Fawcett 1

7/28/2019 Fawcett 1

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/fawcett-1 1/14

1

Regionalism in World Politics: Past and Present

Louise Fawcett

This chapter offers a introductory survey of regionalism in world politics from theSecond World War to the present. 1 It has two related aims: to track and explain thedevelopment and growth of formal regional institutions. Its terms of reference arebroad ranging and comparative with particular attention paid to the evolving rela-tionship between regionalism and multilateralism.

I. Introduction

It is plain to even the most casual observer that there has been a significant growthin both the overall numbers of regional institutions and in the range of their activitiesover the last half century.2 There has been a corresponding interest in the study of regionalism. All this seems to indicate that regionalism has become a more impor-tant, indeed a well established feature of world politics.3 However, as this chapterargues, such a claim needs to be subject to critical scrutiny. The mere growth innumbers of regional institutions may not necessarily imply that they have become

more important. It may mirror the growth in numbers of states in the internationalsystem. And it is certainly true that institutional growth correlates closely with peri-ods of state formation and breakdown, like the end of the Second World War or theend of the Cold War. Further, the expansion of activities of regional institutions,may not necessarily reflect an overall expansion, or increase in effectiveness, but ashift in activity from one area to another, for example a move from economic to se-curity regionalism.

1 This chapter draws on recent work by the author including ‘Exploring Regional Domains: AComparative History of Regionalism’, International Affairs 80/3 (2004), and ‘Regional Insti-tutions’ in Paul Williams (ed) Security Studies: An Introduction (London: Routledge, 2008).I would like to acknowledge the work of Helene Gandois and Miriam Prys in informing mycomments on African regional institutions.

2 For a list and brief description of current regional arrangements and membership of regional orga-nizations by country, see the UNU-CRIS Regional Integration Knowledge System athttp://www.cris.unu.edu/.

3 Mary Farrell, Bjorn Hettne and Luk Van Lagenhove, Global Politics of Regionalism. Theory andPractice (London: Pluto Press, 2005).

7/28/2019 Fawcett 1


2

A related consideration is that the importance of regionalism may wax and wane

according not only to the membership but also to the overall design of the interna-tional system. The current regional moment is designed around the features of uni-polarity and globalization with the opportunities they provide and constraints theyimpose. Rather than displaying linear or sustained growth it is possible therefore thatthe current size and shape of regional activity is only a temporary phenomena, andone that might be succeeded by more ‘global’ or indeed ‘local’ forms of interna-tional order. As Ian Clark has suggested in relation to the processes of ‘globalizationand fragmentation’, such integrative and disintegrative tendencies have always com-peted and coexisted historically and are likely to continue to do so in the future. 4

While critically examining the growth of regional institutions, this chapter alsolooks at the parallel development of theories and approaches to the study of region-alism.5 These have expanded in two main ways. First, in line with mainstream theo-retical approaches in political science in general and International Relations in par-

ticular which have employed different methods for explaining institutional devel-opment and cooperation between states. Second, in what we might call the ‘cottageindustry’ of regionalism which has seen the rise of theories specific to explainingregional integration, often in Europe, but also in different regional settings. All theseclusters of theories provide useful explanatory power, and in many respects arecomplementary. In considering the growth of regionalism over the period since 1945however one cannot escape how the mainstream theoretical arguments - whether ra-tionalist or institutionalist - and those that take the nature of the international systemas a starting point, offer the most important insights into the start-up, growth andfunctions of regional institutions. More ‘region specific’ theories, whether those de-signed to explain European integration (neo-functionalism, or inter-governmentalism), or those that take regional ideas and identities as a point of de-parture (constructivism), provide useful nuance and detail, particularly in explainingregional choices and differences.

The chapter is organized as follows. After a brief discussion of the terms em-ployed, it moves to consider the historical trajectory of regionalism, looking at threemain waves in the development and growth of regional institutions: or three broadtwenty or so year bands representing the years following the Second World Warthrough the early Cold War period: the mid to late Cold War, and finally the yearsfollowing the end of the Cold War.6 To some extent, such division, like all divi-sions, is artificial, yet it is argued that there is a logic to treating these three time pe-

4 Ian Clark, Globalization and Fragmentation. International Relations in the Twentieth Century (Oxford, 1997).

5 Andrew Hurrell, ‘Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective’, in Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hur-rell,Regionalismin World Politics, 38-73; Frederik Soderbaum and Timothy M. Shaw, Theo-ries of New Regionalism(London: Palgrave, 2003).

6 Scholars differ both on the timing and number of these waves depending upon their focus. Stud-ies of economic integration have identified only two major waves in the growth of regionaltrading arrangements. See Jaime de Melo and Arvind Panagariya (eds.) New Dimensions inRegional Integration, Cambridge, 1993) 3.

7/28/2019 Fawcett 1


3

riods differently in terms of understanding and explaining the progress of regional-

ism: not least that each period saw a shift in the balance of forces in the internationalsystem. The chapter then looks at some of the major explanations that have been of-fered for such institutional growth, paying particular attention to the evolving rela-tionship between regionalism and multilateralism. Finally, the chapter offers a pic-ture of the contemporary scene with some accompanying thoughts on regionalism’sfuture prospects.

1. Terms

There have been many attempts by different scholars to define regions and re-gionalism. The terrain has always been fluid and has arguably become more com-

plex since the scope of both these terms is continually contested and subject to dif-ferent interpretations. While regions have been typically defined as geographicallyproximate and interdependent states and regionalism as attempts at formal coopera-tion between such states,7 it is evident that for many, these definitions are today toonarrow. For example some would argue, following Bruce Russett and others, thatgeographical criteria are too limiting in an increasingly interdependent and global-ized world.8 Hence both the Islamic Cooperation Organization (ICO) or the Com-monwealth have ‘regional’ qualities. Others would point out that regional institu-tions, as a subset of international institutions, cannot be measured purely in terms of formal organization: much regional level activity may be properly attributed to in-ternational regimes, or ‘complexes or rules and organizations.9 Further as much of the literature on the ‘new regionalism’ demonstrates, it could be objected that actors

other than states evidently have important roles to play in regional institutions.

10

Inchoosing here to focus principally on formal organizations, based loosely aroundgeographical regions, this chapter in no way implies that there are not other profit-able ways to consider either regions or regionalism. The selection is justified on twopractical grounds: the limited space available and the greater efficiency in measure-ment. Because of their treaty based nature, regular meetings and reporting mecha-nisms, formal international institutions are easier to track and measure than informalnon-permanent regimes.11 Finally, if regions and their accompanying institutionshave to an extent moved beyond the state representing for some even the ‘end of the

7 Joseph Nye (ed.) International Regionalism, (Boston: Little Brown and Co. 1968), xii.8 Bruce M. Russett, International Regions and the International System: A Study in Political Eco-

logy(Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1967).9 Robert Keohane, ‘International Institutions: Two Approaches’, International Studies Quarterly

32/4: 379-396.10 Bjorn Hettne, Andres Inotai and Oswaldo Sunkel (eds), Studies in the New Regionalism. Vols I-

IV, (London: Macmillan, 1999-2001).11 An important source is the annual Yearbook of International Organizations (Munich: Union of

International Associations).

7/28/2019 Fawcett 1


4

nation-state12, the argument that the state today remains the gatekeeper of most re-

gional institutions and activity is a powerful one.

II. Origins and Development of Regionalism

The growth and study of formal regional organizations dates principally from theSecond World War and is part of a general pattern of growth in international institu-tions. This is important since a study of regionalism necessitates a parallel study of multilateralism or at least an understanding of the interdependent relationship be-tween the two.

From a longer perspective, however, regionalism has always been with us. Re-gions as empires, spheres of influence, or unions of states have been apparent in dif-ferent international systems. In the nineteenth century in particular one can point to

the widespread existence of different unions, leagues and associations, showing howthe idea of regional integration is no new phenomena.13 While such unions flour-ished among European states, in the Americas the Inter-American System, with itsroots in the late nineteenth century, provides evidence of a set of semi-formal non-European institutions. Embedded in this American system was the idea of a regionalsecurity regime as expressed in the Monroe Doctrine, which singled out the Ameri-cas as part of a US sphere of influence. And in Europe, alongside the economic uni-ons and political projects, security regimes were also evident as demonstrated bythe existence of a ‘concert’ or balance of powers which informed understanding of regional order.

Indeed it was the breakdown of this loose regime - the European concert – in theevents culminating in the First World War, that encouraged world leaders, led by US

President Woodrow Wilson, to make the first sustained attempt at constructing aformal international security institution: the League of Nations, with importantimplications for subsequent institutional development both global or regional.

The League experiment, though intended to be universal, betrayed a number of regional features, not least that its dominant members were all European. A referen-ce in the Covenant, in Article 21, to ‘regional understandings’, was included to re-flect the interests of the United States in the Americas, though the latter never beca-me a member.14 More broadly, the League period set the tone for a much wider de-bate about how to deal with what Inis Claude would later call the ‘problem of re-gionalism’ or how to integrate regional arrangements into the framework of a gen-eral security organization.15 This debate was overtaken - though not forgotten - by

12 Kenichi Ohmae,The End of the Nation State, The Rise of Regional Economies, (London: HarperCollins 1996).

13 Walter Mattli, The Logic of Integration. Europe and Beyond (Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress, 1999), 1-2.

14 Alfred Zimmern, The League of Nations and the Rule of Law(London: Macmillan, 1945) 522.15 Inis Claude, Swords into Plowshares (London, University of London Press, 1964).

7/28/2019 Fawcett 1


5

the events of the 1930s when Europe, and much of the rest of the world, became

embroiled in a new war. At this time it appeared that the League had failed as a glo-bal security institution, and regionalism, whether as an economic or political processhad also been associated with failure or with expansionist and hegemonic projectslike Japan’s pan-Asian project, or Nazi Germany’s pan-European one.

1. Regional Institutions: The First Wave 1945-1965

Despite such negative impressions, the spirit of regionalism was quickly revived andstrengthened against the backdrop of the ending of the Second World War and thecreation of a new set of international institutions, notably the United Nations and theBretton Woods/GATT system. The League’s example, both positive and negative,closely informed these developments. Such institutions were constructed precisely to

prevent the social, political and economic upheavals that had taken the world to warafter 1939 and hence to make states more secure. Though few states questioned theneed for more ambitious multilateral institutions, many also sought to protect theirown interests through regional or cross regional groupings, and it is in this periodthat the first sustained wave of regional institution building took place.

Three main types of regional institution can be identified in this period. First,what are often called ‘multipurpose’ institutions like the League of Arab States(LAS), the Organization of American States (OAS), successor to the Inter-Americansystem and the Organization of African Unity (OAU); second, security alliances likeNATO and the Warsaw Pact, and third, institutions with a principally economic fo-cus, notably the early European institutions and later attempts to replicate themelsewhere.

Already by 1945, multipurpose institutions of the first type, representing theAmericas, Commonwealth, and Arab states had come into being. And the final de-sign of the UN Charter, like the League Covenant before it, was directly influencedby states with actual or potential investments in such institutions. Hence the earlyreservations of UN founding fathers about how to deal with regionalism and thepossible dilution of universal aspirations and competence were overcome.16 TheUN Charter, in its final form, endorsed the principle of regional partnership and ac-tion within the framework of the global security organization.17

Institutions of the second type, regional security alliances, notably NATO, theWarsaw Pact, the Rio Pact, SEATO, CENTO and ANZUS, were established in the1950s. Rather than the UN-friendly institutions envisaged by the Charter, these alli-

16 Christoph Schreuer, ‘Regionalism v. Universalism’, European J ournal of International Law 6(1995), 1-23.

17 The provisions relating to regional agencies are mainly to be found in Chapter VIII, Articles 51-54. See further Danesh Sarooshi, The United Nations and the Development of Collective Se-curity: The Delegation by the UN Security Council of its Chapter VII Powers (Oxford: Ox-ford University Press, 1999).

7/28/2019 Fawcett 1


6

ances owed their rationale more to the evolving Cold War system and corresponding

attempts by the superpowers to consolidate their respective spheres of influence, andas such constituted a blow to multilateralism Though the five Regional Economic Commissions were an early and integral part

of the UN, the Charter had little to say about economic regionalism outside the UNsystem, or institutions of the third type, those principal aim was initially to promoteregional economic integration. Multilateral regulation of such institutions was pro-vided through the GATT, which like the UN, envisaged coexistence with charterfriendly or non-discriminatory regional arrangements.18 Such institutions, with theEurope leading the way with the creation of the European Community (EC) in 1958,proliferated in the 1960s such that the world was ‘filled with proposals for NAFTA,PAFTA, LAFTA… and ever more’.19

What is striking about this first wave of regionalism, whether in the area of eco-nomics or security, was the fact that it was characterised less by any new norma-

tively informed understanding of regional-multilateral relationships, more by strictlymaterial calculations of power, security and interest. Above all it was the post-warbalance of power, which quickly became that of the Cold War, that represented theoverriding factor in determining regionalism’s early trajectory. If this was self evi-dently true of the new security institutions, it was also true both of the multipurposeand early economic institutions, all of which were mechanisms not only for promot-ing the welfare and security of members but also for enhancing the power and influ-ence of states onto the new global stage. Multilateral institutions had both empow-ered and facilitated regionalism in certain ways providing them with a façade of le-gitimacy, yet their rationale ultimately lay in the post-Cold War order and interna-tional balance of power.

Also striking were the limited and uneven results of this first wave. Of the earlyeconomic arrangements those outside Europe had mostly failed by the late 1960s,though a number were later revived in different forms during regionalism’s thirdwave. The multipurpose organizations were similarly regarded as failures - perhapssomewhat unfairly given the considerable constraints they faced.20 Developingcountries, for example, were able to use such institutions as platforms for promotingcommon positions on matters of importance to their members, such as decoloniza-tion and apartheid (in the OAU) or support for Palestine (in the LAS). The same wastrue of a ‘pan’ Third World institution like the Non-Aligned Movement which (likethe later Group of 77) represented a vehicle for projecting broad developing countryinterests onto the international stage. Given the global context in which such region-alisms developed however, it is unsurprising that many early institutions lacked ca-

18 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Article XXIV.19 Jagdish Baghwati, The World Trading Systemat Risk (Princeton, Princeton University Press),

1991, 71.20 Ernst Haas, ‘Collective Conflict Management. Evidence for a New World Order?’ in Thomas G

Weiss (ed), Collective Security in a Changing World (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner, 1993)63-117.

7/28/2019 Fawcett 1


7

pacity and resources. Indeed, only the two major superpower sponsored alliances,

NATO and the Warsaw Pact, enjoyed almost unqualified success in securing theirrespective regions from external threats and sustaining the ‘long peace’ that pre-vailed during the Cold War.21

2. Regionalism: The Second Wave, 1965-85

Against this backdrop and with the Cold War entering its third decade, a furtherand somewhat distinctive round of regional activity took place. This was, in part, areaction to the superpower dominance of the regional security arena, the disappoin-ting early results of both the multipurpose institutions and non-European economicinstitutions and the changing regional security environment itself. The second waveof institution building which occurred mainly among developing countries, had an

underlying security focus, and hence was clearly distinguishable from the earlierwave of economic regionalism that had been inspired by the creation and successfulearly years of the EC. It was similar in that it was mostly sub-regional in scope(with sub-regional here meaning sub-continental, or at least encompassing a smallergeographical space and fewer states than the earlier pan-regional groups) though italso included both a pan-European security institution, the CSCE, and a pan-Islamicone, the ICO. The more familiar examples of this second regional wave are the As-sociation of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Economic Community of WestAfrican States (ECOWAS), the South African Development Community (SADC),the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the South Asian Association for RegionalCooperation (SAARC), the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) and Gulf CooperationCouncil (GCC).22

Overall, this second wave was characterized by small steps to improve regionalself-sufficiency and cooperation in a changed regional and global environmentwhich afforded a little more flexibility to regional actors. Bipolarity had somewhatloosened in the détente era of the late-1960s to mid-1970s, while many developingcountries had consolidated their statehood and autonomy. Not all these new institu-tions immediately assumed security roles; a number had ostensibly more economicfunctions and purposes: the GCC is an interesting case of an institution designed tomeet a new security threat - following the Iranian revolution - whose charter is cou-ched in mainly economic and cultural terms.23 Still there was a clear security dimen-sion to this second wave of institution building, demonstrated by the fact many of these new security groupings were constructed with a particular local threat in mind:for ASEAN it was Vietnam, for the GCC, Iran; for SADCC apartheid South Africa.

21 John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (Oxford,: Ox-ford University Press, 1987).

22 See further William Tow, Subregional Security Cooperation in the Third World, (Boulder, CO:Lynne Reinner, 1990).

23See Article 4,www.gcc-sg.org/CHARTER.

http://www.gcc-sg.org/CHARTER

http://www.gcc-sg.org/CHARTER

7/28/2019 Fawcett 1


8

The Arab Cooperation Council (ACC) was similarly conceived as a vehicle for the

containment of Iraq, though its life span was limited following the latter’s invasionof a fellow member, Kuwait, in 1990. These new initiatives, however, were still conditioned by the ever present con-

straints of the Cold War. This was of course also true for the CSCE, a quite differentpan-European security enterprise, which by encouraging East-West convergence inseveral areas played a facilitating role in the end of the Cold War.

The results of this second wave, like the first, were mixed, but a couple of pointsshould be noted. As in the first wave, institutional survival rates were high: indeedthe tally of institutional deaths in the first two waves is surprisingly small. It inclu-des the non-European US-sponsored alliances, CENTO and SEATO, the short livedACC and a number of non-European economic institutions, though many of thesewere later revived in some related form. Their survival demonstrates not only howthey were valued by their members, but also resilience and flexibility. Many went

on to further develop and expand their economic and security roles as their raisond’être was shifted, and indeed enhanced by the new global balance of power at endof the Cold War.

3. Regionalism: The Third Wave 1985-Present

Just as the international system had closely defined the parameters and possibilitiesof regionalism during the Cold War, it was system change and its consequencesthat also helps explain the post-Cold War changes and developments. Though argu-ably more complex and diverse than previous regional waves, the new regionalismwas no less a response to the shifting political, economic and security imperatives of

the post-Cold War environment in which states now found themselves. On the onehand, the example of Europe, the effects of globalization and uncertainty about thecapacity of multilateral institutions all provided incentives to other countries to fos-ter projects of economic integration, notably the creation of free trade areas (FTAs).On the other, the removal of Cold War overlay also changed the parameters of thesecurity domain making regional security more vulnerable and accessible to localactors.24 Like the earlier waves of regionalism, the post-Cold War phenomena,widely dubbed the ‘new regionalism’ - despite its continuities with the old - hasbeen the subject of sustained debate and a growing literature.25

24 See Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

25 For two useful surveys dealing with different aspects of economic and security cooperationrespectively, see Edward Mansfield and Helen V Milner (eds), The Political Economy of Re-gionalism(New York, Colombia University Press, 1997) and David Lake and Patrick Morgan(eds) Regional Orders. Building Security in a New World (Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania StateUniversity Press, 1997).

7/28/2019 Fawcett 1


9

At first, there was a distinctly universalistic flavour to the post-Cold War order

which did not immediately suggest an important role for regional institutions. Just asthe two world wars had seen the birth of new paradigms of global order, reflected inthe founding documents of League of Nations and the UN, the end of the Cold Warera was similarly informed by a renaissance of ideas about the possibilities of uni-versal institutions and projects and the fostering of global peace. Such notions werepicked up in the rhetoric of the ‘New World Order’ articulated by US PresidentGeorge Bush Sr., after the 1991 Gulf War, and in popular works by Francis Fukuy-ama and others on the end of history, ideology, geography and so on. These big i-deas were also captured in different understandings of the term globalization. As inthe past, regionalism was viewed positively by some as a mere stepping stone to-wards a more integrated world, and suspiciously by others as potentially obstructiveand damaging to broader global processes.26

Both views contained truths but also tended both to oversimplify and underesti-

mate the diversity of regionalism. Above all the global processes of regionalism didnot form a united project except in that they all represented responses to changes atthe level of the international system. Three factors however highlighted their impor-tance. First, was the experience of Western Europe. Though the evidence from Eu-rope on the eve of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty was decidedly mixed, the Europeanprocess could not easily be disregarded. Even if the example of the European Unionwas not readily or immediately exportable, it still represented an important model of how cooperation might be conducted at the regional level and opened up new per-spectives on globalization. And for the second time in less than thirty years, non-European institutions started to grow quickly after the Cold War ended, a numberbuilding on earlier ‘first wave’ experiments in economic integration. And, no lesssignificantly, the EU, like a number of other institutions, was also poised to movefrom a predominantly economic focus to one which further emphasized political andsecurity cooperation.

Second, and from a more practical perspective, it quickly became clear that thepost-Cold War multilateral structures, given the huge demands placed upon them,were both inadequate for the task and were highly susceptible to the interests of coremembers. Both economic and security structures would need buttressing. This wasrevealed at the level of the international economy when serious financial crises inAsia and the Americas exposed the shortfalls of international financial institutionsand demanded regional responses. It was also revealed at the level or internationalsecurity, most notably in the area of conflict resolution and peace operations gener-ally. In calling for the revival of Chapter VIII provision – and hence a more effectivepartnership between the UN and regional institutions - UN Secretary-Generals likewere not advocating regionalism per se, but burden sharing.27 The UN, despite the

palpable euphoria that accompanied its early post-Cold War years, lacked the re-

26 See further Andrew Gamble and Anthony Payne, Regionalismand World Order (London: Mac-millan, 1996).

27 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Agenda for Peace(New York, United Nations, 1992).

7/28/2019 Fawcett 1


10

sources and the commitment of major states to act as a global security provider, lea-

ving vacuums that regional powers and institutions sought to fill.28

Hence the new wave of security regionalism must be understood in terms of UNcapacity, the relative disinterest of great powers in costly external interventions anddeclining salience of the former alliance systems. Like the new wave of economicregionalism, it represented the further development of a self help system for weakerstates to cope with the changed international environment, demonstrated perhapsmost strikingly in the security reforms of African institutions. It also permittedstronger emerging regional powers the scope to set local agendas within a institu-tional framework that bestowed greater legitimacy on their actions.

Third, and less tangibly, was the way in which regionalism has become caught upin the idea of a ‘clash of civilizations’ as outlined by Samuel Huntington. 29 This attimes clumsy, but nonetheless helpful characterization made the point that ‘civiliza-tions’, often loose regions, could not be easily homogenized and had creative and

fragmentary power. In this sense regionalism, construed as a response to the univer-sal other, merely extended the project that had commenced with the multipurposeinstitutions the early Third World regionalisms and the second wave of more securi-ty-focused regionalism in the latter decades of the Cold War. Regionalism thus pro-vided states the opportunity to place their distinctive mark on their own local institu-tional arrangements. Regionalisms now bore different labels; not only ‘made in Eu-rope’, but made in Africa, Asia and the Americas.

The third wave of regionalism was characterized by diversity of forms and orga-nizations, a selection of which are presented in Table 1 below. Like the third waveof democratization, there were few regions which did not participate in this new wa-ve. New institutions were formed in the Asia-Pacific region, like the Asia PacificEconomic Cooperation forum (APEC), in the Americas, the Southern Cone Com-mon Market (MERCOSUR) and in the former Soviet space, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). China, with the creation Shanghai Cooperation Organiza-tion (SCO), also entered into regional security arrangements for the first time. Majorreforms were introduced in a number of existing institutions, notably in Europe, theAmericas and Africa, where additional protocols, treaties and conventions weresigned relating to conflict prevention and management, human rights and democ-racy. Changes in name - leading to a reshuffling of acronyms - were introduced toreflect these reforms. A great deal has been written about the nature and content of this new regionalist moment, its varied and novel dimensions and its relationshipwith global governance. However one regards it the quantitative (and indeed qualita-tive) evidence cannot be ignored. 30 If one considers one criteria alone: the invol-

28 Richard Price Mark Zacher (eds.), The United Nations and Global Security(New York: Palgrave,2004).

29 Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order (London, Si-mon and Shuster, 1997).

30 See further Louise Fawcett, ‘Regionalism and Global Governance: An Appraisal’, in Pierre deSenarclens and Ali Kazancigil, Regulating Globalization: Critical Approaches to GlobalGovernance, (Tokyo: UNU Press, 2007), 150-176.

7/28/2019 Fawcett 1


vement of regional organizations in peacekeeping operations the growth in activity

is striking. From a mere handful of such operations in 1990, there were over 20 by2000, and following a small dip, a further rise after 2006.31

Table 1: Post Cold War Regional Institutions: The Third Wave 1985-present

new institutions Reformed/renamed institutions

CIS, CSTO, SCO, ARF, APEC,

MERCOSUR, NAFTA, CACO

OAS, ECOWAS/ECOMOG,

CSCE/OSCE, UDEAC/CEMAC, EC/EU,

SPF/PIF, OAU/AU,

IGADD/IGAD,SADCC/SADC

III. Assessing the Growth of Regional Institutions

This chapter has so far briefly outlined some of the main developments in regionalinstitutions from 1945 to the present, with a view to understanding and demonstrat-ing their contemporary significance. Despite the considerable scepticism attached toregionalism since the birth of the first post-war projects, it has showed durability,adaptability and survival. It is not just a ‘fad’ as some early integration theoristspredicted. Perhaps most surprising from an international relations/institutionalistperspective has been the growth in security cooperation: international security is,after all, seen as an area in which cooperation will be hard to achieve.32 Economiccooperation in its different forms has furthermore confounded the expectations of

early models propounded by Jacob Viner and others.33

Yet cooperationhasbeen achieved across a wide range of issues, and regional in-stitutions have helped to generate more orderly relationships between states. Twofeatures of this cooperation stand out. First, a major driver of regionalism in econo-mic and security affairs has been shifts in the structure of the international systemrequiring states to adapt to the changing global and regional balances of power. Thisis well illustrated by considering the timing and content of three waves of regiona-lism as described above. All were responses by states to such shifts, with institutionsdesigned to enhance and consolidate the position of both strong/weak and old/newstates. Cooperation has been a means of increasing security and welfare, but also in-fluence and bargaining power.

11

31 Centre for International Cooperation, Annual Review of Global Peace Operations (Boulder, CO:Lynne Reinner, 2007).

32 See B Guy Peters, Institutional Theory in Political Science: The ‘New Institutionalism’ , (London:Continuum, 2005).

33 Jacob Viner, The Customs Union Issue (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Pea-ce, 1950).

7/28/2019 Fawcett 1


12

A related driver has been the role of core states, whether global or regional lea-

ders. Such core states have both set and moulded regional options for their own andother regions. Local hegemons have important roles to play in harnessing regionalinstitutions to promote and enhance their particular vision of regional order. Oneexample is South Africa’s role in the SADC. Global hegemons, like the US today,also impact heavily on regional agendas, by prioritising issues and rewarding andpunishing states and institutions which follow, or fail to follow their lead respective-ly. In the new security climate since 9/11, the demand that states and institutionsrespond to US leadership in matters regarding weapons of mass destruction (WMD)and anti-terrorist measures, provides a cogent example of this.

Second, states attach value to institutions. If explanations of power balancing andthe uses of hegemonic power are useful in explaining the start up and changing func-tions of institutions, they are only part of the story. Institutions are not mere epiphe-nomena. They have survived and developed new functions, adjusting to changing

conditions, including regime change and state type. In providing more predictablebases for cooperation and negotiation in an interdependent world, they have becomeinvaluable tools of diplomacy and statecraft.34

The above developments are arguably less the result of any natural growth infunctions and ideas about cooperation, deep seated regional preferences, or an on-going process of learning and understanding as embodied in the security community idea, but new institutions or charters for new purposes in a changing world order. 35 The shifting roles and functions of institutions do not necessarily reflect successfulspill-over. Few African organizations, for example, had ‘succeeded’ as economicor development institutions before they developed a security profile. Their membershad, however, understood and appreciated the benefits of cooperation and were ableto respond to new demands as they arose. The same is also true of European institu-tions. If security spill-over has occurred, this development has as much to do withthe development of local threats – in the Balkans for example - and the desire of theEU to reposition itself as a great power and counterbalance to the US, as it has to dowith fostering common identity and purpose. The latter are by-products rather thandrivers of the process.

The notion of a particular European, Asian or African style of economic and se-curity management is not without significance. All regional experiments are to so-me extent embedded in the local cultural environment. It is currently fashionabledownplay neo-utilitarian explanations, and following the work of J ohn Ruggie andothers, to reflect how the forms and structure that regionalism takes reflects the col-lected ideas, identities and experiences of states.36 The question that remains to be

34 John S. Duffield, ‘International Security Institutions’, in R. Rhodes et al (eds), The OxfordHandbook of Political Institutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 635-655.

35 Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds), Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-versity Press, 1998).

36 John Gerard Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity. Essays on International Institutionalization,(London: Routledge, 2000).

7/28/2019 Fawcett 1


7/28/2019 Fawcett 1


14

tutions and broader global processes. The way in which the numbers, functions and

memberships of regional organizations have shifted in line with global trends sup-ports this conclusion.Regional institutions evidently condition the behaviour of their members and pro-

vide parameters for action, but the propensity of institutions to switch roles in res-ponse to systemic changes suggests also the close correlation between material inte-rests and collective behaviour. On the other hand, their survival and maintenanceindicate that states do value institutions and are willing to bear their costs even du-ring periods of uncertainty and failure.

Under unipolarity the trend towards further regional consolidation is set to conti-nue. It is both product of and reaction to what Peter Katzenstein has called theAmerican imperium.39 Given the constraints it currently faces, a multilateral institu-tion like the United Nations, as highlighted in its 2005 World Summit Outcome document, is likely to encourage rather than supplant the roles of regional organiza-

tions in the near future.40 The consequences of the overextension of US power canbe seen in Iraq and elsewhere, demonstrating a growing demand for alternativesources of action. Strong states will continue to find useful legitimizing roles for re-gional institutions, and weak states will also benefit from their welfare provision andsecurity umbrella. To some extent then, contemporary regionalism, like regionalismduring the Cold War, is on a path dependent trajectory unlikely to change until somenew critical turning point is reached.

39 Peter Katzenstein, A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium, (Ithaca:Cornell University Press, 2005).

40 UN General Assembly, World Summit Outcome(UN: New York , 2005).

Documents

Fawcett 1