FALL 2014 - Volume 61, Number 3 AFHISTORICALFOUNDATION … · The Tuskegee Airmen: An Illustrated History, 1939-1949 By Joseph Caver, Jerome Ennels & Dan HaulmanReview by John G

FALL 2014 - Volume 61, Number 3WWW.AFHISTORICALFOUNDATION.ORG

The Air ForceHistorical Foundation

Founded on May 27, 1953 by Gen Carl A. “Tooey” Spaatz and other air power pioneers, the Air Force Historical Foundation (AFHF) is a nonprofi t tax exempt organization. It is dedicated to the preservation, perpetuation and appropriate publication of the history and traditions of American aviation, with emphasis on the U.S. Air Force, its predecessor organizations, and the men and women whose lives and dreams were devoted to fl ight. The Foundation serves all components of the United States Air Force— Active, Reserve and Air National Guard.

AFHF strives to make available to the public and today’s government planners and decision makers information that is relevant and informative about all aspects of air and space power. By doing so, the Foundation hopes to assure the nation profi ts from past experiences as it helps keep the U.S. Air Force the most modern and effective military force in the world.

The Foundation’s four primary activities include a quarterly journal Air Power History, a book program, a biennial symposium, and an awards program.

MEMBERSHIP BENEFITSAll members receive our exciting and informative Air Power History Journal, either electronically or on paper, covering all aspects of aerospace history:

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Preserve the legacy, stay connected:

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Fall 2014 -Volume 61,Number 3WWW.AFHISTORICALFOUNDATION.ORG

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Departments

Book Reviews

Features The Search for General Walker: New InsightsRichard L. DunnReconnaissance Drones: Their First Use in the Cold WarR. Cargill HallTeam Sport, Combat Search and Rescue over Serbia, 1999Darrel D. Whitcomb & Forrest L. Marion

Developing the Next Generation of Military Leaders: Challenges, Imperatives, and StrategiesBy Julie Bélanger & Psalm Lew, Eds. Review by John G. Terino, Jr.

You are Here: From the Compass to GPS, the History and Future of How We Find OurselvesBy Hiawatha Bray Review by Rick W. Sturdevant

The Same Yet Different: Continuity and Change in the Canada-United States Post 9/11 Security Rela.By Bernard James Brister Review by John Cirifici

The Fight in the Clouds: The Extraordinary Combat Experience of P–51 Mustang Pilots During WW IIBy James P. Busha Review by Henry Zeybel

The Tuskegee Airmen: An Illustrated History, 1939-1949By Joseph Caver, Jerome Ennels & Dan Haulman Review by John G. Terino, Jr.

Unforgotten Hero: Remembering a Fighter Pilot’s Life, War and Ultimate SacrificeBy Jim Escalle Review by Joseph Romito

Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at WarBy Robert M. Gates Review by George M. Watson, Jr.

The Pulitzer Air Races: American Aviation and Speed Supremacy, 1920-1925By Michael Gough Review by Joseph Romito

The German Aces Speak II: World War II Through the Eyes of Four More of the Luftwaffe’s CommandersBy Colin D. Heaton & Anne-Marie Lewis Review by Kenneth P. Werrell

Mikoyan Gurevich Mig–15, Second EditionBy Dariusz Karnas Review by Scott A. Willey

A Higher Call: An Incredible True Story of Combat and Chivalry in the War Torn Skies of World War IIBy Adam Makos & Larry Alexander Review by Richard A. McConnell

Hangar FlyingBy Merrill A. McPeak Review by John G. Terino, Jr.

Churchill’s Most Secret Airfield, RAF TempfordBy Bernard O’Connor Review by Al Mongeon

Project 9: The Birth of the Air Commandos in World War IIBy Dennis R. Okerstrom Review by John F. O’Connell

The Bombers and the Bombed: Allied Air War over Europe, 1940-1945By Richard Overy Review by Scott A. Willey

60 Years of Combat Aircraft: From World War One to Vietnam War OneBy Bruno Pautigny Review by Scott Marquiss

Two Flights to Victory: From the Doolittle Raid to the Enola GayBy David G. Styles Review by Scott A. Willey

The Red Baron: The Graphic Circus of Richthofen’s Flying Circus and the Air War in WWIBy Wayne Vansant Review by Scott A. Willey

Hidden Warbirds II: More Epic Stories of Finding, Recovering, and Rebuilding WWII’s Lost AircraftBy Nicholas A. Veronico Review by Steve Agoratus

Billy Mitchell’s War with the Navy: The Interwar Rivalry Over Air PowerBy Thomas Wildenberg Review by Dik Daso

Allied Master Strategists: The Combined Chiefs of Staff in World War IIBy David Rigby Review by Steven D. Ellis

Books ReceivedUpcoming Events and ReunionsLetters, In Memoriam, and History Mystery

COVER: Sandstorm. Art by Dr. Priscilla Dale Jones. MH–53s courtesy of the U.S. Air Force.

38Getting to the Target: The Penetration Problem in Strategic AirCommand during the 1950sPhillip S. Meilinger

2 AIR POWER History / FALL 2014

Board of Directors, 2014

Maj Gen Dale W. Meyerrose, USAF (Ret.)President and Chairman

Maj Gen Kenneth M. DeCuir, USAF (Ret.)1st Vice Chairman

CMSgt John R. McCauslin, USAF (Ret.)Col Thomas Owens, USAF (Ret.)Col William J. Dalecky, USAF (Ret.)Lt Gen Charles L. Johnson II, USAF (Ret.)Lt Gen Christopher Miller, USAF (Ret.)Lt Gen Stephen G. Wood, USAF (Ret.)Maj Willard Strandberg, Jr. USAF (Ret.)Mr. Daniel R. Sitterly, USAF SES Ms. Jonna Doolittle Hoppes

Editor, Air Power HistoryJacob Neufeld

StaffLt Col James A. Vertenten, USAF (Ret.)Secretary to the Board and

Executive DirectorMrs. Angela J. Bear, Office Manager

Patron Members, 2014

Col Dennis M. Drew, USAF (Ret.)Dr. Jerome V. MartinMr. John L. McIverLt Gen George D. Miller, USAF (Ret.)Col Bobby Moorhatch, USAF (Ret.)Col J Calvin ShahbazLt Col Raymond C. Tagge, USAF (Ret.)

Benefactor

Lt Col Steven L. Diehl, USAFCol Wray Johnson, USAF (Ret)

President’s Circle

Col William J. Dalecky, USAF (Ret)Maj Gen Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., USAF

CORPORATE SPONSORS, 2014

Gold Level ($10,000 or more)Lockheed Martin Corporation

The Journal of theAir Force Historical FoundationFall 2014 Volume 61 Number 3

EditorJacob Neufeld

Asst. Editor, Layout and DesignRichard I. Wolf

Technical EditorRobert F. Dorr

Book Review EditorScott A. Willey

AdvertisingJim Vertenten

CirculationAngela J. Bear

Air Power History (ISSN 1044-016X) is pro-duced for Spring, Summer, Fall, and Winter bythe Air Force Historical Foun dation.

Prospective contributors should consult theGUIDELINES FOR CONTRIBUTORS atthe back of this journal. Unsolicited manu-scripts will be returned only on specificrequest. The Editor cannot accept responsibil-ity for any damage to or loss of the manu-script. The Editor reserves the right to editmanuscripts and letters.

Address LETTERS TO THE EDITOR to:

Air Power History11908 Gainsborough Rd.Potomac, MD 20854e-mail: [email protected]

Correspondence regarding missed issues orchanges of address should be addressed tothe CIRCULATION OFFICE:

Air Power HistoryP.O. Box 790Clinton, MD 20735-0790(301) 736-1959e-mail: [email protected]

ADVERTISING

Jim VertentenP.O. Box 790Clinton, MD 20735-0790(301) 736-1959e-mail: [email protected]

Copyright © 2014 by the Air Force HistoricalFoundation. All rights reserved.Periodicals postage paid at Clinton, MD20735 and additional mailing offices.

Postmaster: Please send change of addressto the Circulation Office.

The Air Force Historical Foundation

Air Force Historical FoundationP.O. Box 790

Clinton, MD 20735-0790(301) 736-1959

E-mail: [email protected] the Web at http://www.afhistoricalfoundation.org

3AIR POWER History / FALL 2014

The first featured article in this Fall 2014 [Vol. 61, No. 3] issue of Air PowerHistory deals with the search for Brig. Gen. Kenneth N. Walker, who wentmissing while on a mission to bomb Rabaul, New Britain, during World WarII. The author, Richard Dunn, recounts the history of the mission and subse-quent search for General Walker. Although Dunn mentions new insights anda strong possibility of closing this case, he notes a lack of “usefulness” as wellas costs in not pursuing it.Many people are unaware of the fact that drone technology–such as, the

Kettering Bug–were first demonstrated during World War I. However, theeffort was not taken seriously again until the 1960s, despite the doubtsexpressed by some fighter aircraft commanders, “When the Air Staff assignseighteen-inch pilots to this command [TAC], I’ll consider the issue.” CargillHall’s article tells of their use during the Cold War.The third article, “Team Sport, Combat Search and Rescue over Serbia,

1999,” co-authored by Darrel Whitcomb and Forrest Marion, tells an excitingrescue story that took place some fifteen years ago.In the fourth featured article, Phillip Meilinger details the problem SAC

had in penetrating the Soviet Union in the 1950s. CINCSAC General LeMay,although he harbored serious misgivings, chose forward basing and in-flightrefueling to solve the problem. Still, he was convinced these would work.Fortunately, we never had to find out.There are more than twenty book reviews in this issue; most deal with new

books. The departments section, includes “Letters to the Editor,” “UpcomingSymposia,” “Reunions,” “News” items and Bob Dorr’s “History Mystery.” I very much appreciate the letters I have been receiving and hope you con-

tinue to write. [email protected]

From the Editor

Air Power History and the Air Force Historical Foundation disclaim responsibility for statements,either of fact or of opinion, made by contributors. The submission of an article, book review, or othercommunication with the intention that it be published in this journal shall be construed as prima facieevidence that the contributor willingly transfers the copyright to Air Power History and the Air ForceHistorical Foundation, which will, however, freely grant authors the right to reprint their own works,if published in the authors’ own works.


Air Force Historical FoundationAward Ceremonies October 8, 2014

at the Air Force Memorial &The Sheraton, Pentagon City,

Arlington, VAThe Air Force Historical Foundation will present its highest awards, the Doolittle, Spaatz,and Holley Awards, on Wednesday, October 8th, in ceremonies at the Air Force Memorialand The Sheraton Pentagon City, Arlington, VA.

The James H. “Jimmy” Doolittle Award—recognizing a U.S. Air Force unit’s significant con-tributions to air power history—will be presented at the Air Force Memorial at 4:00 PM tothe 19th Airlift Wing, Little Rock AFB, Arkansas. The 19th’s roots extend back before WorldWar II, when it was one of the original 15 groups that made up U.S. Army aviation. Despitesuffering heavy losses following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the 19th launched the first offen-sive attack against Japan in World War II. The unit's reputation grew greatly through sus-tained superior performance in the Korean and Vietnam wars, and all subsequent conflicts.The 19th truly lives up to its motto “In Alis Vincimus-On Wings We Conquer.”

The remaining awards will be presented at the Air Force Historical Foundation AwardsBanquet, at the Sheraton Pentagon City in Arlington. The General Carl A. “Tooey” SpaatzAward—recognizing an individual for his or her lifetime of contribution to the making ofUnited State Air Force history—will be presented to General Lloyd W. Newton, USAF (Ret.).General Newton's distinguished military career spans the Vietnam War period to the mod-ern Gulf conflicts, including 269 combat missions as an F–4 pilot in Vietnam. The generalserved as a member of the U.S. Air Force Aerial Demonstration Squadron, the Thunderbirds,where he held several positions including narrator, slot pilot and right wingman. He hascommanded three wings and an air division, and held numerous staff positions. He retiredfrom the Air Force as Commander, Air Education and Training Command. The MajorGeneral I. B. Holley Award—honoring an individual for his or her sustained, significant con-tribution to the documentation of Air Force history during a lifetime of service—will be pre-sented to Colonel Walter J. Boyne, USAF (Ret.). Col Boyne is a command pilot with over5,000 flying hours, a combat veteran, aviation historian, and author of more than 50 booksand over 1,000 magazine articles. He is a former director of the National Air and SpaceMuseum of the Smithsonian Institution, Chairman of the National Aeronautic Association,and a member of the National Aviation Hall of Fame.

5AIR POWER History / FALL 2014

From the President

August 10, 2014

Dear Members:

As always, let me thank you for the part each of you has playedin the history and legacy of Air Power across the decades, andfor your generous contributions to the Foundation. We are par-ticularly gratified with your response to this year’s all-digitalvote for our new Board of Directors. For some this was a moredifficult process than the traditional filling out of a ballot andreturning it by mail, and we thank you for making this effort.

We are welcoming as new Board members four fine indi-viduals who will, I am certain, make great contributions to theFoundation: retired Lt. Generals Christopher D. Miller andStephen G. Wood; Mr. Daniel R. Sitterly, currently serving asthe Principal Deputy Assistant, Secretary of the Air Force(Manpower and Reserve Affairs), and retired Colonel Tom Owens. I too was re-elected to the Board, andam honored to continue to serving as the Foundation’s president and chairman of the board.

Our most important communication to you concerns this year’s celebration of the Foundation’s 60thAnniversary. This is a year-long celebration that started with a July 9th gala at the Army and NavyCountry Club. We were honored to have as our special guest the legendary pilot Mr. Bob Hoover. Bobregaled us with great stories of early aviation, and his unique experiences in World War II and as a testpilot during the formative years of our Air Force. Guests in attendance were also treated to the initialdistribution of our 60th Anniversary Commemorative edition of Air Power History, sure to be a collec-tor’s item in the future. This commemorative edition features articles from the near and far past, as wellas some notable writings from senior leaders, historians of note, and Air Power enthusiasts. Please con-tact us at the office or go to the Foundation web site to secure your own copy of this special publication.

This fall will also be an active time for us. On October 8th we will honor our 2014 award winners.We are very proud to announce that General Lloyd “Fig” Newton, USAF (Ret.) has been selected forthe Spaatz Award, honoring him for his lifetime contribution to the making of Air Power history. Wewill also honor with our Holley Award Colonel Walter J. Boyne, USAF (Ret.) for his lifetime contri-bution in documenting Air Power and aviation history. The 19th Airlift Wing of Little Rock AFB is thewinner of the Doolittle Award, presented to an existing Air Force organization that has made a sig-nificant contribution to Air Force History. The 19th earned this recognition with its superlative recordstarting as the 19th Bomb Group, one of the original 15 units formed by the Army Air Force prior toWorld War II. Please, save this date! We would be thrilled to have a strong membership representa-tion at what promises to be a memorable event.

Undoubtedly, many of you have noticed changes to the Foundation web page. We are looking atother improvements to possibly expanding the Book Review section in Air Power History, one of ourmost strongly praised features. We are exploring options for leveraging this feature to highlight cur-rent and recent winners of the “Best Book Reviewed” Award, among others. We believe this exposurehas the potential of growing our services to the membership—which is always our first responsibili-ty—and strengthening the appeal of our Foundation to others interested in Air Power. Suggestionsfrom our readership in this regard will be welcomed and seriously considered.

Dale W. Meyerrose, Maj Gen, USAF (Ret)President and Chairman of the Board


The Search for General

AIR POWER History / FALL 2014 7

Richard L. DunnRichard L. Dunn

l Walker: New Insights

B rig. Gen. Kenneth Newton Walker, one of thearchitects of the prewar plan for strategic airwar in Europe, and commanding general

Fifth Bomber Command, went missing in action onJanuary 5th, 1943, on an unescorted daylight bomb-ing mission to Rabaul, New Britain. The B–17F inwhich the general flew, Walker, and the crew havenever been found. He remains one of the highestranking unrecovered officers lost in air combat inWorld War II. The search in the title of this articlehas multiple implications. First is the search for anaccurate account based on credible evidence ofWalker’s mission and its importance. Then there isa recounting of the search missions that took placein 1943. Finally, mention must be made of theresearch under taken by an eclectic group ofresearchers to narrow the probable location ofWalker’s bomber; and, unfortunately the profoundlack of actual searching and apparent lack of inter-est shown in the case by the Joint POW-MIAAccountability Command (JPAC). New insightscome from previously unexploited sources: unpub-lished research results, diaries from participants onboth sides, and, captured Japanese documents andmedia reports.

Most military historians have heard of theBattle of the Bismarck Sea and understand that itwas seminal event in the history of air power. Mostair power historians are aware of the airlift of Aus -tralian troops to Wau, New Guinea, which helpedturn back a Japanese offensive in early 1943.General Walker’s January 1943 mission to Rabaultargeted a Japanese convoy prior to the one in theBismarck Sea Battle, was the first of a series ofoperations that thinned out Japanese reinforce-ments so that they were unsuccessful against Wau,led to the Bismarck Sea Battle, and, was part ofturning the tide in the Pacific. The importance ofaction against the first Lae convoy and accuratedetails of Walker’s mission are hard to find in pub-lished accounts that cover events of this period.

The Lae Convoy

At Lae there was an airfield which had been theheadquarters of Guinea Airways, Ltd. before thewar and which had been extensively used by theJapanese navy in 1942. Obscure as it was Lae hadbeen the world’s leading airport in terms of cargotonnage in the 1930s thanks to hauling dredges,vehicles, and other heavy equipment (often brokendown and welded back together on location) as wellas subsistence supplies in support of gold miningoperations in New Guinea’s remote mountain

regions. It had also been the departure point forAmelia Earhart’s last flight. At nearby Malahangwas a disused pre-war landing strip cleared byLutheran missionaries. Lae and more broadly theLae-Salamaua-Wau area was one of the “strategicareas” which the Japanese army and navy agreedlate in 1942 was needed to maintain Japan’s posi-tion in New Guinea and prepare for future offensiveoperations. As 1943 began Lae and Salamaua weregarrisoned by a weak force consisting of navy con-struction troops, a guard unit, and two platoons of anavy special landing party (“Japanese Marines”)totaling about 1,200 men; usually 200 or so in theSalamaua-Mubo area and the rest near Lae.

Wau would be the forward defense line for Laeand Salamaua but Wau was a problem. At the centerof the gold mining region, it was the base forAustralian troops and native scouts that kept Laeand Salamaua under observation, occasionallyclashed with Japanese patrols, and, had even raidedthe Japanese bases. Salamaua had an infrequentlyused landing strip. Wau’s sloping mountainside land-ing strip had been the terminus of many of the pre-war flights from Lae, forty air miles distant but withjungle, ridges, gorges and mountains in between.1

In the last days of 1942, just at the timeJapanese army air units were arriving in Japan’s


Richard L. Dunn is an independent consultant advising on the deployment and implementation of tech-nology in the military and civil sectors. He was graduated with a BA, cum laude, from the University ofNew Hampshire and earned law degrees from the University of Maryland and George WashingtonUniversity (Highest Honors). Mr. Dunn has served on several study groups of the National Academy ofScience and Defense Science Board. He was a senior fellow at the University of Maryland. From 1987 to2000, he was the General Counsel of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. Previously he waswith the NASA, in private legal practice and served for nine years on active duty as a Judge Advocate inthe U.S. Air Force.

(Overleaf) B–17E (41-9234)that crashed near Wau,New Guinea, on January 8,1943, after an attack on aconvoy near Lae. This waspart of the Lae convoyoperation which began onJanuary 5, of which GenWalker’s Rabaul missionwas a part. (Photo fromwww.warofourfathers.com.)

THE IMPORTANCEOF ACTIONAGAINST THEFIRST LAECONVOY ANDACCURATEDETAILS OFWALKER’SMISSION AREHARD TOFIND IN PUBLISHEDACCOUNTS

Southeast Area, Japan’s strategic view changeddramatically. Departing from an offensive philoso-phy the Japanese Imperial General Staff decided toevacuate Guadalcanal and Buna, go over to thedefense in the Solomons, and switch to an activedefense and limited offensive in New Guinea. Boththe army and navy recognized that in the SoutheastArea (approximating the Allied Southwest PacificArea) effective air power was the prerequisite forsuccessful operations on land or sea.

The Japanese practiced “cooperation” ratherthan unity of command in the Southeast Area. Itwas, however, apparent to both the army and navythat circumstances had created new strategic reali-ties among which was a line which must be held tomaintain Japan’s position in the area. This was theline: Lae/Salamaua-New Britain-northern SolomonIslands. This line famously called “the BismarckBarrier” in Samuel Eliot Morison’s book title wouldbe fought over for the next year. The first order ofbusiness for the Japanese 18th Army and its sup-porting air force was to secure the Lae/Salamauaend of that line. Initial elements of the 51st Divisionwere arriving at Rabaul by the end of 1942.Originally slated to be part of the 17th Army and goto Guadalcanal, the 51st was allocated to the 18thArmy and assigned the mission of securing the Lae-Salamaua-Wau area.

To supplement intermittent supply by subma-rine and small transport vessels the Japanese wereplanning routes and coastal hideouts for Daihatsumotorized landing craft to transport troops and sup-plies from Rabaul to Lae. These routes had yet to bedeveloped and their capacity would never be suffi-cient to sustain a large force. The decision was madeto risk a convoy to transport substantial elements ofthe 51st Division, organized around a reinforced

infantry regiment and commanded by Maj. Gen.Toru Okabe, to Lae through waters known to beconstantly patrolled by enemy aircraft. Suppliesand support units were also on board, including anairfield maintenance battalion. The key to successby limiting losses en route was provision of air coverfor the convoy sufficient to ward off attacks by air-craft and submarines.

Given the desperate straits of the Japanese atBuna and the weakness of their garrison at Lae theidea that the Japanese might try to reinforce Laewas hardly surprising to Allied intelligence officers.At the end of 1942 and beginning of 1943 the300,000 tons of shipping at Rabaul (fifty large andmedium cargo vessels, twenty small cargo shipsand seventeen naval vessels including destroyersin one sighting report) reached an all-time high.2This plus increased scouting activities by Japanesefloatplanes in the Huon Gulf also pointed to thepossibility of a convoy. Finally radio intercepts notonly confirmed that reinforcement would beattempted but pointed to the date of the convoy’sdeparture.

The recently arrived 11th Hiko Sentai (FlyingRegiment, FR) of the Japanese army would havethe primary responsibility for air cover. Navybombers and fighters would attack Port Moresby tosuppress Allied air power. Navy fighters would sup-plement the army fighters as circumstances per-mitted. Navy float planes or carrier bombers wouldfly anti-submarine patrols along the convoy route.The 11th entered 1943 with forty-nine Type 1 fight-ers (Ki 43) in commission. Three had been lost incombat and six had been damaged in combat oraccidents and were temporarily or permanentlyunavailable.3 Forty-five were operational onJanuary 5. When the navy risked denuding theSolomons of everything except for floatplanes and ahandful of landplanes it could assemble as many asforty-five medium bombers and over sixty Type Zerofighters for operations from Rabaul and Kavieng forshort periods. Army Type 1 fighters (CodenameOscar) were each armed with just one 12.7mmmachine cannon and one 7.7mm machine gun.Navy Zeros (Zeke) were armed with two 20mm can-non and two 7.7mm machine guns.4

General George C. Kenney, Allied air comman-der and commanding general of the U.S. Fifth AirForce, laid plans to intercept and wreck the pre-dicted convoy. He ordered a brief stand down frombomber operations to provide for rest and mainte-nance of his heavy bomber force. He orderedGeneral Walker, his bomber commander, to preparea maximum effort to strike Rabaul shipping on themorning the convoy was to sail. A coordinated strikewith B–17s and B–24s flying from Port Moresbywith another force of B–24s flying from Australiatotaling more than twenty bombers would be thelargest force ever to hit Rabaul in daylight. Inrecent months the Fifth Air Force had avoidedattacks on Rabaul in full daylight. Most attackstook place at night with an occasional bomber com-pleting its attack after dawn. Kenney directed thatthe bombers strike in the early morning.


(Above left) Brig. Gen.Kenneth N. Walker, takenin Washington, D.C. in1942.

(Above) Aerial view ofRabaul, New Britain.

GIVEN THEDESPERATESTRAITS OFTHEJAPANESE…GARRISONAT LAE THEIDEA THATTHEJAPANESEMIGHT TRYTO REINFORCELAE WASHARDLY SURPRISING

But things did not go as directed. Walker dis-agreed with Kenney about an early morning attack.That would require a night take off and also makeit unlikely his bomber force would arrive over thetarget in a compact formation. Walker ordered anattack for midday and, as he had done before, fur-ther ignored Kenney’s wishes by going on the mis-sion himself. The B–24s flying from Iron Range,Australia never made the trip due to bad weather. Asmall advance force of B–17s detailed for an airfieldattack preceded the main force. The main forceheaded toward Rabaul in a formation consisting ofsix B–17s of the 43rd BG and six B–24s of the 90thBG. The B–17s carried 500-lb. bombs and the B–24sone thousand pounders.

Rabaul Mission

At Vunakanau southwest of Rabaul town thepilots of the 11th FR were assembled early on the5th of January. Rain storms from the previous nighthad ended and clouds were slowly clearing. Afterpaying homage to the Emperor they were briefed ontheir convoy cover assignments. The first shift ofconvoy cover would take off at noon (Tokyo time;

two hours behind local time). Shortly after dawn aflight under Lt. Kyoka Yanagawa took off as a secu-rity patrol over the airfield. Yanagawa’s flight hadlanded and a second flight was about to take offwhen a report of approaching planes was received.Both flights scrambled. 5 Four stand-by navy Zerosof Air Group 582 based at Lakunai airfield east ofRabaul town were also scrambled. 6 Anti-aircraftbatteries went on the alert.

Three B–17s from the 403rd BS had been sentto attack Lakunai the Japanese fighter base locatedon an isthmus between Matupi Harbor andSimpson Harbor, Rabaul’s main anchorage but onebomber aborted. Despite multiple bomb runs theB–17s could not see the target. Shipping wasobserved but the number of ships seen from thebombers was considerably less than the numberpresent. Even a couple hours after dawn significantsegments of the two harbors were clouded over. Acable report specified 6/10 cloud cover. One post-mission report said “ground fairly well obscured byclouds.”7 An anti-shipping mission flown at an earlyhour of the morning might well have been awashout due to cloud conditions.

Army Type 1 fighters and navy Zeros sightedthe two B–17s northeast of Vunakanau. After find-ing their assigned target clouded over they headedfor Vunakanau as an alternate hence theirapproach from northeast. As Japanese army pilotspositioned themselves for attack their comrades onthe ground were running for cover. The B–17sunleashed thirty-three one hundred pound bombs(seven hung up and were jettisoned later), thatreportedly fell in the dispersal area at Vunakanau.Returning B–17 crews said that the Japanese fight-ers flew a parallel course with the B–17s but out ofrange until they pulled ahead and then turned infor head-on attacks.

Attacks began about ten miles south ofVunakanau. After their firing runs they broke awayto the side or down. A couple firing passes from thesides were also noted. Action must have been hot,heavy and confusing for the B–17 crews reportedthat they encountered 12 to 15 fighters most identi-fied as Zekes and during the course of their sporadicattacks shot down seven with others claimed asdamaged.8 The Japanese army pilots reported thatthey had set one of the B–17s aflame and were sureit had crashed. Navy Zeros made no claims.9

Both B–17s headed toward the New Guineacoast sporting numerous Japanese bullet hits. SomeJapanese fighters had also been hit but all returnedto their bases. In addition to claiming seven victo-ries some returning B–17 crewmen reported that acouple of their attackers were possibly Me 109’s andeven thought they had seen swastika emblems ontheir wings! Bomber crews had apparently not beenbriefed on a Japanese army fighter with a slim fuse-lage that was new to the area. The B–17F piloted by1st Lt. Jean Jack eventually ditched adjacent to asmall island off the New Guinea coast. The ditchingwent smoothly and entire crew survived includingone man wounded in the fighter attacks. The B–17Eflown by Capt. Eaton Hocutt had a broken oil line


(Left to right) Maj. Gen.George C. Kenney; Major-General C. A. Clowes; Brig.Gen. Kenneth N. Walker.

WALKERORDERED ANATTACK FORMIDDAY AND,AS HE HADDONEBEFORE,FURTHERIGNOREDKENNEY’SWISHES BYGOING ONTHE MISSIONHIMSELF

among other damage. It landed at an emergencystrip near Buna.10 The crew was evacuated in atransport plane.

The interception began shortly before 0730(Tokyo time) or 0930 per Allied reports. 11 Walker’sformation had taken off nearly an hour earlier.Without going into detail regarding Walker’s careersuffice to say he was both a leading theorist andadvocate of strategic bombing. Opportunities toprove the value of strategic bombardment in theS.W.P.A. Theater were few. Here, now, was the oppor-tunity to disrupt an entire, major reinforcement con-voy at its point of origin. One suspects that Walkermight have considered this the pinnacle of his ser-vice with Fifth Bomber Command to this point.

Simpson Harbor, Rabaul town’s inner harbor,was where the greatest concentration of Japaneseshipping was located. Other anchorages were at thesmaller nearby Matupi Harbor and few miles to thesouth across Blanche Bay at Keravia Bay. Theapproach flight of Walker’s bombers would takethem over Matupi Harbor to Simpson Harbor andas they turned south they would be able to observeships in Keravia Bay as well. However, unknown tothe Americans the convoy’s cargo ships were not inany of those anchorages. The cargo ships had com-pleted their loading by barge or from the single pierat Kokopo (Rapopo) on the Gazelle Peninsula wherethe bulk of the ground forces to be transported hadassembled.12 The ships were anchored close to theshore and were about fifteen miles from the mainconcentration of shipping near Rabaul town. Thisanchorage had been reported by reconnaissanceplanes in the weeks before the raid but only minorshipping concentrations had ever been seen there.Indeed, the five transport ships of the convoy not yetjoined by their destroyer escort amounted to littlemore than five per cent of the shipping arrayed ingreater Blanche Bay and its anchorages.

As the bombers approached, the 11th FR atVunakanau completed its preparation for its convoycover mission later in the day. It continued to launchsmall flights for security patrols. Maintenance andrepairs to fighters involved in the earlier intercep-tion were made. Fighters were serviced and madeready for action.13 The only sizeable navy fighterformation at Rabaul was Air Group 252. This unitwas seriously under-strength, having lost themajority of its fighters destroyed on the ground atMunda during the last week of December 1942. Asmall contingent from Air Group 582 and at leastone fighter from Air Group 253 were also atLakunai. Japanese sources indicate there were justseventeen serviceable Zeros at Rabaul prior to theraid. That morning most Japanese navy fighterswere at Buin (forty operational there on January4th per Japanese data) in southern Bougainville260 miles southeast of Rabaul while the mainstrength of Air Group 253 (twenty-three observed,January 3d) was at its base of Kavieng 140 milesnorthwest of Rabaul. If most of the fighters atKavieng were operational this gave the Japaneseabout eighty operational Zeros out of a totalstrength of 102 reported early in the month. 14

The navy’s Bismarck Area Defense Forceincluded 12.7cm anti-aircraft guns in its arsenal.Rabaul’s army anti-aircraft defenses had recentlybeen organized as the 19th Anti-Aircraft Commandunder Col. Nagaki Kawai. Scattered amongRabaul’s harbor, airfields, and various supportinstallations were AA batteries with a few dozen12cm (actually 12.7cm), 8cm, and 7cm heavy AAguns, as well as AA units armed with a half dozen40mm cannon, and a number of 20mm and 13mm(Japanese 13.2mm and captured U.S. 12.7mm)“machine cannon.” Navy destroyers could add con-siderably to the array of land guns and most mer-chant vessels mounted some sort of AA defense.

Until the end of December the headquartersand all three firing batteries of Lt. Col Jiro Ohara’s50th Anti-aircraft Battalion had been situated nearLakunai airfield close to the flight path of theapproaching bombers. But since the beginning ofJanuary Ohara’s headquarters as well as one of hisbatteries and the battery of another AA battalionplaced under his command had been positionednear Kokopo to cover the loading of the convoy.Another of Ohara’s batteries was aboard ship des-tined for Lae. Only a single battery of 7cm AA gunsof the 50th would be close to the flight path of thebombers as they approached their targets.Moreover, while the war diary of the 50th on otheroccasions notes air raid warnings received from theToma radar station, on the 5th of January there isno indication of a radar warning being received. 15Other Japanese sources confirm that the raidachieved surprise.

Twelve bombers in close formation skirtedCape Gazelle southeast of Rabaul and laid a coursefor the ships in Matupi and Simpson harbors. Thestorms of the previous night had completely dissi-pated and only scattered clouds lay over the harborwhile more clouds lay to the south constitutingpotential cover for the withdrawal of the bombers.There were targets enough for two or three timesthe number of bombers closing in on Rabaul.Peering through their windshields American pilotscould see the many ships in Rabaul’s inner andouter harbors. Ahead there were no fighters or anti-aircraft bursts. Contrary to General Kenney’s con-cerns the bombing attack would not be disrupted byfighter interception.

There were three Japanese fighters aloft. Capt.Masayoshi Taniguchi’s led a flight of three fightersproviding security for Vunakanau. Taniguchi 1spatrol line took him near Simpson Harbor but heeither did not see or did not recognize the approach-ing bombers as enemy before turning back towardthe west. He was surprised to see fighters taking offfrom Vunakanau and only when he observed thebomb splashes and AA fire to the east did he react,too late to intercept as it turned out.16 Meanwhile,the warning went out to fighters at Lakunai andVunakanau and anti-aircraft observers also saw theapproaching bombers. No. 3 battery, 50th AABattalion rushed to its guns. Before they could openfire on the formation it broke apart as bombers tar-geted individual ships. Instead of a formation the


WHILE THEWAR DIARYOF THE 50THON OTHEROCCASIONSNOTES AIRRAID WARNINGS…ON THE 5THOF JANUARYTHERE IS NOINDICATIONOF A RADARWARNING

guns were confronted with a dozen targets on vari-ous courses. Some bombs had already been droppedbefore the guns got into action. Belatedly ships in theharbor were alerted. Some with steam up got underway; a few guns got into action, then more joined into throw up a heavy barrage but only as the bomberswithdrew. On the western side of Simpson Harborthe bombers were too high and out of range for the15th Machine Cannon Company to engage.

B–17 and B–24 bombardiers made bomb runsfrom about 8,500 feet or a little higher on selectedships and toggled their bombs. Bombs were droppedon ships scattered throughout the anchorages.Many of the forty 500 and twenty-four 1000-lb.bombs fell close to ships. The B–24s claimed twohits on a ship and the B–17s claimed hits on nineincluding one on a destroyer and one on a cargo shipthat broke in two.17 That was the 5,833 ton KeifukuMaru which had unloaded most of her supplies butwas still doing so when bombs exploded on bothsides of her amidships and buckled her plates.18 Shehad so little warning she never fired a shot in self-defense. Amazingly only one of her crew wasinjured. No other ships were heavily hit but bombscaused fragment damage and some small firesbroke out. The fires, on at least six ships, were theapparent cause of American claims of hits on somany ships. There were also some crew casualties,twenty on one ship.

The American bombers now made their with-drawal trying to regain formation as they did so.Bomber crews could actually observe the fighterstaking off from Lakunai when over the target andafter their bomb runs some could see activity atVunakanau. Japanese AA had made a poor show-ing. Most naval guns had gotten into action late. No.3 battery of the 50th AA Battalion fired severalrounds but reported no success. In exchange four ofits enlisted men had received wounds from bombfragments or rounds fired from the bombers. As thebombers withdrew the AA gunners saw Japanesefighters engaging. Looking back bomber crewmencould see the sky over the harbor belatedly comingalive with AA bursts. Photographs taken while thebombers were actually over the harbor show littleevidence of AA fire.

Up to this point the raid could only be consid-ered highly successful from the American point ofview. Despite the weather related abort of the B–24sfrom Australia a sizeable force of bombers hadtaken Rabaul by surprise and in good conditionsinflicted considerable damage. If Japanese losseswere not what were claimed, they were not incon-siderable. One ship was sunk, half a dozen damagedplus miscellaneous damage to other facilities. Ofcourse it was not then known that none of the shipsin the convoy was among those damaged.Withdrawing to the south some of the bombers flewnear Kokopo and sighted ships of the convoy with-out recognizing the significance of the sighting. Afew bombs were dropped near the ships wrecking alanding barge and inflicting casualties among per-sonnel in the area. Other than Walker, it is unlikelythat the crewmen involved knew that rather than a

general shipping strike this was primarily an effortto disrupt a specific convoy.

Although times recorded in official records arenot always perfectly accurate both the 43d and 90thBomb Group’s recorded 1200 hours as the begin-ning of their bombing attacks.19 Bombing attacksmust have commenced about that time or shortlythereafter and continued for several minutes. PettyOfficer Makato Inoue of Air Group 253 whoreported intercepting the bombers at 1010 was mostlikely the first Japanese fighter to contact thebombers. The 11th FR initially contacted thebombers several minutes later. A dozen or morearmy fighters scrambled and most engaged. A totalof seventeen navy Zeros scrambled but the twelvefrom Air Group 252 after sighting the bombers lostthem in the clouds and never engaged and only twoof four from Air Group 582 did so.20

A summary of the action from the perspectiveof the 11th FR was reported by Jusuke Nagai of theJapanese army press corps as follows:

At 10:18 a.m....13 Boeing and Consolidatedbombers appeared...They were at an altitude of3,000 meters. Our ground batteries sprang intoaction. Our Hayabusa craft rose to meet the enemy.They gave battle to the enemy as he was going toretreat in the face of intense fire from our anti-air-craft guns. Their attack came before the enemy hadtime to get into the formation in which they hadcome. There was a terrific fight. Soon it wasover...one Boeing B–17 and one Consolidated B–24,[were] turned to masses of charred debris.

A formation of Hayabusa gave chase to two fly-ing fortresses headed for the sea. One of the enemyplanes started to dive, leaving a trail of black smoke.The other plane was seen to maneuver to give help tothe comrade plane in trouble. Presently the enemyplanes disappeared into a cloud bank.

Several days after the battle the Americanauthorities announced that the commander of theAmerican air force operating in the area had beenkilled in action. There is no doubt that the comman-der met with death in one of the planes which wereshot down by our Hayabusa planes. 21

The interception was reported in Allied AirForces, South West Pacific, Intelligence SummaryNo. 68 as follows:

B–17s, during a successful raid on Rabaul ship-ping, 5th Jan. 1943, were engaged by 8 to 10 Type OSSF ZEKES and Type O SSF HAPS. One Japanesepilot made a desperate attack and others attemptedsingle passes from above, but on the whole, the inter-ception was pressed in a hesitant manner.

B–24s, co-ordinated with the B–17s on the mis-sion, were attacked by 12 to 15 fighters, of which allexcept two were ZEKES. These two probable MIKESwere painted various shades of green, and on the topof their wings were what appeared to be Swastikaemblems. After leaving the target, interception con-tinued sporadically at altitudes varying between5,000 and 10,000 feet, but our crews received the


UP TO THISPOINT THERAID COULDONLY BECONSIDEREDHIGHLY SUC-CESSFULFROM THEAMERICANPOINT OFVIEW.

impression that these Japanese pilots were inexperi-enced and not anxious for combat.

In general, attacks were from above and infront, with a few passes at the tail; no belly attacksdeveloped. One ZEKE, coming from a 2 o’clock posi-tion, passed underneath and was set on fire by theB–24 tail gun. Another, approaching from 3 o’clock,was also hit by the tail gun and crashed into thetrees. The tail gun of a third B–24 also destroyed athird enemy fighter.

From their perspectives both Japanese and Alliedreports were generally accurate but biased by obser-vations during frenetic combat. The B–24s reportedfighter attacks began at 1205 earlier than anyJapanese report and somewhat inconsistent with theirreported location of the commencement of attacksbeing over the north shore of the Gazelle Peninsula.The B–17 report of attacks beginning at 1210 coincideswith Inoue’s report of engaging the bombers beginningat 1010 Japanese time. Most likely his was the firstencounter. This place and time comports withJapanese anti-aircraft units observing fighters inter-cept the bombers before they disappeared from view tothe south. The Americans were, of course, not specifi-cally aware that the largest Japanese naval fighterunit at Rabaul, Air Group 252, as well as the majorityof the Japanese army’s 11th FR never engaged in theinterception. One crewman noted in his diary that thepreliminary raid by two B–17s might have thinnedJapanese fighter opposition.

Available records are far from comprehensivebut it is certain that the American bombers neverfully reformed in a 12-plane formation and it is alsocertain the lead bomber, Walker’s, was not the firstto leave the target area.22 Consistent with Nagai’sJapanese press report and American accounts at

least Walker’s B–17 and some others lagged behindthe main formation. Reports indicate a B–17 circledthe harbor at lower than attack altitude beforeattempting to rejoin the formation. This was proba-bly Walker’s bomber observing and photographingbombing results. Some accounts suggest Walker’sbomber had been damaged by AA fire but there isno way to verify this and the delayed AA reactionmakes it less than likely. Walker’s bomber may haveappeared in distress merely because it was the leadbomber but left the target below and behind theother bombers.

Perhaps fifteen Japanese fighters assailed thebombers. On the navy side both Inoue and the pairfrom Air Group 582, Petty Officer Tatsuo Moriokaand flyer Shinichi Hirabashi, returned to claimB–17s shot down. The Air Group 582 claim was fora bomber on fire and descending, not seen to crashbut recorded as a definite victory. The 11th FRclaims were approximately as noted in Nagai1sstory, namely one B–17 (by W.O. Hiroshi Kaminoto,2nd Chutai) definite and one B–24 plus anotherindefinite. In addition they reported a bomber thatdisappeared into the clouds trailing black smokefrom an engine.23

The combat was sporadic but continued over anextended period of time. The diary of one Japanesearmy pilot, Sgt. Mitsuo Senoo of the 3rd Chutai,reported five attacks on the bombers ranging fromsouth of Rabaul harbor out over the sea beyondWide Bay. He initially attacked from the side withno effect. His second attack was from the verticaland he claimed to have knocked out an engine. Histhird attack was a steep frontal attack on a bomberthat turned and descended into clouds at a rela-tively low level. Two additional attacks were inef-fective due to oil on the windshield spoiling his


Low-level attack run on aJapanese aircraft in Lae,New Guinea.

WALKER’SB–17 ANDSOME OTH-ERS LAGGEDBEHIND THEMAIN FORMA-TION…PERHAPSFIFTEENJAPANESEFIGHTERSASSAILEDTHEBOMBERS

aim.24 American accounts indicate at least one B–24was under attack for more than half an hour.

The Japanese did not get away unscathed. TheJapanese navy Zeros all returned to base. The armyfighters were not so fortunate. New comer 2d Lt.Hisashi Nagayo of the 1st Chutai never returned.Sgt. Maj. Haruo Takagaki of the 2nd Chutai, a highranking ace from Nomonhan, bailed out of his dam-aged fighter and survived. Corporal Kiyomi also ofthe 2nd Chutai returned to Vunakanau badlywounded in a damaged aircraft. These losses tend toverify the claims of the 90th Bomb Group’s gunners.

The American bombers did not get awayunscathed either. The B–17F with General Walker,Maj. Jack Bleasdale, executive officer of the 43rdBG, and pilot Major Allen Lindberg, commander ofthe 64th BS on board was last seen entering cloudspursued by Japanese fighters with an engine onfire. The B–17, No. 41-24458 named San AntonioRose, never returned and its wreckage and the bodyof General Walker have never been found. Captureddocuments and other information indicate thatBleasdale and co-pilot Capt. Benton Daniel bailedout inland from Wide Bay, were eventually capturedbut their subsequent fate is unknown and theywere unlikely to have survived captivity. Most of the

bombers had received some hits from the reportedly“inexperienced” and uneager attacks. At least onebadly damaged bomber was in distress as it madethe homeward flight.

A shot up B–24 of the 400th BS limped towardNew Guinea with one engine out and rather thantry to cross the mountains diverted to Milne Bay onthe far southeast tip of New Guinea. Althoughrecords are not complete the stranded aircraftapparently sat in the dispersal area there for nearlytwo weeks before being destroyed in a Japanesebombing raid as was the B–17 which made an emer-gency landing near Buna. Ultimately the two raidscost the 5th Air Force two B–17s which went downon the day of the raid and a damaged B–17 andB–24 later destroyed on the ground. It would bemore than nine months before the 5th Air Forceagain attempted a daylight raid on Rabaul and onthat occasion the bombers were accompanied by afighter escort.

In the hours after the shipping strike elevenAmerican bombers made their way toward homeand as described above some in better shape thanothers. In the early afternoon the 11th FR took upits assignment of covering the convoy as it leftRabaul. The various chutai mounted nine or morefighters per shift. The afternoon passed without anencounter with enemy planes. Despite the effortdevoted to the bombing raid there was a B–17prowling along the southern coast of New Britain onarmed reconnaissance. Through the vagaries of tim-ing, position or the intervention of cloud cover it didnot find the convoy. The B–17 dropped five bombs onthe airstrip at Gasmata and three others at Lae.25

In the days that followed the convoy wastracked and repeatedly attacked on its way to Lae.One ship was sunk en route. The infantry battalionon board suffered hundreds of casualties and whenthe survivors reached Lae or returned to Rabaulthey were essentially hors de combat lacking heavyweapons and in many cases without personal arms.A second ship was disabled and beached in Lae har-bor. Much of its cargo was lost as was a portion ofthe supplies landed from other ships.26 Throughoutthe operation Allied attacks were often mounted inuncoordinated, piece meal fashion. Fighter escortssometimes failed to stop Japanese fighters from dis-rupting bomb runs. Lessons were learned and cor-rective actions would be applied in the Battle of theBismarck Sea. One of those lessons was that shipsof the convoy could not be distinguished from othershipping while in harbor.

Among the mysteries about the mission led byGeneral Walker is that only twelve heavy bombersparticipated. That was too few to take full advan-tage of the numerous targets in Rabaul’s variousanchorages as well as stand a good chance of actu-ally hitting ships detailed for the convoy. The failureof the B–24s from Iron Range to join in is under-standable. Their airfield was water logged fromtropical downpours. However, there were at PortMoresby a dozen B–17s from the South Pacific’s11th Bomb Group. They arrived for a week’s tempo-rary duty on December 29th and had flown only two


Brig. Gen. Walker in NewGuinea.

THEAMERICANBOMBERSDID NOT GETAWAYUNSCATHED

missions during their stay. Some pilots from the43rd BG thought they had been ordered to fly theJanuary 5th mission. On January 5th they flewfrom Moresby to Guadalcanal. Whether they wereactually considered for the January 5th mission orwhether an extension of their stay in order to par-ticipate was requested, indeed the exact circum-stances of their departure on the day of that criticalmission, is yet to be determined. What makes thequestion of their departure more remarkable is thefact that they were sent to Port Moresby in signifi-cant part to raid Rabaul; the one B–17 raid onRabaul from Guadalcanal on 25 December 1942was flown with reduced bomb loads, only six B–17sof eleven taking off made it to the target whereminor damage was inflicted on two cargo ships.27

A summary of the most credible evidenceregarding the attack is as follows. The Allies learnedof a Japanese convoy operation which would bringmajor reinforcements to New Guinea. GeneralKenney planned to break up the convoy in port byconducting a day raid on Rabaul. As originallyplanned this would be the largest daytime attackever carried out against Rabaul. However, part ofthe planned force was diverted by weather at itsbase. Twelve heavy bombers made the strike.Kenney and his bomber commander disagreed ondetails namely whether to attack at dawn whenKenney thought there was less likelihood of fighteropposition disrupting the bombing or noon whenthe bombers were more likely to arrive in formationand hit their targets in concentrated fashion. LaterKenney would characterize Walker’s execution of anoon strike as disobedience of his orders. By per-sonally going on the mission Walker further “dis-obeyed” Kenney’s orders as he had done many timespreviously without suffering adverse physical oradministrative consequences. Early morningweather conditions at Rabaul might well have inter-fered with a dawn attack. Japanese army fighterswere on alert beginning at dawn.

The noon strike caught the Japanese by sur-prise and bomb runs were carried out withoutfighter opposition and initially with no anti-aircraftfire. This may have caused Walker to think it safe tocircle the target area for observation and pho-tographing results. Walker’s bomber trailed themain formation leaving the target area. Fightersintercepted the bombers south of the target over theGazelle Peninsula. In a running fight south ofRabaul to and over Wide Bay a number of bomberswere hit. Both U.S. and Japanese witnesses saw abomber which was undoubtedly Walker’s descendinto clouds with its left outboard engine smoking oron fire. Two men are known to have survived fromthe B–17; both bailed after the bomber entered theclouds and landed inland from Wide Bay in difficultjungle country in which each wandered for manydays before being captured by the Japanese.

The search

In the hours after the last of the returningbombers was accounted for it became evident that

Walker and B–17F San Antonio Rose was missing.Royal Australian Air Force searchers and recon-naissance planes were quickly alerted to search theroute to Rabaul and in the Trobriand Islandsbetween New Guinea and Rabaul. According toGeneral Kenney’s account which apparently relatesto the sixth a “report came in during the eveningthat Walker’s airplane was down on a coral reef inthe Trobriand Islands off the eastern end of NewGuinea. I told General MacArthur that as soon asWalker showed up I was going to give him a repri-mand and send him to Australia for a coupleweeks.” MacArthur responded “All right, George,but if he doesn’t come back, I’m going to send hisname to Washington recommending him for aMedal of Honor.” Walker’s biographer, Martha Byrd,makes much of Kenney’s supposed anger at Walkerfor attacking at noon rather than dawn and person-ally flying the mission. She gratuitously adds “offi-cially” to reprimand. Kenney had previously deter-mined that Walker was overly tired and intended tosend him to Australia for a rest. We have onlyKenney’s account and Byrd’s interpretation of whattranspired between Kenney and Walker sinceWalker never returned.28

Kenney relates the following morning that anAustralian flying boat rescued the B–17 crew fromthe “reef in the Trobriands” (actually Urasi I. southof the Trobriands) and discovered it was LtenantJack’s crew and not Walker. Kenney lost hope at thispoint. “I was certain that his plane had been shotdown in flames and unless the crew bailed out theywere gone.” Despite this additional search missionswere ordered. Moreover, there was a convoy to findand attack. Walker’s biographer apparently relyingon Kenney’s personal papers rather than his pub-lished book or official records erroneously assertsthat when the convoy was spotted “no Allied forceswere available to attack it” because of the effortdevoted to the search for Walker.

On the morning of the 6th the 11th FR had 41aircraft operational and the first fighters were up by0600 hours. Japanese pilots were conscious that inthe attack on the 5th interception had taken placeonly after bombs had been dropped. That must nothappen to the transports they were guarding. In thefirst daylight hours no enemy planes appeared. Infact the only other planes seen was a mass forma-tion of forty-four navy bombers and dozens of Zerofighters passing over the convoy on its way to attackPort Moresby. This attack was aborted by weather.Navy fighters reported encountering a B–24 overWide Bay on their return flight and claim to haveshot it down. The B–24D of 1st Lt. George Rose wasdetailed to search for General Walker along theNew Britain coast. Rose’s Liberator failed toreturn.29

Several B–17s and B–24s were sent out to trackthe convoy during the morning and carry outattacks as opportunity presented. One of these wasa B–24D flown by 1st Lt. Walter Higgins. WhenHiggins left cloud cover to make a bombing run onthe convoy Type 1 fighters of the 11th FR’s 3rdChutai attacked. Unit leader 1st Lt. Hiroatsu


AMONG THEMYSTERIESABOUT THEMISSION LEDBY GENERALWALKER ISTHAT ONLYTWELVEHEAVYBOMBERSPARTICI-PATED

THE NOONSTRIKECAUGHT THEJAPANESEBY SURPRISEAND … MAYHAVECAUSEDWALKER TOTHINK ITSAFE TO CIRCLE THETARGETAREA

Hirano pressed an attack dangerously close to thebomber both aircraft being damaged. Additionaldamage was then inflicted on the B–24 by Sgt.Major Koibuchi and the bomber was reported asdestroyed. Hirano’s damaged fighter made an emer-gency landing at Gasmata where its wing wasfound stained red. In Japan it was widely reportedthat Hirano had pressed his attack so closely thathis enemy’s blood stained his fighter.30 If there wasa red stain most likely it was hydraulic fluid. In anyevent Higgins bomber limped away from the fightwith a damaged engine that eventually caught fire.He ditched near a small islet some miles from KawaIsland.31 Another B–24 flown by a fellow pilot of the321st BS, James McMurria, spotted the Higginscrew. For a time it was thought Walker had beenfound but when an R.A.A.F. flying boat arrived itconfirmed that the survivors were not from Walker’splane.

In addition to attacks by individual B–17s andB–24s the convoy was attacked by five B–26s. A B–17led fifteen P–38s, seven with bombs, to the convoy.All the bombs missed but the P–38s claimed nineJapanese fighters in air combat.32 Only one Japanesefighter went down and its pilot was rescued by shipsof the convoy. The B–17 was badly shot up.

Combat over the convoy reached its height onJanuary 7th and 8th and eventually petered out asthe convoy made its return trip to Rabaul on the 9thand tenth. Despite General Kenney’s belief thatWalker would not return additional search missionswere flown. Details of one of these missions came tolight as recently as May 2014, when a member of aB–17 crew provided details to Douglas Walker.

Former Technical Sergeant Herbert Billingtonflew on what he believes was the last search missionflown by the 43rd BG looking for Walker. The crewflying the mission was a volunteer crew availablefor special missions under Col. Roger Ramey thegroup’s commander. According to Billington thecrew was at a de-briefing of the January 5th mis-sion and heard what the returning crews reported.On the final search mission with Ramey in the rightseat next to pilot Lt. Fuller, Billington flew as flightengineer directly behind the pilot and co-pilot. Thepurpose of the mission was to retrace the flighttrack of San Antonio Rose from just south of Rabaulto the point where it went into the clouds and thensearch the likely crash site. According to Billingtonthe San Antonio Rose “went into the clouds justsouth of the north side of Wide Bay and did not godown in the water but went inland through theclouds. We picked it up at the same point and werein and out of clouds as I am sure was S/R. We madea lot of looking all up and down the area about 2+hours.” Billington who went through the de-briefingof the January 5 mission and flew the special mis-sion as just described emphasizes his firm beliefthat the Rose did not go down in water but inlandfrom Wide Bay.33

Translations of Japanese interrogation reportson Bleasdale and Daniel were reproduced in theAllied Translator and Interpreter Section’s EnemyPublication No. 280. Bleadsdale and Daniel are not

actually named in the translated interrogationreports but from Japanese press reports and radiobroadcasts it is known that both survived and werecaptured by the Japanese. From context they areclearly identified with two of the interrogationreports collected in EP No. 280. Both reportsdescribe events leading to their capture. “This PW,flying a B–17 attacked Rabaul but our fighterplanes attacked and damaged his left engine.Losing altitude his airplane circled southward.Realizing his danger PW took to his parachute overthe mountains north of Wide Bay.”34 Both men wan-dered through the jungle for nearly three weeksbefore being captured by the Japanese who had adetachment at Zungen on Wide Bay.

Weeks earlier hope of finding Walker and therest of the San Antonio Rose crew had been all butgiven up. On January 11th Walker’s family wasnotified and it was officially announced that Walkerwas missing. Western New Britain was invaded inDecember 1943 and during the following year muchof the island was occupied by Allied forces. Rabaulheld out until final surrender in 1945. Post warthere were a couple expeditions to the Powell Riverarea looking for downed Allied aircraft and aircrewremains. Some aircraft wreckage was found butWalker’s B–17 was not among them. The PowellRiver is little more than ten miles from the KolMountains which as noted below is the most likelycrash site of Walker’s aircraft. However, the countryis particularly rugged. Unaided ground searcheswould be very challenging and aerial surveys usingvisual observations are likely to reveal little.

The Research

In January 1944 a year after the crew of B–17F41-24458 was declared missing the AdjutantGeneral’s Status Review and DeterminationSection concluded that crew members may havesurvived a crash landing or parachuted from thestricken plane. They might have become unofficialprisoners. They “may reasonably be presumed to beliving” and thus were continued as missing inaction.35

In September 1945 a Missing PersonnelInvestigation Unit arrived at Rabaul with the occu-pation forces. It found that local natives had gener-ally assisted the Japanese and were unlikely tohave aided downed airmen. Japanese records onprisoners had been thoroughly destroyed. Duringtheir work the Unit reached the conclusion that apresumption of death should be applied to menreported missing over New Britain.

The Status Review and Determination boardreviewed the case once again in December 1945 thistime with the input of information from prisonerswho had survived captivity at Rabaul as well asother information that had come to light such asBleasdale having been taken prisoner. It concludedthat the crew members could not be presumed to bealive.

In 1948 the Secretary of the Army requestedthe Command in the Pacific to make an effort to


ON JANUARY11THWALKER’SFAMILY WASNOTIFIEDAND IT WASOFFICIALLYANNOUNCEDTHATWALKERWAS MISSING

locate missing planes and if possible determine thefate of their crews. The 604th Graves RegistrationCompany conducted an investigation of the severalhundred aircraft missing over New Britain andadjacent waters. The unit discovered a number ofremains. Their physical search included villagessurrounding Wide Bay. The only information rele-vant to Walker’s crew came from a Belgian priestFather Poncelet who had himself been a captive inRabaul. According to the unit’s report Ponceletstated that Capt. Daniel had been brought to hisPOW camp early in 1943.

The Walker case was officially closed on July20, 1949 by action of the Board of Review of theHeadquarters American Graves RegistrationService. Walker and the other members of the crewwith the exception of Bleasdale and Daniel weredetermined to be non-recoverable. The board pro-ceedings note multiple locations recorded for thelast sighting of the B–17 apparently concluding itwas last seen “just east of Vunakanau” at 5,000 feetwith its left outboard engine smoking and underattack by fighters. As demonstrated in the narrativeabove the earliest fighter action began after thebombers exited from Blanche Bay roughly due eastfrom Vunakanau. Another location mentioned wasten miles south of the northern end of Wide Bay(from Walker’s Form 371, Data on Remains not yetRecovered or Identified). While navigator 1st Lt.John Hanson’s form 371 placed the last sighting asover Keravia Bay. On this inconsistent and shoddynote official interest in the fate of General Walkerand the crew was at an end.

The story of Walker’s last mission and his lossdid not completely fade away. It was documented inGeorge C. Kenney’s General Kenney Reports (origi-nal publication 1949; reissued by Office of Air Force

History in 1987) which has been quoted in the nar-rative above. Unofficial research in the case hasbeen conducted by a number of individuals notablyGene M. Monihan who has uncovered numerousfascinating details directly or tangentially related toWalker’s loss. After a career with the CIA, Monihanhas spent decades delving into notable air missionsand personalities of World War II. His research isnoted in the acknowledgment section of numerousbooks. Monihan’s research is expressly dealt with inthe Walker biography by Martha Byrd, Kenneth N.Walker: Airpower’s Untempered Crusader whichwas issued by Air University Press in 1997.36

Douglas Walker, the younger of GeneralWalker’s two sons, has pursued the case in his retire-ment. Doug Walker has had a number of interac-tions with JPAC, the Pentagon’s organizationcharged with accounting for missing military per-sonnel and other organizations with related respon-sibilities. The high point of Doug Walker’s contactswith the MIA accounting agencies came in 2003when Johnie E. Webb, Army Identification Labora -tory deputy commander, stated in a letter that hisorganization had personnel in New Guinea and that“we hope the research will lead us to conducting afield investigation which could possibly lead to anexcavation of his [General Walker’s] site should theevidence support such activity “37 No work was everdone in eastern New Britain and JPAC has sincedealt with Walker in what might be described as abureaucratic and reactive mode. When providedwith a plausible reconstruction of the path SanAntonio Rose took after leaving the target JPACresponded in 2007 with a lengthy “analysis” of avail-able “evidence” which included many of the canardsand obviously inconsistent reports mentioned in the1949 Board of Review decision. JPAC even cast


A U.S. B–25D Mitchellbomber executing a lowlevel attack on Japaneseshipping, Rabaul, 1943.

THE STORYOFWALKER’SLAST MISSION ANDHIS LOSS DIDNOT COMPLETELYFADEAWAY…DOUGLASWALKER,THEYOUNGER OFGENERALWALKER’STWO SONS,HAS PUR-SUED THECASE IN HISRETIREMENT

doubt on the fact (possibly not aware of Japanesepress reports, broadcasts and interrogation reports)that Bleasdale and Daniel had survived and para-chuted over land hence finding that its flight pathcrossed the mountains north of Wide Bay no morethan speculation.38 JPAC conveyed its impression toDoug Walker that General Walker’s bomber mostlikely went down at sea in Wide Bay or beyond andthere is no way to find it or recover any remains ofthe crew. As with the 1949 AGRS Board of Reviewthe case is essentially closed.

In recent years Doug Walker has been the cen-ter of gravity pulling together the efforts of a num-ber of researchers interested in the Walker case. Inaddition to Monihan this group includes a Japanesediplomat whose career included service in PapuaNew Guinea (PNG), the daughter of a 5th Air Forcepilot who has visited PNG several times and docu-mented a number of B–17 crash sites, an expert ingee-spatial remote sensing, and other distinguishedprofessionals including Dr. David Lindley.

David Lindley (B.Sc. first class honors, Ph.D.,University of South Wales) is an Australian geologistwhose experience includes 35 years of fieldworkthroughout PNG. During that time he trekked andmapped extensive sections of eastern New Britain,the Gazelle Peninsula in particular. He lived inRabaul for 18 years and was a founding board mem-ber of the East New Britain Provincial Govern -ment’s War Museum. His interest in WWII recover-ies evolved from search and recovery of several alliedcrash sites during mineral exploration activities. Hehas direct experience in the search and recovery ofcrash sites throughout New Britain. His first-handknowledge of weather conditions and terrain,trekking and mapping (during mineral exploration)of many rivers and creeks on Gazelle Peninsula hasenabled him to make significant contributions toresearch related to the search for the San AntonioRose. He speaks fluent New Guinea Pidgin English.

Lindley was able to create a reconstruction ofthe flight path of the San Antonio Rose which other

members of the Walker team consider to be highlycredible. 39 Lindley’s reconstruction makes note ofthe fact that during the northwest or “wet” seasonin the early part of the year of the year clouds typi-cally build up into solid formations over the north-west-facing mountains of New Britain but not overthe open sea on the lee side of the island. Over thesea the skies may be entirely clear or covered byonly sparse cloud cover while nearby northwest-fac-ing mountainous land masses are typically entirelysocked in. Lindley’s personnel experience is alsoconfirmed by satellite imagery.

Applying this knowledge to the narrative of theWalker mission described above it can be seen thatSan Antonio Rose’s disappearance into cloudsstrongly suggests she was over land and most likelyover mountains. This observation is consistent withthe PW interrogation of the airmen that bailed outof the B–17. To further the point, if after disappear-ing in clouds near the north end of Wide Bay theB–17 had then turned and proceeded out over thewaters of Wide Bay, she would have broken free ofthe cloud cover. However, shortly after the B–17 waslost from sight in clouds both the American bombersand some of the Japanese fighters flew over WideBay. In stark contrast to multiple credible reports ofa stricken bomber disappearing into clouds thereare no reports from either side of seeing a B–17 witha smoking engine emerging from clouds, descendingtoward the bay.

Lindley’s reconstruction of the flight path takesthe bomber from the mountains north of Wide Bay,down the Mevolo River Valley to the Kol Mountainsan area of extremely rugged terrain. The KolMountains or a nearby area is the most likely crashsite of San Antonio Rose. Finding wreckage in thatregion or other territory inland from Wide Baywould not be a simple task. At a minimum it wouldprobably take an aerial survey utilizing advancedstate of the art sensing equipment followed up by aground search when the remote sensing equipmentindicates a potential target.

JPAC in conjunction with the Office of NavalResearch sponsored experiments with a Multi-band Synthetic Aperture Radar (MB–SAR)mounted in a Pilatus aircraft over the CentralProvince and Morobe Province of PNG during late2013.40 As this article is written the process ofdoing ground follow up to verify if the targets indi-cated by remote sensing are indeed World War IIwrecks is in progress.

The latest information available is that JPAChas no current plans to continue MB–SAR sensingin PNG or to conduct any kind of investigation forpotential crash sites in East New Britain Province.Such an investigation might result in the discoveryof the wreckage of the San Antonio Rose as well asremains of Walker and eight other members of thecrew. It would almost certainly discover some hith-erto undiscovered crash sites dating to World WarII. Unfortunately JPAC simply seems to have nointerest in undertaking such a project. MeanwhileJPAC is active in PNG but the usefulness and costof its efforts are being seriously questioned.41 �


The last photo of Brig.Gen. Walker in NewGuinea.

IN RECENTYEARS DOUGWALKER HASBEEN THECENTER OFGRAVITYPULLINGTOGETHERTHEEFFORTS OFA NUMBEROF RESEAR -CHERS

1. For strategy and general background see Milner,Victory in Papua (US Army, Chief of Military History,1957); Miller, Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul(CMH, 1959); Craven & Cate, The Pacific: Guadalcanalto Saipan, August 1942 to July 1944 (Univ. of ChicagoPress, 1958); and, Morison, Breaking the BismarckBarrier (Little Brown, Boston, 1950). For backgroundon Lae see Gwynns-Jones, “New Guinea’s Great AerialGold Rush”, Air and Space (1986).2. Allied Air Forces, S.W.P.A.,Intelligence Summary(ISUM) No. 65.3. 11th FR Situation Report, 31/12/1942 (14th AirForce Language Officer translation); other strengthreports for 11th FR are from Southeast AreaOperations Record, 18th Army (US Army, Chief ofMilitary History, Japanese Monograph No. 37).4. For Japanese air operations see Southeast AreaAir Operations Record, Nov. 1942 - Apr. 1944 (CMH,Mono. 32); Mono. 37 (note 3, Ibid.); Southeast AreaNaval Operations, Part 1 (Mono. 98); Outline ofSoutheast Area Naval Air Operations, Part 3,November 1942-June 1943 (Mono. 122); SoutheastArea Operations Record Part 4, November 1942-August 1945 (Mono. 127).5. Nagai, Nippon Times {3/12/1943),”Brilliant RecordWon in South Pacific Area by Army Winged Units”.6. Unit Mission Record ( Kodochosho ), Air Group582, available at Japan Center for Asian HistoricalResearch website http://www.jacar.go.jp (Translation ofthis and other mission records by Osamu Tagaya or viaJustin Taylan).7. Cable report (09091641/L), Advanced HQ, 5th AirForce; Consolidated Mission Report, crew of 1st Lt.Jean A. Jack (1/9/1943).8. Allied Air Forces, SWPA, ISUM No. 68.9. Note 6, Ibid.10. Cable report (note 7); crew evacuated by trans-port: diary of Sgt. Haymond Quillen, 403rd BS(International History Research Associates archive viaEdward Rogers).11. Note 8, Ibid. Field Diary and Battle Reports, 50thField A/A Gun Battalion (Nov. 1942-Jan. 1943), AlliedTranslator and Interpreter Section (ATIS) EnemyPublication (EP) 22.12. Operations orders (various dates), 102d InfantryRegiment, in ATIS EP No. 116.13. Note 5, Ibid.14. lzawa, Rikko and Ginga (unpublished manuscriptin possession of the author); Intelligence Center PacificOcean Areas, Air Target Bulletin No. l, Rabaul:Lakunai, Malaguna, Vunakanau (1/12/1943); see alsonotes 4 and 6,15. Field Diary and Battle Reports, 50th AA GunBattalion (Note 11); Bombers “arrived without warn-ing...” (POW Interrogation Report No. 57, ATIS serial99, PW No. JA 145427).16. E-mail from 0. Tagaya (20 May 2014) withabstract of Tanaguchi auto-biographical information;Claring bould, “Rabaul’s Ultimate Mystery: The Loss ofBrigadier-General Kenneth N. Walker”, The DaedalusFlyer {2002). Tanaguchi’s three fighters were appar-ently observed by the B–24s {Report, Mission IV, AlliedAir Force Field Order, Mission M-4, Jan. 1943).17. Note 8, Ibid.18. Imperial Japanese Navy in WWII, {CMH, Mono. 116);S.W.P.A.,ISUM 140 {quoting PW Interrogation report).19. Note 8, Ibid.20. Note 6, Ibid.

21. Note 5, Ibid.22. The navigator of Walker’s wingman statesWalker’s bomber led the bombing run but the No. 2plane was the first off the target (diary of Francis G.Sickinger, 64th BS, I.H.R.A. archives via E. Rogers).Sickinger also states his B–17 was not intercepted byJapanese fighters until well clear of the harbor.23. Mission details from the Japanese side fromTagaya e-mail (note 16); e-mail Harumi Sakaguchi toDouglas Walker (2/18/2009); notes 5 and 6, Ibid.Claringbould (note 16).24. Mitsuo Senoo diary abstract via H. Sakaguchi(note 23); the memoir of another 11th FR pilot,Hironojo Shishimoto, describes a similar scene (quota-tion in e-mail H. Sakaguchi to D. Walker (7/24/2008).25. Note 8, Ibid.26. Details in various intelligence reports of the 51stDivision (Moto Heidan), ATIS EP 44.27. Salacker, Fortress Against the Sun, p. 304(Combined Publications, Pennsylvania, 2001); diary ofLt. J. Castro, 42d BS, via E. Rogers. Interestingly onthis same day five B–17s escorted by six P–38s flyingfrom Guadalcanal attacked Buin in southernBougainville. Eight Japanese fighters intercepted. TheB–17s escaped harm but two P–38s were lost. FourJapanese dive bombers escorted by Zeros attackedAllied ships near Guadalcanal and damaged NewZealand cruiser Achilles.28. References and quotations attributed to Kenneyfrom Kenney, General Kenney Reports (Duell, Sloan &Pearce, NY, 1949); references to Martha Byrd/Walker’sbiographer from Byrd, Kenneth N. Walker: Airpower’sUntempered Crusader (Air University Press, 1997).29. Data at http://www.Pacificwrecks.com/date/1943/1-43.html.30. Note 5, Ibid; Note 29, Ibid.31. Note 29, Ibid.32. Note 8 Ibid.33. E-mail Herbert Billington to D. Walker(5/15/2014).34. Intelligence Record No. 14, Interrogation of AlliedPW (2/26/1943), ATIS EP 280; Both Bleasdale and Capt.Benton Daniel were named as the subjects of interviewsby journalists in broadcasts from Japan recorded by theForeign Broadcast Intelligence Service (initially on11/3/1943, transcripts in National Archives, RG 263). Apress account which from context references Bleasdalewas published in Nippon Times (1/19-20/1944), “U.S.Flying Fortress Claimed Mediocre”.35. Thanks to Gene M. Monihan for collecting the fulltext of the administrative documents discussed in thissection and summarizingthem in “CircumstancesSurrounding the Fate of Brigadier General Kenneth N.Walker and the Crew of San Antonio Rose” (unpub-lished monograph in possession of the author).36. Note 28, Ibid.37. Ltr., U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory(9/4/2003) to D. Walker.38. E-mail, JPAC J2 (C. McDermott) to D. Walker(7/19/2007).39. Lindley provided comments on the description ofhis reconstruction and certain geographical referencesin this article, e-mail D. Lindley to author (6/10/2014).40. U.S. Embassy, Papua New Guinea, “U.S. TeamUses New Radar to Search for WWII Wreckage” (Pressrelease, 12/12/2013).41. Cole, “Cost and value of New Guinea road triggerprobe of JPAC”, Honolulu Star-Advertiser (5/27/2014).


NOTES


Reconnaissance Drones:Their First Use inthe Cold War


R. Cargill Hall

I n 1959, Ryan Aeronautical Company, which pro-duced the jet-powered “Firebee” target drones forthe U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy, conducted a

study to determine whether these machines couldbe adapted to perform long-range aerial reconnais-sance. Indeed, the study found that they could andthat with lengthened wings they could operate atmuch higher altitudes. Two months after a U–2 wasshot down over the Soviet Union, in July 1960, AirForce Under Secretary Joseph Charyk approved asmall contract for two flight tests of a modifiedFirebee. Conducted in September and October, theyrevealed that a few basic alterations (screening thejet intake and applying radar absorbent materialsto the fuselage) greatly reduced the airplane’s radarsignature. Subsequent plans to contract for thedesign and construction of an advanced reconnais-sance version, known as Ryan Model 136 (RedWagon), sailed through Pentagon approvals. DeputySecretary of Defense James H. Douglas also recom-mended in favor of funding the project and sent thepackage to Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates inNovember. But just a few days before, RepublicanRichard Nixon had lost the presidential election toJohn Kennedy, and the secretary declined to autho-rize so large a contract start for an incomingDemocratic administration. That ended all work ondrones for more than a year. Ultimately, in February1962, Under Secretary Charyk approved a far lessexpensive order for four modified target drones thatwould fly a programmed course over a 1,200-milerange at an altitude of 55,000 feet.

Identified as Ryan Model 147A (code name“Fire Fly”), these classified vehicles1 had a 30-inchplug inserted in the fuselage to carry additional fuel(increasing capacity from 100 to 160 gallons), whichincreased their length from 23 feet to 27 feet (some

later versions would reach 30 feet). The wing was astandard Firebee with extended replaceable wingtips, providing a span of 13 feet. The initial guidancesystem consisted of a simple time-based program-mer capable of being set to command headingchanges, controls for the payload, and a gyrocom-pass for heading control. The drones, flown in acruise-climb mode, continued to ascend as fuelburned off. Launched from beneath the wing of aDC–130 “Hercules,” the 147A was operator pro-grammed to fly a specified route and return to a pre-determined point where a beacon and radio turnedon, and control was assumed by a ground-basedcommand system that directed drone recovery.When recovery was commanded, the engine shutdown, parachutes deployed, and the vehicledescended to earth. After additional flight tests con-ducted in April and May 1962 from Holloman AFBover New Mexico and Utah proved successful, offi-cials in the National Reconnaissance Office contem-plated an order for more vehicles for operationaltesting and eventual use.

Back in September 1961, Secretary of DefenseRobert McNamara had established a secretNational Reconnaissance Program (NRP) thatfunded all United States overflight technical collec-tion assets, and a clandestine National Reconnais -sance Office (NRO) in the Pentagon to manage anddirect the effort.2 This highly classified activity heplaced under the direction of Under Secretary ofthe Air Force Charyk who, in 1962, created fouralphabetic programs to procure, launch, and oper-ate reconnaissance vehicles.3 The last of these, AirForce “Program D,” was responsible for develop-ment, test, and evaluation (DT&E) of aerial recon-naissance vehicles including drones. (An exceptionwas the CIA A–12, for which Program D providedonly the NRP funds.) Thus, beginning in 1962, acovert Program D placed the orders for all classi-fied Ryan drones, their reconnaissance payloads,and their test and evaluation through a “cut out”—Air Force Logistic Command’s Big Safari Office,4and paid for them with NRP funds. In governmentoffices and contractor facilities this special droneprocurement effort, like its immediate successors,was conducted in a Top Secret compartment.Unlike the NRO satellite programs, however,Program D did not operate any of the aerial assetsit developed, which meant that Program D and itsagent, Big Safari, had to find an Air Force com-mand willing to perform that function before itordered any more.


Cargill Hall is Emeritus Chief Historian of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), an intelligencearm of the Department of Defense. Previously he served as Chief of the Contract Histories Program in theAir Force History Support Office, as Chief of the Research Division and concurrently Deputy Director ofthe Air Force Historical Research Agency, and as a historian at Headquarters Military Airlift Commandand Headquarters Strategic Air Command. Still earlier Hall served as historian at the Jet PropulsionLaboratory, California Institute of Technology, for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.He is the author of Lunar Impact: A History of Project Ranger (Washington, D.C.: NASA/GPO 1977),and is the editor, among other volumes, of Case Studies in Strategic Bombardment (Washington, D.C.:Air Force History and Museums Program, 1998); and Lightning Over Bougainville: The YamamotoMission Reconsidered (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991).

Editor’s Note: Increased employment of drones, orRemotely-Piloted Aircraft (RPAs), in military oper-ations has created public interest in thesemachines and, when equipped with weapons, con-current controversy over collateral civilians casual-ties that occur in combat zones. Moreover, many seea dangerous potential for spying on American citi-zens. The military is attracted to this form of air-power because it allows long endurance, long rangeoverflights of enemy territory without endangeringa pilot. This informative report from official sourcestraces the early development and surprisingly wideemployment of the Ryan reconnaissance drones inVietnam.

()verleaf) Antiaircraftartillery site west of ThanHoa, taken from 500 ft. witha Fairchild F415Y on Ryan147SC drone. (All photoscourtesy of Col.John Dale,USAF (Ret.)

RYAN AERO -NAUTICALCOMPANY,…CONDUCTEDA STUDY TODETERMINEWHETHER[DRONES]COULD BEADAPTED TOPERFORMLONG-RANGEAERIALRECONNAIS-SANCE

With test and evaluation proceeding well inApril–May 1962, the NRO sought an operator forthe Model 147 reconnaissance drone. Its represen-tatives, Big Safari officials, first briefed GeneralWalter C. Sweeney, Commander of Tactical AirCommand (TAC), and requested that his organiza-tion assume operational control of the program fortactical reconnaissance. Sweeney, whose commandconsisted of the so-called “fighter Mafia,” emphati-cally refused to participate in a reconnaissance pro-gram conducted with unmanned RPAs. As one par-ticipant recalled, the meeting ended on a Sweeneyexclamation: “When the Air Staff assigns eighteen-inch pilots to this command, I’ll reconsider theissue!” The next stop was Headquarters StrategicAir Command (SAC), home of the “bomber Mafia,”where Major General William H. “Butch”Blanchard, SAC’s deputy chief of operations,received the briefing. SAC operations included alarge strategic aerial reconnaissance component,part of which included U–2 airplanes of the 4080thStrategic Wing. Afterward, following further discus-sion, Blanchard agreed to accept this novel recon-naissance mission, and he assigned Lt. Col.Ellsworth Powell to monitor the upcoming “summertests” of the Model 147 reconnaissance drones thatwould be conducted from Eglin and MacDill AFBsin Florida.

Operational testing of and training with theRyan Model 147 reconnaissance drones continued

in Florida and in the southwest United Statesthroughout 1962 and into 1963, although at a pacemuch slower than desired because at that time BigSafari had modified only two DC–130 aerial launch-ers5 for SAC’s use. In July 1963, SAC formallyassigned RPV operations to the 4028th U–2“Strategic Reconnaissance Weather Squadron”when it moved from Laughlin AFB in Texas toDavis-Monthan AFB in Arizona. Meanwhile, on theother side of the world, the conflict in Vietnamintensified.

The Model 147 jet-powered Ryan drones thatSAC would operate were now given a new codename “Lightning Bug,” most likely because theywere relatively small and fast, flying at speeds of420 knots at altitude. They evolved over the nexteight years through a series of alphabetical desig-nations. The higher altitude 147B had its wingspanlengthened from 15 feet to 27 feet, increasing itsoperational ceiling from 55,000 to 62,500 feet. Othershort-winged versions, at the request ofHeadquarters SAC, Ryan designed specifically tooperate at programmable lower altitudes between500 and 20,000 feet. Later models featured muchimproved engines and guidance systems, and baro-metric altimeters. Each of them was equippedeither with camera, signals intelligence (SIGINT),or surface-to-air missile (SAM) “sniffer” payloads—the latter intercepted and relayed the Soviet “FanSong” radar and SAM-2 transponder signals. Other


Launch of Ryan 147-SCover Laos Back Door.

GEN.SWEENEY,…EMPHATI-CALLYREFUSED TOPARTICIPATEIN A RECON-NAISSANCEPROGRAMCONDUCTEDWITHUNMANNEDRPAS.…“WHEN THEAIR STAFFASSIGNSEIGHTEEN-INCH PILOTSTO THIS COM-MAND, I’LLRECONSIDERTHE ISSUE!”

versions mounted electronic countermeasure(ECM) packages that actively jammed SAM radars,or pods that dispensed metallic chaff to passivelyjam radars. Still another version transmitted real-time TV images to a DC–130 mother ship that loi-tered off the coast. A few, modified to dispense pro-paganda leaflets over North Vietnam, were knownaffectionately among its operators as “Bull Shit”bombers. But whether designed to operate at low orhigh altitudes, all Air Force versions were launchedfrom DC–130s, flew programmed routes, andreturned to a pre-designated spot where groundcontrol took over and they descended by parachuteand were recovered on the ground, or, later in thedecade, in the air by special energy absorbingwinch-equipped CH-3 helicopters. Refueled andwith their payloads reset, the 147s were quicklyturned around and flown on another mission. Onelong-lived low-altitude Ryan Model 147S known as“Tom Cat” completed 68 operational missions inSoutheast Asia before it was lost.

In April 1964, the 4080th wing deployed fromArizona to Bien Hoa AB in South Vietnam. U–2reconnaissance overflights of North Vietnam beganin early June; the first operational 147 drone mis-sion took place on August 20, when a high-altitudeversion launched from a DC–130 based at KadenaAB on Okinawa overflew mainland China and recov-ered in Taiwan. Additional flights over China con-tinued from Okinawa until the end of September,

when the 4028th launch and recovery detachmentsreturned to Bien Hoa to focus on overflights of NorthVietnam in the aftermath of the “Gulf of Tonkin inci-dent.” The drone overflights of North Vietnam andsouthern China resumed from Bien Hoa on October11 and continued throughout the remainder of the1960s. A recovery detachment deployed north to DaNang AB (just south of Hue), where helicopters sup-plied by base tenants (Army, Marine, or Air Force)retrieved those 147 drones that survived their over-flight missions and parachuted to earth. Now avail-able in quantity, DC–130s then returned the dronesfrom Da Nang to Bien Hoa, usually on the same dayto avoid being caught overnight in one of the fre-quent rocket attacks on that northern air base.When in April 1966 Mid-Air Retrieval (MARS) withmodified CH–3s helicopters became available, theytoo were stationed at Da Nang joining the detach-ment already in place. Almost a year earlier, on July1, 1965, with the pending arrival of CH–3s to join theDC–130s and the drones, Headquarters SAC issuedGeneral Order 115 that activated the 4025thReconnaissance Squadron responsible exclusivelyfor drone operations. The 4080th wing, now com-posed of two squadrons, nevertheless would not lastlong as a SAC unit.

On June 25, 1966, Headquarters SAC inacti-vated the 4080th Strategic Wing and its twosquadrons. Headquarters Air Force replaced themby activating the 100th Strategic Reconnaissance


The mission launch air-planes always carried twodrones for any given mis-sion in the event one ofthem had a checkout prob-lem at launch.

DRONEOVER-FLIGHTS OFNORTHVIETNAM ANDSOUTHERNCHINARESUMEDFROM BIENHOA ONOCTOBER 11AND CONTIN-UEDTHROUGH-OUT THEREMAINDEROF THE 1960S

Wing and two squadrons: the 349th StrategicReconnaissance Squadron (SRS) (U–2s) and the350th SRS (DC–130s, CH-3s, and 147 drones),which activated on the same day. The men of the4080th all sewed on new shoulder patches and con-tinued their respective reconnaissance activities.The 147 drones that the 350th most consistentlyemployed during the late 1960s and early 1970swere the low-altitude 147S (AQM-34L/M) and high-altitude 147H and 147T (AQM-34N/P) models. The147S featured a wingspan of fifteen feet, incorpo-rated a new guidance system with a barometricaltimeter, and operated over distances of 400 to 800miles at variable operator-programmed altitudesbetween 500 and 20,000 feet. They proved least vul-nerable to enemy air defenses and became the vehi-cle most often used; Ryan built about 1,000 of them.With a wingspan of thirty-two feet, their 147H and147T counterparts operated at altitudes as high as75,000 feet, but were used sparingly because of theSurface to Air Missile (SAM) threat and because thehigh-altitude reconnaissance targets over southChina and North Vietnam decreased in number.

Throughout the war in Southeast Asia, theapproved lists of strategic, priority-one reconnais-sance targets for high- and low-altitude 147 droneoverflights of China and North Vietnam arrived atthe 350th SRS in the sea port city of Da Nang, sentfrom SAC’s Strategic Reconnaissance Center (SRC)back at Offutt AFB in Nebraska. Headquarters

SAC, in turn, received these targets fromWashington, D.C., where an interagency intelli-gence Committee on Imaging Requirements andExploitation (COMIREX) selected them, as it did forall U.S. overhead assets. A CIA officer chairedCOMIREX, which functioned as an organ of theUnited States Intelligence Board (USIB).6

Farther to the north, in April 1969, NorthKorean fighters attacked and shot down a U.S.EC–121 reconnaissance airplane in internationalwaters in the East China Sea with the loss of allthirty-one on board. Responding to this attack,Pentagon officials ceased manned peripheral recon-naissance airplane missions in the region and sub-stituted in their place 147 reconnaissance drones.After completing preparations, in August 1970 SACdeployed a detachment of the 350th SRS to SouthKorea. This operation, known as Combat Dawn,flew two modified versions of the high-altitude 147series with SIGINT payloads: the 147TE and 147TF(AQM-34Q/R). Equipped with drop fuel tanks, animproved jet engine, and launched from DC–130sbased at Osan AB in South Korea, these latter sys-tems flew long endurance stand-off orbit missions inthe Yellow Sea and Sea of Japan against NorthKorea and China until 1975.

Back on July 11, 1970, as the United Statesbegan to disengage from the conflict in SoutheastAsia, the 100th SRW redeployed from Bien Hoa ABin South Vietnam to U-Tapao Royal Thai Airfield on


Bull Shit Bombers.

THEAPPROVEDLISTSOF…RECON-NAISSANCETARGETS…ARRIVED…FROMOFFUTT AFB[WHICH]… INTURN,RECEIVEDTHESE TAR-GETS FROMWASHING -TON, D.C.

the Gulf of Thailand, whereupon it resumed droneoverflights of North Vietnam. (The last 147 droneoverflight of south China had occurred on October28, 1969. At that time President Richard Nixon, whosought an “opening with China,” ordered these mis-sions halted.) The recovery detachment of the 350thSRS followed the DC–130s in November 1972, mov-ing from Da Nang AB to Nakhon Phanom RoyalThai Airfield located in northeast Thailand. Thatyear proved an intense one for the 350th, especiallywhen its drones conducted low-level photographicBomb Damage Assessments of the December B-52Linebacker raids that brought North Vietnam backto the conference table in Paris.

In the meantime, having observed strategicdrone reconnaissance in Southeast Asia (SEA) andits intelligence products made available to them inSaigon and the Pentagon, leaders of the Tactical AirCommand at Langley AFB in Virginia had a changeof heart, and now actively sought a tactical recon-naissance role for drones in support of its flightoperations. While the SEA conflict continued, how-ever, SAC owned the drone reconnaissance role.Therefore, in August 1968, TAC established a com-mand-controlled 4472nd Tactical Support Squa -dron, stationed it at Davis-Monthan AFB inArizona, and purchased sixty-seven Model 147drones from Ryan Aeronautical that mounted alarge pod under each wing—these to serve RF–4reconnaissance fighters in an ECM-chaff role. Butthe unit never deployed to SEA, and many of itspod-equipped 147s were bailed to SAC for use intheater as Bull Shit bombers. Then, a few yearslater on May 18, 1971, TAC inactivated the 4472dTSS, and Headquarters Air Force replaced it with

the 11th Tactical Drone Squadron, albeit one stillconfined to the ECM mission and still stationed atDavis-Monthan AFB.

On the other side of the Pacific Ocean, SACreconnaissance drone operations from Thailandcontinued until the last 147 mission over Vietnam,conducted five weeks after the fall of Saigon on June3, 1975. The 100th Strategic Reconnaissance Wingand its squadrons returned to the United Statesshortly thereafter; the remaining 147 drones wereplaced in storage and the units inactivated a yearlater, on July 1, 1976. At that time, in the postVietnam drawdown, all Air Force major commandsreceived word that they would have to reduce theirforce structure by ten percent. Coincidentally atthat time, leaders of the Tactical Air Commandappealed to the leaders of SAC to relinquish thedrone reconnaissance role to them. Without a peace-time mission for its drones and with a cost burdenattending its DC–130s and CH–3 recovery heli-copters, the choice was not hard to make. Not longafter the 100th SRW inactivated, HeadquartersSAC agreed to consign its drone reconnaissance roleand related assets to TAC. Headquarters TAC, inturn, assigned the airplanes, helicopters, and recon-naissance drones to its 11th Tactical DroneSquadron at Davis-Monthan, which for the nextthree years continued limited training operations.

Headquarters TAC officials actively sought amission for its drones. They examined in particularthe possibility of using them in Europe in the eventof a nuclear war with the USSR. But the weather inEurope, aerial congestion there, and command andcontrol issues militated against that option. Byearly 1979, TAC’s leaders faced the same choice that


Mid-Air Retrieval System.

LEADERS OFTHETACTICALAIRCOMMAND ATLANGLEYAFB INVIRGINIA HADA CHANGEOF HEART,AND NOWACTIVELYSOUGHT ATACTICALRECONNAIS-SANCE ROLE

1. The best source for this effort in the open litera-ture is William Wagner, Lightning Bugs and OtherReconnaissance Drones (Fallbrook Calif. Aero Publi -shers, Inc., 1982.) 2. Even the name National Reconnaissance Officewas classified Secret within compartmented channelsuntil 1992, when the Department of Defense publiclyacknowledged the organization’s existence.3. Program A, Air Force reconnaissance satellites;Program B, CIA reconnaissance satellites; Program C,Navy reconnaissance satellites; Program D, Air Forceaerial reconnaissance assets including funding of theCIA A-12 and Idealist U-2s. 4. Big Safari began as a classified program in1951–52. The Big Safari office modified military andcommercial airplanes for the Air Force and intelligencecommunity for special missions, and, like the NRO,could pursue procurement sole-source, with a mini-


NOTES

graphic, signals, and communications intelligence.Much of this could not be acquired by their U–2 andSR–71 high-altitude counterparts. A single SACunit operating in theater set the standard for intel-ligence acquisition: Between its first operationalmission in August 1964 and the last one in June1975, the 350th Strategic Reconnaissance Squa -dron flew 3,466 Lightning Bug sorties. During thatperiod, it lost 578 drones to air defenses, failedrecoveries, and other causes. CH–3 helicopterrecovery crews made 2,655 mid-air Lightning Bugcatches in 2,745 attempts, achieving a remarkable96.7 percent success rate. Although not enamoredof Remotely Piloted Aircraft, had former CINCSACand manned bomber proponent Curtis E. LeMayknown of these SAC reconnaissance accomplish-ments he doubtless would have applauded them. �

mum of paperwork. 5. The D meant “Drone” C-130. Initially, Big Safariidentified these two airplanes as GC-130s, the G stand-ing for “Guidance.”6. The CIA Ad Hoc Requirements Committee(ARC) began selecting targets for U.S. overheadreconnaissance assets in 1955, the overflights of“denied territory” at that time conducted by modifiedAir Force airplanes and, in 1956, U-2s. James Q.Reber chaired this committee and its successor, theCommittee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR),when it was subsumed by the United StatesIntelligence Board in 1960. In July 1967, followingreconnaissance satellite operations, the USIBrenamed COMOR the Committee on ImagingRequirements and Exploitation (COMIREX) andestablished separate committees for SIGINT andCOMINT.

Low Altitude Flight Profile.

SAC had previously addressed. Without a peace-time mission for its remotely piloted reconnais-sance drones and with the acquisition costs for itsmanned F–15 and F–16 fighters exceeding originalfunding estimates, the command requested that allAir Force drone operations be terminated. On April1, All Fools Day, Headquarters Air Force inacti-vated the 11th Tactical Drone Squadron. Thataction ended all Defense Department drone activityuntil late 1981, when Congress authorized andfunded the classified research, development, testand evaluation of more Remotely Piloted Aircraft.

The modern American reconnaissance dronefirst flew classified combat missions during the warin Southeast Asia. In low- and high-altitude over-flights of China and North Vietnam in the 1960sand early 1970s, they returned a wealth of photo-

ON APRIL 1,ALL FOOLSDAY, HEAD -QUARTERSAIR FORCEINACTIVATEDTHE 11THTACTICALDRONESQUADRON.THAT ACTIONENDED ALLDEFENSEDEPARTMENTDRONEACTIVITYUNTIL LATE1981


Team Sport, Combat SearchandRescue over Serbia, 1999


Darrel D. Whitcomb & Forrest L. Marion Darrel D. Whitcomb & Forrest L. Marion

In the 1990s, United States military forces, aspart of the great NATO Alliance, were involvedin the Balkans region of Europe, primarily

against the forces of Serbia. The last part of thatconflict involved direct action against Serbia itselfas NATO attempted to staunch their atrocitiesdirected at the southern region of Kosovo. TheSerbians had long-considered Kosovo as part oftheir nation. In 1389 at the Battle of Kosovo Polje,according to Serbian culture, Serbia saved Europefrom the Ottomans by “sacrificing itself to halt theTurks in Kosovo.” Serbia’s gaining of independencein 1878 rekindled its desire for control of Kosovo. Asa U.S. Air Force study noted, to Serbian nationalists,“Kosovo was an intrinsic part of Serbia.” UnderMarshal Josip Broz Tito’s rule following World WarII, Kosovo enjoyed a degree of autonomy whileunder Serbia’s control. But in the post-Tito 1980s,ethnic Albanians in Kosovo—comprising 90 percentof the population—appeared to threaten Serbianaspirations for control of the province. Playing uponSerbian nationalism and fears, Slobodan Milosevicrose to the presidency in Serbia in part upon hispromises of retaining control of “ancestral” Kosovo.In 1989, Milosevic withdrew Kosovar autonomy andpermitted the removal of Kosovar Albanians fromgovernment jobs including the police. By 1991–92as the former Yugoslavia disintegrated, KosovarAlbanians formed a shadow government. Still, theprovince remained relatively peaceful.1

In the spring of 1998, however, Kosovo began tounravel. In March, Yugoslavian—essentially,Serbian—security forces initiated attacks againstinsurgents of the independence-minded KosovoLiberation Army (KLA). The violence increased,including the forced evacuation of Kosovar villagesand the murders of ethnic Albanians. Nevertheless,by summer the KLA controlled about one-third ofKosovo. Serbia responded with a major offensive.Meanwhile, fearful of what appeared to be the startof another round of ethnic cleansing—as occurred inBosnia several years earlier—NATO defense minis-ters considered military options against Serbia. Inmid-October 1998, the NATO Council authorized airstrikes against Serbia which, for the time being, per-suaded Milosevic to comply with a UN-directedcease-fire and the withdrawal of Serbian forces fromKosovo.2

Although Milosevic did, in fact, withdraw a size-able number of his security forces from Kosovo, thecease-fire was short-lived due to violations on bothsides. By early 1999, Serbian forces returned to

Kosovo. Reports of human rights abuses against eth-nic Albanians increased, including evidence of a mas-sacre, in January, of Kosovar civilians at Racak,Kosovo. Meanwhile, thousands of Kosovar refugees,driven from their homes and villages in whatappeared to be a systematic campaign by theSerbians, began crossing the borders into neighbor-ing Albania and Macedonia. In February and March1999, last-ditch diplomatic efforts at Rambouillet andParis, respectively, failed to secure a return to theOctober 1998 agreement or an end to Serbian opera-tions in Kosovo. On March 20, Serbian forcesrenewed an offensive against the KLA and continuedridding Kosovo of ethnic Albanians. Three days later,the Secretary General of NATO, Dr. Javier Solana,directed the start of air operations against Serbia.The NATO operational name was ALLIED FORCE(OAF); the U.S. component, NOBLE ANVIL (NA).3

Air operations planners calculated on a veryshort campaign. In fact, U.S./NATO leaders antici-pated that only two or three nights of limited airstrikes would convince Milosevic to change hisrogue-like behavior. As the campaign began, theforces of U.S. Army Gen. Wesley K. Clark, SupremeAllied Commander Europe (SACEUR), had onlyfifty-one fixed targets approved. He forbade anyform of ground attack, instead directing USAF Lt.Gen. Michael C. Short, the commander of AlliedForces Southern Europe, to conduct an air cam-paign utilizing the almost 550 U.S. and 650 alliedcombat and support aircraft assigned to strike thedesignated targets.4

The air planners were also concerned about thepossibility of allied aircraft being shot down. Theyrecalled how several NATO aircraft had been shotdown in earlier Balkans operations. On April 16,1994, a British Sea Harrier aircraft was downed byan SA–7 missile near Gorazde, Bosnia.5 A yearlater, on June 2, 1995, a Serbian SA–6 brought downa USAF F–16 pilot, Scott O’Grady, over westernBosnia.6 Both the British and American pilots wererescued. On August 30, 1995, near the town of Pale,Bosnian Serbs employing a surface-to-air missilescored against a French Mirage 2000K, call sign“Ebro–33.” U.S. aircraft flew ninety-two dedicatedsorties in support of recovery efforts for Ebro–33until officials confirmed that the Serbians had cap-tured the two-man crew. The crews’ release laterserved as a stepping stone toward the Dayton PeaceAccords in November 1995.7

All U.S. forces in OAF were organized as JointTask Force (JTF)-NA. As expected, SOCEUR would


Col. Darrel Whitcomb, USAF (Ret.), flew the OV–10 and O–1 as a Nail and Raven Forward Air Controllerin Southeast Asia from 1972-1974. He is a prolific writer of Air Force aviation and rescue history, and afrequent contributor to Air Power History. His most recent book, On a Steel Horse I Ride: A History ofthe MH–53 Pave Low Helicopters in War and Peace was published in 2013.Forrest L. Marion graduated from the Virginia Military Institute with a BS degree in civil engineering.He earned an MA in military history from the University of Alabama and a doctorate in American his-tory from the University of Tennessee. Since 1998, Dr. Marion has served as a staff historian and oral his-torian at the Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. Commissioned in 1980, heretired from the U.S. Air Force Reserve in 2010. This article was developed from a soon-to-be-publishedmanuscript on the history of Air Force Special Tactics, 1953-2003.

(Overleaf) Special Forcespersonnel performingCSAR duty for combatoperations over Serbia. (Photo sources are individ-ually indicated.)

AIR OPERATIONSPLANNERSCALCULATEDON A VERYSHORT CAMPAIGN

provide supporting special forces. Its commander,U.S. Army Brigadier General Eldon Bargewell, acti-vated JSOTF - NOBLE ANVIL to do so. Under it,the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF)-2headquarters element at Brindisi was assigned tospecifically provide combat search and rescue(CSAR) capability. The Air Force Special OperationsCommand’s (AFSOC) 21st Special OperationsSquadron (SOS) reinforced its element there to fourMH-53Js and crews. The 20th SOS at HurlburtField, FL, was directed to deploy augmenting forces.Capt. Jim Cardoso was serving as the B Flight com-mander and deployed his flight with five MH-53Js,crews, and support personnel for the operations, asrequested by the 21st SOS so that it could have astandardized fleet and intermix crews. However, asthe Airmen and aircraft were en route, AFSOCordered them to return the aircraft to Hurlburt forreplacement with five MH-53Ms, which had justbeen modified with upgraded navigational andthreat alert systems. They were joined by four MH-60s and crews from the 55th SOS as part of thelarger Task Force Helo, commanded by the 21stSOS commander, Lt. Col. Paul Harmon.8

AFSOC assets at the base also includedMC–130P Combat Shadow (tanker), and AC–130H(gunship) aircraft as well as Special Tactics (ST)combat controllers and pararescuemen (PJs)—highly-trained members of the small Air Force spe-

cial operations community that expected to performtheir jobs on the ground, often in denied or hostileareas.9

AFSOC also increased the ST elements. Underthe leadership of Maj. Terry “Eugene” Willett andhis successor, Maj. William “Bill” Sherman, the 321Special Tactics Squadron (STS), based at RAFMildenhall, United Kingdom, was “spun-up” no lessthan three times in anticipation of contingencyoperations in response to Serbian actions in Kosovo.The third time, however, in March 1999, was thereal deal. Later, Lt. Col. Bradley Thompson—a cap-tain in 1999—recalled he was tasked initially withforming three CSAR teams, totaling about ten per-sonnel. By the time the air campaign against Serbiabegan, however, he was the mission commander forsome seventy personnel, including operators whodeployed to the JSOTF2 from Special Tactics andAir Rescue units at Hurlburt Field and PatrickAFB, FL, Portland International Airport, OR, andMoody AFB, GA. It was one of the largest concen-trations of deployed Special Tactics operators (eventhough some personnel were under the conven-tional Rescue organization) in one location prior toSeptember 11, 2001.10

General Bargewell took a proprietary interestin the rescue mission and closely watched thepreparation at JSOTF2. Harmon briefed him on theoptions that his team had scripted. Bargewell knewthat the Serbians expected the allied force to mountrecovery operations for any downed aircrews andwanted his Airmen to have the best possible chancefor success and survival. He did not want the PaveLows operating singly or even in two-ship forma-tions. Instead, he accepted a three-ship mini-task-force option consisting of two MH-53s—one MH-53M and one MH-53J—and an MH-60G. The MH-53s would lead and provide fire support, while theMH-60 would be the designated recovery aircraft. Arescue mission commander (RMC) would be aboardthe lead Pave Low. This individual would be some-one seasoned—such as Lt. Col. Steve Laushine, the55th SOS commander, or Lt. Col. Tom Trask, the20th SOS operations officer—who would be incharge and empowered to make whatever tacticaldecisions needed to execute the recovery. All heli-copters would have an ST element aboard for theactual pickup. Additionally, Bargewell ordered aU.S. Army Special Forces Operational DetachmentAlpha (ODA) unit to be dispersed on board the heli-copters. The ODA element would be available asanother tactical option if, for some reason, it madesense to land the team members and have themexecute some form of initial overland recovery.11

Several of the USAF crew members objected tohaving the “extra” troops on board, arguing that itforced the helicopters to fly with less fuel and placedmore lives at risk. They took their concerns to Lt.Col. Harmon. He addressed the issue withBargewell who “in no uncertain terms” made it clearto the helicopter crews that this was the way themissions were going to be organized. He dictatedvery specific considerations and criteria for theirdeployment and use. When that was cleared up, the


SEVERAL OFTHE USAFCREW MEM-BERSOBJECTEDTO HAVINGTHE “EXTRA”TROOPS ONBOARD

aircrews, ST elements, and ODA assumed alert pos-ture at Brindisi.12

Combat operations would begin on March 24.Colonel Harmon worked with Capt. Jim Slife alsofrom the 21st SOS to build five helicopter packages,each led by a very experienced flight lead: from the20th, Capt. Jim Cardoso and Capt. Paul Pereira,and from the 21st, Capt. Jim Breck, Maj. LouCaporicci, and Capt. Jim Slife. Every 24 hours, twoteams would be on alert as primary and secondary.They would rotate through the schedule with pri-mary, secondary, and local duties. The primarywould move forward to Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzegovina,reducing reaction time over Serbia, and the sec-ondary would sit alert at Brindisi and respond tocalls in Kosovo. Since two models of Pave Lows wereon site, whatever type the lead crew flew wouldlead. The two squadrons did not intermix their per-sonnel. Captain Cardoso agreed with this plan. Hehad now flown both the MH-53J and M models andknew that the newer M models were more techno-logically advanced. However, he also believed thatthe theater experience of the 21st SOS guys wasclearly a mitigating factor, later stating that “havingtheater experience outweighs the machine.”13

Vega 31

On the night of March 27, a 20th SOS crew,including Captain Cardoso as flight lead for the res-cue package and copilot Capt. John Glass, took off inan MH-53M. Their call sign was Moccasin 60. Onewingman, Moccasin 61, was an MH-53J from the21st SOS, flown by Capt. Shawn Cameron withcopilot Capt. Matt Daley and crew. The other wing-man was Gator 07, an MH-60G from the 55th SOS,commanded by Capt. Chad Franks with copilotCapt. Matt Glover and crew. Colonel Laushine wasaboard Moccasin 60 as the RMC. As directed, anODA package from the 1st Battalion, 10th SFG, aswell as USAF special tactics personnel were dis-persed among the three aircraft.14

As the flight of three helicopters proceeded to

Tuzla, the crews checked in with the NATO AWACSon station and overseeing the strikes that evening.The weather over the region was poor, with mixedrain showers and low visibility, and many strikeshad been cancelled. Cardoso and his group landedat Tuzla and taxied to the refueling pits to fill theirtanks. As they were doing so, the crews aboardMoccasin 61 and Gator 07 heard a Mayday call onthe UHF “Guard” (military aircraft emergency) fre-quency.15

Immediately, Laushine and the aircraft com-manders went into the Tuzla command center todetermine what was going on. There they were toldthat an F–117 had gone down in Serbia. Theyquickly began to formulate a recovery plan andtasked intelligence for the most accurate location ofthe pilot, Lt. Col. Dale Zelko, call sign Vega 31, fromthe 49th Fighter Wing at Holloman AFB, NM.Laushine asked for data on the enemy threats thatthey would have to deal with to get him out.Cardoso was a bit concerned, thinking, “a Stealthjust got shot down and now [they] want us to go inthere?” However, he was now a highly experiencedPave Low pilot and knew that, while the immediateplan was not clear, the crews knew what they had todo and would figure out a way to get Zelko out ofthere.16

The requested information promptly flowedinto the command center. Intelligence sources indi-cated that Vega 31 was down near Novi Sad, Serbia,an estimated 90 miles from Tuzla. Those sourcesalso reported that the Serbs realized they had shotdown an F–117 and were scrambling to capture thepilot. Several flights of A–10s and other supportingaircraft were being launched to assist in the rescue.With that information, Laushine directed his taskforce to take off and head north to set up a ren-dezvous with the A–10s near Osijek in northeastCroatia.17

An hour later, at 2050Z, the Combined AirOperations Center (CAOC) authorized the rescueforce to launch. The three helicopters quicklylaunched and headed north. In this area, at least,


The Vega-31 rescue crew.(Left to right) Capt. MattGlover, Capt. Chad Franks,TSgt. Joe Kirsch and SSgt.Shawn Swift (Source: Col.Chad Franks)

CAPTAINCARDOSO …HAD NOWFLOWN BOTHTHE MH-53JAND M MODELSAND KNEWTHAT THENEWER MMODELSWERE MORETECHNOLO -GICALLYADVANCED

the air was clear, and night visibility was good,although the moon was slowly setting. En route,though, they had difficulties establishing communi-cations with the A–10s and other support aircraft asLaushine tried to organize the recovery effort.Meanwhile, Zelko had been able to use his handheldGPS to determine his location and had securelypassed it to a C–130 orbiting over Kosovo. TheC–130 crew quickly forwarded it through intelli-gence channels to Laushine. The reported position,validated by the A–10 flight lead, Capt. JohnCherrey, who had established radio communica-tions with and authenticated the survivor, indicatedthat Vega 31 was on the ground just south of the cityof Ruma, 25 miles farther south. This was muchcloser to Belgrade, the heavily defended Serbiancapital, and necessitated a complete rework of therecovery plan as the helicopter crews quicklyentered Zelko’s reported GPS location into theirnavigation systems.18

To save fuel, Cardoso directed his flight crewsto land their helicopters and dismount their ST ele-ments and some ODA troops to provide site security.The ST elements aboard the helicopters consisted ofthe individuals listed above in Table 1.

Meanwhile, Cardoso, copilot Glass, and seatflight engineer SSgt. Bill Clemons frantically built anew route to the survivor while the crew ofMoccasin 61 coordinated for a MC–130P to refuelthe helicopters. Once that was worked out, the heli-copters re-launched, quickly rendezvoused with thetanker, just 700 feet above the ground, and took onfuel as ground fog and low clouds were forming inthe area. They repositioned to a holding point westof Ruma but still in Bosnian airspace and awaitedthe arrival of Cherrey’s flight, which would escortthem in to the survivor and provide top coveragainst any threats that challenged them.19

Enemy forces were now aware of Zelko’s pres-ence and were fully mobilizing to capture him. Timewas of the essence. As Captain Cherrey was orches-trating his portion of the effort, he received an intel-ligence report that Zelko had been captured.Cherrey called him on his survival radio and re-authenticated him. The rescue was on.20

Finally, the rescue package received approval tocross into Serbian airspace. At the holding point,Cherrey briefed Cardoso and his flight on the escortand recovery plan. He told Cardoso to call him whenthey were two miles from Zelko so that he could tellZelko to turn on his signaling device. They allacknowledged the plan, and Cherrey directed themto execute.21

Descending to fifty feet above the terrain, theCSAR three-ship proceeded inbound toward thesurvivor. Several times, Cardoso increased his alti-tude to one hundred feet to avoid obstacles and pop-ulated areas. Throughout the night, the helicoptershad been operating mostly in clear air. As theyturned inbound to Zelko, though, they encountereda layer of low-hanging clouds, fog, and rain. Flightengineer TSgt. Ed Hux, serving as the right-doorgunner and scanner on Cardoso’s aircraft, noted, “Itwas probably in the top five of the darkest nightsthat I have ever flown in 30 years of flying.” As vis-ibility rapidly deteriorated, Cardoso and his crew,already wearing NVGs, began utilizing the forward-looking infrared radar (FLIR) system to proceed.Unfortunately, as they entered the low scud,Cherrey and his flight could no longer see the heli-copters to provide direct fire support. They them-selves were being engaged by deadly SA-6 missilebatteries and were now occupied just avoidingZelko’s fate.22

Entering the scud at about 50 feet above theground, the two other helicopters held tactical for-mation on Moccasin 60 so that they did not get sep-arated while so dangerously close to the ground. Onboard all three helicopters, gunners and flight engi-neers were earnestly scanning for immediate phys-ical threats such as trees, towers, or power lines—anything that could damage or destroy a heli-copter—as well as enemy forces. Suddenly, Huxspotted an uncharted power line in the haze, justahead and level with the helicopters. He quicklyshouted, “Wires! Climb! Climb!” as copilot Glassechoed his call. Cardoso immediately reacted andpulled back on the controls, flying his helicopter upand over the threatening wires. The other two crewsmaintained formation and also avoided the threat.Once clear of the wires, Cardoso descended theflight back down about 100 feet and proceededtoward Zelko.23

Approaching Vega’s location, the helicoptersencountered Serbian spotlights vainly looking forthem. But there was no ground fire. About threemiles from Vega, the CSAR team spotted threeSerbian trucks evenly spaced on a road as enemytroops searched for the F–117 pilot. Two miles fromVega’s location, the rescuers contacted the survivorbut they could not see him. Vega’s infrared strobewas inoperable and he couldn’t locate his pen-gunflares. Cardoso’s team told him to fire his overt flare.Vega did so. Immediately, SrA. Shawn M. S. (last ini-tial only), the MH–60G flight engineer, spotted it—one-half mile to the east. Seeing the flare, Capt.


Table 1. Special Tactics Personnel, “Vega-31” F-117 Rescue, March 27/28, 1999

MH-53M (Chalk Lead) MH-53J (Chalk 2) MH-60G (Chalk 3)Anthony “Tony” Negron (PJ) Nate C. (PJ) Eric G. (PJ)Lance Supernaw (PJ) Ronald E. (PJ) John M. J. (PJ)Rob P. (CCT) Christopher B. (CCT) Donald “D. J.” Cantwell (CCT)

Source: History , AFSOC, Jan-Dec 1999, vol 1, pp 101-106 email, CMSgt Wayne G. Norrad (USAF, Ret) toMarion, Aug 31, 2010; email, Lt Col Dale P. Zelko (USAF, Ret) to Marion, Sep 29, 2010; various emails.

APPROA -CHINGVEGA’SLOCATION,THE HELI-COPTERSENCOUN-TEREDSERBIANSPOTLIGHTSVAINLYLOOKINGFOR THEM.

Chad P. Franks, the Pave Hawk aircraft comman-der, turned toward Vega and headed inbound. Thetwo Pave Lows also turned so as to overfly Vega,then turned to the west to hold. Franks flew theapproach to the ground, the helicopter settlingdown as close to Vega as was relatively safe—thesurvivor was just outside the path of the rotorblades. Special Tactics personnel—consisting ofpararescuemen Eric G. (last initial only) (team lead,304th Rescue Squadron) and John M. J. (last initialonly), and combat controller Donald “D. J.”Cantwell—quickly exited and assisted Vega aboard.Zelko heard the almost incredible greeting forwhich he might have lost hope. Grabbing him, theyannounced, “Your PJs are here to take you home!”Forty-five seconds after landing, Franks’ aircraftwas airborne, heading that way.24

Rejoining the Pave Lows, the MH–60G and the53s flew a different route leaving Serbia than on theingress. As they approached the border with Bosnia,they observed Serbian antiaircraft fire in the vicin-ity of their previous flight path. Without being ableto see the aircraft, the Serbians appeared to be fir-ing volleys in hopes that the helicopters were flyingthe same route as before. After the grueling five andone-half hour mission, Cardoso’s team landed safelyat Tuzla at 0254Z. To Captain Cardoso, the resultsspoke for themselves. “We went in with 37 [person-nel], and came back with 38.”25 Colonel Zelko under-went a physical examination before being flown toAviano AB, Italy. Both Cardoso and Franks earned

Silver Stars for the rescue mission; other crew mem-bers received the Distinguished Flying Cross(DFC), and in 2000, Cardoso received the JamesJabara Airmanship Award for the leadership heprovided in the rescue.26

However, this mission had another significance,perhaps unrecognized at this time but profound inits historical implications. In 1967, at a time whenthe USAF was engaged in an intense theater war inSoutheast Asia (SEA) and losing aircraft and air-crews on a daily basis, its commanders in SEA for-warded to the Pentagon a requirement, SEAOperational Requirement 114, which called for “anintegrated system to enable . . . helicopters to per-form the essential elements of search and rescueunder conditions of total darkness and/or low visi-bility.”27 It took another thirteen years of develop-ment before that capability was finally consum-mated in the HH-53H helicopters that then becamethe MH-53 Pave Low aircraft. However, it took theright crews, PJs, ST airmen, young air commandos,men of consummate professionalism and intensedrive, to operationally bring those helicopters alive.It was the men and machines together that made itall work. And this rescue operation was classic aircommando. Moccasin 60 did not land to recoverVega 31, although it could have done so. Instead, itprovided the overall leadership for the mission tofacilitate the recovery action by the brave crew ofGator 07.28

The simple truth is that in the early morning


The crew of Moccasin 60the morning after rescuingVega 31, Lt. Col. DaleZelko: (Left to right), MSgt.John Dubuisson, Capt.John Glass, TSg.t Ed Hux,SSgt. Bill Clemons, SrA.Chris Bloomfield, and Capt.Jim Cardoso. (Source: Col.Jim Cardoso.)

IN SPITE OFTHE…INITIALEXPECTA-TIONS OF ASHORT, LIMITED AIRCAMPAIGN,THE OPERATIONINCREASEDIN INTENSITY

hours of March 28, 1999 in the skies over Serbia, aconcept germinated 32 years earlier in the frustra-tions of the long war in Southeast Asia finally cameto fruition. More than three decades of conceptual-izing, planning, modifying, organizing, and trainingjelled in one seminal moment, and the rescue ofVega 31, Lt. Col. Dale Zelko, was the final and ulti-mate fulfillment of that requirement. His freedomwas the end result of the right equipment and theright men at the right place at the right time, andfor all of the right reasons.29

Hammer 34

In spite of the U.S./NATO’s initial expectationsof a short, limited air campaign, the operationincreased in intensity, continuing until early Junewhen Milosevic, faced with a crumbling economyand dwindling popular support, finally agreed towithdraw from Kosovo. The Serbian leaderremained obstinate until perhaps beginning to fearthat a NATO ground option into Kosovo—which,unwisely, had been taken “off the table” at the out-set—might be under consideration. In any case, theprolonged air campaign provided a second opportu-nity for the combat rescue of a downed Airman fromSerbia. By that time, the CSAR crews spent severaldays at a time forward-deployed to Tuzla AB ratherthan sending crews from Brindisi on a daily basis, apractice that taxed people and machines more thanwas necessary.30

On May 2, Serbian ground fire severely dam-aged an A–10 over Kosovo. However, the pilot wasable to land the aircraft at the airport at Skopje,Macedonia. Later that evening, though, Serbiangunners downed a USAF F–16CG, call sign

“Hammer-34,” flown by Lt. Col. David Goldfein,near the border with Bosnia-Herzegovina. The pri-mary CSAR alert package of three helicopters—justas before, two Pave Lows and a Pave Hawk—launched from Tuzla AB as soon as the downed pilotwas located, authenticated, and a threat assess-ment accomplished. Again, the RMC was Lt. Col.Steve Laushine. His lead MH-53M was flown byCapt. Greg Landreth, 1st Lt. Tom Palenske, andcrew, with the call sign of Skat 11. Capt. Tom Lang,1st Lt. Dan Nielsen, and crew, flew the second MH-53 as Skat 12; and Capt. Bill Denehan, 1st Lt. TomKunkel, and crew, flew the MH-60 as Skat 13. Justlike the Vega 31 recovery force, the helicopter pack-age also had ST elements and an ODA onboard.31

Hammer’s shoot-down occurred four hourslater into the night than did Vega’s, which gave theCSAR force less time to work with. Almost certainly,a daylight rescue in many parts of Serbia wouldhave been too risky to undertake. Unlike the firstmission, as the rescue force crossed the Serbian bor-der it came under surface-to-air missile fire.Executing standard countermeasures, each heli-copter crew managed to evade no less than threemissiles while inbound to the objective area. Alsounlike the Vega mission, on May 2 the night wasbeautiful, clear, with no clouds and a full moon—which increased the threat because “the Serbs knewwe were coming,” noted one crewmember, andenjoyed better visibility of the rescue force.32

The helicopters also encountered large caliberantiaircraft fire but evaded it by jinking and terrainmasking maneuvers. Despite hearing radio trafficsuggesting that the helicopters should hold andawait close air support escort, mission commanderColonel Laushine, aboard Skat 11, pushed the small


The crews of Skat 11 and12, the morning after res-cuing Hammer 34. (Left toright), top: TSgt. Lou Orrie,1st. Lt. Tom Lang; middle,SSgt. Vince DePersio,SSgt. Dan Weimer, SrA.Grady Galvin, SrA. EricFricsons, 2d. Lt. DanNielson; front, Capt. KentLandreth, SSgt. BarryBergschneider, 1st. Lt.Tom Palenske, SSgt. DubScott, SSgt. Bill Kerwood(deceased). (Source: Lt.Col. Kent Landreth.)

AS SOON ASTHE MH–60GLANDED,HAMMER 34BOLTEDFROM THENEARBYTREELINE

force forward to the objective area. Once in the area,the rescue helos linked up with Goldfein’s flightlead, Hammer 33, who had assumed the OSC role,and vectored the helicopter task force to the sur-vivor’s position. Two miles from his location, theMH–60G pilot, Capt. Denehan, spotted ground firefrom his aircraft’s four o’clock position. The flightengineer, SSgt. Richard D. K. (last initial only),returned fire using the helicopter’s minigun.Immediately, the rescuers contacted the downedpilot and directed him to turn on his strobe light.Making one pass over the survivor, the Pave Hawkand MH–53M failed to obtain a “visual” on him.However, they turned on their Precision LocationSystem which gave them a vector towards the sur-vivor’s location. Denehan spotted Goldfein’s strobelight and dashed in for the pickup as the Pave Lowsorbited above, guns ready to suppress any immedi-ate threat to the force. Denehan landed his PaveHawk at 0245Z on sloped terrain in a field near thesurvivor. The Special Tactics team of PJs JeremyHardy (team lead) and Ronald E. (last initial only)and combat controller Andrew Kubik jumped out tosecure the survivor. As they did, they inadvertentlyknocked out a case of bottled water. In the distance,they could hear guns aboard one of the Pave Lowsengaging Serbian forces.33

Unfortunately, Serbian soldiers had also spot-ted Hammer–34, and “were closing in quickly,” asthe AFSOC command historian, Mr. Herb Mason,stated later:

As soon as the MH–60G landed, Hammer 34bolted from the nearby treeline. Unable to identifythe pilot as a friendly, Sergeant Hardy trained hisM–4 rifle on the pilot who immediately went sub-missive. Taking just seconds to authenticate theF–16 pilot, the special tactics team placed Hammer34 aboard . . . and quickly piled on top of him to pro-

tect him from any incoming ground fire. A scant 20seconds after landing, Captain Denehan quicklytook off to the sound of gunfire coming from thesouthwest.34

The case of bottled water served as a conve-nient step for the scampering airmen as they scram-bled aboard and shouted “go, go, go!” Unaware thatGoldfein’s legs were still partly dangling out of theaircraft, Denehan lifted off and climbed quickly torejoin the MH-53s. Changing their outbound route,the flight of helicopters encountered minimalground fire but required a “hard break left” near theborder to avoid an enemy position. The rescue teamlanded safely at Tuzla at 0330Z. As in the rescue ofVega–31, the pickup helicopter pilot (Capt.Denehan) and the lead MH–53M pilot (Capt.Landreth) each received the Silver Star; their crewsreceived DFC’s. Comparing the two rescues, missioncommander Laushine noted that overall the secondCSAR “went a lot smoother than the first,” despitethe fact that radio discipline was poor. There were“way too many people on the radios talking,” headded. There was irony in the fact that the unit towhich the Vega and Hammer pickup helicoptersbelonged was the 55th Special OperationsSquadron. The 55th was slated for inactivation laterin the year. This deployment was their “swansong.”35

For rescuer and rescuee, there was at least onepersonal remembrance of the dramatic event inlater years. In 2010, pararescueman Jeremy Hardywas promoted to chief master sergeant. The presid-ing official for the ceremony was Maj. Gen. David L.Goldfein—Hammer-34, Hardy’s rescued pilot.36

Six weeks after the rescue of Hammer–34, theair campaign ended as Serbian ruler Milosevicreturned to the negotiating table and agreed to pullhis forces out of a ravaged Kosovo. The two success-


(Left to right) Lt. Col. SteveLaushine, and the crew ofSkat 13: Capt. Tom Kunkle,SrA. Rich Kelley, Capt. BillDenehan, SSgt. JackGainer, all 55th SOS per-sonnel.

THE CASE OFBOTTLEDWATERSERVED AS ACONVENIENTSTEP FORTHE SCAM-PERING AIR-MEN AS THEYSCRAMBLEDABOARD

1. Report, The One Year Report of The Air War OverSerbia: Aerospace Power in Operation Allied Force,Volume 1 (Washington DC: Headquarters USAF, Oct2000), pp. 5-7. Legally, Kosovo was under Serbian sov-ereignty.2. Ibid., pp. 7-8.3. Ibid., pp. 9-11, 45.4. Ibid., p. 1.5. Nick Richardson, No Escape Zone (London, UK:Little, Brown and Company, 2000), pp. 140, 229.6. Martin R. Berndt, “Recovery of Basher 52,” USNaval Institute Proceedings, vol 121, no 11 (Nov 1995),pp. 41-43.7. Darrel Whitcomb, “Searching for Ebro–33,” AirPower History 49 (Fall 2002), pp. 34-39; Roger Thurow,“Among Serbs, Facts Clash With Fancy In Attack onGorazde,” Wall Street Journal, Apr 18, 1994, p. 1;History, Air Force Special Operations Command[AFSOC hereinafter], Jan-Dec 1995, vol 1, pp. 150-51.All unit Histories cited herein are held at the AirForce Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, AL.8. Darrel Whitcomb, On a Steel Horse I Ride: AHistory of the MH-53 Pave Low Helicopters in War andPeace (Maxwell AFB, AL; Air University Press, Sep.2012), pp. 446-47.9. History, AFSOC, Jan-Dec 1998, vol 1, p. 92; History,AFSOC, Jan-Dec 1999, vol 1, pp. 86, 88, 96-97. The thirdspecialty included under Air Force Special Tactics wasthat of Special Operations Weather Team personnel. Allthree specialties were under the Air Force’s 720thSpecial Tactics Group. based at Hurlburt Field, Fla. Atthe start of operations in March 1999, in addition to thedeployed helicopters, AFSOC had four MC–130P.tankers and two AC–130U gunships stationed in Italy.10. Interview F. L. Marion, AFHRA, with Lt. Col.Bradley P. Thompson (USAF), Dec 18, 2006.11. Whitcomb, On a Steel Horse I Ride, p. 447. 12. Interview Darrel Whitcomb, with Col. (USAF,Ret.) Paul Harmon, Oct 15, 2009; Interview DarrelWhitcomb, with Brig. Gen. Tom Trask, Aug 12, 2009.13. Interview Darrel Whitcomb, with Col. Jim Slife,Jan 26, 2010; Interview Darrel Whitcomb, with Col.Jim Cardoso, Sept 21, 2009.14. Whitcomb, On a Steel Horse I Ride, pp. 448-449.15. Ibid., pp. 448-49. 16. Interview Whitcomb – Cardoso.

17. Whitcomb, On a Steel Horse I Ride, pp. 449-454.18. Ibid., pp. 449-50.19. Ibid.20. Ibid., p. 450.21. Ibid.22. Interview Darrel Whitcomb with CMSgt (USAF,Ret) Ed Hux, Feb 1, 2010.23. Interview Whitcomb - Hux.24. History, AFSOC, Jan-Dec 1999, vol 1, p. 104-105;email, CMSgt Wayne G. Norrad (USAF, Ret) toMarion, Aug 31, 2010; email, SMSgt Robert Lapointe(USAF, Ret) to Marion, Sep. 6, 2010; email, Dale P.Zelko to Marion, Sep. 29, 2010; email, Donald J.Cantwell to Marion, Jul 26, 2011; Richard J. Newman,“Silver Stars,” Air Force Magazine, vol. 83 (Jun. 2000),pp. 82-83.25. Interview Whitcomb - Cardoso.26. History, AFSOC, Jan-Dec 1999, vol 1, pp. 101-102,105; Newman, “Silver Stars,” pp. 82-83; Whitcomb, Ona Steel Horse I Ride, p. 666.27. History, Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service,1 July 1970 – 30 June 1971, vol 1, p. 191.28. Whitcomb, On a Steel Horse I Ride, p. 453. 29. Whitcomb, On a Steel Horse I Ride, p. 454.30. Report, One Year Report . . . Air War Over Serbia,pp. 71-72; Interview F. L. Marion, AFHRA,with Lt ColStephan J. Laushine, Sep. 10, 2001.31. Whitcomb, On a Steel Horse I Ride, p. 456.32. History, AFSOC, Jan-Dec 1999, vol 1, pp. 106-107;Report, One Year Report . . . Air War Over Serbia, p. 48;Interview Marion - Laushine.33. History , AFSOC, Jan-Dec 1999, vol 1, pp. 107-108; Interview Marion - Laushine; email, AndrewKubik to Marion, Jul 6, 2011; Newman, “Silver Stars,”p. 82; Presentation. Lt. Col. Bill Denehan, CSARConference, Moody AFB, GA, May 30 2014.34. History, AFSOC, Jan-Dec 1999, vol 1, p. 108;Newman, “Silver Stars,” p. 82.35. History AFSOC, Jan-Dec 1999, vol 1, p. 108-109;Interview Marion - Laushine; Newman, “Silver Stars,”p. 82; Presentation. Lt Col Bill Denehan, CSARConference, Moody AFB, GA, May 30 2014.36. Email, SMSgt. Jeremy S. Hardy (USAF) toMarion, Sep. 3, 2010.37. Report, One Year Report . . . Air War Over Serbia,p. 48 [emphasis added].


NOTES

ful combat rescues of Vega–31 and Hammer–34were, in the words of the official USAF report onthe campaign, “among the most significant tacticalsuccesses of the air war over Serbia.” Arguably, itwas only the success of both rescues—particularlythe first—that precluded their strategic signifi-

cance from being more readily appreciated. Putanother way, had a U.S. Air Force F–117 pilot beencaptured and shown to the world on camera, thesituation would have been far more than a tacticalissue for the U.S. and its allies; rather, a strategicand political crisis of the highest order.37 �

Table 2. Special Tactics Personnel, “Hammer-34” F-16 Rescue, May 2, 1999

MH-53M (Chalk Lead) MH-53J (Chalk 2) MH-60G (Chalk 3)Robert W. B. (PJ) Darryl C. (PJ) Ronald E. (PJ)Isaiah S. (PJ) Juan M. Ridout (PJ) Jeremy S. Hardy (PJ)Ryan M. Stanhope (CCT) Christopher B. (CCT) Andrew Kubik (CCT)

Source: Hist , AFSOC, Jan-Dec 1999, vol 1, pp 106-109; vol 5, SD 111-19 ; email (U), SMSgt Jeremy S.Hardy (USAF) to Marion, Sep 3, 2010; various emails.

38 AIR POWERHistory / FALL 2014

AIR POWERHistory / FALL 2014 39

Phillip S. Meilinger

Getting to the Target:The Penetration Problemin Strategic Air Commandduring the 1950s

sion. In January 1945, he took command of the XXIBomber Command in the Mariana Islands—theB–29s conducting a strategic bombing campaignagainst Japan. He was still on Guam when theatomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima andNagasaki ending the war. After the surrender,LeMay served in research and development on theAir Staff, and then became the air commander inGermany. When a replacement was needed at SACin October 1948, LeMay was the obvious choice. In1951, he would pin on a fourth star: at age 44 he wasthe second youngest full general in American his-tory behind U.S. Grant who beat him by a fewmonths.6

The next several years would witness a dra-matic increase in capability of Strategic AirCommand.7 LeMay was famous for his emphasis onrigorous and realistic training. Although someargued the advent of atomic and later nuclearweapons made the need for accuracy moot, LeMaydisagreed. He drilled his crews relentlessly on thenecessity of putting bombs precisely on target.Other problems existed that were just as funda-mental: How would SAC bombers penetrate deepinside Soviet airspace in the event of war, find theirtargets, and successfully attack them? The extremedistances involved, combined with increasinglyrobust Soviet air defenses, made these formidableproblems. Several potential solutions presented


Strategic Air Command (SAC) was established inMarch 1946 by commanding general of the U.S.Army Air Forces (AAF), Gen. Carl A. Spaatz.

SAC was meant to be the jewel in the AAF crownand was thus given the largest number of assets inpersonnel, aircraft and funding. Its mission wasdeterrence, but if that failed, SAC was expected tolaunch an atomic air attack and defeat the enemy.That enemy was assumed to be its erstwhile ally,the Soviet Union. The commander of the commandwas Gen. George C. Kenney, a senior airman whohad served with Gen. Douglas MacArthur in thePacific for much of the war. SAC immediatelyencountered hard times.

Demobilization after the war hit all of the ser-vices hard. The AAF went from 232 total groupsdown to ninety within six months of VJ-Day andover the next two years would fall to forty-eight;worse, few of those groups were even combat-ready.1Although SAC was supposed to be the elite corpswithin the air arm, it was hard hit as well. Chronicshortages of skilled personnel led to a dismal air-craft-in-commission rate of forty-two percent.2When SAC launched a maximum effort simulatedbombing attack against New York City in May1947, only 101 of 180 bombers were able to make itto the target—and this was without anyone shoot-ing at them. Several months later SAC tried again,against Chicago, but the results were even worse.3

When the Berlin crisis broke out in mid-1948and the Soviets blockaded the city, it appeared theworld was moving towards war. Fortunately, thatwas averted, and the newly created U.S. Air Forceinstead launched a massive airlift to supply thebeleaguered city with food and coal. The eleven-month Berlin Airlift was one of the greatestWestern victories of the Cold War, and it wasachieved without firing a shot.4 SAC was nonethe-less in the limelight during that period, because ifmatters escalated and shooting began, U.S. warplans made it clear that the few ground troopsinvolved in occupation duties in Germany wouldserve merely as speed bumps as the massive SovietArmy sped to the English Channel. But SAC wasnot ready, and internal investigations by the AirForce revealed that depressing fact.5 Kenney wasrelieved and a new commander was brought in tostraighten things out—Lieutenant General CurtisE. LeMay.

LeMay, a gruff and no-sense young general, hadenjoyed a meteoric rise during the war. Arriving inEngland as a bomb group commander and lieu-tenant colonel in mid-1943, eighteen months laterhe was a major general in command of a bomb divi-

(Overleaf) The BoeingB–52, the mainstay of SACfor much of the command'sexistence. (All photos cour-tesy of the author.)

Phillip S. Meilinger is a retired USAF colonel who served thirty years as a command pilot, staff officerand educator. He flew C–130 and HC–130 aircraft in Europe and the Pacific, and was in the PlansDivision on the Air Staff during the First Gulf War in 1991. He received a Ph.D. in military history fromthe University of Michigan and taught at the Air Force Academy, the Naval War College, and was Deanof the School of Advanced Airpower Studies (now School of Advanced Air and Space Studies). His pub-lications include ten books and over 100 articles on military and aviation theory, doctrine and operations.Upon retirement from the Air Force he worked six years in Washington, D.C. as a defense analyst and nowresides in West Chicago, Illinois..

ALTHOUGHSAC WASSUPPOSEDTO BE THEELITE CORPS…CHRONICSHORTAGESOF SKILLEDPERSONNELLED TO ADISMAL AIR-CRAFT-IN-COMMISSIONRATE

A NEW COMMANDERWASBROUGHT INTOSTRAIGHTENTHINGS OUT:LIEUTENANTGENERALCURTIS E.LEMAY

SAC would be the equalizer. But Moscow was a longway from the U.S.—5,000 miles—how could thebombers extend their range? A Heavy Bombard -ment Committee met in September 1947 at SACheadquarters and discussed the problem. Very longrange aircraft like the B–36 was one answer, but thesleek new jet-powered B–47 then in the develop-ment stage was only a medium bomber. Air refuel-ing was the obvious solution.8

On June 30, 1948, SAC formed its first air refu-eling squadron, and in December an air-refueledB–50 flew non-stop for 10,000 miles.9 In February1949 another B–50 made the first non-stop aroundthe world flight using eight in-flight refuelingsalong the way. Upon landing back in Texas, LeMaystressed the flight’s importance: “This means thatwe can now deliver an atomic bomb to any place inthe world that requires an atomic bomb.”10

Over the next several years methods weretested to improve the speed and efficiency of in-flight refueling. A “probe and drogue” system involv-ing a hose reeled out from the tanker with a basketattached shaped like a huge shuttlecock was onesuch method. The receiver aircraft was equippedwith a probe that plugged into the basket. This sys-tem worked well for small aircraft, but large planeswere difficult to maneuver while trying to plug abasket.11 In addition, the amount of fuel transferredby this method was limited, approximately 250 gal-lons per minute. Other problems included oscilla-tion and whipping of the hose and fuel leaks.12Nonetheless, the system was useful for fighters. InSeptember 1950 an F–84E flew non-stop fromEngland to Maine—a flight of ten hours that was atransatlantic first for a jet fighter.13 During theKorean War a squadron of KB–29s deployed toJapan to test the system in combat with jet fighters.The world’s first combat air refueling took place onJuly 6, 1951. Far East Air Force (FEAF) and Tactical


(Left) Gen. George C.Kenney, commander of FarEast Air Forces duringWorld War II and the firstcommander of SAC.

(Above) The Boeing B–17was a workhorse in WorldWar II and was involved inearly tests of air refuelingduring the war.

(Right) Lt. Gen. Curtis E.LeMay upon taking over ascommander of SAC. Hewould later pin on a fourthstar and become the sec-ond youngest full generalin American history.

The Boeing B–50, anupgraded version of theB–29 that had more power-ful engines and a taller tail.

themselves, one of these concerned increasing therange of existing bombers via air refueling.

The Challenge of Range

Although Allied bombers had the range toreach most targets in Nazi-occupied Europe, the dis-tances in the Pacific were far greater and it was notuntil mid-1944 that forward bases and long-rangeB–29 bombers were available. On the other hand,experience proved that despite prewar doctrine,fighter escort for the bombers was necessary. Untilthe arrival of the P–51, such long-range fighterswere not available. Air refueling would have beenuseful, for both the bombers and the fighters.

Despite experiments in April 1943, using aB–24 as a tanker with a B–17 as a receiver, theprocedures were too complex to employ the systemon a major scale. Air refueling was not even con-sidered for fighter escort during the war, however,perhaps because of the sheer scale of the prob-lem—by mid-1944 there were over 5,000 U.S.fighters in Europe. At a time when factories werestraining to produce aircraft to supply a globalwar, building hundreds of tankers was unthink-able. The issue of air refueling lay dormant untilthe Cold War when the advantages offered by airrefueling were reexamined.

The U.S. and its allies were outnumbered by atleast three-to-one on the ground in postwar Europe.

THE U.S. ANDITS ALLIESWERE OUT-NUMBEREDBY AT LEASTTHREE-TO-ONE … INPOSTWAREUROPE

Air Command were pleased with the realization ofhow air refueling could impact fighter operations. In1952, tankers began escorting and refueling fightersquadrons across both the Atlantic and the Pacific.In July, operation FOX PETER I deployed the 31stFighter Wing to Japan: 58 F–84Gs, led and periodi-cally refueled by KB–29s, flew from Turner AFB inGeorgia to Japan. It would be the first of many suchdeployments. SAC, which contained several fighterescort wings, deployed them to Korea to practice thenew procedure in anticipation of a major war.14

The limitations of the probe and drogue systemfor large aircraft led to the flying boom. By 1950Boeing had perfected the use of a boom extendingdown and telescoping out from the rear of a tanker.A boom operator, sitting in the old tail gunner’s posi-tion, could actually “fly” it via a small wings termed“ruddervators.” The receiver aircraft maneuveredbehind the tanker and flew formation; the boomerwould then fly his probe into the other aircraft’sreceptacle. The boom system transferred fuel at 600gallons-per-minute—more than twice that of theprobe and drogue.15 The first boom-equippedKB–29P was delivered to SAC on September 1,1950.

Over the next several years the number oftankers in SAC exploded—by the end of 1954 therewere 683 tankers in thirty-two squadrons.16 Withthe move towards an all-jet bomber force, however,even the KB–29s and KC–97s were inadequate.Piston-driven tankers could not keep up with the jet

bombers, nor could they reach their altitude whenloaded with fuel. As a result, B–47s had to descendand slow down to rendezvous with the tankers.What ensued became almost comical. As the B–47took on gas and grew heavier, its stall speedincreased, which meant it had to accelerate in ordernot to fall out of the sky. This in turn required boththe tanker and the bomber to go into a descent inorder to pick up speed to stay above a stall.Eventually, both aircraft would then go into a climb.As the airspeed slowly bled off, another descent wasnecessary. This porpoise maneuver, while con-nected, required inordinate skill for both the tankerand the bomber pilot. Moreover, once the refuelingwas accomplished, the B–47 had to climb back tocruising altitude and accelerate—a process thatused up 25 percent more fuel than if the refuelinghad occurred at the bomber’s altitude and cruisingspeed.17 The Air Force needed a jet tanker, and thesolution was the KC–135, born in 1955.

The KC–135 provided a quantum jump in capa-bility over the KB–29. It could carry 31,200 gallonsof fuel, while also hauling 40 tons of cargo or 160passengers. The jet tanker could offload six times asmuch fuel as the KB–29 and twice that of theKB–97, and because it had twice the range of theKB–97, it meant that one KC–135 could take theplace of three or more piston-driven tankers.Moreover, the “Stratotanker” could do so at thesame speed and altitude as the B–47 and B–52.18SAC embraced the KC–135 and purchased 732 of


The Boeing B–47 mediumbomber using Jet AssistedTake Off bottles for a maxi-mum effort takeoff. TheB–47 replaced the B–29and B–50.

IN 1952,TANKERSBEGANESCORTINGAND REFUEL-ING FIGHTERSQUADRONSACROSSBOTH THEATLANTICAND THEPACIFIC

them, while also buying 744 B–52s. These aircraftwere to become a team over the next severaldecades.

Entering Enemy Airspace

Range was crucial, but it was not the only prob-lem. The B–17s and B–24s had been able to reachtargets in Germany, but enemy interceptors proveda major menace. Fighter escort was essential, butdesigning and building small, agile fighters with therequisite range was a technological challenge. TheP–51 Mustang solved the problem during the war,but the concern reemerged afterwards.

When SAC was formed in 1946 it was assumedescort would be necessary for the B–29s if they wentagainst the Soviet Union. SAC therefore includedescort wings in its numbered air forces. Originally,SAC was to have twelve fighter wings, but thatnumber dropped quickly. In mid-1946 there wasonly one wing operational (two others on paper); by

late 1947 there were five; a year later it was downto two; and in 1951 back up to seven.19 In April 1950LeMay admitted that SAC had no long-range escortcapability.20 Because targets in the Soviet Unionwere even farther off than had been German facto-ries, the issue of long-range escort was obvious. SACbegan to experiment.

First, air refueling was used to extend therange of existing fighter jets like the F–84, but thiswas insufficient for going all the way to the targetand back. The arrival of jet bombers meant thatalthough the F–84 could stay with the B–50 andB–36, it lacked the speed and altitude capability toaccompany B–47s. Moreover, the appearance of theSoviet MiG-15 during the Korean War revealed theF–84s were outmatched. A study conducted by SACin February 1951 revealed that “neither currentescort fighters nor programmed escort fighters havea capability of adequately defending bombers” andas a result, the bomber force would “suffer an unac-ceptable loss rate during daylight conditions overenemy territory defended by interceptors.”21

Because range for fighter escorts remained amajor obstacle, unusual—if not bizarre—solutionswere offered. In 1948 a parasite fighter, the XF–85“Goblin,” was built to be carried inside the bomb bayof a B–36. The intent was for F–85-carryingbombers to accompany the nuclear-toting B–36sinto enemy territory. If enemy interceptorsappeared, two “Goblins” would be dropped via atrapeze mechanism, ignite their engines, andmaneuver to take on the attackers. At the conclu-sion of the dogfight, the F–85s would return to theB–36, reattach to the trapeze, and be lifted back intothe bomb bay.22 The XF–85 flew four times, but re-engaging the trapeze proved so difficult the projectwas dropped.

SAC experimented with other ideas for itsfighter force besides escort. The revolution innuclear weapons design that made them dramati-


The Convair B–36, a hybridwith turboprops and jetsthat was used as a bomber,reconnaissance asset andelectronic warfare aircraft.

The F–85 "Goblin,"designed to be carriedinternally by a B–36 andthen deployed via trapezeto serve as an escortfighter while in Soviet air-space.

RANGE WASCRUCIAL,BUT IT WASNOT THEONLY PROBLEM

cally smaller and lighter meant fighters coulddeliver them as well. In January 1953, SAC con-verted its F–84s so they could carry the newweapons and become part of the nuclear strikeforce—perhaps small, quick fighters could pene-trate more successfully than big bombers. The prob-lem of range remained, however, so one schemeincluded mounting a trapeze bracket on the under-side of a B–36. An F–84F would be attached to thetrapeze (which was external and not in the bombbay as with the XF–85) and would carry a nuclearweapon. Upon entering Soviet airspace the fighterwould be dropped and zoom off to deliver its bomb.It would then return to its mother ship, reattachitself to the trapeze and both would return home.23In a related concept, straight-wing F–84Es wouldattach themselves to the wing tips of a modifiedB–36. The fighters would then shut down theirengines and be “towed” by the bomber to enemy air-space where the faster and more maneuverablefighters would restart their engines, detach, and flyon to drop their nuclear weapons. They would thenreattach to the bomber for the ride home.24

These ideas went nowhere, but the fact theywere even attempted illustrates the seriousness ofthe problem. The Korean War indicated once againthat unescorted bombers would have difficulty pen-etrating even modest air defenses in daylight—andduring the summer months northern Russia wasalways in daylight. Yet, repeated attempts to build asuitable escort fighter were unsuccessful.Eventually, SAC gave up on the escort idea: thefighter force, which had never been a high prioritywithin the command, was given to other commandsthat could make better use of it. The original prob-lem remained: how would SAC’s bombers penetrateenemy airspace to complete their mission?

The Forward Basing Option

Other solutions seemed to offer better results.SAC built deployment bases on the periphery of the

Soviet Union. Escort fighters would launch in theevent of war, top-off their tanks with air refuelingonce airborne, and then escort the bombers as far aspossible into enemy territory before turning back.25This idea ran into difficulties.

The greatest utility of overseas bases is theyare near potential crisis areas. The greatest limita-tion of overseas bases is they are near potential cri-sis areas. The issue was vulnerability. Plans calledfor SAC aircraft to base at forward locations inEurope, the Middle East and Asia—within un-refu-eled striking distance of their targets.26 With thedetonation of the Soviet atomic bomb in August1949, SAC realized such forward bases wereincreasingly vulnerable. It therefore pushed forbases in North Africa—close enough to the SovietUnion for staging, but far enough back to allowsome protection from an enemy strike.27Construction began on four bases in FrenchMorocco, and the first was completed in 1951. Threemore bases were built in Spain.28 These, along withairfields in England, Turkey and on Guam, wouldserve as bulwarks of an overseas basing systemdesigned to outflank the Soviet Union. To be sure,numerous bases would also be built throughoutGermany, Italy, France, etc. for short-range fighteraircraft, but the bombing offensive was initiallyplanned to rely on bases farther back.

General LeMay recognized the vulnerability ofoverseas airbases and in January 1952 stated hisgoal as “to launch our offensive from this conti-nent.”29 That was not yet possible so forward baseswere essential. In 1954, however, a study by theRAND think tank concluded those forward baseswere highly vulnerable to a Soviet first strike, espe-cially if nuclear weapons were used. The analystsexamined the distances involved and then com-pared the forward-basing scheme against a scenariorelying on US-based aircraft with intercontinentalrange. Their conclusion was stark: regarding for-ward basing “we can expect the majority of the forceto suffer serious damage on the ground.”30 That


An F–84F being droppedfrom the trapeze of a B–36in an attempt to solve theproblem of fighter escortand penetration for thebombers.

THE GREATESTUTILITY [ANDGREATESTLIABILITY] OFOVERSEASBASES ISTHEY ARENEAR POTENTIALCRISISAREAS

sounded too much like Pearl Harbor and ClarkField in 1941, so RAND called for a U.S.-basedbomber force relying on air refueling and brief stopsat staging bases in Europe and the Middle East—the concept LeMay favored.31

This report had a significant impact. In exerciseFULL HOUSE that same year, SAC used forwardbases for post-strike staging only. In other words, airrefueling would allow the bomber force coming fromthe U.S. to hit their targets; on the way back theywould stop in England, the Middle East or Guam torefuel. Because of this exercise, SAC made the post-strike profile their basic war plan.32

Within a year of the RAND study the Air Forcehad placed an order for its first KC–135 tanker, andwithin a decade it had bought over 700, of whichover 400 are still in service. As SAC became morereliant on the long-range B–52, plans would changeagain. The new U.S. strategy in the event of war wasto launch the B–52 fleet from secure bases in thecontinental US—air refueling would get them totheir targets and back. The bombers would lift offfrom their bases and hit tankers flying out of GooseBay, Thule, etc. fly to their targets in the SovietUnion, and hit the tankers again on their wayhome.33

The Importance of Electronic Warfare andCountermeasures

The need for aerial refueling, the problem ofpenetrating enemy airspace, the resultant inabilityto provide escort fighters, and the crucial issue ofoverseas airbases all related to the difficulty in car-rying out the war plan. How would SAC fulfill itstask of delivering a devastating bombing offensive?All the factors just noted chipped away at the prob-lem but left unanswered the fundamental problemof how precisely would the bombers reach targetsdeep in the Soviet Union, destroy them, and maketheir way back to safety?

The solution finally adopted by SAC was tosend its bomber force in without escort, employinginstead electronic countermeasures (ECM) anddecoys to slip past Soviet defenses. These, in addi-tion to high altitude penetration, were a temporarysolution. Before surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), themain threat to aircraft was from interceptors andantiaircraft artillery (AAA). One of the majoraspects of the B–36 debate with the Navy in 1949was whether the big bomber could get through; thesailors thought jet interceptors would be able toknock it down. The introduction of the B–47 andB–52 upped the altitude capability of the bomberswhile also increasing speed. It was believed a 600mph bomber at 40,000 feet would make it through.Unfortunately, the deployment of high-altitudecapable SAMs, specifically the Soviet SA-2 systemthat shot down the U-2 of Francis Gary Powers inMay 1960, put an end to that idea. The reverse ideawas then suggested—the bombers would go in atlow altitude—barely above the tree tops and thushopefully below the capabilities of the Soviet SAMsand radar-guided AAA.34 Sometimes, bombers—like

the B–58—would go in fast and low; at other times,B–52s would go in low and slow, trusting to ECM forsafety. It was an on-going and complex cat-and-mouse game fought between SAC and Soviet airstrategists and tacticians throughout the Cold War.

There were still problems. Most ECM operatorswere demobilized when the war ended, decimatinghe electronic warfare field in the AAF. SAC wasespecially hard hit because it was more dependenton electronic warfare than anyone else. Yet, whenthe war ended, of the 5,600 electronic warfare (EW)specialists needed by the AAF, over 70 percent weremustered out by March 1946. Worse, SAC personnelpolicies ensured such vital individuals were made tofeel unwelcome. Major General ClementsMcMullen, the vice commander of SAC untilSeptember 1948, had little use for non-rated officers(those not wearing wings)—which most EW spe-cialists were—and he labored to push them out ofhis command. By mid-1947 there were barely adozen such officers left in SAC.35

Major General Roger Ramey at Eighth AirForce wrote LeMay that his command needed farmore personnel and equipment devoted to this area.Specifically, the B–29s needed jammers to counterSoviet radars; otherwise, SAC bombers would havelittle chance of penetrating enemy airspace.36Another report was even grimmer: the need forECM was of “desperate urgency”; otherwise, takingon soviet radars would be “inordinately dangerous.”The SAC history confesses that when LeMayassumed command “the electronic countermeasurescapability in SAC units was practically non-exis-tent.”37

In January 1951, an exercise to test the ECMcapability of B–50s against air defenses was a neartotal failure—the bombers reached the “target”(Abilene, Texas) with barely half their requiredECM gear still working—had it been actual combat,the attacking force would have been decimated.38The few dozen jammers existing in SAC in 1949were of Second World War vintage; even those werenot installed on the aircraft. Instead, racks werebuilt into the bombers, and if intelligence gatheredfor the mission to be flown indicated a threat, jam-mers would be installed. There was not enoughroom to install enough jammers to counter theentire frequency spectrum; instead, analysts wouldprovide guidance on what threats the crew waslikely to face and the specific jammer needed wasthen loaded on board. Even so, the B–29 and B–50were not programmed to carry an ECM operator. Ifjammers were installed, a gunner would standdown, the radio operator would become a gunner,and the ECM expert would sit in.39

The above illustrates that when SAC sent itsB–29s to war in Korea, they were unprepared for aserious ECM fight. Far East Air Forces had paidalmost no attention to electronic warfare.Fortunately, North Korean air defenses were of aprimitive nature, so the B–29s met little opposition,at first. Although the B–29’s ECM gear was obso-lescent, the left-over Japanese radars used by theNorth Koreans were worse. That changed with the


HOW PRE-CISELYWOULD THEBOMBERSREACHTARGETSDEEP IN THESOVIETUNION,DESTROYTHEM, ANDMAKE THEIRWAY BACKTO SAFETY?

THE SOLU-TION FINALLYADOPTED BYSAC WAS TOSEND ITSBOMBERFORCE INWITHOUTESCORT,EMPLOYINGINSTEADELECTRONICCOUNTER-MEASURESAND DECOYS

Chinese intervention and the arrival of MiG-15sand Soviet-made radars. Now the B–29s wouldhave to fight their way to the target. The dearth ofsuitable ECM personnel and gear was quickly feltand classically revealed when the ECM operatoradded to the B–29 was not even afforded a real crewposition. He monitored his instruments sitting onthe crew chemical toilet that included no seat belt,oxygen hookup or intercom jack!40

Tactics called for ECM-equipped RB–29s toaccompany the bomb droppers to help nullify enemyradar defenses. Even so, by mid-1951 the B–29swere in trouble. On the evening of June 11, 1951,the bombers ran into MiGs receiving guidance fromground sites using Russian gun-laying and search-light radars. Of the four bombers, two were shotdown and the other two severely damaged. Makingconditions worse was LeMay’s decree that the latestECM equipment could not be utilized by the B–29sin Korea. LeMay feared that using the full panoplyof electronic systems would provide the Soviets andChinese too much intelligence on American capabil-ities. He wanted to hold back information to protectSAC in the event “real war” broke out and thebombers would have to go against the full might ofSoviet or Chinese defenses. As a result, the latestjammers were not sent to the Far East. Partly, thiswas due to the lack of room and electrical power out-put of the B–29s—as noted, the ECM operator didnot even rate a true crewmember position.41

Even so, the Korean War laboratory providedinsights into Soviet and Chinese equipment andtactics, while also training and educating a newgeneration of SAC crewmembers on the importanceof electronic warfare. Obviously, SAC was surprisedby the quality and capability of Soviet equipment. Ithad been customary to disparage Russian technol-ogy and assume it was a generation behind thatmade in America. The explosion of a Soviet atomicbomb years ahead of schedule and the appearanceof the MiG–15 over North Korea quickly disabusedAmerican airmen of these notions. It was also notlost on LeMay and his command that just as SAChad held back some of its latest and best equipmentso as not to tip its hand, so too were the Sovietsprobably holding back to mask their own capabili-ties.

By the end of the Korean War, LeMay realizedECM was crucial to the survivability of the SACbomber force, and during that period its ECM bud-get quintupled.42 By the end of 1954 the B–36—butespecially the RB–36—was fitted with increasinglyadvanced ECM gear. The plane’s size made theincorporation of extra equipment, antennae and anadditional ECM crewmember a simple task.43 TheB–47, on the other hand, was virtually defenselesswhen first built—it was thought the bomber’s highspeed and altitude capability would keep it safe.The emergence of the MiG–19 put an end to suchfolly. Eventually, the “Stratojet” was equipped withan automatic jamming pod installed in the bombbay: EB–47s would accompany the bombers to cleara path in to the target and back out. In later modelstwo ECM operators would occupy the pod duringflight.44 The B–52 would be the first jet bomberdesigned and built with ECM in mind from the out-set—the crew position of electronic warfare officerwas included from the beginning.45

Summary

How to penetrate Soviet airspace and defenses?That was the major problem confronting SAC at theonset of the Cold War. Range issues remained fun-damental. As the SAC chief of plans, Major GeneralJohn P. McConnell, noted dryly: “as long as theSoviet Union is the enemy and not Canada, rangematters.”46 The distances to targets deep in Russiawere simply too great without either forward basingor air refueling. Both would eventually be used—airbases in Europe, the Middle East and the Pacificwere built to serve as pre-strike staging bases forbombers. LeMay was leery of this concept—he hadcommanded the B–29s in India and their stagingbases in China so he understood the problems. Hewas reluctant to rely on politically risky forwardbases for the success of his mission. Changes of gov-ernment could result in previous basing agreementsgoing awry—this is what happened in Morocco,Libya, Saudi Arabia, France, Iceland and elsewhereand which remains a problem today.

Military risk was another matter. During theBerlin Blockade, LeMay, who was then the air com-mander in Europe, fretted over the vulnerability of


North American F–86s,which served briefly inSAC in the role of airbasedefense.

BY THE ENDOF THEKOREANWAR, LEMAYREALIZEDECM WASCRUCIAL TOTHE SURVIV-ABILITY OFTHE SACBOMBERFORCE

his airfields to a Soviet surprise attack. Stagingbases were nonetheless built because they had tobe. LeMay knew the danger and believed the solu-tion was an intercontinental bomber flying from theU.S. that did not rely on forward airfields. A RANDstudy of 1954 confirmed SAC fears, arguing thatforward bases would be wiped out at the beginningof a nuclear war. European bases were still used,but they would largely be post-strike recoveryfields.47 After refueling they would return home toreload. This became the SAC plan that was enabledby air refueling. This plan soon changed.

The advent of nuclear-tipped ballistic missilesmade even post-strike staging bases vulnerable.LeMay returned to his goal of relying solely on U.S.bases. The advent of the B–52 and KC–135 helpedrealize this aim. In 1954 the Air Force proposedconstruction of a string of radar sites in the Arcticstretching across the Aleutians, Canada,Greenland and Iceland. This DEW Line (DistantEarly Warning) consisting of nearly 100 sites,became operational in April 1957 and providedwarning of a Soviet bomber attack. Even so, thethreat of a Soviet missile first-strike necessitatedchanges: a ballistic missile early warning systemwas built in 1959 to give some warning (fifteenminutes) of a Soviet missile attack.48 This threatalso led to SAC countermoves: dispersal, and bothground and airborne alert programs. This entiresubject illustrates the iterative nature of strategy:weapons or technologies generated new plans,which in turn resulted in enemy counters, leadingto different plans and technologies, which in turnled to more counters, etc. It was a never-endingcycle of actions and reactions.

Aerial refueling was attempted soon after theFirst World War had ended, but was not used dur-ing the Second World War. Air refueling would havebeen useful to enable fighter aircraft to escort thebombers, but technical impediments and the largenumber of escorts used on a given day—nearly a

thousand—made the production of so many tankersimpractical. The capability remained dormant untilafter hostilities ended. At that point the need forrange greater than that during the war forced areexamination of the air refueling issue.

Initially, B–29s were converted to tanker use aswere C–97s. Hundreds were built for SAC and didyeoman service. The advent of the jet bombers indi-cated, however, that piston-driven tankers wereinadequate—a jet tanker was essential, and thesolution was to be the KC–135, of which over 700were purchased by the Air Force.

Air refueling was bound up with the problem ofpenetration. Getting the bombers into Russia wasonly part of the problem: how would they surviveonce there? During the Second World War theEighth Air Force had paid a heavy price for prewarmyopia that argued escort fighters were technicallyinfeasible and unnecessary. It was a huge error, andCurtis LeMay had been a witness to that poor deci-sion. Fighter escort had saved the bomber offensive,and it seemed reasonable to assume escort wouldremain necessary. Yet, the distances involved wereso much greater, the development of a truly long-range escort fighter was simply impossible.Subterfuges were attempted such as parasite fight-ers. Today, such experiments appear silly, but at thetime they were trying to address a real problem.Speed was also attempted as a possible solution, aswas altitude—both high and low.

In the end, it was decided the bombers wouldneed to go in alone, and for this, electronic warfarewas critical. EW had been used during the SecondWorld War when radar, navigation beams and jam-mers were used by all sides. At the end of the warand demobilization, this area hit SAC particularlyhard. The Korean War demonstrated anew howimportant this arcane technology and expertisewere to successful air operations. Fortunately forSAC, the North Koreans were similarly deficient inthis field—the B–29s had a breathing space to catch


B–29s of the 98th BombGroup in action overKorea.

IN THE END,IT WASDECIDED THEBOMBERSWOULD NEEDTO GO INALONE, ANDFOR THIS,ELECTRONICWARFAREWAS CRITI-CAL

1. Herman S. Wolk, The Struggle for Air ForceIndependence, 1943-1947 (Washington, D.C.: Air ForceHistory and Museums Program, 1997), p. 81.2. “Strategic Air Command—1946: Organization,Mission, Training and Personnel,” Official History, vol.I, 28. (Hereinafter the annual official histories will bereferred to as, for example, “SAC History—1946.”There are multiple volumes each year, although notnecessarily the same number. Some volumes consist of“exhibits”—copies of the actual letters, memoranda,etc. upon which the history is based. All of these his-tories are located in the AF Historical Research Agency(AFHRA), at Maxwell AFB in Alabama. The call num-ber for the histories is either 416.01 or K416.01depending on the year.)3. “SAC History—1947,” I, pp. 185-86.4. For a good account of the crisis, see Avi Shlaim,

The United States and the Berlin Blockade, 1948-1949(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983); for theAirlift itself, see Roger G. Miller, To Save a City: TheBerlin Airlift, 1948-1949 (College Station: Texas A&MUniversity Press, 2000).5. The Air Force chief of staff, Gen. Hoyt Vandenberg,called in, among others, his old friend CharlesLindbergh and asked him to visit SAC bases, checkproficiency and readiness, and report back to him. Thereport was damning. “Lindbergh Report,” Sep 14, 1948,LeMay papers, Library of Congress (LOC), box 61.6. There are several biographies of LeMay, but allfail to cover his entire military career in sufficientdepth. The best of a poor group is Thomas M. Coffey,Iron Eagle: The Turbulent Life of General CurtisLeMay (New York: Crown, 1986). 7. By the mid-1950s the Air Force was garnering


NOTES

up. It was not a moment too soon: the Chineseintervention introduced Soviet-made equipment ofa far higher caliber than that of the North Koreans.SAC would scramble to match it.

In short, range extension—air refueling—cou-pled with forward bases, escort fighters, speed/alti-tude tactics, and electronic warfare were all usedand combined in varying mixes to solve the prob-

lem of penetration. The ultimate goal was ensuringSAC bombers reached their targets deep inside theSoviet Union, deployed their weapons accurately,and were then able to get back out of enemy air-space and home. SAC was certain it could to do this,and experimented and trained relentlessly toensure its accomplishment. Fortunately, it neverhad to prove it. �

The Distant Early WarningLine (DEW Line)--a stringof radar sites acrossAlaska and Canada thatserved as the first line ofdefense against a Sovietbomber attack.

nearly half of the Department of Defense budget; SACwas getting around one-third of the Air Force budget.U.S. Dept of Defense, Annual Report of the Secretary ofDefense (Washington, D.C.: GPO, various years, vari-ous pages); and Clark R. Mollenhoff, The Pentagon:Politics, Profits and Plunder (New York: G.P Putnam’sSons, 1967), Appendix A.8. Thomas A. Julian, “The Origins of Air Refueling inthe United States Air Force,” in Jacob Neufeld, GeorgeM. Watson, Jr., and David Chenoweth (eds.) Technologyand the Air Force: A Retrospective Assessment(Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and MuseumsProgram, 1997), pp. 87-88.9. The Boeing B–50 was an updated version of theB–29. It had more powerful engines and a taller tail,but otherwise it was difficult to tell the aircraft apart.The B–50 did have slightly improved performancecharacteristics—better speed, altitude capability,range and payload.10. SAC History—1950, VI, pp. 65-75. 11. “SAC History—1950,”I, 91; ltr., Adams to Cabell,Jan 24, 1950, in “SAC History-1950,” II, exhibit 1. Theprobe and drogue method is still in use today for U.S.Navy/Marine Corps aircraft and helicopters. KC–135scan be modified on the ground to use the probe anddrogue system. The KC–10, and the new Boeingtanker under development, can use either method onthe same flight.12. Ltr., Austin to Cabell, Jan 24, 1950, in “SACHistory—1950,” III, exhibit 1.13. “SAC History—1952,” I, 225-30. This system wasinvaluable for deploying fighter wings overseas duringan emergency—it would ordinarily take several weeksto disassemble a fighter unit, put its aircraft on shipsto be moved overseas, and then for the aircraft to bereassembled after unloading.14. Richard K. Smith, Seventy-Five Years of InflightRefueling (Washington, D.C.: Air Force History andMuseums Program, 1998), pp. 34-38. Eventually, TACgained its own tanker force of KB–50s. 15. Smith, pp. 26-27.16. Ibid, 31. The C–97 was a cargo aircraft based onthe B–29; the KC–97 was modified as a tanker.17. “SAC History—1952,” I, pp. 182-201; Carroll L.Zimmerman, Insider at SAC: Operations Analysisunder General LeMay (Manhattan, Kans.: SunflowerPress, 1988), p. 63.18. “Capabilities and Features of the KC–135 Tanker-Transport,” Sep 10, 1958, AFHRA, file K416.861-1, pp.6-11.19. “Development of Fighter-Escort in Strategic AirCommand Through 1951,” SAC historical study, Jun 1,1952, AFHRA, file K416.01-29, p. 261.20. “Notes from Commanders Conference, ExerciseDUALISM” Apr 25-27, 1950, AFHRA, file 168.15-10, p.219.21. Robert J. Boyd, “SAC Fighter Planes and TheirOperations,” SAC Historical Study, 1988, p. 5.22. Don Pyeatt and Dennis R. Jenkins. Cold WarPeacemaker: The Story of Cowtown and the ConvairB–36 (North Branch, Minn.: Specialty Press, 2010), pp.221-22; Frank Gudaitis, “It Seemed Like a Good Ideaat the Time,” Aviation History, Mar 2011, p. 68. 23. Pyeatt and Jenkins, pp. 222-24. The RepublicF–84 came in different models: most were straight-wing designs termed the “Thunderjet.” The F modelhad swept wings and was called the “Thunderstreak.”The RF–84F reconnaissance version was the“Thunderflash.” 24. Pyeatt and Jenkins, pp. 224-26. C.E. Anderson,

“Dangerous Experiments: Wingtip Coupling at 15,000Feet,” Flight Journal, Dec 2000, pp. 64-72. Initial testswere conducted on a modified B–29. After severaldozen successful flights the idea was abandoned whenan F–84 while connected rolled over onto the bomber—both planes went down and all crewmembers werekilled.25. One of the benefits of air refueling is that aircraftcan fly at a heavier weight than they can take off.Therefore, it is common for aircraft to take off with areduced fuel load but heavy payload, climb to altitude,and then fill their tanks with an air refueling. 26. For the story surrounding these early basingplans, see Elliott V. Converse III, Circling the Earth:United States Plans for a Postwar Overseas MilitaryBase System, 1942-1948 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: AirUniversity Press, 2005).27. “Overseas Bases: A Military and PoliticalEvaluation,” AF History Division study, Apr 2, 1962,AFHRA, file K416.601-13, p. 2.28. Kurt W. Schake, “Strategic Frontier: AmericanBomber Bases Overseas, 1950-1960,” PhDDissertation, Norwegian University of Science andTechnology, 1998, chapter 3.29. “Overseas Bases” study, p. 4.30. A.J. Wohlstetter et. al., “Selection and Use ofStrategic Air Bases,” Study R-266 (Santa Monica:RAND, Apr 1954), p/ viii.31. Ibid, p. xv.32. “Overseas Bases” study, p. 5.33. “SAC History—1956,” II, pp. 175-80.34. Project LONG RANGE was conducted by SAC in1957 testing the feasibility of B–36s penetrating at lowaltitude, around 500 feet, to keep them below radarcoverage. As they approached their targets, thebombers would ascend quickly to “medium altitude” todeliver their weapon. “SAC History—Jan-Jun 1957,” I,p. 73.35. Daniel T. Kuehl, “The Radar Eye Blinded: TheU.S.AF and Electronic Warfare, 1945-1955,” PhDDissertation, Duke University, 1992, pp. 49-53, 63, 80.36. Ibid, 89.37. “SAC History—1951,” I, p. 194,38. Kuehl, pp. 117-18.39. “SAC History—1951,” I, p. 211.40. Kuehl, 127; “SAC History—1951,” I, p. 174. Notevery B–29 carried an ECM operator when going intocombat; usually, one such aircraft would accompany abomber formation to provide protection.41. Kuehl, pp. 160-61. Alwyn T. Lloyd, Boeing’s B–47Stratojet (North Branch, Minn.: Specialty Press, 2005),pp. 181-82.42. “SAC History—1951,” I, p. 213.43. Pyeatt and Jenkins, pp. 125-26.44. Lloyd, p. 111.45. Kuehl, pp. 207-19.46. Elliott A. Converse III, History of Acquisition inthe Department of Defense, Vol. I: Rearming for theCold War, 1945-1960 (Washington, D.C.: Department ofDefense Historical Office, 2012), p. 480.47. Despite their vulnerability, LeMay tolerated theuse of forward bases simply because they compoundedthe Soviets’ targeting problems. Interview with GenCurtis E. LeMay, by Robert M. Kipp and John T. Bohn,Nov 16, 1972, AFHRA, p. 44.48. For the development of the DEW Line and ballis-tic missile warning, see Kenneth Schaffel, TheEmerging Shield: The Air Force and the Evolution ofContinental Air Defense, 1945-1960 (Washington, D.C.:Air Force History Office, 1991), chapters 8-10.



Developing the Next Generation ofMilitary Leaders: Challenges, Impera -tives, and Strategies Edited by JulieBélanger and Psalm Lew. Kingston, Onta -rio: Canadian Defence Academy Press,2011. Diagrams. Charts. Tables. Notes.Glossary. Index. Pp. 206. $34.95 ISBN:978-1-100-19212-3

This book is the result of the 2011International Military Leadership Asso -cia tion (IMLA) Annual Meeting. It con-tains some of the weaknesses of such vol-umes but also has significant strengths,since most of the articles are excellent inpresentation and analysis. It is also strik-ingly diverse in the national representa-tions of its authors (United States,Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Singa -pore, Switzerland, The Netherlands, andIndonesia) and quite current in its contentand scholarship. It provides a lot of engag-ing contemporary thought regarding lead-ership issues and approaches from variousperspectives that are all focused onimproving leadership development for thefuture.

The volume covers many pertinenttopics. From an American perspective, oneexample is an examination into the gener-ational differences in military organiza-tions with the rise of EMO and Gen Xcohorts and their potential relationship toa military charged with conducting awider variety of military operations withthe rise of COIN. Other articles look atirregular warfare and new domains forconflict, such as cyber. There is also anintriguing essay on the interplay betweeneconomics, strategy, and security in thewake of the recent global recession and theleadership challenges this poses. FromCanada, there are two excellent essays onthe relationship between traditional edu-cation and experiential leadership educa-tion in both the active forces and at theRoyal Military College of Canada.

The chapter relating Fourth Genera -tion Warfare to leadership development inIndonesia is fascinating. There are a fewentries discussing leadership developmentin New Zealand and Australia within theranks and at the strategic level. Anotherchapter focuses on challenges dealing withnetworks and globalization from a Swissperspective. Finally, chapters originatingfrom Singapore and The Netherlandsfocus on developing leadership capacitywithin their respective military organiza-tions.

The authors of these diverse chaptersare a mixture of serving officers and acad-emics. The issues analyzed are timely andgermane to current and future challengesand provide a lot of useful frameworks foranalysis, comparison, and utility in many

forums both in and out of the military.Overall, the compendium is quite good anda nice fit for anybody interested in study-ing military leadership or interested indiversifying perspectives in a professionalmilitary setting.

John G. Terino, Jr., Associate Professor, AirCommand and Staff College

You Are Here: From the Compass toGPS, the History and Future of HowWe Find Ourselves. By Hiawatha Bray.New York: Basic Books, 2014. Notes.Index. Pp. xiv, 258. $27.99 HardcoverISBN: 978-0-465-03285-3

Knowing one’s position relative tofriend and foe, how to get from point A topoint B, and the synchronized timing ofevents, always have been important to thesuccess of military operations. In our mod-ern workaday world, positioning, naviga-tion, and timing (PNT) also have becomenecessary for efficiently conducting busi-ness and personal affairs. While relativelyfew users of the Global Positioning System(GPS) might know that the Department ofDefense developed it and Air Force SpaceCommand operates it, millions of peoplearound the world take its availability forgranted. For nearly two decades, GPS hasbeen acknowledged as a global utility thatprovides extremely accurate, free PNT toanyone with a properly calibrated receiver.

In You Are Here, Bray takes readerson a skillfully crafted, delightfully read-able historical odyssey. Beginning with theancient skill of celestial navigation, thistechnology reporter for the Boston Globeguides us on a tour de force through theappearance of the compass, chronometer,radio, gyroscope, atomic clock, and more.He explains, in easy-to-understand terms,how these inventions contributed to theconceptualization and development ofGPS. Bray does not forget the importantindividuals�Ivan Getting, Roger Easton,and Brad Parkinson�who formed brilliantteams and pioneered three-dimensional,space-based PNT. He acknowledges theEaston-Parkinson dispute about who real-ly “invented” GPS and delivers an even-handed assessment of both individuals’contributions. Anyone interested in thetechnical roots of this issue should readthe recently published, GPS Declassified(2013) by Richard Easton and Eric Frazer.

An excellent synthesis of secondarysources, You Are Heremorphs midway intosomething more than a history of naviga-tion. Bray explores how the availability ofextremely precise PNT has revolutionizedsocial interaction around the world and

created significant privacy issues. Ratherthan relying on sometimes inaccurate offi-cial maps, people can now make their ownby strolling through an area to fill indetails. People can automate their maps torecord traffic problems, hazardous condi-tions, or other transient phenomena.Building GPS into phones and adding aWi-Fi location service, subscribers canlocate each other in crowded downtownsand easily rendezvous at the nearestStarbucks. Humankind essentially hassolved its age-old problem of location.

In the process, however, Bray per-ceives that the perfection of PNT has cor-roded our privacy, the right to be left alone.Once, people had the freedom to disappearby moving around; now, in countless ways,devices with embedded PNT capabilitiestrack our every move, impinging on ourfreedom to lose ourselves in the crowd.Bray finds a disturbing irony in the obser-vation that many people seem unper-turbed or unoffended that they no longerhave the freedom to move around unob-served or undetected. For those peoplewanting to reclaim their privacy, he sug-gests that only legislation, judicial fiat, orpublic outrage can limit societal or govern-mental intrusions. Then almost as anafterthought, Bray finds hope in privacyfeatures built into the software on mobiledevices.

You Are Here presents some interest-ing history and poses some intriguingquestions. Devoid of academic pomposityand intellectual stuffiness, it drawsexperts and general readers alike into atechnologically sophisticated and unbe-lievably complicated tale. Moreover, itleaves one wondering about the implica-tions of what the inventors and users ofGPS have wrought. If anyone could ask formore, it might be an examination of howGPS has transformed modern warfare, butMichael Russell Rip and James Hasik ini-tially tackled that subject in The PrecisionRevolution (2002).

Dr. Rick W. Sturdevant, Deputy Director ofHistory, HQ Air Force Space Command

The Same Yet Different: Continuityand Change in the Canada-UnitedStates Post 9/11 Security Relation -ship. By Bernard James Brister. Kings -ton, Ontario: Canadian Defence AcademyPress, 2012. Notes. Bibliography. Appen -dices. Index. Pg. ii, 234. Paperback is freeISBN: 978-1-100-19744-9

Canada and the United States havehad a close and cooperative relationshipespecially because of shared security

Book Reviews

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objectives. From the Canadian perspec-tive, however, an underlying considerationin the relationship has been its concern forpreserving Canadian sovereignty. Appre -hen sion in the United States for its ownsecurity following the incredible attacks of9/11 had a ripple effect on relations withCanada. Brister has examined how 9/11—as a watershed event—challenged thebinational security relationship of the twonations.

Brister first explains why the SecondWorld War and the Cold War joined thetwo nations in common purpose. He pointsout that Canada aligned its own nationalpolicies with those of the United States onmajor issues of security because it, withthe other Western nations, sought securityunder the umbrella of global Americanpower.

In the aftermath of the Cold War,there emerged a growing pattern of diver-gence between American global policy andthat of Canada, although Canada contin-ued to commit forces to overseas contin-gencies. Canada, pleased with its traderelationship with the United States, espe-cially with the North American Free TradeAgreement (NAFTA) implementation,focused more, in the pre-9/11 relationship,on economic security over physical securi-ty. The 9/11 attacks on the Americanhome land, however, compelled bothnations to revisit their security relation-ship. The consequences of change raisedagain concerns for Canadian sovereignty.Interestingly, some of the issues Bristerraises in this book are also the subjectmatter of the very popular televisionseries, The Border, a Canadian productionthat depicts the changes in securityarrangements in everyday situations andtheir impact on the average Canadian’sattitude toward the United States.

Brister also addresses the most visi-ble component of the Canada-U.S. securityarrangement: NORAD (North AmericanAerospace Defense Command). In thepost-Cold War era and prior to 9/11, is rel-evance had become unclear as a conse-quence of significant diminution in globaltensions. In the moments after hijackedaircraft crashed into the World TradeCenter towers, NORAD suddenly becamea major player in defense of the homeland.Additionally, Article Five of the NorthAtlantic Treaty compelled NATO membernations, including Canada, to respond tothe attacks on the U.S. Consequently, thesecurity relationship between the twocountries again became of great impor-tance and a topic of intense scrutiny.

The Same Yet Different examines howthe relationship has changed and, yet,remained the same. The book is informa-tive because it goes beyond nation-to-

nation relations. It importantly examinesCanadian public opinion and the fears ofaverage Canadians that American securi-ty would dictate Canadian policy deci-sions. Brister reminds us that the heavy-handed, go-it-alone-if-necessary mentalityof the Bush Administration further exac-erbated the tension. The with-us-or-against-us statements further awokeCanadian fears of American domination.

This book goes a long ways to explain-ing why it is in Canada’s best interest,because of shared values and securityrequirements, to accommodate the UnitedStates, despite reservations.

Col. John Cirifici, USAF (Ret.), Milford, Del.

The Fight in the Clouds: The Extra -ordinary Combat Experience of P–51Mustang Pilots During World War II.By James P. Busha. Minneapolis Minn.:Zenith Press, 2014. Illustrations. Photo -graphs. Index. Pp. xvii, 238. $30.00 ISBN:9-780-760345184

No pilots loved their airplanes morethan those who flew the P–51 Mustang.Busha emphasizes that sentiment basedon his interviews with hundreds of pilotsover fifteen years. His book records theMustang’s combat roles by relating a longstring of accounts of pilots who flew theplane in the Second World War. The book’saction centers on operations in Europe,with its closing pages given to escortduties over Japan.

Busha repeatedly refers to theMustang’s 1,651-horsepower, Packard-built, Rolls-Royce Merlin engine and sig-nature teardrop canopy, because those fea-tures won the instant admiration of pilots,most of whom transitioned from the P–47Thunderbolt. The Mustang’s sleekness,speed, range, and maneuverability con-vinced them it was the ultimate fighter ofthe war.

Busha intersperses post-war inter-views with wartime “encounter reports” tobuild the P–51’s history. Even though amajority of his interviewees are aces, theirstraightforwardness and absence of ego-tism enhance the historical value of theirwords. The narratives, however, stilldescribe the dangers encountered and theinherent fears. An excellent index makes itsimple to find references to fighter groupsand squadrons as well as individual air-men. Because most of the narrators wereunfamiliar to me, I saw their experiencesas fresh views of old, but important, topics.Basically, the book is enlightening andenjoyable.

The pilots recall all phases of flying

the P–51, a few starting with their leavingcollege to fight in the war. They talk aboutthe good and the bad. There was a massnight takeoff during which a P–51crashed: The control tower was still smol-dering when I landed. The only thing left ofLieutenant Frascotti’s airplane was theRolls-Royce engine lying on the floor in thecontrol tower. With full fuel, he had plowedright into the darkened tower.” Or the gut-wrenching anti-aircraft artillery: “Thetrain was dead ahead, sitting quietly at theend of a peaceful valley. . . . As our flightneared . . . all hell broke loose. We took firefrom 20mm and 40mm guns, and fromsmall arms. The fire erupted from the trees,the church, and the headstones. We hadflown into a trap and I was the rat caughtin the valley of death!There was the mind-altering reality of combat: I . . . watched thepilot fall, looking for his chute to blossom.The parachute never opened, and he fell tohis death in a plowed field. That scene kindof shocked me; I stared in disbelief. True, Ihad meant to destroy his airplane, but thatwas the first time I had seen one of my foeskilled.

Although the stories focus on bomber-escort missions and low-level strafing-bombing runs, they begin with a brief his-tory of the P–51’s development. Born asthe NA–73 and initially employed by theBritish Royal Air Force as the MustangMark I, the plane became Americanized asthe A–36 Apache before completing twen-ty-five variants ending with the P–51Hthat never saw combat. While the Britishused the plane to repel the Luftwaffe,Americans first employed it as a dive-bomber/ground-attack platform. MajorCharlie Waddell thought, . . . the A-36 wasdesigned perfectly for its dive-bombing roleand was mystified as to why the Air Corpsgave them up. Nevertheless, the Air Corpsquickly converted the Apache to the long-range Mustang and deployed it to Englandin November 1943.

The P–51 pilots stress the responsibil-ity they felt as bodyguards for bombercrews. They devised maneuvers to remainclose to the slower bombers and to interceptand destroy Luftwaffe FW 190s, Bf 109s,and Me 262s before they flew within firingrange of the bomber box. At the same time,the P–51 pilots looked forward to home-ward-bound strafing runs against trainsand vehicles. P–51 attacks at low-level wereso destructive that, on May 21, 1944, Gen.Jimmy Doolittle ordered the bombers tostand down; he divided Occupied Europeinto specific areas for each fighter group toattack airfields, train yards, marshallingyards, communication lines, and any othermilitary vehicles they could find. On D-Dayand beyond, P–51 pilots flew as many asthree missions a day to support the troops

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on the ground. Overall, losses taken byMustangs from flak and ground fire out-numbered those from air-to-air combat—the price of success.

A friend once told me that when hereads my writing, he feels as if he is talk-ing with me over a beer. The same can besaid for The Fight in the Clouds. Bushaallows pilots to tell their stories casuallyand unhindered, adding only short com-mentaries that fuse them into a captivat-ing history lesson about combat flying inthe P–51 Mustang.

Lt. Col. Henry Zeybel, USAF (Ret.), AustinTexas

The Tuskegee Airmen: An IllustratedHistory: 1939-1949. By Joseph Caver,Jerome Ennels, and Daniel Haulman.Montgomery Ala.: NewSouth Books, 2011.Maps. Illustrations. Photographs. Index.Pp. 230. $27.95 ISBN: 978-1-58838-244-3

Celebrated in film, books, and numer-ous other media, the Tuskegee Airmenhave become one of the iconic faces of “theGreatest Generation” for their importantrole in hastening the defeat of both fascisttotalitarianism abroad and institutionalracism at home. Caver, Ennels, andHaulman, all historians associated withthe U.S. Air Force’s Historical ResearchAgency, have assembled the definitive col-lection of photographs detailing the originand exploits of the famed “Red Tails” dur-ing World War II; in the early postwar peri-od; and, to some degree, up to the present.As an illustrated history, the strength ofthis work is the photographs; but it alsohas a useful quick reference page of statis-tics, a fine 49-page chronology covering theestablishment and units of the TuskegeeAirmen from 1939 to 1949, a page of unitemblems, and a pilot roster.

The text is quite readable, and thecaptions for the photographs integratevery well with the prose and structure ofthe work to detail the extraordinary storyof these young African-Americans whofought for freedom on multiple levels.Virtually no aspect of their experience isleft out. The authors provide all the evi-dence needed to rebut the dominant myths(such as having never lost a bomber dur-ing escort missions) surrounding thefamous flyers while simultaneously reaf-firming the valor and impressive capabili-ties of the Tuskegee Airmen. Even thoughthe vast offering of photographs alone isenough to carry the book, the sources,facts, and detailed history are equallyvaluable and up to the same standards asthe images.

There are, however, a few annoyingtypographical or editing errors that mayrankle some readers. The biggest one is areverse of a common mistake seen inmany airpower related histories. MitchelField was a prominent Air Corps basebetween the World Wars. It was namedafter John Mitchel, a former mayor of NewYork City, who perished in an aircraft acci-dent while training for combat duringWWI. The field is often misspelled asMitchell Field, presumably in reference tonoted airpower advocate Billy Mitchell. Inthree photographs of B–25 Mitchell bom -bers, named in honor of Billy Mitchell, thecaptions list them as B–25 Mitchel bom -bers. Yet, in a caption for a photo showingfamous boxers Jackie Wilson and RayRobinson, they are correctly placed atMitchel Field. There is a similar mis-spelling of Curtiss Field. There is a mis-characterization of a gunnery competitionwon by the Tuskegee Airmen in 1949 asbeing akin to the Navy’s “Top Gun” compe-tition. Top Gun is not a gunnery competi-tion; it is for advanced training in aerialcombat. Typically, the winner of any U.S.Air Force gunnery and weapons competi-tion is bestowed the title of “Top Gun.”Finally, in another photo, aircraft aremisidentified as AT–6s when they arereally some variant of a BT–13.

Despite these very minor flaws, thebook is an exceptional pictorial resource onthe enduring legacy of the TuskegeeAirmen and a wonderful tribute to thesepath-breaking aviators. The Class Photo -graphs section at the end is an amazingassembly of period photographs that visu-ally shows these young airmen at a proudtime. All the photographs collected in thisbook tell the vital story of the TuskegeeAirmen in a fantastic manner and makethis book a must for any serious fan of theRed Tails or any historian interested inthe Tuskegee Airmen or World War II avi-ation in general.


Unforgotten Hero: Remembering aFighter Pilot’s Life, War and UltimateSacrifice. By Jim Escalle. BakersfieldCalif.: Traylor House Publishers, 2013.Maps. Photographs. Notes. Bibliography.Index. Pp. 262. $16.95 paperback ISBN:978-0-9887851-1-3

On June 19, 1953, U.S.AF Lt. JimEscalle was lost while flying his F–86Sabre over North Korea. Although not con-clusive, circumstances suggested that hewas killed when his airplane crashed on a

strafing run. A year and a day later, withno evidence to indicate Escalle was alive,the Air Force changed his status from“missing in action” to “presumed dead.”

That might have been the end ofEscalle’s story, were it not for his name-sake and nephew. Author Jim Escalle firstlearned about his uncle while browsingthrough old family photos as a child. Hepeppered his relatives for information butlost interest until two events rekindledthat interest and enabled him to begin asearch to learn the full story of his uncle’slife and death. First, the government pub-lished a report in 1993 suggesting the pos-sibility that Escalle was among thirty-seven airmen captured and handed over tothe Soviet Union. Second, several yearslater he was introduced to the Internet asa powerful research tool.

Starting with old newspaper clip-pings, letters written by the elder Escalle,and memories of local friends, he was ableto find and interview dozens of people whohad known his uncle. He used the resultsof this research to weave an interesting,highly readable story of a man he hadnever met but came to know very well.

Born in 1929, Escalle grew up in asmall farming community in Californiaand learned the virtues of hard work,excelled academically and athletically, andwas an exceptional leader. He took engi-neering courses at a two-year junior col-lege to prepare for a career in aviation.

The Korean War began just as Escallewas completing his two-year degree.Intending to serve as a pilot, he signed upfor the Air Force’s Aviation Cadet Pro -gram. As a cadet he trained at LacklandAFB Texas, Columbus AFB Mississippi,and Big Spring AFB Texas. His final train-ing assignment was at Nellis AFBNevada, where he received fighter-wea -pons training in the F–80 and F–86.

When he reported to Suwon AB inKorea in February 1953, Escalle wasassigned to a ground-attack unit, flyingF–86s with the 36th Fighter-BomberSquadron. He was soon recognized as abetter-than-average pilot and was desig-nated an element leader, leading one oftwo, two-ship formations that made up aflight.

Escalle flew his forty-first combatmission deeper inside North Korea thanwas usually the case. North Korean andChinese ground forces were reinforcingthe front lines in an attempt to seize andhold as much terrain as possible prior tothe impending armistice. Escalle’s flightwas assigned a two-part mission. First, allfour aircraft were to attack a cluster ofpersonnel and supply shelters. That partof the mission was successful, and theshelters were completely destroyed. The

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aircraft then split into two elements, eachsearching for vehicular targets along themain supply route. Escalle and his wing-man identified a parked convoy andstrafed it with .50-caliber machine guns.On his second strafing run Escalle wentdown, presumably a victim of enemy anti-aircraft artillery fire. Other pilots spottedthe wreckage, but Escalle could not beseen, and he didn’t respond to repeatedradio calls. Because the action had takenplace so deep inside North Korea, and withno direct evidence that Escalle has sur-vived, a rescue attempt was consideredimpractical.

In 2007, the Department of Defenseadvised the Escalle family that, notwith-standing the 1993 report, there was no evi-dence of their lost airman having beenfound and that it was highly unlikely theSoviets would have had access to him afterhe was downed. Family members’ dimremaining hopes for any further informa-tion hinged upon a 2008 agreementbetween the U.S. and the Chinese govern-ment, in which the Chinese agreed toallow the U.S. to search their archives forinformation regarding prisoners of warfrom the Korean conflict. It remains to beseen whether those hopes will be realized.

It seems that most military booksdeal with significant battles, great cam-paigns, or noteworthy individuals. Unfor -got ten Hero is the exception, as it tells usthe story of just one “average” man. But inshining a light on his uncle’s life, theauthor has, in effect, told us the story ofmany such average men, the men whostep forward and fight for their countrywhen called upon. Escalle the airman led alife to be proud of, and Escalle the authorhas given us a rich narrative that enablesus to appreciate that life.

Lt. Col. Joseph Romito, USA (Ret.), Docent,National Air and Space Museum

Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War.By Robert M. Gates. New York: Alfred A.Knopf, 2014. Photographs. Index. Pp. x,618. $35.00 ISBN: 978-0-307-95947-8

Duty is Gates’s memoir of his serviceas Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) underPresidents Bush and Obama. Throughouthis tenure (2006-2011), he dealt with innu-merable issues yet focused on a singletheme: a deep concern for the lives of all sol-diers who fought in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Gates had served under six presi-dents in various capacities, including CIADirector. He was a welcome replacementfor the controversial Donald Rumsfeld, anideologue bent on making the Pentagon

kowtow. Considered by many a pragmatistand someone who would listen, Gates wasconfirmed by the Senate by a vote of 95-2.

Gates dismissed both Air ForceSecretary Michael Wynne and Chief ofStaff Michael Mosley over the stewardshipof nuclear weapons. He considered AirForce actions, such as the mistaken ship-ment of nuclear nose cones to Taiwan, agradual erosion of nuclear standards and alack of oversight by Air Force leadership.Although there were other accountableparties, Gates believed responsibilitybelonged at the top.

By his third year as Secretary in thefirst few months under President Obama,Gates drew up a consolidated list of priori-ties that dealt directly with service menand women. He wanted to further improvethe process of getting equipment to thetroops faster. He had done much during hisfirst two years under President Bush inprocuring mine-resistant, ambush-protect-ed MRAP vehicles to replace Humvees thatwere too vulnerable to enemy weapons.Gates believed that by pushing Congress onthis topic both he and those who supportedthe project had saved many American lives.Throughout his tenure Gates pressed formore intelligence, surveillance, and recon-naissance. He also wanted to improve theissue of getting the wounded out ofAfghanistan within an hour as had beendone in Iraq. In addition, he wanted morefocus on post-traumatic stress and theappalling rise in suicides. In addition, healso made a concerted effort to end “stoploss,” the practice of retaining troops onactive duty after their scheduled servicetime had expired—a most unpopular prac-tice.

No recent President had faced themultitude of problems confronting Obamawhen he assumed office, and many ofthese would involve Gates: a founderingeconomy, two wars, the Iranian nuclearproblem, economic instability throughoutEurope, growing nationalism of China andRussia, a belligerent North Korea withnuclear missiles, and the unpredictablegovernment of Pakistan. Also, Obama wassaddled with campaign promises of havingall U.S. troops out of Iraq by the end of2011 and closing Guantanamo Bay’sdeten tion center.

Gates gives no quarter in presentingthe personalities of White House princi-pals, members of Congress, Defense andState Departments, and other cabinetmembers. He didn’t like the politics thatshowed its ugly facade on practically everyissue and is very upfront in his assess-ments of many individuals and readilyrelates his own imperfections. Gates feltthe Congressional bullying, belittling, andinsulting tactics used against DoD wit-

nesses violated nearly every norm of civilbehavior. He saw most members ofCongress as uncivil, incompetent in fulfill-ing basic constitutional responsibilities(such as timely appropriations), micro-managerial, parochial, hypocritical, egotis-tical, thin-skinned, often putting self (andreelection) before country.

The question of the surge brought outdivergent opinions and, in some cases, out-right disparaging remarks against the mil-itary from White House advisers andNational Security Council staffers. Parti -cularly annoying for Gates was NationalSecurity Advisor Deputy Tom Donilon’scomments characterizing JCS ChairmanAdm. Mike Mullen and the military as“insubordinate” and in “revolt.” Gates wasinfuriated and wrote how someone who hadnot served in the military and never evenbeen to Afghanistan could second guess thecommanders in the field. Gates wrote thathe reached the end of his tether with themon the campaign against Libya when the“know-nothings” started questioning tar-geting of ground forces there. At a meetingof principals, he blew up at them; You arethe biggest micromanagers I have everworked with. You can’t use a screwdriverreaching from D.C. to Libya on our militaryoperations. The president has given us hisstrategic direction. For God’s sake, now letus [Defense] run it.

The defense budget would capturemuch of Gates’ energy during 2010-11,and he challenged some of Obama’s pro-jected cuts. Gates had to remind PresidentObama, who himself was confronted witha budget crisis, a deficit issue, and severedomestic cuts, that he had promised thatDoD could reinvest all the savings it hadaccrued during previous reduction efforts.During his remaining few months asSECDEF, Gates used his last publicspeeches to warn Americans about theconsequences of significant reductions indefense capabilities. He was worn out ask-ing the President “what do you want us tostop doing?”

Gates’ memoir serves as an excellentpresentation of the inner workings of thedecision process that occurs between thePresident, his cabinet, and the advisorystaffs; i.e., the inner workings of theExecutive Branch.

Secretary Gates comes across as fair-minded, kind, and open to ideas from bothoutside the DoD and from his own people.He would be a decent person to work for.Briefly stated, Duty is a superb historicalmemoir!

Dr. George M. Watson, Jr., Retired SeniorHistorian, Air Force History and MuseumsProgram.

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The Pulitzer Air Races: AmericanAviation and Speed Supremacy, 1920-1925. By Michael Gough. Jefferson N.C.:McFarland, 2013. Maps. Tables. Photo -graphs. Notes. Appendix. Bibliogra phy.Index. Pp. 238. $45.00 paperback ISBN:978-0-7864-7100-3.

Before and during World War I, U.S.aircraft designers lagged far behind theirEuropean counterparts. The gap betweenU.S. and Europe was so pronounced thatjust one U.S. design—the Curtiss HS-2Lflying boat—flew in combat during thewar. The U.S. had to rely on French- andBritish-designed aircraft to equip its mili-tary aviation units. But by the mid-1920s,the situation had changed dramatically:U.S. airplanes and pilots held virtuallyevery internationally recognized aviationspeed record, and the U.S. had become pre-eminent in high-performance aviation. InThe Pulitzer Air Races, Gough presents aconvincing argument that the PulitzerTrophy Race, run from 1920 to 1925, wasthe driving force behind this significantturnaround.

The race was conceived by the familyof newspaper publisher Joseph Pulitzer.Several years after his death, they createdthe ornate trophy and planned to award it,and a cash prize, annually to the winner ofa transcontinental air race. World War Iput the competition’s start on hold. Afterthe war, other groups sponsored transcon-tinental races, but these resulted in a dis-turbing number of fatalities. The AeroClub of America (ACA), the sanctioningbody for aerial competition in the U.S., rec-ommended to Pulitzer’s son Ralph that thePulitzer Trophy Race be turned into anannual closed-course speed competition.Ralph agreed.

The first two (1920 and 1921) compe-titions were stand-alone events, with thePulitzer Trophy Race being the only raceon the agenda. But in its remaining fouryears, the Pulitzer program expanded sig-nificantly, with as many as ten other racesbeing conducted in addition to the Pulitzer.Results from the first two years made itclear that the Pulitzers would be dominat-ed by military aircraft; additional eventsprovided a racing venue for a broaderrange of pilots and airplanes—civilianpilots flying light airplanes, mail-serviceflyers, builders of Liberty engines, and spe-cific military aviation units among them.

With this expansion, the Pulitzer alsotook on a more lofty title, indicative of itsvast popularity: from 1922 to 1925, thePulitzer event was also billed as theNational Air Races. The results lend cre-dence to Gough’s primary theme, namelythat the Pulitzers catapulted Americanaviation to a position of worldwide leader-

ship. With the exception of a one-year dipin 1924, the winning speed in the PulitzerTrophy Race increased every year. LtCorliss Moseley of the Army Air Service(AAS) won the inaugural race, flying aVerville VCP–R to a winning speed of 156.5mph. In the final Pulitzer, AAS Lt. CyBettis took top honors with a speed of 249.0mph in a Curtiss R3C-1. Thus, in just sixyears, the winning speed increased by 92.5mph. In every year except 1924, Pulitzerwinners posted the best closed-coursespeeds in the world. In three years (1923,1923, and 1925), they also had the fastestabsolute speeds. The Pulitzers ended afterjust six years because aviation expertsrealized that racing was no longer neededin order to test and prove new designs.

To provide an overall assessment ofthe Pulitzer Trophy Race, Gough asks fivekey questions: Did the races result infaster, better-performing airplanes? WouldAmerican Pulitzer racers have been com-petitive even if other nations had chosen toparticipate? Were design features ofPulitzer racers transferred to other air-craft? Did any of the racing-associatedinnovations achieve commercial success?And finally, did the races attract and holdpublic attention for the betterment of avi-ation? Gough analytically addresses thesequestions and answers “yes” to each.

It is difficult to find fault with thisexceptionally well-researched book. Goughdoes an excellent job of weaving severalinter-related themes: how the PulitzerTrophy Race program was conceived,expanded, and faded away after a brief butproductive life; the development and evo-lution of aircraft and propulsion systemsover the six-year period; the role of sanc-tioning bodies such as the ACA, the FlyingClub of America, and the National Aero -nautical Association; and, of course, theactual conduct of each of the Pulitzerraces. There are other books that provide amore all-encompassing history of air rac-ing, most notably Don Berliner’s AirplaneRacing: A History, 1909-2008. But for thereader who wants an in-depth look at thePulitzer Trophy Race, Gough’s book is theone to buy.

Lt. Col. Joseph Romito, USA (Ret.), Docent,National Air and Space Museum

The German Aces Speak II: World WarII through the Eyes of Four More ofthe Luftwaffe’s Most Important Com -manders. By Colin D. Heaton and Anne-Marie Lewis. Minneapolis Minn.: ZenithPress, 2014. Photographs. Biblio graphy.Index. Pp. viii, 296. $30.00 ISBN: 978-0-7603-4590-0

About 2,500 Luftwaffe fighter pilotsgained ace status in World War II. Ofthese, 103 had more than 100 credits, thir-teen logged 200-300 credits, and twoscored more than 300 kills. The GermanAces Speak II contains four interviews ofthese top aces: Erich Hartmann (325 cred-its, the top ace of all time), Gunther Rall(275 credits, the third highest scoring ace),Johannes Steinhoff (176 kills), andDietrich Hrabak (125 kills). This volume isa sequel to a 2011 book by Heaton andLewis with a similar title that covered fourother German aces, two of which werehigh scorers: Walter Krupinski (197 kills)and Adolf Galland (102 credits).

A number of criticisms of this bookcan be made immediately. First, the cover-age is uneven, with Hartman’s contribu-tion consisting of 116 pages; Steinhoff’sjust over ninety pages; Rall’s forty pages;and Hrabak’s twenty-two pages. A secondissue is that these interviews were con-ducted many decades after the war, withall the hazards of hindsight. There is noindication why these four men were select-ed for this book.

That said, these interviews are of avery high quality; thus, the book is a solidcontribution to the literature. Heaton andLewis reveal much about a number of inter-esting aspects of the careers of these aces:why and how they got into flying, flyingtraining, the pre-war Luftwaffe, and, ofcourse, their wartime service. They discussvarious other personalities including anumber of aces such as Herman Graf (262credits) and Hans-Joachim Marseille (158credits). They also provide critical opinionsof Goering, Hitler, and top Luftwaffe com-manders. They talk of the fighters they flewand those they fought against. The inter-views also compare the differences betweenfighting the Anglo-Americans versus theSoviets. Three of the men also mentionAllied fighters shooting at German pilotsdescending in parachutes. One conclusionthat can be drawn from this book is theimportance of luck to their success and,most certainly, their survival. Hartmanmade fourteen or sixteen force landings andescaped Soviet captivity during the war,while Steinhoff was downed a dozen times.While the bulk of the book deals with WorldWar II, there is some interesting coverage oftwo postwar issues: Soviet captivity(Hartman was held for ten and a half years)and the formation of the German Air Forcein the 1950s. The latter is especially valu-able as it includes, brief as it is, the difficultservice of the F–104 in German colors andthe recruitment of former Luftwaffe acesinto the renewed air arm.

This is an easy and informative read.Those interested in aces, fighter combat,and the Luftwaffe in triumph and defeat,

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as well as its reemergence, will profit fromreading this book. While only a slice of thestory, these men give a vivid and intimateview of World War II fighter combat.

Kenneth P. Werrell, Christiansburg, Virginia

Mikoyan Gurevich MiG–15, SecondEdition. By Dariusz Karnas. PetersfieldUK: Mushroom Model Publications, 2014.Tables. Diagrams. Illustrations. Photo -graphs. Pp. 152. $30.00 paperback ISBN:978-83-63678-15-9

Whether you’re just interested in theheavily used MiG–15 or you’re a model-er—especially the latter—this is the bookto have. Karnas’ work is part of a series ofbooks primarily designed for the modelbuilder. If one can’t build a great modelfrom the information contained in thisbook, it is not the fault of the information!

One thing needs to be pointed out upfront. The author’s name is Polish. In fact,the book was printed in Poland; and,except for a couple of people, the staffappears to be all Polish. So, your firstthought is that this is one of those greatpaperbacks, like to Japanese Koku-Fanseries, that is printed entirely in the nativelanguage. Great pictures—not much com-munication! Or, at best, there is one col-umn in Polish and another in English.This is not the case. All of the text andcaptions are in English—and very goodEnglish at that.

From the start, everything is high-quality. The first illustration is a familytree of the design from the prototype to thelast production models. The text runsthrough only the first forty-four pages, buteven those are filled with pictures andsuch. Although this is hardly War andPeace in scope, the text gives a fine historyof the development of the aircraft, themany different models and producers, anda limited amount on operations. For thoselooking for “there I was” stories about theMiG–15 in combat, look elsewhere.

The book’s primary delivery is pic-tures, drawings, and tables depicting theaircraft, its capabilities, and characteris-tics. Because the MiG–15 is a relativelysmall aircraft, all of the line and colors-and-markings drawings can be presentedin 1/72 scale (1/48 and 1/32 drawings areavailable separately). The section ondetailed photos (all in color) is divided intothe major areas of the aircraft and runsseventy-one pages. There are thirty-sixpages of color side-views, generally withtwo aircraft per page. One page is an excel-lent four-view drawing showing the differ-ences between the MiG–15 and –15bis.

I’ve seen a lot of aircraft modelling books,and the quality of the drawings, resolutionof the photographs, and sheer quantity ofmaterial in this book puts it right at thetop of the genre.

From my position as a docent at amuseum that displays a MiG–15, severalpages dealing with Soviets in Korea werevery helpful. I think many people, includ-ing most of the docents, still believe the oldsaw about the 10:1 kill ratio between theF–86 and MiG–15. Since the fall of theSoviet Union and the opening of vastarchival collections, we now know thatnumber is way off. One page of this booklists Soviet aces flying the MiG in Korea,and another discusses the MiG–15 and thecontemporary aircraft in the theater. Iknow I have to go out and find what thelatest scholarship says about the air-to-airtally in Korea.

In any event, if you want one book onthis remarkable fighter aircraft, this isprobably the one to get.

Col. Scott A. Willey, USAF (Ret.), BookReview Editor, and Docent, NASM’s UdvarHazy Center

A Higher Call: An Incredible TrueStory of Combat and Chivalry in theWar-Torn Skies of World War II. ByAdam Makos with Larry Alexander. NewYork: The Berkley Publishing Group, 2012.Photographs. Notes. Bibliography. Pp. viii,392. $26.95 ISBN: 978-0-425-25286-4

German squadron leader GustavRoedel said to Franz Stigler before his firstmission in North Africa, Every single timeyou go up, you will be outnumbered. Thoseodds may make a man want to fight dirty tosurvive . . . Honor is everything here . . . If Iever see or hear of you shooting a man in aparachute, I will shoot you down myself.

A Higher Call is an essential read foranyone interested in examining the ethicsof the “kill or be killed” environment ofWorld War II aerial combat. Stigler’ssquadron leader delivered the above warn-ing about ethical standards as a guidepostfor Stigler. This warrior ethos is evident innumerous stories that provide the readerwith an opportunity to view this complexsurvival experience from a unique perspec-tive—that of a Luftwaffe fighter pilot fight-ing for a lost cause. Although this bookshows both sides (Franz Stigler in theLuftwaffe as well as Charlie Brown in theArmy Air Corps), Makos and Alexanderspend most of their time describing Stigler’sexperience leading up to the unlikelyencounter in December 1943. They do anexcellent job of allowing the reader to ask

the question: how should warriors navigatethe complex decision-making terrain ofcombat, doing their duty while keepingtheir honor and humanity intact?

A Higher Call artfully depicts life with-in Germany during World War II and thedesperate fight its professional militarywaged given impossible circumstances. Thereader will find rich descriptions of lifewithin the Luftwaffe, and how this forcedefined professionalism while engaged inthe day-by-day grind of constant fightingover numerous years. This book is an excel-lent source for readers seeking understand-ing of what it was like to fight on theGerman side with limited resources whileoverwhelmingly outnumbered. It does forfighter pilots in the Luftwaffe what DasBoot did for members of the German sub-marine force. Makos and Alexander articu-lately describe professionals grappling withbeing resilient while engaged in a longwar—something that will resonate withmilitary readers of today.

The descriptions of aerial combatmake the book hard to put down. The oddsfaced by pilots on both sides are brilliantlydepicted, making readers wonder how any-one survived. There were many instanceson all sides during World War II, when war-riors had to decide whether to shoot adefenseless opponent—preventing himfrom fighting another day—or to answer ahigher call. The book describes one man’sinterpretation of whether to shoot or notand how much assistance to defenselessinjured opponents is appropriate. Suchdescriptions set the context for meaningfuldiscussion of ethical decision-making. Inthis kind of environment, many would seekfirst to survive rather than do the rightthing. Given the current discussion of ethicswithin our military, Makos and Alexanderoffer much compelling material for thoughtand discussion.

For military and civilian alike, AHigher Call compellingly guides the readerthrough the application of ethics in combatand it shows warriors attempting to gainempathy with their opponents. It would bedifficult to find of a better book for leaderdevelopment programs at battalion andbrigade or squadron and wing levels for thediscussion of the practical application ofethics in combat. This book is an excellentaddition to any library. An important readthat has the potential to help leaders incul-cate into their leader development pro-grams the understanding of the importanceof doing the right thing—especially whenno one is watching.

Richard A. McConnell, Tactics Professor,U.S. Army Command and General StaffCollege, Fort Leavenworth Kansas

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Hangar Flying. By General Merrill A.McPeak. Lake Oswego, Ore.: Lost Wing -man Press, 2012. Photographs. Tables.Notes. Appendix.. Index. Pp. 364. $24.95ISBN: 978-0-9833160-1-5

With the first book of an intendedautobiographical trilogy, McPeak becomesthe first Air Force Chief of Staff sinceCurtis LeMay to author or co-author abook regarding his career in the Air Force.This is fitting because Tony McPeak maybe the most controversial Air Force Chiefof Staff since LeMay. This first book covershis early life and career focusing on hismotivations to enter the Air Force, train-ing experiences, flying F–104s, performingwith the Thunderbirds, and his combatexperiences in Vietnam.

Unlike most pilot memoirs, this bookis not about the culture of flying, drinking,driving, and chasing skirts. This is a think-ing man’s account of what it was like to bea fighter pilot in the early jet age. McPeakoften tries to relate his career to largersocial, political, and cultural currentsswirling around him but largely fails toconnect these events in more than a super-ficial way to what he is actually doing as ajunior officer. As a chronicle of Air Forceculture during the Cold War, it is valuable.However, the real strength of the book isthe insight it provides into the mindsetand thinking of McPeak as a senior AirForce leader. As he recounts his early expe-riences, one can see direct correlations tothe many changes he engineered as Chiefof Staff in the 1990s.

It is telling that his time with theThunderbirds takes more pages than histime in combat. This experience, morethan any other, served as the touchstonefor his career. Unlike many other pilotswho pen memoirs, McPeak was not asmotivated to fly early in life. He came fromextreme circumstances as a child, literallyearned every break he got in life, becamean accomplished collegiate debater, andentered the Air Force for what he believedwould be a brief sojourn. However, hisdesire to master the craft of flying (as hedescribes it) set him on the professionalfighter pilot path. His descriptions of howflying training worked and how it influ-enced him set him apart once more fromthe standard stereotypical accounts andelevate his analysis. These early chapters,through his presentation of life in the ColdWar Air Force, discussion of the strengthsand weaknesses of different aircraft, andelucidation of training and operations setthe tone for the heart of his story—flyingwith the Thunderbirds.

His Thunderbird coverage highlightsthe value of small, dedicated teams of pro-fessionals at work in a demanding envi-

ronment. Moreover, McPeak, unlike manyin his chosen profession, explores both hisstrengths and weaknesses as a pilot anddiscusses his mental, physical, and emo-tional efforts to overcome his foibles in ameaningful way. His account of how metalfatigue led to a spectacular aircraft acci-dent during an air show in 1967 is a primeexample of his ability to tell a story and,more importantly, the background thatmakes the incident useful to a readerinterested in aviation history. Finally, thebook ends with a riveting account of histime in Vietnam flying close air supportand interdiction missions as a regular linepilot, ops officer, and elite Misty forwardair controllers. He also offers some excep-tional insight on the value of airpower andhow his experiences in Vietnam shapedhis thinking as leader of the Air Forcemore than twenty years later.

Overall, the book is unique. It is art-fully packaged with each chapter begin-ning with an interesting epigraph andgraphic illustration of the dominant air-craft he flew at the time. The appendix,logbooks, and footnotes are useful for alllevels of readers; and the prose itself isexcellent. There are some minor mis-spellings and historical flaws (claiming hewas listening to the Beatles in England in1961, when their earliest recordings werenot released until 1962). These are proba-bly a product of his publishing processmore than anything else. Those minorissues aside, I heartily endorse this workand find myself anxiously awaiting thefuture volumes. As controversial asMcPeak remains for many Air Force veter-ans, this book is a great read that explainsa lot about both him and the service itself.


Churchill’s Most Secret Airfield, RAFTempford. By Bernard O’Connor. StroudUK: Amberly Publishing, 2013. Maps.Photographs. Bibliography. Pp. 255. $24.95Paperback. ISBN 978-1-4456-0690-3

Winston Churchill’s well known dic-tum to “set Europe ablaze” depended to alarge extent on insertion and recovery ofagents and rescue of downed flight crewand escaping soldiers and airmen by air-craft; use of surface craft or crossing fromneutral territories was even more risky. Inthis book, Bernard O’Connor continues hiswork documenting the story of the menand women of the Special OperationsExecutive (SOE) and the airmen who flewthe missions.

O’Connor’s major works have been on

the social and economic impact of thephosphate industry in England and othercountries, but he has made frequent foraysinto operations of the SOE into Europefrom airfields in Bedford. In this book, hetraces the development of the primary air-field and supporting annexes tasked withthe mission to transport the high prioritypassengers into and out of denied enemyterritory. He shows how the land for thefield was obtained and how the field wasdesigned and built in such way as to makeit appear as if it was a little used, out-of-the-way outpost.

RAF Tempsford was located at onepoint of the triangle that Martin Bowmantitled “the Bedford Triangle” in his 1988book on U.S. undercover operations fromEngland during World War II. From here,138 and 161 Special Duties Squadronsflew nightly missions into Europe rangingfrom Northern France, The Netherlands,and Belgium to as far away as Poland andCzechoslovakia during the few days oneither side of the full moon.

Churchill’s Most Secret Airfield isdivided into seven chapters with a com-prehensive section on abbreviations rightat the outset (where it belongs), the earlyhistory of the airfield, the squadrons,ground crew and aircrews, secret opera-tions, everyday life at the base, and dispo-sition after the war. O’Connor has packeda tremendous amount of material into theslim volume. All of the chapters are thor-ough in their treatment of the subjects. Ofparticular interest is the attention to thefinal training of the agents—or Joes asthey were called by the aircrews—andtheir dispatching on missions. Each chap-ter contains several examples of the sub-ject such as discussion of squadron com-manders and individual missions. Onegreat example is the raid on the Gestapoprison at Amiens that was staged fromRAF Tempsford. In the chapter on secretoperations, O’Connor demonstrates a par-ticular gift for describing the women of theSOE and their sang-froid prior to dis-patch.

The book makes excellent use of mapsand pictures (most of which are new to me)to illustrate points. Perhaps a few moremaps to illustrate the layout of the fieldand its annexes would have helped; how-ever, this is a minor nit. The discussion ofharrowing missions, both successful andless so, adds an element of richness to thestory. The final chapter, After the War,nicely brings to a close the story of one ofthe more important, but lesser known,RAF fields of the war.

Overall, this is a good read. O’Connorhas done an excellent job of documenting avital portion of the war in Europe. Thisbook is an excellent companion to Martin

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Bowman’s The Bedford Triangle, U.S.Undercover Operations from England inWorld War II.

MSgt. Al Mongeon, USAF (Ret.)

Project 9: The Birth Of The Air Com -mandos In World War II. By Dennis R.Okerstrom. Columbia: University of Mis -souri Press, 2014. Photographs. Bibliogra -phy. Index. Pp. 300. $29.95 ISBN 978-0-8262-2027-1

This a splendid book about a little-reported-on corner of World War II geogra-phy and forces engaged in a do-or-die situ-ation in Burma and India in 1943-1944.The book deals with some unforgettablefigures. General “Hap” Arnold andAdmiral Lord Louis Mountbatten lead thelist, with brilliant, if eccentric, BritishBrigadier Orde Wingate close behind.Wingate’s scheme for taking the fight tothe Japanese in Burma was the catalystfor the formation of the U.S. Army AirForces “Air Commandos.”

Wingate won the DistinguishedService Order in Palestine, leading SpecialNight Squads against Arab insurrection-ists who were assassinating British offi-cials and Jewish settlers during the period1936-1938. He won another DSO in 1941leading Gideon Force, a roving column ofmen, camels and supplies to assist in therecapture of Ethiopia. In early 1942, hewas sent to the Far East to raise and trainguerrilla forces to help retake Burma fromthe Japanese Army.

In February 1943, he led some 3,000British and Empire troops (includingGurkhas, West Africans, and Indian units)across the Chindwin River. He called themChindits, based upon the term for mythi-cal guardians of Burmese temples. Theyformed Long Range Penetration Groups,to be supported only by air, with the taskof interrupting Japanese Army communi-cations. While doing some damage, theyfinally had to be ordered back. Only 2,120of the original 3.000 returned. The wound-ed were left behind to the tender merciesof the Japanese.

Wingate and his men were receivedas heroes in a theater where successeswere rare. He received his third DSO andhis forces’ exploits made front-page newsin England. A copy of his report of the firstChindit operation went to a friend ofChurchill, who brought it to the greatman’s attention. Churchill was impressedand ordered Wingate back to England toaccompany him to Quebec and theQuadrant Conference with PresidentRoosevelt and the combined chiefs of staff.

There, in a series of briefings, Wingatelaid out a plan for helping retake northernBurma, a move designed to keep China inthe war—a matter of great interest andconcern to Roosevelt. Both Roosevelt andChurchill endorsed his scheme.

General Hap Arnold saw an opportu-nity to use air power in a novel way. Hesummoned two lieutenant colonels, PhilipCochran and John Alison, both fighterpilots, to his office in the Pentagon and putthem in charge of designing, organizing,training, and taking into combat a smalland very special organization to provideWingate’s requirement for air support.

They were unhappy and appalled.Wingate wanted small liaison aircraft toperform medevac, while they both wantedto command fighter squadrons inEngland. However, they had their ordersfrom Arnold and an essentially blankcheck and top priority for men and mater-ial. They set up shop in the Hay-Adamshotel and started planning. Deciding thatthey needed to talk to Wingate in person,Cochran flew to England and met withhim several times. Wingate sketched outhis concept of ground operations and theair support it required.

Cochran returned to Washington, andthe two light colonels put together a con-cept of air support operations and anappropriate table of organization andequipment. It went far beyond the idea ofresupply drops and medevac of wounded.It called for air insertion of the Chinditsand their equipment (including mules) byglider. Resupply would be by C-47s thatdoubled as glider-tow aircraft. A smallforce of fighter aircraft and mediumbombers would provide conventional airsupport when needed. Liaison aircraftwould perform medevac duty.

They presented their plan to GeneralArnold; he told them to carry it out. Therest of the story, and the most interestingpart, is what happened next. As in theweekly movie serials in the 1930s and1940s when the episode ends with thestagecoach going off a cliff—you had tocome back next week to find out if the cow-boy hero jumped in time—you will have toread the book to find out what happened.Believe me, it’s worth it. But have an atlashandy. Okerstrom, who did an outstandingjob otherwise, neglected to include anymaps of the operational area in Burma.

Capt. John F. O’Connell, USN (Ret.),Docent, National Air and Space Museum

The Bombers and the Bombed: AlliedAir War over Europe, 1940-1945. ByRichard Overy. New York: Viking Penguin,

2013. Maps. Tables. Photographs. Notes.Bibliography. Index. Pp. xxviii, 562.$36.00. ISBN: 978-0-670-02515-2

With this book, Dr. Overy has guaran-teed his standing as one of the top histori-ans of the Second World War. A huge arrayof books has been written on the Alliedbombing campaign over Europe duringthat conflict, but if I were forced to nameonly one book to go to for the story, TheBombers and the Bombed would probablyhave to be it.

Overy’s research effort was immense.While the book contains 590 pages, thetext stops on page 437. There are seventy-seven pages of notes followed by twenty-five pages of bibliography and sources andan excellent index. The text is filled withtables and figures. At times, the sheer vol-ume of numbers seems overwhelming anda bit much. But, as I thought about that,I’m not sure how one can tell the story ofthe campaign without using bomb ton-nages, CEPs, deaths, casualties, anddestruction areas. These are how one mea-sures results—both economic and human.

I have been a big fan of Davis’ Carl A.Spaatz and the Air War in Europe foryears. For an understanding of the organi-zation of the strategic air forces in Europeand the Mediterranean areas during thewar, and the bureaucratic maneuveringsthat took place within those organizations,that book is still tops. Overy covers thesame operations, obviously, but goes fur-ther by getting into more detail on some ofthe lesser operations in the Balkans andthe Low Countries. Where he really plowsnew ground is in integrating the story ofbombing operations with what was hap-pening on the receiving end of that bomb-ing. The book jacket claims, “This is aunique history of the bombing war frombelow as well as from above.” That, for achange, is a 100-percent-accurate assess-ment. This book is unique.

Of the bombing campaign itself, Idon’t believe there is anything terriblynew to a reader who has studied it at somelength. In the years between the worldwars—and even during the second war—the claims that an enemy’s economy wouldbe quickly shut down and that the civilianpopulace would become demoralized, per-haps to the point of overthrowing its gov-ernment, just didn’t pan out. There wasnothing quick about the destruction ofGermany’s war industry. And the people ofGermany never revolted. In fact, as Overyshows, there was perhaps the reverseeffect: the people subjected to the bombingbecame more irate against the bombingnations than against their own govern-ments or occupiers. It was the eventualweight of the campaign and reduction of

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defenses that allowed the bombing cam-paign to achieve its aims, but it took a fewyears to get there.

What was new to me was the excep-tional coverage of morale, effects on thelocal economies and lifestyles, and the gov-ernment actions to provide civil defenseand care for the populace. Most readersprobably won’t have looked at thoseaspects. Throughout the narrative, Overydoes a great job of comparing and con-trasting events in Germany, France,Belgium, Bulgaria, Italy, and elsewhere tothe Blitz of the UK. With some sense ofwhat the people of England went through,it is easier to visualize what was going onin continental cities and villages. If for noother reason, the coverage of German andItalian government and ruling party activ-ities to protect, shelter, and feed their citi-zens makes the price of this book worthevery cent.

There are a few books that have to beon the shelves of any serious student ofWorld War II and its strategic bombingefforts: Davis’ Spaatz and Freeman’sEighth Air Force volumes are amongthem. Overy has provided another in theindispensable category.

Col. Scott A. Willey, USAF (Ret.), BookReview Editor, and Docent, NASM’sUdvar-Hazy Center

60 Years of Combat Aircraft: FromWorld War One to Vietnam War One.By Bruno Pautigny. Paris: Histoire andCollections, 2010. Illustrations. Pp. 160.$38.00 (Amazon) ISBN: 978-2-35250-117-2

A self-taught illustrator, BrunoPautigny began his career in a smalladvertising agency. As his career pro-gressed, other agencies followed withassignments varying from advertisingcopy to medical textbooks. As a generalillustrator, he enjoyed illustrating automo-biles and other mechanical devices.Growing tired of the pressure within theprint industry, he switched to working forseveral book publishers. Later Revell Inc.,maker of plastic models, approached himabout illustrating box art for their upcom-ing aviation releases. He also has illustrat-ed articles in France’s Wing Master, a plas-tic-modeler magazine. While creating forRevell and Wing Master, Pautigny createdover 400 aircraft illustrations used inFrench aviation profiles. The majority ofthe book’s illustrations are from these pro-files.

60 Years of Combat Aircraft is a thin“coffee table book” with slick pages.Having no dust jacket, Bruno’s skills of

illustration leap off the cover as you holdthe book—from a Fokker Dr. I Triplane inone corner to a McDonnell-Douglas F–4Phantom II in the other. The book’s fivechapters are titled “World War I,” “WorldWar II,” “The Fifties,” “The Sixties,” and“Concerning Illustrations”; within each, asub-chapter of aircraft of individualnations of the period is shown.Interestingly, a sub-chapter of the “TheFifties” is Operation Musketeer, the Anglo-French-Israeli plan for the invasion ofEgypt to capture the Suez Canal.Concerning Illustrations has a discussionabout how German aircraft of a differentera are illustrated legally today. Eachchapter’s first pages give a brief introduc-tion of Pautigny’s opinion of the aircraftand his experiences illustrating them.Many aircraft have many illustrations(there are twelve North American P–51Mustangs alone). Not surprisingly, “WorldWar II” contains 60 percent of the illustra-tions.

Most pages have three eight-inch-wide illustrations above a short paragraphdescribing the aircraft’s paint scheme,markings, and history. Most of these illus-trations show the standard left profile ofthe aircraft with the propeller blades omit-ted. There are no factory-fresh aircrafthere; each of them is shown as if it hadseen action for a long time. With the book’sslick pages and the colors of the illustra-tions, the aircraft seem to float above thepage!

Don’t do what I did and thumbthrough the book looking for what famousBoeing B–29 Pautigny illustrated. Youwon’t find one. As he states in his intro-duction, he included in the book only whathe has illustrated in his career. So any ofyou Boeing B–29 crewman out there whowant a superior illustration of your air-craft, I know a guy . . .

Summing up, this large format bookwith slick pages and superior illustrationsis deserving of the price. If money is noobject, this is a fine book to add to your cof-fee table. If, however, you are looking for atrue reference book with all the principalaircraft of an era, there are other booksavailable for far less.

Scott Marquiss, Docent, National Air andSpace Museum, Mall and Udvar-HazyCenter

Two Flights to Victory: From theDoolittle Raid to the Enola Gay. ByDavid G. Styles. Stroud, UK: Spellmount,2011. Tables. Diagrams. Photographs.Appendices. Bibliography. Index. Pp. 286.$35.00 ISBN: 978-0-7524-6206-6

I’m going to cut to the chase right upfront: this is the worst book I have read inover a decade as APH’s Book ReviewEditor. It is poorly researched, marginallywritten and edited, and lacks scholasticqualities one would expect from a Ph.D.holder. About the only good thing I can sayabout the book is that it contains a greatassortment of photos—some of which Ihave not seen before—although a numberof them are captioned incorrectly.

The jacket states that Dr. Styles hasearned many international awards for hisnineteen books, most of which deal withcars. A former member of the RAF wholater worked in the auto industry, he gotinto higher education and attended the2002 and 2003 Doolittle reunions as a cor-respondent. From those events, he cameup with the idea to write this book.

In his preface, Styles says that this “isthe story of two great men [Doolittle andTibbets] and two great missions.” Thesemissions are “the only two air attacks onJapan during the Second World War tohave been organized outside any widerbattle plan.” That, in itself, is a pretty dubi-ous statement. But the central assertion is“how Tibbets [sic] and Doolittle’s pathshad crossed [in North Africa] and howDoolittle had deliberately placed Tibbetsin the position to be the obvious choice tolead the 509th Composite Group.” SinceStyles includes not a single footnote in theentire book, where this absolutely sillyassertion comes from is unknown. On page93, Styles talks about Tibbets’ well-knownproblems with Lauris Norstad in NorthAfrica in 1943 and says, “Doolittle . . . wasalso aware of the Manhattan Project, tothe extent that the B–29 was intended toplay a role in ending the war in the Pacificby delivering a new weapon to a Japanesetarget.” In his autobiography, Doolittlestates on page 452, I was not privy to thesecret before we received word on Okinawathat an atomic bomb had been dropped.Since the Eighth Air Force wasn’t involved,I had no need to know what it was allabout. So much for the book’s centraltheme.

As I read the book, I dog-eared eachpage where I found “facts” that wereskewed or just plain wrong. I gave upeventually because the book was gettingtoo thick! Here are just a few samples:Caption on a picture of North Field,Tinian, “This was the huge airfield built bythe Japanese.” On a 3-view drawing of theB–29, “The standard specification had four4-gun barbettes.” Almost everything hesays about Little Boy is wrong, and heincludes a cartoon cross-section that couldhave come right out of the 1950’s popularpress. There’s a picture showing the tunnelin a B–29 that is captioned, “Captain

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Parsons had to go through this tube toreach the bomb . . .” Difficult, since hewould have gone right by it! There areseveral pictures claiming to be of “LittleBoy” that are actually photos of testweapons. The Nagasaki attack airplane,Bockscar, is constantly referred to asBock’s Car. And the final gem after cor-rectly noting these were fission weapons,a picture of Fat Man, “a fusion type ofweapon”!

Of the book’s 286 pages, 101 areappendices that contain material that isoften quite irrelevant to the story—muchof it appears to be “filler” material. In thebibliography, one of the 21 books is TedLawson’s classic Thirty Seconds overTokyo. Unfortunately, the author is identi-fied as Lewis, Ted W.

For readers who want to understandDoolittle and the April 1942 raid, readDoolittle and Glines, I Could Never Be SoLucky Again. For Tibbets’ story, his bookThe Tibbets Story is good. But for the bestscholarship on the bomb and the atomicmissions, get John Coster-Mullen’s AtomBombs: The Top Secret Inside Story ofLittle Boy and Fat Man and RichardCampbell’s The Silverplate Bombers: AHistory and Registry of the Enola Gay andOther B–29s Configured to Carry AtomicBombs.


The Red Baron: The Graphic Historyof Richthofen’s Flying Circus and theAir War in WWI. By Wayne Vansant.Minneapolis, Minn.: Zenith Press, 2014.Maps. Illustrations. Appendices. Biblio -gra phy. Pp. 101. $19.99 paperback ISBN:978-0-7603-4602-0

In last winter’s issue of Air PowerHistory, I reviewed Vansant’s book on thebombing of Nazi Germany. With this lat-est book, Vansant has continued a strongstring of illustrated histories. He is boththe writer and illustrator of these andused a similar format when he illustratedMarvel’s The ‘Nam series. He then wroteand illustrated Normandy, Gettysburg,and Bombing Nazi German for Zenith. Hedrew almost 400 high-quality illustra-tions for this latest venture.

The Red Baron, Manfred Freiherrvon Richthofen, has been the subject ofmany books, several of which are quitegood. However, for a reader who wants aquick brush-up on this noted ace or on airwarfare in the First World War in general,this is an excellent little book to go

through. Some may not think a book donein the style of the old Classics Illustratedseries would be worth the time, but for thepurpose this book serves, it serves well.

Vansant has done an excellent job ofpresenting a number of the principal char-acters of the first major air war. It isinevitable if one is to tell von Richthofen’sstory. Oswald Boelcke and Max Immel -mann—two of the immortal Germanaces—certainly heavily influenced theyoung von Richthofen. Lanoe Hawker, oneof the early British aces, became one of theRed Baron’s early victories. Others such asGermans Verner Voss, Kurt Wolff, Lotharvon Richthofen, and Hermann Goering;Frenchmen René Fonck, Georges Guyne -mer, and Charles Nungesser; and Ameri -cans Raoul Lufbery and Eddie Ricken -backer enter the story as well. Althoughvon Richthofen never fought Americanfliers, his unit did after his death.

Von Richthofen’s death has been thesubject of endless controversy for years.Canadian Roy Brown, an RAF captain,was formally credited with bringing downthe Red Baron on April 21, 1918. Laterresearch has shown that it was probablyan Australian ground machine gun crewthat fired the single bullet the ended thecareer of the 80-kill ace. Who fired the bul-let is really not that important. What wasimportant was that one of the deadliestkilling machines of the German air forcewas no longer a threat to Allied fliers. VonRichthofen’s death, just short of his 26thbirthday, at least spared him the sad expe-rience of watching the defeat of his coun-try’s military during the next half year.

Vansant has included an appendixthat includes brief biographies of some ofthe players in the story as well as picturesand basic data on the most importantFrench, British, and German aircraft. Noone should consider this a comprehensivebook on the war in the air over westernEurope. However, it is a book that I’d rec-ommend to any of the docents of the Airand Space Museum or anyone else inter-ested in a good little primer to betterunderstand aerial combat and the life ofone of its greatest practitioners.


Hidden Warbirds II: More EpicStories of Finding, Recovering, andRebuilding WWII’s Lost Aircraft. ByNicholas A. Veronico. Minneapolis, Minn.:Zenith, 2014. Tables. Photographs. Biblio -graphy. Index. Pp. 256. $30.00 ISBN: 978-0-7603-4601-3

Hidden Warbirds II relates what ittakes to find, finance, recover, and restoreWorld War II planes: time, money, a will-ingness to bargain with landowners andauthorities, the perseverance to freeze,bake, wade through hip-deep mud andfend off crocodiles, and the occasional law-suit. A refinement and development ofVolume I (reviewed in APH summer2014), the book is packed with full-color,original photos of warbirds submergedunderwater; mired in a swamp; danglingperilously from a helicopter; more reas-suringly in the shop under restoration;and, finally, gleaming on the ramp along-side a proud owner. Veronico has exten-sively documented this field, and his web-site Wreckchasing.com is a nexus for war-bird news. Here the aspiring warbirdowner will learn, through accounts ofactual recoveries, which informationsources to research, who to contact, how toraise funds, and what resources are need-ed to restore a warbird.

The warbird field is not as easy as itlooks. Would-be wreck rebuilders oftenshy off when they realize that aircraftretrieval and restoration—especiallybombers—can be a major undertaking.Although driveway projects are possible,the warbird enthusiast often is an orga-nizer of specialists with the industrialcapability—cranes, barges, machineshops, and heavy transportation via land,sea, and air—to locate, acquire the rightsto, reach, extract, haul, rebuild andrestore, and maintain a warbird. Theemphasis is on networking for funds,parts, skills, and facilities. Patience andpersistence are prime characteristics ofthe successful warbird hunter. This is anactive industry whose raw material iswrecks.

In the volume, Veronico sharpens andemphasizes the definitions of the WorldWar II warbird field introduced in Volume1. Although “hidden” warbirds can bethose that are physically inaccessible dueto their remote location, they also can beplanes that may be visible but that peopleand circumstances prevent from beingmade publicly available as part of the avi-ation heritage community. A HawkerFury in Iraq, pole-mounted gate guardsthat we pass every day, or even privatecollections an owner does not displaycount as “hidden.”

“Finding” warbirds is a deliberateand systematic process. Searchersresearch a desired plane’s supposed loca-tion in accident reports, logbooks, or flightrecords, then confirm that theory throughsite visits, diving in lakes and the ocean,aerial reconnaissance, or even GoogleEarth. Searchers depended on boat-mounted sonar and local rumors to finally

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find a B–17 that bellied in on frozen DykeLake, Labrador, Canada, in December1947, 12 miles from where the spring thawshould have deposited it on the bottom.Shade from the B–17 had formed an iceraft, which drifted downstream.

Once located, title and ownership, aswell as official permits required to removea plane from public or private property,must first be obtained. The warbirdsearcher must navigate governments, mili-taries, landowners, and such organizationswith vested interests as nature conservan-cies. Sometimes spur-of-the-moment inspi-ration does the trick; after years of fruitlessengagement with hesitant local officials,would-be searchers of the Dyke Lake B–17flew in another B–17, gave tours, and puton an air show. The recovery permit waspromptly issued.

Once acquired, the main challenge isgetting to the planes and then extractingthem. Geography separates the merelycurious from the truly determined: therestorer who finally recovered a rare P–47Bwreck from a remote North Carolinaswamp via helicopter had many ambitious,but not quite as energetic, predecessors.

Restoration is similarly described.Aircraft are taken apart down to the indi-vidual rib and stringer and reassembledusing as many original parts as possible.Special facilities often are needed: theBattle of Britain Do 17 was placed in acustom-built, environmentally-controlledroom to prevent deterioration. Seventyyears on, some wrecks are little more thana component—restorers constructed fromoriginal blueprints all but the fuselage aftof the engine firewall of a P–40N recoveredfrom the Australian Outback. Authenticityis key: original factory-applied technicalinstructions and even assembly line work-er signatures are carefully preserved.Those aircraft that actually saw combat—notably, the Flying Heritage Collection’seastern front Fw 190A, now a rare flyingexample—are held in special esteem.Especially scrupulous restorations arehonored by such signature warbird organi-zations as the Experimental AircraftAssociation.

Volume I’s thorough bibliography,including annotated lists of internetresources, has been updated for this vol-ume. As before, the thoroughly categorizedindex is intended for quick and repeatedreference.

As a prime point of this book is therelative remoteness of some of thesewrecks, some maps would have been wel-come. It appears as though a deadlineloomed as the volume was finished; I founda few typos and a chapter or two thatseemed hastily put together. The onlything that did not check out in this other-wise thoroughly researched book was aB–17E for which the serial given, 42-5088,appears in sources as a B–17F.

Steve Agoratus, Hamilton, N.J.

Billy Mitchell’s War with the Navy:The Interwar Rivalry Over AirPower. By Thomas Wildenberg. Anna -polis Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2013.Illustrations. Photographs. Notes. Appen -dices. Bibliography. Index. Pp. 271. $34.95.ISBN: 978-0-87021-038-9.

Thomas Wildenberg, a former RamseyFellow in naval aviation history at theNational Air and Space Museum, has writ-ten a well-researched account of one ofAmerica’s most controversial military fig-ures—William “Billy” Mitchell. A statedobjective was to “document the interservicerivalry over air power,” primarily duringthe interwar period. Such an inquiry is adifficult challenge and, while Wildenberg’sinterpretation is clearly delivered from theNavy’s perspective, his work turns out to beas biased as others about Mitchell. Let’sface it: Billy Mitchell was abrasive, bom-bastic and cocky—a figure almost impossi-ble to hold in a neutral light.

Wildenberg labels Mitchell as anunethical evangelist for air power holdingsway over an unlisted group of “disciples”who touted the “benefits of strategic bomb-ing for years after the end of World War II.”Later in the work, he uses the pejorative

“minions” to describe this same group ofsubordinate officers that were oftenassigned under Mitchell’s command and,by association, part of the “Mitchell cabal”that resulted in his eventual court martialin 1926. These “minions” are never clearlyrevealed in this book but can be assumedto be Hap Arnold, Jimmy Doolittle, FrankAndrews, Curtis LeMay and other ArmyAir Forces giants that transformed a cloth-and-wire air arm into the single largestassemblage of combat aircraft in history—without help from the Navy.

The root of interservice rivalry, asWildenberg accurately states, was (andstill is) an issue of funding—money pureand simple. The debate over dollars beganin the early 1900s, prior to Billy Mitchell’sarrival on the aviation scene, and contin-ues full force today. Even Mitchell under-stood that America’s premier service wasthe Navy. The Navy received the lion’sshare of the military budget and had sincethe early 1800s—and rightfully so.Protecting U.S. interests was becomingmore critical as the nation stepped ontothe world stage during World War I.Building a global naval force took time;was extremely expensive; and requiredspecial technologies, training, and doc-trine.

Billy Mitchell’s war with the Navywas a predictable result of the advance-ment of a new military-aviation technolo-gy that Mitchell personally commandedwith great skill over the trenches of St.Mihiel and the Meuse-Argonne in 1918.Wildenberg’s chapters covering Mitchell’searly military service are the best I’veread. Meticulous and revealing, his clearpicture of Mitchell’s strengths andremarkable volatility are juxtaposed byhis promotion to captain—the youngest ofthat rank in the Army—in the same yearthat witnessed the invention of the air-plane. Billy Mitchell was what today istermed a “fast burner.” By the end of WorldWar I, Mitchell was America’s undisputedair-power expert. Who else was betterequipped to wage the budget fight forArmy aviation against the Navy after thewar had ended?

PROSPECTIVE REVIEWERS

Anyone who believes he or she is qualified to substantively assess one of the new books listed above is invited to applyfor a gratis copy of the book. The prospective reviewer should contact:

Col. Scott A. Willey, USAF (Ret.)3704 Brices Ford Ct.Fairfax, VA 22033Tel. (703) 620-4139e-mail: [email protected]

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Books ReceivedDougherty, Kerrie, Ed., History of Rocketry andAstronautics.. San Diego, Calif. Univelt 2013. [AASHistory Series, Vol. AIAA History Series, Vol. 41,.Proc. Of the Forty-Fourth History Symposium of theInternational Academy of Astronautics, Prague, CzechRep, 2010 Illustrations. Photographs. Notes. Pp. 446.Hard Cover [$110.00 ISBN: 978-0803, Soft CoverTSBM: ($60.00 ISBM: 978-0-87703-608-1. Bothinclude a DVD.

Meikle, Nick. Malloch’s Spitfire: The Story and Resto -ration of PK 350. Philadelphia and Oxford: Case -mate. Notes. Photographs. Illustrations. Appendixes.Bibliography. Index. Pp. 343 Paperback $24.95. ISBN:978-1-61200-2521.

Mortimer, Gavin. The First Eagles: The FearlessAmerican Aces Who Flew With the RAF in World WarI. Minneapolis, Minn.: Zenith Press, 2014. Photo -graphs. Appendixes, Bibliography. Index.. Pp. 240.$30.00 ISBN: 978-0-75034-06399

Rickman, Sarah Byrn. Nancy Love and the WASPFerry Pilots of World War II, Denton.: University ofNorth Texas,, 2008. Photographs. Notes.. GlossaryBibliography. Index. Pp. 332. Herd Cover $24.95ISBN: 978-1-57441-241-3

Books Available—July 2, 2014

Baime: The Arsenal of Democracy: FDR, Detroit, and an Epic Quest to Arm and American at War. 364p.Barzilai: 102 Days of War: How Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda & the Taliban Survived 2001. 167p.Blackman: Nimrod: Rise and Fall. 223p.Busha: The Fight in the Clouds: The Extraordinary Combat Experience of P-51 Mustang Pilots During World War II. 238p. Denton: Believers in the Battlespace: Religion, Ideologyu and War. 231p.Grandolini: Fall of the Flying Dragon: South Vietnamese Air Force 1973-75. 253p.Head: Night Hunters: The AC-130s and their Role in U.S. Airpower, 423p.Heaton & Lewis: The German Aces Speak II: WWII Through the Eyes of Four More of the Luftwaffe’s Most Important

Commanders. 296p.Homan & Reilly: Black Knights: The Story of the Tuskegee Airmen. 336p.Jackson: Doctrine, Strategy and Military Culture: Military-Strategic Doctrine Development in Australia, Canada and

New Zealand, 1987-2007. 185p. Lambright: Why Mars: NASA and the Politics of Space Exploration, 320p.McKay: Shifting Sands: Air Coercion and Iraq, 1991-2003. 189p. Newdick & Cooper: Modern Military Aircraft: The World’s Great Weapons. 384p.Okerstrom: Project 9: The Birth of the Air Commandos in World War II. 300p.Schubert: Other than War: The American Military Experience and Operations in the Post-Cold War Decade. 126p.Sine: Guardian Angel: Life and Death Adventures with Pararescue, the World’s Most Powerful Commando Rescue Force. 239p.

As it turned out, Mitchell’s interwartheatrics may have done more for navalaviation than for the Army’s air arm.Wildenberg points out that sinking cap-tured ships and holding mock bombingraids over large American cities “renewedemphasis for the need to obtain aircraftcarriers for the Navy.” Both in the halls ofcongress and in the popular press, callswent up for construction of aircraft carri-ers. Unfortunately for the Navy, buildingan aircraft carrier force within a fixedbudget meant that fewer battleshipscould be built. In reality, the demise of thebattleship came from within the Navyitself, distressing the senior, most pedan-tic of naval staff officers. Ironically, a sim-ilar struggle between “Old Army” officerslike Charles Menoher, and younger air-minded officers like Mitchell, Arnold, andDoolittle took place within the Army dur-ing the establishment of a new combatbranch—aviation.

The most interesting section of

Wildenberg’s work examines the bom-bardment tests and sinking of theOstfriesland. Wildenberg makes clearthat Mitchell’s aircraft violated the Navy’sbombardment “rules” during theOstfriesland tests. But his analysis of theimportance of these tests falls short.Mitchell’s success earned the Army front-page publicity across the country duringthe interservice struggle to assume thecoastal defense mission. Yet, the Navywanted to sink that battleship just asmuch as the Army airmen did “deprivingMitchell of his most dramatic claim tofame).”

Yet, during follow-on tests the nextyear, the Navy had no compunction aboutimpeding the release of test results afterthe sinking of the Virginia. Commanderson the St. Mihiel, the observation ship forthe test, charged newspaper reporters totransmit their reports back to the main-land (the equivalent of $2,250 per 1000words today). Further, official Army

reports were “heavily edited” by a team ofnaval officers to downplay the impact ofthe tests in an effort to avoid the mediacircus of the Ostfriesland sinking the yearbefore. Rather than submit their reportthrough official channels, the Navy doc-tored the Army’s report. Gen. Pershing,not wishing to rock the Navy’s boat,allowed the edits. Wildenburg does notmention the dubious ethics of such actionstaken to keep a lid on Army publicity.

Nonetheless, Wildenberg’s book isworth examining. He offers some new per-spective on Mitchell, including the acci-dental shooting of his second wife thathad been buried in the police reports atFort Meyer, but only scratches the surfaceof the complexities of interservice rivalry.

Lt. Col. Dik Daso, USAF (Ret.), Ph.D.,Adjunct History Faculty, Univ. of SouthCarolina

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September 20, 2014The National Museum of the PacificWar will present its 2014 Symposium atthe Admiral Nimitz Museum in Fredericks -burg, Texas. For more details as theybecome available, see the Museum’s web-site at www.pacificwarmuseum.org/ news-events/the-2014-annual-symposium/.

September 24-26, 2014The League of World War I AviationHistorians will present the first install-ment of its “Centennial of Aviation Warfare”at the National Museum of the USAF inDayton, Ohio. For more details, contact theLeague at [email protected].

September 24-27, 2014The Society of Experimental TestPilots will hold its 58th annualSymposium and Banquet in Anaheim,California. Details will be announced asthey become available at www.setp.org/.

September 26-28, 2014The National Museum of the UnitedStates Air Force will host a World War IDawn Patrol Rendezvous; this event willmemorialize the 100th anniversary of thebeginning of World War I. For furtherdetails, see the Museum’s website atwww.nationalmuseum.af.mil/wwi.asp.

October 1, 2014The U.S. Naval Institute will present ahistory conference on the grounds of theU.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis,Maryland. The theme will be “Leaders inAction: Ordinary People Doing theExtraordinary.” For further details, see theInstitute’s website at www.usni.org/events.

October 4, 2014The National Aviation Hall of Famewillenshrine its latest group of honorees duringa formal dinner at the Hall, co-located withthe National Museum of the United StatesAir Force in Dayton, Ohio. This year’senshrinees will include Bert Acosta, Alanand Dale Klapmeier, James McDivitt, EmilyHowell Warner, and Steve Wittman. Formore information, see the Hall of Fame’swebsite at http://nationalaviation.org/.

October 7-9, 2014The Association of Old Crows will holdits 51st Annual AOC International Sym po -sium and Convention at the Marriott Ward -man Park Hotel in Washington, D.C. Formore information, ping a Crow atwww.crows.org/onventions/conventions.html.

October 8-12, 2014The Oral History Association will hold its48th annual meeting at the MadisonConcourse Hotel in Madison, Wisconsin. Thisyear’s meeting theme will be “Motion:Movements, Transformations, and the Powerof Story.” For additional details, see theAssociation’s website at www.oralhistory.org/.

October 10-11, 2014The Southwest Branch of the World War IHistorical Association in conjunctionwith Tarleton University at Stephenville,Texas and the Dallas Forth Worth branch ofthe League of WWI Aviation His -torians, will sponsor a symposiumon October 10-11, 2014 in Stephenvillewhich will look at how Americans engagedin the Great War before the U.S. enteredit. For more information, contact M. Kihn -topf at [email protected] or Dr. MarcyTanter, at [email protected]

October 13-15, 2014The Association of the United StatesArmy will hold its Annual Meeting andExposition at the Walter E. WashingtonConvention Center in Washington, D.C.For more information on this event, seethe AUSA’s website at www.ausa.org/meetings/Pages/NationalMeetings.aspx.

October 27-29, 2014The American Astronautical Societywill present its 7th Wernher von BraunMemorial Symposium on the campus of theUniversity of Alabama at Huntsville inHuntsville, Alabama. For further particu-lars, see the Society’s website at astronauti-cal.org/node/260.

November 4-6, 2014The Association for Unmanned VehicleSystems International will host ProgramReview 2014 at the Ritz-Carlton, TysonsCorner in McLean, Virginia. For programdetails, see the Association’s website atwww.auvsi.org/events1/.

November 6-9, 2014The History of Science Society will holdits annual meeting in Chicago, Illi nois. Formore details as they become avai lable, seethe Society’s website at www.hssonline.org/.

November 6-9, 2014The Society for the History of Tech -nology will hold its annual meeting inDearborn, Michigan. For more details asthey become available, see the Society’swebsite at www.historyoftechnology.org/.

November 14-15, 2014The History and Political ScienceDepartment at Chestnut Hill College,located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, willhost an interdisciplinary conference on“The Legacy of World War I.” Keynotespeakers will be Jay Winter (YaleUniversity) and Laura Lee Downs(European University Institute, Florence,Italy). To be placed on a mailing list forconference registration, send your name,mailing address, and email address toWilliam Walker at [email protected].

December 4-6, 2014The National World War II Museumwillhost its 2014 International Conference onWWII, “1944: Beyond all Boundaries,” inNew Orleans, Louisiana. For more infor-mation, see the Museum’s website atww2conference.com or call 877-813-3329,ext. 511.

2015January 2-5, 2015

The American Historical Associationwill hold its annual meeting in New YorkCity, New York. For details visit the Associa -tion’s website at www.historians.org.

Compiled byGeorge W. Cully

Readers are invited to submit listings ofupcoming events Please include the name ofthe organization, title of the event, datesand location of where it will be held, as wellas contact information. Send listings to:

George W. Cully3300 Evergreen HillMontgomery, AL 36106(334) 277-2165E-mail: [email protected]


1st AACS MOB Squadron Oct 16-19,2014, Fairborn, OH Contact:

James Mumaw5748 Mallard Dr,Huber Heights, OH [email protected]

2d Bombardment Assn Oct 22-26,2014, Albuquerque, NM Contact:

Karen Nelson1300 Army Navy Drive #107,Arlington, VA [email protected]

4th Fighter Group (WW II) Oct 1-5,2014, Fairborn, OH Contact:

Keith Hoey120 Bay Breeze Dr,Belleville ON Canada K8N [email protected]

63d AAF-FTD Oct 12-17, 2014, Douglas,GA Contact:

John A. Herrmann3562 West Fork Rd.,Cincinnati, OH [email protected]

86th Fighter-Bomber Group Assn,WWII Oct 1-5, 2014 Fort Walton Beach,FL Contact:

Dallas [email protected]

91st Tactical Fighter Squadron Sep24-27, 2015, Fairborn, OH Contact:

Dion Makris7152 Hartcrest Ln,Centerville, OH [email protected]

93d Bombardment Group Oct 16-19,2014, Dayton, OH Contact:

Jim Root15359 Red Fox Walk,West Olive, MI [email protected]

384th Bomb Group Oct 16-19, 2014,Fairborn, OH Contact:

Frank Alfter1306 Adams Way,Beavercreek, OH [email protected]

452d Bomb Group Oct 1-5, 2014,Dayton, OH Contact:

Carolyn Goodwin322 Madison Mews,Norfolk, VA [email protected]

485th Bomb Group, WW II, Italy 50th& Final Reunion Sep 17-21, 2014, Dallas,TX Contact:

Jim Scheib5360 N. Calle Bujia,Tucson, AZ [email protected]

496th Tactical Fighter Squadron Oct23-26, 2014, Fairborn, OH Contact:

J. Kevin Roll677 Todd Trail,Newport News, VA [email protected]

496th TFS/50th TFW - Hahn AB, Ger -many (1970-75) Oct 23-26, 2014, Fair -born, OH Contact:

Bill Flanagan9233 East Ave T-12,Littlerock, CA [email protected]

511th AC&W Group Reunion Assn(613th, 847th, 848th AC&W and 39thAD) Oct 2-6, 2014, St. Louis, MO Contact:

Don [email protected](Central & Southern Japanradar vets too)

554th Recon Squadron Oct 2-5, 2014,Dayton/Fairborn, OH Contact:

Gary Spohn2600 Alpha E Seltice Way PMB 191,Post Falls, ID [email protected]

815th Troop Carrier Squadron Oct 9-12, 2014, Branson, MO Contact:

The Reunion Brat16817 Mountainside Drive EastGreenwater, WA [email protected]

F-16 Alumni Association Sep 25-28,2014, Fairborn, OH Contact:

Sandy Bunn4153 Sierra Park Terrace,Beavercreek, OH [email protected]

3640th Pilot Training Wing LaredoAFB Officer IP & PP Oct 14-17, 2014San Antonio, TX Contact:

Ron Hunt1328 Meadow Moor Dr,Beavercreek, OH [email protected]

Lakenheath POL (Petroleum, Oils,Lubri cants) Oct 10-12, 2014, Fairborn,OH Contact:

David Giboo57 Bristelcone Ct,Battlement Mesa, CO [email protected]

RAF Upper Heyford Sep 18-21, 2014,Dayton, OH Contact:

Sherry MillsP.O. Box 25806,Colorado Springs, CO [email protected]

AC-119 Gunship Reunion Shadows &Stingers; Air & Ground Crew; 71st,17th & 18th SOS Sep 17-21, 2014,Albuquerque, NM Contact:

Col Steve Mac Isaac, USAF (Ret)6449 Coventry Hills Dr, NERio Rancho, NM 87144505-867-3367 or [email protected]

Looking for anyone assoc. with AC-119gunships, 1967 to 1972 in SEA: aircrew,ground crew, support personnel, friends,families, anyone whose bacon we saved!

B–26 Marauder Historical SocietyNational Reunion Oct 16-18, 2014, Akron,OH Contact:

Phyllis HayB-26 Marauder Historical Society3900 E. Timrod St,Tucson, AZ [email protected]

USAF Special Projects Prod’nFacility Sep 28-Oct 3, 2014, Fairborn,OH Contact:

Dick Temple19899 Naples Lakes Terrace,Ashburn, VA [email protected]

Wild Weasels Oct 8-11, 2015, Fairborn,OH Contact:

Larry Lemieux10497 S 475 WWilliamsburg, IN [email protected]

Reunions


the decisive factor. Combat on the EasternFront tended to be at lower altitudes andfrom 1943, he was always up against air-craft more manoeuvrable at lower alti-tudes than the Bf 109G. Since he realizedthis, he did not waste time trying to out-manoeuvre them in dogfights.He used hisskill to go straight in.

The Me 262 was never likely to spendtwenty-five hours in combat. Some com-bat missions would fail to make contact:in others, contact with enemy aircraftwould represent a small fraction of flyingtime.

No idea how they did it but theGloster Meteor was a strangely sluggishmachine. The Me 262 may have beenmore fun to fly than the F–80 but I doubtif it was a better combat machine otherthan the much heavier armamentrequired by its bomber-killer role.

It’s a myth that the MiG–15 (or theNorth American Sabre or the DassaultMystere) owed anything to the Ta 183.This has been investigated by YefimGordon & Co. Incidentally the nose intakewas a feature of Italy’s experimental jetplane, the Caproni Campini, and Britain’sGloster E28/39 early in the war.

The Focke Wulf Fw 200, being a com-mercial airliner, had a rather smallbombload and was relatively fragile, oftensuffering catastrophic structural failureson landing (see photos on Google). TheLuftwaffe never saw it as a heavy bomberfor use against land targets.

The Swordfish, which DAMAGEDrather than SANK the Bismarck, carriedout this attack in weather conditions inwhich no other aircraft could have operatedfrom an aircraft carrier, and it was its abili-ty to take off and land on a flight deck insuch conditions that kept it in frontline ser-vice throughout the war. I had an articleabout this in RUSI Journal in, I think,2011.

A.D. Harvey

German Aircraft Design

The article on German aircraft design[vol. 61, No. 2, pp. 28-39] made interestingreading, however, may I make some obser-vations.

Unfortunately no mention is made ofthe author’s empirical basis for assessingan aircraft’s superiority. Was one betterthan the other because of speed, arma-ment, handling etc., or a weighted balanceof a number of criteria. or was it that somewere worse than others? It would havebeen useful to know the basis for his con-clusions.

Nor is mention is made in the com-ments on German four-engined designs ofthe Fw 200 Condor which was certainlyfeared by the convoys and called byWinston Churchill, ‘The Scourge of theAtlantic’. The Spitfire V became out-classed until the Spitfire IX appeared.These are surely the vagaries of war.Consideration surely also needs to begiven to the opposition aircraft and therelative quality of the aircrew. ErichHartmann may well have been in a Bf 109considered by the author to have hadshortcomings, but he still achieved 352aircraft shot down. Were these victims’aircraft even more inferior or were theyjust bad pilots in good aircraft?

The Me 262’s jet engines may onlyhave lasted 25 hours but was the aircraftitself likely to survive in combat thatlong? Why invest in designing an engine tolast 120 hours if its airframe was only like-ly to achieve a fraction of that? Its speedand armament alone, according to Eric‘Winkle’ Brown, placed it in a different cat-egory of its own as the most significant air-craft design of the war as partly evidencedby its score of victories against P-51s. Only

when the RAF sent Hawker Tempests tocatch the 262s as they returned to theirbases was their weak spot found. TheUSAAF conceded that it was superior tothe P-80 and the RAF likewise conceded itwas superior to the Meteor in manyrespects. And it was not only the Germansthat pushed aircraft into service beforethey were fully developed.

Were not derivative designs of‘Luftwaffe 1946’ – particularly the Ta 183- pitted in combat over the skies of Koreana few years later, far outclassing the firstgeneration Allied jets? It is also possiblystill true to say that every post-war mis-sile and space launch vehicle contains inits DNA the vestiges of the research doneat Peenemunde.

Every country has its good and baddesigns and debate will continue, but therelative success of a warplane along withits aircrew when operated in the furnaceof conflict must surely also be taken intoaccount and analysed as well. It was,after all, an outdated biplane that sankthe Bismarck and a percentage of theItalian fleet but that didn’t necessarilymake it a good design.

John Boyes

Author Responds

Thank you for your comments. I was writ-ing a short article rather than a book and sodid not set out in any formal way my crite-ria for establishing what constituted oneaircraft’s superiority over another design.Various features that I regarded as relevantwere cited, on several occasions, in the firstpart of my article but, yes, not in any sys-tematic fashion. That was the way Ithought most suitable for putting my ideasacross in a short article.

I think the skill and experience ofpilots like Erich Hartmann was always

Letters

OCS-58A Oct 9-12, 2014, Fairborn, OHContact:

Vincent Haney6945 Meeker Woods,Dayton, OH [email protected]

PTC-56M Apr 23-26, 2016, Fairborn, OHContact:

John Mitchell11713 Decade Ct,Reston, VA [email protected]

PTC-62A Oct 1-4, 2015, Fairborn, OHContact:

Dave Tippett227 Forest Creek Dr,Bozeman, MT [email protected]

PTC-71-04 (Webb AFB) Oct 1-4, 2015,Fairborn, OH Contact:

Keith Houk1805 Creekwood Dr,Troy, OH [email protected]

UPT-65A Craig AFB, ALOct 9-11, 2014,Fairborn, OH Contact:

Rafael Ramos431 Ashton Ct,Beavercreek, OH [email protected]

List provided by: Rob Bardua National Museum of the U.S. Air ForcePublic Affairs Division1100 Spaatz StreetWPAFB, OH 45433-7102(937) 255-1386


Panacea Targets

In his article on Sir Arthur Harris andpanacea targets in the Summer 2014 issue[Vol. 61, No. 2, pp. 36-41] A.D. Harveyomits a minor point. In late 1940 and early1941, Middle East Command consideredusing the two squadrons of Wellingtontwin-engine heavies to attack Ploesti. Butthere were several problems:1. The Wellingtons could not climb above11,000 feet and therefore could not safely pass over the mountains north of Greece.2. The alternative was to fly up theDardanelles and violate Turkish neutrali-ty—and risk being shot down.3. The two squadrons, with the RAF’s thenweakness in night navigation, wereunlikely to have much success, for the pro-ject was dropped as Greece and its refuel-ing grounds fell in April 1941.

Robin Higham, Author of Diary of a Disas -ter: British Aid to Greece, 1940-1941 (1986)

Best Book Award, 2013

The Hump: America’s Strategy for KeepingChina in World War II, by Dr. John D.Plating, Colonel, USAF, and teacher of his-tory at the Air Force Academy, has beenselected for the Air Force HistoricalFoundation’s Best Airpower Book Awardfor the year 2013. The award is givenannually after a three-judge panel careful-ly considers and rates all of the books thatwere reviewed in the Foundation’s journal,Air Power History, during the year.Criteria for selection call for the book to beof high quality, contribute to an under-standing of air power, and for the author orauthors to have had a connection to theU.S. Air Force or be a member of the AirForce Historical Foundation.

China’s part in World War II has longbeen little known in America, although themaneuverings of Madame Chiang Kai-shek and her brother T. V. Soong (Chiang’srepresentative in Washington) receivedconsiderable publicity during and after thewar. But just why China was a critical allyin the eyes of Franklin Roosevelt isobscure to most people and certainly nolonger taught in our schools. John Pla -ting’s book explores both the importance ofChina as a counterweight to Japan’s army,and the organization of the India-China

airlift that supplied both China and the U.S. Air Force’s Fourteenth Air Force com-manded by Maj. Gen. Claire Chennault.This dangerous and demanding airliftsupply route became necessary with theJapanese seizure of the Burma Road, andChiang Kai-shek’s insistent demands forever-greater amounts of fuel, munitions,and supplies. Along with his demands,Chiang left the implication that withoutcontinued support he might be forced tosurrender to Japan with the consequentfreeing of thousands of Japanese soldiersto be used against the Allies in the Pacificand Asia. This book is valuable for openingdiscussion into a part of the Air Force’s andAmerica’s activity in the war that almosthas been forgotten.

The judges’ voting for the winner wasvery close, and we had a virtual tie for sec-ond place between Jay Stout’s FighterGroup and Christopher Rein’s NorthAfrican Air Campaign. Fighter Groupexamines the flying training, deployment,and combat preparation of one of the mostnotable Army Air Forces organizations inthe European Theater. An exploration intoair combat planning and fighting in anearby area is found in the book on theNorth African Air Campaign. It is not pos-sible to pick between the two for secondplace, nor should we; they are both excel-lent works of history. We had a number ofother fascinating books on this year’s nom-ination list, as well; all of them are worthreading.

This year’s judges included Mr. ScottShaw, a research staff member at theInsti tute for Defense Analyses in Alexan -dria, Virginia; Dr. Mark R. Mandeles,President, The J. de Bloch Group, Fairfax,Virginia; and Major Willard Strandberg,Jr., USAF (Ret). These three had a partic-ularly difficult job, as the scoring of the toptier of the nominations was very close.

I am most grateful to the three judges,who spent many hours on this task, and tothe several authors and those who sup-ported and advised them during the timethey spent researching, writing, contem-plating their projects, and revising thetexts.

The award will be presented at theannual Air Force Historical Foundation’sawards gathering in the fall.

This year was a first for this competi-tion: we had one author with two booksnominated, Dr. Robin Higham, the veryaccomplished air power historian who alsohas long been associated with the AirForce Historical Foundation. The list of theremainder of the books nominated for thisaward follows, and the judges and I rec-ommend all, as well as those mentionedabove, to anyone who has an interest in airpower and the Air Force:

Fahrenwald, Ted. Bailout over Normandy,A Flyboy’s Adventures with the FrenchResistance and Other Escapades inOccupied France.

Temple, L. Parker. Implosion: Lessonsfrom National Security, High ReliabilitySpacecraft, Electronics, and the ForcesWhich Changed Them.

Lipowski, Bruce E. Birth of a Base:MacDill Field, 1939-1941.

Higham, Robin. Unflinching Zeal: AirBattles Over France and Britain, May-October 1940.

Rein, Christopher M. The North AfricanAir Campaign, U.S. Army Air Forces fromEl Alamein to Salerno.

Dibbs, Hohn M., with Robert Renner. ViperForce, 56th Fighter Wing—To Fly andFight the F–16.

Stout, Jay A. Fighter Group: The 352nd“Blue-Nosed Bastards in World War II.

McGill, Earl J. Jet Age Man: SAC B–47Operations in the Early Cold War.

Higham, Robin. Two Roads to War: TheFrench and British Air Arms fromVersailles to Dunkirk

John F. Kreis, Chairman, PublicationsAwards Committee

Best Article, 2013

This year’s winner of the Best Articleaward is Dr. William Head, Chief of theHistory Office at Robins AFB, Georgia, forhis article “The Battles of Al-Fallujah:Urban Warfare and the Growth of AirPower.” Dr. Head is a prolific author withnumerous books to his credit, with partic-ular expertise in the history of aerial gun-ship development and employment; thisarticle appeared in the Winter 2013 edi-tion of Air Power History. In addition to hismany books, Dr. Head has had articlespublished in the Journal of MilitaryHistory, Virginia Review of Asian Studies,and the Journal of Third World Studies inaddition to The Air Force HistoricalFoundation’s Air Power History.

From before the 2003 invasion of Iraquntil the United States’ forces left thecountry in 2011, Al-Fallujah was a con-stant source of trouble for Coalition mili-tary assigned to control central Iraq; thecity became the center of anti-Coalitionviolence. Some of the highest Americanlosses came during the fighting for this

News


city. Dr. Head points out that some ana-lysts believe that the fighting in Al-Fallujah was the most bitter and vicioussince the effort to re-take Hue City,Vietnam during the Tet Offensive of 1968.Heretofore, air power had played only alimited role in urban war, mostly to levelparticularly troublesome areas so thatinfantry could move through cities clear-ing out remaining enemy forces. At Al-Fallujah, with the use of high techweapons and the ability to locate anddestroy specific targets, this changed. AirPower acquired a new capability, and Dr.Head describes it admirably.

Although fought to a stalemate by theIraqi insurgents at Al-Fallujah, Dr. Headconcludes that “air power and specificallyAC–130s had proven their worth bothwith their ability search and destroyenemy assets in an urban environment aswell as being able to devastate insurgentforces in open and hidden positions.”Before the fighting at Al-Fallujah, fewbelieved that air forces played a substan-tial role in urban war. This idea was shownto be incorrect, and Dr. Head’s analysis hasdemonstrated just how much developingtechnology has altered air warfare capa-bilities.

Dr. Head’s winning article is one of anumber of first-rate pieces that appearedin Air Power History during 2013, includ-ing another article, this one in two parts,that he wrote. Following closely in the

scoring were his own “The Battle for Ra’sal-Khafji and the Effects of Air Power,”A.D. Harvey’s “Air Warfare in Perspective,”and Daniel L. Haulman’s “The UnitedStates Air Force and Bosnia, 1992-1995.”

This year’s judges for the best articlecompetition were all members of the AirForce Historical Foundation’s Board ofDirectors: Ken Alnwick; Charles L.Johnson; and Jonna Hoppes.

Theodore J. VanKirk

Theodore “Dutch” vanKirk, the man who navigated the atomic armed Enola Gay to Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, died on July28, 2014. Reportedly, the last survivingmember of the twelve-man crew, he wasninety-three.

Maj. “Dutch” VanKirk was born inNorthumberland, Pennsylvania, served inthe Army Air Forces until discharged, andreceived a bachelor’s degree in 1949 fromBucknell University. He was personallyrecruited for the Enola Gay mission byCol. Paul Tibbetts, mission commander.

Bernard Fischer

Col. Bernard Fisher, the first personawarded the Air Force-designed Medal ofHonor, died Aug. 16 in Idaho at the age of87. President Lyndon B. Johnson awardedFisher the Medal of Honor, the nation’shighest honor for valor in combat, on Jan.19, 1967 for “personal action above andbeyond the call of duty” in South Vietnam.

In 1966, then-major Fisher, who wasassigned to the 1st Air CommandoSquadron at Pleiku, South Vietnam,risked his life to save his wingman after hewas shot down during the battle of A ShauValley, a narrow strip below the demilita-rized zone between North and SouthVietnam. “Fisher landed his Douglas A–1ESkyraider on an airfield controlled by theenemy under the most intense ground fire,pulled the downed pilot aboard his air-craft, and successfully escaped despite sev-eral bullets striking the plane.” Fisher,who started his military career in theNavy, spent time in the Idaho Air NationalGuard before he received his Air Forcecommission in June 1951. In addition tothe hundreds of close air support missionsflown in his A–1E in Vietnam, Fisher alsoflew the F–80, F–86, and the F–101through out his career. He retired from theAir Force in 1974. He also is the recipientof the Silver Star, Distinguished FlyingCross, and the Bronze Star Medal, amongothers.

New Publications from the Air Force Historical Support Division

Two new works from the Air ForceHistorical Support Division. First,Dr. Jean A Mansavage has complet-ed a study of the USAF’s contribu-tion to the development of the DoDconservation program. The secondwork is by Dr. Michael Rouland, aformer intern in the Air ForceHistorical Studies Office now work-ing for the Naval Historical Center.His study focuses on the tangledhistory of Afghanistan and how ithas ended up mired in the currentturmoil.

Available for download in PDF format at www.afhso.af.mil

In Memoriam


Technical editor Robert F.Dorr is offering copies of hisnew World War II bookMission to Berlin to APHreaders on a not-for-profitbasis at half price. ContactBob at (703) 264-8950 [email protected]

We seek quality articles—based on sound scholarship, perceptive analysis, and/or firsthand experience—which arewell-written and attractively illustrated. The primary criterion is that the manuscript contributes to knowledge. Articlessubmitted to Air Power History must be original contributions and not be under consideration by any other publicationat the same time. If a manuscript is under consideration by another publication, the author should clearly indicate thisat the time of submission. Each submission must include an abstract—a statement of the article’s theme, its historicalcontext, major subsidiary issues, and research sources. Abstracts should not be longer than one page.Manuscripts should be submitted in triplicate, double-spaced throughout, and prepared according to the Chicago Manual

of Style (University of Chicago Press). Use civilian dates and endnotes. Because submissions are evaluated anonymously,the author’s name should appear only on the title page. Authors should provide on a separate page brief biographical details,to include institutional or professional affiliation and recent publications, for inclusion in the printed article. Pages, includ-ing those containing illustrations, diagrams or tables, should be numbered consecutively. Any figures and tables must beclearly produced ready for photographic reproduction. The source should be given below the table. Endnotes should be num-bered consecutively through the article with a raised numeral corresponding to the list of notes placed at the end.Computer-produced articles should be submitted on a CD-R in Microsoft Word or equivalent format, for the PC. Disks

should be labelled with the name of the author, title of the article, and the software used. There is no standard length for articles, but 4,500-5,500 words is a general guide.Manuscripts and editorial correspondence should be sent to Jacob Neufeld, Editor, c/o Air Power History, 11908

Gainsborough Rd., Potomac, MD 20854, e-mail: [email protected].

Guidelines for Contributors


The mystery aircraft in our last issue was theBoeing XB–15. Built as a bomber, it became a trans-port, renamed the XC-105.

This behemoth resulted from a 1934 Army AirCorps proposal for a bomber capable of flying 5,000miles. It was briefly known as the XBLR–1 butbecame the XB–15 before its first flight October 15,1937—two years after the maiden flight of the sameplanemaker’s smaller but less trouble-prone B–17Flying Fortress. Even when it first took to the air,experts realized the XB–15 offered no advantageover existing bombers. They saw this big ship as aresearch vehicle, to enhance aeronautical knowl-edge.

For its size, the XB–15 was somewhat under-powered with four Pratt & Whitney R-1830-11 radi-

al engines delivering 850 horsepower apiece. Itsbroad wing, with a 149-foot span, was so big a flightengineer could enter via a crawlway to make minorrepairs while in flight.

Assigned to the 2nd Bombardment Group atLangley Field, Virginia, the XB–15 in the hands ofMajor Caleb V. Haynes flew a humanitarian mis-sion to Chile in following a 1939 earthquake there.

The XB–15 undertook tests hauling heavy car-goes in Fairfield, Ohio, and in 1940 went to Panamafor classified testing of the defenses of the PanamaCanal. In 1943, fitted with a cargo hoist and cargodoors, the aircraft was given a new mission and des-ignated XC-105. It returned to Panama and spentmuch of World War II hauling freight in LatinAmerica. It hauled hundreds of young womenrecruited for war work from Miami to the CanalZone in what crews called the “Georgia Peach Run.”

The XB–15-cum-XC–108 would have made amagnificent museum display. Instead, increasinglycostly and impractical, it was retired in December1944 and scrapped soon after.

A record fifty-one readers entered our latestcontest — all with correct entries. “As a kid, I ped-aled to the approach end of Patterson Field [in Ohio]and watched Major Stanley Umstead shooting land-ings in the XB–15,” wrote retired Lt. Col. W. C.Hayden of San Antonio, Texas. Chosen at random,Hayden is our History Mystery winner. He’ll receivean aviation book as his prize.

And if we do continue, it’s time to challenge youto identify our new “History Mystery” aircraft.Remember the rules:

1. Submit your entry via e-mail [email protected]. Entries may also be sub-mitted on a postcard to Robert F. Dorr, 3411Valewood Drive, Oakton, VA 22124.

2. Remember: we need your address andphone number.

3. A winner will be chosen at random fromamong correct entries and will receive an avia-tion book.

And let’s get serious about those historicaltreasures in your attic or basement. Some read-ers say they just don’t remember where theircolor slides are. That’s not a good way to assurethe preservation of history. Dig out your slide or

snapshot of a rare aircraft and lend it to AirPower History for this contest

ThisIssue’sMysteryPlane

History Mysteryby Robert F. Dorr

Air Force Historical FoundationP.O. Box 790 Clinton, MD 20735-0790

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Documents

FALL 2014 - Volume 61, Number 3 AFHISTORICALFOUNDATION … · The Tuskegee Airmen: An Illustrated History, 1939-1949 By Joseph Caver, Jerome Ennels & Dan HaulmanReview by John G