Gail Sasse

African Politics

SSSGAI001

October 11, 2011

Famine and Al-Shabaab: Challenges to peace in Somalia

Summary

In the past few weeks, an African terrorist group has captured the world stage as a result

of actions taken by the group to the humanitarian crisis created from the drought in East

Africa. Al-Shabaab is recognized by several names: Harakat Al-Shabaab al-Mujahidin,

the Youth, Mujahidin Al-Shabaab Movement, Mujahedeen Youth Movement, Mujahidin

Youth Movement. The group has been branded as a terrorist organization by the US,

UK, and several other countries, with the claim that they are linked to Al-Qaeda and thus

are participants that need to be stopped in the ‘War on Terror’. While this accusation is

troubling enough for the regional and international community, the situation in Somalia

has been exacerbated by the drought of 2011, followed by what some debate is a man

made famine. Somali’s are fleeing en mass to refugee camps in Kenya, Djibouti, and

Ethiopia. The majority of the Somali population and the international community blame

this escalation of tragedy caused by the drought on Al-Shabaab, who have recanted their

approval of foreign aid groups and the UN World Food Program (WFP) from providing

assistance to the suffering population. This action by Al-Shabaab, in addition to the

recent kidnappings of tourists in Kenya and aid workers with Doctors Without Borders

from the refugee camp, Dadaab, located 80 km from the Kenya/Somalia border, and the

continued practice of piracy along the coastline are just some of the activities by Al-

Shabaab that have further alarmed Africa and the international community.

In this paper I will examine the difficult path that Somalia has led since the collapse of

the country’s government in 1991, the factors that have allowed Al-Shabaab to come into

existence and claim a competing authority to the western-backed Somali Government, the

different interventions and roles of the US, African Union (AU), and United Nations

(UN) against Al-Shabaab, and finally what options are left for the country to fill the

political vacuum for power. Unfortunately there is not a shared conscience of how to

proceed in Somalia and how to approach the issue posed by the Islamic extremist group.

Now, with the situation in Somalia deteriorating even further as a result of the famine,

there seems to be a possibility that Al-Shabaab has been weakened and is clinging to its

own self-suicidal existence. One important aspect that must remain prevalent in all

debates and decisions regarding the situation in Somalia is that the Somali people

maintain a triple identity: clan, religious, and national. This characteristic can be both

harmful and beneficial toward understanding, abating, and formulating a solution to

counter Al-Shabaab. The suggestion as to what route to take in ending the crisis on

Somalia and allowing the Somali people to take hold of their own destiny, is that of a

single identity based on moderate Islam, and which is accepted by the AU, which at times

makes contradictory statements as to the involvement of the international community,

especially the US, from interfering in the future of the country and whether or not Al-

Shabaab can be quelled after recent events relating to the famine, piracy, and guerrilla

warfare that is now being spread outside of the country and into the East African region.

However, a shared religious identity based on moderate Islam appears to be the best

option for Somalia in the future, at least in the short-term.

Introduction to Somalia:

In 2010, Stated President Sheikh Sharif Ahmed stated in an article with the UK

newspaper, the Guardian that “for twenty years, Somalia has been synonymous with war

and displacement. Now terrorism and piracy have been added to this list-and they

threaten death and destruction beyond our borders.”1 The President goes on to proclaim

that Somalia, despite what is thought of by the international community, is not a failed

state and that the people of Somalia yearn for peace.

Somalia is unique in that Somalia consists of a fairly homogenous population in terms of

religion, culture, and language, with the exception of some Arabs, Bavarans, and Bantu

groups. The Scholar IM Lewis “recognizes the fluid nature of the clan identity system,

1 AMISOM Bulletin issue 2, 15 March 2010

saying that a man is a member of lineage only in opposition to another.”2 This is due

mainly to the fact that each clan holds authority over certain resources. In addition to clan

identity, there are two other viable identities for Somalis: Islamic and national identity. In

this respect, it would be assumed that the population and governing powers would unite

under at least one identity to form a cohesive nation-state. However, from 1969 until

1991, President Siyad Barrre’s political strategy of creating clear divisions between the

clans created inter-clan hostility. Out of a vast array of clans, only three benefited under

the President’s policy of nepotism. The remaining clans were marginalised and as a

result, a great migration occurred during Barre’s reign. In addition to the Migration, there

was a lot of fighting between clans, even though these clans held very small differences.

The fighting ensues mainly because in the clan system of Somalia, Clans are further

broken down into sub clans and sub-sub clans, so you have a multitude of differing

factions fighting over limited resources and power over territory.

This fighting indicates that clan identity surmounts the other two identities, but why?

There are four reasons suggested by scholars. First, because clan identity is the only

differentiating factor among Somalis as all Somalis are Muslim, clan identity is necessary

to distinguish themselves as the Holy Koran mentions that “we made you into nations and

tribes so you recognize each other”3 Secondly, it can be argued that individual identity is

a basic human need needed to establish individual identity. Thirdly, clanship is a way to

bring people together, for celebratory and traditional occasions. It is a unifying source.

Lastly, clan identity is used by politicians, especially when manipulated, solely for the

purpose of aggression. “Siyad Barre used nepotism an he gave significant political and

economic opportunities to the people who were closely related to him clan-wise. He also

used the central government’s institutions such as the military and police against clans in

order to punish them. He committed gross injustices in the name of clan identity.”4 The

President allowed warlords to become prominent members of his government. This factor

encouraged clans to enforce their own laws and to use clan identity as an insurance policy

when Somali’s fled to different regions and had to co-habitat with other clans. This

2 Understanding the Somalia Conflageration. Afyare Abdi Elmi, Pg. 303 Koran, Surah 49:114 Understanding the Somalia Conflagration. Afyare Abdi Elmi, Pg. 34

continued even after the fall of the government in 1991. One of the drawbacks to the final

issue is that the clans tend to participate in collective punishment and revenge when it

comes to protecting its people and resources.

So is identity a root cause or a contributing source to the Somali conflict? The answer can

be viewed as it being a source for the fighting because of divisions between clans or as a

mobilizing factor to reach a specific goal. Yet the identity of a clan does not remain

stagnant but it has always been a sense of conflict in Somalia. Conflicts usually arise

when the basic human needs of the mass are not met. One can consider identity as a basic

human need.

Clan identity is indigenous identity which can be used in peace-building, a term defined

by the former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali as “the process that

facilitates the establishment of durable peace and tries to prevent the recurrence of

violence by addressing root causes and effects of conflict through reconciliation,

institution building and building and political as well as economic transformation.”5

What is Al-Shabaab?

In addition to a multitude of clans that seem to be in constant conflict, Al-Shabaab, or

‘the Youth’ has brought Somalia into international headlines. Al Shabaab is a Wahhabi-

based organization that grew out of the Islamic Courts Union, a temporary Islamist power

source that fell in 2006. The reason Al-Shabaab has been able to maneuverer through

Somalia is because the country has not had a central government since 1991 and many

clan leaders are willing to cooperate with the group, despite the fact that most of the

members of Al-Shabaab come from the Hawiye clan. Al-Shabaab, similar to the Taliban

in Afghanistan, offered security when there was no government in place. Additionally,

forced recruitment has been implemented as part of Al-Shabaab's strategy to build

strength and support.

5 Understanding the Somalia Conflagration. Afyare Abdi Elmi. Pg. 36

Similar to a clan itself, Al-Shabaab does not possess the ability to impose universal

application of rules throughout the country. The organization, as a whole, controls most

of southern Somalia except for the capital, Mogadishu. Sheikh Mohamed Mukhtar

Abdirahman, ‘Abu Zubeyr’, leads Al-Shabaab but the organization is divided into

geographical areas, with several different leaders in each region. Each leader operates

independently, and as is similar to the relationships amongst clans, there is friction.

‘Enough Project’ Somali expert Ken Menkhaus states that Al-Shabaab faces multiple

internal divisions over clanship, leadership, tactics, and ideology. Each of these divisions

is led by an individual who must apply his religious fervour with social identity as a clan

member. These divisions could be manipulated and exploited by a new government to

convince parts of Al-Shabaab to abandon their cause and to slowly re-incorporate them

back into Somali society by weeding out Islamist hardliners

Al-Shabaab has waged Jihad against the western-backed Transitional Federal

Government (TFG) and has sparred with its neighbours in the region: the Ethiopians

since 2006, the Ugandan and Burundi African Union (AU) peacekeepers that are part of

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and now Kenya. To compound the

situation, since 2007 Al-Shabaab has claimed ties to Al-Qaeda. Senior leaders have been

trained with Al-Qaeda, so yes there is a link but the link is actually weak, as the only

sharing between the two is their ideology. There is also some questioning as to whether

forces outside of Al-Qaeda have also trained the group, such as former freedom fighters

from Yemen and Afghanistan. In 2008 an Al-Shabaab leader released a video-pledging

adherence to Al-Qaeda. In this video he also called for the young Somali diaspora to

come fight. As a tit-for-tat exchange in Feb 2009 Al Qaeda commander Ayman al-

Zawahiri released a video congratulating Al-Shabaab on some of their progress in their

jihad. He said the group “will engage in Jihad against the American–made government in

the same way they engaged in Jihad against the Ethiopians and the warlords before

them.”6 In 2008 the US put Al-Shabaab on its terrorists list as part of its ‘War on Terror’

In 2010 during the World Cup, 70 + civilians were blown up in two separate attacks in

6 Al-Shabaab, Council on Foreign Relations, Stephanie Hanson, 2011

Uganda. This was a turning point for the organization as it demonstrated that it was

willing to wage attacks outside of its borders.

Like any terrorist organization, Al-Shabaab’s murderous attempts to maintain power have

evolved over time, as technology has changed, new players enter the field, and support

dwindles. The tactics of al Shabaab have evolved over times due to the financial support

they gained from the Arab world, the militia training they received from countries

harbouring other terrorist groups such as Afghanistan, the weapon trade that exists in

Africa, observing other tactics used by similar forces, and the recruiting of foreign

fighters from the Somali diaspora in the US and UK. In 2006, when Ethiopia stormed the

country, Al-Shabaab used tactics such as guerrilla warfare, suicide bombings, gunfire,

and assassinations. During this period, most of the warfare occurred in the capital,

Mogadishu, and forced an exodus of 400,000 Somalis to leave.

Since the departure of Ethiopian forces, Al-Shabaab’s tactics have changed track and

now employ a humanitarian facade by handing out food and money to the poor.

Additionally they took on a campaign of politics and justice with mobile Sharia courts for

swift trials. Before they would take on these new tactics they would meet with local clan

leaders as way of showing that they could be trusted and only had good intentions. The

group knows that radicalism will only alienate the Somali people further. With the

departure of Ethiopian troops, thus removing the group’s primary instigator, they

continued their guerrilla tactics against the AU Peacekeepers, as well as citizens in

Uganda as a retaliatory reaction to that country's participation as peacekeepers of the AU

Mission in Somalia. Within the country of Somalia, the tactics only aggravated the

tension between Somalis and Al-Shabaab. In 2009 orthodox Sunni Muslims from all over

Somalia tried to form a unified defence against Al-Shabaab. Clan Militias also took part

in more rural areas to defend against Al-Shabaab. The Somali population was beginning

to denounce Al-Shabaab as they saw Piracy as un-Islamic and un-Somali.

How is the strength of Al-Shabaab evaluated? Four factors can be used as indicators of

the power status of the organization:

1. Can they reclaim Mogadishu and how far can their influence spread outwards from the

capital?

2. Will the business community support Al-Shabaab, as taxes enforced by the

organization are essential to its continued survival?

3. Is the diaspora willing to continuing funding a “terrorist organization” especially

during a trying time such as famine and how will they fund it with the banking

mechanisms now shut down by the US?

4. Is the TFG willing to engage in negotiations with the group?

Somalia lost an already dysfunctional government in 1991, which allowed rival militias

to vie for control of the country. This dysfunction that continues today threatens the

global peace because of piracy, which costs the global community 7 billion to 12 billion

per year for extra security and ransom payments over the past 5 years. Al-Shabaab has

denied access from western aid workers because of fear of them being informants to the

US and believes the scale of the famine has been exaggerated. Now in 2011, the United

Nations (UN) has declared a famine in southern Somalia, the portion of the country that

Al-Shabaab control. This announcement has weakened the group and its defectors and

opponents blame the group because of the ban that they imposed on foreign aid groups,

particularly the WFP in 2009. It appeared that in July 2011, Al-Shabaab may have had a

change of heart and they reversed this mandate but within a few days they reinforced its

former position. In addition to this ban, it is already difficult to provide aid because Al-

Shabaab takes 10-15% of the aid as profit and charges a registration fee of $4000 to

$10,000 and a project fee of 20% for digging a borehole or establishing an aid centre.

This is ironic because the Al-Shabaab humanitarian office imposes these payments.

Efforts to control Al-Shabaab by West (Primarily USA)

Twice foreign military action has tried to stabilise Somalia. The US tried in 2002 as

dictated in the film, “Black Hawk Down” and Ethiopia in 2006, for which Somalia

gained an ally from Eritrea due to the country’s conflict with Ethiopia. In 2007 and 2008

the US launched aerial attacks on Al-Shabaab in Somalia due to the assumption that

Somalia was harbouring members of Al-Qaeda. “Somalia is still far from secure. The

treat from Islamist terrorists has not receded, while the determination of the US and

Ethiopian forces to rid Somalia of terrorists remain as strong as possible. This scenario is

set up prolong the conflict between terrorists and Ethiopian forces and also to fuel human

insecurity in Somalia and the greater horn of Africa.”7 But what has the ‘war on

terrorism’ really achieved in Somalia?

“The trajectory of United States policy shows that its involvement in Somalia-even if by

proxy through Ethiopian troops-stems not from a genuine desire to promote human rights

and human security in this collapsed state, but from strategic concerns: fears that stateless

Somalia could become a haven for anti-American terrorists.” The sanctions on foreign

funds from the diaspora to the financial company al-Barakaat in November 2011 to

Somalia by the US government have only fuelled anti-western sentiment.

“The solution must come from Somalis themselves. They have done it once before. In

2000 Islamists formed the Union of Islamic court, a national federation of Sharia jurists,

they had at least some legitimacy and held large swathes of territory, until it was

overthrown 6 years later with foreign help.”8 But Somalia cannot proceed with the

current western backed regime still in charge. Outside influencers should encourage the

TFG to open up the political platforms to other opponents, including Islamists. The West

should help but in humanitarian methods, who unfortunately have been disallowed by Al-

Shabaab during the 2011 famine.

Western Donors have raised more than $800 million this year to help those suffering

from the famine. With this aid, the West could help local communities to gain trust of the

west again and assist in the economic development of the country once again. The AU

has asked for more international support yet the UN Special representative for Somalia,

Ahmedhou Ould-Abdallah, has urged foreign governments to stop interfering in a

statement in November 2010 ”today external political interference perpetuates

instability.”9 Yet another contradictory statement was made by Minister Gele of the TFG,

7 Human Rights and Human Security in Post-9/11 Africa, John Akokpari. Pg. 848 The Economist Oct 15, 2011-Don’t aim too high9 AMISOM Bulletin Issue 2, March 15 2010

who has asked for more international support and has visited several European countries

and other foreign officials and the Somali diaspora as an appeal for support.

Efforts to Control Al Shabaab by the AU

AMISOM declares that this is not only a domestic or regional conflict but also a global

fight against terrorism supported by Al Qaeda. The international community must

recognize this. Terrorists are hiding behind the banner of religion and do nothing but shed

blood, and repress the population. “Extremism has nothing to do with Islam and

everything to do with indiscriminate murder and carnage.”10 AMISOM came into

existence in 2007 to provide humanitarian, peacekeeping, military aid, and to lend

support to the TFG controlled by President Sheik Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. It is solely

because of the AU peacekeeping troops that the TFG is still in power. But AMISOM

recognizes that future lies in hands of Somalis, but with some assistance from the West,

mainly in the form of monetary aid. The troops that come primarily from Uganda and

Burundi have suffered major casualties or have had retaliatory attacks against their

citizens. AMISOM is under-resourced and needs more troops. The AU has appealed to

the international community to provide more contributions so that the salaries of the

peacekeepers are on par with those of UN peacekeepers. The primary role of AMISOM is

the continuous training of Somali security forces, which will help to eventually transfer

the peacekeeping and stability into the hands of the Somalis.

The EU, having recognized that Somalia has become a global threat and with the

inclusion of UK citizens joining the ranks of Al-Shabaab, have helped in training local

police and have also given monetary aid of 30 million euros, which is the first payment

from 60 million euro pledge. Ghana, Nigeria, Sierre Leone and Uganda have also

provided police training. On a whole though, most AU states have not met their

contributions as promised.

10 AMISOM Bulletin Issue 2, March 15 2010

Efforts to Control Al-Shabaab by the UN

The AU, while acknowledging that change must come from Somalis, has sought the help

of the UN to take over peacekeeping efforts, but since the US's failed intervention in

1992 the UN is unwilling to send peacekeepers until the fighting stops. Additionally, the

AU Peace and Security Council has asked the UN Security Council to impose a no-fly

zone and begin a sea blockade to protect and retaliate against piracy. Since the AU sees

this as a global issue it is understandable that they believe that the UN must play a role in

securing peace in Somalia. In addition to peacekeeping support, the AU has asked for

more political and economic support of the TFG and has also raised the issue of

humanitarian offenses taking place in the country. However, the UNSC has failed to act

and the Somali people and/or with the TFG do not have the resources to provide support

and have asked for more support to the TFG.

Current Situation

Coincidentally, on September 11th of this year Al-Shabaab kidnapped 2 British tourists

and on October 1st kidnapped a French woman. Both events occurred on the coast of

Kenya near the Somali border. In the past two weeks, two female aid workers from

Doctors Without Borders near the Dadaab Refugee camp in Kenya were also abducted.

Refugees are seeking safety in Kenya, Ethiopia and Puntland. Al-Shabaab has

acknowledged that there is a drought but will not agree with the international community

that it constitutes a famine. Instead they blame Allah for the drought and have asked

people to pray for rain and to return to farming instead on relying on international aid.

Prior to the Famine it was seen that “Even though Al-Shabaab had draconian laws, they

were somewhat popular because of the stability they provided,”11 says Somali journalist

Abdirahman Aynte. However, all of this has changed as the cost of lives lost as a result of

the famine has ruined the organizations credibility because its mainly affected al-

Shabaab controlled areas of southern Somalia.

11 BBC News Africa 9 August 2011, Could Somali Famine Deal a Fatal Blow to Al-Shabaab? By Farouk Chothia

Some view the UN declaration of the famine as a mistake and a provocation for Al-

Shabaab by appearing to undermine the group. It has been suggested that the UN should

have sought to work with al Shabaab, to gain its trust, and then get aid in. The UN could

have used the divisions within Al-Shabaab that were brought on by the famine as a way

to further weaken the group. But in reality, when you look at the actually statistics, it is

conflict and not drought that is killing more Somalis. “Conflict has turned hunger into

famine and disaster into tragedy.”12 This famine, not nearly as bad as the one in 1992, has

been grossly exacerbated by the lack of international humanitarian assistance and the

downturn in the global economy, which has pushed food prices up. The famine in 1992

affected 23 million people while the famine that the country is facing today affects a

mere compared to 10 million

The TFG has offered amnesty to al Shabaab the group and has had to resort, with AU

troops, to actually force Al-Shabaab out of Mogadishu. All Shabaab does not seem to

worry about this development as it claims it is just a change in its tactics against the TFG

and foreign intervention. In reality, Al-Shabaab is at its weakest point in its history.

As for the neighbouring countries, as mentioned before, Kenya has been hit the hardest

recently as a result of allowing Somalis to take refuge in aid camps near the Somali

border. Kenya is now evoking the UN Charter on the Right of Self-Defence, Chapter vii

article 51: Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of

aggression.

As article 51 reads: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of

individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the

United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain

international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right

of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any

way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present

Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or

restore international peace and security.”

12 BBC News 10 August 2011, Somalia Drought: Tragic History Repeats Itself by George Alagiah

The US agenda in Somalia has been focused solely on targeting Al-Qaeda and has done

nothing but further destabilize the country. The US backed Ethiopian invasion displaced

1 million and killed 15,000 innocent Somalis. IGAD and the international community,

particularly the US, then took the reigns once Ethiopia pulled out and aided in designing

the TFG. The TFG has only been able to control Mogadishu recently and this is only due

to the assistance by the AU. This sparked a new civil war and within a month the south

fell to Al-Shabaab as the ineptitude of the TFG opened up a new power vacuum for a

competing power source

Recommendations

Many scholars put identity not only at the centre of the Somali conflict but also as the key

to peace building. 4 Strategies have been proposed

1. Partitioning the country among competing clans,

2. Ignoring and/or suppressing clan identity

3. Power sharing

4. Identifying reconstruction opportunities.

Somalia’s current government is based on power sharing. The 4 Major clans are

represented and then a conglomeration of smaller clans makes up .5 of the representation.

This is called the ‘4.5 formula’. The problem with this is there are too many clans and for

this this formula you must give clans autonomy. Finally, who actually represents clan is

problematic because there may not always be agreement inside a clan, as clans are further

divided into sub clans and sub-sub clans.

I will not discuss option 1 or 2 as I see them as being unattainable and flawed.

Power sharing, and not military intervention, may be best in the short term “one way of

reconciling the contradictory dimensions of clan identity is perhaps by using political

representation and dividing seats among clans in the parliament while subordinating the

use of clan identity to the other value of competency for the cabinet, senior bureaucratic

positions and other important posts. Another way is to create a bicameral system where

one houses represents clans while the other represents the population using geographical

formulae.”13 I believe that this would be similar to the structure in place in Lebanon,

which is based on power sharing between religious groups.

The fourth strategy is to reconstruct identity, which involves identifying an inclusive

identity that all clans share. Most Somalis want this strategy. Islam resolves the divisive

clan identity. Additionally, Islam and Somali identity can at some point be used

interchangeably and eventually rely on the Somali national identity which is more

acceptable to the Islamic community and its Christian neighbours, and also calms fears

from the US and deals with the discrimination from the ‘War on Terror’. This is a long-

term solution.

President Sheikh Sharif Ahmad believes that Al-Shabaab can be defeated easily but only,

and this is once again a contradictory statement by the TFG, if the international

community actually believes that Somalia can be salvaged. Most importantly, the global

community must acknowledge that what is happening in Somalia is a threat that is not

constrained within its borders. The TFG claims to be working with the Somali diaspora

and take part in transparent political negotiations.

Conclusion:

The famine of 2011 may be the last straw for Al-Shabaab and thus a new era of hope for

Somalia. Peace is not unobtainable at the hands of the Somalis. Case in point is

Somaliland, which broke away in 1991, proves that Somalis can live in peace by their

own means. But how do we bring the Somali people, who are divided by clanship, to

come together and oppose Al-Shabaab? As mentioned prior in the paper, a common

identity must be reconstructed. In the short term, Islam can be the unifying force, but the

international community must accept this decision and not confuse this in the ‘War on

Terror.’

13 Understanding the Somalia Conflagration. Afyare Abdi Elmi, pg. 45

But in the long run the identity must be that of a Somali national identity in order to calm

the fears of the country’s Christian neighbour states along with the West. This national

identity can only come into being once Islamic extremism as portrayed by Al-Shabaab

has been eradicated. The AU and international community can assist in the elimination or

at least the quelling of Islamic extremism of Al-Shabaab but from there on, the future lies

in the hands of the Somali.

Bronwyn Bruton of the Council of Foreign Relations, argues in a 2010 report that “the

blessing of the TFG by the USA and other western countries has previously served to

isolate the government and at the same time, to propel cooperation among previously

served to isolate the government and, at the same time, to propel cooperation among

previously fractured and quarrelsome extremist group.” She proposes a “’constructive

disengagement’ policy that recognizes Al-Shabaab Islamist rule in Somalia as long as it

does not engage in regional violence or terrorism”14

Somali’s dealing with their own political and legal system is not a new concept, it’s just a

reinvented system. In the past, conflicts were settled by Somali traditional legal systems

within clans and between clans. This system was called Heer, which is a form of Somali

culture, and was preceded by elders and religious scholars. These members would come

together to discuss an issue and come up with an outcome despite the fact the fact that

there were no police, jails, or courts. It was purely a traditional and informal process. “If

a given member of society rejected a decision, pressure through his kin group was the

best way to convince that person to accept such a decision.”15

The global community should support the Somali people in the path they choose for the

future with a strong unified government who support them through tough times such as

droughts and famines. If the government can provide this support then the Somali people

will no longer need the group to fill the political vacuum and they have a chance to unite

against Al-Shabaab. Somalia must not be left to fend for itself but it does not need further

interference by outside forces concerned only with their on motives.

14 Council on Foreign Relations, Al-Shabaab by Stephanie Hanson Aug 10, 201115 Understanding the Somalia Conflagration. Afyare Abdi Elmi, pg. 32

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