon dioxideassociated with those facilities in oraffecting interstate or foreign commerce,including pipeline facilities on the OuterContinental Shelf.

(b) * * *

(5) Transportation of a hazardousliquid or carbon dioxide in offshorepipelines which are located upstreamfrom the outlet flange of each facility 'onthe Outer Continental Shelf wherehydrocarbons or carbon dioxide areproduced or where producedhydrocarbons or carbon dioxide are firstseparated, dehydrated, or otherwiseprocessed, whichever facility is fartherdownstream;

(6) Transportation of a hazardousliquid or carbon dioxide throughonshore production (including flowlines), refining, or manufacturingfacilities, or storage or in plant pipingsystems associated with such facilities;

(7) Transportation of a hazardousliquid or carbon dioxide by vessel,aircraft, tank truck, tank car, or othervehicle or terminal facilities usedexclusively to transfer hazardous liquidsor carbon dioxide between such modesof transportation.

(8) Transportation of carbon dioxidedownstream from a point in the vicinityof the well site at which carbon dioxideis delivered to a production facility.

4. In § 195.2, a definition of "carbondioxide" is added in alphabetical orderand definitions of the following terms"interstate pipeline", "pipe or line pipe","pipeline or pipeline system", "pipelinefacility", "production facility" arerevised to read as follows:

§ 195.2 Definition.• *. • • •

Carbon dioxide means a fluidconsisting of more than 90 percentcarbon dioxide molecules compressed toa supercritic al state.

Interstate pipeline means a pipeline orthat part of a pipeline that is used in thetransportation of hazardous liquids orcarbon dioxide in interstate or foreigncommerce.

Pipe or line pipe means a tube,usually cylindrical, through which ahazardous liquid or carbon dioxideflows from one point to another.

Pipeline or pipeline system means allparts of a pipeline facility through whicha hazardous liquid or carbon dioxidemoves in transportation, including, butnot limited to, line pipe, valves, andother appurtenances connected to linepipe, pumping units, fabricatedassemblies associated with pumpingunits, metering and delivery stationsand fabricated assemblies therein, andbreakout tanks.

Pipeline facility means new andexisting pipe, rights-of-way and anyequipment, facility, or building used inthe transportation of hazardous liquidsor carbon dioxide.

Production facility means piping orequipment used in the production,extraction, recovery, lifting,stabilization, separation or treating ofpetroleum or carbon dioxide, orassociated storage or measurement. (Tobe a production facility under thisdefinition, piping or equipment must beused in the process of extractingpetroleum or carbon dioxide from theground or from facilities where CO 2 isproduced, and preparing it fortransportation by pipeline. This includespiping between treatment plants whichextract carbon dioxide, and facilitiesutilized for the injection of carbondioxide for recovery operations.)* * * *

5. Section 195.4 is revised to read asfollows:

§ 195.4 Compatibility necessary fortransportation of hazardous liquids orcarbon dioxide.

No person may transport anyhazardous liquid or carbon dioxideunless the hazardous liquid or carbondioxide is .chemically compatible withboth the pipeline, including allcomponents, and any other commoditythat it may come into contact with whilein the pipeline.

6. Section 195.8 is revised to read asfollows:

§ 195.8 Transportation of hazardous liquidor carbon dioxide In pipelines constructedwith other than steel pipe.

No person may transport anyhazardous liquid or carbon dioxidethrough a pipe that is constructed afterOctober 1, 1970, for hazardous liquids orafter July 12, 1991 for carbon dioxide ofmaterial other than steel unless theperson has notified the Secretary inwriting at least 90 days before thetransportation is to begin. The noticemust state whether carbon dioxide or ahazardous liquid is to be transportedand the chemical name, common name,properties and characteristics of thehazardous liquid to be transported andthe material used in construction of thepipeline. If the Secretary determines thatthe transportation of the hazardousliquid or carbon dioxide in the mannerproposed would be unduly hazardous,he will within 90 days after receipt ofthe notice, order the person that gavethe notice, in writing, not to transportthe hazardous liquid or carbon dioxidein the proposed manner until furthernotice.

7. The introductory text andparagraph (b) of § 195.50 is revised toread as follows:

§ 195.50 Reporting accidents.

An accident report is required foreach failure in a pipeline system subjectto this part in which there is a release ofthe hazardous liquid or carbon dioxidetransported resulting in any of thefollowing:* * * . •

(b) Loss of 50 or more barrels ofhazardous liquid or carbon dioxide.* * • • •

8. The introductory text of § 195.52(a)is revised to read as follows:§ 195.52 Telephonic notice of certain

accidents.(a) At the earliest practicable moment

following discovery of a release of thehazardous liquid or carbon dioxidetransported resulting in an eventdescribed in paragraph 195.50, theoperator of the system shall give notice,in accordance with paragraph (b) of thissection, of any failure that:

9. Section 195.102 is revised to read asfollows:

§ 195.102 Design temperature.(a) Material for components of the

system must be chosen for thetemperature environment in which thecomponents will be used so that thepipeline will maintain its structuralintegrity.

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26926- Federal Register, / VoL 56,. No. 113 / Wednesday, June 1.2, 1991 / Rules and Regulations

(b) Components of carbon dioxidepipelines that are subject to-lowtemperatures during normal, operationbecause of rapid- pressure reduction orduring the initial fill of the line must bemade of materials that are suitable forthose low temperatures.

10. A new § 195.111 is added to readas follows:

§ 195.111 Fracture propagation.A carbon dioxide pipeline system

must be designed to-mitigate the effectsof fracture propagation.

11. Section 195.116(c) is revised toread as follows:

§ 195.116 Valves.* * * * *

(c) Each part of thevalve that will bein contact with the carbon dioxide orhazardous liquid stream must be madeof materials- that are compatible withcarbon dioxide or each hazardous liquidthat it is anticipated will flow throughthe pipeline system.

12. In § 195.306, paragraph (a) isrevised and paragraph (c) is. added to,read as follows:

§ 195.306 Test medium.(a) Except as provided in paragraphs

(b) and (c) of this section, water must beused as the test medium.

(c) Carbon dioxide pipelines may useinert gas or carbon dioxide as the testmedium if-

(1) The entire pipeline section undertest is outside of cities and otherpopulated areas;

(2) Each building within 300 feet of thetest section is unoccupied while the testpressure is: equal to or greater than apressure that produces a hoop stress of50 percent of specified minimum yieldstrength;

(3) The maximum hoop stress duringthe- test does not exceed 80 percent ofspecified minimum yield strength;

(4) Continuous communication ismaintained along entire test section; and

(5) The pipe involved is new pipehaving a longitudinal- joint factor of 1.00.

13. Section 195.401(c) is revised toread as follows:

§ 195.401 General requirements..* * * * *

(c) Except as provided by § 195.5, nooperator may operate any part of any ofthe following pipelines unless it wasdesigned and constructed as required bythis part:

(1) An interstate pipefine,, on which:construction was begun after-March 31,1970, that transports hazardous liquid.

(2) An interstate offshore gatheringline, on which construction was begunafter July 31, 1977,. that transportshazardous liquid.

(3) An- intrastate pipeline, on whichconstruction was begun after October20, 1985, that transports hazardousliquid.

(4) A pipeline; on which construction.was begun after July 1-1, 1991 thattransports carbon dioxide.

14. In § 195.402, paragraphs (c) (7), (9),and (12) and. (e) (2)i (4), (5), and (7) arerevised to read as follows:

§ 195.402 Procedural manual foroperations, maintenance, and emergencies.* *, * * *

(c) * * •(7) Starting up and shutting down any

part of the pipeline system in a mannerdesigned to assure operation within-the-limits prescribed by paragraph 195.406,consider the hazardous liquid or carbondioxide in transportation, variations.inaltitude along. the pipeline; and pressuremonitoring and control devices.

(9) In the case of facilities notequipped to fail safe that are identifiedunder paragraph 195.402(c)(4) or thatcontrol receipt and delivery of thehazardous liquid or carbon dioxide,detecting abnormal operating conditionsby monitoring pressure, temperature,flow or other appropriate operational.data and transmitting; this data to anattended location.* a * * *

(12) Establishing and maintainingliaison with fire, police, and otherappropriate public officials to learn theresponsibility and resources of eachgovernment organization that mayrespond' to a hazardous liquid or carbondioxide pipeline emergency andacquaint jhe officials with the operator'sability in respondinq to a hazardousliquid' or carbon dioxide pipelineemergency and.means ofcommunication.

(e)a . a

(2) Prompt and effective response to anotice of each type emergency, includingfire or explosion occurring near ordirectly involving a pipeline-facility,accidental release of hazardous liquid, orcarbon dioxide from a pipeline facility,operational, failure causing a hazardouscondition, and-natural disaster affectingpipeline facilities.* * a * a

(4) Taking necessary action. such- asemergency shutdown or pressurereduction to. minimize the, volume ofhazardous liquid or carbon dioxide that

is released from, any section of apipeline system in the event of a failure.

(5) Control of released hazardousliquid or carbon dioxide at an accidentscene to minimize the hazards, includingpossible intentional ignition in the. casesof flammable highly volatile liquid.

(7) Notifying fire, police, and otherappropriate public officials of hazardousliquid or carbon dioxide pipelineemergencies and coordinating with thempreplanned and actual responses duringan emergency, including additionalprecautions. necessary for an emergencyinvolving a pipeline system transportinga highly volatile liquid.

15. In § 195.403, paragraphs (a) (2), (3),and. (47) are revised to read' as follows:

§ 195.403 Training.(a) * * *

• (2) Know the characteristics andhazards. of the hazardous. liquids orcarbon. dioxide transported, including, inthe case of flammable HVL,flammability of mixtures with air,odorless vapors,. and water reactions;

(3) Recognize conditions that arelikely to cause emergencies,. predict theconsequences of facility malfunctions orfailures and hazardous liquid or carbondioxide spills, and- to take appropriatecorrective, action;

(4) Take steps necessary to controlany accidental release of hazardousliquid or carbon dioxide and to minimizethe potential for fire, explosion, toxicity,or environmental damage;.

16. Section 195.410(a)(2) is revised toread as follows:

§ 195.410 Une markers.(a) * * *(2) The marker must state at least the

following; "Warning," f611owed.by thewords "Petroleum (or the name of thehazardous. liquid transported) Pipeline"or "Carbon Dioxide. Pipeline" (inlettering at least I inch high with anapproximate stroke. of one-quarter inchon a. background, of'sharply contrasting.color), the name of the operator and atelephone number (including area code)where the operator can be reached at alltimes.

17. Section 195.414 is revised to readas follows:

§ 195.4,14 Cathodic protection.(a) No, operator may operate a

hazardous liquid interstate pipeline afterMarch 31, 1973i a hazardous liquidintrastate pipeline after October 19,1988, or a carbon dioxide- pipeline after

Federal Register / Vol. 56, No. 113 / Wednesday, June 12, 1991 / Rules and Regulations

July 12, 1993 that has an effectiveexternal surface coating material, :mlessthat pipeline is cathodically protected.This paragraph does not apply tobreakout tank areas and buried pumpingstation piping. For the purposes of thissubpart, a pipeline does not have aneffective external coating, and shall beconsidered bare, if its cathodicprotection current requirements aresubstantially the same as if it were bare.

(b) Each operator shall electricallyinspect each bare hazardous liquidinterstate pipeline before April 1, 1975,each bare hazardous liquid intrastatepipeline before October 20, 1990, andeach bare carbon dioxide pipelinebefore July 12,1994 to determine anyareas in which active corrosion is takingplace. The operator may not increase itsestablished operating pressure on asection of bare pipeline until the sectionhas been so electrically inspected. Inany areas where active corrosion isfound, the operator shall providecathodic protection. Section 195.416 (f)and (g) apply to all corroded pipe that isfound.

(c) Each operator shall electricallyinspect all breakout tank areas andburied pumping station piping onhazardous liquid interstate pipelinesbefore April 1, 1973, on hazardous liquidintrastate pipelines before October 20,1988, and on carbon dioxide pipelinesbefore July 12, 1994 as to the need forcathodic protection, and cathodicprotection shall be provided wherenecessary.

18. Section 195.418(a) is revised toread as follows:

§ 195.418 Internal corrosion control.(a) No operator may transport any

hazardous liquid or carbon dioxide thatwould corrode the pipe or othercomponents of its pipeline system,unless it has investigated the corrosiveeffect of the hazardous liquid or carbondioxide on the system and has takenadequate steps to mitigate corrosion.* * * * *r

19. Section 195.440 is revised to readas follows:

§ 195.440 Public education.Each operator shall establish a

continuing educational program toenable the public, appropriategovernment organizations and personsengaged in excavation-related activitiesto recognize a hazardous liquid or acarbpn dioxide pipeline emergency andto report it to the operator or the fire,police, or other appropriate publicofficials. The program must beconducted in English and in otherlanguages commonly understood by asignificant number and concentration of

non-English speaking population in theoperator's operating areas.

Issued in Washington, DC on June 7,1991.Douglas B. Ham,Deputy Administrator, Research and SpecialPrograms Administration.[FR Doc. 91-13930 Filed 0-11-91; 8:45 am]BILLING CODE 4910.40-6

National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration

49 CFR Part 571

[Docket No. 87-04, Notice 71

RIN 2127-AC 73

Federal Motor Vehicle SafetyStandards; Air Brake Systems

AGENCY: National Highway TrafficSafety Administration (NHTSA), DOT.ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY. This rule amends StandardNo. 121, Air Brake Systems, to revise thetiming requirements for parking brakesystems, add new requirementsconcerning release performance andaccumulation of actuation energy forparking brakes, and incorporate anearlier agency interpretation of thestandard into the standard. Thesechanges are intended to ensure thepracticability and objectivity of theparking brake timing test, and clarifythat a diaphragm is not considered acomponent of a brake chamber housing,as that term is used in Standard No. 121.The rule will make the testing procedureeasier to perform and more objective,eliminate confusion about theapplication of the standard to singlediaphragm brake systems, and improvethe consistency of the regulatorylanguage.DATES: This amendment is effectiveDecember 9, 1991.ADDRESSES:. Petitions forreconsideration should be submitted to:Administrator, National HighwayTraffic Safety Administration 400Seventh St. SW., Washington, DC 20590.It is requested, but not required, that tencopies be submitted.FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT.Mr. Scott Shadle, Office of VehicleSafety Standards, National HighwayTraffic Safety Administration, 400Seventh Street, SW. Washington, DC(202-366-5273).SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

A. March 1988 Fin a Rule

In a final rule published in the FederalRegister (53 FR 7931) on March 11, 1988,

NHTSA amended Standard No. 121, AirBrake Systems, to clarify the standard'sparking brake requirements, particularlyas they relate to air-applied,mechanically held parking brakesystems. The amendments requiredactuation of a mechanical means forparking brake application at therequisite level of retardation withinthree seconds after operation of theparking brake control. (For trailers, suchactuation was required within threeseconds after venting to the atmosphereof the front supply line connection isinitiated.) In addition, vehicles wererequired to be capable of meetingrequirements related to parking brakeretardation force within the threesecond period. The amendments alsorequired that the grade holding test (oralternative drawbar test) be met withonly the mechanical means for parkingbrake application in operation.

The primary rationale for the parkingbrake timing requirements is NI-ITSA'sbelief that a vehicle's parking brakesystem should generate retardationforce in as short a time as is practicable,since the parking brake system issometimes used as an emergencybraking system. The approach of theMarch 1988 final rule was to require thatvehicles be capable of meeting parkingbrake retardation force requirements,specified in terms of a grade holding ordraw bar test, within a specified time.For trucks and buses, the amendmentsrequired minimum parking retardationforce requirements to be met at all timesafter three seconds from the time ofactuation of the parking brake control.For trailers, the amendments requiredminimum parking retardation forcerequirements to be met at all times afterthree seconds from the time that ventingto the atmosphere of the front supplyline connection is initiated.

In responding to commenter concernsthat it is not possible to safely conductthe grade holding or draw bar testswithin three seconds, NHTSA stated inthe March 1988 final rule that it did notbelieve that manufacturers must, as apractical matter, determine theircompliance with the timing requirementduring their grade holding or draw bartesting. The agency stated that, instead,certification could be accomplished byusing an engineering analysis of thevehicle's parking brake system or, ifnecessary, a test measuring the airpressure in the parking brake system todetermine when the pressure reacheszero. The assumption underlying thisstatement is that if a vehicle couldcomply with the grade holding or drawbar test with zero air pressure in thebrake chambers, and if the air pressure

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