Fairchild-Republic a-10 Thunderbolt II

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airchild Republic IO

Thunderbolt



P TO THEW RTHO[ j) \ cQ)(J

- - - - ( ~ \ ~ - - 1 ) ; ; ~ ~ L: _

A V I A T I O . N r S ~ SERIES

airchild Republic IO

Tliunilerbolt II

Peter Smith

You are SLOW A- J0, the F-I 6C screams,

You staRRer so I)ainfull), across the sk) ,

While Jsoar effortlessly five miles hiRh,

Jturn, and Jtwist, and Idive, and Jzoom,J tear a:;:ure sky wi th my transonic boom

The A- J0 says nothinR; just Roes on

killinR wnl<s; thwaninR the dictator s dreams.)

You are UGLY, A-JO, the F-J5E sneers,

StraiRht winRs, hiRh enRines, an anRldar Geek,My lines flow and blend, aerodynamic and sleek,PartinR the sunlit sky, with my roar and m flash,

While you crawl down in the mud,with the trool)S, in the hash.

The A- J0 says nothinR, just Roes on

cullinR tanks, caminR the enemy teaLl)

Yot are AWKWt ARD, -10,

the AI)ache whool)s l / [ ,

M blades take me an) lace , J m claimy, I m neat,

nd I I)ack quite a lJUnch, RtlllS and missiles coml)lete,

(While it s true that just one hit orinRs me doum in a /Jile,

) et you take hit after hit after hit, and still

kee/J fiRhtinR in style) .

The A-1O says nothinR, too btlS), with tanks,wrninR each victory into a rout )

Ymtare OLD, A-IO, thejSF boasts,

I m a fledRlinR, et er) thinR des irahie and wand,I can fly from adeck, I can fly from the land

I f Icould only fly from this drawinR hoard,

I d quickl) rel)lace ) Ol/,

Your da) is done, my da) is to come,just wait, you ll see it s tr 1C ) ,

The A I sa) s nothing, continues

chewinR Ul talll<s, wiling the et,i/ hom )

Yul) - the -10 sa) s nothinR; getson with the joh; she is only a COR

Without hraRRing, without fllSs,

without expecting nutch thanks,

KillinR Tanks, KillinR Tanks,KillinR Tanks, KILLI G T KS

The Gis on the gnJlmd wal e their arms in relief,

As T7 s cnonl)le, carlsinR the enem) hiRh wief. Still the A I 0 says nothinR, hra thinks to herself,

Just doin my joh hoy I , I m GLAD I m a HawR )

PETER C. SMITH, 2000

The Crowood Press



knowledgementst puhlishedin 2000by

Crmvollli PressLtd

ry, Marlhorough

S 2HR

PererC. Smith 2000

rightsreserved. No part o thispuhlication may

reproduced or rran )lllittcd n ny form or y ny

electronic or mechanical Including

copy.recording,or any information :-,tllragc

rerril ·al ~ y ~ t I l l without p r m ~ i o n n writing

publishers.

C ataloguing-in-Publication Data

cataloguerecord(or thishook is anlilahle (rom

Brirish Lihrary.

1861263244

previouspage: An -10 teamin rrail

carrying 600USGallon drop ranks ro

rheir fCrry range. These aircraftare o the

th Tactical Fighter c quadron, hased ar Eidson

Nmional Archi\Ts, College Park, 11)

the memory o f C a p ta i n Richard

e S t or r , Captain t e ve n R i ch a rd

and Is t L i e u te n a n t Patrick B.

s o n, t h e A - O pilots who gave their

fighting viI.

Goudy Lac ,

headin :s .

and designed hI

Puhli,hing

Business P rk, Lamhourtl Woodland,

Rcrkshire.

tedand bound hI Bookcra(r, Midsummer orton.

I would particularly like to t h an k t h e fol

lowing for their unstinred aid, advice and

help in compilingthe chequered history of

the Warthog , and acknow ledge my deep

debt to their contributions to th is contin

uing story.

First and foremost, I am grateful to Dr

George M. Wat o n , w h o gavegracious per

mission t o q u ot e from his comprehensiv

history o f t he early day o f t h e A-IO pro

gramme, The A-10 Close Air U} } ort Air

craft an excellent ourcefor further investi

gation; alsoto MrGeorge C. Leavy, who was

on t he A- tO programme from the very

beginning, and is currently Senior Manager

on the A-IO Engineering Program at

orthrop Grumman, Bethpage, ewYork.

Thanks arealsodue to Rebecca Looney,

Curatorand Lynn V McDonald, Volunteer,radle of Aviation Museum, Garden City,

ew York;Commander Stephen J. Riordan

IV U S N R etd)and DrEllen Bicknell,Avi-

ation Archives, Bethesda, Maryland; Kent

A. Mitchell, Hagerstown Aviation Heritage

Museum, Hagerstown, Maryland, for per

mission toquote from hisbook Fairchild Air

craft 1926-/967; B ri an i cklas, a ti on al

Air Space Museum, Washington, DC, for

guidance on the 277 cubic feet repository

collection housing the Fairchild Industries

Inc. Collection 1919- 0) ; Linda Dela

torre, DVIC/JCW , March AFB, Califor

n ia ; K ir sten Tedesco , Deputy Direc tor l

C urator of Collections, Pima Air pace

Museum, Tucson, Arizona; Gene Jillson,

Johnson Controls, Inc., March ARB, Cali

fornia; Marcie T Green, Archivist,

AFHRA/R A , Maxwe ll AFB , A la bama ;

Kevin Kelly, Tucson, Ari:ona; Gina McAl

lister, VP CorporateCommunications, San

Antonio, Texas; im on W a tson, Aviation

Bookshop, London, for the special A-IO

nose-art photos, and others; Hugh Mor

gan, Beavercreek, Ohio; Mas te r S gt

M ic ha el . Comlrack, Idaho Air ational

Guard, GowenField, Boise, Idaho; Ru sellneddon, Curator, Armament Museum,

Egl in AFB , F lor id a; M ic ha el P p ec ia lc ,

Exe cu ti ve D ir ec to r, ew Eng la nd ir

Museum, Windsor Locks, Connecticut;

John Panoiski, Empire State Aerosciences

Museum, cota , New York; Martin Bow

man , o rwich; Wi ll i am Doone r, Curator ,

McClellan Aviation Museum, California;

Archie DiFante, Archives Branch, Depart

ment of t h e A i r Force, Maxwell AFB, Ala

bama; Sgt Kipp, Historian , 355 WG/HO,

Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona; Frank A.

Hudson; Douglas R. ThaI , eniorA ccount

Executive, Public Communications Divi

sion, D ep ar t me nt o f t h e A i r Force, Wash

ington, DC; John . Marsh, Directorl ura

tor, Grissom Air Museum, Peru, Indiana;

Majo r Les li e S . J ackson , U AF Rtd, Air

Force History Support Office, BollingAFB,

Washington, DC; Freida Johnson, FFTCI

HO, Edwards Air Force Base, California;

Judy Bell, Department of the Air Force,

HQ Per so nn el e nt er , Randolph AFB,

Texas; mygood friend Kengo Yamamotofor

his photographs; Jose Cruz, Director, Fire

and Aviation Management, U Depart

ment of Agriculture , Forest ervice, Wash

ington, DC;Marie Puntillo , Departmentof

the Army, Office o f t he Chief of Public

Affairs, Washington, DC; Pete r Cal leja sand Ralph St rong , Archives Reference

Team, S mithsonianN ational A irand Space

Museum, Washington, DC; Staff Sergeant

Tracy Lynn Olcksak , H is tor ian, I04th

Fighter Wing, Massachusetts Air ational

Guard, Barnes A GB, Westfield; Master

ergeant Kelly R. Mazezka, COIC, Public

Affairs, H Q A RP IP Denver, Colorado;

Major Rene Poche, 926 FWIP AS JRB,

New Orleans, Louisiana;James T Parker II

Archival Research International, Wood

bine, Maryland; D. Menard, Department of

t h e A i r Force, USAF Museum, Wright-Pat

terson AFB, Ohio; my good friend Peggy

Olds, anta Barbara, California; Raymond

L. Puffer, Ph.D, Historian, Air Force Flight

Test Center, Edwards AFB,California; Tom

N ewman,of the Archives Reference Team,

N ational A ir Space Museum, Washing

ton, DC; Diana Bache rt , U AF Museum,

Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio.

In addition, Iwouldlike to thank all the

k i nd a n d ever-helpful staff o f t h e Refer

ence Library at Bedford Central Library for

their unfailing assistance in trackingdown

obscure documents for m e; D er ri ck N .

T er ry , rA,Maryland A ir a ti on al G ua rd ,

I75th Wing, Baltimore, Maryland, for

information and photographs of that unit;

C had la ttery , for permission to u se h is

photographs; Peter E. Davisfor permission

to use his p h ot o gr a ph s; D on a ld

Sorensen; Roger Kline; Tony Thornbor

ough for h is photos; J. R. Ferguson, II

C I CLA BollingAFB, DC.

Peter C . S m it h

Rise ey Bedford UK, 2000

Introduction

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

12

13

14

15

6

17

Contents

VARYING ORIGI S

ARMY NEEDS VERSUS AIR FORCE DOCTRINEAAF S

THE A-X PROGRAMME

THE COMPETITIOYA -9 Versus YA-lO

POLITICS, POLITICS AND POLITICSThe A-7 A Trials

FAIRCHILD

THE A-I0 IS BORN

THE A-I0 DESCRIBED

THE TF34 TURBOFA

THE GAU-8 AVE GER GATLI G

PACKING A PU CHA-lOOrdnance

ITIAL DEPLOYME T PRODUCTIO A DTACTICS

FLYING THE MISSIO

FLUCTUATI G FORT E A D EW CO CEPTSThe YA-I0B, the OA-lO, LASTE

AIR RESERVE A D ATIO AL GUARD OPERATIO S

JUSTIFICATION AND VINDICATIONDesert Shield and Desert Storm

A STEADYI G PRESENCE

Post-GulfOperations

7

8

14

21

30

41

47

53

6

77

83

90

98

107

115

125

131

147



18 POSSIBLE FUTURES 157

19 THE SAGA OFTHE I R ~ l G H T I N G lOs 166

20 PRESERVATIONS AND SURVIVORS 173

Appendix I Specifications 178

Appendix Friendly Fire 179

Notes 180

Glossary 186

Index 191

\11 Army fighting a ground warneeds close

slipport from the air, whether in offence or

ddence . The level to which thi require

1l1l nt should be fulfilled by an independent

,\II force has been the subject of the most

lllntroversial and long-lastingdiscussions in

he hriefhistory of air warfare. It is an argu

mcntthat has been running almost contin

uouslysince aircraft were first converted to

war purposcs. From as earlyas 9 7 when

wldcspread use of low-flyinggr ound strafing

hy the RFC r esul ted in heavy los se s of

ntrodu tion

aircraft and aircrews, the pros andcons have

been hotlydebated almostannually.

Prior to the development of t heA-I 0, a

host of aircraft had been u ti l i: ed in the

CA role. They weremainly fighter made

over as dive-bomhers (RAF, USAF, and

othe r s) , or original dive-bombers (Luft

waffe, US Mar in e Cor ps ), b u t various

attempts had been made to produce a one

job aircraft specifically for the role . In the

FirstWorld War, these included the British

Sopwith Salamander and German Junkers

Ju I and CLl, while the Soviet 2 and

Shturmovik and LuftwaffeHerschel H

aw the light of day in the Second W

War. The USA s firstserious attempt to

duce such an aircraft was the Thunder

Ii. I ts story is therefore special.

Subjected to all mannerof derisive

name - Hog or Hawg , Pointy-nose

Mach-snm ,among mhers - t heA-I

confounded all itscriticsandoutlasted

alternatives. It looks likcflying on wel

the twenty-first century.

Designed to operatefrom makeshiftrunways closeto the action two A lOs areseen parked on a simulated

Autobahn on th ir home base. USAF

7



CHAPTER 0 E

Commando Wingon 20 December

Thi Wing was soon redesignated a

pecial O pe ra ti on s W in g a nd , o

August 1967, redesignated I pecialO

at ion Squadron , with Lieutenant C

mander John affell, Jr, taking

mandon 2 December 1967. On 5 Jan

1 96 6, I A i r Commando began opera

f r om Plc ik u A ir la s e .

Following ear ly s u cc e ss e s, a se

kyraider squadron - 6 ir

mando - was established at England

F or ce B as e as part of I A ir Comm

Wing. From August 1967, the i

duties o f t he squadron's pilots were

-I Hand A-IJ Skyraiders f ro m D

Monthan airbase over to t he U S

facility a t Quonse t Point, Rhode Is

The aircraft were refurbished, a nd

f low n b a ck to England FB. Eventu

fourteen pi lots, commanded by Lieute

Commander Repp, initiated a full re-

ing programme, which continued

Fehrll<lrY 196 . On completionof th is

transferred, via the un'ival cho

Clark FB, to Pleiku, Vietnam. Unde

command o f Command e r Wal la c

Ford, they had an establ ishment str

of twenty-five pilots, with 135 airme

mid-March, the squadron', twenty ai

were unloaded at Cam Ranh Bay from

e s cor t c a rr i er t ra ns por t s hi p a nd

squadron commenced operations·

The kyraider had enormous load-c

ingcapability and stayingpower, but be

increasingly vulnerable t o t he Comm

g r ou n d d e f en e s, w ith their AAA and

power. Extra protection for both pilo

powerplam became necessary, to give

degree of immunity in sucha dangerou

The wiet Union had set a p r ec e d

this type of flying armoured box durin

econd World War;developingstrong

aircraft defences of the irown, th ey h a d

the need carlyon.

The ovie t approach to lo w- lev

attack and ground strafing was mostcl

represented in the development and

the Ilyushin 11 2Slm l tovik

aircraft, wr e ce i\ e d w ide p u blic ity in the west a

t im e.\ I tw a s indeed a formidable weap

air warfare. Ithough of standard cons

tion and lacking the outstanding p

mance of its contemporary, the Petly

Pe-2 dive-bomber, which was faster

many f igh te r s, it w as an immensely s

and rugged. It could take considerable

ishment and also operate efficiently a

level. Itsorigins dated back to the un

factory performance o f t h e yeman

9

VARYING ORIGINS

aircraft, following the lead of the French in

Igeria wi th the Fennec, which had faced

little or no ground oppo ition and hadthus

been able to operate almost freely. Initially,

the same conditions might have applied

against the Vietcong but, as the Soviet

nion increased its supply and, later, the

orth Vietnamese regular army forces

engaged, with ophisticated 12.7mm cali

bre multi-barrel AAA and urface to Air

Missilesystems, the makeshift types rapidly

bec am e m or e a nd m or e vulnerable. The

increased firepower o f t he C ommu ni st

forces led to the early termination of the

projected light armed reconnaissance air

craft (LARA) project, which had calledfor

a relatively unsophisticated aircraft able to

operate with all three services (Air Force,

Mar in e Cor ps a nd N avy) , as wel l as the

Vietnamese. Although such an aircraft did

eventually appear, in the shape ofthe Rock

well OV-I 0 B ro nc o, i t w as u se d more as aforward air control F C) aircraft. Anoth

er interim measure h<lll to he <lliopted.

The French had a lso u se d thei r own

D ou gl as k yr ai de rs i n the CA role, and

the Vietnamese i r F or ce wa s supplied

w i th th is aircraft by the U A. It proved

such a great succe that the U AF it elf

eventually adopted the - I k yr ai de r.

The establi hment of 1Fighter quadron

(Commando) FS(C) at Bien Hoa ailfield,

significantly escalated intervention in

outh-East A s ia . O r ig ina lly , three U

Skyraidersquadronswere planned, in order

to give the necessary ' ti f fe ni ng ' o f t he

VNAF units. The first detachment, I

FS(C), commanded by Lieutenant Com

mander John M. Porter (la ter relieved by

Lieutenant Commander WilliamR. Eichel

berger), was based at Bien Hoa f ro m 8 J u ly

1963,as part of 34 Tactical Group. Its A-I E

Skyraiders arrived there on I M ay 1 96 4.

Redesignated 1 AirCommando quad

ron, Composite, thi unit became part of

6251 Tact i ca l F ighter W in g o n July

1965, before moving into 3 Tactical Fight

er Wing on 21 ovember 1965, and then ,

hy March 1 96 6, 14 A ir CommandoWing. Its dut ies oon expanded , from the

training of VNAF pilots t o much more

active participation in the war, flying psy

chological warfare, photo-reconnaissance

missions and, eventually, full combat

bomber missions.

On 15 August 1967,theunitwasrede

ignated as I Air Commando Squadron,

Fighter, commanded by Lieutenant Com

mander James R. Hildreth; i t w as r e or g a

nized once more to becomepar to f 56 Air

rh e o rt h A mer ic an A-36, an Alison

lllJ.:med Mustang fighter firred with Vul

dive brakes, introduced in 19 43,

I r,,\ \:d more valuable . This aircraft was

I . , t h f a ~ t and accurate, and served very 'at

I l.tltorily at icily, a lernoand Anzio in

I 4 ~ 4 4 and in Burma and China in the

.IItlC period. However, only 5 had been

11Idl; once they h ad b ee n u se d u p, the

l A F w as once more forced to rely on

liJ.:hter-bombers for CA .

Aftcrthe w a r a s p ec ial tudy into racti

1 d a ir power was set up, but the introduc

l I n o f t h e j et aircraft again led to argu

Itl, nt and counter-argument. During the

Ilcxt major inciden t , the K or e an W ar ,

there was again a n a cu te lack of aircraft

IIltahle for CAS duty. Again, there was

I1\lIch birrerness: the Armywanted heavy,

Illlirate and sustainable Marine-type air

IIpport, while theA ir Force jet pilots sim-

wanted dog-fight with MiGs. They

Illd no t w an t to get involved in ground

Ittack, o the r t h an in operations of the

illick 'in-bash-out' type, which were hoth

maccurate and meaningless.

Again the argument raged, b ut t he

r 'lIlt was t ha t, w hen t he V ie tn am \Var

hccame a full shooting w a r f o r the Ameri

m the most re liablea ircraft in support

ml : troops on th e ground was the slow and

rcllable, but accurate and enduring Doug

AD Skyraider. The N av y a nd

brine Corps had used the kyraider in

K o re a a decade or more earlier, and there

wasstill no US ir Fo r c e equivalent.

Severa l ' tud ies into Counter Insur

J.:cncy (COl ) aircraft had come u p w it h

various answers, bu t none w as r e ally s a tis-

lilctory. In the end, following the lead of the

V i et na me se i r F or ce (VN F), the US Air

Force was forced to adopt retired US avy

Spads , refit and refurbish t hem , and use

them in the ground-support role. The Army

was calling out for an aircraft that could

deli\ er varied and sustainable ordnance and

loiter over the barrie zone; only the Able

Dog firred the bill, but i t wa s to become

mcreasingly vulnerable a time went on.The rmywas 0 desperate for such an air

craft, and theA ir Force was so powerless to

,upplyit, thatthe Army eriouslycon idered

huying, training and utili:ing itsown aircraft

to do the job. Thi naturally raised hackle

w i th in theA i r Force, who considered CAS

tobe its job, even if ith a d nor produced the

aircraft to c a rr y it o u t. I tw a s time f or a h a sty

re-think on policy.

The orth American T-28Dtra iner was

converted f or use as a l ig ht ground-arrack

The r ol of close support had long been an

area of acute controversy in the SAil'

Force. Even in the I930s, when the

a v y w as s p ec ializ in g in the dive-bomber

as its main air weapon, t he U A F

shunnedthe concept. It continued pre

fer the low-level 'arrack' concept, which

w as a lso f a vo u re d b y the RAF a t t h e time.When the SA evenrua l ly became

embroiled in t he e co nd World W ar , i t

land forces came up again t the German

rubs in onh Africa, and found them

selve' stopped dead by t he m o n several

ocorions. There wa much recrimination

at the time' The only available a ircraft

t he U S AF h ad carry out close air sup

port - the Curtiss PAO fighter armed with

underwing bombs - proved b e O ta lly

inefficient and inadequate in this role.

ow, the requirement was a ground

arrack aircraft with the armoured pro

t ec ti on o f a n or he r e co nd World War

a irc r a t, the Soviet 11 2 or hrurmovik.

A modern equivalent , combining the

qualities o f t he AD a nd t he 11 2 was

thought to be the solution.

eneric the highly accurate North

American A-36A dive-bomber1, and

the Republic-linked original PA7D

Thunderbolt fighteraircraft, also of the

Second World Wa r, w e re considered to

be suirable precedents. Borh adopted

dive-bombing w it h bom bs and low

level arrack with rockets to strike at

German tanks.

3 . H istor ic: speciali:ed and Orally dedi

cated aircraft and weapons h ad b ee n

developed by the Junkers company, and

orhers, for theGerman A ir Fo rc e f r om

the First World War. ome, particular

ly h ad b ee n designed combat the

th reat p os ed b y tens o f t ho u a n ds o f

heavily armoured Sovie t tanks during

t he e co nd World War, the same threat

that hung l ike a nightmare v r all

N TO defence planning more than

thiny years later.

mmedi te nfluences

I Immediate: the S rmy needed a s pe

cially designed close support aircraft.

During the Vietnam Wa r, its neglect of

thiskind of airpowerhad led to a pauci

ty of suitable machine', and it hadbeen

forced to adoptthe semi-ohsolete avy

AD Skyraider pis On-engined aircraft.

The kyraider could carry an enormous

Otal and range ofordnance and could

loiter in the battle :one , bu t improved

AAA from enemy forces, and the intro

duct ion of SAMs, mean t t ha t i t wa s

proving vulnerable ground defences.

Three strands of h isto ry in fluenced the

metamorphosis that led the A-IO's

ultimate role as a d es tr oy er o f t a nk s

and armoured vehicles. They were the

following:

Influences

8

arying rigins

was nothing new aboutusingaircraft totry to destroytanks.Almost as soon as

British hadinventedthemand used them on theWesternFrontagainstGerman

hes.the Germans tr iedusing air powerto stopthem. Thisaerial photo. taken

raiin 9 7 shows two Br it i sh tanks in the roadthrough ahamlet af ter

strafed by machine gun firefrom Germanaircraft. Bundesarchiv MiliUirarchiv

-10 Thunderbolt \I affectionately

universally nicknamed the 'Warthog'

s inc e its inception - earned itself a

reputation as the tank-busting

ar excellence during theGulf War.

hype is necessary; the f ae ts s p ea k f or

Although the A-IO represent

j us t a s ma ll f r ac t io n of the combined

d Nations aerial armada that pound

Saddam Hussein s massive tank force, it

s c r e lite d with the majority o f t h e t an k

y a wide margin.

The A-I w as n o r, h o we v er , o r ig ina lly

a a dedicated rank-kill ing air

t . F ro m i ts e ar l ie st inception, it had

forced upon a reluctant Air Force by

needs of the Army o n t he ground and

Army s determination see those

e ds s at is fi ed . I t r ol e changed with the

and it metamorphosed into

supremearmour desnoyerknown today.



V RYIN ORI INSV RYIN ORI INS

The originalThunderbolt, theRepublicP-47D wasused as a divebomberin northern

Europe between 1944-45. Here.·Chunky·. of the 358th FighterGroup. 9th Air Force,is

seen atHigh Haldenairfield. shortly before theNormandy D-Day landings in June1944.

Imperial War Museum. London

Although theGermans found thatthe 3.7cm Flak 18 Bard Kannanewas thebest tankkilling weaponfor their CAS Stukas,the llies preferred thebomb orthe unguided

rocket. Firedin salvoes ofeightfromunderwing racks. the standard3in rocket had a

601b warheador AP shot. These weaponswere popularbecause theyenabledthe

carrying aircraft, in thiscase a HawkerTyphoonfighter-bomber ofthe RAF s2 n d

Tactical Air Force.to stand offand delivera massivepunch,Against massedtargets

they provided abig hit, butwere highlyinaccurate weapons if f ired ata range

greater than1.000ft. Enormous claimswere madefor them in breaking up German

tank and AP columns in theaftermathof the Normandyfighting, butcareful analysis

afterwards provedthat mostof thedamagewas actuallyinflicted by cannon firing

afterwards.Nonetheless,their reputation.deserved or not. continued intothe post

war era. Imperial War Museum London

However, its claims to success fail

stand up to de ta i led and exper t sc

after those battles in which it estab

its reputation. Despite this, the le

had already been established and ha

ed to this day; the facts have fa iled

nish its image very much l

Orig ina lly bu il t a t Farmingdale,

Island, the Jug (as this monster was

tionately known) was built in huge

bers. [0. order to satisfy demand, pr

t ion had t o b e subcontracted out to

plant at Evansville, Indian(l, a nd t o

tiss-Wright at its Buffalo p lant . o

less, the PA70 was always most c

associated with Farmingdale, and

choice of name for its tank-busting s

sorwas therefore a logical one. [nev

the pilots who flew the new aircraft

up with their own way of referring

A-I 0, and it is surelyas the Warthog

this aircraft will always be known

The success of the P-47againstGe

a rmou r d ur in g t h e b re ak ou t from

beachheads and the Falaise Gap

ground-attack role, a nd t he wings were

also strengthened to carry the bomb loads

demanded. However, apart from a few

other refinements, such as the introduc

t ion of a bubble cockpit canopy, and la te r

improvements in engine power and range,

i t was s imi lar to the standard production

modeL For its day, it was a very largefight

er (lircraft, built (lfOLmd a single enormous

radial e ng in e, t he P ra tt Whitney R

2800-21 and -63. Armed with up to eight

0,50-calibre machine guns as all. intercep

tor, it could eventually tote up to 2,0001b

(91Okg) o f b ombs i nt o a ct io n a nd had

range e nough t o strike at all orthern

European targets from the UK.

The P-47D was a c la ss ic example of a

high-perforIn(lnce fighter aircraft having

the s t reng th and power to make the suc

cessful conversion into a fighter-bomber.

Another was its British contemporary, the

Hawker Typhoon. Both aircraft received

were acclaimed as tank-busters in battles

such as Morta in and Falaise, the PA70

with bombs, the Typhoon with rockets,

Ill. it alsoacted as a dive-bomberwhen all

ll 500 North American A-36 Apaches

Ih.ll had been bui l thad been used up.

rhe USA s main contribmion to the land

\\ oil i n Eur op e was mad e by t he 9 th A ir

Iwee, initially based on ailfieldsin the UK.

Ihi outfitworked in conjunction with the

IInl ish 2nd Tactical Air Force, which used

Il.lwker Typhoons equipped with rocket

Ill. hombs ( BombPhoons ) to fulfil one o f

their mainobjectives - direct (lnd indirect

llll e support by fighter-bombers o f t he

trInies in the f ie ld . A dec is ion had been

m,lde to concentrate long-range fighter

I Hnher protection on the North American

I' 51 Mustang and [Urn the more rugged and

I rl1ng PA 70 into l ground strafeI and dive-

Hnher. The first dive-bombing missionwas

wndueted by PA 70s on 15March 1944, by

1he 366th Fighter Group, (lgainst St Valery

.1IIfield. (After unreservedly rejecting the

\\h111e dive-bomber concept earlier in the\\011 , the realization that th is was in fact the

I ,1 way to achievethe mostaccuratedeliv

l ry of bombs might have caused redfaces in

the USAAF and theRAE The answer was

1lllplyto call it vertical bombirig instead )

In Apr il 1944, two Tac t ic al Air Com

mands were established to support t he US

11 and 3rd Armies respectively, once they

<ld gotashore in Normandy. At first, the P

47Dscarried relatively ineffectual paylmcls

lit 2501b (115kg) bombs, but loadingquick

ly escalated. Soon, combinations of 5001h

(230kg) bombs and 231b (I0.5kg) fragmen

Llrion bombs were being carried on racks

under the fuselage, and 1,0001b (454kg)

hombs werefound perfectly feasible for the

Thunderbolt. Two 500lh (230kg) bombs

lould be carried under the wings.

By June 1944, the time of the ormandy

IIlvasion, the USAAF had considerably

huilt up the IX and XIXTactical AirCom

mands. There were no less than twenty-one

.,quadrons of P47Os in the former, and fif

teen in the latterin time for operations.The

RAF h ad s ix te en s qu ad ro ns s im il ar ly

l quipped (as Thunderbolt l ls ) in the Far

East by t he e nd o f t h e war, while the Free

French Annee de A ir a ls o h ad s ev er al

(Jrou/Jes de hasse supplied with the PA70

to pelform the same role. The la tter rook

part in the further invasion ofSouth France

and operationsin thattheatre in theautumn

and winter of 1944. Units belonging to the

air forces of Brazil (in Italy 1944-45), Mexi

co and the USSR alsohad them.

The Republic PA 70 Thunderbolt vari

ant featured greater armour protection for

rhe p ilo t, which was neces sa ry for the

eneric nfluences

Its name is a red her r ing. The Republ ic

division of the Fairchi ld Corporation led to

unimaginativeAir Forceofficersgiving the

aircraft the historical, but not veryoriginal,

nameof Thunderbolt I l , i n a k ind of trib

u te t o t he S ec ond Wor ld War long-range

fighter, the Republic PA7 Thunderbolt.

The original Thunderbolt was a heavy,single-engined fighter aircraft designed to

escort Boeing B-17 Fortresses to Berlin.

With its great strength and power , i t was

pressed into s er vi ce i n 1944-45 as a

makeshift ground-attack aircraft armed

withboth bombs and rockets for European

ground-support operations following the

ormandy landings. As such, i twa sa sub

stitute for the true attack -type aircraft,

11-2 represented one- thi rd of the en ti re

Soviet warplane produ tion.

With improved armam nt, power and

tactics, and ava i lab le in overwhelming

numbers, the turmovik dominated close

air-support operations on the Eastern

Front between 1943-45and earned itselfa

legendary repu tat ion . [ t is little wonder

then that , a lmos t a quarter of a century

later, US designers should look h ar d a t

w ha t mad e t hi s a ir r af t s o outstanding.

this former medium bombunit was thrown

in to ba tt le w it h l it tl e o r no conversion

training for either aircrew or ground-sup

port complement. It suffered horrendous

losses, being reduced to a m er e three air

craft after just seven weeks of operations.

None the less, as t ime w en to n t he air

c ra ft p ro ve d i nv al ua bl e, a nd tactics

improved as numbers and expertise rose.

The famous Circle of Death shallowdive

approach, which replaced the low-level

attack, was introduced later in the war and

quickly p roved a mos t succe ss fu l way of

decimating German Panzer columns. The

striking power of the 11-2 was much

increased by the VYa high-velocity20mm

cannon, which could open up most Ger

man tanks with ease. The reintroduction

of the rear gunner a lsogavea better mea

sure of defence from German fight rs

attacking from behind, while the fitting

during 1942 o f t he more powerful 1,750

hI AM-38F was another step forward,

resulting in the 1I-2m3 sub-type. With the

evacuat ion of many aircraft factories to

safety beyond t h e U ra l Mount ai ns , a nd

with Stalin s force and power behind it,

product ion numbers soared. Relatively

s imp le in construction, Shturmoviks, like

T-34 tanks, were tu rned ou t in enormous

numbers as the war went on. By 1945, the

Sukhoi Su-2, which l ed in [Urn to the

for all. extremely specialized air

to fulfil the ground-attack role; the

lt was the BSh-2, Bronirovann)1 Shtur-

(or armoured assault ).

BSh-2 was to combine the heaviest

armour protection, with simplicity

toughness of construction. Its enor

engine would haul it through the sky

carry intoaction a heavyforward-firing

h ine-gun armament of four ShKAS

guns, mounted in the wings,along

unguided rocket-projectiles , such as

RS-82 andthe laterRBS-82 and ROFS

2, exclusively for ground-attack work.

performance, rear-gun protection and

other considerations went by the board

a focus on this principal mission.

Ilyushin took up t h e c ha ll en ge a nd

up with a twin-seatdesign witha sin

engine, t h e AM-38 in-line, rated at

The outer portions o f t he air

ft , n ose, t ai l , r ea r fuselag e and wings

basically ofstandard metal construc

while the core of the 11-2 was virtual

all. armoured box that encased the vitals

the mach ine, the pi lot sarea, the engine

tment, the fuel tanksand the radi

(At Stalin s insistence, the design

altered f rom a two-seater to a s ing le

ter, to economize on space.) The box

built of 7mm armour plate; this was

to a maximum of 12mm thick

behind the pilot, which was nowthe

vulner(lblearea, given tha t the re was

rear gunner.

By the time the 11-2 entered service, the

po ten tia l had been considerably

:Ulced by the adop t ion of two ShVA K

cannon, with 100 rounds per gun,

p la ce of two of the wing-mounted

guns,with upto eight RS- 2 rock

being carried on underwing racks. The

craft had all. in ternal bomb-bay but, in

the underwing capacity in place of

kets , up to 1,3201b (600kg) of bombs

taken into battle. The speed wasof

l imited- some 270 mph (430km/h)

about the best - but this was no tcon

important. The range on this total

dedicated t ac ti ca l a ir craf t was a mere

miles (590-720km) at most.

When theSoviet Union was invaded by

in June 1941, only a small num

of turmoviks were available. Their

st taste of action was on 26 June 1941,

four turmovoi vialJolk (ShAP or

o und t ta ck A ir R eg imen t) w en t i nt o

ion over the Berezina River. With all.

d strength of sixty-five aircraft,

10 11



V RYINGORIGINSV RYING ORIGINS

Left The Junkers Ju 87G Gustav , with itstwo underwing 3.7cmF ak 18 Bard Kannane,

servedfrom 1943 to 1945. It hada common l i nk wi th Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv

f o r med l ed b y Oberleutnant Otto

with Hauptmann Hans-Karl S t ep po

Erprobungsstelle as his second-in

mand. Experienced pilots were selec

take the aircraft into combat.

Despite the fact that all extra

equipment, such as dive brakes co

tional bomb racks and t he like

str ipped,it was found that the alread

Stuka was made even slower and sl

less manoeuvrable w it h t he se ca

empla ced . However , thes e were th

craft that were selec ted, a longwith t

1298-2, to equip the new Panzer ageon the Eastern Front. They f ir st saw

bat a t t h e huge tank battle of K u r sk i

1943 (Operation Zicadelle They

formed well especially whenconcen

as one force under the commandof H

mann Hans-Ulr ich Rudel, and s

many victories. With conventional S

dropping b om bs to suppress thedefences, the Gusravs attacked the S

tanks, mainly from the rear or sides

theirarmour was thinner, and knocke

a great number.

Like most skills t he a rt o f rank b

was o ne t ha t had to he acquired.

pilots like Rudel himself proved na

ly adep ta t i t; b y the end of the war h

personally killed more than 500

Others were almost as proficient, b

all provedso skilful. Nonethe less t

87G was without doubt, the tank-s

er supreme, and each dive-bomber

included one Panzer Jager Scaffel from

on until t h e e n do f t he war.

At the end o f t he war Rudel, a

others, f l ew h i s intact unit t o surr e n

the Americansand was subsequently

rogated. He thought his captors mig

interested in knowing how his slow

had been so su ccessf u l i n knocking o

many Soviet ranks; after all it was p

ly obvious to him that they w o ul d b e

for Stalin s attentions. He was listen

with complete scepticism, and the

claims w er ed i sm issed as N azi propag

Speed was everything to Western ai

a nd they could not conceive of sacri

mph foraccuracy. They really believe

an inherently inaccura te weapon su

an unguided rocke t proje ct i le cou

fi red f ro m a high-speed Thunderbo

Typhoon andh i t a target as small as a

ing tank. However, they refused to a

that cannon f ir e f ro m a slow-moving

couldachieve the same or indeed, fa

ter results. That attitude was no t to c

for m<lny ye<lrs.

(1.5kg) tungsten-cored, armour-pierc ing

explosive shel l , which had the abil i ty to

pene tra teSov iet tank armour60mmth ick

a t a n impac t angle o f6 0 degrees at a d is

rance of 100m. Upgraded versions were

capable of pier c ing 120mm thick a rmour

plating.

The weight of t h is weapon was 430lb

(270kg) and it had a length overall of

145 in ( 3, 6 20mm) . E ac h bmr el was 6ft

(180cm) i n l eng th and was f i tt ed w i th

streamlined pods which he lped w i th the

aerodynam ics and also p ro te ct ed t he

breech mechanism. An <lir inmke W l fit

ted in a bulbous cowl ing w i th a circular

fronta l aperture above the gunpod for the

gun s hydraulic oil hearer. Th e automati

cally fed six-round clips of shells were

loaded into horizontal trays that extended

from either side of the gun. They had fold

ing down hinged c aps t o t ak e t he clips.

The rounds carried were 14.5in 06.25cm)in l e ngth w i th a maximum diameter elf

1.9in (4 .75cm) . As well as the po in ted

nose a rmour-p ie r cing rounds, alternate

l oa di ng s c ou ld include b lunt- t ipped

rounds, BrandsprenggandatpatTOne (incen

diary) s e lf -de s truct ing tracer rounds,

which only igni te d i fa hit was scored on a

truck s fuel t an k, o r the S/Jrenggranat/Ja

trone i8 (high-explosive) round of self

destructing tracer for soft-skinned targets.

Various aircraft were tri<ll-fitted with a

variety ofanti-rank weapons to see which

was the most suitable and stable weapons

platform f o r i t. Among the aircraft finally

equipped were the Junke rs Ju88P tw in

engined bomber, which carried a hand

loaded, 75mm KwK 39gun under the fuse

lage; the Bf 110G.2R/1 and 4 twin-engined

fighters Zerswrer , which carried a s i ng l e

BK 37mm cannon, also benea th the fuse

lage; a nd t he Hs 129B-2/R4 twin-engined

ground-attack aircraft whi ch h ad p re vi

ously carried the two 20mm MG 151/20

cannon. Results varied, but in t he e nd t he

large Ju88 proved unsui ta b le in this role

and took heavy losses.

One o f t he trial aircraft thus fit ted, in

Decemher 1 94 2 wa s a Ju -87D Stuka ,

which had two of theseawesome wearons

slung benea th each wing ou tboard of its

fixed undercarriage legs. Experimenta ltes t

firings against captured Soviet tanks by

selected Stuka pilots g av e good ove ra ll

results a nd t h e i d ea w as t ak en t o t he bat

t l efi el d f o r more practical experiments in

real action conditions. In February 1943,

the Vem/chverband JUT Panzerkam/Jfung( experimen tal tank-fight ing un it ) W l

Illlwever the Germans had al so f o r eseen

tI\l need to provide a sp eci al i st ai r cr af t f or

tI\I role. Junkers had developed the J1 and

the CLI, which incorporated both a rmour

I rlltection and offensive capability against

1.1I\d forces in a dd it io n t o t he ir n orma l

l1lachine guns i n t he form of bundles of

crl nades. This w as m an if estl y the germ ofl Illse support.

One pioneer in the a rt o f using aircraft

III destroy tanks, or at leastdisable or ha lt

them, was Oberleutnant Robert Ritter von

(,reim. On I March 1918, while he was

,erving with the 34 (Bavarian) Jagdscaffel

11\ the great final German offensive on th e

Wes te rn F ro nt , h e a nd his wing-man,

VI:efeidwebel Putz attacked a Br i ti sh tank

llliumn, strafing them from 2,000ft

(600m) and successfully breaking up their

Ittack. 1twas the first rank-busting success

11\ aviation history. Von Greim was award

l·d the Pour Ie Merite f or h is action, and laidthe foundations on which the Luftwaffe

\\,;\S hu il t two dec ad es later. The Luft

\\ affe s forte was whole-hearted support for

the Army and it was this that gave them

the Blitzheig victories of 1939-41 . The ir

.mitudecontrasted with tha to f the Allies,

\ \ h o w er e reluctant to commit aircraft in

di re c t support of troops o n t he ground,

.1I\d, indeed, had buil t ha rd ly any a i rc r af t

that were capable ofdoing this.

Machine-gun strafing might have been

lifficient to str iptracksoff the tanks of the

British and French armies, andevenpene

Irate thearmourof some of the light tanks

deployed by these forces. However, such

me thods proved useless against the ar

moured monste rs encountered on the

EasternFront when Hitler rook up cudgels

.Igainst Stalin s Communist hordes in June

1941. TheT35B heavy tank with 50-mm

armour pla te , the KV-1 A heavy tank with

770101 thick armour, and even the far more

numerous T34/76A m ai n b at tl e t an k,

\ \ i t h i ts sloping armour up to45mm thick,

needed far greater penetrating power than

l hi s . A solution was hastily sought.

The answer was found in the conversion

o f t he 3 7mm Flak 18 (or Bard Kannone

3.7cm) cannon , an anti-aircraft gun de

,igned in the First World War which,

much improved, entered service with the

L uf tw af fe ; i n 1 93 3 a s the FI<l 18/36/37.

Although its slow tr<lverse m<lde it unsuit

able in i ts design role under test i t w as

found eminently suitable for conversion to

u seas an anti-tank weapon. With a m u zzl e

vclocityof2,820ft (855m) persecond,this

weapon fired a Minengranac/Jacrone 18 31b

Although primitive and s lo w by s ub se

quent standards, t h e t an k w as s u e ss fu l

when u t i li zed co r rect l y and spread fear

among the G erman infantry. Antidotes

were urgently required and one was the

introductionof specially armoured aircraft

thar could make low-level attacks in the

face of AA fire. Boththe G rmans and the

British produced such aircraft , and these

may also be considered as great-grandfa

thers of the A-I0.

Th e British answer was the Sopwith

Salamander, a t y pi cal biplane of the period

but d esi gn ed f r om the outset as a ground

attack machine. From the enginecompart

ment to the pilot s area there was some

armour protection (although proof against

small-arms fire only). This aircraft appeared

too l at er o takepart in <lny fighting but the

concept was sound enough. The Germans,

whose need to protect themselves from the

British tanks W l more pressing did ra the rbetter. As e a rl y a s \916, at Verdun, their

scout aircraft had been employed in the

ground-strafing role Schlachtscaffeln units)

with Halberstadt and Hannoverna aircraft.

the Fairchild-RepublicA-10ThunderboltII aircraft of the1970s- to kil l Soviet tanks

This pair arefrom the917th Tactical FighterGroup(AFRESI.

Natonal Archives Washington

Modern historians h av e t en ded to

ignore t he p re ce de nt o f t he J u- 87 G,

emphasiz ing instead the fact t ha t t he

Royal Air Force found its measure and

defeated it .6 The RAF undoubtedly

defeated the Ju87 in the Battle of Britain,

when i t w a s incorrectly u se d a s a strategic

weapon, but i t d id not defeat theS tuka in

the preceding Battle of France , which saw

the e jec t ion of all British f or ce s f ro m

Europe in a matte r o f a f ew w ee ks or in

subsequent c ampa igns in the Balkans. In

addi t ion , the RAF hardly ever if at all

encounte red the Gustav version, intro

duced in m id-1943, which fought a lmos t

a l l i ts battles o n t he Eastern Front, creat

ing h avoc among Sov ie t t an k columns.

The fact is that this a ircraft had a si g ni f i

cant influence on the A-lO s final and

most famous combat role.

The Ju-87G had a more d is tan t an te

ceden t, da ting back to the First World

War. Th is grim conflicthad seen the intro

duction, by the British Army, of the rank,

in an effortto break the hideous stalemate

of t rench warfare on the Weste rn Front.

c Influences

he Skyraider h ad b ee n t he basis on

the original A- 10 concept hadbeen

then s ur el y a more relevant

than the P-47D was to b e f o u nd

e n e xamini ng t he historic influence.

adventof theThunderbolt II no

had come closer to satisfactorily

that role than the Junkers Ju87G,

of the famed Stuka dive-bomber.

underwing cannon fired tungsten

shells that could pene tra te the

hide o f e ve n t he Sov ie t T-34 the

n ba tt l e t a nk of the Eastern Frontdur

theSecond World War.

the subsequent pursuit across North

Europe had led to propaganda and

i a hype that portrayed the PA7 as a

tank-busting aircraft. This, in

influenced subsequent post-war deci

to form the Tactical Air F or ce i n

and further affec ted policy adopted

heAir Force once i t h a d won its inde

from theArmy in the same year.

12 13



ARMY NEEDS VERSUS AIR FORCE DOCTRINE AAFSS

CHAPTER TWO

my ee s Versus ir Force octrine

SS

Developed fromthe F 156 the F·5 provedmost suitablein itsdesigned role as a low-cost light fighter-

bomber.Althoughthe US Army was equallyimpressed when it conducted trials it was notpermittedto

operate them.The USAF combatevaluatedthemin Vietnam butthey werenotdeemedtough enough forthe

CAS role envisagedfor them. Smithsonian Museum Washington

evcntually to seeservice allover the

w ith licence-huilt versiolls heing bu

Canada, South Kmea, Spain, Switz

a nd T ai wa n in addition to US

machines. By June 1972, when produ

ceased, some 1,871 of various mark

been produced by Northrop, with a f

776 licence-built. They served with a

range o f ai r forces, i nc lu di ng t ho

Ethiopia, Greece, Iran , Libya, Mor

Norway, the Philippines, South K

South Vietnam, Thailand and Turke

U S A i r Force interestagain wanedaft

second prototype had taken t o t h e air

the third prototype was placed on

pending further consideration.

The breakthrough c am e o n 25

1962, w he n t he D ep ar tm en t o f De

000 stated t h at t he N -156F had

selected as the fighter for the Military

tance Program MAP) for supply to

NATO and S E A T O allies. American

numbers were to be allocated as t h e U

was the purchasing agency for the

gramme. It was also maderesponsiblef

training of Alliedaircrew at Williams

Arizona. On 9 Augus t 1962, t h e N

became the F-5A Freedom Fighter an

by the 2,500Ib.s.t. dry and 3,850Ib.s.t. after

burning J85-GE-5 powerpl<lllt.

Further disappointment followed when

N orthrop approached European aircraft

manufacturers- Faireyin England, Fokker

in the Netherlands, Fiat in Italy a n d S A B C

in Belgium - with the aim of licence-build

ing the N -156F for NATO. The talk was of

world-wide sales of 4,000 aircraft. Alas, it

came to n o th i ng , a n d t h e Lockhecd F-104

Srarfighter turned out to b e the final choice

for many of the se nat ion s. In addition,

fighter, orthrop still entertained hopes

that i ts less affluent allies might s ti ll b e

interested. On 25 February 1958, Northrop

t o ok t h e decision t o c o n ti n u e w it h t h e F-

156Fasa privateventure, takingadvantage

o f t he T3 8 c o nt r a ct t o h el p offset design

costs. Belatedly, the Air Force came to rec

ognize the low-cost benefitto itsallies and,

after inspecting a mock-up in 1958,

ordered one static test airframe a n d t h re e

prototypes under the designation o f t h e F-

156T Freedom Fighter.

The first N-156F made its maiden flight

on 30 J ul y 19 59 . I t was p ower ed by two

2 100Ib.s.t. General Electric non-afterburn

ing YJ85-GE turbojets, la ter to be replaced

the trainer version w h i ch b e ca m e t h eT

,8 Talon). T he U S Navy also t u rn e d t h e

projcct dow n flat. The d e ci s io n h a d b ee n

made to scrap the hundred or so escort car

ricrs t h a t h a d b e e n buiIt during theS econd

World War, a nd n ot t o replace them.T his

m c a nt t h a t a naval version would h a ve n o

homc base to work from; t he N av y was

looking for high-performance machines

for i ts giant new orrest l class carriers.

However, even i f two o f t h e A m er i ca n

armed forcessaw n o n e ed for a lightweight

I quipped with leading-edge slats and

fLuling-edge flaps.

A rmament f or t hi s lightw eight inter

Il ptot comprised a pair of upper nose

IIIlHlI ted M 39 2 0- mm c a nn on . A n A IM

IlL S idew inder point-and-shom missile

I <Hild be car r ied on stations located at

loth wingtips. Underwing pylons could

,Ilcollllllodate conventional free-falling

I(lInhs and mher weapons.

Despi te i ts advanced design, relative

I heapness a nd p ot en ti al , t he N -1 56

,dmost immediately suffered two serious

l (hacks. The Air Force, w h ic h w a nt e d

IlIgher, faster and bigger fighters, rejected

I h e w ho l e concept, although it did take

lightweight supersonic fighter. Sophisti

cated interceptors were, e v en t h e n, get

t i ng e v er larger a nd m or e c om pl ex , a nd

already passing out o f t he price range of

most countries in the Alliances. A· a result

of to ur s by Northrop representatives in

1955 they came up with a design for such

an aircraft, powered by a pair of G eneral

ElectricJ85 turbojets, originally developedto power the GAM- G reen Q uail decoy

drone. The main criterion for Cold-War

and C ommunist world-wide guerrilla tac

tics against democratic governments was

versatility, a nd t he N o rt h ro p c on ce pt

the -156F - was c a pa b le o f o p er a t in g

from short runways and makeshiftairstrips

in jungles and rough terrain, close t o t h e

a c ti o n, o r from escort car ri e rs for b as ic

maritime and convoy-protection duties.

With the finalization o f t h e design came

the N -156T , a tw o-seater advance trainer

version. T his seemed to represent an ideal

s ol ut io n a nd m uc h c on fi de nc e was

expressed in its future. The twojets o f t h e

propulsion plant were located close

together in the rear fuselage, being fed by

two lateral air i n ta k es o n t h e u n de r si d e o f

the fuselage, w it h t h e all-flying horizontal

tail mounted below the engines, low on

the fuselage itself. Fuselagedesign accord

ed t o t he area rule, with a narrow cross

section in the area o f t he wing, wh ich

resultedin a near-constant cross-section to

facilitate airflow over the whole aircraft.

The - 15 6 h a d very thin wings, w it h n o

d ih ed ra l o r a ng le o f i nc id en ce . T he se

wings were sw ept back 24 degrees at quar

ter-chord and were fitted with a leading

edge extension (LEX) a t e ac h wing root.

E ac h w in g was f it te d with s e aled f lap

ailerons, hydraulically powered, locatedat

mid-span a nd h ad s ingle - s lotte d, light

alloy flaps inboard of them. The continu

ous-hinge flaps along the leading edges

were of full-depth honeycomb build.

The -156F was equipped w ith remov

able wingtip fuel tanks, also area-ruled,

The Northrop N - 15 6 F c a me a b ou t as a

result of a detailed 1954 study ofthe needs

o f t h e m ai n Free World D efence groups,

ATO a nd S EA TO , for an affordable

Northrop N 156F

it a maximum speed of 408 mph

650km/h) and a cruise speed o f 3 6 8 m p h

590km/h). Wingspan was 33ft lOin, wing

area 184sq ft, fuselage length 29ft 4 i n a n d

height 9ft 5in. The aircraft had a range of

796 m il es ( I ,275km), adequate for the

Army s needs, and a servic e c e il i ng o f

39,200ft (11 ,500m). No armament was

carried, b u t t h e C es s na was quite capable

of being converted for a CAS role with the

i n st a ll a ti o n o f cannon a n d u n de r wi n g

racks for bombs and rockets - s t at e o f t h e

art for the 1950s.1t was certainly easy to fly

and proved very manoeuvrable at low

level. Whether i t would haveproven itself

tough enough for the role envisaged for i t

is more doubtful. o n e t h e less, the trials

were deemed a success, t h e A r m y declared

theC essna tobe ideal, a n d t h e ACDA and

the A r my A v ia t io n Board both recom

mcnding large procurement.

The Army s enthusiasm, not for the last

time, aroused t he Ai r Force s jealousy.

Quick to a c t a t any hint t h a t a n y part of its

recently acquired independence should be

taken from it, whether i t was interested in

that facet o r n o t, t h e U S A F m o ve d q u i ck

ly t o h av e t h e Army s idea quashed. The

three T 3 7 As were returned to t h e U S AF

i n 1 95 9 a n d t h er e the matter ended, for

the time being.The Vietnam War proved t h a t t h e A r m y

had been right a n d t h e A i r Force wrong on

this score, and the hasty adoption by the

U SA F o f the former Navy Skyraider, and

itssuccess, reinforced the fact that suchanaircraft was a necessity . The Army would

tryagain, but, in themean t ime, a new con

tender had arrived on the scene.

Tweetybird by i ts p il ot s - i ts

lbou s dua l s id e-by -s id e c oc kp it a ndforward fuselage reminded them

W a rn e r Brotherscanary - th is was a

n - en g in e d j e t t r ai n er b u il t in Kansas.

thesetting up ofP roject L ongA rm ,

e e o f t h e s e l i tt l e aircraft 56-3464, 56

56-3465) were obtained on loan

t h e U S AF in 1958 and flown to Fort

for a one-year trial period. The trio

given A rmy markings.

The Cessna 7A h a d t wo Continen

920Ib.s.t. J9-T9 turbojets, which gave

T-37A

Army s Advanced Aerial Fire Support

em A A F S S) originated in 1964, and

for seven years. Well beforcthis

, t h e A rm y had frequently expressed

dissatisfaction w i th t h e CA S providcd

the USAF, w h ic h s e em e d m o re c o n

d w ithhigh-altitude dog-fighting. Its

raft were becoming faster and larger,

less able to operate dow n in the mud

the A rmy w anted to see them. As

t h e l a t e 1950s, the A rmyA viation

a t D e ve l op m e nt A g en c y AC DA)

to work w it h t h e Test Board to seeif

s possible for t h e A rm y to operate its

fixed-wing air support, which would

moresuitedto its needs.

The parameters were clear: the aircraft

t o be able t o o p er a te mainly in the

e n v ir o n me n t o v er t h e immedi

battlefield; it h ad t o b e a b le to deliver

a wide var iety o f o r dn a nc e ; t o

off and land from primitiveand short

strips; it h ad t o be of rugged and

construction, in order to w ithstand

s at a high level of intensi

and should be simple to fly a n d m a in

Looking around at w hat was available

thc shelf , the ACDA decided that the

7A USAF version o f t h e 318)

t h e o n e aircraft that f i a ed t h e profile.

415



RMY NEEDS ERSUS IR FORCE DOCTRINE - FSS IUIYNEEDS VERSUS IR FORCE DOCTRINE - FSS

Fiat G.91 was another ofthe lightweight fighter-bombertypes easyto handle and

ously considered by the US Army as a means ofoperatingtheir own

e airsupport. Smithsonian Inst tute Washington

The Hawker Siddeley P-II 27 Ke

was a u ni qu e a ir cr af t t ha t, e ve n

h ow ed g re at p ro mi se . I ts v er t ic al /

take-off a nd la nding V / T OL ) ability

it enormous potential, enabling i t t o op

not o n ly f ro m s ma ll a ilf ield s c los e t

f r on t line , but a lso f ro m m oto rw ay s

even f ro m a c le ar in g i n the ju ng le. I

end, that potential was not fully realized

the aircraft was steadily developed int

ea Harrier. The Harrier w ent on to ea

p lac e in combat aviation history, sho

down tw e nty A r ge ntinian aircraft d

the Fa lk lan ds c o nf lict in the e ar ly 1

b ut, in theend, it was not considered tough

enough for the forward air control FAC)

job in v ie w. I ts c as e w a not helped by the

fact that, during the trials, 0052 crashed,

killing Bignamini. This effectively termi

nated the tests and the surviving aircraft

wa sent b a ck to Germany in 1962.

P-1127 V-6) Kestrel

The Army was d e te r mi n ed t o make one

las t e f fo r t to g a in its o w n a i r support from

fixed-wing aircraft.

tested the prototype machine, Italian IIForce test pilot Riccmdo Bignamini.

Once th ey h a d a r r iv e d in the U , these

t wo a ir cr af t, a G .9 1 R- J c /n 0 52, L uf t

waffe number BD+102) and a G .9 1 R- 3 c /n

)065, Luftwaffe number EC+ 105), retained

the ir thr ee - s ha de d Luftwaffe camouflage

Lheme.For the tests, yellowwas painted on

the tail, after-fuselage and belly and under

Ideofthe nose, the word ARM Y appeared

white forward, a n d Army was paint

ed on a p a ne l on the tail.

The G.91 pelformed well, and itslimited

maintenance requirements were attractive,

A natural candidatefor the US Army s close air support was theBritish Hawker P 1127 Kestrel

whose VTOL capacitymeantthat it couldoperatefromthe most primitiveairstr ipsclose tothe front

line. Vehement opposition was voiced in Congress because the aircrah was British and theconcept

was pressuredout. Later the US MarineCorps gottheir licence built version ofthe Harrieraher a similar

fight on Capitol Hill. SmithsonianInst tute Washington.

Fiat G.91R-3

The Italian Fiat G.9IR-3 w as Eu ro pe s

answer t o t h e vexed questionof affordabil

ity . I n the late 1950s, ATO h el d a com

petition for lightweight strike aircraft; the

winner w as a p le as i ng d es i gn f ro m F ia t,

which appeared in 1 95 9.

A swept-wing, ingle-seater, poweredby a

s in gl e 2 ,2 70 kg B ri st ol r ph eu s 8 01 /0 2

engine, Fiat sG.91 hada wingspan of .56m,

a length of I . 29m, a height of 4m and a

wingarea of 6 4 2 m ~ Itsweight empty was

3 ,26 9k g , f ully la de n 5 ,67 0k g. I t h a d a top

speed of 1 ,09 0k m /h , a c e iling of 13,260m

and a r a ng e of I, 5 km. Its armament was

m o de s t, w ith ju st tw o 20mm cannon.

Despite coming o ut o n top in t h e c o m

petition, the G .9 1 w as not greeted with

m uc h e nt hu si as m by the European

nations. Only Italy, G reece and G ermany

employed t h em , a n d some 45 were con

structed. In J961, the U Army trialled

the aircraft along with t he o th er s a t Fort

Rucker, admiring the simplicity of its con

s t ru c ti o n a n d low maintenance require

ments in the field, and the fact that it

could operate o ut of p r im i t iv e l a nd i ng

strips. Two aircraft were ::lcquired o n l o an

from the Federal German Luftwaffe, They

wereflown to the SA as cargo of a -124

G lobemaster transport aircraft e ar ly i n

1961, along with German pilot and

groundcrew, a nd t he m an w ho had flight-

from the decks of many avy aircraft

carriers. Its compactness and suitability for

the Jol in hand, and i t u cc es s , im pr e ss ed

the troops on t he g r ou n d, a n d t he US

Army decided to tr ia l it against other con

t e nd er s. I n 1 96 1, t wo Skyhawks Eu os

3 and 14 49 ), w hi h w er e s u rp lu s

to avy requirement, w er e a q ui r ed and

modified to operate from rugged front-line

airstrips. The normal main undercarriage

w as r e pla c ed b y a tw in, high-flotation, 1011

pressurewheel system, and enlarged under

w ing f a ir ing s w e re f itte d to accommodate

rhis. As a f u rth e r a id to landing- in p r im i

tive conditions, a d ra g chute was abo fit

t ed , h ou se d in a canister below the rear

fuselage. Still in their original Navy mark

ings, the aircraft joined the trials at Fort

Rucker, w h er e t h ey p e rf o rm e d v er y w ell.

The rmy thought highly o f t h e m, b ut t h e

D oD p ut pressure on t hem to drop the

whole idea, and both aircraft were returned

to their original configuration and

returned to the Navy a t t he e nd of J961.

-4 A4D) was to prove an equally inspiredd e sig n, w ith the longest production life

1954-79) ofany Fre e Wo r ld m ilitar y je t. I t

served with t he U S Navy for twenty years,

f o ug h t in many battles with other nations,

asfar apart as Israel and Argentina, and was

still flyingfiftyyears on.

The motivation for its mall size and light

w e ig h tw a s in c r ea ing concernat the seem

ing ly in ev itab le r is e in w eig ht, dimension

and cost of contemporaryand planned fight

er aircraft. Much like orthrop, Heine

mann was convinced that this trend could

be reversed. However, when the avy was

p r es e nte d w ith the d e sig n, it w as a lre ad y

committed to s e ve r al f igh te rs and a ked

Heinemann to redesign the concept as an

aval Attack planewith nuclear capability.

This was done and the result proved a win

ner from the out et. Gradually, the aircraft

was developed for differentrol s and proved

sufficiently versatile to adapt to them all.

With a wingspan of 27ft 6in, a length of

3 9 ft 4 Xin and a height of only 15ft, the

Skyhawk w as a compact little aircraft, but

full o f d y na m it e . A n a l l- w ea t he r variant,

the 40-2 A-4C) made its debut flight

on 2J ugu t J959. This aircraft was

equipped with terrain clearance radar

TCR) h ou se d i n a n e x te n de d n o se , f or

sea-level or ground-hugging approach to

target zones. n autopilot w as f i tt ed f or

the f irs t tim e, to save on pilot fatigue on

long flights, a n d t h er e w as a s ys te m i nd i

catingangle ofattack, a s w e lla s a I m v- a lti

tude bombing system L B .

The 4 0- 2 , wi th its a ll-w e a the r a nd

night l ow -l ev el c ap ab il it y, s er ve d w i th

great distinction in the Vietnamese War

Skyhawk

What h a d b r ou g ht a b ou t this sudden

ge of heart by the Air Force I The

prototype N-156F w as te s te d e a rly in

2 by the A rmy under t he A A F

a s a p os i bl e candidate f or its

d -w in g C S a ir cr af t . W h il e t he ir

might be disdainful o f t he Army s

and t l lr n a blind eye to helicopter

lopment, the knowledge t h a t A r my

were testing out such sophisticated

r a nga la r m b ells in earnest.

I n 1 96 1, t he A AF S tr ia ls f ina lly came

fruition w h en t h e Army revealed that it

comparative-testingfixed-wingaircraft

CA These tr ia ls, in vo lvin g g r ou n d

cesin realisticscenarios,were condu ted

year at Fo rt Ru k er , Alabama. The pro

N-156F s/n 5 9- 4 9 7 ) w as s p ec ially

in Army markingsfor the tests. The

m y p il ot conducting them expressed

m s elv es f a vo ur a bly imp r es s ed a f te r

but the orthrop was n o t t h e only

contender. The others included

Navy s ow n lightw e ight fighter, the

n t y b u t rugged Douglas A4D-2N ky

and two foreign designs, the Italian

G.91, and the British VTOL innova

the Hawker P-J 1 27 ,la te r to b e d e ve l

intothe magnificent Harrier.

f am ou D ou gl as A4D-2N kyhawk

another brilliant and enduring design

the brain of Ed Heinemann, who had

the avy the immortal SBD Daunt

and AD kyraider dive-bombers from

at EI egundo, California. The

16 17

- - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - -



H WG MEN General JohnPaul McConnell US F

P -I 1 27 w as never exclusively tri

by the U A rmy but two Army

Lieutenant Colonel Lou Solt and

AI Johnson, were assigned, along

Great Britain and WestGermany, to

Tril ar t ite Eva lua t ion quadron ,se t up

1 April 1965 a t West Raynham, or

, U K. Three o f t he te st a ir cr a f t w e re

- the DoD w as l ea rl y interest

from the outset - although they initia l

ie d Br itis h X S s e ria l numbers. The

rmy pilots (who were, incidentally,

by ju st one avy a nd on e

Force pilot in the American cont in

expressed great enthusiasm. The

seemed t o p re se nt t he answer to

A r my s p ra ye r s: it w as able to operate

up in the front line, cheek b y jo wl

the t r oo ps i t w as supporting, and it

he maintained and flown hy Army

for immediate r m y a s sig n

There w o uld b e nowaitingtime forcover to arrive from distant airfields. It

the ideal forward deployment aircraft.

the Tripartite Evaluation reached

conclusion, in January 1966, the th ree

K es tr el s w e re shipped b a ck to Ed wa r ds

and a signed M il it ary erial num

6 4- 1 2 62 , 6 4- 1 2 64 and 64-1 265)

order to continue trials with all three

services.Whenthe FederalGer

Government decided to reject the

concept , thei r th ree a ir cr a f t w e re

shipped over to the U A , r ec ei vi ng

s er ia l 6 4- 1 2 66 , 6 4- 1 2 67 , 6 4- 1 2 6 .

P-II27 thenbecamethe XV-6A. The

became seven withthe arrival ofoneof

British Kestrels (XS-695), which was

US serial 64-18263 (but, in fact,

its o r ig ina l s er ial during the trials).

gain, the Kestrel showed up well, but,

the Army, neither the Air Force nor

Navy showed any sign of being

There were several reason for

o ne o f which was the faet t h at t h e

OL techniquedemanded a great deal

pilot. The skills would not b e e a sy to

and would require constant hon

Certainly, there were individual pilots

o had those s k ills , b u t no t enough of

m,and thea t tempt to manthe nell air

would complicate an already difficult

Another f a cto r w as a m a rk e dly

attitude towards the purchas

of any foreign aircraft, no matte r how

o r a dv an ce d, a nd even from a

asfriendly a Great Britain, on th e

o f ome members of the Congress

o ff icials in Washington, DCI, The

t at es M ar in es , for whom the

RMY NEEDS VERSUS IR FOR E DO TRINE FSS

P - 11 27 w as v it al , h ad to fight tooth and

nail against vehement opposition at home

even to obtain licence-built models. The

US A rmy had enough to contend with,

fighting the Air Force, and needed

COilgre s a nd t he DoDon i t s id e, s o i t d id

not go out of itsway to al ienate them.

The trial results of the aircraft that were

te s te d b y the Army w e re n u llif ie d b y the

DoD, which had been subjected to much

lobbying by Air Forceofficials. Eventually,

t he o rd er w en t o ut that t he A rmy was

banned from acqu ir ing any fixed-wing

systems at all; under the new remit,

on ly he l icopte r were permitted The

AAFSS had t o t ur n away from operating

its own <tircraft and turn to the rotary

options. All seven V - 6A s w e re g r ad u ally

pu t in to mothba l ls and, by t h e e n do f t he

decade, had been done away with.

A Rotary Solution

The competition to provide a r o ta r y s o lu

tion w as w on by the Lockheed AG-56A

Cheyenne helicopter , against opposition

that included Bell s scaled-down ver ion of

its Iroquois Warrior, a low-profile machine

with r e tr a t a ble skids. The d es i gn w as

based on two cockpitsmounted in tandem,

with a gunnerpositionedahead and below

the pilot. No proto type of th is hel icopter

was ever buiIt. The other con tender, the

i ko rs ky - 66 of 1964, was more innova

t ive . I t f e atu r ed the novel Rotorprop tail

rotor, which was designed to ro ta teon its

axis through 90 degrees and thus act in a

dual capacity as <tn anti-torque rotor or as

pusher, effectively transforming the heli

copter into a compound aircraft in c r uis e

condition.

An Army banned from having a fixed

w ing a irc r af t in it inventory was looking

or an all-round aerial fighting machine

an attack hel icopter (AH) - and the mean

est of them all was the Lockheed AH-56A

Cheyenne, de si gn ed in 1967 in direct

response t o t h e AAF Program. The first

prototype w<ts rolled ou to n 3 lay of tha t

year. It wasa large two-seater,with a single,

rigid, four-bladed ro tor coupled w i th <tn

anti-torque tail rotor and a three-bladed

pusher. The AH-56A was p ow er ed by a

single General Electri T64-GE-16 turbine

engine rated at 3 ,43 5 s h p, which g av e i t a

speed of214 kno t ( 24 6mph) .

The Cheyenne w as m a de meaner by i t

armament. n a ss oc ia te d r es ea rc h and

developmentproject, the XM51 Armament

18

Subsystem (1966-72), w ou ld h av e com

b in ed a M 5 40mm grenade launcher with

780 rounds of linked ammunition in a s tor

age drum wit h a ociated ammunition

chutes. The XM52 Armament ubsystem

(1966-72), the other associated R D pro

j e ct , w ou ld h av e g iv en her a h el ly t ur r et

mount ing the XM140 30mm g un w it h

2,010 rounds of linkless ammunition in a

storage drum w ith a c o n v ey o r. A th ird R D

project, an alternative to the XM 51 pack

age, was the XM53 Armament ubsystem

(1966-69), f or a chin-mounted XM196six

b ar re l 7 .6 2m m Minigun i th 1 1, 57 0

rounds of linkless ammunition in a s tor a ge

d r um w ith a c o nv e yo r .

Even the prototypes were equipped with

an XM62 30mm automatic gun housed in

a b e lly turret, and a lso f e atu r ed a chin tur

ret that could be equipped with either a

XM53 7.62mm Gatl ing mach ine gun

( Minigun ), o r an XM51 400101 grenadelauncher. The helicopter could also tote

additional hitting power in the form of

tube-launched, opti c al ly t r acked wire

command missiles (TOWs) a nd XM200

rocket launchers. The TOW weapon sys

tem w as p r im ar i ly a n a nt i- ta nk a nd

armoured vehicleweapon, withthe missile

being guided o n t o its target by the gunner,

whokept hisvisual sight cross-hairslocked

on to the object ive . Any f l igh t-path cor

rectionswere sent to the missile s brain by

two wires that paid out d ur in g flight.

ince it inception, the basic TOW has

been steadily improved through a er ic ,o f

marks, and TOW2A and TOW2B a r e c u r

rently produced.) Other packages for the

Cheyenne included a 2.75in (6.99cm)

rocket system with the M200 19-tube

rocket launcher, the M 1 gun pod, and the

M2 series Armament ubsystem.

The Cheyenne out-performed its two

r iva l but deve lopment and project ion

costs rose steadily. There were continual

d e la y s in the programme, as competitive

te sts w e re conducted wi th two la te r con

tenders, the Sikorsky S-67 Blackhawk,

which n appeared in 1 9 70 , and the Bell

309 King Cobra, which arrived a yearlater.

Sikorsky at first planned simply to mod

ify the -61 into a gunship, and then uti

Iize th is m od el a s the b as is fo r a n el l

AAFS contender. A long with Bell sKing

Cobr,l candid<tte, the BI<tckhawk under

took comparative trials again t the

Cheyenne in 1972 . In t h e e ve nt , n on e

came u p t o the Army final requirements.

Despite the act t ha t t he C he ye nn e

gave the Army a ll i t needed, and m o re , in

If anyman can lay claim to beingthe father of the A-1 O that man is GeneralJohn Paul

McConnell. USAF. A s A i r ForceChief of Staff. he was theone whofinally grasped the

CAS nettle and. after personalactive intervention.saw the A-X programme finallyini,

tiated. These moves followed a distinguishedcareerthatdated back to the early1930s.

Born on 7February 1908. in Booneville,Arkansas. to Dr S. P McConnell and hiswife

Dessau, John PaulMcConnell graduated from Booneville High School in 1923. In 1927.

he graduatedm gn uml ude from Henderson Brown lnowHenderson Statel College

at Arkadelphia, Arkansas, witha Bachelor of Science degree. Determined to followan

Army career, he enteredWest PointMilitaryAcademythe followingyear. andgraduat

ed tn 1932 as First Captain of the Corps of Cadets. From 10 June he was a 2nd Lieu·

tenant. but.wanting tobean aviator, he tookprimary flying training at Randolph Field,and advanced trainingat Kelly Field. both in Texas. He was duly awarded his wings in

1933 and on 1August was confirmed as a1st Lieutenant.

As a fighterpilot in the A rm y A i r Corps.McConnell was in his element. flying by the

seat of his pants in the wires-and-struts biplanes of the 1930s.He served in the 79th

PursuitSquadronat Barksdale Field, Louisiana. from November 1933to June 1937. and

then went onto serve first withthe 50thObservation SquadronatLuke Field, then asPost andGroup Adjutantwith the 5th Bomb Group at Hickam Field, Hawaii. until June

1939. He also broadenedhis knowledge beyond flying, taking on awidevariety of operational and administrationalassignments on the ground. In June 1939. he served as

Assistant Engineering Officer withthe 91 st School Squadron at Maxwell Field, Alaba

ma, before moving on to become Assistant Post Adjutant.January to July 1940.As atemporaryCaptain,McConnell becamethe Adjutant.Southeast Air CorpsTrainingCen

ter. and Aide to Brigadier GeneralW. R Weaver between July 1940 and January 1942.

a periodduring which the USA was thrust into the SecondWorld War. Promotion to

Major followed o n 1 5 July 1941. and to Lieutenant Colonel on 23 January 1942.

GeneralJohn Pau McConnell who originatedthe A X programmewhen Chief of-

Staff US F SmithsonianMuseum. WaShngton. DC

19

Through these appointments.McConnell retained contact withthe G i s o n the gro

and he never forgotwhat those men really wanted from the men in the sky.

McConnell served as AssistantExecutive in theoffice of the Chief of the Air F

in Washington, DC. between January andMay 1942. He observed at closequarters

workings of politics. and how it influenced the services.Promoted to full Colonel on

December1942. he was moved tothe post ofDeputyChief of Staff and Chief of S

HQ A r my A i r Force MFI Command responsible for technical trainingat Knollw

Field.North Carolina, between May1942 and September 1943. Next. he held thepof Deputy Chief of Staff. HQ MF Training Command, based at FortWorth. Texas.u

November 1943.

McConnell thenserved in keyAir Force positions in both Asia and Europe. add

aworld perspective andinsighttohis experience. Between November 1943 andF

ruary1944. he served as Chief of Staff of the China-Burma-India ICBI Air ForceTr

ing Command. based at Karachi in British India now PakistanI. and subsequentl

SeniorAir StaffOfficer and Deputy Commander,3rd Tactical Air Force. at Comilla. a

in India. He served in Asiafor the remainderof thewar. butdid notconfine himse

pushing paper around. McConnell took part in combat operations against the Jap

ese forces that were thenoccupying Burma and therefore knew CAS from the sh

end, as well as in theory.

ABrigadier Generalfrom 24 August. in September 1944, John McConnell beca

Senior Air Staff Officer. Southeast Asia Air Command, based then at Kandy, Cey

Inow Sri Lanka . While serving in Ceylon,he met WAC officerSally Dean, serving

the staff of Lord Louis Mountbatten.After adifficult wartime courtship,the couplemried in November 1946, and later had two sons. Bruce and Dorsey.

Following the successful end of the war. McConnell remained in the area. and

June 1945, became ActingDeputyChiefof Staff forOperations. Plansand IntelligeEastern Air Command, based at Chungking,China. In April 1946. he was made Se

Air Adviser to the ChineseGovernment. whilesimultaneously commandingtheAirD

sion, NankingHeadquarters Command. a post he helduntil June 1947. He sawat f

hand howthe Communist guerrillasoperated against conventional armies, andhow

power could counteract it. if usedcorrectly. In China it failed. butJohn McConnellh

meanwhile returnedhome to Washington, DC. where. in June 1947, he was appoinChief of the Reserveand National GuardDivision. HQ MF.

When theUSAFwascreated.John McConnell neverforgothis A rm y A i r Force ro

His next appointment. in May1948. was as Chiefof the Air Forces CivilianCompone

Group, andthiswas followed, in December of thesame year, by appointmentas Dep

SpecialAssistant to Chief of Staff, for Reserve Force. In July 1950he took passagEngland, where he became Deputy Commander, and then Commander.of the 3rd

Force. USAFE. Promotion to MajorGeneral followed on22 December 1950 and. in

followingMay.McConnellwasmade Deputy Commanderand Chiefof Staff.HQ 3rd

Division and 3rd Air Force. In May1951,he was additionallyassigned command of

7th Division of Strategic Air Command ISAC , and. in February 1952. was appoin

Commander 3rd Air Forceand 7thAir Division. BetweenMay1952 and March1953

reverted to Commander of the7th Air Division.

McConnell returned to the USA in April 1953to undertakea four,year touras Ditor of Plans at SAC HQ. Dffut AFB. Nebraska. In November 1957, he became comm

der of SAC s 2nd Air Force. based at Barksdale AFB. Louisiana. On 30 June 1959

was promoted to Lieutenant General and in August 1961. was appointedVice C

mander-in-Chief back at SAC HQ. Another promotion. to four-star rank full Gene

came on 1October1962, with his next European assignment.as Deputy C-in-C of

US European Command, based at Camp des Loges,France.

In August 1964.McConnell was appointedVice Chief of Staff of the USAF,

became Chief of Staff on 1 February 1965. In this capacity he again performed a drole, as amember of the Joint Chiefsof Staff, the principalmilitary advisers to the P

ident. the National SecurityCouncil and the Secretary of Defense, and also be

responsible to the Secretary of the Air Force for managingthe human and materesources of the USAF.

By thistime.JohnMcConnellhad wonan impressive numberof medals. includ

the Distinguished Service Medal. theLegionof Merit withthree oakleaf clusters,Distinguished Flying Cross. the Bronze Star. theAir Medal.and a host of foreignawa

also, including Commanderof the Orderof the BritishEmpire. the GrandCordon of

Hui 2ndClass)and theCollarOrder of Pao Ting 5th Classl.among many others.

Despite his illustriouscareer. John McConnell always maintained the comm

touch.Whenthe A-X programme was still in its gestation period. hetook himself of

Vietnam to speak to the men who were doing the fightingeyeball-to-eyeball.He

tened to what theyhad to say. and.more importantly.acted upon i t .F ro m that pointA-10was on itsway.



CHAPTERTHREE

- - - - - - -

The hi f r i val to the 1 on the Experimental Programme wasthe Northrop Y A ~ 9 a very different

conceptanddesign A fiercecompetition separatedthem S n 11 comesinto land atEdwards AFB

Smithsonian Institute Washington DC

loca t ion, dupl ica t ion and posi t ion in

such vulnerable units as f uel t a

hydraulic and avionics.';

The old Soviet Shcunnovil idea o

armoured box around the pilot wa ada

and updated, with the substitution of m

ern lightweight titanium in p la ce o f

bolted on steel plate of Stalin's facto

The Air Force was al 0 asked tocon

er h or t t ake- of f an d landings (ST

from primitive landing grounds; it was

thinking in terms of the jung le airstrip

the Vietnam War, but the T l capa

would later comeinto its own ina very

ferentscenario. There was a lack of fa it

free-falling bomb being delivered

suffic ientac uracyagainst pinpoint tar

to meet the requ irementso f CAS as

defined. Delivery in a dive was a tried

proven method, Iut was increasingly

of favour. The orth Vietnamese reg

army had begun deploying tanks in l

numbers, and s uc h t ar ge ts g ra du

assumed greater importance in t he

Force's thinking; bomb had nor had g

success against them in the past. la

cannon had, bu t theAmericanshad l

s t ag e in terms o f t h e V ie tn am War, and

relatively low opposition, that opposition

was rapidly g rowing and h ad t o be taken

i nt o a cc ount . Wh il e r et ai ni ng , o r e ve n

improving on the Spad s admirable quali

ties, the new aircraft was to be more than

100 mph (160km/h) faster, with a mini

mum speed of 350 mph ( 560km /h) .

Unlike contemporary makeshift fighter

bombers, the newaircraftwas t o h a ve t h e

in-built strength and design to withstand

punishment. Expensive je ts such as the

R ep ub li c F -I 05D T hu nd er ch ie f, t he

M cDonnell FAD Ph ant om and t he

Vought A-7 Corsair, which lacked such

features, were b ei ng b ro ught d own by

peasants a rmed with mult iple machin

guns. They were spend ing seconds , nor

hours, over the ta rge t zones.

The failure o f t he duelled systems of

the e aircraft to p rotect them fromsingle

strike losses was t he s ub je ct o f a special

s tu dy , f or which G en er al Dynamics,

Grumman, o r th rop and McDonne l l had

been approached on 2 May 1 96 7. The e

large organi:ations wer e a sk ed t o a pp ly

theirexperti e to ideas on the protection,

The Air Force's RFP

h X PrograDlDle

(,iven the task ofprovidingthe Armywith

the CA a i rc ra f t i t needed, the U AF

could shirk the issue no further, and

embarked upon a thorough and complete

evaluation. Those in the higher echelons

might still doub t the value and worth of

lich ;:In aircraft, or i ts p la ce i n modern

warfare, but they were determined that, if

they were to have such an aircraft, i t must

he the very best. In 1966, General John P

McConnell, the ir Force Chief of Staff,

lI1itiated the A-X (Attack Experimental)

programme. In March 1967, twenty-one

different aircraft companies were sent the

Air Force's Request for Propo sa l (RFP) ,

which embodied in general terms the lat-

est thinking on C r eq ui re me nt .'

The Air Force proposed an aircraft that

could m at ch t he load capacity o f t he

II1defatigable A-I kyraider (known

affectionately as the Heavy Hauler ), but

a lso o ffer the manoeuvrability at low

pe ed t ha t W;:lS nece ssa ry in order to

achieve accuracy on the target. Although

t he A ir Force was s t il l thinking at thi

hidden enemy, but t he F-5 had problems

delivering i t , for the 75 Ib (340kg) tanks

frequently hung up' during attacks, or

fa iled to separate from the pylons cleanly

in the shallow dives, caus ing damage to

the undersurfaces of the s lender wings.

A Ithough it h ad b ee n d e igned as a short

take-off aircraft, combat-loading to its

capacity was deemed e s sent ial i f i t was to

perform its CA duties adequately. The

loading cancelled out thi advantage, and

the aircraft truggl d sometimes to stagger

in to the sky. Itwa alsodifficultto achieve

the necessary levels of accuracy. Eye-sight

i ng wa g oo d enough, but the F 5 did not

have the all-round vision of the Spad; the

mounting position of the guns often

obscured the pilot's vision at the most cru

cial moments of a t ra fi ng r un , as smoke

emi siems clouded the wind hield .

Although this exper imenta l combat

usage o f t h e F-5 was declared a te hnical

success, and many Freedom Fighters were

later del ive red to the ou thV ie tname e, a

second combatdeployment by the AF

was vetoed by the 00 0 as not worthwhile,

a nd t h e 1 0t h Fighter Commando was dis

banded. Once more, t he USAF tur ne d

back to its instinctive placebo, the fa t jet

madeover into a trike aircraft, andadopt

e d t h e avy's A-7, as the Corsair-II.

However, the ne tt le would have t o be

grasped, and a ded ica ted CA aircraft

wouldhave tobe found.The USAir Force's

F 5 Vietnamese combat deployment ,

although brief,gavefurther weight tosome

les ons tha thad already been digested from

previous eras. The ideal machine had to b e

accurate, had topack a powerfulpunch,had

to be resistant to ground fire (increasingly,

sUlface-to-air, or AM capability), and had

t o h av e t he e ndur an ce n ec e s ary to s tay

overhead and low, a nd t o be on call. The

F 5 deployment, therefore, although not a

success, was not totally wasted.

A re luc tan t A ir For ce w as s pu rr ed

towards making a decision by among

other factors, the Congressional hearings

on CAS. During ep tember and October1965, th ree A ir Force generals and th ree

combat pi lots, with others, were interro

gated about closeair-support operations in

Vietnam. Thi was fol lowed bya damn

ingspecial sub-committee report on tacti

cal air support. The sub-committee criti

cized t he A ir For ce f or ' it s f ai lu re to

develop aircraft andequipment for'limited

war and closeair-support operations'I;.

With Congr es s a nd t he A rmy both o n

itsback, theA ir Force finally began to ;:ICt.

fitted to the aircraft'snose on the p or t sid

to extend itsrange and linger timeoverthe

battlefield. Instrumentchange were made

and a lead-computing gunsight replaced

the standard f ix ed opt ica l o rs igh t.

On 20 October 1965, painted in brown

and dual-tone greencamouflage, with light

grey undersurface, the F-5Cstook offfrom

Williams AFB. After a s taged f ligh t a cro s

the Pacific , they arrived a t t he Bien Hoa

airbase three days later, and flew their first

combat sortie that same day The first

twelve F-5C were later joined bya further

ix F-5As. Between October 1965 and

March 1966,theseaircraftflewsome2,5 0

combat sorties, mainlyCAS butwith fight

erand reconnaissance dutiesas well.

In the former duty , the F-5s carried

between2,000and 3,0001b (910-1 ,360kg)

of mixed ordnance, but were never risked

over North Vietnam. tandard procedure

were basic; the aircraft attacked ground

targets in a shallowdive, relying on pilots'

judgement for a im in g and r elea se . In

spring 1966, the 4503rd I ecame the I th

Fighter Commando Squadron , under the

3rdTactical FighterWing, and finally flew

some 3,500combat missions. Such inten

s iv e us age s oo n s hm ve d up the F-5's

strengths, and weaknesses, and revealed

that i t was not really the CAS aircraft the

A rmy (or t h eA i r Force) was looking for.

The little aircraft, although not strong

and tough in its construction,even withits

additional a rmou r, w as n imbl e a nd

manoeuvrable at low levels . I ts handling

qualitieswere such that i twasable to evade

much of the increasingly effective ground

fire that wasaimed at i t. I nd eed, i twa s to

clock up the least number ofdirect hits of

any je t aircraft in that conflict. I t was also

relatively simple to main tain and keep in

action, as i ts sortie rate proved, and, with

help from Northrop representatives on th e

ground, the e igh teen Freedom Fighters

employed by the 10th had a highavailabil

ity rating. These f ac to r r anked h ighly in

the CA table of desirable qualities.

On t he d own side, the aircraft's verylitheness brought its own penal ty. I t was

not able to carry, and therefore deliver, a

very heavy or accurate ordnance package

against the enemy. In t hi s r espect it

showed up poo rly aga ins t contemporary

jet support, and proved inferior t o t he

Douglas -IH Skyraider. In addition, the

F-5 could not compare either in range or

in vita l loiter factor.

apalm was oneof the prime anti-guer

r il la weapon s in jung le f igh t ing aga ins t a

Army's a t tempts to ob ta in its own

-wing aircraft t o p ro vi de t he CA

wasstill desperately needed had been

Now the pressure was on th e A ir

ce to come up with a satisfactory and

solution. Defense ecretary

t e rt M c a mar a i ns tru ct ed the Air

tose t to and re-build itsCA poten

, i n o rd er t o fill the gap lef t by the

of the A FSS p ro gr am . Al

it had sanctioned the F 5 for i ts

t he U SA F did not immediately

this optiononboard itself, o ther than

c ondu ct limited combat te ting in

Vietnam. The Air Force's request

200 F-5Cs and F-5Ds was finally sanc

by t he DoD on 26July 1965. This

thought I y many to beme rely a

for the few Air Force officers who

d in theconcept, led to the ukoshi

(Little Tiger) programme.

The first USAF commitment was the

on loan of five F-5A-15 and

en F-5A-20 aircraft from the MAP

They we re u ti li :e d by the

03rd Tac t ic al Figh ter Wing (TFW)

ch,on 29July 1965, formed the4503rd

t ical Fighter Squadron (TFS) (Provi

a l) for operational s e rv ic e t ri al s

T). Immediate needs led to these air

beingmodified for combat operations

outh-EastAsiaasF-5Cs;while this was

ng carried out by orthrop, selected

underwent conversion training

t he type at Williams AFB.

Modifications were dictated by t he A

experiences against the Vietcongamiorth Vietnamese regular army. Extra

protection for the pilot was

u t and some ninety poundsof this was

ked in , mainly along the underside of

forward fuselage below the cockpit.Jet

nable pylons were fitted to the under

of the wings, with ISO-gallon drop

being accommodated on the centre

and on either inboardpylon inservice

The rudder travel limiter was

oved. Inflight-refuelling probes were

Air Force Combat-Test

F S

of firepower, on 9 August 1972 the

AAF project was eventually

d off. The Army decided that such a

was toocomplex, andelectedto go for

ller, more sprightly advance attack

ter, typified by the newer Boeing

Series Apache.

20 27



T HEA-X PRO GRAMME T HEA-X P R O G R ~ I ~ I

YA-lO.massive flaps lowered n undercarriage down.comesin to land duringearlytrialsat Edwards

AFB. National Archives. College Park. MD

of this, and instead opted for

large, in-builtweapon as the mostcost

ective way t o e qu ip t he future C S

They proposed an upgrade of the

Electric M-61 as a starting point.

oiter time was another major facror. It

considered impossible t o m at ch t he

er's ability here with any current

ne ,s ince the due l lingof any pow

was deemed essential for the air

ft 's survival. Two engines of sufficient

to l if t o ff the proposed aircraft

u ld requi re a large p rope ller , which

meanplacingthe engines well away

the fuselage. The si:e o f t he wing

h av e t o he increased, thus raising

maximum t<lke-off weight ahove the

(27,200kg) thar the Air Force

to be the top Iinc.

ome novel concepts were put forward

n attempt to solvethis problem, includ

t he o rt hr op proposal t o a dopt the

used by the Learfan executive jet

have two tu rbop rops coupled in the

tail. This was just oneof a series of

i l ed s tud ie s that followed during

0 and ledfinally t o t h e A-X. In the

, techno log ica l advances came to the

' s a id, with the development of high

ss ratio (H PBR) turbofan enginesused

civilianaircraft with greatsuccess. They

resented an answer to the combination

levels of manoeuvrahilit1 on which

Force would not compromise, cou

wi th maximum power, simplicity of

and reduced vulnerahility.I'

t ics and the Mission

r eg ard to ta t ic s, as long ago as the

195 s the embryo of inter-service

practice ofCA had beenkept

e with t he J oi nt Operations Center

) at PopeField, FortBragg, orthCar

. It was staffed by armypersonnel from

orps and ir Force pilots from Langley

Army Majo r Michae l J. Dolan

their often-forgotten work in test, revising and re-te ting the theory in

d e xe rc is es u ch as Portrex and

ar sen ice schoo\ , of horhrhe A rillY

Air Force SOllle thought was given ro

air doctrine in I c c t u r c ~ and occCl:: io la

x c r c e ~ Swarmcr anJ

pointed upthe need for the tr a in ingof

ArlllY in the use of a irpower in support of

< l t t a c k l ~

Lessons learnt then were taken out and

dusted. A brand-new series of detailedstud

ies was carried out, analysingall aspects of

the CAS mission, from the range of options

for which such aircraft woull be utilized,

the parameters within which the aircraft

would operate, and which attributes would

bes t cove r th em , to the probable scale of

enemy resistance a nd h ow t he effects of

that resistancecould be minimized.

It was f ou nd that the dominant role

would be the provision of close and accu

rate supporting fire and ordnance delivery

in the v icin ity of friendly ground forces,

and that secondary tasking a t h igher alti

tudeswas not essential. Giventhe required

hattlefield ope ra ti ng p ar amet er s o f a

I,000ft OOOm) ceiling, in weather condi

tion - that resulted in one-m ill' visibility,

comparative t and analysi of Korean

and Vietnam Waroperations clearly illus

trated that an aircraft with a v er y h ig hlevel of manoeuvrability, andan op timum

performance ar the low level, easily out

performed high-speed jet fighter-homber

typestasked for the same role. With regard

tn hostile ground re istance, there was a

wide and growingarray of oviet weapon

ry available to most hostileforce- likely tn

he encountered in the 1970s and Os.

These ranged from small optically guided

automatic we,lpons, quadruple 14.5mm

heavy machine guns, and mobile multiple

23mm, 27mm, 57mm, ) mm and 100mm

A a nd A -2 Guide li ne h ea t- se ek in g

missiles. In addition, there was the possi

ble threat f rom a i r- tn-a ir m is si le s f ir ed

from protecting interceptors.

Modifying the Requirements

I-laving determinedwhat wasrequired, the

U AF examined its current inventory . It

found that it d id not possess any aircraft,

o the r t ha n t he A -I Skyraider, that could

conduct efficient and effective CAS mis

sions, and meet such requirements or sur

vive such defences. 1The U AF attack aircraft at that time

included the A-I, A-26, F-I 0 and T-2 ,

w ith t he B-57 and the A-7D multi-pur

pose aircraft, the la tte r of which was pro

cured to fulfil bo th the CAS and interdic

tion missions.To these could be added the

F -I 05 a nd t he F-II], which were high

speed attack aircraft and in no waysuitable

for CAS a s i t had been redefin dY

Four years of study led the A ir Force to

mod ify i ts o rigina l p ropo sa ls somewhat .

22

Now i t was looking at a speed of 400 knots

(740km/h). I t h ad to comp romise on run

way length, to accommodate the largerair

craft that seemed to be coming out, and this

wa nowput at 4 OOOft (I ,200m). This, it

was argued, would be theamounto f runway

left available in a useable condition after a

pre-emptive oviet airstrikeagainst known

ATO bases. The M-6 1 wa n ow c on si d

ered too mall a weapon to ta kl the latest

(wiet armour and a much l arge r gun , a

30mm stunner w it h a much higher muzzle

velocity, was now thought more relevant.

BrigadierGeneral Thoma H. McMullen

was one s enio ro f fi c r who had first-hand

experience of what was needed. Later to

become Systems Program Director o n t he

A-I0 project,McM ullen hadspent a tourof

duty in Vietnam as one o f some 250 For

ward Air Controllers (FAC). You could not

h i t the enemy unless he could befound and

his position accurately pinpointed and the

s tr ik e a ir cr af t l ed t o h im . The role of

McMullen and his colleagues had been to

fly over enemy concentrations in a l ig ht

observation aircraft such as the Cessna 0IE 'Bird Dog' or the orth American OV

10 'Bronco'. They spent their time hunting

the e lu sive Vie tcong t roop in the jungle,

stooging over suspected areas at 1,000 to

I,500ft 000-450m), marking the enemy's

positions with smokebombs or white phos

phorous (WP) rockets, and then callingup

the air strike.

F rom h is own p er onal experience and

detailed study, BrigadierGeneral McMullen

produced the definitive criteria on which

the wholeA-X programme was subsequent

ly based. He listed five basic attributes that

such an aircraft must embody, and defined

them as follows below: '

• Re spon ivene ss

• L et ha l it y

• u rv iv ab il it y

• Simplicity

• Cost.

Necessary Attributes

spons iv n ss

McMullen defined responsiveness as the

ability to support ground troops with a sig

nificant ordnance load and range. The basic

view of the soldier on the ground was that

close airsupportwasanextensionof his own

supporting firepower a nd a n integral ele

men t o f any land fighting. Foreshadowing

what was to come in t he G ul f War,

McMullen stated that any CA pilot must

have the ability visually to identify friend

from foe. His own role inVietnamhad been

relativelysimple; there, the air environment

had been passive, and FACscould be used

to direct battle operations with no fear of

interception by hostile aircraft. This would

certainly not be the casein Europe.

McMullen's viewwas that, ina majorbat

ric in w hi ch the l ine between opposing

forcesinvariably becomesblurred, airstrikes

d ir ec ted a t a set of map coordinates alone

would not bereliable: 'Pilotsmust beable to

enemy positions and, in addition, must

be able to lo iter so that as the local scene

changes they can provide immediate sup

port.' Here, McMullen was echoingthe cry

ofthe Korean War 'Dough-Boys',given elu

cidarion by General Mark W. Clark:

Th e aircrafr which i, to pJ ll\ ide close tactical

,uppon ,hould he deSigned ,pecifieJiII for thatIlll iun and lol he c o m p r o l 1 l l ~ c d hy a rrim<lry

requlfI:mcnt to engage in ,ur-tn- llr hattlc: .. Ide

ally, ta c rical , upport design, , hould be t h e c o

o r di n at e d e f fo n o f ho th g r ound officer, (\\ ho

c a n s l ar e t h e r c q l l i r c m e n t ~ as the) would

, r a re the reLjuirelllenr fman ani l lc ry piece) and

air { l t r i c c r ~ (who CCill reconcile t h c ~ c require

Il l l l lh with engineering Illnirarion,,). 4

To g i e t he n ew CAS aircraft the required

ability to stay over the harrlezone for long

periods, McMullen insisted that it had to

be capable of operating from forward

airstrips ra ther than from sophisticated

airbases far t o t h e rear.

ethalily

In McMullen s theory, lethality was the

ability to destroytargets while patrolling a

large area. During the course of this, 'sec

ondary or collateral damage had to be

minimized. There had to be confidenceon

the ground that incoming aircraft would

not make g ro ss e rror s in their ordnance

delivery. McMullen held that radar bomb

ing wasaccurate,but not accurate enough

for the CAS mission'. He reiterated that

the prime directive was the ability o f t h e

pilot to sec what he was hitting.

Lethality had to in lude the capability to

take out a w id e r an ge of enemy targets.

McMullen acknowledged that tanks were

the most difficult ground target to hit andde-troy. Tanks could be destroyed by the

stand-off Maverick television (electro-opti

cal) guided missile sy tem with terminal

homing, when therewasadequatelight con

trast to distinguish the target. The US

Navy's Rockeye free-fall c1u t er h omb,

which contained 247 2.1 in bomblet s,

designedfor use again t tanks and armoured

vehicles, was considered effective against

t anks , only in the 'a rea sense '. However,

w he n t ho se t an ks w er e c lo se t o f ri en dl y

23

ground forces, something with more p

sionwas a requirement, hence the adop

ofthe 30mmgun.

All-weathercapability was the ideal

CAS aircraft, but the overriding pri

was the abiIity of the pilot to see the en

especially when bad weather condit

(common enough over central Europ

well as sial reduced visibility to afew h

dred yards. Acceding to the SAF stu

cited by McMullen, European opera

conditions were such that a CAS air

operating within a I OOOft OOOm) cei

with one-mile visibility, would be op

t ional for 85 per cent o f t h e t im e. h

such an aircraft be safely operated b

that I OOOft (30 m) c ei li ng , i t w ou ld

possible to deliver napalm at 300 ft (9

urvivabilily

The new CAS aircraft needed to beab

survive hitsfrom the massedarray of potialground fire, and return safely to bas

McMullen's view it was far more desir

to have a system that cou ld take se

damage but still keep functioning, tha

rely onan aircraft whose chances of surv

depended solely o n n ot being expose

return fire. Such a machine would be im

tent in any CA scenario envisa

McMullen accepted that in central Eur

with the high concentration of radar, h

seeking missiles and heavier-calibre A



Ti lE A X P R O G R ~ I ~ I THE A X P R O G R ~ I ~ I

esrab Jshed by Jow·amude level rum manoeuvre reqUlfemenr

6,500lb

undetected, and they also had the tel

advantage of economy. The airflow

ducedhad the spin-offeffect of reducing

infra-redsignature of the aircraft, increa

its immunity to seeker missiles.The cha

of ground particle damage when opera

from primitiveairstrip wered creased.

General Electric had begun vigorousl

pushits T64 and TS engines s ince the

A-X proposal in March 1967, but airfr

companies had been i n d is us si on w

Garre tt abou t i ts n ew turbo fan eng

Among others con sid ered were Ali

Division of General Motors, Contine

Motors and RollsRoyce of Derby,UK. P

& Whitney prepared a package of eng

candidates that i tw as t o o f fe r t o the w

ners ofthe preliminarydesignstudies. H

ever, two main choices had been s tudie

the General Electric TF- 34 and the V

Lycoming FI 2 - and their respectivem

itswere to beadjudged in tria ls on the

selected competitive prototypes.

On I May 197 , Colonel Jame

Hildebrandt wa- appointed ystem Prog

Director and hief of the X yst

ProgramOffice. The next stage was reac

on 7 August, when just six o f t he twe

companie s responded to tI e A-X R

Fairchild-Hiller Corporation, the Boe

Company, orthrop Corporation, Ce-

Aircraft Company, General Dynami s C

poration and Lockheed Aircraft Corpo

tion. The others de l ined to bid , consi

ing the package uneconomical.The six

were then carefully crutini:ed by a bo

under Colonel Hi Idd randt, a nd , o n

October 1970, the Source election Ad

sory Committee briefed its findings to

ource Selection Authority ( e cretary

theA ir Force, Robert C. eamans, Jr),

the commanders of the Air Force y ste

Logistic and Tac ti a l Air Commands.

17 December, the A-X Sys tem Prog

Director presented a source selection br

ing to the Defense Systems Acquisit

Review Council (D ARC)l\

In the mean time, the weapon arou

which the successfuI con tender wasdesign the A-X aircraft was ready for t

der in i ts turn . On 16 November, t h e

Force relea ed to industry requests forp

posals for the GA - 30mm canno

The ompetitive

Prototype Phase

The D RC accepted the factspresented

it, a knowledged that the need for the A

Martin hadbeen active in the CAS areafor

nearly two years. -The final draft requirement calledfor an

a ir craf t w ith a targe t weigh t of 35,0001b

(IS,876kg) able to haul 9 ,5001b (4,309kg)

of varied ordnance into action. An overall

unit cost, including Research and Develop

ment (R D), of 1.4million was the opti

mum budget requirement for a proposedsix

hundred a ir craf t. n inf lat ion contingency

buffer of 15 per cent was built in.

Included in the requirement was a high

level of manoeuvrability under a 1 ,000 ft

OOOm) cloud ba e and a rad iu s of 250

miles (400km), plus the ability to loiter in

the battle zone for two hours;a turn diam

e ter o f I m ile or less; and, to allow the air

craft to work c lo se t o t he front line from

'au t e re forwa rd bae s ' , a maximum take

off d istance of 4,0 Oft (I nOm ' bu t n o

more than 6,000ft [I, ml . The power

plant had to b e 'state ofthe art'; thechoice

was l ef t t o the contestants , a l though the

Air Force made a strong recommendation

for twin turbofans in the range of 7,000 to

10, OOlb (3J.l-44.5k ) of thrust. Ord

nance load to be in ex ess of 6,0001b

(2,730kg) and a gross weight allowanceof

20,000-25,000Ib (9,100-11,370kg), 'but

not more than 30,00 Ib ll3,650kgJ'1I.

Hughes Aircraft Company considered

bidding for the avionics package as a prime

cons t ruc to r and the A ir Force officials at

Aeronautical Systems Di vision expressed

a desire to obtain prime bidsfrom avionics

f irms for f i rs t -round s tud ie s, b ecau se of

their usually excellent capability in sy'

tems analysis. For production, they would

revert to a support role. mong th e t en

avionics firms invited by the A ir Force to

a bidders' conferenceat Wright-Patterson

AFB, Autonetics Division o f o rt h Ame r

ican and Hugheshad already flight-tested

equipment suitable for the A-X, while

Sperry, Westinghouse and International

Business Machines (IBM) werealso active

participants.

The AF studies into propulsion

options had comedown infavour ofthe turbofan, which offered a numberof attra tive

options to the CA profile. Their simplici

ty of des ign, w ith lack of propeller and

reduction gearing, made them a compara

tively easy sy tem to install, maintain and

replace in the field, part o f t he rationale

o f t he A-X. Such engines cou ld be f it te d

c lo se r to the aircraft's centrelin giving

economy of profile. The very high-bypa s

fans were relatively quiet, increasing the

chance of a low-level approach remaining

Prototype Deve lopment (CPD) scheme,

o ne o f t h e firs t times such a scheme was

used. T hi s m ea nt t ha t two contractor

would compete on the Prototype Develop

ment Program and, after sixteen months,

would receive instruction for the full-scale

development production phase proposals.

Once these proposals had beenevaluated,

there wou ld be a f ly -o ff s taged between

both companies' prototypes and, depen

dant upon the analysis of this, the final

contractor wouldbe selected. Thisscheme

ensured the maximum testing of compet

ing sy tems, as e n h ri ne d t he A ir Force's

Systems Management Directive.'

The cost-plus (incentive) scheme intro

duced by Secretary of DefenseMelvin Laird

hroke new ground in abandoning the prac

tice of concurrence of theentiresystem (air

craft, powerplant, weaponry, av ion ic , and

so on). It introduced the now-familiar 'fly

hefore-buy' method, whereby all the sepa

rate components were individually put out

to competitive tender and evaluated before

final purchase. This, alongwith the need to

keep toa fixed timetable that was ubjec t to

step-by-step evaluation, and the possibility

of following an 'off-the-shelf' philosophy,

r es ul ted in a development process that

would be longer than hitherto, but couldbe

precisely controlled. Thus, the aircraft, the

engines and the main Gatling gun anna

ment a ll h ad to come together only after

they had been separately developed, tested

and approved. Then, the system could be

trialied and examined asa whole.

The R P and the ids

On Z7 April 1970, the A ir Force y stems

Command established the A-X Sy temPro

gram Office ( PO) in the Deputy for Sys

tems Management, eronautical ystems

Division, Wright-PattersonAFB, to oversee

and co-ordinate this complex series of oper

ations. This preliminary move wasfollowed,

on 8 May, by the ir Force distributing an

RFP for the competitive prototype phase ofthe A-X aircraft to twelve different compa

nies: Beech, Bell, Boeing-Vertol Division,

Cessna, Fairchild-Hiller' Republi via-

tion Division, General Dynamics/Convair,

Grumman ircraft Engineering Corpora

t ion, Lockheed-California ompany, Ling

Temco-Vought(LTV), McDonnell Aircraft

Corpo ra ti on , o rt h Ame ri ca n v ia ti on '

Los Angeles Division a nd o rt hr op orair

Division. Douglas Aircraft at Long Beach

and Martin decided nor to hid, eventhough

To help deal with thecost factor on th e A

X i t was decided to adopt a Competitive

Establishingthe Programme

2. Musthave the capability of identifying,

attacking and destroying targets of a

fixed or fleeting nature in v ery c lo se

prox imity to friendly ground forces.

3. Must have a high degree of survivabili

ty on themodern battlefield and should

operate effectively in t he a tt ac k o f

ground target.

4. must possess an all-weather navigation

capabilityand simple targetacquisition

equipment.

5. Must possess its ownstrategic and tac

tical mobility and be fre of the require

ments for e labora te and vu lnerab le

fixed facilitie .

6. M us t have effective c ommand and

control equipment.

The A-X design requirements, including

the ha ic flight de ign weight (BFDW)

were ident i fi ed in a development concept

paper (DCP)' see table below).

The original spe ification stated flatly

that 'c10 e air support i best performed by

a slow-flying dive-bomber ;.

It w en t o n t o c al l f or a r ad iu s o f 2 50

miles (400km) and a l oa d f ac to r of 3.5

from an aircraft cruising at 275 knots. The

desired take-off capabili ty remained the

combat-lifting of a ful l r ange of ordnance

- eighteen Mk 2 (500Ib) bombs and

1,350 rounds of 3 mm an,munition -with

suffic ient fuel for a 50-mile (80-km) flight

to the ba tt le zone, thirty minutes ofcom

bat, and a 15 -mile (Z40-km) homeward

leg , from a 4,000ft (I ,200m) runway. '

5.0

1.65 I/. nautical mie nm) radius turn

1.2 ,I,nm radius turnl

3.2 fnm radius turnl

6,OOOh/mn

250/2

73

5.0

STRENGTH

Limit load factor BFDW)

Limit load factor maximum weightl

PERFORM N E

Instantaneous 1300kt. BFDW)

Sustained 1150kt, BFDW)

Sustained 1150kt, 18 Mk 82 bombs)

Sustained 1175kt. BFDW)

Rate of clmb 1275kt,BFDW)

Radius/loiter with 18 Mk 82 bombs)

Useful load,fuel and ordnance

1 OOOfl groundturn, take-off and landingl

l Must be quickly available for employ

mentand responsive to the needs ofthe

rmy commander.

inimum A-X performance capability

ummary of esign Requirements

The final view o f w ha t t he ideal c1ose

support manned aircraft system would look

like to US F was summed up as follows:

during a major engagement . o thing has

changed ince. Congress then, a now,

was questioning the v er y n ee d f or the

F to develop a brand-new, and very

specialized, one-role aircraft, in addition to

this programme. They failed to understand

the requirements, nor could they under

stand w hy a multibillion-dollar intercep

tor, designed to fight many miles up, could

not also d ro p down to n ea r z er o f ee t t o

deliver ordnance. The same arguments

that persisted in the 1930s persist today.

In 1974, p re s u re to economize, or lose

the whole package, dominated thinking

o n t he A-X and led t o much discu sion

with the manufacturers and suppliers. The

C aircraft design, motivated by single

mindedness and l a ck ing re li a nc e on

sophisticated avionics, did not include the

expensive add-on tha t migh t have been

considered vital to the airsuperiority fight.

The A-X was always designed to cost.

Even so, Congressional pressure, some

times politically motivated, ensured that

t he A - I was to suffer a long, and some

times painful, gestation period. At each

step of the programme, the developers had

t o f ig ht two opponent groups: the 'five

miles-high' school ofthought, verypower

ful w ithi n t he A ir Force, and politicians

who were either uneducated in defence

matters, orwho had theirown axe togrind.

defined the fifth element for theasoverallcost ofthe system. Although

pert inen t to the actual combat role , it

none the l es , a v it al f ac to r, and one

has cont inued to dominate the A-I

mme to the present day. Jt was recog

even in 1974, that the costs of high

formance fighter aircraft, l ike all other

nssystems, wereescalatingalarming

Fdoubted that it would get the

even for the low numbers of such

aft required to maintain airsuperiority

need to keepsucha CA aircraftin the

and maintaining a h igh sor ti e r ate was

vital. Any aircraft that, through its

design or maintenance and ser

profile, spent most of i ts time on th e

und, was a wasted asset and was, effec

outof action as much as if ithad been

damaged. The fast-moving ground

e env is aged , w ith huge columns of

tanks bulldozing their wayacross the

h German plain toward the Channel,

not allow for any dilatory response.

foresaw that a commanderwould

to deploy his CAS aircraft rapidly to

forward area, and have them loiter and

over the battle :one, seeking targetsof

o n t he ground, thus reducing

flying toand from the ba e fields.

followed that maintenance times on

new A-X had to be as lowas possible.

t ur na ro und t ime on the g ro und

refuelling, rearming and essential ser

- needed to be k ep t t o a thirty

window. Keeping the ground skills

uired to achieve this objective was a

factorin reliability and asim

n would help with thi , as wou ld

in-built capacityto achieve 3,500 flight

r be tween e sential engine change.

powerplantof the aircraftitself had to

y easy on spare-part renewal and

s ibi Iity.

the aircraft would be 'exposed to

heavygroundfire and despite

of the protect ion tha t can be l u i lt i n,

rateswill probably be high'.

manoeuvrability would minimize

ability of enemy defences to 'lock on'

aircraft, and this made it anoth

s ential attribute to t he A -X design.

u e ofstand-off weaponry,such as the

erick , would also give it an edge.

24 25



THE X PROGR MMETHE X PROGR MME

The roll out ofthe A-Xfrom Fai rchil d s facility in 1972 Natona Archves. Colege Park MD

essential requirements for continued de

opmentand operation test production.

A l l was now ready for the final fl

e va lu at io ns t o e e w hi ch design wo

come o ut o n top of the A-X competiti

YA-IOtook to the airand,a month later, in

August 1972, the RFP r e p o ns e w er e d u e

back from the contractors. By I A ugu st ,

the Air Force had completed and released

proposal instructions (PI) containing all

Thevery first test flight o f t h e initial prototype 71-1369 over Edwards AFB California with test pilot

Howard Sam Nel son atthe hel m o n 1 0 May 1972 Natona Archves Washington DC

chief t es t p ilot Howard Sam e lson . II

thus beat it contenderinto the air by twen

ty days; the orthrop YA-9 f lew f rom

Edwards o n 30 May, piloted by te I pilot

Lew Nelson. On 21 July 1972, the second

On I March 197 t h e A i r Forccdesignat

ed the t wo A- X prot ot yp es as the

Northrop A - 9 a n d the Fairchild A-IO. In

June 197 j the U AF awarded lettercon

tracts t o t h e G en er al Electric Company

a nd t h e Phi cn Ford Corporation for the

competitive development of the GAU

gun systcm and practice ammunition.

E ngine de ign lagged further behind, and

i twas not until 9 January 1972 that t h e A i rForce negotiated t he A VC O Lycoming

contract for development o f t hc FlO

LD I00 turbofanengine.

By October 1971, the engineering

designs h ad b e en completed a nd t he full

scale development/production RF P was

released to the prototype contra tors the

fol lowing p ri \. On 1 May 1 97 2, the pro

totype YA 1O made its debut flight a t t he

Air Force FlightTest Center, EdwardsAFR,

California , flown by Republic Division

Full-Scale Developm nt

and Production

The centralization of a ll in fo rma t ion

appertaining to the A-X programme was

established, via the PO, with t he A ir

Force, whichguaranteed its full and impar

tia l d issemination. Direct communication

b et we en o rt h ro p a nd Fairchild was forbidden. This wa to ensure the upholding

of an cnshrined policy en uring n o u n du e

advantage could benefitone orother ofthc

contractor-, eithcr by governing a c ti o n o r

by any misinterpretation of the rules,

whether by accident or design. HO\\,e\'er,

hoth designers were free to initiate design

changes, should th ey be deemed cssential,

pnl\ ided they keptthem w ithincontext of

the specifics as laid dow nin theircontracts,

as originated or assubsequentlynegotiatcd,

agreed and incorporated thereinY

ompetition

and the contractorshad toensure that they

did their utmost to meet theT goals. This

stric ture also related to t he o t he r major

componentsofthe system. Forexample, the

Armament Development and Test Center

ADTC), developing the 30mm Gatling

gun, was obliged to co-ordinate efforts with

the gun cont rac tor s v ia the programme

office to ensure a two-way flow of infonna

tion. Likewise, co-ordination ofthe parallel

development ofthe avionics systcm, which

was to p rovide c le ar -a ir and all-weather

capability,was the responsibilityof theS P O .

Moral a wel l as financial obligations were

spelled out. C olonel H ildebrandt specified

four basic programme objecti\ es, which

were in order of priority):

• 63233F-development

• 27131 F - A-X squadrons - active

.52519F- A- Xsquadr ons- Ai r ation-

al Guard A N G )

• 329A - weapons system;

1. Development of a clo,'cair-support sys

tem capable of performing the mission

within established cost goals.

2. Maintenance of a healthy a nd fa ir

c om pe ti ti on b et we en t he two CPP

contractors.

3. Assurance of visibility by the Air Force

o f t h e contractors' progress and by the

contractors of the Ai r Force 's pro

gramme goals.

4. Definition of procedures u sed in con

duct of CPl) e ffor t for the benefit of

other programmes using a similarman

agement approach.;1

evelopment

U AF Headquarterslaid down all theA-X

pelformance goals. Any deviationsfrom this

couldonly come about fromdecisionstaken

by a panel of adjudicators from the Joint

Contractor and t h e S cc r et a ry o f Defense.

W it hi n t he fixed param tel's of allocated

funding, the SystemsProgram Office(SPO)

How diIigently these admirable objectiy

wou ld b e c ar ri ed out by the company

remaincd to be seen. or was th is the end

of attempts to provide both a tight control

and a level playing field .

The U AF laid dow n ground rules that

guided the prototype phase in respect ofbothdevelopmentand competition.

Obligationsand

Objectives

relationship around the in-house G overn

ment target'for overall funding of the A-X.

A: long as th is overriding Federal restric

tion was kep t to, the , A F had the flex i-

bility todivide the funds into cost element ,

tailored t o t h e needs ofthe A-X programme

itseIf Trade -o ff s cou ld be made between

these element , w ithout further reference

to, or approval hy the Office of the eere

tary of Defen:e (OSD).

The elements selected for the A-X by

t h e A i r Forcewere as follows:

beenproven, and therefore gave the go

for the Competitive Prorotype Phase

development. On I Decembe r 1970,

eamans announced the choice of

competing contractors: Fairchild-Hiller

on's Republic A\'iation Di\'ision,

New York, a n d t h e orth

Division, of Haw

a. Eachwasawardedwith a

contract.

plancalled for twoprotorypes from

competitors. Northrop s propos

on cost-cutting, and its propos,ll

m or e mod es t than Fairchild's. The

contracts reflected this differ

N or t hr o p, u n de r Contract No.

657-71-C-306, was awarded 28.8 mil

II following its choice ofthe Lycoming

turho(an engine. Fairchild, opting (or

higher-thrust, but moreexpensiveCen

Electric TF-34 to power its larger air

t , was a l lo ca ted 41.2 mil l ion, under

o. F3 3657-71-C-308. As t he

e s th emse lve s were Covernment

on 9 J,lIluary 1972, under C ontract

F33-657-C-0135, the S AF awarded

Lycoming 26.5 million cost-plus

e-fee to develop its FIOO-LD-IOO

includingfull qualification tests).

3 ovember 1972, a fixed-priced

contract, o. F33-657 73-C

betweenthe A ir Force and

Electric Company, of Lynn, Mass

tts, for the qualification testing of

TF- 34.This wasre-negotiated in March

to incorporate d e ve l op m en t a n d

of th ilTy-two enginesfor a cost of

7 million.';

C o m pe t i ti v e P r ot o ty pe Phase

P ) o f the A-X programme was given

funding limitations by t he U SA F

a Sy stems Management Directive

on 5 May 1 97 1. 1' A unit flyaway

of 1.4 million 1970 Financial Year,

dollars) was re-specified for the pro

aircraft; this figure wasbased upon

l requirement of six hundred aircraft

at a r at e of twenty <lircraft per

Year-hy-year fund allocation wasmi ll ion in FY 1 97 0, 2 7. 9 i n FY 1971,

4 7. 9 in FY 1972, reducing to a rail-off

in FY 1973 of 7.6 million.

A-X p rogramme was a lso the first

AF weapon d e ve l op m en t u n de r t h e

DTC) concept. nder

the average unit flyaway cost target,

by the ecrerary of Defense, was

soleobjective. Through this, the U AF

t h e G o v er n m en t (represented by the

adopted a customer/provider

26 27



ION LINE AT FAIRCHILD REPUBLIC.

raphscourtesy of Farch d Repub c Archves

of Avaton Museum Garden City New York

Production linein full swing with 111 and

foreground andwing assemblyarea in the

Left The wing sections on trolleys.

Below A 10 production in ull swing.Looking down theline.

op left The AftSectionShopin Building 17

op right The A 10 Engine Line.

Above left The individual work w lkw ys for final assembly on the

production line.

Above Working on the internal systems ofthecombinedforward and rear

fuselage sections.

Left Nearingcompletionwith various access panelsopenfor work.



/

THE COMPETITION - YA VERSUS YA·IO

CHAPTER FOUR

Dr Grossman, amember of the Amercan Institute o

Aeronaut Astronaut and Amercan Mathematicians

Associaton, still lves in New York Cty. where heha

worked as a management consultant since1981.

Photo courtesy of Fairchid-Republc Archives,

Crade of AviatonMuseum, Garden City New York

landing gear. Because the resultant wi

height w as s m all, t he l an di ng g em w

shorter and therefore sturdierand simpl

and could be optimum-positioned for

safer and more table wide-track underca

riage. Again, this offered great advanta

HAWG MEN Norman Grossman

Dr Norm an Grossman, recognized f or his pioneering

work i n t h e f ield o f design, producton and testing of

high-performancemilitaryaircraft and aircraft systems,

was involved with the A 1 0 project throughoutmost of

its turbulent life.

Born in New York Cty on 3 November1922, Norman

Grossman waseducatedatNew York University, becom

ing a Bachelor of Aeronautcal Engneerng in 1943. He

became thePrncipal Resdent Engneer of Repubc Avi

aton, and thenFairchid Industres, Inc., between 1946

and1951, beng awarded hs Masters degree in 1948.

In 1951, Grossmanwas appointed Assistant Project

E ng n ee r, a nd i n 1 95 5 he became Staff Engineer at

Fairchid-Republc. In addition, he inspired a new gen

eraton by lecturing in Mathematicsat Adelphi Colege

from 1951 t o 1953. In 195B, Grossman became Chief

Electronics Engneer, a post h e h e d unti 1962,when,

with Fairchid s expansion. he became Manager Res

Division 1962-64), andt hen Assistant Genera Man

ager, from 1964 to 1968.

Grossman also found time to contnue hs academic

work, acquiring a PhD in Mathematics i n 1 95 8. a nd

later working at the Brooklyn Polytechnic Institute,

Farmingdale Campus for ten years from1965.

Grossmans next appointment was in 1968, when he

became Vice President of theFairchid organizaton. A

year later he was made President. a post he held until

1975. With the reorganizaton of Fairchid, following

the USAF re vie w o f wo rking p ractce s, on 20 March

1975 Grossman replaced Chares C ol s as Chairman

and ChiefExecutve Offcer, a post he hed until 19BO.

Birds of many colours Seen here at Edwards AFB, California, is aline up of all six pre-production A-l0

with their various test paint colourings. Natonal archives,Washington DC MD

could be keptactivew hile essential rearm

ing, ammunitioning and fuelling could he

safely carried out by ground teams.

As w ell a s clearing the underw ing sur

faces forstores capacity, the configuration

f re ed u p the s a me a r ea for h a ng i ng t h e

Fairchild YA IO

The Y A- IO , d e sig ne d to m ee t t he same

ohjectives as the Y A- 9, w as a much largeraircraft, but there was much common think

ing in the derail. The off-the-shelfapproach

was as much in evidenceat Fa ir c hild a s it

was a t N or t hr o p, e v en with regard t o t he

selection o f t h e engine. The General Elec

tric TF34 h a d o r ig ina lly b e en the selected

powerplant for the N a vy s Lo ck h ee d S- 3 A

Viking carrier-based, anti-submarine war

f ar e d e sig n. The TF34 was a lso a non

afterhurning turbofan, but had t he m uc h

higher rating of9,275Ibof th r us t s tatic s e a

level) that was considered necessary to lift

and manoeuvre the much heavier YA-IO

which weighed 23, OOlb 1 , 2 0k g e mp ty,

45,600Ib/20,730kg maximum take-off gross

weight).

It was the posi tion ing of the twoengines

o n t h e Fairchild prototype - h ig h u p above

andbehind the wing oneither side the rear

fuselage - that most struck the eye_ This

configuration provided a n um be r o f

important advantages. Keeping the wing

and hody unencumbered enahled the

YA-IO partly t o e m ul a te i ts s p iritu al p r e

decessor t h e A - I kyraider, a llowing m a x

imum underw ing pylon provision for ord

nance stowage.0

less t h a n e l ev e n suchstations could he featured.

Automatic by-products of such a h ig h

engine mounting location meant a higher

degree o f i m mu n it y f r om f o re ign object

damage F O D ) w hen working o u t o f prim

itive,unsurfacedairstrips. eparation from

the f u se lag e a llow e d a le ve l of one-shot

powerplant destruction immunity, should

ground fire cause the di integration of one

unit> The nature of the system also led to

an improved turnaround time; engines

YFJ 02-10-100 non-afterbuming engines.

These wererated at 7,5001b thrust, some 15

per cent less t ha n t h e TF-34. To compen

s a te f or the lack of thrust, orthrop pro

posed to increasewingspan by7ft 2.5m) to

m ee t t he Air Force specification. The

engines were halfthe length o f t h e TF-34,

and a lm os t2 5 p e rcent lighterin weight. By

mounting the two engines a t c h e t height,orthrop claimed easy accessibility and a

half-hour total replacement time. 4

Interchangeable parts n ot o nIy m e t t h e

U A F n e ed f or e a se o f m a i nt e n an c e a n d

s u pp ly, it a lso meant reduced initial con

tractor c o sts , w ith o nl y o n e ingle part

h a vi n g t o be tooled up and produced for

both sides o f t he aircraft. orthrop was

able t o t a ke advantageof this by featuring

portand starboard duality not only in the

engines, but a lso in the main landing-gear

flaps, speed brake, ailerons, elevatorsand

spoilers, a m on g o t h e r p ar t .4.

T o e n su r e survivability in the face of

e xp ec te d b at tl e damage, orthrop s

designers came u p w i t h w h at t h ey t e rm e d

redundant critical structural members .

With these built in, an aircraft could sur

vive even ifvital features were damaged or

made totally inoperational; in the ground

attack systems that were th n current,

such damage would automati a lly le ad to

the 10 s of theentire aircraft. In Northrop s

design, the access doors on the A-9 would

rapidly vent themselve in t h e ve nt o f a n

internal explosion f ro m a high-explosive

shell or missile strike, t h us a v oi d in g a n y

lethal build-up of pressure that might rip

the whole aircraft apart. Cabling for con

trol was c1ualled and separated, so that it

could not be eliminated b y ju s t o n e h i t in

a v ital s p ot. A ll hydraulic system and flight

controls w e re f itte d w ith manual back-up

i n c as e of power failure. The fuel tanks

were foam-filled a n d s p li t up i n t o t h re e

separatemodule in each wing o n t h e same

p r in c ip l e, a l t ho u gh o n ly o n e o f these was

self-sealing.

Northrop YA 9

The Y A- 9 w as of conventional de ign,

with short, straight, shoulder-mounted

wings, and a s in gl e f in . I ts e ng in es w er e

faired intothe slenderand elegant fuselage

undereach w ing r o ot, c los e to thecentreof

gravity. T his positioning minimized pitch

trim c h an g es m a de necessary by power

hanges, but led to limited yaw in engine

out situations. 46 The pi lot s canopy-shaped

cockpit wa mounted well forward over the

nose, giving 360-degree i l ity w ith 2 0

degree ventral viewing ahead.

Re s po n din g to the Air Force s urgent

requirement to cut costs to the bone,

o r th r op c am e up with something of a

bolt-on philosophy, with a h ig h numberof

equipmentsutilized

off theshelf .

Themainla nd ing - ge a r s tr u ts w e re f ro m th e McDon

n ell D ou gla s A - 4; the w he els a n d b r ak es

came from theG rumman Gulfstream 2; the

nose landing gear and s tr ut c am e f ro m

orthrop s own F-5; and the Escape 2 ejec

tionseat had been developed by McDonnell

D ou gl a f or the Lockheed -3A Viking.41

The choice of powerplant was equally

dominated by cost considerations. orth

rop opted for the veo Lycoming ALF

502, given the military designation of

A-X specification s Table pages 32-3).

I n f a ct , i n many ways their designs reflect

ed the significant differences in t h e c o m

panies thatoriginatedthem. T heyhad cer

tai n aspects in c om mo n: b ot h were

single-seater, ubsonic, twin turbofan-pow

e r ed a irc r af t; both featured interchange

a b le p a rts and dual redundancy controls;

b o th h a d the pilot seated well forward, forgood all-round visibility, and encompassed

in an armoured citadel; both could deliver

16,0001b 7,270kg) of munitions precisely

to the target at lo w le ve l. H o we v er , each

contractor s interpretation w i th in t ho s e

basi s similarities wasvery different.

The Oillpetition

YA Versus YA IO

a nd Compa risons

competitive flight evaluation, compar

the YA-9 with the Y A- I O, to o k p lac e

30 May and 24 October 1972.

period the two companies also

flight-testing of their respective

The Y A- 9 c lo c k ed u p a to tal of

s o rties , amounting to 1 61 .6 f lig hts, while the YA-I made 14 sorties for

a l of I 9.6 flight hour .4\

23 August, the second YA -9 proto

w as being evaluated by the company

s ,s o a ll f o ur a ir cr a f tw e r e r e ad y in

for the fly-offs. T h e re h ad b e en hic

w ith both YA-lOs along the way: the

prototype had made a he a vy la nd

r e s ulting in both mainlanding wheels

o ut a nd t he aircraft scraping its

o n t he deck. The first prototype had

more s e rio us d if fic ulties

stalled, for the resulting turbulence

t h e i n bo a rd s e ct i on of the w in g w as

i n to t h e TF-34s, which themselves

stalled. T his problem necessitated a

of the inner-w ing profile, with

a dd it io n o f a f ix ed s lo t t o d am pe n

n t h e degree of airflow.

SAF Proposal Instructions P I),

contained e ve ry e ential require

for t h e c o n ti n u ed developing and

, w e re r e le a se d on 10 August 1972.

c o mp e ti t or s h a d t o m e et these by the

of 10 O ctober,and give their

p r op o sa ls b y 2 4 October.

fly-off betweent he A -9 and the

a u th o riz ed in Pr og r am Introduc

Document P-71-7-10,originated by the

S P O ,and by AFFTC Project Directive44 I t b e ga n at Edwards AFB, on 10

1972, and was completed on 9

The c ri t er i a f or the fly-off

the technical evaluation, opera

u ira bility , a d e ra iled co t analysis,

negotiation of rival proposals.4;

two competing machines differed

antly in t h ei r a t t e mp t t o m ee t t h e

30 31



TH OMP TITION - YA-9 VERSUS YA-IO

Ar Force FlghtEvaluaton Systemsl of the A.9A PrototypeAircraft, Technca report No 732 byFrank Lucero Thomas R Yechout andRoy D. Brdges Jr Air ForceFlght Tes Centre Edwards AFB

forna March 1973 ppl 13

Ar Force FlghtEvaluaton Systemsl of the A. 0PrototypeAircraft, Technca report No 733 by FrankN Lucero Thomas R Yechout andRoy D. Brdges Jr Air ForceF ght Tes Centre.Edwards AFB

forna p3

660rounds

4,000 rounds/min

60 Iburst limiter instaled for testsI

n/a

n/a

Hydraulc

n/a

n/a

n/a

0.69

488 sq ft

n/a

-1 deg

7deg outboard panel)

52.5 sq ft each)

Taper rato 0.61

118.4 sq ft total area)

-7 deg

829 sq It

40deg

4879 sq ft

25 deg up, 15deg down

92.36 sq ft total areal

or -65 deg

n/a

n/a

28.42 sq It total)

30 deg up, 10 degdown

11.2 sq It each tail)

or - 25 deg

2 Internal fuselage tanks and 2 internalwing tanks

10,010

n/a

2.755

3,055

2,100

n/a

2,100

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

Norsight

A IO

635rounds

4,000 rounds/min

60 Iburst limiter instaled fortests)

1,0651b

7081b

Hydraulc

22in

45 in

72in

98 sq ft

30 deg, 29 min

0000 deg

1000 deg

88sq ft

45 deg

22.7 sq ft

30 deg upand down)

102 sq ft

57 deg up, 63 degdown

98sq It

60 deg up)

42sq ft

12 degup, 8degdown

31 sq It

30 deg right or left

Internal - 5each wing

9,750

1,500

n/a

n/a

4,875

750

4,875

750

3,900

600

1,950

300

9,074

1,396

n/a

A 9A

n/a

580 sq ft

3deg, 12 min

0000 deg

0000 deg

98 sq ft

TH OMP TITION - YA-9 VERSUS YA-IO

Horizontal tail exposed area

Sweepback lat 25 pctchord)

Incidence

Dihedral

Flght controls fap total area Fowlerarea)

Fap travel

Aieron area each, aft of hinge)

Aieron travel

Speed brake split aierons) area total aft of hinge)

Speed brake travel

Lift dumper upper fap surfacel area total

Lift dumper travel

Elevator area laft ofhinge - 70 pct)

Elevator travel

Rudderarea aft of hingel

Rudder travel

Fue tank configuration

Fue volume weight lbl

Liquid measure gal

Leftmain fuselage

Rightmain fuselage

Left wingweight lbl

Liquid measure ga)

Right wing weight lbl

Liquid measure ga)

Pyons 21- total weight b)

Pyons 2)- total lquid measure ga )

Pyons - each weight Ilbl

Pyons - each lquid measure gal

Usable fuel - total weight Ib)

Usable fuel- total lquid measure ga )

Gunsight

Armament total capacity

Automatic gun 11. six-barrel. fuselage-mounted,

model M61Al, 20mm

Rate off ire

Burst shots

Overal weight - loaded

Overal weight - empty

Gun and feeddrve system

Overal gunwidth

Overal gunheight

Overal gun length

Taper ratio

Wing area total

Sweepback at 25pct chordl

Incidence

Dihedral

Vertcal tail exposed area

20,500

45,600

20,500

23.800

26.2 design - gear up)

28.0 design - geardown)

n/a

n/a

26

n/a

n/a

32

n/a

n/a

1.5 to 1 8 fwd

n/a

n/a

+or--40 deg

24 x 77-1Dn, 14-ply

36 x 11 in, 24-ply

n/a

631.0

174.4

79.0

64.0

64.0

61.0

125.0

660.0

226.0

212.24

231.92

130

56.0

29,800Idesign)

Trcyclegear - single wheel, each with

direct-acting oleoshock struts

Single-place, low-wing, twin rudder tail

Two GS YTF34/F5 turbofans

9,2751b each

n/a

A IO

41.795 II)

18,719 1)

19,219 II)

20,754 I

20,254 III

n/a

n/a

382.5

32.6

108.5

380.6

31.0

109.0

389.1

38.0106.5

382.5to 382.4

32.6 to32.5

108.5to 109.2

30 deg

18 x 6.5-8in, 12-ply ratng

32 x 8-16in, Type VII 24-ply ratng

642.0

203.0

123.5

83.0

30.0

60.0

63.0

696.0326.95

122.5

224.4

12.0

47.0

23,734 I)

23,615111

A 9A

Single-place, high wing,single conventonal tail

TwoLycoming YF 02-LD-l00 turbofans

7,5001b each

Two - each with hydraulc pump,

generator, andengine start turbine

Trcyclegear - single wheel. each with

direct-acting oleo shock struts

empty dry, no pylons, no ammuniton, gun includedl

empty gun, no ammunition, 10 pyons,unusablefuel

approx. 2,0001b flight test instrumentationl

re of gravity atdesign weight - fuselage staton

MAC

gear up) - fuselage station

MAC

aft gear down)- fuselage station

MAC

abrupt cg Shift gear up to gear down) fuselage station

MAC

nosegear steering

tyre sze

geartyre sze

nches]

h essboom)

height

stabizer height atroot

at centrelne

height ground to bottom of fuselage)

height ground to bottom of tail)

height aft centrelne)

taispan

landing gear span Ityre centrelne}

e landing gearaxle tomain landing gearaxe

landing gear off-centre lIeft of centrelne)

centrelne distance from fuselage centrelne

htl b)

I

weight max alternative)

I

load Imax)

I

empty dry, no lquids or guns)

ng gear

between theA·9A and the A·



THE COMPETITION - YA· VERS S YA·IOTHE CO IPETITION - YA VERSUS YA IO

34

Making Choices

With rhe conclusion of Milestone II,

the termination o f t h e rrials, on 2 Dec

ber 1 9 72 , f i nal f l ig h t t im es totalle d 3

hours forall the YA-9aircrafr, and 32 .1

the YA-I Os. Analysis o f t h e resulrs took

weeks, inc luding r he holida y period, a

The de ta ile d br e a kdow n and anal

for rhe YA-lOis gi ven in r he ta ble on pa

36-7.

Simultaneous with the flight-tesr

ystems C ommand h ad b ee n conduct

its own bench-top examination and co

parisons on survivability, powerplanr,

production-run adaptability. Specialla

ratory faciliries h a d b e en e st a bl i sh e d

Wrighr-Patterson AFB, Ohio, to resr

effecrs borh of sustained jetengine wea

t he s t ru c tu r e, a nd also the r e s is ta nc e

oviet anti-aircraft weaponry o f t h e p

od, both gunnery and missile.

Systems C ommand u ed l iv e f ir e f ro

c a pture d 23m m w e a pon, w hic h fired hi

e xplos ive r ounds intoexact replicas o f

fuel r a nk s t o b e u se d in both aircraft. T

aim was to s ec i f rhe foam-filling in

ranks, a nd t he surrounding voids, wo

lerform as claimed. The t a nk s s t o o d u

the tests, faiIi n g t o e xp lo de , even wi rhigh-s leed s i mu l at e d a i rs t re am b l ow

over rhem, and being hit b y F R G-HE

projectiles at muzzle velocity. Such pro

tion was unique and achieved e onomi

ly with only two or three per c e nt o f

rota I tank volum e be ing dis pla c e d by

volume o f t h e intern;ll f oa m. I n addir

the fuel t a nk s w er e k e pr well clear o f

engine hot sections, s o t h il t , i n rhe ev

o f t h e m b ei ng p u n t ur ed , r he risk of i

tion was minimized.

For protection again r heat-seeking m

siles, the infra-red signature of rhe airc

was reduced by the upward cant of

e n gi n es , o u p le d w i t h the size and loca

ofthe empennage, which together mas

much o f t h e h e at output. The tempera

o f t h e e x ha u st plume w asal so reduced

cool bypass air mixing w ir h r he exha

gases.

S i m il a r t e st i ng was done against

a r m our pla te o f t h e G A U - gun. The

le t- pr oof w indshie ld for the aircra

canopy w as si m il ar ly t es t ed w i th 7 . 62

a r m our- pie rc ing r ounds , w hic h f ai le d

p e ne t ra r e, w h il e 2 3 m m a nd 3 7m m H

were fired hor izonta lly inr o r he p i l ot s ptective tiranium harhrub panels.i

35

Deficiencies

High rudder forces upon loss hydmulic

power; unacceptableoperation the heading

and reference system pilot discomfort caused

by the ejector seal. one these was an

insurmountable obstacle «

Deficiencies

El1gine/airframe incom/Jatibility; general cock

pit reach; unacce/Jtable o/Jeration the head

er and reference system; /Jilot discomfort

caused b) the ejection seat; unacce/nable man

ual reversion control in /Jitch.

Conclusions and

Recommendations

Attributes

Strafing and bombing acwmcy annament

control; cockpit visibility; auxiliary power

unit; maintainability.

One important innovation produced by

Northrop was the unique s ide force con

trol FC) linked to t he c om bi ne d

aileron/speed brakes o f t he o ut er wings.

Whereas both aircraft featured the s e s plit

upper and lower panels, to give fasr decel

erarion w ith lit tle or no rrim change, the

YA-9 s s pec ial f e atur e connected these

speed brakes to the rudder by m a nua lc on

trol. The s yste m a ided tracking accuracy,

leaving the pilor free to concenrrare on

r he gr ound ta r get w hile t h e S F C took c a r e

of r h e b a nk a n gl e and fuselage direcrion.

YA-9

YA-JO

Both aircraft came o u t o f t h e tests well and

were c onside re d to ha ve a dva nc e d CA S by

significant amounts. The d eci si o n w as hair

line. Th e overall evaluations wereas below.

Ami/nttes

Bombing and strafing accuracy; annament

control; visibility; pressurization; ground cock

pit cooling; maintainability

the t es t p il ot o pt ed for the YA-IO. This

w as a v i t al f act o r, because o f t h e similarity

of the de live r y a c cur a cy te st results. The

next stage of the trial was therefore vital to

the final outcome, both in the source selec

t i on p r oc e s and the follow-on develop

ment, and this was the assessment o f t h e

respective aircraft s survivability factors.

OM ING RESULTS

I. T here was no difference hetween the

YA-9 a nd t h e YA-IO, regardless o f t h e

hom bing profile selected.

2. T here were no differences between the

YA-9 and the Y A- lO i n the overall

BD -33 bom bing results; both were

e qually a f fe c te d by external factors.

3. T here was no s ignif ic ant dif f er e ncebetween the YA-9 a nd t he YA-lO in

the g r ad u al i m pr o ve d l e ar n in g t r en d .

4. T here were differences in individual

p i lo t p e rf o rm a n ce b e tw e en the YA-9

a nd t he Y A- 1O i n the B D U- 3 3 b o m b

i n g r esu l ts. As before, how eve r , the se

t e n de d t o c a nc e l e a c h other out.

4. On first-pas strafing the YA-9 per

f or me d s li gh tl y better than the

YA- l Oo n the 45-degree profile.

S. All four te s t pilots pe r for m ed s lightly

hetter with the Y A -lO in the 15-degree

profile.

6. T here w e re dif fe r enc e s he tw ee n the

YA-9 a n d t h e YA-lOin individua lpilot

performance in the 45-degree profile,

hut t h es e d i ff er e nc es t e nd e d t o c a nc e l

each other out.

One thing the trial could not evaluate by

,tatistics was the pilots gut feeling . When

asked which aircraft felt r ightto fly most of

A-10 on duskexercises swoops low over an air

liaison officerduring thecomparative trials with

the A-7A. The A-10wonthe trials. handsdown.

despitepolitical scepticism. USAF. The YA-IO performed better overall on

the I5 -degree profile.

2. The YA-9 pe r f or m e d s lightly hetter

overall o n t he 45-degree profile.

3. On first-pass strafing hoth aircraftwere

essentially the same o n t he IS-degree

profile.

STRAFI G RES LTS

Strangely e n ou g h t h e accuracy o f t he

competing systems was n ot t h e principal

factor in these trials. Instead, t h e i n te n

tion was to s t re t ch b o th designs as fa r a s

possible in o r d er t o identify and magnify

the differences between the two in a whole

raft of challenging fl ight profiles.

The S t ud y G r ou p , based a t K i rt l an d

FB, e w M ex ic o, but assigned to

DC /Dev Plans at C o m ma n d H Q , com

prised Captain Ronald L. K er ch n er , t u dy

Ma nage r , R ic ha r d H. Anderson, Captain

Robert F Couch, L i eu t en a n t C o lo n e l

William B. ewhart, Jr, a n d K e nn e t h W.

Smith, Office o f t he Assistant for tudy

Support. Their findingswere that there was

no significant d i f fer ence i n weapons deliv

ery accuracy between the two prototypes.i2

The final report on this s ta ge o f t h e pro

gramme made the following p o i n t :

Flght hours

146

1385

Fly·off comparisons

Type Sor1es

YA·9 123

YA·O 87

A s t h e GAU-8 wasstill underdevelopment,

t h e U SA F substituted the M61 cannon for

the tests a nd 20,000 rounds of ammunition

from this weapon were expended on strafing

r un s, w h il e 7 00 cOlwentional homhs were

dropped in the hombing t est s. A 1 0 includ

e d i n the c time t o t al s w er eai r cr af t p elf o r

m a nc e a nd ha ndling testing.

• SeeFrankN Lucero James Ford and Roy Bndges Jr.

AirForce F ghtEvauaton SystemsIofthe A·9APrototype

AC aft. TechnIca reporr No 73 2 AFFTC Edwards AFB CA,

March 1973 and Frank N Lucero Thomas R Yechout and

Roy Bndges AirForce F ghtEvauatonISystems)of the

A-0 PrototypeAwalt Techntca report No 73-3

March 1973 AFFTC Edwards AFB C p

w er e a ls o on hand to e xa mi ne b ot h

machines for their respective maintenance

and probable combat-ready-in-service sta

tus. The planned flight programme was

123 hours for each aircraft, but, in the

event,both m a c hines e xc e ede d this total.

The n um b er o f sortie conducted by

each o f t h e competitors prototypes during

the fly-off is s h ow n i n the lable below.

Joint Test Force J T F) c om pris e d te s t

ts dr a w n from the Systems Command

responsible for the engineering and

of all U AF aircraft, and

Tactical Air C o m m an d T A C) , who

to he the pri me users. Experts from

an d A ir Training Commands

e Fly-Off

YA-10 on18 December 1974. totingtwenty-eight Mk-82bombsover Edwards AFB. California.

angledlower tail fins. and the observationcameras- two forward.angled rearwards. one

angledforwards. one undereither wingtip angledinwards- to record tests. NatonalArchives.Washington, DC

forward operations. The main

ng ge a r itself partially retracted back

two-thirds) into streamlined pods.

course, duality in the form of inter

parts w as a s much a feature of

YA-1O as o n t he YA-9, and its landing

ailerons, rudders, elevators, control

and engines w er e al l construct

this pr inciple. The m a nua l ope r a

pr ovide d for in the e v e nt o f hydraulic

was s im ila r to t he o rt hr op design,

one s pe cia l pr ovis ion the YA-IO had

a n i n -b u i lt s el f -s t ar t in g a ux i li ar y

unit for the supply of compressedair

en g ine starts.

w as a ls o developing special

c on ce pt s a nd c on du ct in g

layouts on tooling at t h is s t ag e l

table, pages 32-3).



7

T cOMP TITJO YA 9 VERSUS YA JOTHE COMP TITIO YA 9 VERSUS YA IO

system evaluationreportsummary

no Date 1972 Safety code Correcton category Def ciency Sera no Date 1972 Safety code Correcton category Defciency WUC 11 0001 PROPULSION SYSTEM WUC 230001

2 Nov M Poor accesst o t opof f uselage 10-2-1 2 Nov III M Possible inadvertent doubleengine shutdown10 Nov D Unacceptablenylon straps retaininglower fuselage access 10-25-18 9 Nov I D Difficulty in interpreting fan tachometer readings

doors 10-62-54 6 Dec II M Restrctedaccess for fuel control removal/installation14 Nov M Lockin integral cockpit ingress/egress provisions 10-65-55 2 Dec I M Excessve carboning of engine carburetting scrol2 Dec D Large numberof fastenings required forengine nacele

AUXILIARYPOWER UNITiWUC 24 1accessdoors

Excessve gapat air inlet duct/engine inletinterface10-50-19 24 Nov M Poor locaton of APU inlet forunpreparedsurface operatons2 Dec II M

2 Dec I D Potental damage to coin-slotted screws durng removal ENVIRONMENTALSYSTEMS WUC 41001

4 Dec I D Difficulty in handlng RT unit for removal and replacement) 10-10-5 Nov D Lack of disconnect provisions on over-temperature sensor4 Dec II M Crack in structure at F 512 {aft fuel tankbulkhead stiffener}

wiringof refrigeration package10-47-36 27 Nov M Poor access to ventilation garment blower12000}

2 Nov II M Poor locaton toofar forward) of throttles LIGHTINGSYSTEM WUC 440001

10 Nov I D Poor location and actuation of throttle friction collar 10-27-23 13 Nov M Incompatibility of interior lighting with task requirements14 Nov I D Difficult ingress to cockpit with parachute on 10-21-62 14 Dec M Lack of formaton lights on forward fuselage13 Nov I M Lack of la be l n g of release mode control

HYDRAULIC SYSTEM WUC 45000}14 Nov II M Poor location of external lghts control pane

10-6-2 Nov III M Unacceptablerapid bleeding at hydraulc pressure after eng14 Nov I M Poory designed latching device o n r a m inlet doors

M Poor grouping of prm ary flight instruments shutdown15 Nov II10-17-12 14 Nov D Inadequate dumping provisions for hydraulc reservoirs14 Nov I D Poor grouping ofengine instruments10-23-22 14 Nov D Difficulty in reading hydraulc pressure gauges15 Nov I D Poor actuation of speed brakes

15 Nov I D Unsatisfactory grouping of light test buttons/switches FUEL SYSTEM WUC 46000)

16 Nov I D Uncomfortable parachute 10-4-13 14 Nov II D Inadequatefuel quantity indicating system18 Nov I M Unconventonal actuation direction of crossfeedand 10-3-35 18 Nov III M Inadequate fuel shut-off control for APU

tankgate valve controls 10-48-37 24 Nov II M Poor access to f uel cel problem s27 Nov D Poor forward visibility 10-57-40 24 Nov I M Inability tocorrect fuel imbalance27 Nov M Unacceptable locaton of anti-skid switch

OXYGEN SYSTEM WUC 47 14 Dec M Poor canopy operaton for emergencygroundegress

10-12-8 2 Nov III M Unacceptable location ofoxygen overflow vent5Dec M Engne over-temperature durng airstarts with throttles

forward of IDLE INSTRUMENTS WUC 51000)

14Dec M Poor access beyond reachl of forward cockpit control surface 10-14-10 6 Nov M Highly vulnerablelocation of pitot tubeto maintenance

activitiesGEAR SYSTEM WUC 13000110-5-19 10 Nov III M Functonalinadequacyof attitude indicatng system2 Nov III M Poor locaton of brake componentsfor forward airstrip10-46-41 30 Nov I D Lack of HARS gyro cut-off circuit durng maintenance activitieperatons

18 Nov III M Possblehardoverof nose-gear afterelectrical component INTERPHONE WUC 6400

malfunction 10-18-21 10 Nov M Poor access to intercom headset cordage4 Dec M Loss of normalbrakingsystem with both electrical systems

RADIONA VIGATION WUC 71001inoperative

10-54-48 4 Dec D Difficulty in reading TAC RT unit indicators12 Dec III M Loss of normal and emergency braking with anti-skid10-53-57 14 Decmalfunctions M Inadequatemarkingsof TAC suppresser cables on RT unit

WEAPONS OELIVERYWUC 75000}CONTROL SYSTEM WUC 14000)

10-67-5814 Dec M Inadequate access to electric connector in pylons, 3 4 8 and2 Nov I M Lack of access to speed brake actuator

10-68-59 5Dec M Lack ofaccesspanels on wing pylons and 1114 Nov II M Poor location and modeof fap control

10 Nov I D Poor material uti zed in flightcontrol surfaces ALL AVIONICS

14 Nov II M Undesired fap blowback 10-8-6 2 Nov D Poor type of electrical connectors solder-ani27 Nov II M Lack of flight controls ground lockin cockpit

2 Dec I D Poor access to aieron trimactuator

4 Dec III M Inadequate switchover t oandf rom m anua reversion



THE COM PETITIO 1 - YA 9 VERSUS YA IOTHE COMPETITION - YA 9 VE RS S YA IO

view of an A-10 during icing tests atalti tude overEdwards AFB

1975. Thisplane haddistinctivemarkings with port-onlyleading edgesof

undercarriage pod knee tail fin andengine nacellecoloured yellow.

Archives Washington

Report and the FY 74 Congressional

h ee t o n t he A-IO in the light of

D ARC review of [ 0 Mar ch [ 97 3.

Depu ty Secre ra ry dec lared the new

mate of ].7 01 i ion'wasfor reporting

poses', and that i t would not alterthe

scribed to ta l un it flyaway design-tn-

target of 1.5 million.

The A-IO DT E / IOT E Phas

fl ight-testing began on 10 March [

wi th the two YA-lOs at Edwards AFB

ontinued throughout 1973 and 1

when the first ofthe pre-production b

a ir cr af t t oo k o ve r. l os t of these tr

ate Company Pnce Quantty Target C e mg Quantty Contractor Governm

development estmate estmat

01/3/73 Fairchid-Republ c $1593 1 $1594 Ch 1 1 $1594 1870

01/3/73 Genera Eectrc. Lynn, MA. Ch 2) $277 32 $273 305 323 $273 30503/11/72 General Eec(nc. Lynn, MA Ch 2) $145 $149 $163 $149 $163

21/6/73 GeneralE ectnc. Burmgton, VT Ch3 $238 $131'

PROCUREMENT

Fairchid-Republc 110.3 48 110.3 $1253 48 1103 1103

General Eectnc, Lynn, MA $593 128 $593 $656 124 $593 $593

GeneralE ectnc, Burmgton, VT $132 48 $132 $143 48 $732 $137

aircraft. There was an option for initia lpro

duction of forty-eight aircraft, but this was

dependent upon results of the pre-produc

tion tests and rhe ou tcome of the GAU

Gatling gun trials. General Electric was to

develop and deliver thirty-twoTF engines.

The details of the conrracts are ontained

in the table below.

There was sti muchconcern over cost

ings and orne of those involved seemed to

be having second thoughts. The Deputy

ecretary for Defense asked the ecretary

of t h eA i r Force tn modify and re-submit

rhe 3 [ December 1972 elect Acquisirion

Excellentrear under-viewof an A-10 in a dive showingthe splitflaps inoperation.

It is carryinga mixedrangeof ordnance including asingle AGM65 under theport

wing. Natonal Archives Washington

Cost Pus Incentve Fee:

Defmmzed Development)

Fixed Pnce Incentve Frm.

Defmltzed (Procurement)

Fixed Prce IncentveF rm:(Defmltzed)

Fixed Prce Incentve Firm: Defmltzed)

Fixed Pnce IncentveFirm:

(Defmltzed) Development Procurement

F33657-73-C-0500

F33657-73-C-0222

F33657-73-0073

A 10 original contract details

Contract Type

that the design-to-contract hould a im at

the 1.5-million target and conta in con

tractual incentives aimed at keeping costs

wel l below thi s f igure, i f th i s were achiev

able. They sril lbasedrhe procurement pro

gr<lmme on t h e 1.7 million figure rhat was

CAIG's besr esrimare, however''''

Proceeding to

Full-Scale Development

• Targetpnce overal

• A-fO proporton of IOta Pnces are In m i o ns of do ars.

Having demonst rated and validated, as

hest they cou ld, the systems feasibility

under the Proto type Development Pro

gram, the next srep was full-scale develop

ment , and rhe design, fabrica tion, testing

and evaluation for the system. Approval

for this was given by the DeputySecretary

of tate for Defense, William P Clements,

Jr, after further review of the -X pro

g ramme and t he D ARC recommenda

tions. He pas sed hi f ind ings to the ecre

tary of Defense on 2 F eb ru ary 19 73,

telling his superior that he expected the

Air Forc e to make a thorough review of

rhe whole design, and t o k ee p it t igh t tn

prevenr unnecessary additions [ the bud

ger. Th e Air Forcewas expe ted, he wrote,

' to e l imina te any features whi ch a re n ot

absolutely necessary for accomplishment

ofthe closeair- upport mission .

Th e authorization to proceed with the

award of both airframe and engine con

trac tswasreceived byA ir Force Command

on I March 1973. Th e twocost-plus-incen

tive-fee contracts were duly i ssued that

same clay. Fairchild-Republic was to con

t inue with p roto type aircraft testing'and

[ develop and build ten pre-production

I. There must be successful accomplish

mentof thecompleteQualification Test

(QT) as a demon tration milestone.

2. The date of exerci ing Option Il, which

committed the first substantial amount

of production funding, was not ro pre

cede the completion ofrhe QT.3 . A d el ay option c laus ewa s ro be keyed

to Option II.

p r epared to make a has ty dec is ion . On 1

January 1973, the Deput y e cr et ar y of

Defense, Kenneth M. Rush , took the next

cautious step. He author i zed rhe U AF to

make asourceselecrion announc ment,and

also ro enrer intocontractual negotiations

with Fairchild, including the design-to-cost

objectives. Th force was not, however, per

mitted at thiss tage to proceed any further

and sign a full-scale development contract.

This was placed on hold while the whole

programme continued under review of the

Office ofthe ecretary of Defense D) by

way of t he C os t Analysis Improvement

Group (CA1G), whose brief was to obtain

costings appertaining to the entire pro

gramme. Not until the CAIG report was in

could thenex t stage be r e c h e d l ~The CA[G r ev iew was pas sed to rhe

DSARC on February 1973. Given a fif

teen-year expected I ife cycle for t he 6 00

a ir cr af t t he A i r Force proposed to purchase, the group estimated that a force of

A-lOs that size would, in Fiscal Year (FY)

1973 doll ar s, c ost 3.[5 billion rather

than the 3.134 bi ion the A iI Force had

estimared. Furthermore, while Fairchild

hadestimated the total unit flyawaycosr as

1.4 million, a nd t he A ir Forc e had e st i

mated it at 1.5 million, the CAIG wasfar

more pessimistic, puttingthe figure at any

thing up to 1.7million.lo

Despite this review, the DSARC went

ahead with the recommendation t h at th e

ecretary of Defense should duly authorize

theAir Force tn go aheadwith the award

ing of rhe definitive engineering contract

for rhe A-IO . Howeve r, t he D SARC

insisted that the contract wi th General

Electr ic for t h e e ng in e mus t c on ra in t he

following three provisions:

·Cost-orientation wasalso recommended for

both airframe and engine contracts, so that

special attenrion hadro begiven tos t a ying

within the design-to-cost guidelines. Fur

thermore, both contractsshould have pro

vision for extending long lead-time obliga

tions. Indeference to the fears expressed by

the CAIG review, they also recommended

The pi l o t ' op in ions on t h e YA-10 were

also given a hearing. The Direc to r o f

Defense Research and Engineering, Dr

John . Fo tel ', J r, - t at e d that those pilot

who had flown both types had expressed

preference for the YA-IO.

Other factors that may have swing the

decision Fairchild's way were the utiliza

tion of an existingpowerplant, the superi

or in-built redundancy features, and rhe

berrer maintenance/flight hours ratio of

the YA-IO.

One final influencing factor, unofficially,

was political. There was no doub t rhat the

aeronautical future of ew York tare re lied

very much on rhe securing ofthe A-X con

t r ac t for Long I sl and plan t s. Apart from

Grumman, Fairchikl-Republic was the only

other major p laye r and , by 1972, i t was in

trouble. The cancelling of the Boeing SSTprogramme in 1971 had been a heavy blow

to itsmain sub-contractorand rheF-14pro

ject, another prop, was not going well and

seemedlikelyto go the same way. orthrop,

based in buoyant California, was not suffer

ing in the same way. 0 doubt, Congre s

Olen from the north-east made theAir Force

well aware of the situation.

Th e D ARC recommendation was

passed on to the DoD f or i ts r ev iew. Fur

ther srudies were requiredand no one was

January 1973, the DSARC h el d a

to review the findings and make

l decision.

YA-9 was adjudged to have uperi

d l ing characte ris tic s, while the

had much greater roll inertia, but

r had the edge on toughness, load

e and ease of maintenance. Both

ines had exceeded the specification,

was highly commendable, but a

still h ad t o be made.

DSARCchoice was the YA-lO, for

s listed by ecre tary of theAir Force,

C. Seamans, J r The overall consen

thatthe YA-I0 had superiorground

capacity, as the underside o f t h e

gave ea y access and the larger size of

itselfgave greaterordnance-carry

Another influence on the deci

was the fact that the YA-I 0 was closerthan theYA-9, and itstransi

f rom tes t programme to product ion

be quicker, with only minor modifi

ns to the prototypes required. The

wasalso expressed a t the time that the

of the YA -I w ou ld en 'ure

its f lyaway costings mightbe heldclos

the required 1.4 millionper unit than

of itsrival. Seamansadmitted that this

not be guaranteed, and in the event

ed to be ill founded.

38 39



THE O ~ I P E T I T I O \ YA 9 VERSUS YA 1

Another Fly-Off?

Eastern-seaboard organization onlyad

to the partisan political ballyhoo ;

aturally, there was widespread opp

t io n t o a n y fly-off between the A-7D

the YA-tO , bo th in the Air Force a nd

Fairchild. ot be ause, a s s ome ena

would have it, t he y h ad any t hi ng t o

from such competi t ion , bu t because

two sys tems were so d is simi la r that

conclusions would be meaningless. T

would simply not be comparing l ike w

Iike. The Presidentand Ch iefExecutiv

Fairchild Industries a t t h e time, Edward

Uhl, spel t th is ou t in simple terms.' A

eva lu at io n, h e p oi nt ed o ut , h ad t o b

c ombina t io n o f flying chamcteris

basic design featur's and analysis '. A

off against an aircraft such as the A-

which was totallydifferent in concept

design, '[could] not be used to evaluat

the salient characteristics of the A-

Uhl doub ted whether any tests wo

change minds alreadymade up and did

feel the 'abilityof anyone toconvince

cial interest Congressmen of the need

specific flight-handling characteristics

performing close air-supportmissions,

vivability', or, indeed, any 'other close

support performance parameters, espec

ly when they are not directly evalua

through flying''' .

TheOSD was opposed to the fly-ofthe same reasons. Ellio tt L. Ri hards

Secretary of Defense a t t he time, h ad

appear before the Armed Services Co

mittee on 2 March 1973, and faced h

tile questioning about why the trials

not yet been c ar ri d o ut . He could o

reiterate t hat ' i t wa difficult to sec ho

f ly -o ff wou ld p rov ide mean ing fu l n

information'. Merely taking the two

craft in to the a ir wou ld leavea whole

of knowledge untapped and untested. T

The A Trials

(instantsupport in theevento f amphibious

landings to counter localized threats, as at

Inchon dur ing the Korean War, or during

interventions in Lebanon and the like) had

the heavy punch ofthe proposed A-X. This

new aircraft 's role was defined as 'concen

trating heavy firepower, matching selected

munitions to different targets, Itthreatened

sector from dispersed b<lses .

This a rgument did not completely

s i lence Congres s iona l c ri ti cs , many of

whom had their ownaxe to grind, but it suf

ficed to keep the programme al ive. By

December J972, however, the wolves were

o n t he prowl again and fresh demands for

comparative analysis of the Y -10, t he A

7D, and the AH-56 helicopter were being

voiced. The r ev is ed A-X Development

Concept Pap er was b ei ng p re pa re d for

December 1972 release, but, as early as July

1972, the Director of Defense Re-carchand

Engineering (DDR E), Dr John . Foster,

Jr was asking the ir Force to examine the

A-I0/A-7 comparison issue a nd t o provide

supporting analysis for such data to be

in orporated in those findings. 1

The RDT E Def en se Bud ge t w as

reviewed by Congress in September 1973,

and critics homed in on several aspects of

the A-LO programme, which led again to

c al ls f or a comparative t r ia l w i th t he A

7D. Citingthe high production co t of the

A-IO and its single-role capabilityagain t

the alleged vcr atility of the A-7D , they

also referred to uninformed c ri ti i sms i n

some in t he Wes te rn media, queryingwhether theA-I 0 could perform even that

single role . In particular, Democrat Sena

tor Howard W. Cannon from Nevada

made the is ue hiscrusade, using this as his

main argument. In a meeting with James

R. chlesinger, ecretary for Defense, he

'challenged the survivability of t he A -tO

in the European environment '. The fact

that the A-7D was being produced by the

LTV Corporation, based in Dallas, Texas,

while the Fairchild company was an

Politics Politics n Politics

Congressional Critics

CHAPTER FIVE

Early in I, the A-X programme came

under the balefulscrutiny of Congressmen,

who queried why three separate aviation

systems were being promoted t o d o what

seemed to them to be one job.Suspicion of

t he US Military buying anything foreign

led t o w ra th in some quarters when the

Marinesshowed In interest in the Hawker

iddeley Kestrel. Questionswere alsoasked

aboutthe suitability of the Army consider

ingsuch a -ophisticated attack helicopter

as the Cheyenne. aturally, the A-X d id

not escape condemnation, and the 000was a sked to explain why so many types

were required for the same task.

This coincided with the DOD's own fur

the r in -depth examinat ion of the role of

CAS, which began in February 1971. This

studied CA acro s the whole spectrum,

including doctr ine , tact ic and require

ments , moving away from the V ietnam

experiencesand looking more to ATO's

European defence needs. The Air Force

was undergoing a similarswitch, with the

South-East Asia scenario fading away, anda new emphasis on redressing the huge

imbalance of conventional ground forces

in Europe.

The 00 0 toldCongress thatthe increas

ingly important role o fCA in the new

'trip-wire' scenario , which tried to avoid

first use of tactical nuclearweapons, meant

that a ll typ e were requi red to mee t t he

varying th re at s posed by mass Soviet

armour. Neitherthe Cheyenne (with c1ose

in, immediate response) nor the Kestrel

The 'Warthog' was involved in many fights

and battles during the first twenty years of

i ts life , a ll of which were against political

enemies. Indeed, long before the first pro

to type took to the air, the aircraft had been

subjected to misinformed criticism that

a lmos t l ed t o i ts d em is e b ef or e i ts b ir th .

80

10

58

148

83

3

64

160

andorgani:ationalchanges in the office to

cope with theex tra workload. The setting

up of a management operations office was

IT4uested, along with the separating of

procurementand production intoseparate

directorates, pius the additionoffunction

a l d iv i sions within those directorates.'

The table belowshows how th is developed

over the course of the next year.

The euphoria ofthe supporters of theA

t O following the much-debated award of

the pre-production aircraft contract was

short-lived. Less than a month af te r the

developmentcontract for t heGA - had

been awarded, the SenateArmed Services

Committee put the whole programme

backfor many months by cuttingthe num

ber of pre-production A-I0s from t en t o

six ; More thelll that, thecommittee made

a recommendation for yet another fly-off,

th is t ime be tween the A-I0 in i ts incom

p letes ta te, and the A-7D , the Air Force 'version of the avy'- Corsair-II, which

h ad b ee n i nt ro du ce d i n to t h e U AF a

long ago a s 1969 ot for the firs t time,

and not by any means for the last, politi

cians were meddling withthe A-LO and it

was once morefighting for its life.

Dec 75

AuthOrsed ASSgned

65

6

54

125

72

5

56

133

30Jun 74

AuthOrsed ASSgned

98

54

7

37

92

48

6

38

Dec 73

Authorised ASSgned

Tota /Ight hours

590.9

548.5

On 18 April 1972, the A-XSystem Pro

gramOffice was redesignated theA-I 0 ys-

tem Program Office an d o n 2 \ June, the

Acting Secretary o f t h e A ir Force, John L

McLucas, announcedthe award to General

Electric ofthe developmentcon tractfor the

GA - gunsystem beingdeveloped for the

-10. The award consisted of a fixed-price

incentive-fee contrac t o f 23,754,567 for

three pre-production systems. This com

pleted the f in al l in k i n t he c ha in o f t h e

programme.

In keeping with the change of pace and

new status signified by the renaming of the

A-X programme, the A-LO PO became

'Deputy for t he A - I ' . Brigadier General

Thoma H. McMullen,who had been pro

moted on 19 July 1973, was appointed to

the j ob , a r ol e he relished. As full-scale

development was now under way,

M Mullen requested Command Head

quarters to authorize increased personnel

8 14 4 14 14 10 10

1 1

27 43 43 48 48 50 50 35 57 57 62 62 61 fJ 61 fJ

1 1 1 1 1 2 2

4 5 5 5 5 10 8

5 6 6 6 6 12 10

2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1

3 3 3 2 2 3 3

104 158 164 203 195 236 8 222 8

6

36

2

23

Tota sortes

467

354

63

34

2

27

aSSgned as needed on parr tme baSIS

LOGISTICSCOMMAND

Offcers 1

Airmen

Civi ans 4 _

TOTAL

AIR/AIR TRAINING COMMANDS

Offcers 2

Airmen 1

Civi ans _

TOTAL 3 _

GRAND TOTAL 107

ATEDPERSONNEL

Engineers

Offcers 8

Airmen

Civi ans 28

TOTAL 36

TOTAL

OFFICE

Offcers

Airmen

Civi ans

of A-10 Program Officemanning 1973-74

30Jun 73

AuthOrsed ASSgned

flight details _

ype Retrementdate

15April1975

13June 1975

were conducted at a lower intensity

before, were designed to test out

and additions that were to be

in th ese ten machines. The

of changes were introduced on

nd prototype (7L-L370), leaving

(71-1369) for comparison. The

an was increased by 30 in (75cm)to

induced drag and, as further aids in

r ec ti on , t he c oc kp it a nd c an opy

redesigned, the engine pylons made

to reduce the profile and the land

r fairing and kneecap were made

in profile . The fixed slats intro

d ur in g t he e ar li er t ri al s w er e

d with fully automatic retractable

With these improvements, p inand

ry testing took place during 1974.

machines were not finally pen

offuntil 1975, by which t ime they

ach ieved a considerable total of

hours, as shown in the table above.

40 41



POLITICS. POLITICS AND POLITICS - THEA-7ATRIALSPOLITICS. POLITICS AND POLITICS - THEA-7ATRIALS

The Fort Riley CAS Tests

Dates 1974

7 23 Jan

3Jan 5 Mar

20 Feb 1 0A

8Apr1974

8 11 Apr

10 13 Apr

12 13 Apr

15 Apr 15 M

15 19 May

15 Jun

Mid to late J

LateJun

A·10/A·7Dfly off schedulemilestone

Schedule miestones

Air Staffand GSO review of plan

A 70 training

YA·l0 training

Testforce in place

Aircraft deployment

Coordinaton meetings/briefings

Loca area flights

Actvetestng

Redeployment

Reports 3 provided to DOT E

OSARC III meetng

Report to Congress

Four fighter pilots who had wide C

combat experience flying such aircraf

the FA or F-IOO, but who had flown neit

The test was scheduled to take p la ce f r

McConnellAFB, Kansas, between IS Ap

and9 May 1974. The aircraft would fly s

ulated combat missions against ground t

gets and defences a t t he Army's Fort Ri

Kansas,test area. The venuehad beench

sen because its size gave enough scope

realistic operations and itsterrain wassi

lar, if not exactly identical to the expec

northern European battle area. The Ar

had adequate data-collection instrumention already in place, with Range Meas

ing System II (RMS-II), which provi

the players'positions, andthe telemetry

n al s f or important ground and airc

events, and the Cooper Harper rating

tem, plus the test pilot summaries, used

evaluate pre-flight and taxi, take-off, atta

features and landing.) The weather

recorded as'favourable' (whether 'good'

the normalsense of the word, or favoura

in that i t was bad enough to simulate

miserable European climate, was not sp

out ). A timetable for the tr ia ls was p

pared)) see below).

4. Cockpit visibility analysis.

5. F ligh t and handl ing qualities of t he

craft h roughout t he en ti re miss

envelope'. Qualitative data was t o

assembled on taxiing to take-off, he

gross weight on take-off, loitertime o

target, manoeuvring, both priorto atta

and thereafter, according to type of o

nance being delivered, evading SA

and AAA defences andlandings. 7\

I . P ilot 's target location and subsequent

attack and fur th er a tt ac ks on same

through different weather, heigh t and

visibility windows.

2 Respective aircrafts' evasion response

while conducting such attacksand how

low-level manoeuvring affected the

defensive unit.

3. How t he aircraft could be tracked by

the defensive unit while conducting its

attacks.

43

prepare an analysis of resulting data to sub

mit to the DDT E.71 The Currie scheme

was further refined on 10 December, with

Tactical Air Command (TAC) given the

lead Air Force role in overall charge, the

additional i np ut o f t h eAFSCand t he A ir

Force LogisticsCommand (AFLC) in every

phase, and the provision of additional sup

port for the Army, as necessary.

The dateofthe fly-offwas fixedfor spring

1974. The expectation was t hat t he A-1O

would be far enough along the line to have

qualified for a maximum l oa d f ac to r in a

representative configuration gross weight,

so that some of the ordnance qualification

tests would have been completed, and some

communicat ions equipment and the vital

depressed reticule sight would have been

installed and tested. Itwas inevitable, how

ever, due to the time-scale, t hat t heYA-1O

would not be fully equipped (making the

test even more farcical). The GAU-8 gun,t he HUD , t he Maverick missile system,

flare dispenser system, IR jammer equip

ment and ECM equipment wou ld al l b e

missing from the test machine. The aircraft

itself would not be qualified for maximum

load factor at all gross weights, and nei ther

wou ld i ts external fuel tanks.7 As Dr

George M. Watson, Jr, concisely summed

up, withall th ishighly relevant equipment

missingfrom the YA-l0, one might wonder

why the fly-offwas ever undertaken'74.

Why indeed) Perhapseveryone,from the

DoD and A ir Force downwards, thought

that thi s was the only way t o halt ill

informed political criticism in an open and

final manner. Ifth is is the case, the wasted

time and effort would be fully justified.

The Program Management Directive

spelt o ut t he aims o f t he fly-off as the

acquisition of evaluations by combat

experienced pilots, and assistance in the

determination of the relative capabilities

of t he A-IO /A-7 aircraft in the CAS mis

sion. They presented a Ii st of perti nen t

points on which evaluat ion data was to be

assembled and examined:

survivability in the face of hostile force, for

example, wa s a v it al f ac to r i n CAS, but

would not be part of any fly-off equation,

hereas actual test firings against A-X

wing specimens have provided real data to

use in vulnerability assessment'. How

woulda fly-offdetail the ability to operate

from badly damaged fields'? Nor was a fly

off considered cost-effective for the infor

mation it would yield'70

A similarview was expressed before the

House Subcommi tt ee of t he Commi tt ee

on Appropriations, by the Deputy Chiefof

Staff, Research and Development , Lieu

tenant General William J. Eva ns . He

stoutly maintained that extensive studies'

had shown that the A-IO was f ar mor e

l ik el y t o s ur vi ve enemy fire t ha n t he

A-7D, or, indeed, any other aircraft that

we could apply t o t he close support role'.

He added t hat t heA-7D, FAand F-IOO all

lacked what was sought for the correctconductof the CAS mission.

A l l thi s reasoning was t o n o avail, and

the politicians were dete rmined to have

their say show who was i n c ha rg e.

Accordingly, on 9 September 1973, the

Air Force Chief of Staff, General George

S. Brown, told Senator Cannon that the

fly-off would take place. The actual com

petition would involve assembling a team

of highly experienced combat pilots,

allowing them to fly both t he A -7D and

the YA-IO, and let tingthem state in detail

which aircraft they would prefer to fly in

combat in the CAS role. The Senatorhad

to b e sat is fi ed with that; meanwhile, a

concept and guidelines for a fly-offto sat

isfy Congress h ad t o be drawn up.

On 2 Octobe r , Ma lcolm R Currie,

Director of Defense Research and Engi

n ee ring, p ropo sed a p lan to complete the

fly-off. Under this scheme, the Deputy

Director of Defense Research and Engi

neering (DDT E) and the Weapons Sys

tem Eva lu at ion Group (WSEG) would

develop joint test programme parameters.

The USAF would come upwith a detailed

plan forthe

flight schedules,forapproval bythe OSD. The deadline for thi swas I Janu

ary 1974.TheAi r Force would carry out the

tests ina realisticcombatenvironment that

included a varie ty of tactical scenarios in

suitable terrain and weather conditions

matching the central European battlefield.

The US Army would help bysupplying the

'targets' o n t he ground, and having them

simulate known Soviet defences and tac

tics. The WSEG would monitor the tests

and then the Ai r Force and WSEG would

Below Included inthe tri ls conducted by the

VA lOs at Edwards AFB w r testsof thefuelling

system. Here a ground fuelling testis underway.

with theVA lO beingfed by a KC 135 Stratotanker.

USAF

Close up vi w ofthe spinchute compartment

duringtests with the A 10 at Edwards AFB.

California. USAF

42



POLITICS. POLITICS AND POLITICS - THEA-7ATRIALS POLITICS. POLITICS AND POLITICS - TilE A-7A TRIALS

t A-7CorsairII another military aircraft saddled with t h e n a me o f an illustrious forebear.

of theirown suitable aircraft forground-attack missions the Army adapted the CorsairII for

theA-7Dpurely as astop-gap. Whenthe A-10 was developedto dothe jobproperly an

A 7D lobby influenced Congressto haltfunding unti la trial fly-off was heldbetween the two

on everycount. Natonal Archives. Washington

Vulcan de-brief: ajorClyde A. Hayman USAF talking with Army

Sergeant Ronald C Weems Vulcan squadron leader about the A-10/A-7D

evasive-action performance during thefly-off. ajorHayman was responsible

forvoice-recording systems andground-data collection at FortRiley Kansas

during thef1y-offsin Apri l 1974. Natonal Archives Washington

figure of 1.5 million for 6

aircraft (1970 rates), which w

the PO estimate, but M

Mullen recommended that th

should budget for 1.7 millio

whichhad been theCAIG e

mate. Using t h e same gui

lines, the PO estimate w

1.6 million a nd t h e indep

dent Air Force estimate,

million, right on target.':

The C ha irm an o f

D RC review, Arthur

Mendol ia, Assistant Secret

of Defense ( Ins tal lat ion a

Logistics), then questioned

Deputy Dir ec to r o f Defe

Research and Engineering

Test and Evaluation, Gene

Alfred D. Starbird, on the p

gramme from hisangle. Gen

al tarbird counselled cautirecommending a minim

commitment until further te

ing h ad b een f in al iz ed .

a sk ed for 39mi ll ion long -le

funding , whi le k ee pi ng

option for a minimum quan

of twenty-eight aircraft, unti

l ea st O \ 'ember 1974, thed

of the next test review.

The Chai rman o f the C

AnalYSis Improvement Gro

(CAIG), Milton A. Margo

p oi nt ed o ut t ha t t he over

weight of the A-IO h

increased by 1,0001b (454k

sin e the last DSARC h

pushed t h eAi r Force estim

up to 1 .7 million. This caused him gr

concern asdid the SPO s 15 per cent e

mated i n r ea se i n the cost ofthe firstfo

dozen aircraft, a nd t hi s was without

increased inflation costs. He thought

Air Force 's 6 . per cent escalation r

was a more re liable estimate than

ystem Acquisition Review's 4 .9

cent, and he congratulated the Air Fo

for i t analy is. 4

Mr Mendoliawasequallycomplimenta

telling the Deputy ecretary of Defense

26July 1974 that theAir Force had mett

critical te t mile tone ofdemonstrating

compatibility of the prototype GA - g

a nd t he A-I . He noted that by th is d

ove r40 hou rs of flight-testing of the pro

type aircraft had been carried out and t

Fairchild had put right all the deficienc

noted o n t he early Air Force evaluati

The DSARC was therefore recommend

T alk and Yet oreTalk

butawait more meaningful 'overall testing

results ' before mak in g a ny p ro du ct io n

commitment. CI ments asked t h at Con

gress allow such flexibility, and reque ted

192.7 million for FY 75 and 1.4million

for RDT&E.'1 However, the fight was not

y et won - not by any means_

On 9 July 1974, the D ARC lilA con

vened to assess theAir Force's plan to ini

t iate the package - the A-I 0 aircraft, the

GA - Gatling and its associated 30mm

ammunition. s <1lways hudget<1ry consid

erations were at the top of the agenda, and

the A-1 P ro gr am Man ag er , B ri ga di er

General Thomas H. McMullen, reiterated

the January 1973figur s that had been set.

The Air F or ce ha d g iv en a n a im ed for

The Texas lobbyists' biggest

'selling point , the fact that the

Corsair-II was proven and in

production, and would there

fore he cheaper, was dismissed

asmyth. Infact, the conclusion

was that the A - 10 w ou ld be

cheaper, in term-of hoth acqui

si tion cost and Iife-cyclecosts. ;

When it came to the te timo

ny of the four pilots, the conclu

sions of the instruments and ref

erees were more than backed up.

A ll p lump ed f or the YA-IO,

especially when flying CAS in

poor weather. One pilot, Cap

t ain Mike Sexton, flatly stated

thatthe YA-I0 was the onlyair

craft that can hand le the close

air-support type of mission in a

full spectrum of weather opera

tion encountered in the European scenario'. Another, M<1jor

Williard K. Mincey, confirmed

this, stating that under a visihil

ityrange of two-and-a-half miles

and with a low c loud base, the

turn rate o f t he A-1 0 provide

the only airplane that will allo\\'

you to operate and main tain

visual contact with the target

and stay in close proximity '' '' ' .

Perhaps the decidingfactor in

this one-sided contest was the

comparison ofthe loitertimes of

the two aircraft. On one mis

s ion, w ith both aircraft flying

their sorties with an ordnance

loading o f e ig ht ee n 500lb

(227kg) hombsagainst the FortRiley target

a re a 299 miles (480km) away, the YA-IO

was able to remain over the target for two

hours. nd er the same conditions, the

-7 0 could only manage eleven minute I

The 'Dough-Boys' on the g round in a Hot

War condition, with hordes of Soviet T-55

battle ranks stomping all over them, need

edmore than eleven minutesofm aningful

air support, whatever enators 6,000 cosy

miles awayin Kansas might think

The t e st f ind ings weredu l r eviewed by

the hierarchy and, in June, as sched

uled, Secretaryof State Clement recom

mended to enator John L. McClellan,

Chairmanof the Committeeon Appropri

ations, that the FY75 A-I programme

should be approved. Th is endorsement

was still l imited, however, with the rider

that t h e DoD shoul d n ot proceed o n t he

results of this rather inadequate test alone,

Gatling, and a new powerplant to ge t off

the deck w it h i t. I n the light of this, the

Texas delegation s Congressional tactics

are easily understood.

In fac t, the Cor air-II was ye-terday 's

aeroplane and there was really no conte·t.

There was almostcomplete unanimity from

both as essors and pilot alike that the Y

10 was b y f ar the bes t y stem for the job.

Under ir Force analy is the YA-IO, with

its far heavier payload, the projected anti

tank lethality of the GAU- gun, and its

better vision in murkyair conditions, such

as those that prevailed in northern Europe,

was more suitable t ha n t he A-7D. More

over, the survival rate of the Y -10 , s o d is

paraged by Senator Cannon and the media,

was projected to be far higher t ha n t ha t o f

the Corsair-II. Losses would be far fewerdue

to the YA-lO's inherent strength, toughness

and resistance toground fire, whileits sortie

and maintenance ra tio would bewayabovethat of the A-7D.

simulated: unlimited,S, 0 ft (1,5 Om),

3, OOft (900m) and 1,000ft DOOm). Two

situation responses were assessed: (a) Red

attack on friendly forces executing delay

ing tactic; and (b )Red breakthrough dis

organi:ed friendly force. No actual bombs

were dropped during the flight tests.

Th e second prototype YA-lO aircraft

(71-1370) was utilized in these tests.

The YA-IO s competitor, the A-7D, wa

a former Navy aircraft, the Corsair-II, or

, LUF' (' hort Little gly F***er ).;

Introducedinto theAir Force as a stop-gap

mea su re , i t was f ir st evaluated by the

USAF at Luke FB A ri zo na , in u gus t

1969, by t h e 4 52 4t h Fighter Weapons

Wing. Had the tests gone the way the

Texas lobby had hoped, a new variant, the

F-7DER, wou ld have kept t he Ling

Temco-Vought (LTV) production lines at

Dallas/Forth Worth going for several more

years. It would have had a stretched airframe t o a cc ommo da te t he GAU-

s i m ~ u l ~ a t : : : i o = = n ~ _ =sy ste ms q ua tn g So vi et e qu ip me nt

gun Quad 23mm AAA

tramer SA 7 IR SAM

SA 6 radar guided SAM

luation had sixteen missions, each

consisted ofone YA-IOsortie and

D sortie. The ordnance configura

MD 2bombs (heavy), six

b omb- (me di um ), and gun strafing

with simulated Maverick, Rockeyepalm a ttacks . Fou r c ei ling s were

n or t he -10, were selected.

were split into two phas

a limited, qualitative evaluation,

the respective test sites; and

a qual i tat ive and quan t ita t ive

Fort Riley. Here, t h e Army pro

following equipment to simulate

(wietequipment.

44 45



POLITICS. POLITICS A 0 POLITICS - THEA-7ATRIALS

Pre-briefing session: Captain Mike Sexton, USAF receivinghis target

recognition briefing priorto hissimulated CAS mission overFort Riley, Kansas,

duringthe A-7D/A-10fly-oils inApri l 1974. Natonal Archives Washington

CHAPTERSIX

IBM, Fai,child continued to expand h

various companies.

When he witnessed the t r o i o u ~ con

ditions f aced by a er ial photographe

irchild

Underside view ofthe A-10 with bottom access doors down,showing how thehuge

bulkof theAvengerguns systemis accommodated inside thefront ofthe aircraft,

and how thisnecessitatesthe shifting oil-centre ofthe nosewheel andassociated

gear. Fairchid Republc

York and other eastern-seaboard cities

and then expanded to Canada. Bu iness

b oo me d a nd , e ve n a ft er inheriting a 2

mill ion fortune and a seat o n t h e board of

At this stage of proceedings, with t h e G o

button finally pressed afteryears of agoniz

ing and G overnment toing and froing on

the CA issue, doubts began to creep in

about thecompany that was torroduce the

A-IO. omewhat belatedly, the ability of

Fairchild to cope witha programme ofthis

importance and magnitude began to cause

increasing concern in Air Force circles.

The Background

The Fairchild Airplane Manufacturing Cor

poration was founded in 1926. Thegenius

b e hi n d t h e c o mp an y was herman Mills

Fairchild,born on 7Ap ri l 1 96, to awea lthy

family from O neonta, N ew York State . His

fathe r was a Repub lican ong re ssman as

well a a successful businessman and o n e o f

the f o u n d e r ~ of a small tabulating company

that was later to become IBM. A n aptitude

for all th ings mechanical was inherited by

h is son , who , in h is you th , h ad f re e run of

the factory in Endicott, New York, and

became fascinated with adding m h i n e ~and photography. III health dogged the

young man s youth and he was forced to

leave Harvard, which he had entered in

1915, inorder tospend time in the healing

climate of Arizona. An early achievement

the world s first night-timerhotograph,

taken using a ~ y n h r o n i z e d flashsystem and

timer that he hadinvented.

Health problems frustrated Fairchild s

efforts t o j o in up w he n t he U SA e nt er ed

the First World War , in 1917. Turning his

brain to t h e w ar effort, h e c am e up with

an advanced aerial camera system for the

Army, but, by t he t i me h e h ad p er fe ct ed

this in 1919, military interest had w aned.

The following year, w ith money from his

father, Fairchild established his n com

pany, the Fairchild A erial C amera Com

pany, and succeeded in persuading the

A rm y t o t ak e his product after all. ext,

h e h ir ed a n a ir cr af t to demonstrate his

cameras, t h e n p u r c h , r ed his own aircraft,

a Fokker D.VII. H e o b t ai n e d l u cr a ti v e

contracts to make aerial urveys of ew

o f t he A- IO programme. The

review, w hi c h t o ok place from

4-22 eptember 1 97 4, was

headed by L ieutenant G eneral

Robert E Hails, ViceComman

der, Tactical A ir C om m an d.

Colonel Samuel J Kishline,

Deputy Director A-I Program,

i nf orme d D RC that the

GA - g un a l ig n me n t had

been corrected by mak in g a

modification to the aircraft that

depre sed the gun by 2 deg re e .

The use of automatic elevator

pitch-down was con side red

redundant, and was abandoned.

The secondary gun gas problem

hadalso beensolved by addinga

double-baffled deflector to the

barrels and a potassium-nitrate

flame- uppre sant additive to

the propellant. This worked,and increased the projectile

v eloc ity a l it tl e. Thus, by 18

eptember, the C ritical Design

Review C DR ) o f GA - /

30mm gun was completed.

The engine qualification

tests on the TF34-G E-I 00

tot all ed 2, I I hours. They

included high-altitude trials

wi th a B-47 te t ai r craf t; an

environmental series that

included inlet distortion, cli

mat ic, water , s t eam , sand and

rocke t g as inges to r tes ts ; and

o ve r -t e mp e ra t ur e a n d over

speed demonstrations. T hey had all been

completed by 31 October 1974. Tests on

s ta ll , p os t- t al l and spin characteristics

tests had also been brought to a successful

conclusion. By II eptember, compatibili

ty l a un c he o f A G M - 65 A Maverickair-to

g ro un d t ac ti ca l m is si l w it h - 10 a ir cr af t

at Edwards AFB had also b ee n o m pl e te d.

All that remained outstanding was the

critical de i gn r ev iew CDR) of the

armour-piercing incendiary A P I) round

for t h e 3 0 mm c a n no n . On 6 ovem ber,

Colonel Jay R Brill was appointed A -IO

Sys tems P ro gr am D ir ec to r, r ep la ci ng

Brigadier G eneral T homas H. McMullen,

whose succe sfuJ tenure of office had last

ed from June 1973 t o o ve mb er 1974, and

h ad s ee n t he A -l O c om e t ri um ph an tl y

through a critical period.

The yearwas crownedon 22 November,

w he n De pu ty ecretary of Defense

Clements authorized procurementof fifty

two A- I 0 aircraft.

the firing pass was can idered the answer

to that difficulty. More serious and more

visually spectacular) was the appearance

o f t h e e c on d ar y g u n ga ignitionphenom

enon. The gases generated by the propel

lant were not being tota lly consumed

inside the gun barrel; some gaswas surviv

i ng t o be e xp el le d i nt o t he a ir , where i t

fla h-ignited. This r esul ted in a larg f ir e

b al l i n front of the aircraft, temporarily

blindingthe pilot at a critical momentand

causing enginedisturbance as the gasball

was ingested i n to t h e turbines. T here were

also hold-ups concerning the ammunition

for the gun. The ecretary of Defense had

authorized c on t in ue d d ev el op m en t o f

heavy metal munitions depleted urani

um), buthad w ithheld approval to procure

such munitions for inventory until the

developments were completed.H

Thes problems caused concern and,on

4 eptember,Air Force Vice hiefof taff,

General Richard H. Ellis , ordereda v w

Tests

- gun and armour

ammunition critical

review.

gun testing at

ssed angle.

firings, including

for gun ga concentra

with inc re ased la r r el

a n d Phase II (pro

on) ammunition with

rotating band.

o ad s a n d p er f or m an ce

s wi th ai rcr aft wing

ions.

ach to stall,stall and spin avoid-

tests.

engine qualification tests.

ss ystem sled tests .

in-flight refuelling.

stores ertification.

of 39 mil lion for

funding, as requested,

e approval of fifty-two

, but with t he o pt io n

e nt y- ei gh t o nl y b ei ng

The DSARC further

p rova l for u sing heavy

production ammunition

etary of Defense

g v the go-ahead to

I Force to proceed wi th

t ial production o f t he

g the long-lead fund

1 July 1974. Atthe same

approved procurement

-two aircraft, subject to

to twenty-eight, until

1974, when a whole

important testswere due

factorily concluded.

tests were the following:

wasgiving unexpected prob

General Electric. On 26 February,

t in-flight tests o f t he A -I O 1

pe wi th t he GA -8/A gun

been conducted. On 19 June,

/ A 3 0 mm g un wa f ir ed for the

with combat ammunition. II

good. But, during the A -10/A -7

pilots had encountered problems

by t h e g un a l ig n me n t angle. This

ina tendency to fly a dangerously

nana patternduring the low-angle

runs. Realignment to flatten out

46 47



The pilot s titanium-assembled bathtub citadel designed to protecthim and his instruments from

groundfire. Note thatit is assembledfrom individualplatesof varyingthickness and nota single

forging. airchid· epubl c

from open-cockpit aircraft, and

o ut th at no enc losed cockp i t

existed, Fair hilddeterminedon

hi: own. I li ri ng o rm an Mac

as his chief engineer, and with the

Professor Alexander Klemin of the

m School of Aeronautics (he

a er on au ti ca l ski ll s h imse lf ) ,

soon produced the first aircraft to

name, the Fairchild CahinModel

or FC-1. In an era of biplanes, this

g monoplane, as this aided

photography, and had other r vo-

features, such as an enclosed,

h ea te d c ab in and full

ns.

FC-I went through a host of vari

modifications, firmly establishing

ng company, which went from

t o s t rength. As the aviation

mushroomed across the U A in

1920s and throughout the 1930s,Airplane Manufacturing Corpo

g rew wi th i t. Starting with shared

facilities at Farmingdale , Long

in 1925, t he company expanded

series of transport,survey, sea

and light aircraftdesigns, including

-2W2 u se d by Admiral Richard

Antarctic exploration. Eventual

c ompany s et up another factory

real in Canada in 1929, and in

r began construction work on

larger plantat Hagerstown, Mary

Fairchild Caminez Engine Cor

wasalso set up a t t he sametime.

9 , Fairchild viation Corporation,

company for the Fairchild

acquired Kreider-Reisner Air

ny and became a suhsidiaryof

i at ion Corpora t ion (Avco) . In

Kreider-Reisner became Fairchild

C or po ra ti on ( FA C) , and

created RangerEngineeringCor

to manufacture aircraft engines.

t heone original holdingcom

two when Fairchild Avi

split , with the creation

ild Engine and AirplaneCor

(FEAC) at Hagerstown with the

EngineeringCorporation at Farm

The aerial photography and sur

remained in the F C. FE C

two materials-processing compa

mold Aircraft Corporat ion in

AI-Fin Corporation in 1941, to

forming and bombing processes in

manufacture. Alsoin 1941, FEAC

the tratos Corporation to

high-altitude superchargers. The

F IR HILD

coming ofanother world warsawFair hild

a i rc raf t r iding h igh , and the building

around the same time of all-metal aircraft.

Perhaps t he most successful of t he many

design coming out o f those plants in the

econd World War was the M-62 initia l

flight tra iner, which spawned a hos t o f

variants. These were soon sub-contracted

out, so g re at b ec ame t he d emand, a nd

more thaneight thousand were eventually

produced.

After t he war a ser ie of large-capacity

troop carriers, such as t he C - 2 A P ac ke t

a nd t he C -119A Flying Box Car, carried

Fairchild on for some yea rs in so l id p ro fi t

while other companiesexperienced leaner

pickings. However, with the relative fail

ure o f t h e C-I23B Provider to gain large

orders, Farmingdale began to need sub

contract work to stayafloat. Fortune were

revived with the collaboration with the

Dutch Fokker company, which producedthe Fairchild-Hiller FH-237 from the F-27

Friendship.

In 1961, FEACbecame Fairchild Stratos

Corpora t ion (FSC), and expanded in to

space applications. In 1964, FSC acquired

Hiller Aircraft Corporation, a helicopter

builder, and b ec ame t he Fairchild-Hiller

Corporation(FHC). Other famous compa

nies were not faring so well. By mid-1964,

the Republic Aviation Company, a neigh

bouring Long Island outfit famed for pro

ducing many front-line fighter-bombers,

from the original econd World WarPA7

Thunderbol t to the Vietnam veteran F I05

Thunderchief, or Thud , had I een reduced

to sub-contractwork on the McDonnell F-

4 Phantom-I tail sections. Fairchild him

s el f wa s n ow a n o ld man , b ut h e was as

shrewdas ever, and beganpurchasing large

chunk of Republicstock. This ca h injec

t ion kept the company afloat until the

inevitable takeover finally took place on

29 eptember 1965. Wit h t he establish

ment of the Republic Aviation Division of

the Fairchild-Hiller Corporation, the A-X

first came int o t he picture . In 197J, FHC

became Fairchild Industries Incorporated

(FI), and acquired aircraft manufacturer

wearingen Aviation Corporation.

The longdelay from the fir t scoutingof

t he conc ep t t o t he actual placing of firm

orders was not to Fairchild's advantage

apart from the fact that other, less patient

companies fell ou t o f t he c ompe ti ti on

while t heGovernment and the Air Force

deliberated f or ye ar s, w it h maddening

slowne s. While they waited, their current

wor k wa s d ry in g up. By 22 ovember

1974, when the decision was finally made,

Fairchild-Republic Company was a ivi-

sion of Fairchild Industries, and i t was the

Fairchild-Republic Company that actually

hand led the A-10 project.The YA-10was

the very la t a i rc ra f t project to be under

taken by hi company prior to he rma n

Fairchild's deat h , on 2 March 1971, a

month shor t o f his seventy-fifth birthday.

ssessment and

Misplaced Optimism

Business was badfor the Fairchild-Repub

lic Company (FRC) around t hi s t im e. It

had not been running a full-time aircraft

assembly line since November 1964, nine

years before, when the F-I05 had reached

t ermina ti on. i nce that date , on ly sub

contract work h ad b een und er ta ken,

including the product ion of wing controlsurfaces for the Boeing747 Jumbo airliner,

and t ai l a ss embl ie s for t he McDonnel l

Douglas F-4 Phantom. At first, this did not

seem to be problemat ic, ei ther to the Air

Force or t o t he company itself.

Itwas standardpractice for th e SAF to

conduct pre-award surveys ofany compa

ny to whom a largeconn-act was due to be

placed to satisfy themselves of itscapabili

ties to deli ver and high li ght any faults.

Teams would go into a companyand assess

its capacity, capability and financial foot

ing. Thi practice wa app l ied t o FRC as

normal ami thecompanygot a clean bill of

health, being rated assati factory. (Even if

it h ad not passed this in itia l inspection,

FRC would not necessarily have been de

barredfrom obtaining the contract.) How

ever, the company subsequently proved

itself deficient in many areas, and this 'ini

tial erroneous assessment''''-' was t o h av e

far-reaching repercussions.

In mid-1972, Fai r ch ild Indus t ri e s at

Farmingdale had been very upbeat about

the project. At this stage, both prototypes

hadbeen completed and, after completion

and roll-out, had been disas embled (the

fuselage had engines, wings and empen

nage removed for a separate load), and

loaded aboard two McDonnell Douglas C

124 s for shi pment t o Edward' FB. the

firs t was flight-testing at Edwards AFB,

while the se ond,completedat the Repub

l ic Div i sion , was a lso at Edwards being

readied for herdebut ight.Vincent Tizio, the programme manager

a t t he time,proclaimedin an interview that

Fairchild's approach was related directly to

the goals of t he programme under t he Air

Force 's n ew pol i y of prototype fly-offs for

aircraft. He explained the difference. He

claimed that most militaryaircraftdevelop

ment had been gea red towards advanced

pelformance parameter, frequently with

a weight constraint that migh t b ea fac to r

in this . Cost became a function of what it

took to achieve these specifications. With

the A-X, Tizio saw the design goal as the

incorporating of pelformance capabilities

already achieved intoan opt imum aircraft

for the CA role and environment,with an

ease of maintenance:

Tizio admi tt ed t hat t he cost factor dic

tated much o f wha t Fairchild was doing:

We made many, many trade-off studies on

cost, maintainability and performance.' He

cited the examples of t he GEC TF34: We

worked hard with GE t o come u p w i th a

less expensive engine. And we had to take

some performance and weight penalties,

F IR HILD

but we gotit . 'Other examples he gavewere

the state-of-the-artand minimum-cost ori

entation leadingto the usc of brazed rivets,

a minimum ofhoneycomband no compo

i te , which re ulted in 'basically a state-of

the-art aluminium airplane'.

The company carried out its own com

ponent- t es t ing under t he 41.2 mi ll ion

fixed-price contract for the two YA-IOs.

Several hundred hours of wind-tunnel

work were involved, in both Government

and private facilitie , including tests that

simulated power -on cond itions. Th is

investment eliminated the possibility of

toomany problems appearing on t h e flight

tests. Nor d id i t c ause undue delays in the

p rog ramme , wh ich was , at that stage,

seven weeks ahead of schedule. The deci

sion to test-fly from Edwards rather than at

Farmingdale, taken for s afety rea sons ,

among others, cost twoweeks of that time,

accordingto Tizio.

Republ ic took the whole programme

seriously that Vice-President Donald Str

(a former P-47, F 4 and F-J05jockey hi

self) haddeliberately set out to create a f

-imile o f th e f amou s Loc kh ee d ' k u

Works' at Farmingdale. This a re a w

screened hehind high wooden fence a

labelled the 'Tiger Works '. What Ti

termed 'semi-hard ' tooling, suffic ient

the two prototypes and no more, was us

Sub-contracting was kept to a minimu

Revealingly, hes t a ted t ha t , We re prep

ing r igh t now for production, organi:

our people and deve loping product

concepts as well as doing design layout

tooling.' However, he h ad t o admi t t

th is design-oriented programme had n

included any capital investment in plan

This was t heorgani : at i on a t whi ch t

Air Force now to ok a longha rd look, a

th ey were far f rom imp re ssed with w

they saw

48 49



F IR HILD F IR HILD

50

I. Top-level management was market

oriented. It wa no t exper ienced nor

ideally structured to manufacture the

A-IO weapon system.

Hails, was appointed to head up a team of

very experienced te hni ca l a nd profes

sional personnel, a m ix o f b o th A ir Force

and civilians. one of themhad any prior

involvement in the A-IO Program, ensur

ing complete impartial ity. The composi

tion of the r ev iew te, lm was a s shown in

the box (above).

I. Fifteen advanced numerically co

troll d ( /C) milling machines, w

three-axis, three-spindled and five-ax

three-spindled mills.

2. 45 conventional mills.

3. 2 or 3 tape-controlled drilling machin

4. 3 or 4 automatic machiningcentres

drilling, boring with au tomated to

head changers.

5. p ec ia li ze d cutting machines.

Farmingdale s workforce increased fro

1,750 to 4 ,000 very quickly, with proje

t io n t o 6 ,0 00 , whi le Hag er st own we

from 800 to 1,200 in thesame period, w

1,000 dedicated to the A-I0. This ex

employmen t b ro ug ht t h e age ave ra

down to 45, the industrial average. IIO

which regarded his experience in planni

and control a i nv al ua bl e t o t he pr

gramme. A separateA-I 0 Program Gro

under Vincent Tizio , with assistant dire

tor J. B. hedlock (described as 'one

the best contracts men we've got'), w

appointed from in-house. Away from t

A-IO programme, the McDonnell Do

glas, Boeing and Space Shuttle work w

hived offseparately.

Collis was confident that the e alte

ations would do t h e trick. 'Thesechang

in organization are aimed at strengthe

ing ourmajor functional areas such as Pr

curement a nd M anu fa ct ur in g a nd

improve our capability of de tec t ing a

correcting the root ause of possible d

ciencies in ouroperation,'he told Warr

Whetmore. )HIt wasas well that Collis f

that way for, on 20 March 1975, he w

replaced by D r Norman Grossman, w

hadbeen for thirty-two years a t the heaof FRC aircraft design, development a

construction. I

For r e- eq ui ppi ng, t he c om pa

planned f or a maximum product ion ra

of f ou rt ee n t o twenty aircraft

1977-7 ,and estimated that, to achie

that level via in-hou e machining, a

million investment in n ew s pa ce a

machine tools was r eq ui re d o ve r a

above the current 20 million, five-ye

capital budget. ome o f t he e qu ipme

would be fi nanced via the Defense Indu

trial Plan t Equipmen t Center 1PE

pool, while the rest would come o ut

company f un ds . A 90 ,000 square fo

capacity warehouse was conver ted to

new machine shop , at a cost of IO m

lion. New equipment for Farmingdale w

Iisted as follows:

51

The PO was specifically charged with

asce r ta ining whether the contractor'

re tructured proposal included all the costs

re la ted to a ovember 1973, stop work

order; re -nego t ia t ing , wi th appropr iate

consideration, a more realistic schedule;

keeping a c lo se check on FR s finance

'to ensure that adver e financial condi

tions in other divisions [did] not degrade

thecashpos it ion ofFRC to thede t r imen t

of the -10 program l);.

hanges

Th e findings and recommendations of the

Hails Report resulted in sweepingchanges

in both policy, company management and

equipmen t. Air Force organization and

attitudes also underwent equally signifi

cant changes across the whole spectrum.

Many changes t oo k p la ce at FRC

be tween November 1974 and January1975. In a n i nt er vi ew t he President,

Char le Col i is, outlinedthem. I ,Th e office

of President was e tallished, with Colli

initially holding the position with respon

sibility for overseeing the bus ine s s id e,

while Norman Grossman, former Director

of Engineering, wa promotedto Executive

Vice President, with responsibility for all

techn ica l and product ion aspects of the

A-IO. The two men had adjoining offices,

forease of communication.

Th e widely separated facilities, which

had led to such a complex organizational

set-up, were done away with. 'We cen

tralized, rather than decentralized,'

explained Collis. With 25 per cent ofthe

p la nn ed p ro du ct io n w or k o n t he A -I O

destined for Hagerstown , the various

facilities of bo th p lan ts were regrouped

into principal functions reporting direct

t o t he President. Quality assurance was

taken from the Manufacturing Division

a n d g iv en independent s tatus under a

new director, L. 1. Medlo k, brought in

from General Dynamics. Procurement

was treated in a similar fashion. Similar

changes invo lved In teg ra ted Logi tics

Support being r moved from Engineer

ing, a nd p ut u nd er D on al d J. trait as

director. Their brief was 'everything rela

t ive toopera ting the A-I 0 - s pa re s provi-

ioning, ground support equipment, man

uaIs I0;

Ralph Bonadede, former F-I05 factory

manager, wasappointed to head up Manu

facturing, with John Healey, formerly of

Rockwell International, as assistant. This

was a move that pleased t he A ir Force,

Recommendations

Despiteits findings, the Hails Report con

cluded that the ir Force should continue

its support of the A-IO programme, while

taking correctiveaction to resolve identi

fied management deficiencies. Muc h o f

the report s findings were no tmade imme

diat Iy publ ic as the Air Force did not wish

to makethings worse for the company, but

i t was recommended that a number of top

managers shou ld be rep la ced, either

through re-assignment or outside recruit

ment.

They also made a number of detailed

recommenda t ions abou t pu tt ing the Air

Force s house in orde ra t the plant.

Th e programme office was to become

more involved in the production,sub-con

tracting and manufacturing aspects of the

programme; there was t o b e insistence on

timely notification of lead time change,

with ac tion to resolve any p ro bl m that

arose; formal taskingprocedures hould be

establ ished and any PMRT and Produc

tion Readiness Review deficiencie fol

lowed up; and it hould be ensured that th

AFPRO was actively participating i n a ll

phases of the project.

The Air Force itself did not c ome out

unscathed from the report. The Systems

Program Office (SPO) and ir Force Plant

RepresentativeOffice (AFPRO/AFCMD)

were said to lack management and coordination aswell as organizational relation

ships I . The AFCMD on occasions failed

t o r ea ct t o t he n ee ds of t he AFPRO in

SPO/AFPRO relationships. In the view of

the report team, 'Thi less than co-opera

tive relationshipbetween the PO and the

AFPRO had a negative effect upon FRC s

re 'ponsivene s. 1 4

Th e machinery in the plant was criti

c ized as be ing ou tda ted and in some

cases totally obsolete. 'One assessment

was the Fairchild-Republic's capital

equipment was at l ea st 1 yea rs outdat

ed. Another officer noted that some of

the e qu i pmen t o n t h e s ho p floor was

used t o produce the Republic P-47

Thunderbolt 30 years ago.I 1

9. Th e average age of the workforce was

54, which indicated experienced men,

however, the report expressed concern

ra the r than satisfaction at th is , pI

sumably o n t he n ot io n that theycould

not stand the high-pressure, full-scale

production programme I)1.

2. The FRC-IO Program Director (who

doubled as a Company Vice President),

h ad n o d ir ec t c on tr o l o ve r e i th e r t he

Hagerstownor Farmingdale plants,and

was himself based at a third facility, at

Germantown, Maryland.

3. Th e two FaciIity Managers lacked

experience in large-scale weapon sys

tems production.

4. The companyorganization, scaled down

as i tw as t o sub-contract work, was 'too

complex and organizationally cumber

some to allowfor efficient commitment

to the A-IOproduction program'' ' '

5. Financially, FRC had overrun i ts in ter

naldevelop test and evaluation (DT&E)

budget baseline by 16.1 p er c e nt a t t he

54.1 per cent completion point, and \Va.

3 million behind schedule.

6. Major components had fallen behind

schedule, and the revised schedule for

the f ir st s ix a i rc raf t had a projected

overrun of almost 12 million.

7. Overall, the division was 'not reallyopti

mally organized to manage and control

a sophisti ated production program .

The Hails Report Review Team

LieutenantGenera R Hais

Colonel R Kleinman ISystems Managementl

Top SergeantJ.Seigler

Mrs E Cook

Colonel L R Reed ContractAdminis tration/OAI

LieutenantColonel R C Smith Management Engineerng)

Major R O Suelze Procurement/OAI

Mr M. Vezeau Procurement/OA)

Colonel E O Reinhardt Air ForcePlant Representatve)

LieutenantColonel W.A. Williams Contract Administration)

Major N. W. Kuzemka ProcurementManagement)

Colonel R E Lx IIndustrial Resources)

Major K H Kagyama Producton/QA)

Mr P A. Melanese Productonl

Colonel E Hunt Procurement Polcyl

Lieutenant Colonel J. O Zacharry Financial Management)

Major C T Keeney Financial Management/Overhead)

Major A. L Mcintyre Financial Auditingl

Major R R Pinkbiner Financial Management/Overhead)

Colonel J. O Tanner Producton/OAI

Lieutenant Colonel W. A. Wolfe IManufacturing)

MajorW. Head Procurement Managementl

Colonel W. M. Lake Program Managerl

LieutenantColonel R L Bulmer Systems Procurement)

Lieutenant Colonel E Low R D Managementl

LieutenantColonel H Blue Flght Operatons/SystemsSafety)

LieutenantColonel J.J. Stirk Judge Advocate)

FLIGHT OPER TIONS S FETY

LEGAL

M NUF CTURING

M N GEMENT

FIN NCE CONTR CTING

FACILITIES

SUBCONTR CTING

TE M CHIEF

TE M STAFF

QU LITY SSUR NCE OA

The indings

The Hails Report of the team s findings

appeared o n 3 0 e pt em be r 1974, and was

as detailed and comprehensive as i tw a far

from <complimentary about the FRC man

agement and organization. ;The criticisms

ranged from top management right do\Vn

to shop-floor tooling and the competence

a nd e xp er ie nc e o f t he emp lo ye es t hem

selves. They can be'[ be summarized as

follows:

am

ails Report

Commander, Tactical ir Com

L ie ut en an t Gen er al R ob er t E.

F orc e was s o concerned that

several inves tigat ive teams in to

-Republicwith the remit to high

deficiencies, and de te rmine the

ible way of putting them right.

therefore, the Air Force Contract

Division (AFCMD) told an

Management Review

lRT ) t o ' e v al ua te FRC s produc

bility ' at both Farmingdale and

The teamstarted work on 30

year and continued, with com

zeal, to probe and assess until

Their repor t made d istu rb ing

it finally h i t the desks in the

team concluded that, while FRC

competenceto accomplish

development, test and evalu

(RDT&E), it lacked 'theto p er fo rm in the production

phase >;. Neither FRC s technical

agerial structure was capable of

anything like t he A ir Force s

delivery scheduleduring the pro

phase. The report, PMRT-I, listed

than 131 discrepancies within the

' s management func t ions that

correction by the contractor ;.

b ruary 1974, a fte r a seven-month

space, thesecond report, PMRT

encourage theAir Force that

putting i tshousein order quickly

although some progress had been

e in-house Air Force Plant Rep

Officer at Farmingdale contin

monitor progress, but FRC s [ resi

to provide t he AFPRO wit h

n concerning the proposed

plant consolida

A-I 0 System Program Director

and the Air Force Contract Man

Division (AFCMD) were both

of thi', and i t re inforced doubts

t ome et t he A ir Force s

bells were now ring ing loudly

4 September 1974, the Air Force

e f o f caff General Richard H.

to conductan urgent review.

PMRT Reports and



F IR HILD

Re-scheduled deliveryprogramme for pre-productionA-las

Demonstrated Current

performance I estmate

300 342 342

1,200 1,900 1,900

1,200 1,460 1,460

1.8 1.8

112 lor

10 4 4

3.5 3.2 3.2

2.2 2.0 2.0

19,260 20,850 20,850

45,640 47,400 47,400

12 12

Approved

programme

Rome A ir Development Center; 71-137

was acquired by th Air ForceOrientatio

Group AFOG), which used it for sever

years as a travellingdisplay nationwide, I

fi nal r es ti ng p la ce was, appropriate

2

10

112

12

45,640

19,260

300

Developmentestmate

10. 1,200

Land 1,200

A-l0 technical progression

Operatonal/technical charac te f/s t cs

TECHNICAL

Strafng accuracy,ICEP) mies)

OPERATIONAL

Cruise speed Ikm/hl

Weight empty IIbl

Bombing accuracy, MK 82 ICEPllft)

Sustained load factor, 6 MK8 2 a nd 7 5 0 r d s ammo:

at 275 Klg) 3.5

at 15 0 K g) 2. 2

Forward airstrip 10. andland ro l, 4 MK 82,

750rds 30mmammo 1ft)

Loit ert m e at 250nm radius, 18 MK 82,Ihr)

•Meets orexceeds contractualguarantees

I= mean vaue

Maximum gross we igh tl b )

Maintainability manhours/flt hrsl

Both went in to flyable storage and ended

up in different places: 71-1369 was disas

sembled and itsairframewas despatched to

Griff is s AFB , ew York, where i t was u ti

l iz ed i n ECM experimental work a t t he

he tO orn

Development Under Way

CHAPTER SEVE

18 December 1974, at Edwards AFB, California.

YA-lO pictured on the runway armed with

twenty-eight Mk 82 bombs. Natonal Archives,

Washington, DC

With the delivery of sixpre-production air

craft, the A-IO programme wa a bl e t o

develop properly. Visually, there were few

differences. Perhap most obvious were the

YA-IO's lower f in s, which had the front

lower section angled, whereas those on the

p ro du ct io n mod el s wer e r ou nd ed i nt o a

smooth curve. The leading-edge slats

became standardized, like the trailing-edge

fairings that hadbeen retro-fittedto the YA

1 to aid engine airflow. Ventral trakes

a dd d t o p er fo rm a s im il ar f un ct io n wer e

also carried. A further 2ft 6in (75cm) were

added by extendingthe wingtipsoutboard of

th ailerons.Flaptravel was reduc d from 40

to 30 degrees(and would be reduced further

to just20 degreesin full production models).

The first pre-production machines

arriveddisassembled at EdwardsAFB v ia a

Lockheed C-5A transport aircraft on 15

February 1975, the day after the 1,000th

YA-lO test fl i gh t h ad b ee n clocked up.

With the appearance of thes aircraft, the

YA-10's pioneeringworkwas largely done.

LocatIOn

Edwards AFB

Farmingdale

Farmingdale

Farmingdale

Farmingdale

Farmingdale

First f g ht date

15-2-75

26-4-75

10-6-75

17-7-75

9-8-75

10-9-75

t he AFPRO had b een responsible to the

SPO.lli Few agreedwith this, and G ner al

Samuel C. Phillips, AFSC Commander,

felt that the AFCMD per formed a v ita l

function in ensuring consistent application in dealing with contractors. He listed

a number of important innovative pro

grammes t hat the AF C had introduced,

and concluded that future good work of

that kind would be lost. 0 This viewpoint

carried the day.

The Air Force had nothing to complain

about wit h r eg ar d t o FRC 's p re di ct edDT E schedulefor these six aircraft. The

original delivery had been agreed as com

mencing in December1974, with the final,

sixth aircraft having a June 1975 delivery

date_ Fairchild fully in tended to comply

with this, but late vendor deliveries and

other problem were making thi difficult.

The Air Force and the company therefore

mutuallyagreed a new schedule s table

below), which wasduly followed.

There was always scepticism aboutthe A-l0

in the upper echelons of theAir Force, as well

as in Congress, and politics has always playeda

large part i n t h e A-l0 story. Keeping the to p b ra ss

fully aware of the aircraft s real capabilities in an

attempt to counter b ot h t h e m e di a a n d politically

inspired rumour factory has always been vital.

Here,Captain Allenback explains s o me o f t h e

A-la s cockpitinstruments to Secretary of the

Air Force, Verne Orr. USAF

No. S n Old de IVery date Newdelvery date 1 73-1664 December 1974 February 1975

2 73-1665 February 1975 May 1975

3 73-1666 March 1975 June 1975

4 73-1667 Apri 1975 July 1975

5 73-1668 May 1975 August 1975

6 73-1669 June 1975 September1975

figures were wrongand that o nl y I m il li on

wou ld be saved by such a move. Fur ther

deliberations took place between Brigadier

General Jay R Brill, -10Program Directorand General Sam C. Phillips, Commander,

ystems Command. The final outcome was

the announcement, made on 3\ larch

1975, by the Secretary of theAir Force, that

the i r Force \vas not averse to mov ing

some A-I workload to Hagerstown'IH.

i r Force hanges

The USAF also took action to implement

the HailsReport recommendations and set

itsown house inorder.Extramanpower was

assignedto the SPO and AFPRO. Brigadier

GeneralThomas H. McMullen hadalready

beensucceeded by Colonel laterBrigadier

General) Jay R Brill, on 6 ovember \974,

in the normal course of events.

General Hails thought that the whole

investigation migh t have been avoided if

of emphasis from Long Island to

brought anguished squeal fromState politicians, and charges of

of faith' from Democrat Congre s-

m J Downey, West Islip. He wa

ewYorkCongressionaldelega

inJanuary 1974, put presure on

togo ahead withsucha move,

Id mean the los of 1,000 jobs. 1

th , FRC had, since winning the

for the A-la, de te rmined on

90 per cent of the aircraft at Farm

and 1 per cent at Hagerstown. 2the HailsReport,Charle Collis,

hi l as t act as President, had sug

2 -41 per centof the workload

b e r ea ss ig ne d f rom ew York to

There were sound environmen

afety reasons forthis move - flight

s more acceptableover the seaoff

of Maryland thanover suburban

rk. Costs wou ld a ls o b e s av ed

as much as 8 .5 mil l ion

s - because the faci Iities the

se) already existed at Hagerstown,

would be cheaper to employ and

taxe were lower

o test f rom ewYork Congre smene A ir Force to carry out another

the benefits or otherwi e of the

i ch t oo k p la ce b etwe en 3 a nd 5

1975.They concluded that Collis's

g in

52 53



THE IO IS BOR THE IO IS BOR

Oppositepage, bottom The very first production

A-10 is towed out complete on 20 January 1975,

Fairchild-Republic Archives, counesyCradleof Avialion

Museum, New York

characteristics at high angles of attack,

stall warning, susceptibility to depar t

from controlled flight and susceptibili

ty to spin. Additional tests evaluated

PAVE PE NY and aural stall warning

ystems. In eptember L975, AFTEC

announced that the results o f t he se

tests were 'excellent l .

2. Further verification of operational suit

ability and military utility and opera

tionaLeffectiveness.

3 . Analyticalasse smentof the A-I0 capa

bility in the face ofthe postulatedthreat.

4. Targetacquisition, attackand re-attack.

5. Further asses men t o f t he GAU- /A

10 compatibility to include strafesafe

tyaccuracy.

6. B omb w ea po n delivery accuracy

demonstration.

7. Initial evaluation of reliability, main

tainability, and supportability,

8. Demonstration of critical static loads

to ultimate loading condition.

9. omplete one lifetime of fatigue test.

It soon became clear that the full LOO per

cent flight-airload te ting would not be

completed by D AR IlIB and, on L

August, t he A ir Force, NA A, DDR E

agreed to drop the requirement prior to

DSARC IIlB, and accept the 0 per cent

flight-airload testing already completed bythe YA-I O. This was felt to give suffic ient

proof to support a p re di ct io n t h at t he

DT E aircraft could carry the extra 20 per

cent ordnance I quired, The Air Force

predicted that th 100 per cent te ting

would, in any c as e, b e completed by

June. 'l;

On 21 October L975, another milestone

was reached,when the first flight of a pro

duction A-IO ( s/n 75-025 ) was complet

ed at Farmingdale, This aircraft, along

Opposite page, top The Number One production

model A-10 comes together at Fairchild-Republic,

Fairchild-Republic Archives, counesy Cradeof Aviation

Museum, New York

1. Invest iga t ion of s tal l /post stall/spin

characteristics. To include forty sorties

to a certa in aerodynamic and engine

then were f lown to Edwards AFB under

their own power. The assignmentsfor each

aircraft were a shown in the table above.

The opportunity was taken luring the e

trials to te t co lour scheme and camou

flage patterns, in order to ascertain their

relevance t o t he A role. The A-LOs

appeared in a var iety o fh u e a nd p at te rn s

in the Californian skies, includingMASK

lOA in which, lacking FS595 equivalents,

the appearance changed , cham leon- like

w ith the sh if t ing light conditions. In the

end 'Ghos tGrey' was the scheme adopted

prior to European deployment, when a

very different camouflage requirement was

manifestly needed.

The test p ilo tsfor th is large programme

at Edwards included three from Fairchild,

four (later five) from the A ir Force Flight

Test Center (AFTEC), and four from the

A ir F or ce T es t and Evaluation Center

(AFTEC), Kirtland AFB. This establish

ment r mained static in strength although

other t es t p ilot s were rota ted through it.

This series of trials, Phase L LOT E, was

completed by 13 June 1975. The next

phase, D ARC III B was the final series of

test', uponwhich full production approval

was dependent . I t h ad been postponed from

October L975, until February 1976, and

included freedom-from-flutter tests, initial

performance measurements, fly ing qualities, GA-8/A-LO accuracy demonstration,

aerial refuelling, laser spot seeker (PAVE

PE Y integration, bombing accuracy,

combat ammunition pelformance against

tanks andAPCs,and 10T E conducted by

AFTEC. The specific te t objectives were

I i t ed a s fol low :

n

73-1664

73-1665

73-1666

73-1667

73-1668

73-1669

Programme

at t he A ir Force Museum, at

AFB, Ohio.

mechanical changes that had taken

the original design a nd t he

the A-IO are shown in the table53.

Performance tests; handlng tests, aerodynamic qualities, flutter and airloads

demonstraton, loading to 100percent limit

Gun and ordnance stores testing and certification

Systems evaluaton and weapons delvery accuracy tests

Buk of the performancetestng, performance and propulsion evaluatons.

Spare for initialoperational test and evaluation lOT EI

Prncipal initial operatonal test and evaluaton (IOT E) vehicle, although this was

alsodone with someother aircraft

Clmatc testarticle. Pans caled for cold-weather testing in Alaska, tropical condition

testng in Panama and desert testing at Edwards, Centro. Also clmatic hangar tests

at Edwards fortemperaturerangesof -65 to 165 degrees

six pre-production aircraftwas

a s pe ci al r ol e i n the t es t p ro

which had a planned I, 00 flight

DT E valua tions . ; In addition

flyable aircraft, FRC bui l t two

ames, specifically for t he c on

of ground test involving static

g ue t ri al s. A t e t laboratory was

c ted a t Farmingdale for this pur

fatigue-tested aircraft h ad , by

undergone 6 ,000 hou rs , wh i1e

c-test airframe t ri al s w er e t o b e

by September. Infact, these ran

a crack developing when, on 23

lifetimefatigue te ting was

ent through its range. This led to

ening and a con tinuat ion of the

d on 2 October 1975, testing of

cracked fuselage frame was

with the full 6, 0 - ho ur mark

a ined . Th is re in forcement was

nda to ry , commencing with a ir 14 (75-0263), and was retro-fit

Nbrs 6 and 7 (73-1664and

-IO 10T E Phase II testingbegan

1975. '10 The first pre-produc

aft waspacked full of instruments

the fourthaircraft, was not, initial

w ith th GAU- /A Gatling.

i t made its first few flight with an

jacket. The remaining five

f ir st f lew f rom Farmingda le and

54 55



TilE A-IO IS BORN T HE A-IO IS BORN

Close-upof the refuelling slipway a to p t h e n o se o f t h e YA-l0 at Edwards AFB. Natonal Archives

ColegePark MD

canopy. Thc solution w as r o in rall a s im

ple screcn-wash s y stc m in e vita bly , c h r

tened H ogw ash ). T his proved uccessf

and was madc a standard fitmcnt fromai

crafr br 16 75-0265) onwards, a s w e ll

bcing rctro-firrcd [0 carlier a irc r af t. I t w

alsosuspecrcd that the gasemissions mig

affcct cnginc pcrformance, 0 cngin

cleaningsolvcnts wercused [0 dissolvc th

gas rcsiduc. During tcsts on 3 N o ve m bc r a t t h c a

gunncry r,mgcs at Ncll is AFB, N cvada, th

- 1 0 m o st succcssfully dcmonstratcd th

fired off. The h ei gh t o f t he firing passes

r a ng e d f ro m 10f t 3 m) up to 25, Oft

{7,5 Om),arspeedsthar variedfrom 135ro

415 knO[ ,and at g f o rc es r a ng in g f r om r o

5 during s lip s, b a nk s and h ig h a n gle s of

a rr ac k. A ll t h es e w er e conducted w ithout

mishap, e x ce p t t h e s o n ie o n 2 ovember

1975, when a G -8 gun g as e m is s ion

caused the gun to ja m. This w as a tempo

rary sedlack, however.

One s id e- ef fe ct wa s c au se d by the

re idue o f t h e gun sgas tending ro blur the

p il or s v is io n a s i t adhcrcd ro thc A-IO s

The addition of pmassium nitrate oxidizer

ro the propellanrallowedfor moresroi hio

metric comhustions o f t h e gun g as e w hi le

t he y w e re t il l i n the gun barrel. This ITleanr

t ha t t he g as w as les s p r op e lla nr - r ic h a s it

exited the mu::le. This solution had been

passed ro t he A ir For c e b y the avy,

w hi ch h ad u e d a s im il ar method in itslarge

1 6i n b ar r le sh ip ), i n h ea vy c ru is er ) and

6in light cruiser) naval guns.

In excess of sixty flights were made dur

ing GAU- cannon testing, during which

some 39,000 rounds of ammunition were

Close-up view o f t h e l a s e r tracker o f t h e A-l0 also

givinga good view ofthe undercarr iage detail .

Edwards AFB California 4November 1975. Natonal

Archives Washington

with the f o llo w in g tw o s ins 75-0259 and

75-0260), was sent ro j o in t h e d ev e lo p

ment t e am a t Edwards AFB. T h e se t h re e

A-lOs brs 7 a nd 9 ), a lo ng w it h t h e

tenth aircraft s i n 7 5- 261) were the last

be entirelycon tructed at Farmingdale.Beginning with the elevenrh aircraft sin

75-0262), the w o rk w as divided between

there ami Hager [Own, as t h e n e w facilitie

came on-srream.

There w er e s till s o me p r ob lem s w ith g a s

emissions from the GA - . A h ea vy -d ur y

nose shroud, affixed [Q the aircraft s nose

like the visor of a k ni gh t s helmet, had

proven c u mb e rs o me , s o an arrempt was

made to solve the problem of the secondary

ignition ofthe gas, and the resultanr fireball.

Above Themunitions barrel loader known as the

Oraggin l is hand-manoeuvred intoplace by three

ofthe ground teamprior to loading the GAU-8/A

30mm ammunition belts at EdwardsAFB California

February 1975. Note the only built-in access tothe

cockpit is on the portside anda ladderis needed

on thestarboard side. Engineshave their covers in

place. Natonal Archives Washington

56 57



lethality against captured

T-62 b at tl e t an k targets. The

c o uld f ir e o f f 1 3 5 0 rounds in just

ds of continuous firing b u t t h is

n ec e s ar y. I n f ac t a two-second

u f fic ien t to d em ol i h the major

targets.

THE A IO IS BORN

The y ea r 1 97 6 b eg an w i th h ig h h op es

t h a t t h e A - t O programme was at last getting

into full swing. On 10 February DeputyS ec

retary of Defense Clements signed Develop

ment C oncept Paper 23 B authorizing the

Air Force to proceed with full production of

the A LO at fifteen aircraft per month.

Even then furthertesting was to contin

ue the follow-on programmeafter DSARC

III B including:

I. F ly in g q ua li ti es p e rf o rm a nc e a n d

propulsion testing.

2. C ompletion of airload testing.

3.

4.

5.

6.7.

8.

Stores certification.

Climate testing.

Systems evaluation.

Verification of technical data.

Reliability maintainability and sup

portability analyses.

D evelopment ofoptimum tactics.

THE A IO IS BORN

9. N o rm a l a n d e m er g en c y procedures.

LO Evaluation of cost of ownership.

lL. Identification d e f ic ien c ies to deter

mine mission area or s y te m s r e qu ir

ing further t e t i ng .

12. E va lu at io n o f a er os pa ce g ro un d

e q u i p m e n t l ~

On 30 Ma r ch 1 97 6 the A L 0 w as f o

mally accepted i nt o t he A ir Force by th

Commander Tactical AirCommand Gen

e ra l Ro be r t Dixon from C ommander

Air Fo rc e Sy ste ms ommand Gener

William Evans at Lan gley A FB. A f ter

longgestation period theA -I 0 h a d a r r iv e

H WGM N - Donald l Sorensen

The Fatigue Aircraft is set up for tests

rability and longevity. Fairchid-Republc

Cradleof Aviaton Museum. New York

an A 10 fromEdwards AFB in 1976. showing

arriageretractingforward. The aircraftis

750bbombsforfurthertesting. Natonal

Washington, DC

58

In the deveopment of any aircraft the test pilot and those that flight trialled the

teething problems on the earlyproduction models, hadthe most influence on whether

a design. brilliant or indifferent. c ame to a successfu fruition. One of the men that

ensured the A-10 was one of the formercategorywas Donald L Sorensen who was

invoved with much of the Hawg's eary deveopment.

Born in the townshipof Turock, Caforna. in 1945.the son of a local turkey farmerwell

known inthe Himar area, Donald joned theUSAFand, after qualifying as apilot spent

most of hiscareer in the Air Force SystemsCommand, in the f e d o f weapons acqus-

ton. He primarily flew flight acceptance on newaircraftat the factores. In addition to

the A-1 O. Donaldalso accepted F-16s at the Fokker Company in Amsterdam, Netherands.

and at the General Dynamics facility in Fort Worth. Texas. He was statoned twice at

Edwards AFB. Ca forna firstly from1974to 1975asan A-37 test support pilot and againf rom 1983 to1985 as a Field Mantenance SquadronCommander and F-4 pilot.

Itwas durngh s first assignmentat Edwards flying theA-37, that Don first became

invoved inthe A-1 0 program. The fly offbetween the YA-9 andthe YA-10had just been

competedwith the A-1 0 being seected as the newair to ground fghter. Don's job as

atest support pilotwas to chase the A-10 with the A-37 durngvaroustest flights. Of

ths seresof fl ighttests three in particular he reca ed to th e author as being of spe

cialnote. These were the initial icngtest. the spin recovery testing and the gun devel-

opment problems. Don tod me;

Theicng test requ iredtheuseof a specialy equpped KC-135 tanker with a tank ful of green

dyed water and a specal spray rng nozze extendedfrom theboom.

Thegoa of the test missonwas to spray water intotheintakeof oneof the A-I 0engnes at

an alttudewith temperaturesandconditons toinduce icng. Iwas in asupportA-37 with an engi

neer on board to evaluatethe icng procedures.The immediateprobem was forthe A-I 0 to be

in the proper positon toreceve theice,the piots vSon was obscuredbyIcecoverngthe wind

screen and preventedh mfrommaintainingproperposton off of the KC-135.Thereforewe decd

ed that theA-10 piot would need to fy formaton off of myA-37and I. in turn. was requred to

fy formaton off of thetanker in order tokeepthe A-lOin properpositon.Ths worked wel and

the A-I 0begantakng theice. Probes wereattached tothe naceleof the A-I 0engne so that my

engineercoud visualy measurethe amount of ice forming. After about two inches ofice accu

mulated we began a descent to see what happens when the chunks of icecame off and were

ingested in theengne.The engnewas equppedwith a varety of telemetry instrumentaton,

reayng rea tme informaton toground supportpersonne. One probem. Evenas we descended

to lower alttudes, we st couldn't fnd awarmenoughtemperatureto melttheice.We decded

to return to base and abortthemisson.Fina y as wewere descendng andon fnal approachto

land theicecame off and went intotheengne. It wasvery uneventful. The A-I 0 engnes hgh

bypass rato can withstand a lot of FOD. Futuremissons were pannedfor warmer days.

The spn testng wasaccomplshedeary in theprogram. The A l0 required a specal bal

l s tc operatedmechan sm to be attached tothe tai secton to shoot out a spn recoverychute

shoud the aircraftnot be able torecoverf rom thespn.They decded that thespn would be

initatedat an alttudeof about 30,000 feet The aircraft used for achase panewastheA-37

due to its s im i a r f gh t characterst cs. Theproblem for us was that theA-37 cockpit was

unpressursed and was lmited to 25.000 feet for physiologicalcondit ons ( .e . the bends).The

test group got specalpermissionforthe A·37to fy above25,000 feet in th is specal testenv

ronment Qute abit of extra physiologicaltraining wasgiven to a l o f thechase piots. Durng

my frst chase f g ht I found it becoming uncomfortable as wepassed about 27,000 feet At that

alttude theoxygensystembegan to pressurefeedthe piotwi th 100 oxygen.Ths made it

very diffculty tobreathand talk as pressurewas constanty bengforceddownour lungs. After

the frst misson supportng thespn test I decded I coud monitor the entresi tuatonjust as

wel fromsomewhere below 27,000feet. Thespn tests were accomplshed onthe A-I 0with

absolutely no problems.

59

Asyou know the whole A-10airframe wasdesgnedaroundthe 30mmGat nggun. The fr

ingbarre of thegunwas algnedexactydownthe centrelne of the aircraft to aVOid anyyaw

ing durng gun f rng For this reason thenose wheel had to be desgned offsetof centrelne.

Manyprobemsarosewith the gun testng. The frst probem occurred as thegunwas f\fng Gun

gases would b Ud u p in front ofthe noseof the aircraft durngthe f rng sequence and then the

heat generated by the f rng wouldoccasionaly cause a fame-outof an engne. In fact one A

10 test aircraft was lost due to thegunprobemsand fame-out of both engnes with no restart.

O coursethe beneft of thetest envronmentwas that practcaly everythingwas on f e so the

frst ejectonsequencefrom an A 0 was wel documented.To resovethe gun gasprobemthey

deveoped a gas suppressant additve to be added tothe ammuOiton powder. DUrng the frst

subsequent test everything wentwel with no gungas igniton. But therewas st oneprobem.

The suppressantres duecovered the piots front Windscreen makng it neary impOSSbe fo rhmto see toland Thenext soluton tothe gasproblem was to add a gungas diverter attached to

thebarre of thegun.Ths worked fairy wel as it divertedthegasesaroundthenose of theair

craft. Eventuay though,they found that theincrease in weight fromtheheavy diverterf xture

was eventualy crackngthe gun mounts on the aircraft. Asyoucansee fromal this. in the test

ingbusness. one fx sometmes can leadto another probemand so on, adinfn tum.

In 1975Don was assigned tothe Air Force ContractManagementD vs on (AFCMD) to

be working with the A-10 producton.

In ita ly the A-Os were gong t o b e buit and fown at theRepubc Companylocated at the

Repub c Airport in Farmingdae, Long Isand, New York So initaly. I was assgned to Farm

ingdale,but.beforethe orderswere processed.theydecded insteadto buid thefuselageand

wingsat Repubc and shpthemto the Fairchid Companyin Hagerstown, Maryland, for fnal

assemblyand f g h t operatons. When I arrvedin late 1975there were no operatons or fnal

assembly lnes yetestablshed I was basicaly given freeregn to set upthe fy ingportonof

the acceptance test mission at Hagerstown. Ths included offce space, f g h t planning faci

tes rampspace. airspace procedures, weather, lfe support, acceptanceprocedures plus oth

ers.Ths took severa months so the frst twelve A-Os were fown in the extremely congested

airspace around the New York Cty compexes. We few the frst twelve in awarning area at

theend of Long Isand. Idistncty rememberone day, at theendof amission as wewere return

ing tobase, the AirTraffc Centersay ng, 'Im showing about fortyaircraftbetween you and

Deer Park and ata l alttudes; use cauton. Not very comfortng words in the fghter testng

environment tosaythe least. We were g a d t o be in Hagerstown.

I actvely started flYlOg the A-I 0 10 October.1976. SlOce therewas not an actve training

squadronyet establshed, I attended a ground schoo at Oavis-Monthan AFB in Tucson. Ar

zona, folowed by fying training usngthetest aircraft at Edwards.The frst producton A-l 0I

few was the thirteenthaircraftthat came off the producton lne No tme to be superstt ous

Flght operatons hadquite a fewgrowingpans as with any new weapons system.There were

a total of850 testpointsaccomplshed on each f ght. Sncethe A-I 0 carredaboutfourhours

of fuel internaly, we were ableto accomplsh it al durngone verybusy f ght. Durng the ini

t a l f gh ts we would discover upto forty discrepancies as not beng within the contractual

specifcatons. Theseconsisted of suchminorthings as paint missing orscrewsloose.to major

things such as f g ht control miS-rggng or problems with in-fght engne restarts.

Eary on inthe programwe hadan aircraft aieronthat wouldbegnto futter (rapid twistng

vibraton) at amaxmum speed of 450 knots andzero gs. After severa re-rggings ofthe f gh t

controls with noapparenthep. we convncedthe System Program Offce SPO , based at

Wrght-Patterson AF8 and prmary overseers of the contract, that the aieron shoud be

removed. It subsequentywas removedandsentto Edwards AFB andpaced on a test A-I 0that

hadcamera pods mounted on the wings to f m the futter. And.sure enough, usnghgh speed

continued overleaf



THE A IO IS BORN

HAWGMEN Donald l Sorensen continuedCHAPTER EIGHT

he tO escribed

A leanand mean profi le is presented by thissleek A 10. 78-674. of the23rd Wing seen on therunway at

Pope AFB. North Carolina. The SLIMElights andformation str ipscan be clearly seen on the outboard wing

section inthis photograph USAF

When Iwas goingthrough the T 38 p h a ,e o f my

[raining, it cemed like the instructor,who h lll

flown the A-I 0 real ly enjoyeJ t h e t h r il l of fly

ing, a n d w h e n I [ a l ke d w i t h [ h e m, [ h e y , p o ke o

[heir daysflying [ h e A - I 0 as a r ol e [hey really

lo\ ed. T h e y J i d n r h a \ e a n y p r o hl e m w i t h [ h e

Image- [hey weren t concerneJ ahou[ thar. Rut

[hey Im ed that kll1d of flying 1:

Airframe

The original RFP from t h e D o D h ad a k

contractors to xp lo re var ious des ig

Built with lasiccostsfirmly in mind, muc

o f t he A-IO s des ign was conventiona

e v en w he n ir first appeared in the mi

1970s, but i ta lso carried some very innov

ative ideas i nt ot he skies,

qualified to fly any aircraft in t he A i r For

inventory, she chose t h e A - I 0:

Perhaps thos e e xpe r ts s hould have

examined more closely the results o f t he

Fort Riley competition tr ials more than a

decade earlier I

Like its predecessors, the Junkers Ju 7

S t uk a a n d t h e Douglas AD Skyraider, the

A-IO was built for a special job, and, like

them, i t d id t h at j o b perfectly. three

aircraft were functional and efficient, if

not beautiful. The A-IO was h a te d a n d

feared by its e ne mi e a nd loved and cher

i sh ed by i t customer, the troops o n t he

ground, but i t was derided and scorned by

its own people, both in t h e A i r Force and

outside it.

As aircraft became increasingly auto

mated, and pilots became less and less

involved in actually flying them, those air

craft that r ea ll y h ad t o b e f lown became

more appealing. The A-IO has proven

i tselfbeyond all critic ism, a nd n ow pilots

w n to fly i t. F ir st L i eut enant D i ane

Ridgely explains why, when he had

It is no cxaggcrarion 10 say that almosteveryone

lI ith f i r >t · h an J k n o ll l e J g e (eel, t ha t t he

USAF , Jecision t o r e pl a ce t h e A - 7 D lI ith the

FairchrlJ A - I O T h u n Je r h o lt II \ \ a , i l l -con

cei\·ed and prem llure.I:;

When t h e A - I 0 first j oi ned t he Air Force,

it presented a truly unique profile and out

line. T here was absolutely n o c ha nc e o f

mistaking i t for any other type of aircraft,

military or civil. The sneering began

immediately . If t he uni nformed observer

was not criticizing its appearance, t hen it

was i ts lack of speed, or c h an c es o f sur

vival. Its lack of aesthetics h id i ts multi·

functional talents from thos e a ir superior

ity fighters who were always ai mi ng t o go

hi gherand faster. No young flyer w i th T o p

Gun ambitions \Vas going to volunteer to

fly the A-IO - or so t hey t hought . I t was

t he d on e thing to knock the A-tO, and

even as lace as 19 s elf -procl aimed

experts were making remarks like this:

modeof f ght.A l ter workng with the SPD on theprobem acontractualspecif caton was writ

tento alow 80poundsmaxmum stck force at maxmuma rspeed whie inmanua reverSon

Alter thatwe carred a force gaugewith us on eachacceptance f g ht topace on the stck to

check theforce in-fght.

TheA-O wasaso the frst aircralt to recevetheACES I I ejecton seat a remarkabe eec

ton seat that is st usedonthe F-16 andF-15.

As theprogramprogressedthe qualty of the aircralt improved conSderaby In-fght dis

crepances were reducedto very few on each f g ht with only anoccasona major probem

When I left the factory on anotherass gnment the Fairchid-Republc Company wasproducng

twelve aircralt permonth It wasvery excitng and sometmes frustratng to be inon the inital

development and productonof amajorweapons system. Butto see the faci ty and operaton

gofrom absolutelynothing to ful-scaleproductonwas very rewarding.

Don finally retred fromthe USAF in February. 1988.He immediatelywent to work for

Delta Airlines andis currently 19991 a captainof MD-88s I ... a stretchedversionof

the DC-9 with glass cockpit. flight management system IFMSI and a variety of other

electronic gadge s A verygood relable aircraft.l based in New York. Donhasbeen

marred toElen for thirty-one years andtheyhave threechidren.Mark. JohnandClare

and several grandchidren. They enjoy travel ng. andDon especialy lkessnowsking

andbackpacking

it was shown that the aieron setupanosciatory frequencycausng the surface

twist. Had the aieron been left onan operatonal aircralt it most lkely would

eventualy cracked in f ght.

interestng dscoverywas excessve aircraft ro inmanua reverson. TheA- 0 had

a reverson system that coudbe actvated in-fght shoudthehydraucs be lost forsome

it pump faiure or as a resultof ground fre. Thswason y a get youhome feature

dsconnected the f g ht controls fromthe hydrau c actuators and bascaly reverted to a

ngthe trm tabonthe aieronwhich In turnmoved theentreai eron.We always sad

lketryng to fy the Queen aryas the stck forces wereextremely heavy. Ths al worked

a t l ow speeds but we dscovered that each arpanesstck force was different at hgh

requredvery lnle stck pressureto maintainleve f g ht atmaxmum speed whie

d over 100 pounds of sde stck force just to maintain leve f ght. We soon

that asmpe re-rgging ofthe aieron coud alter theamount of forcerequred in ths

Donald Sorensenin the cockpit of one of the first six pre producton A-Os

his finalflight operatons preparaton which was to include engine runand

checks. These werenorma y completed before the aircralt was painted in its

The firstsix pre producton aircraltwere each painted in adifferent paint

to be evaluated andto enable selection of afinal colour. Donald L Sorensen

60 7



THEA IO DESCRIBED THE A IO DE CRIBED

Force Plant Representative Office Fairchild monitoredall the work atthe

n. Maryland.plant during the construction ofthe A l andacceptedthe

forthe AirForce. Here airframecomponentsare being preparedfor assembly.

for the AX which wou ld be re la

inexpensive, rugged and highly sur

Mindful of th i , Fairchild always

the A-la s ailframe configuration

the cost/performance balance 2i.

o f t he high thrust of the sel

powerp lant , a nd t he in-built fuel

economy built i n to t h e basic specification,

there was l i tt le n eed for the streamlined

external surfaces that wereconsidered to be

state o f t h e art a t t he t ime. To ensure ease

of manufacture- again , following the 1011

cost philosophy insisted upon by Congress

a nd t he A ir Force - FRC kept the A -l a s

62

l in es aus te re . In Fai rchi ld s own words,

Because o f t h e high t hrust and fuel econo

my o f t he engines, simple external lines

were possible w i t hout t he need for twisted,

tapered external sUifaces. The straight-line,

constant cross-section fuselage segments

a llowed mul t i-use par ts to be fab rica ted

from one set of too ls in large lot sizes. 2H

This type of fuselage, with as little com

pound (or double) curvature as pos ible,

alsoavoided t he t i m e-con um ingand cost

ly proce ses of manu fac tu ring t r etch

formed ections.

Some 95per cent oft he fuselage was built

from stress and corrosion-resistant light

alloys 2024 and 7075) with partsbraze-riv

eted together in traditional manner. Com

posite materials, then comi ng i nt o vogue,

were deliberately shunned because o f t he

cost. The A -l a s skinning was mainly done

with simplefla tp lates, many oft hem inter

changeable. As Ed Heinemann had done

with the Douglas AD Skyraider design, 20

great effortsweremade to reduceweight if

a cos t p enal ty ensued. Dr orman Gross

man based hiswork on an arbitraryfigure of

75 per Ib ( 165 p rkg) empty weight. Any

alteration or modification put forward had

to meet thi s r equi r emen t; i f i t wou ld cos t

more per unit saved, it was rejected. When

a change of design added weight, but saved

more t ha n t he yardstick figure of extra

weight, itwa given due consideration.

A m odul ar approach was the basis of

simplifying construction to s u ch a n e x t e n t

t h at , o n c e t h e p l a n t got into ful l w ing, a ll

the various parts could be mated within a

normal eight-hour shift. The fatigue-test

ing crack at 80 per cent of design life-span

had led to s ome strengthening of the

affected ect i onaroundt he area w here t he

two engi ne m ount fa irings were incorpo

rated. Here, the fu e lage began i ts taper

toward the rail secti on, w hi ch t erm inat ed

in a hinged, upward-tilting tail-cone.

There were t hreem ai n fu elage ections

- forward from the nose to abaft the cock

pit, c e nt r e, a n d aft - incorporating the

engine m ount i ngs and empennage fixingpoints. Wit h the tradition<ll internal

bomb-bay no longer needed, withalls tores

carried on pylons, t he avi oni cssuiteswere

located forward, and t hererem ai ned some

24.5 cubic feet of unusedspace internally.

The common belief t h at t he A -I was

b ui l t a r ou n d t h e GA - / A g un is partly

right, but t he p o i t io ni ng o f t he wings

(low), a n d e n g in e h i gh ) , a n d the need to

give the pilot t he m axi m um visibility, all

also had an impact on the airframe design.

n interior wide-angle view ofthe Maryland plant

showsin detai l the paperhoneycombsectionsof

construction. US

Below A Fairfield worker isseen preparing

various A l components for bonding ofcardboard

honeycomb. Adhesivefi lm was put

in place. honeycomb material was positioned

and thenlightly sealed down pr ior to theactual

bonding process. US

Below right A rotary mill cutsmetalhoneycomb to

the correc ts izeforbondingto the A l engine

nacelledoor covering. US

63



THE IO DESCRIBED THE IO DESCRIBED

Looking forwardalong the under-fuselagefromthe portelevator. showingthe various

ventral lymountedantennae. including therearward-slopedVHF/AM bladeand theVHF FM blade as well as thefuel-dump pipeto port. Peter Smith

Location o f t h e e n gi n es aft o n t he uppe

rear fuselage was deliberate policy, leavin

the wings f re e o f e n cu m br a nc e . The

advantages o f t h e engines positions wer

listed by Vincent Tizio, as follows:

further separated from t h e o t he r by rigi

foam panels and protective firewalls. The

two widclyseparatedhydraulicsupply mod

ules, t h e e n vi r on m en t al c on t ro l u n it a n

the auxiliarypower unit A P U ) are locate

in the aftersector under the engines.

The fuselage immediately abaft the

cockpit has two rectangular-shaped flush

air inlets forward, and the tw o outboar

d u mp n o :: l es aft. These reveal the loca

tion of theavionicsequipment bays, wher

the densely packed electronics cabinet

require maximum airflow for cooling out

side the pilor s titanium armour citade

The various antcnnae arc ventrall

mounted, including the rearward-slopin

VHF/AM blade, a nd t he VHF/FM blade

Also located here are the fuel-dump pipeto

port, and a ventral strake, an addition tha

was deemed desirable after in itia l tr ia ls

The AP e xh au st \ Tn ts t hr ou gh t h

IOlVer after-fu e age_ The fuel-dump pip

access is a largcr opening. The main fue

bag tanks arc l o ca t ed a l on g t h e t o p o f thi

s e ct i on o f t h e fuselage, w it hi n t h e m ai

fuselage a n d s u rr o un de d by r et i u la te

foam for self-sealingin t h e e v e n t o f a c ti o

damage. Smaller sLimp tanks,also self-sca

ing, arc locatedat the bottom and contain

sufficient reserve fuel supplyfor 230 mile

370km).

Powerplant Positioning

I C learunderw ing and fuselage area fo

loading up t o e l ev e n pylons w it h a

unre tricted variety ofordnance.

2 lncrea ed invulnerability to F O D vi

the extremely high vacuum-cleanin

effect o f t he big turbofan ingestin

debrisfrom rough stripsl

3. Less c h a nc e o f gun-gas ingestion intthe engines.

4. Ease of maintenance in the fi ld and

access for rapid rearming and fuellin

turnaround of aircraft in forward-are

combat condition, fo r a high sorti

rate_

S Minimal ground jet blasteffect, aide

by the upward cant o f t h e n o d e s aft

6. M o un ti ng o n separate nacelles on

either side o f t he fuselage reduced

one-strike-and-you re-out AA A o

re i s ta n t a n d self-sealing, and filled with

folded foam-rubber panels. This reticulat

ed systemsub-divides the tanks,re tricting

airflow, spillage a nd c om bu tion within

them. Each tank is shielded bymore foam

protection, paddingout the space between

t he t ank a nd t he i nne r fuselage, and is

The APU exhaust can be seen here. below theengine on theright-handside.in the

lower after-fuselage.Thelarger opening isthe fuel-dump pipeaccess. The mainfuel

bag tanksare located alongthe topof thissect ion of thefuselage. within the main

fuselage andsurrounded by reticulatedfoam forself-sealing inthe eventof action

damage.Smallersumptanks.also self-sealing. arelocated atthe bottomand contain

sufficient reservefuel supply for 23 miles (370km). Peter Smith

The low rearfuselage. showingthe APU inlet (the exhaust venting isopposite. on

theport sideI The lower sideof theGeneralElectr icTF-34-GE-l00 turbofan engine

nacelle can also be seen. Peter Smith

The starboard ide o f t h e lower forward

fuselage features t h e e me r ge nc y rescue

access. T here i no boarding-ladder provi

sion o n t h i ide o f t h e aircraft.

The main fuel tanks, built I y Goodyear

Tire Rubber Company, are ated in

t he e nt ra l section. These tanks are tear-

o ut h an dl e a nd a rm a me n t access panel,

centre, with the forward hinged door. The

whole underside o f t he frontal fuselage

hinges d ow n t o starboard t o g iv e u nr i

valled and unrestricted maintenance

a c es s t o t h e whole of the General Electric

/ 49E-6 cannon ystem.

t h e b o tt o m o f t h e fuselage abaft the pylon

hinge upward and gives acce s t o t h e liq

uid oxygen. Four inset flush air inlet to

cool the avionics h el ve s a rc l oc at ed

behind and below the cockpit.

The f r on t c e nt r al p o rt fuselage section

houses the external rescue latchw ith pull-

Detail ofthe fuselage abaftthe cockpit. which carries both the national insignia.

and that of the US irForcesin Europe. The two rectangular-shapedflush air inlets

forward. andthe two outboarddump nozzles aft. reveal the location ofthe avionics

equipmentbays.where thedensely packed electronicscabinets require maximum

airflow forcooling outsidethe pilot s titanium armourcitadel. Peter Smith

t he g un a nd t he e ng in e affected

is very apparent, especially for

and cockpit visibility was certainly

o r ta n t c on s id er a ti o n. The A-IO

20-degree visibility overthe nose,

over the side and a omplete

round. The need to accom

the huge Gatling in the aircraft s

the length. The adoption of

versal aeria l refuelling receptacle

( ARRSI), a ls o i n a unique posi

p t h e nose and ahead of the pi lot

the need to accommodate the

protective titanium bathtub llictat

configuration ofthe forward section.

the port sside forward,easy access to

electronics and avionics com

is by way of drop-down panels.

hinged door s open out to the star

side o f t h e aircraft and the whole

offset to that side to accommodate

/A A vengerG atling that take

o f t h e space forward. On the lower

fuselage, there is a square panel

access t o t he electrical sy tems

and a test panel with four oblong

recesses, and, just a h ea d o f t h a t , t h e

magazine.

forward port fuselage section houses

and fully retractable board

der, with built- in steps, in a stowage

is lowered and r ai ed automatically

pilot s cockpit, and is dulylabelled

warningsign to tand C le ar . B oth

and abaft th is door are the vertical

ntallyslatted air-ventilatingout

the ductsmark the loca

the flexible ammunition feed chutes

the two drums, e a ch h o ld i ng

PGU-13 high-explosive HE) or

armour-piercing AP) incendiary

Below the fuselage is the ventrally

HF bladeaerial.

small, bottom-hinged pull-down

with recessed finger grip is located

ow the rear c an op y o n t h e tar

side o f t h e forward fuselage. This is

manual cockpit rescue release.

fairing t h a t e x te n ds downthe starboard side o f t h e fuselage at

centre is the side-mounted pylon,

A A -35 P VE PENNY laser spot

devi e T his tracker device locks

nd trackssurface target illuminat

aser, a nd t ra n m it t he d at a directly

pilot s head-up d i p lay H D), or

to t he o nb oa rd c on tr ol o f t he

Maverick anti-armour missile.

mounted V H F homing aer

th is . A small hatch at

64 65



THE IODESCRIBED THE IO DESCRIBED

ardrearwing showing thecurved blended fillet atthe junctionof thefuselage

section, with i tstrai l ing-edge slottedflaps inboard. Also seen are

ncestation pylons, numbered r ightto left) 8 7 6 5 and 4 Peter C Smith

Above Close-up view ofthe portunderside of

the wing showingthe layout ofthe single-slott

Fowler-type interchangeable trai l ing-edgeflap

andailerons. Alsovisible isthe honeycomb

compositeconstruction ofthe tabbalance wei

Small rubber grippers on t h e e d ge o f t h e f l a p a r

a ground-handlingsafetydevice inadvertently

leftin place. Peter Smith

The starboardwheel-fair ing kneecap , and

leading edge ofthe innerhydraulical ly operate

interchangeable Fowler-type wing slats, which

have three settings,improve airflow and provid

added lift at slow speed. The flap deflection on

productionmodelsis 20 degrees, compared wit

twice as much on the prototypes. Peter Smith

Below Theunderside ofthe hydraulical ly

powered, heavily camberedstarboard wing flap

Whendeployed, these split aileron/decelerons

increasethe standard wing area. Peter Smith

Possible Loadings

5 was an afterthought, to give better air

flow. l at s o n t he leading edge o f e ac h

wing o n t h e i n i de o f t h e wheel fairing are

there to avoid stall at lowspeed and high

atrack angle.

The porr wheel fairing kneecap at the

leadingedge o f t h e outer wing has a front

section, which hinges down, and houses on

its left-hand side the single-point pressure

refuelling connection attachment, where

the fuel hose is connected. T his fairing

nose also houses, o n t h e r i gh t -h a nd side,

the self-test maintenance panel, for routine

testing o f t h e aircraft s y tems. The under

carriage fairings house the Menasco tricy

cle undercarriage. This forward-retracting

g ea r h as Typ e VII mainwheels and trap

doors. The rear parr o f t he fairing can

accommodate a A lE-40 chaff/ R decoy

dispenser.

Based on the Skyraider, t he A -I O has

eleven stores pylons - ten underw ing and

one centrally mounted under the fuselage,

numbered I to 5 u n de r p or t w in g) , 6 central) and 7 to I I under the rarboard

wing). tations I, 2, IO and II have a

pylon w e ig h t l i mi t of I, OOlb 454kg),

while stations 3 and 9 have a pylon limit

of 2,5001b I , 1 35 k g) a n d s t at i on s 5 6

and 7 were rated at 2,5001b I, 135kg) load

capacity. The centreline pylon is rated at

5, 0 Ib 2,275kg) capacity loading and is

o ne o f t hr ee o f t he t at io ns p lu mb ed for

the 50 -gallon 6 0 gallons/2,27I

lin-es) droptanks foroverseas ferry flights.

The leading edges o f t he o ut er wing

have a 7-degree dihedral and pa ne ls a r e of

honeycomb composition. The A-IO was

designed from t he o ut et as a l ow -s p ed

aircraft a nd t he wing were configured

with n il weep. The requirement for shorr

take-off and landing operations ( T O l )

from primitiveor makeshift airstrips close

to the f r ontline in a central E ur ope a n ba t

rle scenario, and for tight ba ttle f ield tur ns

at low altitudes, was met by a d e ep a n d

rounded ACA 6716 profile, which

tapers to a NAC A 6713 profile a t t he t ip

o f t h e wing. The elongatedP itot tube head

is m ou nt ed o n t he starboard outer wing

section. S tarboard navigation and strobe

lights are carried o n t h e c a m be r ed wingtip

fairing. The A- IO carries an AlE-40 chaff

dispen er i n i de t h e c u r ve o f t h e H oe r ne r ,

w hichcan also carry infra-red IR) decoy

f la re for protection against such Russian

nasties as t h e S A - 7 Grail.

The single-slotted Fowler-type inter

changeable t ra il in g-edge f laps and

ailerons, with their cables and actuating

rods, have hydraulic hinge activation. The

a i le r on t a b is of honeycomb composite

con truction, with t a b b a la n ce weights.

ingle-slotted flaps are mounted inboard

o f t h e ailerons. The inboard flaps are auto

matically openedat slowspe d byhydraulic

jacks, to improve airflow and give wing lift

at low speed. Each hydraulically operated,

interchangeable Fowler-type wing slat has

three settings. The flap deflection on pro

duction models is 20 degrees, compared

withtwice t h at o n t h e prototypes.

The very large hydraulically powered

ailerons/decelerons and slotted flaps split

and hinge upwards and downwards a t t he

l eading edge to s low the aircraft. When

deployed, the e split a ilerons/decelerons

increase the srandard wing area. The set

tingsusedare 7degreesfor the take-off pro

file and 9degree for landings.They al so a t

as airbrakes, s plitt inga bove and below the

wing, and can alsobe utilized asdive brakes.

The flaps are interchangeable and the

aircraft can still fly with one flap shot away.The control cab le (used ins tead of the

more vulnerable rigid control rod s) a re

duplicated, and led thr ough a r m our e d ducts

o n b o th sides o f t h e fuselage. They operate

the triple redundancy hydraulic flight-con

trol system. The rear wing features the

curved blended fillet a t t h e j u n ct i on o f t h e

fu elage a n d t h e i n n e rwing section, withits

trailing-edge slottedflaps inboard.

A ventral srabilizerfairing o n t he front

o f t h e fuselage-mounted ordnance station

c e n tr s e ct i on , d i he d ra l le d o u te r s ctions

and sharply drooping wingtips. These take

the form of cambered wingtip fairings, the

flat outer edges ofthe dow nturned H oern

er w in gt ip d e igned to reduce drag and

give improved aileron effe tiveness. This

design provides better lift capabilities at

low speeds and minimized t ip los e s ll l.

Giving the wingtip this droop increases

c ru is e range by 8 per cent, it is claimed.

The Fairchildlow-wing mounting,asdi

tinct from the high-w ing a ppr oa c h of

orthrop s YA-9 contend r was motivated

by the need t o m o un t t h e m a x i mu m num

ber of weapon-carrying pylons without

compromising the aircraft s sustain d, low

level, low-speed handlingand manoeuvra

bility. The straight wings have trailing-edge

splitflaps, while theordnance is mainlycar

ried o n t he t en underwing pylons, plus an

optional central s ta ti on u nd er t he main

body o f t he aircraft. The heaviest load

bearing pylons are c o nc e nt r at e d o n t h e

thicker, inner section o f t h e wing, closer to

the fuselage itself, and the aircraft s centre

of gravity. The rolling inertia o f t h e A-IO

was thus sub tantially reduced, which aids

handling in the fully laden configuration.

A Iso, a l ow w in g a ll ow s e as y a cc es s for

rearming and aids fast combat sortie rurn

around times. witching the bulk ofthe fuel

carried from the wing t o t h e central fuselage

reduces vulnerability, although integral fuel

tanks a re t il l c ar r ied o n t he wing centre

sections, port and starboard.

considerations affecting the place

t h e e n g i ne s were infra-red blank

tability

main landing gear partially retracts

faired pods, and this con

to the unique wing form and

that is necessary for the low-level

envelope for w hich the A-10

igned. It a lso enables a wide land

eartrack, offering maximum stability,

i a l in operations f rom rough for

landing grounds.

wings are of three-spar construc

w ith the fuel ranks in the centre sec

Extensive wind-tunnel testing result

t he u ni qu e profile, w i th s t ra i gh t

gs, Flaps and Fairings

damage so c o mm o n a m on g

pe l ik e th F-I05.

I tanks kept well awayfrom engine

sections, for additional security.

engine noi e in the cockpit,

pilot fatigue and enhancing

time_

a ci ng engines outside the main

ture permits a s imp le , uninter

structure.

t ure p o te n ti a l, s h ou l d a l ar ger

i n e b e co m e a requirement, and

space for fu elage-carried111

66 67



THEA-IO DESCRIBED THEA-IO DESCRIBED

Empennage

The tail unit is a tlVin interchangeable

T hi - configuration, c om mo n d ur in g

econd World War, but less popularfo

rast three decades, allows the a i r r a

continue functional flying even if one

of the tail is shot away by ground fire.

p or t a nd starboard unit· a rc f ul ly i

c h a ng e a hle . Bo th the rudder and el e

Mk 2 L DG P a n d AIR bomhs. The rear

section of t h e m ai n wh e el semi-recessed

housi ng can house an LEA chaff dis

p e n se r /I R d e c oy d isp e ns e r, a s \Veil as the

ol eo a nd t rap for the f o rw a rd s e mi

retractable main\Vhecl housing.

T here is a commonalityof parts between

t he p or t a nd starboard sides, and l andi ng

g ea r, a iler o n rudder, elevators, control

acuators a n d e n gi n es a re a ll d up l i ca re d,

Above The hydraulically operatedrudder actuator on the lower p o rt i on o f t h e s t a rb o ar d u n i t o f t h e twin interchangeable tail f i n. A t t h e

frontof thefair ing isa smallformation-keeping l ight Peter Smith

Right Detail ofthe starboardrudderand endplate tail f i n o f t h e twin interchangeable tail unit on A-10 AF-77-259. Peter Smith

Top Detailof thestarboardempennageshowingthe inside configuration ofthe rudder and endplatetai l fin.The projection below thetail-cone

isthe receivingantenna ofthe ALR-69 radarwarning system, which comprises the ALR46 V receivercoupled with the ALR-64 CompassSail

low-band missilealert receiver,This apparatusprovides an all-roundnoticeof enemyradar locking on tothe aircraft in readinessto engage.

elowthatsection isthe ventral lymountedradarwarningantenna.The portand starboard elevatorshave trimtabs outboard, Peter Smith

a nd c an b e q ui c kl y r e mo v ed i n h ig h- r is k

c o mb a t, t h us i mp r ov i ng t h e m a no e uv r a

hility o f t h e aircraft.

A m on g t h e more exot i cordnance that

can form rart o f a n A-la s working kit are

the LA -6 even-round rocket launcher,

the MX -64 baggage pod, the Mk 7

Rockeye and t he U-64 Gator, c1u,ter

lo m b uni t s C B U ), a s w e ll a s m or e mun

dane w earons ouch as the S -3 H a n d

B et ween t hem , th e se w in g p y lo n s can

cope w ith ju s t about everytype of standard

USAF tactical confi gurat i on, i ncludi ng

el ect roni c count ermeasures E C M) pods,

electronic warfare EW) dispensers and

the A LQ -1 31 d e ep and shallow), the

ALQ-I 4 V )-IS l o ng ) , a n d t he A LQ

1 4 V) - 1 l o ng ) po ds , p lu va ri ed o rd

nance, i ncl udi ngMk 2 I o w- d mg , g e n er

a l -r u rp o se , o r L DG P ), M k 4 L DG P, Mk

2 AIR, M1 1 7 w ith MA - 1 7 f in ) ,b o m b s

and B D U-33 pract i ce bombs, The wing

s p ar s a r e s tr e ss e d f or 733 g w h ile c a r ry in g

at maximumordnance capacity, The inner

st at i ons can be f it te d w it h L A - 117 s in

gl e-roundor LA - triple-round Maver

ick launchers, while t h e o u tb o ar d wing

p y lo n s, w ith lighter rayl oad l i m i tat i on-,

can b e f itte d w ith the dual-rail adapter for

two A I M- 9 L/ M i d ew in d er missiles,

R epresentat i ve and typical A -l0 load

ing s a r e g iv e n in the table below,

Thin ventral s tl a ke s w er e a dd ed i n

order to improve the airflow a r ou n d t h e

fuselage weapons pylons at stations 5 and

7. These stationsthemselvesare detachable

Port undercarr iage fair ing ofthe Menasco tricycle

undercarriage showing the forward retracting gear

with the Type VIImainwheels and trapdoors.The

rearpart ofthe fair ingcan accommodate an ALE-40

chaff/lR decoydispenser. Alsoseen isordnance

station 4, of which t h e i n b oa r d p y lo n h as a

maximum loading weightl imit of 3,5001b 1,588kg).

TheA-10can carryexotic ordnancesuch as the

LAU-68 seven-round rocket launcher,the MXU-648

baggagepod, the Mk 7Rockeye andthe SUU-64

Gator,clusterbomb units, as well as more mundane

weapons, like the SUU-30H and Mk 82 LDGP and

AIR bombs. Peter Smith

ative pylonloading forthe A 10 -Mk82 Mk77 Mk 20 Rockeye AGM-65 Laser-guidedbombs AIM-9 2.75 I LUU-l LUU-2 30mm

500lb Incendiary Clusterbombs Maverck Sidewinder Rockets

bombs missie missieI -

-GBU-l0 BGU-12 1 000CBU-52 CBU-65 CBU-87 CBU-89 CBU-97

12 2 1 0004 2 1 000

- - _ -

6 2 2 1 000

4 2 2 1000 6 2 1000

4 2 2 1000- -

6 2 1.000- -

I 1.0006 2

2 2 1.000

4 2 I 1.000f - - - -

I4 2 1.000_

outof Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona, banks overthe desert while carrying out

n g m is s io n . N o t e t h e l a s e r p y lo n i s e mp t y a nd o n ly a s i n g l e Maverick

USAF

68 69



THEA-IO DESCRIBEDTHE A IO DESCRIBED

Breakdownof single-engined CAS Gombat loss

by types llS

By designing the wing and tailpla

c on ti nu ou one -p ie ce structures,

building their surfaces around three

of approximatelyequalsize andstreng

was hoped tha t the loss of anyone cou

absorhed by the remaining two. The

approach wa taken with the fuse

which conta ined four main longe

allowing the aircraft to survive on th r

great deal of w o rk w as later don

Fa irc h ild s c ien tists , in conjunction

the ir Fo r c e Fligh t Dynamics Labor

at Wright Patterson AFB, Oh io , o n

frame and general damage tolerance

ways to strengthen airframes against

Prior to the l at e 1 96 0 , this type of an

sis h ad n ev er b ee n done in depth,

Fairchild s work at this time has bene

other systems, both military and civi

this day.

Percentage ofdamage oss

62 per cent

8 percent

percent

7 per cenl

3 percent

Leh Detail ofthe starboard Type VII mainwheels ofthe Menasco tricycle

undercarriage, which aretotal ly interchangeable port and starboard.They f

forwards intothe large bulbousfair ing centre ,to eliminateany weakeningof

highly stressed wing The wheels ofthe main landinggearprotrude below t

fair ing sufficiently tominimize damagein anyemergencybellylanding. Peter

Above Close-up ofthe nosewheel ofthe Menasco tricycle undercarriage fr

thestarboardside, with the oleogear retractedto itsminimumlength.Theto

ofthe hydraulic activation leverholdsa landing spotlight,and the hydraulic

steering unitis seen directly abovethat. Behindthestrut i s the hingedrear

door with retention straps, and above isthe lower section ofthe rectangula

py lon,at the bottomof which the AAS-35 PAVE PENNYlaser-seekingpod is

located. Peter Smith

Above, right Starboardside view of thenoselanding gear of theMenasco

tricycle undercarriage. The Type VIInosewheel isforward retracting andha

emergency gravity extension. Peter Smith

auseof damage oss

Damage to fuel system

P ot incapacitation

Fy ng-contro damage

Loss of enginepower

Structural damage

period gave them a unique insight, and

FRC th er e f or e h a d something of a h ea d

start in designing the A-tO. They alsostud

ied Israeli lossesin the ix-Day War, which

h a d b e en unexpectedly severe. They found

that in both these widely different combat

areas, AAA h it s c au se d m or e damage or

losses than Ms. A b r ea k do w n of vulner

able areas came out as hown in the table.

emergency gravity extension. The nose

wheel and its gear is offset to the starboard

side of the aircraft s nose to accommodate

the General Electric A/A 49E-6 cannon

ystem. The cylindrical hydraulic steering

unit is mounted between the two landing

lights and thestarboardopeningdoor folds

upwards and inwards t o e nc as e t he Type

VII unit totally.

Internal Arrangements

Re pu b lic h a d conducted detailed studies

and analysi intothe cause ofcombat losses

o n t he F-I05 during the Vietnam Wa r. I ts

database grewas losses ofThunderchiefs to

ground fire and m is s ile s s te a dily in r ea s ed

during the period 1965-68, when opera

tions intensified. Their findings over a lo ng

RIGHI SYSTM

HYORAUIIC RfSfRVOIR

~ U X l l l ~ R Y POwfR UNIf

fNVIR CONIROI UN

un SYS IfM

HYORAULIC R[SrRVOIR

RUDD[R

marks this out as a production model. The

YA-IO prototypes featured an angularcon

figuration here.

The l ow r e ar f us el ag e has the A PU

inlet, with the exhaust venting opposite,

on thepor t side. The hydraulically operat

ed rudder actuators are o n t he lo we r p o r

t io n o f t h e twin interchangeable ta il f in.

Undercarriage

The main landing gear h as a simple wide

trackmain gear with anti-skidbraking and

a steerable nose gear. Both the main gear

use i ng le struts that do not t um , b ut

retract forward, so that in an emergency

they free-fa 114

The Menasco tricycleundercarriage has Type VIl mainwhee l

(dimensions 36 x II in), which are totally

in te rchangeab lepor t and ta rboard. They

fold forwards. in to rhe large bulbou fairing

to e l imina te anyweaken ing of the highly

s tre s se d w in g. The wheels o f t he main

landing gear protrude b el o w t hi s f ai ri ng

s u f fic ien tly to m in im ize damage in any

emergency belly landing.

The Ty pe V I I nosewheel m e as u r es 2 4 x

7.7-lOin, i f o r wa r d- r e tr a ctin g and has

WING

r 0 r t a n d s ta rb oa rd e l ev at o rs h v trim

tabs outboard.

The underside view of the after-fu elage

and u n de r ca r ria ge f e atu re s a c u rv e d a fte r

tail fin. The huge engine nacellehouses the

massive TF34 high-bypass turbofan and is

mounted close in to the fuselage,simplifying

the asymmetric handling problems. This

type of engine has fewer moving parts, sim

plifying installation and maintenance. The

9,000Ib.s.t. engines arc also very quiet com

pared with those of conventional jets and,

having no afterburner, p re s en t a much

s m aller lR f o otp r in t f or SAMs and hand

held missiles to lock on to The core engine

exhaust nozzle itself is canted upwards a t the

r ea r, r e du c in g th is ig na tur e even further.

The angled exhaust ducts vent betweenthe twin-boomed tail fins. The engines are

positioned uniquely above the wings and

to the rear of the aircraft, to give great

invulnerability to light groun I fire, and a

degree of immunity f ro m d e br is f o r eig n

object damage, or F D), when operating

from primitive forward airstrips, the Auto-

b hn and so on.

The rudder has a n e xt en si on s tr ip o n

the lo we r e d ge , w h ile the bulbous lower

frontal s ec ti on o f t he e ndpl at e t ai l f in

G ~ U l A GUN

tructed of a honeycomb compos

t ur e that combines lightne s with

A s m all formation-keeping light

at the front of the fairing for the

operated rudder actuator on

por ti on o f t he s ta rb o ar d u n it.

lar ge n a ce lle s h id in g the General

TF-34-GE-100 t ur bo fa n ar c s et

the wingsclose to the rear fuse

the twin-tail assembly provides

safety margin dictated by a l ow

low-altitude battlefield combat sce

his aircraft was designed for a high

ti-s o rtie r ole, and had to be

for intense SovietSAM and fight

Tank columns from Central

were expected to b u rs t a cr os s the

plain at any time, to swamp ATOsheer weight of numbers.

cting below the tail-cone is the

an tenna o f the ALR-69 radar

system, which c ompr is es t h e

receiver coup led with the

om pas s a il low-band missile

This apparatus provide an

nd notice of enemy radar locking

the aircraft in readiness to engage.

that section is t h e v en tr al l y

radar-warning antenna. The

arrangement.

70 71



THE tO DESCRIBED Ti lE tO DESCRIBED

A-lOs began to be dep loyed to

pean zone of operat ions , even

- in strengths were found to be

i ronica lly, th is was partly

o f t h e A-I O s ,uccess. Increased

times meant more exposure at

and in turhulence, and the orig

s ign had n ot bee n required to

for this. Cracks were found in the

of fastener holes in the lowerwing

ome A -lOs were equipped with

which revealed t ha t t he

ng sk in were experiencing three

expectednumber ofhigh-g load

led to thicker lowerskins being

ted, giving a n e xt e nd ed life of

,

interior of t he A-IO naturally

thesame emphasis on survivabili

exterior de ign. The flight con

use completely redundant, dual

lically powered actuation servos,

drive dual flight control surfaces,

is also a manual back-up system,

the pilot the ability toge t his dam

safely hack to base should all

power be lost.

duality built in under the sun iv

mandate is extensive. Evena major

a projectile is not always ertain of

g the A-IO. Losing any fuselage

anymain structural rib, orone

chment , o r engine a t tachment ,

not necessarily C<1u e catastrophic

The control system involves the

independentlyactuated ailerons

to ensure survival even if

lost. imilarly , sub-systems, and

such as a l te rna tors and

were p lac ed in widely separated

The flight control systems had

l led in other aircraft, b ut t he A

wide phy icai eparation,withcon

running through troughs on sep

of the aircraft.

Originally des igned to make d iving

attacks, the a ir cr af t h as a dive velocity

stabilized a t 2 60 k no ts by the airbrakes

( de ce le ro ns ), w it h t he u pp er a nd lower

surfaces of the ailerons opening up.

The fuel system is well protected, and

combat damage is kept to a minimum via

thc independen t tanks and feed systcms.

There is no need for special fuel manage

ment for the con tro l o f the aircraft s cen

tre of gravity, as the main tanks are locat

cd r igh ta t that spot to mainta in ba lance .

The fuel system is completely automatic

and has b ee n k ep t basic, with single

point refuelling, a nd t h e slipway a top the

nose replacing the probe of the YA-IO.

Three o f t h e stores stations, 4, 6 and 8,

arc adap ted to take the P/ 7540 63-1

fuel tanks (600 US gallons/2,270 litres

capacity), a fac il i ty i nc lu de d t o allow

ferry operations from CO U bases to

Europe, Asia or any other potential dan

ger point.

Spec ial pa in ts were t ri al le d o n t he

outer surfaces to reduce the IR signature

via sun glint. The pilot s survival,should

evcryother ystem fail to keep his mount

airborne, r e t s with the zero-zero (:ero

height, :ero- peed) e ject ion seat , g iving

h im eve ry chance of be ing p icked up.

The original pre-production YA-IOs and

the firs t 101 production A-lOs featured

the McDonnel l Douglas IE-9 Escapac,

which was tandard U AF equipment

the time. However, early in the produc

tion life (commencing with number I 2,

wi th sin 77 -1077), an improved scat from

the same company, the Advanced Con

cept Ejection Sea t(ACES II), was intro

d uc ed , a nd e ar l ie r operational aircraft

were retro-fitted.

TheACE II works on a fully automat

ic inertia-reel system, with rocket catapult

ejection tr iggered in three scenarios, as

shown in the table below.

time sequenceoptions

Jettson

fres

gun f res to slow seat

fres

chute bndle severs

tme to safe altitude

release actuates

Inflation

survival kit deploys

lime sequence sees low speed

00

03

N/A

0.5

N/A

N/A

0.75

25.8

lime sequence sees hgh speed

00

03

047

127

142

N/A

152

29

64

lime sequence sees hgh alttude

00

03

047

1.27

142

variable

variable

variable

variable

72

Ease of Maintenance

Designed to opera te with the bare mini

mum o f s uppo rt in extreme conditions,

rapid ru rnaround ofcombat mis ions and

easy maintenanceof the aircraft s systems

wer e k ey f ac to rs i n the A-IO s design.

Much thought was g iven to this, a nd t he

resulting aircraft is outstanding in these

respects. The built-in system test for fault

isolation, and the quick-disconnect com

ponents ensure this. The A-I wa, alsoas

self-sufficient as possihle, with a 30 per

cent reduction in speciali:ed ground- up

port equipment being c1aimed 14

A tul1laround t ime of th irty minutes

between sorties was the aim, providing 80

per cent availability, based on an average

mission time of I. hour . In thar half-hour

on the ground, the supportingteam can fully

refuel the A-I 0 and load ix Mk 2 bombs

on sixstations,along with fullyre-ammuni

tioning the Gatling, makinga total weight

of 2,0001b (910kg) combat loading. The

design target for main tenance on theA-I 0

is 9 .2 hou rs p er f ligh t hou r, a f igure that

compa res wi th 19. hou rs for the simple F

5E, and 26 hours for the A-7. The civilian

on-condition method was initially adopted

for engine maintenance with onboard

inspection. The engine modules, including

theho t section, can be changed withoutan

engine removal, a can all the fan blades.

The engine overhaul t<lrget wa 3,500 hours.

The installation of an engine can takeplace

with the half-hour time frame,as there is no

need to move any airframe sections.

To help speedy maintenance, each mov

<lble surface and the control co lumn in the

cockpit are aligned with rigging pins. To

reducehydraulicleaks, permanent connec

tions femure all through the system, except

for the actuators. At the Edwards AFB tri

a ls , 6 .2 maintenance hours per flight hour

was achieved over a l38-f1ight period.

Cockpit

The single-place co ckp it o f t he A -I

Thunderbolt II hinges r ea rwards , h as a

padded and armoured headrest, and is

quipped with the McDonne l l Douglas

ACES II ejection s cat an d t he Kaiser

head-up display (H D). A sma ll , bottom

hinged pull-down panel with recessed fin

ger grips is fitted just below the rear canopy

for external manual cockpit rescue release.

The pi lot s wi ndscreen is bulIet-proof,

made from a IY2in 3 cm) th ick glass-and-

plasti sandwich, and the front screen was

tested with 7.62mm armour-piercing (AP)

projectiles. The wholepilot s compartment,

along with the internal ammunition canis

ters, is surrounded by a titanium citaclel that

is proof again t lightgrouncl fire.

Originally built w i thout any inertial

navigation system I S), the A-1O was

originally to have reiied torally on visual

navigation and target acquisition and iden

tification. A simple and robust fixed gun

sight reticule o n t he HUD and a control

panel for the Maverick missile were the

soleaids to targeting. The introcluction of

mobile Soviet AM units such as the

SA- Gecko, and mobile AAA weaponry,

73

An engineer makesadjustmentsto the ACES II

ejection seat first introducedin No 77-1077.

Natona Archves Colege Park MD

typified by the quadruple 23mm ZSU

tem, capable of 4,000rpm, and their ac

deployment in among the batrle tank

the front line, led to a i tch of polic

the TAC 5 review. The change from d

to low-level attack also brought about

need to retro-fit the system.

Optimum pilo t and inst rument p ro

tion is provided by the titanium batht

This citadel is built in and integral w

the forward airframe and consists of v

ously sized heavy titanium sheets bo

together. The toml wcight of the enclos

is I,2001h (545kg)and accounts for a l

part of the ovcrall lVeight of 2,88

(1,310kg) devo ted to protect ion , o r so

14 per cent o f t he A-IO s to ta l em

weight. The thickncss o f t hi box va

from in (12.5mm) to a maximum of I

3 mm) extending up t o t he c an opy a

windscreen framing. The pilot, his eje

scat, and all flying control and instrum

panels, sitwithin this shield.The insid

the bathtub is lined with ballistic nylo

n eg at e t he effects of t i tan ium pal

internally from direct hits externally. D

ing the statictesting to compare the re

tance of the t i tan ium pla tes against b

ceramics andaluminium, some430 rou

of API and HEI were fired in to the co

pit area, with 7.62mm API fired in to

armoured windscreen. The A-IO s pi

un ival from uch hits wasrated ten tim

higher t ha n t h at o f pilots ofconventio

warplanes. The Gulf War would dem

strate that such academic ratios could

fully borne out in combat conditions.

The pilot s instrument layouts as origi

ly conceived and finallyfitted arc illustra

in the diagram ancl photograph on pageThe conceptwas toavoid complex avion

to keep down cost and improve main

nance and sortie rates. Therefore, no co

puter ancl no radar is featured. Fire con

for bombing and strafing is via the sim

gunsight, on whichairspeed, diveanglea

tucle (including roll angle), and altitude

displayed, withtarget information.A tele

sion displayandhand controller is useclw

the Maverick missile, which, once aim

requires no further attention from the pi



THEA-IO DESCRIBED THEA-IO DESCRIBED

• Air to air radio

• Air to ground radio

• Basi c HUD display

• TACAN navigation system

• PAVE PEN Y l ascr spot scckcr

• Maverick ASM provision.

For adverse weather conditions which

might blank out laser and visual weapons

sighting a beacon transpondercan becar-

ried for use with the MSQ 77 blind deliv-

erysystcm Thc full complcmcntof avion-

ics installed wasas follows:

Starboardsideof thefuselage - thepull-down

panel isfor externalmanual cockpit release. The

oblongfairing is theside-mounted pylonthat

carriesthe AAS-35 PAVE PENNY laserspot tracking

device. Thislocks on andtracks surface targets

illuminated by laserand transmitsthe data directly

tothe pilot s head-up display HUD ordirect lyto

the onboard controlsof theAGM-65Maverick anti

armour missile. Theventrally mounted VHF homing

aerial can be seenbehindthis. The small hatchat

the bottomofthe fuselage abaftthe pylon hinges

upwardsforaccess tothe liquid oxygen, while the

fourinset flush air inlets are tocool the avionics

shelves locatedbehind and below thecockpit.

Peter Smith

Below In-flightrefuelling helped to extend the

A-10s rangeconsiderably. but thiswas only a

necessityfor long-range deploymentmissionsfrom

the CDNUS area outto Europe, Asia and theMiddle

East. Herea Hawg ofthe Air Force Reserve takesa

drink while hercompanionwaits herturn.

USAF

The cockpit ofthe A-10 presentsa clean, uncluttered appearance below .

SimonWatson

40. Enginecorespeedindicator L R

41. Engineoil pressure indicator L R

42. Fan speedindicator L R

43. Fue flowindicator44. APU tachometer45. APUtemperatureindicator46. Hydraul ic pressuregauge( eftsystem

andright system)

47. Fuequanti ty indicator48. Auxiliary landinggear extension handle

49. Laser spot seekerpanel50. Rudderpedaladiustmenthandle51. Essentialcircuit breakerpanel52. GuncameraCTVS53. HARSfasterectswitch

I

thefuselage - thesingle-place

A-10 ThunderboltII. showingthe

armouredheadrestof theMcDonnell

ACESII ejectionseat. The small. bottom

panel with recessedfinger grips

the rear canopyis forexternalmanual

se.The oblong fairing at centre

topof the side-mounted pylon, which

AAS-35 PAVE PENNY laserspottracking

starboard sideof thefuselage.

mirrorsometerfal lack indexers

(HUD)

lightsl storesjettisonswitchnef repul lhandle

hand lee fre pull handleshingagent

raswitchy l ighteel steering engagedlight

edl ightcontrolindicatorrolpanel

n l ightdeindicator

azimuthindicatortechan.l freq.indicator

attackindicatorindicator

ADIindicator

r

axi lightsswitchondisplay

eand overridebuttonon indicator

rolpaneltal situation indicator(HSI)tion mode selectpanelge turbinetemperatureindicator

7 7



THEA IO DESCRIBED

was as follows:A-10 Basic Dimensions and Areas 1974

CHAPTER NINE

Area488 s q f t (453m ); flap area80.2 s q f t 7 .4 5 m ) ; a i l e ro n a r a 4 7 .1 4sq ft

(438m ); deceleron area86.0 sq ft 7 . 9 9m ); a il er on t ab r ea 5 .0 q ft

0.46m ); leadingedge slatsarea 10.56sq ft (0.98Im )

Area 107.5 sq f t 9 .9 9 m ) ; r ud d er a r a 2 2.4 s q f t 2 .0 m )

L ngth 53ft 4in 16.25m); height14ft8in 4 .47 m ); h o ri z on t al t a il s p a n 1 f t

lOin 5.74m); wingspan55ft Oin 16.76m);wheel track17ft 2.6in 5.25m);

wheelbase 17ft8.76in 5.40m)

Area 118.4 s q f t 11m ); elevator area 29.0s q f t 2.69m ); elevator tab area

2 1 s q ft 0.19m )

turn radius altitude 5 OOOft/1 500m; tropical day conditions;

Mk 82 bombsl

target. TheHUD provides the pilotwith his

aimingcues, aswellas the pitch and roll atti

tudes, airspeed and altitude o f t h e aircraft.

The High-Bypass Turbofan

When the A-X programme w as f irs t i

ated, the problem of finding the opti

d ue t o t h e failure o fo ne o f t h e dual-p

T38 u n its , w h ich , s till c o up led u p, s u

all the power from the s ys tem . Ra pid

couplingmighthave saved the day and

l ed t o the installation of an automati

c o up ler , to s e pa r a te the section from

p r op d r ive s h ou ld a s imila r f a ilur e OCC

The turbopropcontinued to be pla

bymore problems, not onlywith the w

ing o f t he new automatic de-coupler,

also with overheating [on the skinaro

the exhaus ts, a lubrication problembearing failure ; the list went on and o

In themean time, Allison were modif

the T40 with a nine-stage compressor,

hop es o f a ch ie vi ng 5 ,5 00 hp w e re h

However, yet another incident occurr

June 1953, when a Skyshark being d

b y D ou gl as t e st pilot C G . D oc

ingston and his compatriotGeorgeJa

shed its propellers and part of the gear

Livi ngs ton go t the p lane down f or a c

landing, wasforced to eject, and ende

in a plaster cast forseveral months.

By now, t he US Navy was running

of pa tience . Heinemann , no t conv i

that the car-o rienta ted General Mo

concern was giving its Allisondivision

support, wasalready involved in the de

of a more conventionally powered

a lt er na ti ve , w hi ch b ec ame the fam

A4D Skyhawk. The avy cancelled

duction orders and the project even t

died. The Allison T40, however, con

ued to be tweaked and changed. A B

enquiry, headed by Commander A

Jacks, found t h at t he main difficultie

with the metallurgy of t he b ul l g

which was a t t he limitsof

the technoo f t h e day. With this, ando ther impr

ments, the T40 wen t o n t o c on fo un

critics, andeventually transmuted in to

engine that powered the successful L

heed Electraairliner.

The Navy sponsored t he T 40 , w hi ch

hadtwo power sections, eachdrivinga p a ir

of 14ft diameter Aeroproducts propellers.

By 1947, the Navy specification wasfor an

attack aircraft able to take o f f f r om the

short d ec ks c i rc a 470ft) of t h e l it tl e

asablanca class escort carriers, with a

combat radius of600 miles (960km), and

the ability to conduct sustained attack on

ground or sea targets. [n substituting sus

tained attack for ax imum lo ite r t ime ,

the p a ra lle ls w ith the A-X become evenmore significant.

That summer, Douglas was sent a letter

of intent for the engineering development

o f a n imp ro ve d A D , a nd t h is w as f ol

l ow ed by a contract f or tw o p r o to ty pe s ,

under the designation XA 20_1. 4 \

Along with project engineer Ben

Collins, Heinemann came up with a

22 OOOlb (I0,000kg) a ir cr af t, w i th f ou r

20mm cannonon three main bomb stations

for strafing and e igh t ( late r in cr e as e d to

twenty) other ordnance attachment points.

I t was capable of l ifting o f f t he d ec k in

und er 3 00 ft ( 90m) and had a maximum

speed o f4 00 knots, which, i t w as h op ed ,

could b e im pr o ve d to 500 knots, or c los e to

the final figures for the A-tO. This looked

like a f o rm ida b le a irc r af t, even i n 1 94 7.

Although the design was going w e ll, b y

1948, increasingly frequent problems were

being encountered with the turboprop.

These w er e s o s er i ou s that they delayed

the whole programme and the fi rst fl ight of

the Skyshark did no t t ak e place until 26

Ma y 1 9 50 . The unreliability o f t he gear

box and the sensitivity of the prop-control

system at one point prompted considerat ion of a change to the Prat t andWhitney

turbopropT34, but this was having its own

difficulties at the time.\H

By December 1950, the A2D-l had

achieved a s pe ed of 4 7 5 k n ots ; the Navy

d e cid ed to p r o c e ed w ith a p r elim in a r y e v al

uation and ordered ten moreaircraft. Hopes

w e re d a sh e d, h o we v er , on 14 December

1950, whe n t he Sk y sh a rk c r a sh e d at

E dw ar ds AFI 3, k il li ng t es t p il ot H ug h

Wood. This w as s u bs e qu e ntly f o un d to b e

The TF Turbofan

Douglas A2D-l Skyshark

[n the summer of 1945, Ed Heinemann set

to work to f ind a s u cc e ss o r to h is f a me d

Navy a t tack bomber, the Douglas AD

Skyraider. 42 The advantages of turbojets

were already known, while theconcept o f

the turboprop, a gas turbine powerplant

g ea re d t o a p ro pe l le r, w as showing great

promise, in theory. Both theNavyand the

ArmyAir Force had sponsored studies into

their potential. The results predicted that

a turboprop-driven attack plane w o uld b e

able to to te significantly heavier ordnance

weights, overgreater distances, at a higher

and faster cruising s pe ed , w it h a shorter

take-off distance than conventional air

craft. Such advantages heldgreater appeal

for the avy, limited by thedeck leng thof

aircraft carriers, than for t he USAAF , a t

tha t time still apparent y obsessed by the

long-range strategic mission. However, an

aircraft with suchattributes would almost

exactly fulfil the requirements of the A-X

programme two decades later.

The early choice of powerplant for

Heinemann s team was the General

Motors, Allison Division T40. In t hi s,Heinemann was enthusiastically backed

by the Bureau of Aeronau t ics (BuAer)

t eam, u nd er Captain Selden Spangler,

who was convinced of this engine s poten

tial. Douglas had already been examining

alternative powerplants for the Skyraider s

successor, and among these w as a 5,000 hp

d es ig n f ea t ur i ng a p ai r of wing-mounted

gas turbines,each driving its own propeller

w it h a n associated reduction gear system

d e sig n ed b y the Joshua Hende company.

A t ur bo fa n w as recommended early on as

the ideal powerplantby theAir Forcefor the

A-X. lt had become well established among

c ivilian a irc r af t b y the I970s, but earlier

attempts t o h ar ne ss i t t o m il it ar y r eq ui re

ments had come unstuck, due to the state of

t he a rt at t he t ime . I n a d dition , p o litica l

implications had stifled cross-over technol

ogy he tween different develoflers.

250nm

2 hours

406nm

258nm

2 365nm

2.29 g

326 g

234 g

5.93 g

385knots

390knots

260 knots

3 850ft

1 130ft

2 140ft

1 085ft

A-l0Actual

55

36

25

CEP

ft)

10

750

2 1201b

44 2281b

Forwardairstrp weight30,3441b

51 1

5.2

5 5

Accuracy

Mrad)

Air Force Goa

250nm

2hours

350nm

250nm

2 300nm

g

35g

g

50g

350knots

400knots

260 knots

4 000ft

1 000ft

4 000ft

1 000ft

225

225

300

Airspeed KCAS)

The final production parameters for the

A-IO asordered under the 1974programme

are shown in the boxabove.

10

1 350

9 5401b

1810 650lb

Maximum take-offweight45,5601b

3 062

3 302

3 518

Slant range

ft

10

20

45

Angle

degrees)

STRAFING 30mm gun predictedFrng conditons

No. of Mk 82s

Numberof pyons

Ammuniton rounds

External ordnance

Operational mission weights

Internal fuel

Horizontal rail:

Vertical tail:

Wing:

A-10 performance characteristics

Parameter

Toral aircraft:

CAS radius

Loiter t m ea t CAS radius

Reconnaissance radius

Escortradius

Ferry range

Sustained load factors at 150knots

Sustained load factors at 275 knots

Instantaneous load factor at 150 knots

Instantaneous load factor at300 knots

Combat speed with s x M k 82 bombs at 5 000ft

Cean at sea level

Stabized 45-degree dive speed

Take-off distance SL 32 degrees C maximum gross weight

Forward airstrip weight

Landing distance SL 32 degrees C maximum gross weight

Forward airstrip weight

61

69

75

CEP

ft

350

275

265

Airspeed KCAS)

Accuracy

4 550

2 750

1 350

AltitudeAGL ft)

130knots 1 003ft 306m

150 knots 972ft 296m

170 knots 1 176ft 358m

200 knots 1305ft 398m

250 knots 1 864ft 568m300 knots 2 598ft 792m

delivery performance

actual results

faps

munications UHF/AM 225.00

.975 MHz); VHF/AM L 16.00

MHz); VHF/FM (30-76

; IFF/SIF (AIMS); Secure Voice;

AIC-18 Intercom

ns delivery o ~ i c a l s i gh t w it h

D; a rmamen t c on tr ol panel;

/APX-IO[ I FF X - ba n d tr an s po n

guncamera; Maverick fire control

tion AN / R - LI (V )

UHF/OF; HARS; VORl

LORAN C/O

P AV E P E N Y l a se r

tra tion : Ra da r homing and warn

as follows: AN/ALR-46(V)

to 75-0299);AN/ALR

7 5 -0 2 99 to 7 6 -0 5 54 ) ; AN/

7 7- L07 7 to 7 7 -0 2 76 ) ; 7 8 -0 5 82 ) Late r s im p[ i

t o t wo t yp es AN/ALR-46(V)-9

r af t up t o 7 8- 05 81 ); A / AL R

post78-0582).

Mariet ta AAS-35 PAVE

laser-seeking pod is an optimized

g h in g o n ly 3 21 b 1 4 .5 kg ) , and

) long. Under this system, first

servicein 1978, the seeker con

d-scans, looking for laser radi

i t p ic ks u p the coded signals

forward air controller (FAC), situ

ground, in a custom-built fixed

ationaircraftor, more common

y s , in a h e lic o pte r o v er the front

ck s i ts s po t i n the pre-selected

76 77



Detail ofthe starboard GeneralElectr ic TF34 GE 100 turbofan engine nacelle with the U i n le t i n t h e

fuselagebelow. The angled exhaust ductsventbetweenthe twin-boomedtail finsand theyare notfi tted

with afterburners to givea measure ofinfra-red immunity.The engines positionsabovethe wings and to

therear of theaircraftgives greaterinvulnerabili ty to light groundfire anda degree of immunityfrom FDD.

Peter Smith

plant remained, although in the

years ince the kyshark fias

hnology had moved on. The Gen

ctric Company of America ; had

experimenring with VTOL designs

end ofthe 1950 , with mixed results.

u pw it h a m al l jet exhaust-driven

lift engine. This concept was

through 90 degrees, give forw::Hd

T HE T F3 4 T R BO FA N

propulsion, and became the cruise fan.

Testing of both designs resulted in data

that showed that, with massive increase in

size and power , the se fan s could work

much more efficiently at subsonic speed

than previous turbofans.

With the active interest of theA ir Force

f rom 1 96 2 o nwar ds , General Electric

moved o n t o develop a sys tem whe rebya

Ease ofmaintenance isone factorthat makes

theturbofanpowerplants ofthe A-10 so effective.

Staff SergeantJames Johnston a r w chief with

the 354th Aircraft GenerationSquadron services

aThunderbolt II engine. Natonal Archives Colege

Park MD

conventional turbine was able to drive the

f an byway of a connecting haft. The air

that passed through the f an was eight

times t he amoun r pas ing through the

core engine (compressor, combustor and

turbine), an S: I 'bypass ' ra tio . This led to

the developmenrof the G E1/6engine, and

the company s expertise was rewarded

with a n A ir Force contract to power the

hugeC-S Galaxy freighter.

The research conrinued, with theGEC

planr a t Lynn, Massachusetts, working onmailer ver ions of the same idea. There,

t he T 64 turboshaft engine was combined

with a mul t i- s tage power turbine, with

smaller versions o f t he T F3 9 fans being

added. These ideas parallelled develop

menrs taking place in the Lycoming com

pany, which hadbeen experimenting with

its TS5 rurbine with a reduction gear, and,

in 1963, had carried o ut t he first high

I ypas engine test run. By 1965, the Lynn

plant had refined its ideas into a practical

engine, the TF34.

I n 1 96 6, this powerplant won a US

Navy competition, against the rival Alli

son TF32, as the powerplant for the Navy's

new S-3A Viking anri-submarine aircraft.

This success, which surprised evenGener

al Electric themselves, brought the high

bypas to prominence at precisely the time

when th e A-X programme was wrestling

with the engine question. It was destined

to provide the solution.

Ithough it lacked the efficiency of the

turboprop sy tem considered for the A-X

programme, the powerplant offered sever

al advantages for low-altitude, low-cost

operations, asenvisaged for the CAS role,

as follows:

• i mp li ci ty of design. 0 propeller and

no reduction gear, or, at least, a much

smaller or simpler system

• Ease of maintenance, v ita l in the bat

tlefield and for optimum sortie rates

• Ease of installa tion, being modular in

design, and ease of acce s

• The high-bypass turbo was relatively

qu ie t compared with the prope lle r

orconventional jet engine. On e unex

pectedbonusdur ing theGulf War was

the ability of the A-IO to sneak up on

enemy armoured columns, whose own

noise masked the approach. This had

a s p ower fu l a psychological effec t as

did the screaming sirens of the Junkers

JuS7 rukas on ground forces. The

enemy did not always h ea r t h e A -lO

coming until it hit them, and by then

i t was too late

• Affordability: cheap to purchase, cheap

to run, cheap to replace

• Reduced IR ignature

• High thrust at low speed, enhancing

manoeuvrabi Iity.

Comparing th e General

Electric TF34 and the

Lycoming F102Both conrenders were tria l ie d by the

Air Force. The 9,2751b (4,2ISkg) GS

YTF34/F5, f i tt e d to the YA-IO, was

deemed a b et te r b et t ha n t he 7,5001b

(3,4IOkg) YFI 2-LD-IOO, even though

powering a much heavier aircraft. Faults

found on the Lycoming wer e l is te d as

follows:

I. I na de qu at e engine removal/installa

tion clearance.

2 Unnecessary oil filler cross-over rube

to oil tank.

3. Inadequate sized mesh screen i n o il

tank.

4. Inadequate c lamping of engine oil

tank supply line.

S Chafing of fuel supply l i ne against

accessorygear case.

6. D if fi cu lty in reading engine oil-pres

sure gauges.

7 Dif ficu lty in reading engine oil

temperature indicator.

Lack of shrouds on engine tail-cones.

9. I na bi li ty to adjust throttle resistance.10. Burning, buckling, and di to rt ing of

second- tage turbine nozzle vanes.

II. Inability of engine hoist to allow

longirudinal movemen t o f engine.

12. nstable engine operation para

ters at high power settings.

13. n ac ce pt ab le r eq ui rement t o s

down left engine to arm/de-arm gun

According to Dr Watson , Oneof the

ons Northrop chose a lower-thrusteng

was b ec au s i t cost less. But th is selec

had certain repercussions, since the sm

er engine required a trade-off of a num

of pelformance objeetives. 4

In the even t , choosing a lower - th

engine helped orthrop lose the contr

hut other factors, less obviou from fl ig

testing, wouldsway the final decision:

I The Lycoming F102 wou ld req

more work and expenditure to deve

into full-scale production, with

redesigned fan and a boosted T55

11 Bcore. The TF34 wasalready un

initial production.2 The TF34 \Va demonstrahly suit

for military usage, as demonstrated

the avy's Viking programme, and

Air Force' plan to utilize it on th e

78 79





THE TF34 TURBOF N

the TF engine

CHAPTER TEN

Fuel and Refuelling

a safety factor. The APU inlet is located on

the starboard side o f t h e fuselage, with the

exhaust venting on the port side.

The m ai n t an ks a r e s u b- d ivid ed with

900lb 41Okg) self-sealing sumps. Collec

tor ta nks pr ovide theengine with an emer

g e nc y 1 0 -s e co n d f u el s u pp ly in negative g

c on fi gu ra ti on a t m ax im um pow er. A

booster pump in the port main tank is providedfor engine and APU startings should

the main boost pump fail. The system

automaticallyemptiesthe wing tanks first

via higher-pressure boost pumps.

Two independent sub-systems operate

the f ue l s u pp ly f ro m the m a in , w ing and

auxiliary tanks f irs t d e sig ne d f or the F-

I l l ) . Under thissplitsystem, the portmain

and wing tanks feed the por t e ngine a nd the

APU, while the starboard main and wing

• P er s on ne l i n f o li ag e and foxholes

• M o vi n g a n d fixed armoured vehic

including armoured trucks and med

a nd he a vy tankssuch as the Russian

76 light tank, T-54 medium tank

JS-lll heavy tank

The Competition

A r ou n d t h e s am e t i me , P h il c o- F or d

been following another line of resea

w h ic h h a d r e su lte d in the M39 based

the MG 213), and the A ir Force had fi

this t o b ot h t he F-IOO and F-5 f igh

bombers. Other contenders were un

development at the H ughes Tool Com

ny andG eneral A mericanT ransportat

By the time o f t h e A-X programme, th

fore, much work had already been do

On 5 January 1968, t he A ir For

R equirement A ction Directive RA

had given clear expression of their urg

need for a heavier-calibre aircraft gu

Earlier studies clearly demonstrated tthe b e st w ay o f c ov e ri n g t h e target sp

trum envisaged for CAS w as w i th a 30

gun. CAS targets were defined as follo

into its own, being used not only in fi

er-bombers such as the F-4 a nd t he A

but a lso in gunsh ips, such as the AC -

and AC-130. E ve n gr e ate r c om pre s s

r e su lte d in t h e G e ne r al Electric 7.62

Minigun, a G atlingthat wassmall eno

t o be carried in helicopters, the A-3

a nd t he AC-47 P u ff t h e Magic Drag

gunship adaptations for ground straf

These weapons were satisfactory w

d ep lo ye d a ga in st i nf an tr y and s

skinned vehicles, b ut wh en t he N oVietnamese regular army entered the

w ith its a r r a y ofS oviet-built and supp

battle tanks, something w i th m o re pu

was required. This l ed t o General Elec

developing a 3 0m m G at l in g w it h m

penetrating and t he re fo re m o re s

ping) pow er when used against armour

1967-68, the six-barrel T-212 demons

tion g u n w as being tested.

• I nc re as ed r at e of fire

• Less w e ar on each barrel and, therefore,

lo ng e r lif e e x pe c ta n cy o f t h e weapon

system

• E xt e rn al s ou rc i ng of power giving more

reliable jam c l ea r an c e o p ti o ns o v er

recoiI weapons

• L es s s tr es s o n t h e aircraft s environment

than reciprocating weapons, due t o t h e

rotary m o ve m e nt o f t h e G a tl ing.

The m a in dis adva nta ge s were t h e s h ee r

bulk o f t h e system - which m a de f itt ing to

conventional a ir cr a ft v e ry d iff ic ult - andthe weight, which obviously had a n eg a

tive i mp ac t o n t he carrying fighter s per

formance.

By 1949, the General Electric 20mm T

71 Gatling was test-firing at 6,000 r ounds

per minuteand, further developed, refined

and reduced in size as the M61Al, was fit

ted to the Lockheed F -l04and the Repub

lic F-105 fighteraircraft. W i t h t h e a d v e n t

of the V ietnam conflict, this weaponcame

World War b a tt l es s u ch a s Y pr es , the

S ommeand Passchendaele. 111

G ermany took theconcept further, with

t h e d e ve l op m en t during t he S ec on d

World War of the Mauser MG 213

revolver c an no n. T hi s single-barrelled

weapon could be fired at 1,400 rounds per

minute, twice the f irin g r a te of conven

tional w e ap o ns . Like s o many other Ger

man designs, th is w as f ar in advanceof the

Allies owndevelopments, and France, the

UK a nd t he USA all plundered the ideaand began to look at a v e rs io n o f t he M G

213 for their own forces.

Around 1946, t he U SA A F h ad begun

its own independentquest for the ultimate

aircraft weapon, under Pr oje c t V u lc a n.

The development workwas undertaken by

General Electric, which decided that a

modern equivalent ofthe G atlingconcept

was the only a ns we r to increasing the rate

of fire w ithout running into insurmount

a b le m a ter ial w e ar and heating problems.

The advantages of re-adopting the multi

barrel method wereas follows:

The GAU venger atling

History

l The 3 0m m G AU -8 c an no n itself,

specifically designed for destroying

armoured vehicles, m ou nt ed o n t he

centrelineof the aircraft.

2. The titanium-armoured ammunition

drum, holding 1 l74 rounds of ammu

nition.3. The various ammunitions used.

The core o f t h e A- 1O s deadlyfirepower is

the A/A 49E-6 gun system, which h as a

gross weight of 4,2001b J,910kg). The

three-part system comprises the following:

The history of the GAU-8 can be traced

back to l86l, w he n A m er i ca n Richard

Gatling revolutionized warfare by invent

ing what was, in reality, the first machine

g u n. I n Gatling sconcept, six independent

gun barrels and breeches were held togeth

er in a circular arrangement, and turned

around a common axisby means of a hand

cranked handle. A lthough h i gh r at es of

fire could be achieved by trained infantry

men with the weapons o f t he day the

British Army was the most proficient at

this), Gatling s i de a g av e t ro op s a much

higher rate of fire against massed opposi

t ion. A c c ur a c y was not so much a p r ior ity

as pure firepower, a nd t he ability t o s t op

oncoming f o ot s o ld ier s with an almost

sol id wall of lead.

Gatling s invention proved its worth

d u ri n g t h e A m er i ca n C i vi l War, and was

also invaluable to the B r it i sh A rm y,

invariably heavily outnumbered in such

campaigns as the ZuluWar, t h e S u d an a n dthe Boxer Uprising in China. lo The

British e q ui v al e nt , t h e Maxim which

u se d r ec oil e n er g y) had a ba d reputation

for jamming a t t h e most critical times, and

Gatling s weapon, a l th o ug h n o t i m m un e

to such s im ila r p r ob lem s , w as m o re popu

lar. In the end, i t w as made obsolete by the

invention of the belt-fed, water-cooled

Vickers machine gun, and its many deriv

atives, which caused such carnage in Firs t

lowpressuretur ine

tanks feed the starboard engine. There is

p i lo t -o pe ra t ed c ro ss -f ee d v al ve l in ka ge

be tw ee n the two, which allows pressurized

flow into either engine from either system

in t h e e v e n t o f damage or malfunction.

Forair-to-airrefuelling, the sideways H

type marking on top of the noseare visual

cue lines. The aerial refuellingslipway and

UARRSI receptacle for the tanker boom

a r e lo ca te d a t op t h e nose, forward o f t h e

cockpit, giving the pilot an easy view.

The slipway door hydraulically folds

down on operation of a l ev er o n t he fuelsystem control panel. O n c e t h e nozzle has

been guided d ow n t he slipway to t he

receptacle, nozzle latch rollers automati

callylock into position by means of actua

tors a n d t h e flow commences. The pilot is

able to select t he t an k sequence himself.

On c o mp l et i on , t h e nozzle disconnects

either v ia a manual disconnect/reset but

ton on the pilot s control s tick g r ip or via

a s ign al f r om the tanker itself.

highpressure

tur ine

essorydrives

om ustorompressoran

General Electric TF34-GE- 100tur

engine n a ce lle h as a le ng th of 100in

) a n d a diameter of 50in l25cm).

identical and interchangeable. To

infra-red lR) lock-oo by target

S A Ms , t h ey are not f itte d w ith

and their unique pos itioning

as they are partly screened

twintail units. To avoid trimchanges

different powersettings, the jetpipe,

after-end protrudesfrom the nacelle,

an upturned angle.

to expedite self-sufficiency ind , a n A u xiliar y Po we r U n i t A P U)

in the after-fuselage space midway

the two TF34 e n gin es . I ts d u tie s

supply air for engine starting, and it

generator for the aircraft s electri

w er . I t can a lso b e p re ss ed into ser

h y dr a ulic pump to pressurize

c r af t s h y dr a ulic s y ste m, to enable

maintenance. I t h as an automated

deviceintegral to the system, as

82 83



THEGAU 8 AVENGER GATLING THE GAU 8 AVENGER GATLING

A 30mmAvengerArmamentsystem: theseven barrels left . the bel ts

n centre . andthe 3 shells inthe helix right . General Eectrc

Below TheAvenger growls and groundcrewwearing earprotectors wince asground test firing ofthe

GAU-8/Ais undertakenby thepilot ofthe YA-lO test aircraft atEdwards AFB. US

breech, and a bolt with integra l cock

firing mechanisms. The muzzles of the

rels protrude from a perfora ted shield

low-slung housing extension. Each ba

is 7ft 6in (2.30m) in length, and a spe

reduced-length bolt was built by Gen

Electric especially t o h el p a ch ie ve e

this figure. The barrels have spiral riflin

the apertures. Powered by dual hydra

rotary motors, each barrel rotates thro

the firing chamber with ra te-of-f ire

tings of 2 ,100 rpg (or 35 rounds per

ond) and 4,200 rpg (or 65 rounds per

ond). This compared with 6,000 r pm

the smaller M61 gun. A pe r-bar re l f i

rate of 10 rounds per second which ensu

longer barrel Iife through less wearper

rel even though the rounds themselves

heavier. Minimum life expectancy

each set of gun barrels is 21,000 roun

The gun is off se t to port but t he fi

barrel is always posi t ioned on the cenline, the direct starboard barrel, and w

the other s ix ba rr el s cyc le through

spot , i t c ool s down ready for the next

ing. Each round is rammed intothe bre

and is locked into position. As each ba

l in es up i n turn, t he c oc ki ng p in c

presses a firing spring and a tr igger re l

es. Th e actuation of the firing mechan

The A49£-6 Gun SystemDescribed

it needed to beable to identify the lead

a nd c ommand t an ks from the dross

following.

The A/A 49E-6 Gun System met, and

v exceeded, all the criteria demandedof i r. I t is an awesome weapon, which has

proven i tse lfdeadly in combat.

Theseparameters pointed to a Gatling for

h igh ra te of fire, t o smoth er t h e t ar ge t

f rom a distance; a high muzzle velOCity to

aid penetration by concentrating the

force a t t he p oi nt o f impact so that the

pene t rato r can get through the protec

tion. In the A-X equation, thistranslated

into a need definitively t o k ill a Russian

T-62 MBT t an k a t a range of 4,000ft

(1,200m) with the minimum number of

direct hits.

The 3 mm GAU8 Cannon

The 30mm General Electric GAU-8/A

Avenger Gatling cannon has seven non

repeating barrels, each with t he ir own

1 Lethality - the ability to pene t ra te the

latest Soviet tank armour.

2 Accuracy - the abil i ty to hit a target

with a re la tively small print from the

air.

3. Cost efficiency - the cost of a weapon

knocking out a tank mus t be cheaperper h it t ha n t he t an k itself.

4 . Endurabi I ity - the systemmust be capa

ble of multiple kills in order to take out

more than one target at a time i f i t was

to be battle-effective.

5. Accountability - the system must be

able to te ll fr iend from foe, but,equally

important when facing mass targets,

the toughestof tough-hide monsters. Not

only were their ta rgets seemingly invul

nerable to fire, bu t they also presented a

verysmall print, which required extraordi

nary accuracy to strike . Moreover, they

exis t ed in t he ir t en s o f thousands. Not

onlyhad the new A-X aircraft to beable to

deal with these monsters individually, but

also en masse Any successful weapon sys

tem had to combine lethality and penetra

tion with a high hit-and-hit-again capaci

ty to take out several targets in one pass.

The GAU-8 was required to have the fol

lowing attributes:

and PhiIco-Ford, but it covered all bases by

also contrac t ing a t the same time for a

back-up system with Hughes. The Hughes

entry was its licence-builtSwiss-manufac

tured Oerlikon 304RF, a lso a 30mm gun.

The Air Force intended to test and evalu

ate this weapon (which it designated the

GAU-9), against the winner of the GAU

8 competition. However, when it came to

comparisons, after the testingof theGAU

9 had been completed in A pr il 1 97 3, it

p roved so infe rior t o t he GAU-8 that it

was immediately dropped from any further

competition.'

This cleared the way for the funding of

the General Electric winner, a nd t he gun

programme was accordingly awarded 3

mi ll ion in FY 1970; 9.62 in FY71 and

6.30 in FY 1972. I19

The Task

This weaponssystem was easily the biggest

gun carried by any combat aircraft a t t he

time of its inception. It needed to be, for

its t ask was a daunting one. It was to

destroy the Russian main ba tt le tanks

(MBTs), and the So vi et s had been

renowned for many decades for producing

for identifying technical and engineering

aspects of the system and providing flexi

bility in costand performance relevant tothe A-X. II

The Air For ce RFP, i ss ue d on 16

November 1970, called for a 30mm

weapon able to fire at a rat e o f 4 ,0 00

rounds per minute, with a muzzle velOCity

of 3,500ft/sec (I ,050m/sec), parameters

that could only be met by a Gatling-type

design. General Electric, having had the

most experience in thisf ie ld, was favourite

from the outset. In theend , it camedown

to a straight 'shoot out' between GE and

Philco-Ford. In June 1971, each company

was given 12 million contracts to build

prototypes that would be evaluated against

each other. Included in the contracts were

also the deve lopmen t o f f our types of

ammunition: target practice (TP); highexplosive incendiary (HEI); semi armour

piercing high-explosive (S PHE); and

armour-piercing incendiary (API) with

steel penetrator. 116 In the interim, the YA

10would use the 20mm M61 as a stop-gap

weapon. ; In fact, the GAU-8 wasfitted to

both prototypes i n 1975.

For the competition in June 1971, the

Air Force awarded the contracts for the

GAU-8/A prototypes to General Electric

BTR-50P armoured p r s o ~ car

t-sensitive, hard-point targetssuch as

bunkers and artillery pieces.

October 1971, a Memorandum of

was signed by the Comman

Aeronautical Systems Division,

Armament Developmentand Test

designated the A-X Program

and t h eA i r Force Armament Lab

as responsible for bot h t he man

t and deve lopmen t o f the GAU

The agreement assigned overall

responsibility to the pro

office s project division and listed

as including included Pha se I

titive phase), 'except for pro

responsibility upon award of the

contract'. The other responsiincluded in te rf a ce engineering,

ing, and r epor ti n g t o higher

Armament Developmentand Test

was responsible to the A-IO Sys

Director (SPD) for techni

eering support for the GAU

The ADTC designated a GAU-8

Manager, based at t h eA i r Force

Lahoratory, to be responsible

84 85



THE GAU AVENGER GATLI G THE GAU AVENGER G AT LJ G

The considerable size ofthe Avenger s 30mm round isclear. An A-10 pilot presentsa

dummyroundto thecommanderof theKorean Air Base he i s v i s it i ng . A s h el l w a s

presented to thecommanderof each base visited by the A 10 crews during the

demonstrationtour. USAF

Source policy, to ensure c o nt i n ui t y

delivery, were manufactured by b ot hA erojet and Honeywell concerns.

The training round hasa steel body w

a s imp le aluminium crumple head. T

HE1 round has a n a l um i ni u m cartri

case, with an ignitortubein the base, al

with either a single-base nitro-cellu l

extrudedpropellant or a double-base ni

cellulose/nitro-glycerine ball propell

The tip is a s te el fragmenting body c

taining the high-explosive/incendiary m

and with a MS05A3 im pa ct fuse a t t h e

Eac h A PI round h as a 15m m de ple

uranium penetrator built intoan alumi

um base, and this extension is surround

by a aerodynamically profiled windshi

o f t hi n aluminium, with the head o f

penetrator held in position by an alumi

um ring a t t h e c o n ed e nd. D e plete d ura

um is a by-product of t h e n uc l ea r fu

enrichment process and possesses a v

high denSity, hence its choice for the j

Although i ts use brought the expec

outrage from the S oviet U nion, w hich,

propaganda purposes, branded it an at

ic w eapon , there is negligible radioact

ty involved a nd t he rounds are perfe

safe to hand Ie. However, it was not just

Kremlin that expressed concern;the usdepleted uranium also impacted o n

USA a nd p ut the weapon into a spec

export category, which, under nuclear p

liferation concerns, stric tly limited

nations permittedto purchase it. Acco

ing to some allegations, th is voideda p

siblesale of the A-10 to Thailand, wh

had expressed interest.)

The impact o f t h e p e ne t ra t or ensure

massive concentrationof force over a v

w i th 8 0 per cent of rounds fired o v er t h e

optimum distance of 4,000ft 1,200m)

falling within a 40ft 12m) diametercircle.Each API shell is built with an alumini

um alloycase rather t h a n t h e brass or steel

used previously, making f or a 30 per cent

reduction in ammunition weight. They are

f it t ed with p la st i c driving bands, which

ensures less wear and, again, extends gun

barrel life. While the pr a ctic e r ound and

HEI round were commonplace, the APl

types were especially developed for the

GA -8 a n d, u n de r t h e A i r Force s Second

damage agents . The pilots making the

firing passes attacked at low altitude and

used correspondingly low dive ang le s inorder to simulate movement through a

h o st i le a ir d e fe n ce system. Ammunition

used in the attacks comprised 30mm

armour-piercing incendiary rounds, \

The improvement in the ballistic quali

ties ofthe ammunition compensates for the

heavier rounds and reduces projectiledrop,

so that during its time of flight over 4,000ft

1,200m ) only a [Of t Jm ) drop is experi

enced. This translates into high accuracy,

The a r c o f f l a me s p ew s o u t a nd i s t a k en u n de r

thenose ofthe aircraftduringaerialtest fir ing

ofthe GAU-8/A cannon on the Edwards AFB ranges

with observation aircraft attop left. Withthe paint

burning offthe nose aftereachfir ing andthe

obvious dangersinvolved much work was done

to alleviate thisconditionbeforea solution was

final lyfound. USAF

Below I n a n attemptto solve theburstsof

flaming nose gas whenthe GAU-8/A was first

tested at Edwards AFB a heavy-duty nose

installation was fitted on thetest VA-to aircraft.

This did notproveeffectiveand was removed

shortlyafterwards. Shownin this view arethe

fitmentsthat heldthe heavy wedgein place.

Natonal Archives Colege Park. MD

A-10 normally fires a combat mix eM )

with the ratio o f o n e 1.51b (0.68kg) PGU

13 high-explosive incendiary HE[) round

for e ve ry f ive d e pl e te d u r an i um DU)

1.651b (0.75kg) PGU-14 armour-piercing

incendiary AP[) rounds. The 30mm pro

jectiles are 1ft (JOcm) long, have a weight

ofO.941b (0.43kg) and are emitted from the

barrel at 3,240ft 980m ) per second. They

havean effectiverange against Soviet-built

armour of 21 ,600ft (6,500ft)

On 10 March 1978, test firings o f t he

GAU-8 weapon system were made against

a simulated Soviet tank company actual

ly ten A merican combat-loaded M-47

tanks). The pilots a t ta c ke d a t low alti

tudes and dive angles, simulating opera

tions in a hostile air defence environ

ment. The G U -8 achieved 253 impacts

on the targets, including forty-three per

forations o f t he armoured envelopes and

inflicted damage totalling eight immobilized tanks, four o f w hi ch were cata

strophically killed. l60

On 14 August 1979, further G A U -8 test

firings were conducted, again against ten

combat-loaded M-47 tanks simulating a

S oviet tank company A rray [7 .161 Sim

ilar trials followed at intervals. Array 21

utilized t h e 3 0 m m armour-piercing incen

diary rounds, which proved Aerojet lot

number A JD 79A181-001 to be effective

The Munitions

linkless feed system. This avoidsjams for a

total of30 secondsof continuous firi ngtime.

The large fixed outer drum is cylindri

cal andcontains an internal drum that ro

t at es . A helical cutaway in t hi s d ru m

holds the radially stored shells, tips facing

the axis, and bases held in c h a nn e l s o n

t h e o ut er d ru m. When t he r ot or turns,

the s h el l s a re c o mp r es s ed forward and

mechanically lined up, before entering

the loading chutes.

Both gun and drum feed mechanism are

driven by a pair of77hp 57.4kW) hydraulic

motorsgiving the maximum 4,200 rpgfiring

rate. Aselsewherein the -10, the system is

dualled,so that if one motor goesdown, the

reduced 2, 100 rpgrate can be maintained by

the one remaining motor.

For r e ar m in g b e tw ee n sorties, the

mobile automatic loader system ALS) is

used. This transfers the belted ammuni

tion from stacked bins to t h e i n te r na lammunition canisters by remote control.

Three principal types of rounds can be car

ried, the P G U-14 armour-piercing incendi

ary, w hich can penetrate tank armour; the

PGU-13 high-explosive incendiary, used

for taking out trucks and soft-skinned tar

gets; and the training practice round. The

mmunition rum

ws this sequence is v ia a synchro

rotor, which revolves o n t he com

inside the guncasing. Each bar

s its own individual fire system

ex ternally on th is rotor, and

fixed cam tracks internally.

rotor makes one revolution,

c ur ved c a m tracksengage and, thus,

rotor spins, the whole firing

is initiatedand repeated.

bolt then unlocks and slides back,

withit theempty cartridge case. 0

ammunition is externally ejected,

, i t is collected back in the ammu

d r um a n d recycled.

exhaust gas venting for the gun is

o n t he por t front side fuselage,

to the rear a r e a ir -c ooling slots for

on feed chutes.

g un , 7 ft 6 i n 2 . 30 m ) in length

80 calibres), reaches back i n to t h e

fuselage, and the total A/A 49E-6 gun and ammunition drum com

has a weight of 4,2001b (1,910kg).

barrels are mounted so that they

2 degrees from the aircraft s line of

and each one has its ow n br e ec h and

a firing mechanism external to

moving revolving rotor. The

horsepower MH P ) , c o mp u te d

muzzle velocity, rate of fire and

mass, comes out at 17,700,

c om par e s w ith under 100 MHP for

l Second World War weapon.

thegun produces a deep-throated

which in itself is very intimidating.

also pr oduc e s 4SkN 10,000I b) of

which slows down the aircraft by

knots. A lthough the whole ammu

supply can theoretically be fired off

half a minute, in practice, bursts

t o o n e o r t w o seconds, deliv

ore than enough firepower to take

ost Russian-built armour. There is

atic round counter, which keeps

informed of hisreserve condition.

g un was f ir st f it te d i n Feb ru ar y

Soviet T-62 battle tanks

by Israel from the Egyptian and

armies proved its worth, and actualduring Desert St01m against Soviet

armour confirmed this.

for theGatling arelocatedto

of the g un in their own massive

l hou sing . A max imum of 2,348

can be carried , in two 1,174-round

drums, fed to the barrels by a

86 87



THEGAU AVENGER GATLINGTHEGAU AVENGER GATLING

A Korean airman examinesthe General Electric GAU-8/A Avenger

30mm seven-barrel cannon mounted o n a n A-10 Thunderbolt II aircraft.

The A-10 was on demonstration at air bases in the ROK to familiarize

field commanders therewith its capabilities. USAF

89

Above Membersof the 75th Combat Munitions

Unit Munitions Flight 23rd Maintenance Squadron

feed 30mm roundsinto the GAU-8/A weapons

system onan A-10 Thunderbolt I I o f the 75th Fighter

Squadron. USAF

Right Detail of the mouths of the seven 30mm

General Electric GAU-8/A Avenger cannon

showing thespiral rifling of the apertures. Each

barrelrotatesthroughthe firing chamber and has

rate-of-fire settings of2,100rpm and 4,200rpm.

Peter Smith

Th e PGU-14 rounds were found to be

able to penetrate armour o n t he Soviet

built T 55 T 62 and T ba ttle ta nks w ith

no difficulty. A-lOs are c r ed i te d w i th

k n o ck i n g o u r n o less r h an 9 8 7 Iraqi ranks

during Operation s rt Storm.elow

Black

344

1.50

082

034

11.4

6 8

12

HEI PHU 13 B

Black

White

33

1.60

0.97

34

11.4

6 8

1.2

API PGU 14 B

Above An A-10 ofthe 355th Tactical Training

Squadron carrying AGM-65 Maverickmissiles

opens firewith itsGatlingcannon overthe Gila

Bend Tactical Range in 1988. Natonal Archives,

Coege Park, MD

small a r ea a b o ut t he di amet er of a fifty-

pe nc e pie ce ) , a nd ge ne ra te s enough ener

gy to punch i ts way through the thickest

Russian t a n k a r mo u r o f t he t im e. A s a n

a dded bonus, the de ple te d ur a nium ignites

as i t pe ne tr ate s a nd forces a jer of flame

into the tanks innards. After penetrating

the ta r get ve hic le , the A PI does not have

s u ff i ci e nt p o we r t o e x it , and so remains

inside having the maximum effect o n t he

occupants. It is a highly s a tis f ac tory

w e a pon to use a ga ins ta n aggressor in that

the ta r get is de s tr oyed, a nd the c r e w is also

voided and therefore not a va ila ble to man

reserve tanks.

Blue

White

34

1.50

0.84

34

11.4

6 8

1.2

TP PGU 15 B

88

GAU-8 ammunition characteristics

Case colour

Markings

Muzzle velocity FPS

Weight Ib complete round

Weight lib projectie

WeightIIbl cartridge case {after firingl

Length inl complete round

Length inl projectie

Diameter. projectie

e personnel loadthe 30mm cannon on an

the combinedArmy-Air Force live-fireIV at the YukonCommand

Site Alaska. Natonal Archives, Coege Park,



CHAPTER ELEVEN

acking a unch

IO rdnance

Propulsion is boost sustain, and a s pe ed of

a bo ut 7 20 m ph l 150km/h) is attained.

The guidance system can be electro

optical television, imaging infra-red, laser

or infra-red homing. When the electro

optical TV system is used on the Maverick

A variant, as s o on a s the protective dome

cover is remotely detached from the nose

o f t h e m iss ile , its v ide o c irc u itr y b e c om e s

a c ti v at e d, a n d t h e view generated by the

TV camera is transmined t o t he pi lot s

PACKING A PUNCH - A-IO ORDNANCE

control bunkers, emplaced artillery a n d t h e

l ik e. I t combined a much larger warhead

with a penetrator with either ground or air

borne laser designators. The missile seeker

p r ob e s a s e c to r 7 m ile s I 1km)wide and 10

miles I6km) ahead forits target. A s a n in

built safety factor, should the missile lose

the laser spot, it goes ballistic and the war

head is neutralized. The M a ve ri c k F is a

avy variant w ith IRR a n d t h e larger war

head f or s imila r d u ty m a in ly f or u se a g ain s t

sweep. To enable highsurvivability aga

strongly defended targets, the Maverick

equipped with launch and leave LL ca

bility. This enables the pilot to take ano

er target under fire directly one A G M-6

launched, or to take violent avoid

action without affecting the accuracy

the missilestrike. The Ma v er ic k h a s a w

height and speed launch envelope, andc

be fired at targets as distant a s 1 3 nauti

miles or as c lo se as a few thousand ya

u gh t he GAU-8/A s ev e n- ba r re l

is the A-IO s mostfamous weapon,

P un ch , t h e aircraft is no

when it comes to delivering a w ide

range ofother heavy ordnance.

the features that made the old A

a id er s u ch an outstanding success

was the sheer amount and

of rockets and b om bs i t c ou l d toteb at t le zone, sufficient to counter

d every threat s e ve r al tim es o ve r .

hilosophy behind the A -1 O w as

the s a me line s and the aircraft was

p r o vid e d f or in that respect by

no less t h an e i gh t u nd er w in g a n d

under-fuselage pylon stations. The

of stores c a pa b le o f b e ing c a rr ie d

was therefore large from the

o n ti n ue s to grow w iththe new

gy of the last twenty years.

p y lo ns a r e not ju s t f or c a r ry ing

ns. Provision is a lso m a de f or in fr a

flares, electronic

rmeasure chaff d isp e ns e rs , r a da r

pods a n d i l lu m in a ti o n flares,

stores.

Weapons

Tank executioner parexcellence An AGM-65Maverick air-to-surfacemissile on the

underwingpylon of an A 10 parked on theflight line ready for operations.

National Archives. Co egePark, MD

An A 10 ofthe 81st Tactical Fighter Wing in 1983 attheheightofthe Cold War banking away to theright to

displayits ordnance to thecamera- fourAGM-65 MaverickSceneMagnification missiles, and an AUAlQ

119 electronic countermeasures pod. USAF

- 1O us es a w id e r an ge of air-to

guided missiles AGM) and guided

units GBU) t o a c co m pl i sh its

e d t ac t ic a l r ol es of tank-smasher

S . G ui d an ce o f such systems can

J R, r ad ar or laser, b u t t h e effects on

a r mo u r a r e e q ua lly d e v as ta tin g .

Maverick

e fe rr ed A -1 O w e ap on , u se d w it h

effect duringOperation Desert

is the AGM-65 Maverick. The A

the Maverickgo together likepork

andS addam Hussein s depleted

es learned onlytoo well the dead

f the combination.

The AGM-65 is a tactical,air-to-surface

guided missile ASM) designed specifical

ly for C A S , i n te r di c ti o n a n d t h e defence

suppression mission. It provides stand-off

capability and a h igh p r ob a bility of strike

a ga in st a w id e r an ge of ta c tic a l ta r ge ts,

including a rm ou r, a ir d ef en ce s, s hi ps ,transportationequipmentand fuel storage

facilities. When used by the U S A F during

Operation Desert S wn n, t he M av er ic k

s c or e d 8 5 p e r cent hits on itstargets. By far

the majority o f A G M- 6 5s thus utilized

were fired by A-lOs.

Developed and produced by Hughes Air

craft C ompanyand theR aytheon Corpora

tion, the Maverick hasa number of variants

d ep e nd i ng o n A i r Force, N av y o r M a ri n e

90

usage. The launch weight o f t h e A i r Force

Maverick is 462lb 21 Okg), it has an overall

length of 8 f t2 in 249m), a diameter o f H t

30cm) and a w in gs pa n of 2ft 4i n

71.12cm). The Maverick hasa range of 17

miles plus 27km or 12 nautical miles). War

heads, which o n t h e Maverick make up the

centre section o f t he missile, are cone

s h ap e d, a n d v ar y a ls o, depending on type

and service usage. One is fired by an FMU

135/B contact fuse in the nose. The other is

a delayed-fuse penetrator for hard targets,

with a heavier warhead designed to intrude

deep intothe target by kineticenergy before

firing. In all, however, the propulsion unit,

situated behind the warhead, is the Thiokol

T X- 48 1 s ol i d- pr op el l an t r oc ke t m ot or .

cockpit screen. Once the ta r ge t h a s been

selected, t h e p il o t c e nt r es t h e o n- s cr e en

cross-hairs, locks them o n , t h e n launches.

On the Maverick B, the system is the

same, e xc ep t t h at t he s y ste m h a s s c re e n

magnification,so that smaller, or moredis

tant targets can be more readily identified.Both thesesystems are restricted to normal

vision, but for night-time operations, or

poor-weather visibility over target scenar

ios, the Ma v er ic k D u se s I RR to exploit its

h e at - se ek i ng p ot e nt i al , a n d t o give the

p ilot a c lea r s c r ee n im ag e n o m a tt e r w h a t

the conditions. All three u se s h ap e d

c ha r ge w ar he ad s. M a ve ri c k E is a US

Marine Corps adaptation f or u se a ga in st

strongly fortified positions, such as HQ or

w a rs h ip ta rg e ts , w h ile the Ma v er ic k G is

s i mi l ar t o the D, with the heavyweight

penetrator warhead for larger targets.

The Maverick is fined with the propor

tional navigation autopilot, and stabiliza

tion is via long-chord delta wings/flippers,

with tail control surfaces mounted c los e tothe trailingedge of the wing o f t h e aircraft

employing it.

The AGM-65 is cylindrical and has

either a r o un d ed g la ss n os e , when electro

optical imaging is employed for targeting,

or alternatively a z in c sulphide n os e f or

IRR. The A-IO c a n c a rr y u p to six AGM

65s o n o n e mission, usually in three-round,

pylon-mounted clusters, enabling it t o h it

s e ve r al d if fe r en t ta rg e ts during a s in gl e

97

away. The e x plo siv es c a rr ied in the w

h e ad s a r e either 8 6 lb 3 9 kg ) Comp B

80lb 36kg) PBX AF)-108.

The Air Fo rc e b e ga n to be equipp

with t h e A G M -6 5 A from August 19

a n d, t o d a t e , s o m e 2 5 ,7 5 0 o f t h e A and

variants have been delivered. Compatib

ity launches of the AGM-65A Maver

with A-lO aircraft, carried out by the

Force at Edwards AFB, were completed

11 September 1974. S i nc e t h en , t h e A

a nd t he M av er ic k h av e b ec om e t he

T ea m i n tank-busting. During the G

War, the A -lOs fired 4,801 Maverick m

s ile s, w h ich w as in e x ce s s o f 9 0 per cen

t h e e n ti r e Ma v er ic k to ta l f ire d by all

Forceaircraft. 1M The Maverick D b e ga n



P CKING A PUNCH IOORDN NCE P CKING A PUNCH IO ORDN NCE

462 462 485 670 630 670

207.9 207.9 218.25 301.5 286 301.5

125 125 125 125 300 300

56.25 56.25 56.25 56.25 135 135

17 7 12223 152491 12223

2 ROCKEYE

The Rockeye is a free-fall, anti-tank a

armoured vehicle unguidedclusterweap

The system made its debut i n 1968, and

made up of a clamshell dispenser, fit

with a mechanica l Mk 339 t imer fuse a

filled with a load of 247 dual-purp

armour-piercing (AP) and shaped-cha

(SC) bomblets, Each weighs 21m (600

and h as a 6Yzoz (180g) shaped-charge w

head containing high explosives (H

These s haped cha rg es p ro du ce up

250,000 p,s.i. at thepo int o f impact, wh

gives armour penetration capability up

7in (17.5cm). Its maximum impact

against large formations in open coun

and it is designed t o s top mass tank bre

throughs ( as in a orth German plain s

nario, or i n dese r twar fa re , a s i n the Gurather than precision target ing, wh

remains the province of the guided weap

More recently, the Mk 20 dispenser

b een adapt ed t o d el iv er the more let

Gator air-delivered mine (ADM) syste

CBV 5

Th e most eff icient anti-personnel CB

theCBU-52, uses (alongwith theCBU-

and CBU-71) SUU-30 dispensers to ca

220 ant i-mater ia l bomblet s , w i th a to

weight of785lb (355kg). TheSUU-30

s imple metal cylinder, 93in in length, a

16in in diameter (232 x 35cm), which

divided along its l ength top and bo tt

with the upper and lower halves loc

together. The top half consists of a re

forced carrying section strong enough

withstand sway-bracing for l oad ing a

forced powerejection.

The fuse arming and delay mechani

is fitted a t t he fore e nd o f t h e dispens

tr iggered by wires or lanyards on rele

from the parent aircraft. Forflight spin s

bility the after endof thecombined cyl

der is fitted with four cast-aluminium fi

whi ch a re attached at a 9-degree ang

being canted 1.25 degrees. At the tim

moment duringdescent, the fuse booste

ignited a nd t he forward end of the SU

30 is unlocked. Simple ram air action

the dispenser does the rest, opening

two halves and releasing the bomble

w hi ch s pi n- arm t hems el ve s either

mechanica l Mk 339 timed or FMU-

FMU -2 6, FMU -5 6 o r M 90 7 p ro xi m

fuses. They self-disperse over a wide a r

dependingon thehe ight o f release.

armies some means partially to restore

imbalance on t h e ground.

Mk84

3,100.00

2,039

129

18

1,945

Trtonal H-6

Nose/tail

BSU-50 AIR

Mk 84 Conca Fin

Mk83

1,014

11994

14.06

1,000

3851b Trtonal Minai I

Nose/tail

Systems using submunitions contained in

cylindrical dispensers are w id el y u se d i n

theUSAF inventory and particularlyeffec

tive in open walfare s ituations, such as

those encountered in Desen Storm. The A

10 can carry most types of th is weapon very

well. Similar weapons were developed by

the Germans during the Second World

War to mitigate the overwhelmingnumer

ical superiority of the Russian infantry

forces. The CBU-52 is a refinement of this,

designed to give number-s tarved Western

NAPALM

The s tandard napalm dispenser carried by

the A-lOis the Mk 77 napalm canis ter

munition. Currently the only incendiarymunition in theUSAF active inventory, it

has replaced the M-47 napalm-filled bombs

in the incendiary cluster bombs of yester

year. apalm is an incendiarymixturecom

posed of benzene, gasoline and polystyrene.

It can be delivered at very low level and is

particularly effective against entrenched

and dug-in infantry forces and bunkers.

Cluster Bomb Weapons

issued for bombs w i th less aerodynamic

drag. The shape of all the bombs in the

series is cy lindr i ca l w i th conical fins or

retarders for external high-speed carriage.

Th e whole range can be accommodated

by t he A -l O a nd is shown in the table

below,

The Snakeye system to slow bomb

descent first appeared in 1 96 4 and has

been extensively utilized since. It has a

retarder tail, with Mk 14 or Mk 15 f ins for

the Mk 81 250lb ( l15kg) o r Mk8 2 5001b

( 230kg ) bomb, w hi ch a ll ow s f or a l ow

level, high-precision attack profile, while

a t t h e same time avoiding bomb-fragmen

tation damage to the delivery aircraft and

retaining theop t ionof a low-dragdel ivery.

NedCrane

268.50

Contractor

Unit cost

Free-Fall Weapons

Mark Mk8

Weight (Ib) 500

Length ( n) 66.15

Diameter ( n) 10.75

Warhead (Ibl 50

Explosive 9 b Trtonal Minai I H-6

Fusng Nose/tail MAU-93/B

Stabisers BSU49/B AIR Mk 15 Snakeye

Mk 80 family of free-falling bombs

Dumb Bombs

8 SERIES GENERAL PURPOSE G P BOMBS

These ballistic non-guided weapons ar e

not equipped with autopilot or their own

propulsion, but either an FMU-I13 radar

proximity airburs t fuse, or both nose

(M904) and tail (M905) mechanical fuses.

They can therefore be tailored for various

missions and usedas blast weapons,crater

ing dibb les or t o prov ide f r agmenta tion

effect. Target r anges are cathol ic: punch

ing holes in enemy airfields, taking out

parked ai rcr af t o r mass troop formations ,

soft-skinned vehicles and orher military

ground t r anspor t, dug- in ar ti l le ry posi

t ions , identif ied deep bunkers and com

mand posts, early-warning radar and AAA

sites, static SAM sites or mobile Scud-Bs

when located , s upply dumps and rail or

br idge cuts. The design dates back to the

late 1950s, when a new specification was

Although the Western news med ia a re

seemingly obsessed with the precision of

laser- and radar-guided weapons, there is

s ti ll a place for the conventional free

falling bomb in the modernbattle scenario,

The A-lO is capable of carrying the com

plete range, although the 5001b (230kg)

bomb is its normal inventory for this type

of payload . I n addit ion to conventional

bombs , a whole range ofother free-falling

weaponry plays an important r ol e i n mod

ern-day warfare, including napalm, cluster

bomb unit s (CBU), and o the r dispensers.

cent greater than tha t o f the Paveway In

orderto reduce weight and costs, the Pave

way II detectoropticsand housi ng are con

structed of injection-moulded plastic

instead of metal.

G

Front air to airview of an A-10 Thunderbolt II of the

25th Tactical Training Squadron, equipped with an

AN/AlQ 199electronic countermeasures podand

an AGM-65 Maverick missile taking part in

Exercise Team Spirit 86 . USAF

Below]High angle front view of an A-10

Thunderbolt II aircraft of the 81st Tactical Fighter

Wing.This A-10 is equippedwith multiple ejection

racks and is carrying an AGM-65 Maverick missile.

USAF

tation warhead is II in (27.5cm), the airfoil

group, 18in(45cm). The explosive is 1921b

(87kg) of Tritonal, PBXN-l09, with a

FMU-81 tail fuse. The GBU-12 hasa range

of 8 nautical miles and a circularerror prob

ability of 10ft (9m), Some 29,654 were produced for theAir Force at a productioncost

of 563,426 million, and a un it c os t of

19,000. Although 4,493 were used during

t he Gu lf War, again, the A-IO was not

among the carriers.

The Paveway II also features much

improvedde tector sensitivity,reduced ther

mal battery delay af ter release, increased

maximum canard deflection, laser coding

and an instantaneous field of view 30 per

B

AGM·65 Maverick missile variants

Demn

Electro-optical/television gu idanee

Electro-optical/television gu idanee

with screen magnification

Imaging infra-red guidance

Infra-red homing

Laser guidance

Launch weight Ilbl

Launch weight Ikgl

Warhead (Ib)

Warhead {kgl

Unitproducton cost { ,000 1

15-18 in (37 .5 -45cm) , the airfoil group,

28in (70cm).

The explOSive utilized is either 5351b

( 245kg) Tr itonal (BLU- I 09 ) o r 9451b

( 430kg) Tr itonal (Mk 84), w i th FMU-18

nose/tail fusing. Th e effective range is 8nautical miles and circular error probabil

ity is just 9m. The production unit cost of

theAir Force variant is 23,700 and some

10,145 have been deliver ed. During the

Gulf War, 2,637 were expended, but none

by the A-lOs.

With the smaller GBU-12, also built by

Texas Instruments, the weight is 8001b

(365kg), with a length of 129in(322.5cm).

The diameter of the Mk8 2 blast/fragmen-

and CBUl2 Paveway

ed bomb unit 10,in i ts latest form,

001b (910kg) Mk 84 bomb linked

laser guidance ( man-in

package. With either a general

(GP) or penetrating warhead, the

tesand locks on the tar

t h his laser designator a nd t he ord

is precisely homed t o a spot of laser

reflected back from the target. Not

associated with the A-lO as the

this laser-guided bomb (LGB) is

less, Thunderbolt II capable and

ordnance.

are two types of GBU-IO LGB

the original Paveway I intro

i n 1976, had f ixed wings. Control

the MAU-157 Series.

deployment in February 1986, after

f or t r ia l s and testing in

1983. The development costs of

Force s D/GMavericks is 16 8 mil

costs 2,895.5 mill ion for

ioncost of 3,063.5 mill ion.

six main types ofAGM-65 Maver

si le are given in the table (right).

lO Paveway

to the Pavel.vayI, but with MAU

i e s control, these systems have

a 2,0001b (910kg) GP (GBU-IO)

b (230kg) GP (GBU-12) war

or use against enemy armour, butBU-I 1 syst em has the Paveway

system marr i ed to a BLU

penetrator or Mk 84 blast/frag

bomb for really deep concrete

bunker C31 (command,

communica tions, in te l ligence)

The autopilot is Bang-Bang Mode.

II G BU-I 0 has a weight of

(J,165kg), and a length of l72in

The diameter of the warhead is

92 93



PACKING A P UN CH - A fO ORDNANCE PACKING A PU CH - A IO ORDNANCE

ughthe Avengerand the Maverick arethe A-l0 spreferredweapons

st armoured targets.free-fal l ing iron bombs canalso still be effective

t certain types oftarget andthe A l hasto be mission-capable in

which it was.in fact originally designed.Here a bombdropped

a shallow diveexplodes on impact during a tactical capabilities exercise

the desert. Natonal Archives Colege Park MD

Rockeye andother retardedbombsare also partof theA-IO s servicing

equipmentfor hostilesin a hurry. Here a parachute-retarded bomb drops on

to a light vehicle target inthe Californian desert during a tactical capabilities

exercise. Natonal Archives ColegePark MD

which had only a s m all chance ofh i t t in

their targets IM

Th e SFW is becoming the main USA

weapons in halt or hold (HoH) scenario

a t the beginning of a major regional con

tingency (MRC), givingessential time f

the ground forces to b e m o bilize d an

cohere to engage such an a t tack. Th e al

up weight is 927lb(420kg),and the syste

has an overall length of92in and a diame

ter of 16in (232 x 35cm). The unit bas

line cost o f the system is 360,000and th

h a s a f fe c te d t he n umbe rs t o be ordere

wit h t he original USAF requ iremen t

17,000 being cut b ac k t o a mere 5,00

The A- I0 will be able to to te tensuch sy

te m s p e r s o rtie .

TheSFW is described as an unpowere

t op a tt a ck , w id e- ar ea c lu st er munitio

specifically designed to give a multiple k

ratefor each aircraft passingover an enem

armour phalanxand supporting vehicles.h as a p r ov e n a ll- w ea the r , 24-hour oper

tional capability. With the proliferation

SAM and hand-he ld anti-aircraft missil

s ys te ms , it w as not envisaged that survi

ability over s u ch f o rm a tio ns w o uld b e p r

longed, hence the n ee d t o m ak e everyon

o f t h e A-10 s attack runs count, inflicti

maximum damage on the oncoming ta

masses. The SFW wasdesigned forthe A-

(and its successors) to make such attacks

a heightenvelope embracing an altitude

200ft (60m) aboveground level (AGL)

20,000ft 6,000m) mean s ea le ve l MSL).

can d e liv er th is w e ap o nr y either in le

flight (the most effective method), or in

shallow-angle dive attitude, when terra

demands it, and at speeds between 250 a

650 knots. Althoughthe system can be us

outside this scenario, its effectiveness a

value show a marked decreasein proporti

to any increase in releaseheight, dive ang

or speed, due to the adverse effects of wi

conditions, weaponsdispersal area and fa

offin aiming accuracy.Thisiscommonto

TMD ordnance deliveries, and ha s l ed

the introduction of the wind-correct

munitions dispenser (WCMD) tailkit. Th

will enable improved SFW delivery frhigheraltitudes and will open the door

strategic aircraft, as well as tactical aircra

to e m plo y the SFW. The SFW ordnan

with WCMD improvement is designated

the CBU-105.

TheWCM 0 project is a top priority 00

programme under development at Eg

AFB, Florida. On 3 A ug us t 1 99 8, i t w

given the go-aheadas an Air Force lead a

streamlined acquisition programme cost

CBU97 CBU10S SENSOR FUSED WI: APON

SFW

Further 1,0001b 454kg) CBU systems, the

CBU-97/CBU-105 SFWs and SUU-66/B

TMDs, with the F lU-39 fuse, contain ten

BL - 1 08 /B s en s or - fu se d submunitions

along with forty hockey puck-shaped skeet

lR-sensing projectiles. These weredesigned

for the Cold . Wa r s et t in g, a s a means of

blocking the Felda Gap choke pointsouth

west of Eisenach, a nd s ou th o f Hersfeld

along the Felda river, and preventingWar

s aw P ac t tank hordes punching through

West Germany to the Rhine. The hope was

thatthe A-1Ocouldslow theadvanceof the

Soviet tank hordes by culling the leaders,

and a g oo d number of others along the

invasion corridors. They used to joke that

wewere a speed bump, recalled Lieutenant

ColonelSteve Ruehl, who flew the A-1O atthat t im e a s a y o un g lieutenant.

16\

The SFW s aw its fi rst operational

deployment with tw o B-1 B bombers dis

patched to Bahrain e ar ly i n 1 99 8. The

SFW is the latest wide-area cluster mun i-

tion,but distinct from the others in that it

is the first onesmartenough to f in d its ta r

get after i t h a s been released. In fact, the

SFW is considered ten times more effec

tive than Vietnam-era cluster munitions,

The most serious l imi tat ion of the sys

tem is that missions have to be requested

seventy-two hours in advance th rough

n om in at io n a t t he Division Targeting

Board, although they m ay be allocated

down to battalion le ve l. A ls o, the mine

field remains unmarked.

Th e a v er a ge a r e a covered by a ty pic a l

drop is a rectangle measuring 200 x 650m.

This w o uld b e la id by six drops, placing a

total o f 4 32 AT a n d 132 AP mines w i th

the following AT density (dependingupon

the laying direction): a re a - 0 .0 03 M/

M , L i ne ar - AA 1 - 0.66 M/L - M (200m

side) or AA2 2. L6 M/K - M (650m side),

and there is a 275m safety zone built in

around this box.

Laid minefields, once established, not

only inhib it the enemy, but a lso r e str ict

the free movement of f r ie n d Iy f or ce s. I n a

fast-flowing battle situation, minefields

can be self-defeating. In order to overcomethis problem, both the Gator mines are fit

t ed w it h pre-programmable self-destruct

mechanisms, which can be set prior to the

A-IO s take-off by means of a selector on

the dispenser itself. This gives the battle

field commander three pre-set SO t ime s :4

hours, 48 hours or 15 days.

With an all-up weight of 710lb (325kg),

an overall length, including n o se f u sin g

and tail fins, of92in (232cm), and a cylin

drical diameter of 16in (35cm), the CBU

89/B is built around the BLU-91/B AT

mine, w it h t he BLU-92/B AP mine

(DODIC K29 K292 and K293) being

used to de te r mine c lea rance . The BLU

91/B weighs 4.31b ( l .95kg) and the BLU

92/B weighs 371b (Ukg). Both h av e

dimensions of 57 5 x Sin 5.38 X 12.5cm)

and ar e 2 .6in (6.5cm) h igh . E ac h ha s a

unitcost of 39,963.

Once the d is pe ns er h as b ee n f or ce d

open , the m ine s im me d ia te ly a r m a c co r d

ing to pre-programmed instructions. Once

laid, the AT mine, which h as a two-minute

arming time, is equipped with microelec

tronic magnetic sensors. These have the

capability not only of identifying and

s e lec ting a r mo u re d v e hic le s f ro m other

contacts, but also of choosing theoptimummoment of detonation in order to in flict

the maximum pene t ra t ion of the target s

ventral protection, t o d is ab le i t M -K il l )

and/or eliminate i ts c re w K -K il l) . E ac h

mine contains a 1 .7 kg w a rh e ad w ith a Mis

znay-Schardin explosive charge of 585 g

RDX, which can defeat the belly armourof

most known Ru ss ian - bu ilt ta nk s . The

spalling metal from the v e hic le k ills a ll its

occupants instantly, even though the tank

might continueto move. Shouldthe enemy

tank beequipped withautoloaders, the det

onat ion of r ou nd s i n the belly-mounted

ammunition carousel is usually achieved.

The AP Scatmines, also with two

minute arming times, contains540 g Comp

B4 high-velocity e x plo siv e f ra gm nts

which, when activated by trip-wiring, dis

perse horizontally over a w ide r e gio n.

The area of each Gator minefield is deter

mined by the height at whicl. the dispenser

is set to open, the mines being self-dispens

ing aerodynamically. This height is con

trolled by the electromechanical fuse fitted

to the nose ofthe dispenser, or by an option

al proximitysensor.The pre-selecteddisper

sal point results ina ground-pattern of mines

proportionate to the drop height. Such sensitive weapons have to be dispensed within

set limitations, but the range for the Gator

mine is enormous, with height o f release

var yi n g f rom 2 00 ft u p t o 4 0, 00 0f t (60

1Z,OOOm) and speed of release rangingfrom

200 to 700knots airspeed. Targets of oppor

tunity can b e ta ke n under attack with the

system, the determining f a cto r b e in g the

unit b as ic lo ad U BL) ofthe FASCAM for

the ta rg e tto b e ta k e n o u t.

CBU 89 B GATOR MINE

The impressive CBU-89, from Aerojet

O rdn a nc e C ompany (AOe), is also

known as the Gator mine. This multi

weapon system is designed to scat ter a

range of mines of different capability over

a w id e a r ea i n rectangular blocks. The aim

is to denywhole areas of the battlefield, or

projected invasion pa th , to theoncoming

e ne my , o r, alternatively, to immobilize

mobile enemy concentrations already on

the move by su rrounding them with

instant and reinforceable minefields.

Mineficlds have traditionally been static

and complex; the laying of them was a

drawn-out affair, and theycould always be

bypassed once thei r whereabouts became

knownto the enemy. With theadoptionof

the Ga tor mine, US forces now h av e t he

opportunity tocreate minefields anywhere

and of any size, within a relatively) short

period once the movementsand direction

of the enemy th rus t are known. Th is sys

tem a lso g ive s a lo ng e r r a ng e -la y in g capa

bility than any other FASCAM method.

The A- lOis o ne o f t he USA F s preferred

delivery systems for the CBU-89.Bas ica lly , a L,OOOlb (454kg) cluster

munition built a round theSUU-64TMD,

and with optional FlU-39 proximity sen

sors, the CBU-89 dispenses simultaneous

ly seventy-two BLU-91/B anti-tank mines

(AT), and twenty-twoBLU-92/B anti-per

sonne l (AP) mines. There a re two com

panion systems, for Navy and ir Fo rc e

use, but t he CBU-89/B wit h the SUU

64/B TMD r e la tes to the A-IO.

was considered v ita l to thecontainment of

the overwhelmingpreponderanceof Sovi-

et f o rc es in Central Europe, and proved

equally effective in the Gulf.

CBU 87 B

A deve lopmen t o f the s tandard CBU, the

CBU-87/B is a L,OOOlb (454kg) air-deliv

ered cluster weapons system. This com

bined-effects munition (CEM), an inte

gral p ar t o f t he dispenser, is specifically

designed to take out soft targetareas with

detonating bomblets. t comprises the

SW-65 tactical munitions dispenser

(TMD), which can b e f it t ed with the

FlU-39/B proximity s en so r. I t contains

ZOZ combined-effects bombs (CEB), each

ofwhich is constructed of scored steel and

is designed to t ime-burst in to 300 frag

ments f or u se against a w id e r an ge of tar

gets. These include tanks, armoured per

sonnel carriers, trucks, ground personnel

en masse and a r ms d u mp s . Tw elv e timed

selections give ten height-of-burst (HoB)

options.

This all-embracing killing power is con

tained withinone small package and morethan ZOO ofthe bom bs dispensed from each

d is pe n se r m a ke s f or a lethal swathe of fire.

Each CBU-87/B has an all-up weight of

950lb (430kg), with a length of 92in

(Z 32cm), and a diameterof 15.6in (39cm)

They a re f it te d w it h a six-variation spin

control mechanism for controlled, but not

guided airborne delivery. Manufactured by

Aerojet General/Honeywell, each CBU

87/B h as a unit cost of 13,941

similar to t he C BU -5 2, t he

has an all-up weight of 800lb

an overall length of 93in and a

terof 1 6 in Z3Z x 35cm). Maximum

is 6Z5 KIAS, and fusing is similar.

submunitions load is 650 BLU-63A/B

ti -personnel bomblets,

of which contains 5g titanium pellets

incendiary. They are most efficiently

against f lammable targets such a s o il

, bowsers and dumps, vehicles and

areas. The unitcostof theCBU-58

2,893.

Each of the BLU-61A/B submunitions

a spherical bomb let 312in (8.75cm) in

ter and weighing 271b (1.25kg), of

0.651b 0.3kg) is an HE warhead.

effect on densely packed infantryfor

o r c ol umned motor t ra ns po rt

in d e files , is devastating. The

h as a unitcost of 1 ,542.

v ar ia ti on o n t he CBU-58, o f approxi

the same specification, the CBUcarries 650 bomblets, which combine

two separate kill mechanisms - f ra g

ion and incendiary - in one pack

Both incorporate a time-delay fuse,

causes random detonations after

The effect of th is delayed action is

neutralize large portions o f t h e battle

ld for long periods, and black out whole

delaying the progress of invading

Slowing up advancing spearheads

94 95



6 4 p e r cent less t h an t h e original cost

It also arrived five months ahead

e d ule , in A p r il 1 99 9. A d ir ec t c o ns e

of s rt Sto rm , w h er e a dv e rs e

and dust, andthe dense

e from the b u rn ing o ilf ire s s e t by the

tingIraqis,severely limited pilotiden

ionand location of targets. The tailkit

e s t o SFW, CEM an d GATOR

and steers t h e m u ni t i on f ro m a

release point to exact target coordi

all the time giving in-flight correc

to compensate for launch transients,

and weather inter

The systemwill also beretro-fitted.

b ig p lu s f or t he A ir Force is the fact

t h e system will enable non-specialist

such as the B-1, B-2, B-52, F-15E,

and F 117 to deploy tacticalweapons

a greatheight,thusenablingthe force

backaloft once again. WCMD gives

A ir Force, never enthusiastic aboutCAS missions, a further opportu

to avoid thatcombat scenario as much

. A ccordingto theP rojectH ead,

enantC olonel S tevenWelch:

i n te n t o f WCMD is to allow aircraft and

to fly above the anti-aircraft artillery

surface-to-airmissilethreats and keep them

harm s way. Itwill allow the warfighter to

theC B U-87, -89 and -97fromaltitudesup

5,000 feet.16i

an achieved accuracy e r ro r o f less

30ft, WCMD t ur ns C BU s i nt o

T h e W C M D system is most cer

A-IO c ap ab l e, b ut , i n v ie w of such

rks, it is doubtful w hether the aircraft

b e a ll ow ed t o d ep lo y the system on

n g o t he r t h a n a small-scale profile,

t h t h e Paveway II.

SFW is something r a dic al in the

of a ir- d elive r ed w e ap o nr y . D a vid

ek,defenceanalystw ith theR and

in Washington, g o es s o f ar a s

that the s y ste m h a s a potentially

capability . Major JeffLatas,

R equirements Officer a t t h e P en ta

is equally enthusiastic:

ne pass, I can dropa whole array of weapons

n optimum fashion, so I can go out and kill

targets w t one airplanc. l68

all TMD delivery systems, the sub

are released after the container

at a pre-determined height. In the

o f t he SFW, t he t en BLU-108/B

s are parachute-stabilized to slow

P CKING A P UN CH - IO ORDN NCE

descent. Their in - bu ilt r a da r a ltim e ter s

a ut om at i ca l ly f ir e a d ua l- no zz le r o ck et

motor, which spins the submunition and

f ir es it b a c k v er tic ally. Ea ch submunition

sub-divides into four armour-penetrating

projectiles, a nd e ac h o f these four is fitted

with its own individual IR sensor, enabling

them to detect armoured targets. As t he

submunition r eg ai ns a l ti t ud e, t h es e f ou r

projectilesare released and loft over the tar

get area, where their I R lo ck on to the sig

natures of a n y a r mo u re d v e hic le s , w h er e

u p on a penetrator is explosivelyfired a t t h e

heat source. Should the sensor fail to detect

such a s ign a tu r e a f te r a p r e- s et p e rio d, the

projectilesautomatically fire to inflict hurt

on any other enemy personnel or vehicles

in the targetzone.169

Each CBU-97/ B r el ea se is designed

t o c o ve r a rectangular f ir e z o ne o f a b ou t

500 x 1,200ft 150 x 360m) in a r ea .

C olonel William Wise, Air Fo rc e Pr o gram Director, Area Attack Munitions at

E gl in , d es cr ib ed a t yp ic al low-altitude

deployment thus:

The engagement would begin with the bomber

m a ki n g a d r op a t a n altitude ranging from 200

feetto3,000feetaboveground level withatyp

ical mission altitude of 1 ,5 00 f ee t. F or a ny

attackcommencing below an altitude of 1,500

feet, the d i sp e ns e r w ou ld u se a p r e- s et t i me d

release. Although the time is variable,it would

be a b o ut o n e s e co n d a f t e r a d r op at 300 feet,

meaning the dispenser would release 10 BLU

108/B submunitions at about 280feet. Each of

the 10 submunitions then would h a ng o n a

parachute for about eightseconds,during which

time the p r oj e ct il e s a r e s p un u p and finally

ejected a t a b o ut 100 feet above ground level.

Each o f t he hockey puck-shaped projec

tiles then uses an infra-red sensor to rapid

ly l o ca t e a hot target, such as a tank or

armoured vehicle. The projectile locks on

to i ts ta r ge t and fires a self-forging; high

velocity slug, which strikes and immobilis

es the target. iO

Further im p ro v em e nts a r e in tr a in under a

pre-planned improvement P 3I) pro

gramme. These include the incorporation

of a dual-mode active/passive) IR to help

with target detectionand identification, as

well as modifications to the warhead itself

to deal better w ith soft-target options, so

that e a ch S F W f ir es a s m alle r centre slug

with an outer ring of shards. Because the

centre slug is fired at a higher velOCity it

remains as lethal as the larger slug on the

96

regular SFW. In addition, the system foot

print is to be enlarged for better targetcov

erage. This involves dispensing actual pro

jectiles at a higher altitude, thus increasing

the le tha lity z on e to a r e c ta n gle 600 x1,800ft 180 x 540m). With theadoptionof

joint stand-off weapons JSOW) suitable

for deployment by bothA ir Force andN avy

aircraft, Octal will be replaced by an insen

sitive explosive fill to allow Navy usage.

The likely A-IO SFW/WCMD load is

ten systems per sortie, which gives quite a

respectable profile in the delivery of this

new form of weapon.

AIM 9 Sidewinder

Defensive armament was not a great con

sideration for t h e A - 1 0 as it wasoriginally

conceived. Low-level flight, while expos

ing the aircraft to maximum ground retal

iation, gave in i ts elf a m e as u re of invulnerability against enemy fighter aircraft.

A lthough theS ovietU nion s expansion of

its lookdow n-shootdow n systems was to

p os e a s er io us t h re a t, t h e A - 10 m a in

chanceof survival in such encounters was

via evasion, rather than combat.

N on e t he less, provision was made for

the carrying of air-to-air defence missiles.

The standard lo ad ing in such a configura

tion wasfour AIM-9L/M Sidewinders car

r ied in p a ir s on LAU-1 05/LAU-14launch

er rails, o n A N G dual-rail adapters DRA),

o n e it he r t he p or t outboard p y lo n 1 ) , or

the starboard outboard pylon 11), w ithan

ECM pod on the opposite outboard pylon.

In t h e e v en t , a l th o ug h th e y w e re c a rr ied

intocombatduring s rt Storm, none was

ever fired air-to-air. The o n ly k ill of this

nature was achieved by the Gatling.

Three Sidewinders were actually fired

off during the Gulf War - t wo by the 23rd

TASS and one by t he 7 4t h T F S - but all

these were accidental, while the 23rd

T AS S N ai l F AC aircraft scorned their

use even for their missions, only carrying

Sidewinders on a solitary mission.

ECM

The ECM pod is u u ally m o un t ed o n t h e

outer wing station opposite the AIM. The

A-10 is configured to carry the following

Westinghouse-built noise/deception jam

mer d e ep , s h allo w and all-band) pods:

• AN/ALQ-119 V)-10, - 1 2, - 15 and -16

• A N /A LQ -131 V )-1 to -13 and -15

Head-on view ofthe 23rd Tactical FighterWing

A-10, withfamiliar shark s mouthmarkings, and

long-rangefuel tanks on the innerordnance pylo

forferry operations.It isseen here in 1991 in

Kuwai t, pr ior to i ts returntothe USAat theendo

theGulfWar. USAF

Below Chocksaway During Operation Desert

Storm theA-10really came intoher own.Here

a heavily ladenSharknose is aboutto departfor

the battle-zone with a full complement ofiron

bombsand a single Sparrowhawkfor defensive

purposes. USAF

Bottom Nosewheel inthe air, main undercarr iag

on thedeck, thisA-10, 80 224 ofthe 23rd Tactical

FighterWing is seen atEngland AFB Louisiana.

USAF



Dusk overthe California foothills and two A-lOs

make a nice study asthey wing home after

exercises. Eachaircraft carr ies asingle

averickunderthestarboard wing anda single

Sparrowhawk outboardunderthe portwing USAF

Below Checkingovermapco-ordinates,the pilot

of this 57th wing Hog sitsunderhis opencanopy,

helmetlessin theshimmeringheat on theready

areaof a desertairstr ip.Stil lwearing the European

Theatre of Operationspaint scheme,at the express

orderofWashington,the A-lOsstoodout amile,but

fortunately, encountered little or no air resistance.

USAF

Bottom Averymixedbatchof ordnance including

MavericksandSparrowhawkmissilesistotedby this

mean-looking pairof A-lOsfromthe 57th Tactical

FighterWing working from Nell is AFB Nevada.The

combined chaffandflaredispensersabafttheunder

carriagefairings can be clearlyseen here.Theyfea

turethe new two-tone greypaint scheme. USAF

Above Head-on view oftheA-10revealsthe

considerableexhaustemissionsfrom the twin turbo

fanengines. Suchemissionshelp maskthe infra-red

fingerprintoftheaircraft a sa n unplannedbonustotheuniquemountingofthe powerplant. Also clear

isthe dihedralofthe outerwing sections. USAF

Right The 511th Tactical FighterSquadron deploys.

Thisbraceof A-lOs inthe EuropeanTheatre ofOper

ationspaint schemefly low overthe English country

side.Thetai l-bandand lettering of 79 224 show a

markeddifferencefrom the moreflamboyantstyling

sported by theVultures aircraft, 79 995. USAF

Below This quartetof A-lOsfromthe91stTactical

FighterWing, re-deployedto the Gulf from RAF

Bentwaters/Woodbridge in England,areseen in en

echelonformation andpresenta formidable show

offorce overtherugged landscapebelow. USAF

Above Bosnia bound Apair ofA-lOsfromthe 52nd CompositeFighterWin

deployedfrom Spangdahlemin Germany, l i ftoff inclose formation fromtheir

airbasetoconductanotherpatrol in theturbulentYugoslavskies. USAF



airborne shotof testpilot Donald Sorensenflying the number 4pre-production aircraft. Donald Sorensen

An air-to-airright front view of an 78th Tactical FighterSquadron A l0 ThunderboltII aircraftduring a

g mission overthe North Sea March 1988. USAF Master Sgt Patrck Nugent

11 369 makes a splendid sight haulingfour Maverickmissiles on underwingracks. USAF

The VA-lOBdual-seatnight-attackprototype is

preservedat Edwards AFB. Ar Force Flght Test Centre

Museum Edwards AFB

Above A l0 ThunderboltII ofthe 190th Fighter

Squadron part of the 124th Wing Idaho Air

National Guard at Gowen Field Boise Idaho.The

first A l0 arrived therein 1995. Missionconversion

has occupied mostoftheirt ime sincethenand

IdahoNational Guard pilotshavenotyetf lowntheir

aircraftoutside the USA. Boththe A l0 andthe OA-

10 are operated by the 190th Squadron. Master Sgt

Tom Gloeckle 1245th Wing Visual Informaton SectonIdaho AirNatona Guard

Gulf War action. Tliisshark-nose Hawgis being

re-armed between sorties. The Draggin i s

manoeuvred into place; notethe empties coming

out on topofthe stack.The burntpaintaroundthe

noseshowsthat theAvengerhas alreadybeenput

to good use. She alsocarriesa pairof Sparrowhawk

defensivemissiles outboard on herstarboardpylon.

USAF

==



Below n 195 showsthe austere colourscheme

used on 81stTFWA-10s on deploymentfrom RAF

Woodbridgefor missionsover Germany during the

ColdWar. Simon Watson

Air-to-airrefuell ing, fromthetanker sviewpoint.

Atankerplaneof theUtah irNationalGuard refuels

A-10 232 airborne with a varietyof ordnance during

a joint CONUS exercise inthe 1980s. The stubby

wings flythe refuell ingnozze,which automatically

locksinto theA-10s slipway s i tu a te d i n f r o nt o f t h e

cockpit. Authors collection via Mark Savage

Above This TAC aircraft, sIn 79-0220 belongs

t o t h e 509th TFS whichwas relocatedat RAF

Alconbury, Cambridgeshire when RAF Woodbridge

became toocrowded.The standardEuropean

Theatreof Operations paintscheme was carried,

with a light grey str ipe, edged in white and adorned

with askull. Simon Watson

Below A-10 78-0681 on display atthe USAF

Museum,Wright-Patterson AFB Ohio.Although

here carryingthe name ofCaptain Jeff Scott on

thenose,this was alsothe mountof CaptainPaul

Johnson,who, on 21 January 1991 performed an

eight-hourrescuesupportmission during Operation

Desert Storm for which he was awarded the ir

ForceCross, the irForces highestawardfor valour.

The aircraftwas deliveredto themuseum on 24

January 1992. Rick Patterson via the USAF Museum

Wright-Patterson AFB

Bottom The 81stTFW, Woodbridge, was onc6Jthe

home forA-10sIn 233 shownhere indelivery Mask

10Apaintschemewith yellow panels on thelead

i n g e d g es o f t h e w i n g s. Simon Watson

tthe Las Vegas irShow, Nevada,Apri l 1998 a

head-onstudyof an A-10INbr. 00274 New Orleans

Baby , a DesertStorm veteranassigned tothe 55th

Fighting Fifty-Fifth ) FighterSquadron,20th Fighter

Wing. Immaculatein its new GhostGreypaint

scheme, it i s b a se d a t S h a w AFB South Carolina.

KengoYamamoto



Vought. The object of thisweapon wa

defeatall known defences by sheer spe

Mach 4.5 or 3,000 knots (5,500km/h50per cent faster thanthe bulletsfromGAU-8 Avenger gun The spin-stabilmissiledid not have to carry anyexplowarhead; the impact of the bundepleted uranium rods was thought t

sufficient to annihilate any k narmour-plate protection ofthe day.

The HVM was to have been guidethe target by a CO

2laserguidancelink

beam scansa raster pattern and senseposition therein. Coursecorrection wbecarried out by controlsquibs carriedaft of the processor in the nose-cone.main body o f t he missile contained

boost/ ustain motor vent ing via af la r a ft , wbich a lso contained the

ward-looking laser receiver. The sspeed ofthe missile would render inetua l any avoidance movement s by

t ank, so such cor re ct ions would beVought was thinking at that t ime o

8,OOO-dollar HVM w it h a wei ghunder 80lb (35kg) and a range of 3 m(5km),which wouldhave given the Afar greater reach. The plan called forusc of the LANTIR system and acontrol installation incorporating the

get acquisition and tracking FURguidancelink built into the leadingedthe wing. 0 less than twenty-eigbtsmissi les would be mounted - nine

under each wing in two underwing pAlthough successful test f ir ings

conducted as early as 1983 and a two-programme was proposed, which whaveculminatedin aseries of live in-ftest firings by the A-IO, funding wasforthcoming.

Vought HypervelocityMissile HVM

Among the proposed armaments for tbe

A-10 in tbe mid-1980s was the hypervelocity missile then underdevelopment by

PACKING A P UN CH - A·IO ORDNANCE

97

In i ts newrole as FAC aircraft, theOA-IO

carries LUU-2 flares for illuminating targets by night or in bad weather . They areof two-mill ion candlepower and have aburn l ife of fi ve minute s i f i gnit ed at

2,400ft nOm . They arereleased in levelf l ight with a time-delay free-fall before aparachute opensand the flare ignites, giving the marker aircraft t ime to get clear .Targetmarking can be carried outeither

via the conventional white phosphorus WP or 'WillyPete ') rocket, or by the useof target markerflares. These arecarried inthe pylon-mounted SUU-25 f lare dispenser,which hasfour tubes, each capableof carrying two f l ar e . The e timer flaresa re 3ft ( 0.9m) in l ength, Sin l2.5cm indiameterand weigh 29lb (13kg). They areof I,OOO-candiepowerand havea burn life

of approximately threeminutes. There arethreetypesofLUU: I/B (red);5/B (green);and 6/B (maroon).

OA-IO Flares and

Target Marker Flares

sequence oHour- AI, A2, B1 and B2), andat the rear of both main landing-gear fair

ings (block grouping release sequence offour-AI, A2,BI and B2).These areloadedwith M-206 flare cartr idges and RR-170A/AL single and double chaff cartridges.

• Al - forward-antel);Qa module• A2 - l ow -bandmodu le• A3- mid-/high-band module

• A4 - after-antennamodule.

For defence against incoming missiles, the

OAfA-I0 car ri es combined ALE-40(V)chaff countermeasures and M-207 flareswithdispensersin four locations: under thecurve of each wingtip (l inear row release

• AN/ALQ-184 Vn

• QRC 80-901(V)-3.

Chaff and FlareCountermeasure Dispensers

Various electrical countermeasuresmountings

were utilized on the A l downthe years. USAF

The basic purpose of these systems is to

emit noise which simulates chaff) or spec ia l coded s igna ls to trigger repeaterdeception jamming (RD]) of the hostileradar picture . A single processor has twoindependent fore and aft jamming sets.Operations a re ava il able according totype, overfive wavebands.

The AN/ALQ-131 (V)shallowconfiguration(low-drag)ECM podcoversbands4and 5. I t ha sa l ength of II in (27.5cm),aheight of 20in (50cm). The -9 and -10weigh 600lb (275kg) ; the -13 540 lb(245kg); and the -15 580lb (265kg). The

deep configuration covers bands3, 4, and

5, has a l en gt h of Illin (277.5cm), aheight of 24.5in (61.25cm). The -4, -5,and -6 weigh 675lb (305kg); the -12640lb(290kg); and the -14 680lb (310kg).

The AN/ALQ-184(V)-1 is 13ft (3.9m)inlength,20in high(50Cln) andhasa widtho f lO in ( 25cm), w it h a wei gh t o f 625 lb(285kg). The (V)-15all-band pod, withtwoin-buil t heat exchangers, has an overalllength of 12ft II in(3.8m), a width of12in(JOcm)and a heightof21in (JOin with suspension lugs) (52.5/75cm) , and weighs580lb(265kg). It is a modularsystem, witheach part connected by means of a digibusand cooled by a power-free self-containedfreon/ram air system. Basic configuration is

as follows:

Left Armed with smallpractice bombs.these

two A-lOsof the18thTacticalFighterSquadrons.

343rd CompositeWing. are on atraining mission

fromEielson AFB. Alaskain 1983. USAF Offcial

Rear view of two A-lOs on the mainrunwayat

Davis-Monthan note on tail) AFB. Tucson.

Arizona.in February1998. While the engines of

theclosest aircraft 235 arecovered. the core

engineexhaustducts on the right-hand aircraftareclearly visible insidethe massive twin engine

pods. On eitherside ofthe rearnavigation light

arethe two rearbuttonantennafor the l band

radarwarning receiver. KengoYamamoto

Operation Southern Watch saw the

s periodicallydeployed to Kuwaitiairfields

rcethe southern no-fly zone overIraq.to

Sad dam Husseinfrom inflicting further

on hisown subjects with hislargely intact

e.Mavericksandrocketpods.now back in

thisaircraft s weaponsstations

anothermission. The main war

on this dutyhasbeen Iock-ons by Iraqi

systems. which usuallyprovoke an immedi

armedresponse. USAF



INITIAL DEPLOYMENT. PRODUCTION AND TACTICS

CHAPTER TWELVE

Initial eploy lent

Production n Tactics

The first Stateside trials under Euro

pean conditions were made during Opera

tion ReforgeT h e ld in the former West Ger

many. The A-IO was a ls o a bl e t o p ro ve

its elf to ta lly compatible with the third

g e ne r at i on p r ot e ct i ve shelters, which

NATO was e r ec t in g a t t h e time t o g iv e

nuclear-blast protection f or its a irc r af t. I n

view of northern Eu ro p e s m ise r ab le

weather, testing forsuitabilityfor low-ceil

ing/poor-visibility operations was the

ifornia, along w ith a ir cr a ft f ro m t h e o t h e r

services, u n de r O p er a ti o n Red lag

Using the ellis AFB r an ge , f ul ly

e q ui p pe d w i th simulated Soviet ZSU-23

and ZSU-27 AA A and S -6 SAM sys

tems, the A-IO w as g iv en a g ru el li ng

going-over in t h e h e at and the sand. The

scenario r e pl i ca t ed a Soviet armoured

thrust with accompanying fighter support,

a n d t h e aircraftperformed well. Some 112

s o rties w er e f low n, with fast turnarounds

t h e G at l in g . The a ir cr a ft w o uld

switch roles a n d c o n t in u e t h e h u nt .

One serious teething problem wa

g u n f irin g causing the aircraft engin

stall, and this culminated w ith a d

engine stall on aircraft number six

Edwards AFB in June 1978. This ne

to be rectified before the programme

m ov e o n. Meanwhile, operational

prepared to expand as production ste

increased.

Wreathed inthe smoke from its30nm GAU-8/A Gatling, an A-10fires a burstduring

the Long Rf e III semi-annual aerialgunnery competition.The A l frequently hones

its skills insuch air-to-ground gunnerycompetitions, which testthe abil i ties of

tacticalair crews to plan and execute long-range missions, execute attacks on first

look targetsand accuratelydeliverordnanceafterlong fl ighttimes to thetarget

zone. Such scenariosare realistic with regard to modernCONUS-based operations.

National Archives,Co egePark, MD

An A-10 ofthe 510th Tactical FighterSquadron TFSI The Buzzards carryingthe tail coding WR indicating

theirbase location,Woodbridge-Bentwaters. A ful l loadof ordnance includesthe AGM-65Maverick

missile on the innerstations and an ALQ-119 V)-15 electronic countermeasurespod on theport outer

station. USAF

Delivery and Nomenclatur

Original plans had c a lle d f or a d e

schedule of fourteen aircraft per m

from F RC , w it h e ac h year s con

be ingbudge ted for on a year-by-year

In fact, as the programme rolledFairchild exceeded this target and pr

tion peaked at sixteen aircraft per m

A s p ec ial ceremony was held on 3

1978 to mark the delivery of the one

dredth a ir cr af t s /n 7 6- 0 55 3) . I n a

dance were representatives o f t he

being achieved between e a ch , a n d t h e test

resulted in an estimated loss of five A-lOs,

three fighters, one flak and one to

SAM.

The findings of these early tests, alongwith the p r ob a bl e n e w areas of deploy

ment, led s om e dr a stic re-thinking of

the A-IO s tactics. The future attack pat

tern o f t he A-IO - a ir cr a ft operating in

mutually supportive p air s - w as f irs te s ta b

lished at t hi s t im e. Under this arrange

m e n t e a c h flight co-ordinated the attack,

with one aircraft tackling ground defences

at lo ng r a ng e w ith Maverick missiles, and

its partner going in and killing tanks with

nor m . Fur ther evaluation was carried out

in t he U S A in N ovember and D ecember

1976 at the Fo rt Lew is rroving grounds,

Washington State, where the r a iny c li

mate was notoriously similar.Europe was n ot t he only possible place

f or Ea s t/Wes t c o nf lic t, h o we v er , a nd t he

A-IO had to b e f itf o r duty i n a n y climate.

A c co r din gly , in J a nu ar y a n d February

1 977 , r ct ic climatizing tr ia ls w e re con

ducted by t w o A - lO s , at Eiels on A FB,

Alaska, underOperation acl rost At the

other extreme, four A-tOs based a t t h e U S

Army D ry La ke a ir str ip took part in anti

armour thrust exercises at Fort Irwin, Cal-

profile cowlings. This was done f lyin g a

standard production aircraft, w hi c h F R C

had leased backfrom t h e A i r Forcefor just

that purpose in September 1976. The idea

was that such a v e rs io n could be powered

by theG eneral Electric low-bypass engine,

the J 101, which developed more than

10,0001b 4,540kg) of thrust. Alternative

ly this variant w o uld b e capable of takingthe European Turbo-Union RB 199

engine. T his w o uld , in th eo r y, have given

a n e x tr a 30 to 50 knots 55-95km/h) top

speed to the A-tO, but i t a ls o f ai le d t o

attract interest in Europe.

n e er t o keep it going w h ile its own devel

opment programme was under way Ulti

mately, this was to result in the P A NA V IA

Tornado. In common w it h m os t of its

European counterparts, to t h e R AF speed

wasstill e v er y th i ng a n d t h e A -I 0 w as not

iv n muchchanceof survival at a ll in this

respect.

In an attempt to produce a variant ofthe A-IO that might have m or e a ppe al to

the Allies, which did n o t h a ve a n y s u ch

a ir cr a ft in their inventory - and had not

e v en p l an n ed o n e - F a ir ch i ld sent over a

m o de l f e atu r in g e l on ga t ed a n d reduced

next milestone in the A-IO story was

a n no u nc em e nt t h at t he first opera

u ni t t o deploy t he n ew aircraft

u ld b e t h e 3 5 4t h A i r C o m ba t Wing,

at Myrtle Beach AFB, South Caroli

The first production a ir cr a f t w as d u ly

over t o t h e A ir Force Tactical Airm a n d t h e r e o n 20 March 1976, some

m o nt h s a h ea d of s c he d ule . I n the

time, the final operational test and

programme was being under

by the 355th Tactical Fighter Train

W i ng T F T W) based at Davis-Mon

AFB, Arizona. They were s oon be ing

n exhaustively, a nd t he first A-IO to

c k u p 1 ,0 00 hours flight time reached

target that December.

The V ietnamWar that hadspawned the

was by now ju st a bitterand haunting

but the aircraft s tank-crunching

ilitywould now be turned to ATO s

need in E ur op e t o b ol s te r i ts f ra il

- w ire p olic y. I t w as hoped that any

invasion could b e l i mi t ed t o con

warfare long enough to b uy time

outhaving to resort to full-scale tacti

nuclear exchanges. Mutually assured

MAD) was t h e n e x t step after

s o it w as a p olicy worth pursuing. The

heavily againstsuccess, with the

w Block ground forces outnumbering

west by more t h an t hr ee to one in

and seven t o o ne in m a np o we r .

the les s, ith a d to b e tr ie d , and if any

ft was capable of nipping off the tipsSoviet armoured columns, then sure

that aircraft was the A-IOI

Accordingly, theA -tO was previewed in

future deployment area, attending the

Farnborough Air Show in Sep

1976, and making a promotional

of U S A FE bases and installations in

Europe. The R A F tr a ditional

disliked CAS, and i n a ny c as e had the

ya l a vy s Hawker Siddeley S.2 Bu cc a -

98 99



INITI L DEPLOYMENT PRODUCTION NDT CTICS INITI L DEPLOYMENT PRODUCTION ND T CTICS

ngtip-to-wingtip,the A-lOs swoop in low again. US

Alow-level pass by three A-10 Thunderbolt lis of the 355th Tactical Fighter Wing, which was

ding a firepower demonstration for US President Jimmy Carter. US

Such a delivery profile meant accep

high level of vulnerability. Again, Ge

McMullen s views encapsulated the t

ing o f t he Ai r F or ce i n the mid-1

Accepting the fact that the diving, slo

ing A-tO presented a super radar targe

emphasized the fact that radar-di

SAMs were relatively ineffectual becathe ground clutter effect. At h igh e

tu de s, m is siles c o uld b e d od g ed , w h il

borneflares provideda reasonabledef

a ga in st I R m is si le s, a s l on g as th e y

tuned to the p r op e r w a ve le ng th a n d

r e ctly f ilte re d s o that the missile di

detect the fact thar they weredecoys.

allin all, McMullen would rather have

tem that c o uld ta ke a n d survive fire,

than depend on complete non-expos

In the 1980s whenthe Hawgs first deployed to

central Germany, their potentialfighting grou

the possibilities of their forward bases being

eliminated by sneakSovietair attacks was a

too clear.Fortunatelythe A-10 wasable to

demonstratethat in such an event,the Autob

weresuitablesubstitutes for them to carryon

fightwithout toomuch inconvenience. US

Early Tactics

The most realistic CAS m iss ion e n vis

aged a t t he t im e c a lle d forslow speed and

shallow dive delivery_ Exhaustive studies

had s ho wn t h at t he o pt im um dive angle

for dive-bombing was 45 degrees, while for

s tra f ing it w as between 10 degrees and IZ

degrees. A cc or di ng t o t he e ar ly p ro

nouncementsof G eneral McMullen, T he

prototypes d e mo n st r at e d t h a t t h ey were

perfectly docile to handle in a dive and

could be very accurately aligned with the

target. The g o od r o ll r a re , inherent in the

d es ig n, m ak es i t p os si bl e to make last

minute corrections. 172

The A-tO w as a lso d e sc r ibe d a s being

insensitive to drag o f t he s tor e s . A ls o,down o n t he ground in t h e b a tt l e zone,

where evasion was t h e m a in defence, and

rapid response wasessential, the ability of

the A-I 0 to pull Z.Z ga t 150 knots, was,for

General - Mullen, a most important

attribute, especially in bad-weather opera

tions. The A -t O s b ig p lu s - the a b ility to

spend maximumtime over the ta r ge t- w as

what the A rmy w anted most of all, and

therethe aircraft delivered.

n

71-1369 and 71-1370

73-1664 to 73-1673

75-0258 to 75-0279

75-0280 to 75-0309

76-0512 to 76-0554

77-0177 to 77-0276

78-0582 to 78-0725

79-0082 to 79-0225

80-0140 to 80-0283

81-0939 to 81-0998

82 -0646 to 82-0665

A-10 production

Prototypes 2

Pre-Production 6

Production 22

Production 30

Production 43

Production 100

Production 144

Production 144

Production 144

Production 60

Production 20 - -- - -- =- - :- =- - : : : c_

yp No.

•Four aJrcraf sin73-k1670to 73-1673mcluslve, werecanceled

h a d b e e n n i c kn a m ed t h e S u pe r ho g , a n d

t h e F - I0 5 j u st h a d to be the U ltrahog .

Major posed the question: Wh a t do you

suppose t he A -I O w il l b e called - the

Warthog) The n a m e s t u ck , a n d v r the

y ea rs , u su al l y abbreviated to plain

Hawg , has become somethingof a term

of endearment.

There was initial h o pe t h a t t h e original

order might be extended,either by t h e A i r

Forceitself, or by foreign purchases, but in

the end, th is was not to be the case.

for fi v e y ea rs , d er i ve d i n part f ro m i ts

ungainlyappearance, and in part from an

article by Major Michael G . Ma jo r , in the

summer 1973 issue of Tactical A ir War

fare C entre s in-house magazine TAWC

l eview I n d is cu s sin g p o ss ible names for

the new aircraft, Major recalled that the

Republic F-84 had received the less than

complimentarysobriquetof G roundhog

d ue t o its lamentable unstickingqualities

on take-off. Following this , the F-84F

more than twenty-four German aircraft

kills between them - but it lacked flair. Of

c o ur s e, it had happened before. The -II

h a d b e en t a ck e d on to t h e P h an t om ; a n d

English Electric s PI A h ad been christened

Lightning in October 1958 to much dis

g us t i n the U K , w h er e t he n am e w as f or

ever associated with the U S AA F s S econd

World War Lockheed P-38).

The official title wassuperfluous, how

ever The A-10 ha d a lr ea dy had a name

gement and w o rk f or c e a s w ell a s top

ry brass. The Air Force took the

perform an official naming

a nd t he r at he r unimaginative

ofT hunderbolt II was duly conferred

the A-IO. 0 doubt this tribute to

u b lic s P- 47 Thunderbolt was w el l

t,and was appreciated by the twovet

PA7 pilots in attendance - r et ir ed

General Francis S. Gabreski and

C olonel R obert S. Johnson, with

707



INITIAL DEPLOYMENT PRODUCTION A D TACTICS INITIAL D EPLOYMENT. PR ODU C TION AN D TAC TIC S

Further Evaluationand Deployment

a bl e f or operational units that a s

programmed d e po t m a i nt e na n ce P

b as e was e s ta b lish e d at McClellan

California, to retro-fit earlier a

fl own in from a c ti v e u n it s acros

Atlantic. The 81st Tactical Fighter

TFW) pilots who ferried t h es e

back to Sacramento Logistics C enter

A L C) t h en pickedup factory-fresh m

from Hagerstown o n t h ei r way back

UK.The other major addition was the

duction of PAVE PEN Y, in 1 97 8,

Meanwhile, the assimilation proces

speeding up and lessonswere beingle

all the t im e. A t ri o of A-lOs toure

Pacific Air Forces PACAF) bases in

andJuly 1977,w hileon lJulythatye

3 5 6t h T F S became the first opera

s q ua d ro n a t M yr t le B ea ch . I n Nove

1977, another la rg e-s ca le te st was h e

t he J oi nt A tt ac k We apon s Sy

JAWS) t e am a t Fort Hunter Ligget,

fornia, Here, the A-IO was tried ou

combat evaluation as a partner to

Army s AH-1 Cobra helicopter. Nom

ly rivals, these two a ct e d a s a team f

purposes of these te sts , with the C

taking o ut t he hostile air-defence sy

but improvementscame about slowly and

surely, The upgrading o f t h e stability aug

mentation s y ste m was e a sie s t t o a ch ieve,

relieving the pilot of some o f t he work

load, although its main function remains a

mandatory warning system to allow com

pensation for e x ce s s control usage. The

HUD was also upgraded, and featured an

improved symbology generator because of

the installation o f t h e A IASN-141 INS,

The first production aircraft to have this

featurefactory-fitted was the39] st aircraft

s n 79-0127). It was considered so desir-

Typicalof theterrainthe A-lOs were guarding, and thetwo-planeformation they

adopted, two A-lOs of USAFE move purposeful lyoverthe WestGermanforestsduring

ExerciseThunderhog II,held in 1980 USAF

Howard Sam Nelson piloting the A l 0 on i tsmaidenfl ight, 10 May 1972 Long

established as Fairchild-Republic s ChiefTestPilot,Nelsonsaw theaircraftthrough

itsearly teething problemsto asuccessful launch, He w a s p r o mo t ed t o t h e b o a rd o f

thecompany, butsadly was to l o se h i s l i f e a t t h e P a ri s Air Showat Le Bourget,in the

onlyserious airdisplayaccident involvingthe A-lO. Natonal Archives Colege Park MD

Early Upgrading

The e a rly te sts with training and opera

tional units, a nd t he switch to the Euro

pean battlefield, brought about some re

evaluations. In particular, the lack of all

b u t t h e basic avionics to a id the - 10pilot

in h is ta sk s, a n d t h e lack of relaxedstability , were soon fo un d to need rectification.

At the beginning there was no inertial

navigation system I NS ), n o weapons

delivery computer, no in-built drag chute,

Prolonged manual flying, invigorating a s i t

might be in an age of computer-aided

everything, w ith he dge- and tree-dodging

at v er y l ow l ev el s i n combat conditions,

put a s ignif ic ant s tr ain o n t he pilot and

causeda drop in effectiveness, The terrain

masking ability remainedat the core of the

A-IO s combat scenario, but ta c tic a l a ir

navigation TACAN) required more than

the pilot sskill to make it battle-efficient.

The A-IO h a d n o t b e en o p er a ti n g long

in Eu ro pe b e fo re n e ce s sa ry modifications

began to be made. The process was staged,

T here was much a d ve rs e p u blic ity

w he n, o n 3 June 1977 a t t he Paris Air

Show, test p i lo t H o wa r d Sam Nelson,

Director of Flight Operations at Fairchild,

was k ille d, His mount was seen t o g e t i n to

trouble o n t he s ec on d loop of a double

loop manoeuvre, rapidly developing a h igh

sink rate that proved uncontrollable. The

aircraft struck the ground without recov

ery, bounced o n ce , h i t a s e co nd t i me a n d

disintegrated, elson had n o c ha nc e o f

survival.

gestation period, and remains one of the

safest militaryaircraftto fly, despite the haz

ardous nature of its calling, This record

madebad incidentsall the morenoticeable,

....-ru . : = ~ O f

fue reserve20minloiler I

atS L I dropbombs fre ammo

/ ~150nm I 256nm

278km) 474km)

406nm 752km)radius

............_ . . ~ ~ ~ ; : l r X5

OOOf

dropbombs

- . = ~ j b m ~ ; : U X5

OOOf O ~ : : : : : : : 0 -- : t t c t : ~ M ~ m J

ArmedReconnaissance Mission

Ordnance:8 x Mk 82 bombs, 750 rounds ammunition,

• F u f ue - 8 x b o mb s : 3 3 4n m 61 9k m)• P arta fue 6,213Ib/2,828kg)- 18 x bombs:144nm 267km)

LowAlti tude Mission

Ordnance: 18/8 Mk 82 bombs, 750 roundsammunition,

150nm 278km)radius

Close Air SupportFireMission2

Ordnance: 6x Mk 82 bombs, 750 rounds 30mm ammunition,

aircraftescort mission and the armedrecon

naissance mission s diagrams ,

Even though itwas breakingnew ground,

theA -lO had a comparatively accident-free

185nm 293km)

258nm 478km)radius

350nm 648km)radius

100nm 185km)

250nm 463km)radius

. = ~ j b m , ; : l r X5

OOOf

dropbombs

_. :fut ;: _l r \ 5 O O O f t

dropbombs

rtMission

nance: 8x Mk 82 bombs, 1 350 rounds ammunition,

SupportFireMission3

ance: 6x Mk 82 bombs, 750 roundsammunition,

SupportFireMission1e:6 x Mk 82 bombs, 750 rounds 30mm ammunition,

d e r t h e o rig ina l A-X p rop os a ls , s ix

combat scenarios wereenvisaged for

A-lO: three variants of close-supporting

missions, the low-altitude mission, the

102 103



I ITIAL DEPLOnIENT PRODUCTION AND TACTICS INITIAL DEPLOYMENT. PRODUCTION AND TACTICS

e of AGM-65 Maverick missiles on a mobile transporterawait loading on the

ingstationsof an A l0 a t a B r it i sh b as e i n t he 1980s. USAF

The -10 f or ce i n E ur op e w as s

tured w it h t wo m ai n operational

(MOB) forming the core of the opera

The e w er e both w ell b a ck f ro m the

l in e, i n E ng l an d, a t t he Suffolk bas

RAF Bentwaters a nd RAF Woodbr

Although the central front in Ge

dominated NATO thinking and stra

the -I had in theory to b e a b le to

support against a oviet la n d a s sa u

matter where that might occur. Pote

ly, t he A -I m ig ht see action anywhe

Europe, from t he o rt h Ca pe a t the t

Norway, close to the gigantic Murm

complex, down to Gibraltar, the B

base on the southernmost tip of S

I n r ea lity , h ow e ve r , any confront

was expected t o t ak e p la ce on the n

Gcrman plain. While the MOBs gav

TFS f ul l b ac k- up , s up po rt , s up pl y

administrative facilities, plus hard sh

and intelligence networks, instant-rn es s u n its continually rotated throu

destroy enemy forces and equipment.

The squadron was deployed to Barbcrs

Poi nt aval Air tation, H a wa ii, f or

Operation O/JIxmune Journey and then

at FortRucker Army Ailfield, Alabama,

for Operation Quick F i r e I ~3 . Tr a in ing : 354th Tactica lFighterTrain

ing Wing, based at M rde Beach,

outh Carolina, began to convert from

A-7Ds to A-las in autumn 1976.

The Warthog Versus the Bear

At this time, thc largest concentration of

A-las was gathering i n E ur op e, with a

continued build-up of units based at RAF

Bcntwatcrs. This bcgan w i th t he 9 2nd

TFS in January 1979 a nd cont i nu ed

apace throughout 1979 and 19 0 , until a

peak was reached , w i th 10 A-las on

strength forming some si x squadrons ofthe 1st TFW.

I. Tactical evaluation and trials: 57th Tac

tica l Figh ter Training Wing (TFTW)

based at e is FB, evada (the ir

Force Wea pons a nd Tactics Center

(WTC)), h e ga n f ly ing A-las on I

OClOher 1976, with the66 th FW

2. Ta c tic al f ig hte r tr a in ing : 355th Tacti

c al F i gh te r Tra ining Wing (TFTW)

hased a t Davis -Monthan A FB , A ri

zona, hegan conversion from A-7Ds to

A-las in March 1 97 6, w ith detach

ment touring PACAF the year after.

This unit was assigncd an important

missionbctween January and J un 1 98 6,

w hi ch w as to maintain capability to

dcployworld-wide and p ro vi de C JIld

anti-armour o pc ra t io ns i n a ny threat

environment, cmploying GA - ,Mav

erick and a v ar ie ty of conventionalmunitions on missions dC igncd to

with justfifty-five A-las operational, three

units predominated, as follows:

Artwork I Tiger II on theinside ofCaptain G. Camp s access ladderdoor afavourite placefor art on the

otherwise unadorned A-lOs.A maintenance electr ician conductsa pre-flightcockpit checkduring

Exercise Gunsmoke 89 theTacticalAir Commands biennial air-to-groundfighter gunnery competition

in 1991. The A-lOs win thiscompetition yearalteryear. USAF

four - la s no tch ing u p 117 s or ti es i n a

single day.

By A ug us t 197 , t r ai ni n g hy the 333rd

Tactical FighterTraining Squadron (TFT

washeing conducted in readiness to turn out

pi lo ts f or the 1s t T F W , w h ic h w as under

notice to switch over to the -I hy Janu

ary o f t he following year. At around the

sametime, the92nd TF was due tohand in

i ts o ld F A Ds f or the -la, under Program

Ready Thunder. I n A u gu s t of that year, the

354th TFW saw the hack of itslast A-7Ds at

My rtle Be ac h, a n d, a f te r a thirteen-month

tr a ns itio n p e rio d, b e ca m e the f ir,t f ully

openltion,ll -lOWing in the ir Force.

The A-IO cont inued to make itself

known world-wide with ten aircraft from

the 354th taking part in another Red Flag

e xe rc i se i n t he a ut umn, t he J oi nt Air

Attack Team III at Fo rt K n ox and in l-

lant Eagle held at Ty nd a l A FR, Flor ida . 1n

the same year, an e igh t-p lane un it tookpart in Ex er c is e ColJe Elite over Hawaii.

As the A-las slowly came off the pro

duction l n initial allocations werein the

continental nited tates (CO .

aturally, these wereprincipallyin experi

mental and training units,in order to make

sure tha t the aircraft was fully pannedout

and up to ,peed. By the middle of 1977,

Smokewreathesthis A l0 ofthe 355th Tactical TrainingSquadron as her 30mm

Gatling Avengerchurnsaway attank targets on theGila Bend Range during

exercisesin 1988. USAF

whole Wing, some eighty-nine fit A-I s,

made 533 sortie, in fourteen hours. The

76th Tac ti ca l F ig ht er q ua dron out of

England AFB matched thi, with twenty-

the A-la, targeted the armour. 0

ammunition was used, hut otherwise

were made as reali,tic a, po i

Evaluated hoth separately and in the

comhination,hoth system,werefound

ave improved kill ratios when work

together.

an operation-readiness inspection,

at Tr av is Field, t he A ir N at io na l

r d ( A C ) hase nearSavannah, Geor

in January 1978, a complete squadron

wo d oz en A -las of the 356th TFS was

The trials encomp,lssed hoth

rates and endurance, with ordnance

,1ssessment taking place o n t he

Stewart ranges. Over a four-day peri

the ,quadron conducted 3 19 in di\ id

missions, an ;1\ erage of three sorties per

for each aircraft, dropped 42 k 2 2

homh, and f ir ed o f f ,O llle 2 5, 00

of30mm in realistic attacks.

Between 17 and 24 April 197 , a

o f e ig ht ee n A -I , f ly in g f rom

AFB, ~ ~ u t Carolina, f le w 3 24 s or

in three days, thusdouhling the Mlrtie

to ,ix per day. Atthe endof th i , in ten

p e rio d, a ll a ir cr a ft remained coml at

This record did not lastfor long, and at

_outh K o re a in March 1979, dur

Operation Coronet Fil1c , t he A -IO

worked upfrom fi\C to seven sor

per day. Similar high s o rtie r a te s w e re

at RAF Bentwaters, Suffolk,

during Operation Porker 500, the

704 705



the A l0 ofthe 442nd Tactical Fighter Wing on the ground duringExercise

et Card.The 30mm Avenger GAU 8/A cannon is prominent i n t he foreground

T S O Pef od T F

91st Ahlhorn 1July 1979 to 1989 2nd

509th Ahlhorn Post 1989 2nd

78th Norvenich 1October 1979 to 1989 2nd

510th Norvenich Post 1989 to19 March 1992 2nd

5091h Jever Planned only to 1989 2nd

511th Jever Planned only post 1989 2nd

510th Sembach 1September 1978 to 1989 4th

78th Sembach 1989 to 3 May 1991 4th

92nd Leipheim 1Apri 1979to 1989 4th

91st Leipheim 1989 to 25 September 1992 4th

511th Wiesbaden Planned only to 1989 4th

92nd Wiesbaden Plannedonly post 1989 4th

6

can load the 1,200-lxld rounds in twenty minu

including the time taken to haul the equipm

[ the aircraft a n d d o all theconnections.

h a f f a n d flares and t he E e M p o d a r c

loaded up. This c o n t ai n s c o s mi c sruff wh

expertscan explain, but, a s a pilot, a ll 1know

that if I go i n to a n area that radar thre

thiS is designed to r e ac t t o that a n d j am s

rad.u signals, or indicates that I am ina s l tg

different place to where Ireally am, so that

enemy GH11 l0 [ InCItemy

aircraftIt

g i v ~ L

little herrer chance to out manOCU\TC a mis

or r Rlar gun Y lcm we arc hcing engaged

Other self-protection measures include

raJarwarning receiver,a small scope lip on th

t o p w h i ch wou ld t el l u s i f there is a r a da r o

there, and, ifit h a d b e e n programmed to the fr

quency and specifics of the s igna l, i twil l te l l

what kind o threat it is, w h e th e r a n SA-2,

A - 4 , S A - 6 , w h i ch is sending out the signa

Our PAVE PENNY laser sporrerdoes not em

wouldsayif the Russians were doingsom ething

overthere. At some pointthe decision wouldbe

made for us todeploy toour forwm dlocm ions in

G e rm a ny . W e would get the aircraft ready for

com bm - that would i n c lu d e b r i ng i n g o u t live

Maverick missiles, putting in wartime amll1uni

tion loads, loading up the real M avericks and

some other m unitions, and we d be on our way

to Germany. We d usc either triple or sll1gle

M a v en c k r a i b, w h i ch wou ld b e l o ad ed f rom

theirshipping caskets. The ammunition loader,

called the A-IO Draggin,li would h o ok u p to

the aircraft s A ru.

7

The loading operation was: pull the Dragginup

to the aircraft;as the loaded heltsarefed i n t o t h e

helix, t h e e m pt y cases are aUlOmaliGllly wken

out; thearm am ent bins come Out on largetrailers,

five or six at a time, and to t a ke t h e s p e n t bullets

out they always have an extra casing that the

em ptyam m unitioncan go into. I t s a pretty slick

operation and a well-trained and practisedcrew

In case theirforwardoperating location bases were destroyed or overrun by the Red

Army the European basedA lOs frequently practisedrefuelling and rearming and

working from improvised runways Here an A l0 comes in under a bridge on anewly

completed stretch of emptyGerman Autobahn t om ake a perfectlanding Natonal

Archives Coege Park MD

Our Intelligence sources c o n s ta n t l y m o ni

tored the \ (farsaw Pactground forces nnd they

The AFE A-I 0 teams continually prac

tised tactics and patrolled over the pre

dicted kill-boxes at known choke

points , such as the Fulda G ap, through

whi h oviet armour would be funnelled

on i t t r ip wes tward to the coast. These

boxes varied but were rectangles about80

nautical miles long by 20 nau tic al m iles

wide, based on predicted scenarios. The

same routine was adopted by the remain

ing two TF , the 509th and 511 th, when

theyjoinedthe 81stduring 1980.

In the e v en t o f a Soviet invasion, it was

expected that a fast deployment from the

Kwouldestablisha force of eighteen

lOs at each FOL. C ombat deployment

wou ld be in conjunction with the FA ,

either airborne in OV-I OA Broncos, o r o n

the ground, and the A-I O s ability to linger

in the vicinity of a fast-changing scene

combat p er si st en ce ) wou ld p ro ve

invaluable. The ideal situation would see

three tw o-plane groups from e a ch u n it in

contact with the enemyspearhead, with

another three groups en route or close to

th battle zone awaiting target assign

ments. The remaining two g roup wou ld

be o n t he ground, refuelling or rearming.

Major Kennedy described the probable

preliminary mov s asfollows:

W i t h t h e bulk of theA -IO fighting units in

Europe c o nc e nt r at e d o n c o nf r on t in g t h e

mountingmenaceof theS ovietthreat,the

U A F E p i lo t and gr ound te a ms eemed

d e t i ne d to be in the forefront o f a ny

shooting war in the 1970s and 80s. T heir

training, a n d t h e tactics developed by the

A-I to cope with combat in the deadliest

fire zonein the world, are therefore central

to t he A -l O story. By combining an eye

witne ss a count l7S with t he d at a subse

quently re leased, it is possible to gain agood in ight i n to t h e scenario.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

Preliminary Moves

lyingt ission

Sentinel. Throughout 1979, squadrons

arrived from the A - the 51 th, the

91 st a nd t h e 7 8 t h- untiIfourwerein place

by the end o f t h e year. Two o f t he FOLs

Ah lh o rn a nd e mb ac h) were also fully

activated, so that practice forward deploy

ment could begin immediately. The 509th

1 October 1979) a nd t h e 51] th l janu

ary 19 0) followed. The FOLs themselves

were divided b e tw ee n t h e 2 n d A T Farea

no r t h) a n d t h e 4 t h ATAF south).

The detachments were in e igh t-p lane

unitsassigned to other squadrons FOLsfor

one week in three,so each piloteventually

covered the whole area as well <: h i own .

Thus, a t ot al of th irty-two A-lOs were

always forward-deployed in Germanyat any

one time, while the rest were held ready in

the UK. Each -10 p ilot u sual ly spent four

weeks at the MOB, followed by two weeks

of intensive flying, with twosortiesper day

on occasions, from the FOL. T his churn

policy enabled the -I p il ot s t o b ec ome

thoroughlyfamiliar with the terrain and also

the people over which theywere expecting

to have to fight. ot onlydid the contours

o f t h e land become etched in their memo

ries, but the di positionoffriendlyforces was

al so u nd er st oo d; t hi s was e ss en ti al for

smoothco-ordination in time of crisis.

During t h e h e ig h t o f t h e C o ld War, the

A-IO units in the SAFE were disposed as

hown in the table below.

These dispositions were continued for

eight years, only changing when, in

autumn 19 , due to crowded conditions

a t t he uffolk bases, the 509th and 51 I th

TFSs were transferred intothe I th TFW,

based at RAF Alconbury, near Hunting

don in Cambridge hire . From that point,

the 1st maintained a forward element of

two dozen A-lOs, w iththe I th maintain

ing eight more.

USAFE A l0 deployment 1980 88

FA, bringing with them wide knowledgc

of the European c o mb a t t h ea t rc ; o t he r s

transferred from existing combat units,

bringing their expertise. Complementing

them, as always, were green pilot, main

ly new intakes from the T-38 training

schoolsback in CO US, along witha few

oftheir instructors from under the wing of

the 355th T F f W.

The 92nd TF was the first A-IO

squadron to complete tra in ing. It arrived

with i t eighteen aircraft at Bentwaters on

26 january 1979, fully combat-ready.

Almost immediately, it deployed to em

ba ch t o t ak e part in O peration C enain

of six forward operating locations

in WestGermany. These FOLs,

c a m e unde r the Allied Tactical Air

rce ( T A F) c o nt r ol , were Ahlhon1,

, Leipheim, orvenich, embach and

Of these, jever and Wiesbaden

never actually used, but would have

in hot-warconditions.

Each squad ron was a lloc ated i ts own

, wherelimited refuelling, rearmingand

or repair and maintenance facilities

ted close to the f ront . hou ld any a ir

t r equi re more major rep ai r i t wou ld

ve to withd raw to o ne o f the MOBs. In

event (which was quitc probable) that

-emptive Warsaw Pact airstrikes might

thc FOLs, the -10 would

ed to lift offinconfinedspacessuch

utob hns (indeed, itfrequently practised

newstretches of motorway prior to pub

or similar suitable cmergency

At the s ame t imc, i t wou ld have to

on its in-built independence to keep

sorties while it could, with revet

ts incamouflage wooded area, or even

n car parks, ifnecessary.

Following the arrival of the first eigh

of the 1st at RAF Bentwaters

February 1978, the build-up o f t h e so

uperwing of s ix such uni t s fol

d quickly. The pilot mix was quite

ed; some transferred straight from the



FLYI G T HE MI SSIO N F LYI NG T HE MI SSI ON

Battle formation. A pair of Warthogs in paired-uphunting mode cross the Rhine.

USAF

One-stopground refuelling kept the A-10 mobile and versatile. Here. an A-10

is refuelled by Staff Setgeant Dana Martin of the 81stTactical FighterWing on a

German Autobahnduring exercises. Note the pilot's ladder isfully deployed in the

background. NationalArchives,College Park, MO

The he l icopter / -10teamworb \ 'erywell,W

the he los rakingout thede fence \'i 'pop-

fo llowed by t h e A - IO striking the targer,

while he goes around rhe helo pops up ag

Hnd on.

Our job i, togo in and kill t nks, to elunin

the ta rge t with I1m,i1es or hul leh ,md theA

doc, a good Jobm thIS. Very dliclent. DUTln

practice ~ c : - . ~ i o n oul III thc C.difornlan dC

they tookone A-10, fully loadedwith amillu

t ionand let her loose on fifteen tanks theyh

parked out there. They found Ih t seven

heende'troyed cara'trophically,the other ei

were all hurned out , incapable of ac t ion a

immohile.

Flymg t he A -I O i , \'ery ,,,nple. If you h

f lown a Cessn 150,you c n fly an A- IO. T

first f l igh t in ,m -10 is solo. There is no lW

scare r t r a in ing Iane, thcre\ no instruc tor

thc hack scat or next to yOlI t o g e t you out

lrnuhle. It's an ea ,y aircnlft lO fly, \Cry simp

the haSlc, of it. The h i ~ g e s t prohlemwiththe

10 come, with the ac tua l employment . \Vh

you ge tout to the target area - a nd t h e FAC

the ground ~ l a n ~ gIving you information, a

you're sitting in Ihe cockpi tof an a irpl ne t

h i l ~ no autopilol, a very marginal trim ~ Y ~th t YOli don't dare let go of for more th n aho

three seconds Your HUD i, TIght on the im

your cockpit, you look at the la rge t followi

the H Dd i sp la y, y ou l oo k a t t h e m ap t hm k i

out plan of a t t ckand try III rememher wh

the friendly forces r e, a n dwhe re t h e h d gu

re, II th thut the ctu,,1 hard pmtoftheA-I

mi ion is the CAS part.

In lerdict inn, which we do g e t t ,, ,k ed

occa onally, I e , ,,y .Relatively. Because youc

down hcf'lt'eh.md a ndp l n it II out .Kno

ju..,r where your ta rge t is, ir\ normally not vc

mobile. If it 's on rhemap, a bridge just does

on

and hopefully the FAC,he'llgive us an

o f how th e b at t le 's going. Whe re t h e 'lI'm

where the enemy' , a t , wha tkind ofequipm

the ~ n e l l l Y has in the way of i r defence , ob

vations,launches, ,mything like tha t .He ' ll

I> the s ta rt POInt ca lled the ini tia l point (

di, tance frolll the II the target.Also coo

n te, and nything ebe that will be of use to

The A-lOs can co-ordinate their at

with Cobra helicopters:

Th e A-IO can also co-operate with

Allied ground-support aircraft in the

a l though the la t ter (o ther than a few

Harriers) will mainly he conducting

bash-out' missions, while t he A -I 0 s

around.

level pproach nd acquire the larget precisely

before the final att ck r u n. I t abo facilitates the

divedeliveryof free-f,tll,as distinct from guided,

or ' launch and leave' ordn<:lI1cc, which b fi red

from heyond-visual-range (BVR) for greater

accuracy. The aircraft's no se i , r.,ised between 15

nd20 degrees, andthe ir cra ft i, rolled in to the

attackeither for bomhdeliveryor strafing.

The Army's fire-support requirements clr( '

t r ansl red and tr nsmit ted by t he a ir liaison

officers (ALOs ), t h ro ugh t h e FAC s \'ia the

'nine-line hTlef' , ys tem , which condemes the

e ential demibof each mi ion for rapid a',im

ilation. The 'nlnc;\inc-hncf' inform(ltio l com·

prises the following:

I. Initial point (11) of,mack.

2. Magneticheading IP to target.

3. Dist,mce II [ target.

Elevation or targer- area.

5. Identification of target.

6. M p coordina te, of target.

7. Position offriendly forces.

8. Optimum direction.

9 Any other relevantinformation.

Once we get to the forwlTd rea we'llcall up on

the a ir ,to , groundand go, 'Hey - w h ; J t ' ~ going

The mission continues as follows:

Adopting the c1a ic A-I 0 wedge formation,

the wingm n would drop h c k from the flight

leader at anangle of between 45 and 70degrees,

while maintaining a ~ i m i l a r di 'tancc clpart. This

g i n ~ ~ the pilot in the fear r O ~ l t i o n a hCUCf c y c ~hall on hIS le der. He i, hetter able to match ny

lllilllOCLI\TC.., thelt ~ l I c c ~ ~ l I l t r r a i n ~ l l l , l ~ k i n gmight requITe,as wellas heing lIowed to switch

to ~ t a y s l l n ; ~ i d e while maintaining the ~ ; l t n c pro

file. The downside is rhat ir m kes the rear man

morevulnerahleto hostilefighter attack.

On ppnl<lch to the t rget area t h e FAC is

contacted for the late't updme on the'ltuatlon

on t h e ground,which wtll almo't cert inly have

ch nged s i n c ~ t h ~ fi t t sking of the mission.

The protec t ion of the soldier on t h e g r ound is

paramount to the A-I 0 pilm; it is his primeduty

andonly task. After the updare, the t ' get area

attack form I ion is a dop te d , u ,i n g e i th e r t h e

wedge formation, or, iffree-I II bomhsarc heing

u, ed and t im ing be tween runs i, vit.ll, the trail

(ormation. In t h l ~ forma tion, the wingman

moves into line stern, with a \Vide g po f I to

3 mi les (2 . 5-5km) be tween the aircraft. This

allows for the ,,,fedispersal of the flight bIder's

homh f r a g m c n l ~ l hefore t h ewingman cro. lc:- , the

: lame ;llf: lpaCC to make hi;; f Ul l .

Toohraincorrect \'islItll ~ i g h [ J l l g of a ~ m a l l lar

get, t h eA - I 0 pilot use, the standard 'pop-up'

procedure, to widen hi, hori:on from the 1011 -

\Ve fly p I f or purpme. Olw;ou,ly, all the

A-lOs,except for ahout X in the AIT Force, re

single-seat ircr ft. A l ot of jets h v e a g u y i n the

h ck who occasion lly can look o ut t he back

winduw c11d ~ l : C i clllyone is coming lip astern.

Or, i fyouarc in f s t a i rc raft l ike the F - II I you

don't figure t hat anyonc\ going to he ahle lO

come up hehind youanyway. The A-I ,which,

it aid, het bird ~ r r i k c ~ on the r C i l f ~ \ i c \ \ ITHrrOf,

h , a problem. So we fly 'IS apair,flight le der 'lI1d

wingman. The j o b o f t h e flight le d i, to n,\\'t

gate, figure out whmk ind of tactic:, and \ \ ' C < l r o n ~to deploy ove r the t rget area, keep up with the

ch nge, in the s i tu tion, ge t to the II and co

ordinatethe at t acb .The Wingy\ joh the ,.lIne

IS the b ck-seater's joh, h i , j o h i , p r im r i ly t o

check 6 o'clock [ make ~ L 1 r c no o n c ' ~ coming in

to hoot the flight, nd to make su re to keep the

flight whole du ri n g t h e d es c en t i n to t h e target

area. So I shared responsihility. We have

three T<lliio ,ets th t we arcahle to t l k to e c h

other Oil and it c an g et real h l l ~ Y . . , o m c t l m c ~In Ime form tion, the two , rcraft fly any

thing from 6, 00 to 9,000ft (I, 00-2,700111)

part in l ine bre ' h t (+ or -10 degrees). Each

pih)[ l max imum al l ; round VICW, cs:,cntial

for ear ly v i su a l ~ i g h t i n g on i n coming ho s ti l e

interceptors. The two pilots split responsihili

tics, wilh the s e ni o r p il o t, t h e flight leader,

being r C l r ( ) n ~ i b l c (or cor rec tnaviga t ion to the

target zone and air#to;ground contact with

friendly forces en roule. The wing man would

warchIheir backs.

basic two-plane attack configuration: line,

wedge and trail.

According t o Ma jor Kennedy,

Flight Patterns

and Formations

The standard A-lO combat flight patterns

are long established, with the two-plane

unit as the primary hunting formation.

Three- and four-plane formations have been

tried, and areoccasionally used, but the one

and-one formation gives unique flexibility

and confidence. Three formations form the

not have t ime to 'lock on', but increases

likely damage f rom l igh t weapons and

hand-held TOW missiles. It also demands

total concentration from the 'A-I driver',

if he is to avoid natural and man-made

obstacles- trees, electricity pylons, chim

neys, and so on. Attaining ingress to the

chosen target, however, til l often involves

such missions, especially in typically Euro

pean conditionsof lowcloud layers.

Despite the retro-fitments of INS to the

H Dd is pl ay , to help alleviate the dangers

inherent in a 'down-among-the-branches'

approach, t h e A -IO pilot still needs the

basic skill ofan exper t nav ig ator . l ap s to

I:250,000 scale o n t he ingress route and

the actual ta rget vic inity are standard

equipment on all A-IO missions. Being

able to plot his position o n t he e detailed

maps is as much a part o f t he a rt o f A-l 0

flying as actual flying skills. 0 navigator

is sitting behind the pilot to keep t r ackwhile he concentrates on flying and firing

theordnance; the pi lor flying the -10 has

tot: I responsibility.

p a ~ ~ i \ ' c system that receives laser energy

on the ta rget andthrows it up ro our I-IUD.

After II the prel im ina rie s haveheen done,

i r cra ft a rc ready to go, a nd t h e y s e nd t h e

The pilotgoe, overand looks ove t the

He> got a checkli, t of the minimum thing,

h , to check to m kesure thea ir c ra f t i , a c tu

to go into comhat. Once we start thi,

it is l Z ~ h o u r r r o c c : , ~ and j- c a ngo Oil

into the night.Sometimes we simulate fly

offat night.

So, off we go - we 'l l depar tEnglandand goon

to ourFOL in (Jerman1 of which thete arc

four. We'l l go ove r the re n d we'll ,it

h rd she lte r the re, the , quad ron operatiom

It> h r d lI1d it's biologic l- and chemi

nt defended, nd we'll o pe r te o ut o f

r nd hardened '\lrcraft ,helters.

h c r ~ \\( 11 gel ICl'lking- if ~ o l l 1 c t h i n g i going

we ,,,,,,,III deploy hope ful ly before w r

out. If nor, we'll deploy , 'oon as po ,

fterw rd, nd once we ge tove r the re we'll

s t r i gh t i n to t h e b a l ti c .We will 'ser

e ' the target, olherwiseknown as destroying

k i l lin g and maim ing Clnd anylhing wec a n do

m ke the enemy lImervice ble. If not, we'll

in \ a r i ) l I ~ ~ t a g c ~ of (lIen, depending Oil the

and then, once we g e t o u r [cbk IIlg,

l l lUnchOl l t f rom the FOLthrough speci,,1

th t a rc s e t u p a nd changed periodic lly,

to the forw rd rca.

on which type of mission the

to carry out - C A , ai r

suppression of enemy air

n ce s ( EAD) , combat search and res

(the successor of the famous SA OY

of the Vietnam War era), or spe

ope rat ion s suppo rt sor ti es - h e had a

of task specifications to follow, which

been finely tuned over more than two

of experience against constantly

g threats. Althoughthe introduction

Russians of increasinglysophisticat

systems made the A-IO's

tougher, itsabilityto punishany aggres

undiminished, even if the tac

altered.

vu Inerability o f t h e A -I 0 in the low

attack posture was the sub je t of

ess debate. This configuration can be

ed a operations conducted below

ft (450m) aboveground level (AGL).

down lower, to below 500 ft

m), d ec re ases enemy action danger,

the AAA and SAM systems do

108 109



ng exercises followed thegroundtr ials;here.the A-10 takes up

t i on bel ow and behi nda KC 135 Stratotankerover Edwards AFB California.

Classicaerial view ofthe undersideof an A-10of the81stTactical FighterWing.

based at RAF Bentwaters. Suffolk, UK patroll ingover theGerman countryside.This

would have been itsmain battleground hadthe Cold Warturnedhot She carries two

AGM-65 Maverick missiles on station9 andone on station 10. to balance the M

pods andotherweaponry. Natonal Archives Colege Park MD

There i, alway, the f l,t jeh \. , , Iuw je t, arg

ment. A l ot of peoplestill rgue that \pced

life , and that you can only,urvive 1\ er the b

tlef ield ifyoua rc going fasr. The newjc ts, p

marily thc F-16,md thc Torn ldo, have improv

and goodcapahilities. They h<ne vcrI good n l

igat ion systems, they have v y good weapo

and point ing systems. The F-16 and Torna

can both make higher homh r um a t vcry f

,pceds, knowing that whenmakinghomh dro

on ranksrhey have a fairly g,xKI chance ofh

ring c l o ~ e enough to caLisc ~ o m e damagc, an

while iron homh, fe relatively cheap, and \

have lors and 10h of them lying a round, o

Maverickscan c o ~ t , accordingIOlypc, 'lIl)'whe

he twe en 40 ,000a nd 100,000 Ihc IVa, talkin

in 19891 and that s rather,ignificant expend

ture to kill tank. Especially ifyou ,h ,dd h l

I en t o m i, s t he t an k a nd destruc t a tact ic

h u ~ h incrroL.. i t h < 1 ~ happened There arc l lprohlems IVith using the Maverick, which is wh

we p leti,e usingit I raerically evcryday to t

andgethetter at recogni:ingthe p r o h I c 1 1 l ~ .

usually try to run into highcr irspeed ,md

throttle to max. Of course, theysay thar the

10 hasjust two throttle setting,. Its cither O

m i t s Off . orqUlte l

When we egress the ta rge ta rea wego h

home to our hardened she her and s tay in

cockpit while the guys on t he ground go h

through i t a ll ga in: new Mavcr icks, load

gun again, ~ l m more g a ~ . Intel l igence w

come out and tell us what\ going on h ICk at t

hattie i f there s bc en a ny c ha nge s , a nd a

changes to our ta , king.We might he going h

to thesame targetag(l in, or we might he go

somewhere diffcrent.

The uropean ttlefield

There was much scepticism about

rationale behind the A-lO, especiall

Europe, where ground defences wer

their strongest. Prejudice against all f

of CA had been deeply ingrain edAllied air forces, and particularly in

RA F, for fifty year or more. one o f

Allies subscribed to the -10, ei

because of a lack of money, or becaus

such prejudice. The A-IO p ilot s w

aware of the controversy, but r ema

unswayed by the doubters, both in Eu

and in somesections oftheir own serv

MajorKennedy put it a follows:

Vulnerability to oviet interceptors

not con sid ered a major threat by A

Vulnerability to Soviet nterceptors

The idea is to stayprotected wirh the gun we

firc and manoeuvre h lCk outof there. With the

M l\ erick you c n sometimes stay o ut o f the

enemy,threat e n n ~ l o p e in which c a ~ e we will uSC

all the giliry and capahilityhuilt in tothe A-IO

to makca quick I/lO-degree turnand get out of

the rhreararea. Thc hattlefieldgChrealcrowded

i:lIld \\ C normally arc turningII1lo ,>omeone d . . , e ~threatenvelope again wc normally tum again

and con,tantly evade nd he clear of them hefme

theyhave tunc to achicve a lock on us.

We usc a ll our powcr to try and keep the

enemy g u n n e r ~ guessing where the jets arc

going. If we get no r e s p o n ~ c at Ih is point we

Evasion and Survival

vasive Tactics

the gla S. Thi, new y tem will I , impro\ c our

ahility to drop iron bOlnh i t Wi ll automatlcilly

gi\ e u, a calculationwhich we call thc Dearh

Dot . I fyuu fly the aircraft t u t h e f<irget, pur rhe

Dea th Dot on t h e target, ,md d rop t h e homh it

will 1Im ,r cenainlyhit c1 ,e enough to causc

terminal damage.

\Y.e are al o getting c r u i ~ e y tem w it h a

radar h imeter . They ha\ C e limated th,lt

hel\\ l en 6 and 70 per cent of A-I 0 flying acci

dcnh ,Ire due t o rhe aircrafr hilling rheground

andthey Ihrnk rhcpi lot , were j lN not aware of

how low they where, or, whenthcy recognl:ed

the danger, didn t ha\ C e nuugh a l ti t ud e t o

recoverthe <Iircraft.

What he was talking about turned out to

he LASTE.

It ll go find the target and, hasically, not make

for agood day

Thi, i , pre t tyco,mic .We ha \ e e1e\ Cn ordn ..nce

,tatiuns and this gi:mo tells us whicharc luaded

andwith what e CCln fire our W C C l p o n ~ off in

salvoes m singles and itkeeps trackof allrhc fir

ings and tells u, what is stillavailahle.It spret

II nicc.

We havesome modifications to rhe Hawg that

we re getting right now, including an improved

HUDt h a t generates a l i tt l e g r ee n c ro ss up on

Although the A-IO primarily bases its hit

ting power on either t he GAU- venger

gun or the Maverick missile, it can carry a

wide range of ordnance. The pilot s selec

tion is made according to target suitability,

via the armament control panel (A P) on

the lower left-hand side of his instrument

panel.

The ACP provide switches for the selec

tion of all the weapons tations, control of

the Ga rl inggun s f ir ing rate, a rming of

selected weapons, mechanical bomb fu ing,

AIM-9 modeselection, jettison and release

modes, ripple quantities and release inter

vals. The eleven ordnance station pylons

are each represented by the i r own selec t

push-buttoncontrol, withalarm readylights

for each, and a master switch Arm indica

tor. The thumb wheels located over each

button correspond to the type of weapon

loaded on the pylon. E/O indicate a Mav

erick missile; LDGP shows that the load is

a low-draggeneral-purpose bomb; HDGP

relates to a high-dragGP bomb.

The station required is selected by push

ing in the appropriate button. Ifa string of

weapons is to be released, the buttons are

pushed in sequence. The release mode is

rotated forSGL (single), PRS (pairs) or RIP

(ripple) release of ordnance. If the bombs

selected require fusing, there are nose/tail

activator sw it ch e . When the Master

switch is moved t o t he Arm po ition, the

ready light come on over the selections.

Once eve ryth ing i set upv ia the the

pilot chooses the methodof release by way

of a but ton on hiscontrol stick.

Depending on the target, and type of

ordnance delivered, the A-1O team theneith rgoes around againfor another run, or

stations i tself in the outfield to await fur

ther targetdirection. Egress from the battle

zone is done a t low level,with the two air

craft alternating the lead so that each can

check theother forbatrle damage.

follower a ndpu t the pipper on the target area

andrhen tr bfer downimide rhecockpit to rhe

TV ,creen . We h . \ C two type, of laverick.

One gi\ C, l a TV pICture- it\ actually a TV

\ 1I e o G11l1Crcl rhelt\ mounted in the n ) ~ l of the

Mavcrick ilnd }.nn. u a v id eo p ic tu re ;.I y ll

look at i t in hlack andwhite (actllall), l a kind

of greeny-hlack).A t lIlk u,uallyh,,, camouflage

hut , , ,ually ,hull up dark again t a pluughed

uut field fm example, which will appear to he a

light background. The Maverick will luckon to

the difference, in the cuntra,r. It check> out

fuursides o f t h e rarget lthe paramete,,1 and it

will luck on to the contra st he tween the dark

and the light <1rea, and then when you launch,

it will continue ro ,ray locked on to tha rand it

wil lguide i t elf and impac t the targer.

We also h<1ve the infra-red Ma\ erick now

thar h<1s hetter capabilities.Obviously, the TV

guided M<1verick ha, prohlem withthesmoke ,

haze and dust, lowvisibilities, <1nd ifyou C<1nnot

sec the target it s not able to lock on. The IRMaverick gives us greater c<1p<1bilities as a rank

t e nd s t og e t re<11 hot with theenginerunning

and the treads get hot as i ts ta r tsmoving. The

IRscans the infra-red spectrum to help give us

a greaterlock-on range. Again, it presents the

video for you to see o n t h e T V sc reen as <1n

infra-red picture. Hot th ings show upa s b ei ng

light a ndc o l d t h ing s s how as being dark. So

<1gain the laverick works on t h at contrast in

the light to lock on the target once launched.

Maverick control is real neat stuff and

with its own TV screen. The method is

the HUD to get a rough placement on

targetalong the Maverick s intemled line of

when we launch our. The lookout will

the position o n t he TV screen against

one on the HUD and then ha ve t o adjusr.

we l l g o into pop-up, unm<1sk nur te rra in

tanks close in the gun act ion of

has three type of kills listed:

and llHl\ C half a mileaway. Unfonunate

tank> do andthey mm e fairlyqlllckly and it\

flUId cl1\'ironmct1ryou <lfe atf,lCkl11g Into,

a g r l ~ . H dcal of concclltmtion d l l good

on the pan of the pilot and a l ot of hell

h > wingm lll

kills - hits that strip tracks

fuse turrets, making the tank useless

action.

kills - enough direct hits to

any oviet-bui l t tank into scrap

trophic kills - ammunit ion or fuel

-ups for total destruct.

favoured weapon is the Maverick:

ction of Ordnance

777



onducted with minimum hindrSEAO is therefore crucial to both

and BAI missions and usually pre

them. It is equally important for the

conducting of pa sive air operation

electronic warfare (EW) missions to

or disrupt enemy radar systems at c

times during a battle ,

In order to be effective, the actual

tion, de te ct ion and pinpoin t ing of

enemy AAA and AM y tems, fixe

especially mobile, is paramount.

increasing mobility of such systems m

them difficult to fix ina wide-rangingb

and the ability ofthe A-I 0 to wipe the

depends on theEW support mea ures,

with other target-acquisition sources.

The extraordinary difficulty in the

War in dealing with the mobile S

missile launchers is a classic case in

The inevitable time-lag between loc

and strike a lway g iv e such systems

to hide themselves, hence the role o

OA-10 to combine both missions sim

neously. Airspace co-ordination are

phase l in e a re used to he lp o-ord

and optimize the EAD offensives.

In this scenario, the host i le a ir

themselves are the targets , or, ra the

hostile fighter and strike aircraft on

bases. Depending on the location of

bases, with their concentration of p

and therefore vulne rab le aircraft, t

ometimes a role for the A-IO, and s

times for something with long rang

punch, like the B-52.

Offensive Counterair OCA

Waiting andwatching. An A-10 instandard European paintscheme heads outover

theWest German plain during ExerciseReforger 83 USAF

during s rt Storm by one -10 usingmissiles to down enemy helicopters.

This entails the destruction, damage, neu

tralization or degrading of all enemy air

defence systems, inc luding radar sta tions,

EW sites andcontrol HQ bunkers,acro a

specifically defined area of the battlefield,

in order tha t o ther air operations can be

Suppression of Enemy Ai r Defence

SE D)

F LYI NG T HE MI SSIO N

defending friendly ground force s. BAI

therefore requires pre-planned cO-OId ina

t ion hetween the friendly land force and

t he A ir Force clement charged with the

destruction of mutually agreed BAI tar

gets . As such, BAI has an almost immedi

ate effect on ground operations in the

assigned sector.

Close Ai r Support CAS

This is now defined as air ac tion against

hostile ground targets that are in c lo se

proximi ty to friendly land forces, These

require the greatest degree of highly

detailed integration between both friendly

air and land forces for each mission or sor

tie conducted; the fire-and-movement co

ordination of both must be precise. The

term close proximity means that friendly

ground force and/or non-combatant are

near enough to the assigned enemy targetsto b e h az ar de d by anything less than

absolute accuracy of ordnance delivery

from theA-I O.

The role of air control as accomplished

by attack aircraft includes the suppression

of enemy a ir d ef en ce ( SE 0 which

means the b lanking of fixed and mobile

AAA andSAM sites along the front line,

and also offensive counterair (OC) mis

siems. In theA-I0 case, these are flexible

and were, in fac t, translated into action

A b u s y s c en e i n t he s h el t er o f a f o r w a rd l a nd i ng b as e i n W es t G e r ma ny i n t h e

1980sas munitionsmaintenancepersonnel usethe Draggin ammunition loader

to replenish theAvenger on aThunderboltII during Exercise Checkered Flag 83.

USAF

Battlefield Air Interdiction B A )

Current Tactics

, ighr, ir enr<1i1, a wholc lor of m<1rhem<ltic>, hur

if end, up wirh rhe had guys seeing grear

chunk> of hIS ,lIfcrafr hcing hlo\\ n <lway \\e

rh lnk he l l gcr rhe picturc

The AIM-9, which ,hould he cuming <llong

, cry ,horrly, will givc us e en grearcr self-pro

leclion cal <lhiliry. If 11chody decidc, ro comc

down rhcre wlrh l and power , r ruggle , we ll

h<lve grearcr ahiliry a nd r h c f,lcr rh<lr \\T can

C<1rry rhe AIM-9,which b a very cap<lhlc AIM

mi i le , , houldhe lp us kecp rhemof four hacb.

This is seen as a p rimary Air For ce t a k

with in the ou tl ine parameters o f t he AI

scenario. Although the enemy aggressor

ground forcesmay not have closed to with

in close proximity of defending land units,

t ho se h o t il e f orces pos e a potentially

imminent threat to the movements, dis

posi t ions or planned operation of the

This embraces all aeria l activity carried

out in order to delay, neutralize or, ideally,

totally destroy an enemy army s full poten

t ia l as a m il it ar y threat before it can be

effectively deployed against the defending

land force, The bulk of operations and

strikesare carried out beyond the immedi

ate vicinity of friendly ground force and

r hu s on ly very limited co-ordination is

required, Targets deemed to be within the

remit of the A-lOin the Al role would be

C3 communications nodes, ammunition

dump amisupplybases,rail linksand mar

shalling y ar d i n the immediate rear of the

enemy forces dispositions, vital road

bridges, and so on.

While Major Kennedy was discus ing the

1987 European battle tactics, currentt hi nk in g on t he usage of attack aircraft

had no t changed tha t much. At the very

end of the twen t ie th century, there are a

number of scenario in which the A /OA

10 f inds employment: a ir interdiction

(AI), bat t l f ie ld a ir interdiction (B I),

suppression of enemy air defence ( EAO)

and offensive counterair (OCA).

owadays, the -I is able to use the

AIM-9 idewinder in conjunction with

the lead-computing EEG -II a i r- to-ai r

gunsight.

Ai r Interdiction

nor ro dog-f igh rhu r to rak e ourordnancc to rhe

fronr <lnd make rhcArmyComlmlnde rhappy),

srill,if someoncdccide, ro srick aroundand play

wirh lIS (which \\ C <lll rhink rhey will cvcnrual

II be forccd to do i fwc causeenough prohlems

to them), we Gll1 je t t ison our ordn,lIlcc to

improveour manocuvrahiliry.

And fin<1lly, we can go in fo ra k i ll . So, if guy

i n ~ i ~ t s on ;o,t<lying around wc arc going to t<lkc

him on <I our level <1nd wc lI go im idc a nd usc

the gun on him. Thar , cyc-shooting by rhc way,

h < l ~ i c a l l y we d o n or h av e a ny a ir c om pu ti ng

FLYING TilE MISSION

life inreresring hec<luse lor o f r h e n ewe r <lir

cr<lfr h<lvegor ,m e real nicesy lems to he lprhe

pilor figure our \\ here he sgOing. Thank> to rhe

ROY l Ordn<lnce Survey \\e have 1:25 ,000

rnaps for our primary navigation means. Creal

maps, rhey reallyare.

Srep rwo - h eGlU,e of rhe m<lnoeu\T<lhiIIlYof

rhe A- IO \\ e C<ln h lc<llly our-rum <lny orher

<lircr<lfr. In Europe Ihl i> hecomingmore diffi

culr for some of rhem C<ln u ,I<l1nvcrI highGs

in makingmore difficulr rums, hur srill we make

f or a ve ry difficulr rarger indecd for cven

,killed f ighrer p i lor u sc d r o opcrming <I high

altltuJc .... 0 to hide, to turn on 1[.

If rhc guy hecome, per;isrenr, \ \ e \ \ i II i f \ \ c

are absolurely forced to ( an d ou rm a i n lask is

ngly vulnerahlc ro enemy fighrcrs. Of cour>e

heSovier intercept rypes, rhcF lankerand rhe

ulcrum, are very good, verycap<lhle aircrafr. So

heA- I ,to dcfend it,e1f, h. I\\ ay, had a basi

four-,repsurvlnil philosophy.

The firsr ,rcp to hidc - if rhey can r find

ou, rhen rhey can r ,hoor you Th<lr is whywc

cnd to fly ourprcsent t<lcrics. Iwill fly our romy

i,siom ar low alrirude, in Gcrmany, helow 500

Thc arrack phasc will find mc hclow 100

popplllg LIp toacquir e the target, service it,

hen depan again hack hclow I 0 f cc r. Makcs

jers are mOSI efficienr m high altirudesand

lirrle loirer rime.

The A-I 0 i, in for numherof IInpnnTmenrs

h<lVC heen funded. Oneo f rhemi, rhar \\e

gc t ting rhe AI t\ I -9 . Pre,enrly, \ \ i rh a l l

<lircmfr, rhere is prohlem wirh rhe

gn to \ \ h ich rhey h<lvc heen huil l , \\ hich

lowerflight, more I r m o u r ~ r l a r i n g r r o ~and, n c c c , , ~ a r y hecClu te of rhe CI1\irOll

we a rc working in performance in

, which made LIS, it is said, i n c r c a s ~

low level. interceptorscannot touch the A 10. butinfra-red andhand-held SAMs

Highmanoeuvrability with atight turning circle. andchaff and lightdispensers.

A-10a good chance ofevadingthe SAMand Triple-Aof anyenemybefore

lock on. Here. an A 10 isseen pull ing high g s a s it banks over close tothe

range demonstrations in 1984. USAF

although uninformed critics in the

be preoccupied by it. Major

described ome countermeasures

improved defences:

772 713



FLYING THEMISSION

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

2 2n d T ac ti ca l A ir S up po rt T ra i

S quadron T A S T S), e x O V -IO Bron

2 1s t T ac ti ca l Air S u pp or t S q ua TASS), Shaw AFB, South Carolina, pa

507thTAlRACW, ex OV-IO Broncos,

verted to OA-lOsOctober 1991, but in

v ate d 1 o v em b er 1 99 1, b e in g rep lac e

3 63 rd F W f ro m G eo rg e A FB , C al if o

Tran s fe rre d to 3 6 3rd FW on 1 A p ril 1

inactivated December 1993.

Dictatorsin the Middle East andFarEasthave no scruplesaboutthe useof chemical

and biological weapons and A l0 ground crews have to be ready. Here a suitably

protected airman makes an adjustmentto a bomb rackmounted o n a n A l0 during

combat readiness competition SabreSpirit 88. Teamsfrom eleven Pacific area

commandscompeted forhonoursin tencategories related to operation

preparedness. Natonal Archives Colege Park MD

5th Fighter Weapons Wing, N e llis A FB,

Las Vegas, Nevada.

O US

20th F i gh t er W i ng , e x F - I I I E and EF-

I l I A, m o ve d fro m R A F U pper Heyford,

UK, to Shaw A FB , 3 1 December 1993,

ta ki ng over 363r d F W A- IO aircrafr

including the 21st FS OA-lOs, redesignat

ed as t h e 5 5 t h FS on I J a nu a ry 1 99 4.

luctuating ortunes

nd ew oncepts

The VA lOB the OA lO LASTE

W hi l e A -l O firep o we r w as p rinc ipa lly

concentrated in Eu ro p e, re ad y for the big

one , C ONUS units expanded, conduct

ingspecializedtasking.To fulfil othercom

mitments,and to gain experience in a w ide

range of climates and conditions, incase of

the unexpected, detachments were s e nt t o

likely flashpoints, mainly in the PACFAC

area. Frequent exchanges were made

between CO US-based A -1 O u n its and

the front-line squadrons in the U K ,s o that

a rotation of p ilots g a in e d experience of

b o t h t h e area and of ferrying. In any full

scale combat, the loss rates of a ll ty pe s of

aircraftwere expectedto b e h ig h and,w ith

the attrition rate of A -lOs likely to be sig

nificant, rehearsal of cross-Atlantic rein

forcement was deemed essential. These

pilot exchanges became known a boar

swaps . There w er e a ls o a n u mb e r o f t e st

and evaluation units,such as the AX Joint

Te st Forc e J TF), set up to monitor devel

opment, formulate A-IO tactics and sug

gest improvements.

In Europe, the rapid run-dow nafter the

c ol l ap s e o f t h e S o vi e t U nion was finally

halted w ith the reactivation on 4 January

1993 o f t h e SlOth FS as part o f t h e 5 2n d

Fighter Wing. Based a t S p an g da h le m A B

in t h e r e un i te d G e rm a ny , it had fifteen

A -l Os a nd n i ne O A- I Os from t he 9 2n d

TFS. Detachments t o A v i a no A B in Italy,

to coverthe various Balkans crisis points,

drew A-lOs from th is, the final EuropeanThunderbolt II outfit. The rest withdrew

to C ONUS , wi th d et ac hm en ts t o

PACAF.

Dispositions

T hrough the 1980s a n d i n t o t h e 1990s, the

main Air Fo rc e A -1 O d isp o sition s w e re a s

listed below.

A pa i r o f 9 2 T F S A lOs inthe last chance arming

area at Bentwaters.August 1986. Peter Davies

Such strikes reached their peak during

the Luftwaffe s pre-emptive strikes on

Soviet airfields at t h e s t a r t o f t h e G e r m a n

Eastern Offensive inJune 1941. More than

2,000 Soviet aircraft were caught on the

ground and destroyed for the loss of less

than fifty German attackers. Such success

is harder to achieve nowadays, with the

development of sophisticated early-warn

ingradar networks, but strikes likethis can

still have a lo n g-te rm e ffe c t. Ifa irc ra fta re

not actually found and destroyed o n t he

ground, the enemy is at least forced to dis

perse them, so that t he y n o lo ng e r p os e

any threat to friendly forces. For example,

in t h e G u l f War, the Iraqis had to seeksafe

refuge for their a irc raft in Iran , their for

m er e ne my . ) S im il ar ly , i t is possible to

knock out enemy facilities, maintenance

hangars, fuel supplies, ammunition dumps

andcontrol bunkers.

In order to co-ordinate the application

o f t h e a b ov e m iss ion s it is crucial for the

Joint Force Commander to have a g oo d

grasp of what is the mostessential objectivein any givensituation. The decision about

t h e e m pl o ym e nt o f t h e air component is

th e re fore a lw ay s n e go tiate d b e twe e n la nd

and air commanders and,once i t h a s b ee n

taken, it is implemented by the issue of an

a gr ee d a ir t as ki ng o rd er ATO). Time

scales can vary, butthe average time to exe

cute is about seventy-two h ou rs, w h iIe the

durationof a typical ATO is often less than

twenty-four hours.

A l0 pullsout ofthe arming pit at Bentwatersfor themain runway while the

thesection still undergopre fl ightpin pull ing. August 1986.

Davies

m a p a n d Maverick safely aboard a 511 TFS pilot advancesthrottlesfor

Peter E Davies

174 775



FLUCTUATING F OR TU NESA D NEW CONCEPTS THE YA IOB THE OA IO LASTE FLUCTUATING F OR TU NE S A D NEW CONCEPTS THEYA I OB THE OA I O LASTE

ALASKA

II th TASS, ac tivated a t

son FB A l as ka , I J ul y

raking over A-lOs f ro m

51sr Composite Wing T

c a l) , b a e d at Osan A B R O

February 19 I, with 25th

detached at uwon AS reing -lOs from January

R ed es ig na te d as 5 I t TF

January 19 4 , a mi moved

to O san I October 1 99 0

1 9 th T

2 5t h T FS , p ar t of the

Composire Wing Tactic

Suwon AB, ROK , s t

receiving A-lOs January

By 9 ovember 19 9, g av

all A-lOs prior toconverri

F-16, butinactivaredon 31

1 99 0. R ea cr i va re d w it h

10son I Ocrober 1993.

there on I Ocrober 1990 as

of 5 1 st Figh r er Group

Inactivated I Ocrober

Left A four plane trail formationfrom the25thTacticalFighter

Squadronseenover Korea during

Exercise Team Spirit 8 Natonal

Archives Colege Park MO

19rh T S, at Suwon, ROK,

ex OV-19 Broncos, converted

to OA-IOs I A ug us r 19 9, to

replace the 25th TFS. Assigned

to 5th Tact ical ir Control

Group at Osan and moved

REPUBLIC KOREA

5th Tactical AirControl Group

TA G , at uwon, ROK,with the 25rh FS and the 19rh

TA , between I January 19 4

and I Ocrober 199 .

PACAF

Engineering FlightTest EFf ,

a ramento Air Logistics Cen

ter ALC , McCle llan AFB.

This un it f le w s in 81-0989 to

t es t s of tw ar e a nd h ar dw ar e

modifications.

EveryA-IO hasat sometime

or other passed through Sacra

men to A ir Logistics Center

SM-ALC , which is the A-IO s

main maintenance depot.)

Above Thisrear view shows how

the highpositioning ofthe engines

reducesthe riskof damagefrom

ground debris On a wet paved

runwayat Suwon Air Base inthe

Republic of Korea two A lOsstand

ready inthe earlymorning light inthat

potentially deadly f1ashpoint USAF

4443rd Test and Evaluation Group, part of

the Tacrical Air Warfare Center TAWC

at Eglin FB Florida.

422nd Te t a nd E va lu at io n q ua dr on

TE ), at ellis AFB, Las Vegas, Nevada,

redesignated 30 December 19 I.

3246rh Test Wing TESTW , a t Arma

ment Developmentand Test Center, Eglin

A FB, Flor ida . Re c eiv e d f ir t A-lOs early in

19 ,and f ou r a ir cr a f t s /ns 7 3 -1 6 65 , 7 3

166, 79- 166 and 2-064 served

be tween then andend of 1992.

6 5 I O th/4 12 th Te s tWin g , Air Force FI ight

Test Center FFfC , EdwardsAFB, Cal

ifornia. Part of the original A-XJoint Test

Fo rc e J TF) f o r m ed in 1 97 2, becomingthe

A-IOJTFon 18January 1973. Redesignat

e d as 412nd Test Wing TW 2 October

1992.

44 5th Test Squadron, flew aircraft of the

4443rd T WC at Eglin AFB, Florida. The

three A-lOs utilized between 2 Septem

b e r 1 98 1 and I June 1 98 9 w er e s in s 7 8

0715,78-0599,79-0166.

602nd Tactical AirControl Wing TAIR

CW , converted from OV-IOs to OA-IOs

IOctober

19 7 w iththe

2 3r d T a ct i a l Airupport Training quadron TASTS , fol

lowed by t he 2 2nd TA T 5 June 19

Redesignated as the 6 2nd A ir C on tr ol

Wing ACW on I October 1991 with the

22ndand 23rd TA T .

507th Tactical Air Control Wing

AIRACW , at h a w A FB, South Caroli

n a ,e x OV-I 0 Broncos, redesignatedas Air

Con tr ol W ing CW on I Ocrober

1991, operated OA-I Os from Shaw A FB

South Carolina, f ro m 1991 u nt il I A pr il

1992, when transferred to the 363rd FW.

363rd FW at h a w A FB, outh Carolina,

rook over OA-I 0 from 7t h ACW at

haw FB ou th Caro l ina , on I April

1 99 2. I n ac r iva r e d 13 December 1993,

when replaced by 2 th FW from RAF

Upper Heyford, UK.

22nd TAST inactivated I ovember

1991 and replaced by the 334rd TF ,and

23rd T T inac t ivated same da te and

r ep la ce d by t he 35 4t h TF Both

squadrons returned to the355 th Wing on

I M ay 1 99 2 and 602nd ACW inactivated

June 1992.

76th TF , converted ro A-I s winter

19 I Inactivated 2 9 Ma y 1 9 92 .

355t l \ TFS, o p er a tio m ll w ith the A-IO

F eb ru ar y 197 . I na tivated 21 March

1992, due ro the closure of Myrtle Beach,

AFB. Reactivated as part of354rh Wingat

Eielson AFB to r ep la ce r h e I I t h TA on

2 August 1993.

354th F , activated 5 January 1 99 3, a r

McChord AFB, Washington, as separare

part of355th Wing for Army co-operation

work at Fort Lewis and the Yakima Firing

R an ge . M ov ed t o Davis-Monthan AFB,

Arizona a nd t he n replaced 333rd F at

Davis-Monthan A FB , r iz on a.

353rd TFS, received A-lOs i n A ug us r

197 . Inacrivated 15 December 1992.

354rh Ta c ric al Figh r er W in g a t Myrtle

Beach FBouth Carolina,

ex A-7Dse a rly 1 97 7. Be ca m e f ir toperarional A-IO

Wing O cto be r 1 97 . R e de si g na t ed as

354rh Fighrer Wing FW on I October

1991. Inactivared in s tag e s during 1992,

355th F March, 356th F in June and

353rd FS in December.

357th TF f , ex A-7Ds converted ro A

lOs A pr il 1 97 9, and became rhe 357th

TF on I ovember 1 99 1 , a one o f t h e

A/OA-I Formal Tr ai ni ng n it FfU .

355th Tacrical Training Wing, Davis

Monthan AFB, Arizona.

358th TF f , ex A-7Ds January 197 ,

becoming the 35 t h F ig ht er Squadron

FS) on 1 October 1991, as an A/OA-I 0

Ff U

354rh TFS, summer 1994, took over334rh

TFS A -lOs a t McCho rd AFB, Washing

ton, and moved to Davis-Monthan AFB,

A r izo n a, I October 1994.

333rd TF , ex A-7D March 1 9 76 u n til

inacrivarion 15 February 1991, TAl RCW,

Davis-Monthan AF B, r iz ona , I ovem

b e r 1 99 1, 355th Wing, same p la ce I M ay

1992, handed over A-I s t o 3 54 rh TFS

ummer 1994 and became F-15E aircrew

training quadron at eymour Johnson

AFB, North Carolina.

356th TF , the first operarional A-1O

squadron, October 1977. Inactivated 3

June 1992.

FighterWeapons Wing FWW ,a t the

apon and Tactics Center WTC , el

FB Las Vega, evada.Redesignated as

Fighter Wing FW I October 1991.

F ,redesignated from the 2 1s t F at

w A FB on I J a nu a r y 1 99 4, e q u ip p e d

OA-I s until convertedto F-16 /D

1996, their OA-I Os b e in g tr a n-

to the 74 th F at Pope AFBand the

AFRE at aval Air tation

ew Orleans.

F ,as par to f the347 th FW, based at

y AFB, Georgia, converteJ to A - lOs

e ummer of 1995.

FW as part o f the 507th A irContro l

W at Shaw FB ou th Car

converted from A-lOs to F-J6C/Ds

1996.

TF , converted to A - lO s m id- 1 98 1 .

c ar e d to Po pe FB NorthCarolina 1

1992, as parr of23rdComposite Wing

Fighter Wing TFW , ex A

converted 23 September 1989, Eng

FB lexandria, Louisiana. ccept

very last A-IO s/n 82-0665 . On I

1 99 2, w ith c los u re of En g la n d A FB,

d t o P op e FB orth Carolina as

Air-Land Composite Wing.

TA T , e x O A- 37 Bs , c on ve rt ed t o

- IO October 19 7 a t D a vis - Mon th an

Arizona, as part of 602nd TAIRCW.

ivated I ovember 1991, replaced by

TF .

Ta cr ica l Fig hte r quadron, firsr of

TFW s q ua d r on s to convert to -10.

15 February 1992, converted

1 6- / D, b ur re-converted b ac k t o Ain summer 1 99 4 a r Po pe , A FB, orth

F ,as part of new23rd Wing,convert

- I in s u m me r 1 99 6, r a k in g so m e

r af t f r om 5 5r h F a r h aw A FB .

Fighter Weapons Squadron FW

is FB Las Vegas, evada as part of

57th TTW and then FW. Became the

Division of the Fighter Weapons

ol FWS o n 3 0 December 1981.

to 0 -lOs on 15 June 19 as

of 602nd TARCW. Inac t ivated I

1 99 1; r e pla ce d b y 333rd F .

776 777



FLUCTUATING FORTUNES AND NEW C O C EP TS - THE YA IOB THE OA IO LASTE FLUCTUATING FORTUNES AND NEW CONCEPTS - THE YA IOB THE OA IO LASTE

target recognition, c ou pl ed w it

improved HUD and was expected

ready by 1985. [ t was thought tha

could be re tro-fit ted to t he A- I0 fwould provide them withall then ig

bae l-weather ab il i ty they would r

obviating any need for a specialized N

and allowing the project to die.

[n theevent , the system underwe

era l design changes and was not re

time to be fit ted on the productio

The Ai r Force delayed introduct

1981, a nd t he system finally h ad

retro-fi tted to theA- tO fleer.

The trials at Edwards were all cond

successfully. They continued unti l

but no further conversions took place

Air Forcewas convinced that the new

angled navigation and targeting inf

system (LANT[RN), then being

oped, would be the r ea l a nswe r to

prayers. LANT[RN also featured auto

LLLTVwould have been buri di n lhi ng edges of the a ir craft 's wings,

promised delivery of this version o

/AW as ea rl y as 1983. Unfortun

much more attractive to theAir For

the possibility of equipping the singl

original so that itcould handle allasp

the /AW mission. This variam, the s

scat nightattack (SSNA) aircraft, co

produced much more cheaply, and the

an even more'austere', or cut-price ve

Costing had much to do with the differ

ence in the schools of thought. The cost of

upgrading an A-tOinto a two-seater to take

the new equipment was estimated at 1,500,000 apiece. Fairchi1d came up wi th

improvements that they hoped to incorpo

rate into the production aircraft, includinga

new one-p ie ce w indshield and single

clamshell canopy for better vision. They

also planned to give the WSO some much

needed protection by means of composite

alloy/titanium/nylon sidepanels. The FUR

and radarwere to be built into the knees of

the l anding pods, whi l e the Laser ::md

Nose u p a nd bombed up looking leanand mean 73 1668 thefifth pre-production

aircraft headsout of Edwards AFB overthe Californiafoothi l ls on testand evaluation

trials. The ruddersand the tail finsare painted bright orange to aidtest observations

during thesummerof 1977. AFFTC/HO Edwards AFB

of airworthiness checkson bo th front and

rear seat control and handling. The low

a l ti tude warn ing s ensor s were t r ia l le d

extensively against a wi de v ar ie ty of

ground profiles and both natural and arti

ficial obstacles. Th is was followed by low

altitude flights, target and threatdetection

and gun firing. While the p i lo t remained

responsible for the Ca t ling gun attacks,

the missile deployment was made by the

WSO, one mansearching for thenex t tar

get while theo the rconduc ted thecur ren t

strike. The Air Force was especially eager

to assessif all the complex new equipment

could be handled equallywellby one pilot,

for , if i t could, theenhancements could all

be retro-fitted to bring the basic A-I 0 up

to date. [ n t hi s they were not backed by

Fairchild, which envisaged /AW work as

strictly a two-man profile.

built in tandem overthe main ammunition

drum, with a considerableelongationand a

built-up fairing, which were used to accom

modate di sp lac ed avionic s package s. To

accommodate two men, the cockpi t was

made side-opening (to starboard). The

WSO lacked thetitanium'bathtub' protec

tion o f t he pilot and was n ot HUD

equipped, but i n m os t other respects the

two cockpits were duplica ted, with after

fl i ght c ont rol v ia a second yawstick.

Improvements include advanced avion

ics in the form of a short-range, multi-mode

navigation and attack r adar , c ar ri ed in an

underwingpod. Based on the Westinghouse

WV-50 standard-weather radar, the new

terrain-followingradar (TFR) providestar

get indication,simple ground mapping,ter

rain tracker/avoidance and trlrget detection

modes, the latter ofwhichcan pickup small

moving targets. This enables the early

detection of hosti Ie threats from the radaremissions o f S AM and radar-controlled

'TripleA's ites . A Texas Instruments AAR

2 s te er ab le f orwa rd -l ooki ng i nf ra -r ed

(FUR) se t is carried on the centreline sta

tion, coupled with a low-light-level TV

(LLLTV) sys tem shipped in plac e o f t he

PAVE PE NY outfit . This wor ks w it h a

Litton L -3 9 i ne rt ia l navigation system.

The package makes an image presentation

superimposed upon the modified Kaiser A

10 HUD, with limiteddepth cueing,as well

as apair of cathode-ray tube (CRT) displays

in the aftercockpit. Thisdata can be input

to give target-ranging data to the Catling

gun. There is provis ion also for asecondary

terrain-avoidance monitor, as mentioned

by Major Kennedy, as well as the upgrading

of the existingINS.

A l l in a ll ,w i th thes e improvemems, the

/AW a ir cr ew was provided w ith a com

plete ' re al wor ld ' d is play , electronically

generated FUR system, with radar-gener

ated terrain contour profiles and terrain

avoidance s teering information, with a

laser-slant range-measuring system. This

resulted ina 2,0001b 91 Okg) weight penal

ty bu t theN/AW wasstillcapable of carry

ing the same offensive ordnance into battleas the A-IO. The additional weight did,

however, callfor additional stability and to

achieve this the fin and rudders weremuch

enlarged vertically, by 20in (50cm) to give

better lateral stabili ty and contro .

The N/AW variant was pushed ahead,

the first aircraft being delivered to Edwards

FB f or f ligh t t es ts , which commenced

with a debut flight on 4 May 1979. The

300-hour flight-test programme consisted

been no stated requirement forsuch an air

c ra ft , b ut , i n t ru th , t he A ir Force had

expressed growing concern at rhe fact that

the Soviets were devoting almost 40 per

cen t o f thei r training to night operations.

Whi l e t he basic A 1 could operate at

night, i tcould only do sovia the use of illu

mination flares. This relatively primitive

method could belargelynullified by adverse

weather conditions. Furthermore, experi-

e nc e o f A-1O European operations had

made i t c lear how much all-weather capa

bility was needed in that theatre.

As a preliminary step, the first ofthe preproductionDT E A-lOs (s/n73-1664) was

sent back to Farmingdale to become the

test-bed and evaluator for the new design.

Workcommenced at Farmingdale in April

1978, and continued for just over a year.

With considerable foresight Fairchild had

buil t in such an enlargement so t ha t t he

physical changes were not as great as might

have been expected. The second cabin for

the weapons systems officer (WSO) was

developments in the basic A-10 design,

and a number o f modif ica tions had been

made to it.

The poim made by Major Kennedy

rhar there was no dual-seat A-lO - had

exercised rhe minds ofborh theAir Force

a nd FRC for some rime. Indeed, a s long

agoas rhe 1972 Specification, ir had been

spelt out that ' rhe vehic le design shall

a llow for e as e of growth to a two-place

version for training (withcombat capabil

ity) and n igh t /adverse weather (N/AW)

attack'. The c ompany h ad s ou gh t to

improve on t he basicdesign andhad seenthe need for a two-seat N/AW version.

In autumn 1977, FRC made a proposal

along t hes e l ines to t he A i r Force and, in

1978, the 000 gave the company permis

sion, and 5 million dollars o f t he 7 mil

lion dollars of development f unding , to

design and builda prototype.The rest came

from FRC itself and from interested avion

ics suppliers. The 00 0 contribution

seemed generous, since there had originally

Inacrivated 1 October 1993, having

replaced by the354 thFW and355rh

on 20 August.

TFS, as part o f the 343rd Composite

received two dozen A-lOs on 1

1981, and moved to Eielson AFB,

on I January 1982. Converted to

and relinquished A-lOs from March

ng thetai l-codefor Alaska this 343rd Tactical FighterWing A l0 prepares to drop Mk 82 Iron bombs

ng combinedArmy-AirForce live-fire ExerciseCalfex IV atthe Yukon Command Trainingrange. USAF

the 1980s and i nto t he 90s,

had be en several wide-ranging

Composite Wing, w it h 18t h TFS,

son AFB, A la ska . Redesignated as

Tactical Fighter Wing on 8 June

and as a Wing in March 1991.

FW reactivated at Eielson on 20

1993, replacing 343rd Wing and

its personnel and aircraft.

118 779



FLUCTUATING FORTUNES A N D N E W CONCEPTS- T H E Y A I O B . T H E O A I O. L A S TE FI_UCTUATING FORTUNES A N D N E W CONCEPTS- T H E Y A I O B. T H E O A I O . L A S T E

Whenthe blow from Congress came in

summer of 1982, Fairchild officials ad

ted that t hey had to place a f or eign m

tary sale within six to nine months if

were t o k ee p the A-IO production

open past April 1984. t the tim

seemed t ha t t he ir best opportunitie

such a f or eign sa le l ay in negotiations

were under way with Peru, Moro

iRAt the time of the sales drive for theA

Iran presented a picture similar to Mo

co. The Shah was an autocratic ruler,pro-West and a good bu lwark against

pene t ra t ion ofCommunisl l ' in to the

rich Middle East under the guise of A

nationalism. Had the planned sale o

A-IO gone through, however, the surp

ove rt hr ow o f t he S ha h, a nd his rep

ment by a vitriolic avidly anti-Wes

clerical government, would have led

some r ed f aces i n the White House.

Iranians might have found the A-IO u

in theirown prolonged andbitter war

Saddam Hussein, but t ha t was not t

either.

THAILAND

In the Far East, after the calamities o

1970s, when the whole area collapsed

Communist darkness, one na tion see

to hold out against the Red tide. Thai

remained a free country, butthreatene

its northern and eastern borders. Th e

o f t h e A- I0 was thought very likely h

The Thais h;ld seen the power o f t he A

a nd k ne w well enough that what

needed was rel iable hitting power, ra

than showy acrobatics. Yet again, how

er, the depleted uranium 'problem' s

stifling o f i nt er es t a nd n o sales resu

was what they really n eeded, b u t

could not have bo th that and sleek m

million dollar air superiority fighters.

A-IO was not designed to slug it ou ta t

tudes, while any fighter could drop bo

and fi re o ff m issiIes that looked effec

even if they did not actually hit anyth

There were no sales to Morocco.

A F ai rc hi ld r ep confided a t t he t

Essentially, our competitors arc f igh

which could cost twice as much as a n

10. I f there were any armies i n the w

that had t he ir o wn t act i ca l av ia t

they'd love the A-IO.' But, there were

and here was the rub: 'A Mach 2 plan

sexier, and some pilots may think hit

ground targets is a grunt's job.Ii>

In 1983, the Fairchild sales team was fairly

confident of selling between s eventy and

eighty A-lOs to foreign countries over the

following twoyears. In theevent, not asin

glesalewas evermade outside the USA. At

the ParisA ir Showthat year the talkwas of

three very interested parties, two in the

NeClr East and one in the Far East . What

happened t o t he se po te nt ia l customers?

Congress Ends A JOFunding

In 1 98 2, Congress delivered t he d ea th

blow to the A-JOwhen it voted to discontinue all funding o f t h e aircraft with the

Fiscal 1983 Defense Authorization Bi I I

The House and Sena te conferees o n t he

bi II made the recommendation and Con

gress approved. There was to be no

reprieve, although 29 million was provid

ed for ' l inetermination cost s . Even as l a t e

a s 1 98 3, F ai rc hi ld was h op ef ul that its

lobby in Congress might reverse thisdeci

sion. The Reagan adtTlinistration hCld

sought 357 .3 million for twenty A- lOs

and the House, pr ior to the House-Senate

conference, had recommended 329.3

million for 30 A-lOs, p lus 28 million for

Cldvance procurement of twenty more in

Fiscal Year 1984. I t was not t o be.

ost Sales

End of th e Line

MOROCCO

The target of extensive Fairchild presenta

tions, with a moderate ruler, and LibyCl and

Alger ia as uneasy ne ighbours , the A-IO

seemed an ideal buyfor Morocco s defence

needseast ofthe Atlasmountains. Howev

er,as elsewhere, the strictlyone-role profile

of the A-IO worked against i t. I t maywell

haveheen th; lt this excellentCAS ;lircraft

The main difference in t he OA-IO is

internal. Externally, there are hard ly any

differencesat all, withthe role beingmain

ly reflected in the pylon loading. White

phosphorus marker rockets r eplace the

Mavericks and bombs, bu t the 30mm guns

ar e s ti ll carried, c l ass if ied as a defensive

weapon, although with a change of muni

tions its tank-smashing potential remains

undiminished

Initially, two groups of A-lOs were con

verted in to OA-IOsand these were based

a t Davis -Monthan AFB, neClr Tucson,

Arizona.

Towards t he end of the 1980s, having

designed, bui lt a nd operClted the best

CA aircraft in the world, the Air Force

wasst i l l kicking hardagainst it, threaten

ing at every turn to withdraw i t f rom ser

vice and replace it wit h t he F-16. As so

often b ef or e i n t hi s d eb at e, t he threat

brought first anger, then despair from the

Army; one suggested solution was to

transfer to en t ire A-IO force to Army

control. Yet again, t h eA i r Force wanted

the best of both worlds: they migh t not

wan t t he A- I0, bu t the re was no way the

Army was going to be allowed to fly jets.

The trouble was that t he n um be rs

impinged on the pure a i r superiority jets,

the glamour planes, that the USAF was

al lowed to f ield un.der the various disar

mament treaties with the Soviets.

Tothwart the Army and reduce the num

bers problem, an alternative proposal for

entire A-I 0 usage found f avour. For a long

time the Bronco and similaraerial FAC aircraft hadbeenobsole te andther e wasclear

ly a need for a much-upgraded successor.

The A-IO filled the bill and helped solve

t he o th er problems. By converting the

A-IO in to an observation and reconnais

sance aircraft, numbers could be kept on

s trength, but would not be counted in the

pure f ighter totals. The alterations neces

sary were not very great and modifications

would ther e fo r e he cheap to implement.

A-lOB Trainer

OA-lO

Like the lAW a training vers i on a l so

called f or a two-seat design, and this, the

proposed A-lOB, wasalso studied. It called

for no advanced electronics, just dual con

trols and the like. Fairchild culled data for

this design from the trials with the l W

an d t he A ir Force p la ced an order for

twenty A-lOBs, to be added to the e nd o f

the norma l A -IO production run. The

plan was for these to b e f l own b y AFRES

and ANG units. No othe rs would have

been b ui lt ; i f the need arose, existing

A-lOs would be converted for the job.

However, the easewith which the A-IO

could be f lown negated the need for the

TrClining Twenty' i n the eyes of Congress,

and all funding WClS deleted in J983. Thus

it WClS that the FClirchild designers fell vic

tim to their own success, and the A-lOB

never became more than a g le am in thedesigner s eye.

Above Rear view ofthe VA-lOBovertheCalifornia desert showing thetai l which had

been raised by 20in 50cml. andthe extrapods

forthe night/all weather role. AirForceFlght Test

CenterMuseum Edwards AFB

Top Aerial view ofthe VA-lOBoverthe California

desert during trials from Edwards AFB showing

thesize ofthe second cockpit and associated

fairing which necessitatedthe heightened

verticaltai l on thisaircraft. Air Force Flght Test

CenterMuseum Edwards AFB

Excellent view ofthe one-off dual-seatervariant

during test-flyingfromEdward AFB California.

Notethe highrearseatingfor thesecond crew

memberand theextendedcanopyfair ing which

housedsome ofthe extra electronics forthe

night/all weather role. USAF

f 9

720 2



FLUCTUATING FORTUNESAND NEW CONCEPTS - THE YA IOB THE OA IO LASTE FLUCTUATING FORTUNES AND NEW CONCEPTS - THE YA IOB THE OA IO LASTE

Pilotaccess to the A l0 cockpit is by way ofa telescopic boarding ladder,loweredfrom a door on the port

sideof thefuselage below thecockpit.This isseen here onan A l0 ofthe 509th Tactical FighterSquadron

TFS . pictured at RAF Alconbury,Cambridge, UK, in 1989. The rearward-raised cockpitcanopy

isalso shown to good effect, with theKaiserhead-updisplayalso clearly visible. USAF

Egypt and Thai land ,bu t no tone

came to anything. <0

failure to sell the A-IO abroad,

e in tensive e f fo r ts , le ft Fa irc h ild ,

with the finish ofUSAF production,

and dry.

roduction Run nds

the final production aircraft, 0713

rolling off the delivery line

ng delivered to theAir Force on 20

1984, an eleven-year production run

t o an end. ' This A-IO was to be the

aft built at Hagerstown and, with

of the A-IO programme,

hild was forced t o c as t a ro und for a

Since 1977, the Air Force had

hop in g t o replace the Cessna T-37

which had s er ve d i n i ts inventory

1958. Fairchild, with a history of suc

trainer aircraft, naturally was interand, even before the issue of the RFP

1, had begun preliminarydesign stud

w as hoped that such a programme

k ick in a t t he end o f t h e A-lO run,

there prove to be no reprieve, and

keep t he p la nt g oi ng . I ni ti al ly , i t

that th is w ou ld b e the case, for, on

1982, the company was named prime

for the next generation trainer

fleet, and w as a wa rd ed a 1 04 m il

to deliver the two prototypes,

an option for fifty-four more. Foreign

werealso expected to follow.

a s, i n a r e- r un of the early A-IO pro

the company had promised more

i t w as a bl e to deliver. Although its

the T-46A, was a winner, the pro

wasbeset throughout by delays and

Fairchild had promised todeliver

st aircraft in April 1985, and, indeed,

ntation to unveil the first machine

on II Februaryofthat year, but it

out t o b e a f ak e and a sham. The

displayed was not much more than

o w s he ll , a mock-up la ck ing m or e

1,200items. Whenthe Air Force Sec

V e rn e Orr found out h ow h e h ad

he was furious and the compato undergo another searching'con

r e vie w , in a r ar e c a s e of deja v

although flight-testing, which

d on IS October 1985, revealed

or nothing w r on g w ith the aircraft

t he company w as i n deep financial

Itresorted to allkinds of expedients

the inevitable showdown and

The company cash reserves were

to cover d::lily costs until, in the

same year that t he T-46A took so success

fully to the sky, the decision had beenmade

to s ell o ff the whole aircraft division, and

fruitless talks hadbeen h a d w ith Grumman

and Boeing. Costs continued to escalate and

the Air Forceslashed the T -4 6 p ro gr am me

by cancelling most o f t h e 1986 and all of

1987 budgets. Th is was the l as t s tr aw

Fairchildcould not afford to continue devel

opment without this funding. On 5 March

1987, the cancellation ofthe T-46Atrainer

programme was announced. Only the two

prototypes and the first production aircraft

survived, and nineother production aircraft

were scrapped on the line.

Hopes that renovation and moderniza

tion w or k f or the Thunderbolt II might

keep the faCility working at a reduced level

were dashed, when even the rights t o t he

A-IO programme were t r ansf err ed to

Grumman, along w i th 116 of Fairchild s

best project engineers. l The Hagerstownplant was totally shutdown in 1 98 7 . After

sixty turbulent years, Fairchild had ceased

to exist. <l

With the break-up of the Fairchild Cor

poration i t w as thought a nadir h ad b een

reached , bu t there were revelations still

t ocome.

The Certifier Scandal

One of the low points of the story was the

revelation, via the qui tam provisions of

the False Claim Act, filed on 1 3 J u ly 1 9 8 2

by eil Aliksanian, a f or me r F a ir ch il d

employee, that the company had allegedly

mischarged the Government on several

contracts and had failed to provide theAir

Force with informat ion on equipment

malfunctions u nd er a n ot he r c on tr ac t.

Under the provision o f t h e a ct a private

cit izen could f il e a suit on b eh al f o f t he

Government ami, if the Government then

took over the case, and the prosecution

were successful, the filer would receive a

part of the c ivil c laim s. The Federal

Authorities duly intervened in the case on

30 June 1989, and the Depar tment o f Just ice proceeded to probe.

Th e Officer of Inspector General for the

National Aeronautics and Space Admin

istration (NASA) launched a lengthy and

involved investigation, the result of which

was revealed by Assistant AttorneyGen

eral Frank W. Hungerof the Civil Division

on 20 December 1990.

The Department of Justice said that

Fairchild Controls, while s till a division of

Fairchild Industries, inflated the amounts

charged to ASA con tracts f ro m 1 98 2

through 1988. NASA's investigators said

that Fairchild Control mischarged engi

neeringand manufacturing labour as over

head and research and development; treat

ed capital investments as expenses;

included accrued expenses in the current

year that were not subsequently paid; and

charged unallowable expenses into over

head expense accounts.

Whil e t he c as e w as s ti ll in its earlier

stages, Fairchild Industries s o ld Fa irc h ild

Contro ls to AERO Acquisition Corpora

tion, on 25 ugus t 1989. Fairchild Con

trols, at Manhattan Beach, California, was

renamed Fairchild Space Defense Cor

poration in 1 9 92 .

Fairchild Industr ies had to pay the Gov

ernment 5 mi ll i on on behalfof itsformer

division, Fairchild Control Systems Com

pany, and had al so repaid a further2,890,000 through contract adjustments.

Aliksanian was due, under the settlement

figures, t o r ece ive 600,000 for revealing

these discrepancies_

Specifically with regard t o t he A -10

contract, Fairchild Space paid theUni ted

States 298,640 to sett le allegations con

cerning a malfunctioning certif ier device

which tested the capacity of the fuel tank

o n t he A-IO aircraft prior to take-off. The

Government said that Fairchild Space,

after discovering thepa r t was not working

properly, corrected the problem, but did

not tell theAir Force about it, then billed

the Government for the replacement. As

part of the se tt lemen t, Fairchild Space

gave t he A i r Force replacement parts and

warran ties. S;

LASTE

When Major Kennedy was describing his

low-altitude approach, a s u s e d in 1 98 9, he

gave a tongue-in-cheekaccountof how he

estimated his altitude.

We Ay out all1und 250-500 feet, estimatingour

height hy a device ca l led the peE (pilm's cal

culated eyehall). As we leave I p ic k up on a

lOwer that I know is ahoUl 500 feel h i gh a nd

adjust lO that, if I Ay past it half-way down I m

at 250 feet,IH;

His account was not far from the truth and,

even 0l)erating from the f la t Eas t A lig lian

countryside, the 509th, like other units,

had r e gu lar los se s f ro m la ck - of - altitu d e

problems.lh6 The low-altitude safety and tar

get enhancement (LASTE) s y ste m w as

th er e fo r e m o st w e lc o me , although i t w as

much delayed and did not arriveuntil 1991,

making it a post-GulfWar modification. Its

a rr i va l f in al ly d id a wa y w it h t he TLAR

('That Looks About Right ' ) bombing solu

tion, brought on by the need to fly at

12,000ft (J,600m) (instead of using the

European down-on-the-deck method) dur

ing theGulf War. Before LASTE, as Major

DaveFeehsrecalled, 'If weflewabove 1,000

f e et w e expected to get a nosebleed. HiThe s ys te m w as g ra du al l y a dde d to

active A-lOs at the Sacramento ALC,

although some unit s d id it vi a 'in-house'

speed lines. LASTE is built around a r a da r

altimeter, which is linked to a v o ic e w a rn

ing system that gives the pilot 's i tuational

awareness should he fly too low. The acti

vation waspre-set, with both a minimum

altitude datum and a f ix ed descent angle;in either case, the pilot would receive audi

ble warning in time to takeaction. Toease

some of the strain of flying (including calls

of nature) as the A-lOs shuttled across the

Atlantic,an autopilot was incorporated for

the first time, proving especially beneficial

to the OA-lO pilots.

This was coupled with the updated HUD

system, which w as s imila r to that used

o n t he F-16 fighter to improve bombing

accuracy. The HUD displays a continually

computed impactpoint (CClP), the'Death

Dot', to ensure h its . I ta ls o h a d the capabil

ity to predict the Gatling's munitions tra

jectories, improving strafing accuracy. This

improvement enabled the Air ational

Guard A-lOs of the 17th TFG to comeout

on top at t he biannual 1991 Gunsmoke

Competition for Attack Aircraft.

According to the Deputy Commandant

ofthe Fighter WeaponsSchool, NellisAFB,

prior lO LASTE i t t o ok a thousand-hour pilO

whohad been down thechute 300 ll 400 ti mes

lO begood enough r o g e t g o o d h o mh s , and new

pilorswere lucky lO h i t t h e Earlh. Now we can

put a new guyin the airplane,and because of the

LASTE system h e c a n g e l very, very accurate

deliveries. I f w e w e r egoingafter t; lnks in revet

ments likewe did i n I ra q, w e w o u ld not m iss. A

miss is v e ry r a re - and I m talkingdumh homhs

ro m 14,000 feet.''

The s ame accuracy a lso a pp lies to the

Gatling; Major John Marks s t at es that :

We routine ly shom targets <If 15,000 feet slant

range and tha t' sonly hecause tha t' show fm the

LASTE system computes. The bullets are still

effective beyond rh(lt ri::lngc, and w c r c n ow

looking t upgrades that w il l a l lo w us t o f ir e

fnl 11 greater d i s t < l n c c s l ~ 9

A f in al segment o fLASTE was giv

t he A-lO some night-fighting capabili

which was all butabandoned after the ca

celling o f t he NI W project. Improv

cockpit lighting was installed, which w

designed to work wi th t he newly int

duced night vision goggles VG).

The first experimentation with t

VG was initiated in theaftermathof t

Gulf War. As with most systems, these

now standard equipment. The princi

behind the NVG is the amplification

ambient light (moonlight, city lights, a

so on),but if this illumination is too brig

it becomes dazzling th rough the goggl

Even the lights of an aerial-refuelli

tanker aircraft can wash ou t' the goggl

so t he se h av e t o be removed a m il e f ro

the rendezvous. To prevent fai lure, the go

gles have to be stored in the cockpit forfi

minutes during both take-off and landin

On moonles s n igh t s, flares candropped overthe targetto create the sa

effect and new types ar e being develop

t ha t e mi t t he ir light in the non-visu

spectrum, which can be picked u p b y t

NVG. The downsides of the system are

awkwardness when i n p la ce ; i ts restric

(40-degree) view field; and vertigo w

prolonged use. The definite upside is

increase in the 'Nighthog's ' lethality by

factor of one hundred.

122 123



FLUCTU TING FORTUI S A D NEW CONCEPTS- THE Y I OB. THE O I O. L STE

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

ir eserve nd National

uard Operations

917th Wing, Barksdale AFB, Louisia

June 19 0, front-line combat airc

delivered for the first time direct from

production line to a reserve u ni t, w

LouisiClnCl. As part o f t h e 9 2 6t h T F G,

received A-lOs in December 1981,

completed conversion by the follow

June. In 1992, converted to F-16s a nd

lOs w en t i n to storage at AMARC. D

sionreversed 22May 1996, and tw oA -

(78-0655 and 0-0237) taken in from

20th Fighter W i ng o n 17 June 1996;

more 79-0106 and 79-0106) contribuby t he 4 7t h F , whil e three others (

0093,79-0121 and 0 -01 )we re recei

from t h e 4 42 n d FW AFRES. An offi

welcoming ceremonyon I October 1

marked the completion o f t h e 9 2 6t h F

re-equippingwith the Hawg.

706th Fighter qua dron, pa r t o f t h e 9 2 6t h

Fighter Wi ng a t A e w O r le an s ,

303rd Fighter Squadron, part o f t h e 4 4 2n d

Wing based at Richards-Gebaur AFB,

Kansas City, Missouri, received its first A

lOs in October 1982. Squadron moved to

Whiteman AFB, Missouri, June 1994,

having been redesignated as an FS on 1

February 1992.

442nd FighterWi ng, originally442nd TFG,converted f rom a tac ti ca l a ir li ft uni t . I ts

303rd TF exchanged i ts C-130Es for the

A - IO u n it at Richard -GebClur AFB, near

KmlsCls City , Missouri, October 19 2.

BecClme 442 TW FclmlClry 19 4, Clnd then

an FW on I FebruClry 1992. Wing moved to

WhitemClnAFB, Mis ouri, I1/12June 1994,

when RicharJs-GehClur was closed down.Air Force Reserve (AFRES)

47th Tactical Fighter Training quad ron

TI T ), part of9l7 Wing, tookdelivery ofthe first factory-fresh T hunderbolt IIsJune

19 O. Redesignated 47th FS I June 1992.

Deployed four years running on two-week

basis to A viano airbase in Italy,tClking part

in the ATO peace-keeping flight· over

Bosnia-Herzegovina. I Octoher 1996,

t as ke d w it h F RE and A G A-IO pilot

training, to a u gm e nt t h e 3 5 5t h W i ng in

Arizona. Warthog face is carried o n t he

noses of their aircraft. The automatic loaderis positionedcarefully for re-aimingthe AvengerGatling. US F

In Clddition to its regular Air Force units,

the USA has two reserve forces - the A iI

Force Reserve(formed in 1946) and theA ir

a t io n al G u ar d . B o th arc highly trained

a n d m o ti v at ed , a n d c o ns t an t ly on call to

provide the regulars withan up-to-date air

striking force whenever danger threatens_

Both were found ready and highlyefficient

when the call came from the Gulf, andbothhave seen active service deployment t o t h e

trouble spots o f t h e world s ince the n.

The fell units detailed here are repre

sentatives of the whole.

45th Fighter S q ua d ro n , p a rt of 434th

TFW, c on ve rt ed t o A -I O J un e 19 1.

W h en 9 30 th T FG was activated in July

1987, the 45th with its A-lOs passed under

theircontrol, becomingan F on 1Febru

a ry 1992. Squadron finally deactivated

w he n t h e 9 3 0 t h was ordered to shed ClII its

A -lOs on 30S eptember 1994, prior todis

bandment on I October 1994.

46th Tactical Fighte r T r a ining Squadron

TITS), part of 9 1 7 W i ng , first activated

as an A-IO outfit on I October 19 3, and

redesignated as t he 4 6t h T FS o n I June

1992, before the A-I s were phased o u l o n

I October 1993 and the quadron closed

down.

t o t he aircraft s upper surfaces to further

reduce its IRsignature. The flying control

are actuated by 40mm diameter titanium

rods, which arc proof a ga ins t 12.7mm hits,

a n d t h e p i tc h c o nt r ol rods are duplicated.

Like th e A - IO , t h e u -2 5 i pecifical

Iy d es i gn e d t o operate from primitive

airstrips and ukhoi built in underwing

pods t o h au l fuel pu mp a n1 spares, and

even thought of transporting groundcrew

the same way The Su-25 nicknamed

Grarch or rook , because of its ability to

g e t t o h a r d- t o- r e ac h s p o t , which that

bird is a bl e t o d o) has b e en p r ov e n in

combat in A fghanistan, w here i t f ir st

f lew in the early 1980s. Some forty Su

25s were deployed, and f lew a t ot al o f

61,000 combat hours. It is reported that

i t h as outstanding performance in the

field, and is a bl e t o tClxi where 6 x 6

trucks stick in the mud. The Frogfoot has

higher speed than the A -I O, t o avoiddetection, whereas t h e A - IO relies on its

smaller IR p r i nt s h ie l di n g t o a c hi e ve t h e

same purpose.

The u-25, with it two T- s close

together, has proven more vulnerable to

single engine- tr ike da m a ge t ha n t he A

10, a nd n o less than f ou r u -2 5 wer e l os t

t o S t in g er missi le s in a two-day period,

w i th t w o o f t he pilots being killed. The

analysis was t h a t t h e missile shredded the

rear fuel t a nk , w hi c h was located above

the main jet exhmlsts, and the resulting

fire eventually knocked out both engines.

Extra steel p l at i ng u n de r t h e fuel tank,

a n d 1 0 -1 5 mm t h ic k steel segments, were

hastily installed between the engine bays.

Th is appeared to d o t h e trick and no fur

t h e r S t in g er losses were taken. The fuel

tanks were foam-filled.

[n nine years o f c o mb a t operations in

Afghanistan, twenty-three Frogfoors were

lost, o r o n e u-25 per 2,800hour s combat

flight time_

The -10 a lso has the edge o n o t he r

means of survivability when i t w as hit,

although the pilot enjoysa rear-armoured

scat in addition to a 24mm welded titani

um cockpit armour tub. One Frogfoot,I i10ted by Colonel A lexander V Rutskoj,

reputedly survived being hit by A , and

by two AIM-9L Sidewinders from Pakistani

F-16s. It returned to base and, after refur

bishment, was displayed a t t he Paris Air

Show i n 19 9 It is now on display at the

Khodynka Museum.

First gainingoperational status in 1984,

the Frogfooc continued in production

until 1991.

a t 9 , 92 l lb o f t hr us t giving the Su-25 a

maximum speed at sea level o f 6 0 6 m ph

5 26 k no t o r 9 75 km /h ), a nd a n a tr ac k

speed of 42 m ph 6 9 k m/ h) , while i th a s

a combat radius o f 4 00 n au ti ca l miles

7 50 k m) w it h two d rop t ank s a nd a n

o v er a ll r an g e of 777 mile s l,250km).

Ceiling is 22,965ft. The non-afterburning

engineshave the unique ability tooperate

with d ie e l and regular petrol for short

period, giving them flexibility in primi

tive areas.

Like t h e A - I 0, the aircraft is equipped

with a 3 0 mm c a n no n , b u t t h is is a double

barrelled AO-17 A w ea po n w it h 250

rounds, capable of only five one-second

bursts . I t h a s o n ly eight w e a pons pylons

for mixed stores, wi th a 9, 700lb 4,400kg)

GlpClCity. Ordnance cmried includes

UB32A pods w ith thirty-two 57mm rock

ets; B M I pods w ith tw enty Omm rock

ets; S 4 240mm guided rockets; S5 330mmguided r oc ke ts ; the A 7 Kerry A 10

Karen a nd A S 17 Kedge Clir-to-surfacemis

siles A M-); 350 , 4 9 0 a n d 6 7 0k g l a e r

guided, rocket-propelled b o mb s ; 5 0 0k g

ir on bom bs, with incendiary, anti-person

nel a nd c he mi ca l o pt io ns ; PP 22

2 3 mm g u n pods. For defensive firepower,

the Frogfoot carries AA 2D Atolls or AA

A/Jhid air-to-air missiles, which, like the

A-I s Sidewinders arc c ar ri ed o n t he i r

own small pylon, one on each wing.

T here is a l as er d e si g na t or a n d t a rg e t

indicator in the nose o f t h e aircraft, and

256 flares or chClff p a k et s arc carried in

containers positioned in t h e t a il - co n e o f

the ClircrClft Clnd Clbove t he e ng in e

exhausts.

The Su-39 wa s a mod if ie d v er si on

speci fi ca lly des igned to k il l t anks . The

two-seater trainer was converted by mak

ing the rear cockpit into a fuel and avion

ics space for t he T V tr acke r wi th t he

Kopyo-25 multi-mode radar in a fuselage

mounted pod . Powered by two 44 13 k

Tumansky/ oyuz R-195 engines, it has

extrachaff and flares in wingtip launcher

pods, a n d a n IR jammer extrusion beneath

the rudder. The 30mmcannon was moved

to a new position below the nose, but car

ries only 200 rounds. nderwing weapons

arc a pair of racks carrying eightA T 9 anti

tank missiles each; the A 17 Krypton and

II Kilrer M the ICltter for anti-radar

strikes. Laser guidance for the KAB500

LGB, the S5 r o ck e t a n d the Karen and

Kedge alsofeature. Fordefence, it can carry

the R-27, R-27ER, R-60, R-73 and R-77

A Ms. Cooling intakes have be e n a dded

A-IO?

allies were scorning t h e A - IO

concept, w hat did the other major

t he o vi et U ni on , t h in k? o t slow

i m it a te a n y military innovation, the

soon came up with a similar concept.

was not the much-touted ukhoi Su

codenamed Frogfoot by ATO, but a

more fla ttering mimic, the Ilyushin 11-

It WClS based o n a n earlier design, the

ground-attack aircrClft, and its

l ~ l performance were very

lr to t h e A - IO. The design never got

the experimental tage, however,

so the Frogfoot has come to represent

Russian Clnswer to t h e A - I 0 ; Cllthough

on is similClr, it is very different

the Frogfooc more closely

lles the failed orthrop YA-9, with

R-13 pur e tur boje ts tuc ke d

t h e wing roots o f t he high, strClight

gs. It has been described as the AlfaJeta ck version o f t he BAe Hawk, a

m a de m o re valid by the u

B, a dc-militarized two-seater combat

The dimensions arc a wingspCln of

47ft 2 in ), a n overall l e ng t h o f

3m ( 5 ft 2 i n) a n d h e ig h t o f 4. m

9 i n) , m a ki n g for a smaller profile

t he A-IO. Its empty weight is

9,500kg), max OOlb

The Tumansky R-13 is rated

was never any official confirmation

rumours that, as the threat from the

t U n io n diminished, and doubts

u t t h e survivability of t h e A -I O in i ts

ned mission continued to b e v oi c d,

A-IO was on i ts way out in 1990.

o f n e w pilots was being heavily

back, w ith ins tr uc tor s at ellis R,

da , t he A- IO Fighter Weapons

being informed t ha t n ew assign

would be coming their way beforeI , But, aspast events had shown, the

was a tough H ogto slaughter

an added safety measure, to aid sta

on night-flight formation

ian, t he A -I wa f it te d with LVF

l igh t ing ( Ll ME at the wingtips,

r edges o f t h e ta il f ins and abaft the

extra rearnodules.Floodlights

e also added to the innerslllface o f t h e

pylonsto aid night in-flight refu

These mall additions arc the only

r d indica tions of a LA TE upgrade.

724 125



AIR RESERVE A N D N A T IO A I. G ARD OPERATIONS

This s q ua d ro n f le w the very first

LA TE- e q uip pe d A - IO , and b e ca m e

FW March 1992. The 175thfirstequipp

w it h A -l O s i n eptember 1979 and, twe

ty years on, stillproudlyflies them in pea

and war. Overseas deployments includ

by March 1989, t he u ni t h ad s he d i ts la st

A-IO.

1 7 5th Wing , lo ca te d at Wa rf ield A GB,

M ar yl an d. I t 1 04 th TF tr ad e d in A-37

for A-lOs, commencing in October 1979.

A p a i r o f Black Hogs from the103rd FighterSquadron,theflying armof the l l1th

FighterWing ofthe Pennsylvania ANG. based at Willow Grove Air Reserve Station,

north west ofPhiladelphia.Seen here over-flyingthe distinctivelandmarks of Kuwait

Cityduring their deploymentto the Gulfto enforce thesouthern no-fly zone.

Grumman Corporaton

Above lined up inthe snow on a typical Massachusetts winter d a y - 9 D e c em be r

1995 - at BarnesANGB. Westfield.arethe A-lOs ofthe 104thFighterWing. Air

National Guard. I04th FighterWng/MA ANG

1 74 t h T a ct i ca l F i gh te r Wing, based at

Hancock Field, New York. The unit s

13 t h T FS began conversion from A-37

t o A -I , eptember 1979. On comple

tion, October 1979, redesignated a s TFW.

By ovember 198 ,firstF-16arrived,and

1 28 t h F i gh te r Wing, based at Truax

ANGB, Wis co n sin . Fo rm e rly a n OA-37

outfit, the 128th TASW h ad i ts 176th

T A S S changed overto A- l Oo n I October

19 I, becoming the 12 th TFW. Be ca m e

a n FW 16 March 1992 a nd t ar te d c on

vertingto F-16. By the end of 1992, all A

lOs had been replaced.

20March 1996, withaircraft contributed by

the Massachusetts A G. Local area train

ing commenced A u gu t 1 99 6.

13 th Tactical Fighter Squadron, with the

174th TFW located a t H a nc o ck Field,

New York. A a TF , the 13 th exchanged

its A-37s for A-lOs in eptember 1979,

and flew A-I s for a decade before dis

carding them for the F-16, March 1989.

l72nd Fighter Squadron,part of 110thF W

based at W. K. Kellogg Airport, Battle

Creek, Michigan. O ri g in al l y t h e l 7 2n d

TA ,this unit exchanged its OA-37s fort he A -I 0, commencing I October 1991.

In March 1 9 92 , it becamean FS as part of

the I I O th FG , and then FW.

131 s t F i gh te r q ua d ro n, part of t h e 1 04 t h

FW at Barnes A GB, Massachusetts. As a

TF i n J ul y 1 97 9 i t f ir st r ec ei ve d A - lO s,

J u ly 1 97 9. Be ca m e an FS in March 1992,

and now rumoured to be o n t he brink of

convertingto F-16 as p a rt o f t h e Fast-As

CAS dawn.

124th Wing, Gowen Fie ld , Boise A ir Ter

minal, Idaho, with the 190th FS began con

version from F-4GWild Weasel to A-1O on

I 1I th Ta ctica l A ir S upport G roup, based

a t Willo w G rove A ir Force Reserve Base,

Pennsylvania. Its 103rd T A c om me nce d

conversion to OA-I Obs-Hogs in 19 ,

and has operatedthem since. On 16 March

1992, Wing redesignated the III th Fighter G r ou p a n d in 1 996 as an FW. 11 th

Fighter S quadron, part of 1 03 rd F W at

Bradley N G B , C onnecticut. I18th TFS

was the f ir st -e ve r A G unitto receive tac

tical combat aircraft straight from the pro

duction line, the f ir st A -1 O a r r iv ing in the

s u mm e r o f 1979. nit redesignated as a

Fighter Squadron 1996.

1 10 th F i gh te r W i ng , W K. Kellogg Air

port, Michigan. As the 172ndTactical Air

S upport G roup, this u ni t h ad its II0th

TA discard its 0 -37s and begin to re

equip with the A-IO on I October 1991.

Became :111 FS M ar h 1992 a nd t he n a n

FW in 1 99 6.

J04th Fighter Wing, located at Barnes

ANGB, Ma ss a ch u se tts. I ts I3lst TFS

began toconvert to the A-1O inJuly 1979,

and w a r e de s ign a te d a t t he 1 04 th F G i n

March 1992, a n d t h e n as the 104th FW in

1996. C o nv e rs i on t o t h e F- 16 , lo ng p re

dicted, has not happened.

14t h Fighter q ua d ro n , b e lo ng i ng t o

175th Wing, based at W ar fi el d A GB,

Maryland. As a T F S, thi unit began to re

equip from A-37s t o t h e A -I O in October

1979 and received the first A G LASTE

equipped a irc r af t. Be ca m e an F March

1992.

Air National Guard ANG)

1 03 r d Ta ctic al Air S up po rt q ua dr on

belonged t o t h e II I th Fig hte r Wing basedat Willow G roveA F R E Base, Pennsylva

nia. Converted from OA-37s between

1988and March 1989, becomingan F S 1 6

March 1992.

1 03 rd F i gh te r W i ng , b as ed at Bradley

A N GB , n e ar W i nd s or Locks, Connecti

cut, had i ts 1 18 th FS begin converting

from F-IOOs to the A-IO, summer 1979.

Redesignated as an FW 16 March 1992.

group OG), retaining the 4345th. A-lOs

p ut o ut t o grass 30 S eptember 1994, and

unit deactivated 1 October 1994.

The very f irst A G A-I wasdeliveredto

the 1 7 4th Ta c tic a l Fig hte r W in g, t he n

based a t M a rt i n A FB, Ba ltim or e , Ma ry

la nd , in September 1 97 9. F ou r m or e A G

groups similarly equipped d ur i ng t h e fol

lowingfive years.

ordnanceadornsthe underwing pylonsof two 104th Fighter Wing A-lOs s/n 78 0612 and 78-

ofthe Massachusetts ANG atBarnesANGB. Westfield. o n 1 8 October 1997. I04th Fighter Wing/MA ANG

O perationsG roup,at GrissomAFB,

a . C o mm e n ci n g J u ne 19 I, the

TFW h a d its the 45th TF convert

rom the A-7D to the A- J Wingcon

to an aerial-refuelling outfit inJuly

a nd t he 4 5t h became p ar t o f t he

activated 9 3 0t h T F G. U n it redesig

I F eb ru ar y 1 99 2 as an operations

F ig ht er W in g, a va l A ir S t at i on

e w O rl e an s, L ou is ia na . A s the

h T FG , its 706th TF b eg an t o re

w ith the A-lOin December 19 I;

on completed by Junethe following

The g ro up w as p ar t o f t he 4 34 5t h

a t G r is s om A FB, b ef or e tr an s fe r rin g

to the 442nd TFW at Richards-Gebaur

on 1February 19 4, and subsequently

e 911£h TF\V based at Barksdale a

later. The 926th was o ne o f t he

rveunitsactivated for GulfWar combat2 9 D ec em be r 1 99 0, and contributed

A-lOs to that mission. The group

ed activeduties on 15 June 1991.

of A-lOs to t h e 9 1 7t h , t h en part

TFW,G r is s om A FB, I n dia na . A ll

to the 47th TFS. Redesignatedas the

TFW in 198 , and back t o a n F W I

1992. After a p e rio d with B-52s, on I

19 96 , a n ew pilot-training pro

began, with the goal offorty-three

a nd A G p il ot s p e r y e ar q ua li fy

o n t h e A-IO.

726 727



IR RESERVE N N TION LGU R OPER TIONS

Tail Codes, Nicknamesand Paint

wing fighter. The squadron flourished

f le w a w ide v a rie ty of types over the ye

including the F-94Starfire, the F-89 S

pion, the F-86L Sabre and the F-I 0 2 D

D ag ge r. I n 1 97 5, a change of role and m

s io n w as e nv is ag ed w he n the squad

became the 190thTacticalReconnaissa

S quadron and part o f t he 124th Tact

Reconnaissance Group. I t r e -e q uip

a g ain , th is tim e w ith the RF-4C varian

the McD onnell F-4 Phantom II, and th

s e rv e d f or tw o d e c a de s at G ow en Fielcl

1991 the aircraft were finally replaced

FAG Wild We as e l f igh te r s, and fo

themselves flying combat over south

Iraq, enforcing the no-fly zone, twicefi

anti-radiation missiles when illegally ch

lenged by Saddam s air-defence radar

tems. This wasfollowed by participatio

Operation Provide omfort enforcing

northern no-fly zone.

Further reorganizationfollowed in 1when the 1 24 th F G became the 12

Wing, with eighteen u ni t s, t w o f ly

squadrons, fifteen support units at G ow

Ficld a n d a n e l ec t ro n ic c o mb a t t r ai n

r,mge control squadron assigned to Mo

tain Home AFB. The FAGs wererepla

by A-lOs a nd t he C -1 30 Hercules tra

port in the two flying units,

The Idaho AN G n ow h as a comp

ment of 1,200 volunteers f r om a ll o

t h e s ta te , i nc lu di ng teachers, farm

plumbers, s t ud e nt s , d o ct o rs a n d sa

m e n, w ho give up t h ei r t i m e t o serve

nation. The I da ho v o lu nt e er a i rm

have not yet t a k en t h e A-I 0 into ac

c o m ba t b u t s t an d ready, should the

c om e. B ot h t h e A -l Os a nd t he O A -

a r e f lo w n w ithessential spares now be

provided by the N o rt h ro p G r um m

Corporation,

All A/OA lOs w he th er A ir Fo

AFRES or ANG, have carried distinc

u n it m ar ki ng s D UM ) , m or e g en erc al l ed t a il c o de s o r TA C codes . F

introduced at Davis-Monthan A FB t

h a ve b e co m e s u bj e ct t o A iI Force st

dardization, and are now 1 2 in h ig h

Bin w ide 30 x 2 0c m) , w it h e ac h l e

placed 2i n S cm) ap ar t a nd p ai n

black, They are located outboard jus

front o f t he each rudder. The aircra

r a d io c a ll number is usually below th

in smaller characters,

se

Eg n AFB Florda

Eeson AFB Alaska

RAF Alconbury UK

W K Kelogg Airport Michigan

Barksdale AFB Louisiana

BradleyANGB Connectcut

Davis Monthan AFB Arzona

Edwards AFB Calfornia

Engand AFB Louisiana

Eg n AFB Florda

Pope AFB NorthCarolna

GowenF ed Bose Idaho

Grssom AFB Indiana

Whiteman AFB Missouri

Barnes ANGB Massachusetts

Myrtle Beach South Carolna

Warfield ANGB Maryland

Moody AFB Georga

Davis Monthan AFB Arzona

NAS New Oreans Louisana

HancockFied New York

Osan AB ROK

Nel s AFB Nevada

Eg n AFB Florda

Willow Grove AR8 Pennsylvania

Shaw AFB South Carolna

McClelan AFB Calfornia

Spangdahlem AB Germany

Suwon AB ROK

Shaw AFB South Carolna

McChord AFB Washington

Nel s AFB Nevada

Truax ANGB Wisconsin

RAFs Bentwaters/Woodbr dge UK

m o nc y a n d n o airfield - but the squadron

gradually became established, I ts f ir st

mount was the North American P-51D

Mustang, l a te r t o be redesignated as the

F-51 Di n 1947 with the arrival o f a n i n de

pendent Air Force, T h a t same year the

squadron started flying operations from

Gowen F i el d, a f or m er A rm y A i r C or ps

training base, south of Bo is e s a ir termi

n al . I ts worth was quickly demonstrated

in the 1 95 0 K or e an C r is i s, i n w h ic h t h e

190th was placed under full-scale mobi

l i za t io n i n o rd er t o replace Air Force

units sent to the war. The squadron

s e r ve d in G eorgia and C alifornia, return

ing t o I d ah o in 1 9 53 .

Thcfirst je ts a r r ive d in 1 95 3, w ith the re

equipping of the s qu ad ro n w i th the

F- 86 A Sa br e , the first American swept-

IR RESERVE N N T ION L GU R OPER TIONS

Unit

3246th Test Wing

343rd Wing and 354thFighterWing

10thTactcal Fighter Wing

110th Fighter Group ANG

917th Tactcal Fighter Group et seq ARES

103rd Fighter Group ANG

355thTactcal Fighter Winget seq

412th and 6510th Test Wings

23rdTactcal Fighter Wing

2346th Test Wing

23rd Wing

190th Fighter·Squadron 124 Wing ANG

424thTactcal Fighter Wing and 930th Tactcal Fighter Group AFRES

442nd Tactcal Fighter Group et seq AFRES

104thFighterGroup ANG

354thTactcal Fighter Wing et seq

175th Fighter Group ANG

347th Wing

602nd Air Contro Wing

706th Tactcal Fighter Squadron 926thTactcal Fighter Group AFRES

174th Tactcal Fighter Wing ANG

51stTactcal Fighter Wing

57th Test Group

4443rd Test and Evaluaton Group

111 th Fighter Group ANG

507th AirControl Wing

337th and2874th Test Squadrons

52ndFighterComposite Fighter Wing

51 st Tactcal Fighter Wing

20thand 363rd Fighter Wings

354th Fighter Squadron

57thWing

128th Tactcal Fighter Winget seq ANG

81 st Tactcal Fighter Wing

UM

AD

AK

AR

BC

BD

CT

OM

ED

EL

ET

FT

10

IN

KC

MA

MB

MD

MY

NF

NO

NY

OS

OT

OT

PA

SF

SM

SP

SU

SW

TC

WA

WI

WR

IdahoState s first A ir N ational Guard, the

1 9 0th Fig hte r S quadron, came into being

on 13 October 1 94 6, I t w as f or me d f ro m

Second World W ar v et er an s, t we nt y

three officers and forty-four enlisted men,

who met for o n e n i gh t a w ee k i n a s ma ll

building on Fort Street in downtown

Boise, Their first commanding officer was

none other than L i eu t e na n t C o lo n el

T h om a s G , Lanphier, the P-38 Lightning

p il ot c re di te d w it h s ho ot in g d ow n the

Betty Bomber carrying the Imperial

Japanese Navy s Commander-in-Chicf,

Y a ma m oto , in a c las s ic interception mis

sion over the Solomons.

The unit started out w ith absolutely

nothing - no aircraft, no buildings, no

A- 0tail codes

Operations of an ANG Unit

The above is onlyan outline of the A/OA-

10 s place o v er t h e last decade in AFRES

and ANG service The v al u ab le - and

v ar i ab le - w or k p er fo r me d b y these units

a n d t h ei r aircraft particularly during the

Gulf War, see pages 131-46) should not be

underestimated, One outfit, appropriately

enough the first, the Idaho A ir N ational

Guard, is w ell p lac e d to stand as an exam

ple of all the units.

176th Fighter S quadron, partof the 128th

Fighter Wingat Truax ANGB, Wisconsin,

O ri gi na ll y a TASS flying OA-37s,

squadron officially changed over t o A - tO

by I October 1981, and was redesignated

t he l 76 t h TFS, Ta ctic al p a rt o f t h e titles

w as g ive n u p on 16 March 1992, and con

v e rs ion tothe

F-16followed, withthe

lastA-IO b e ing r e pla ce d b y t he e nd o f 1992,

190th Fighter S quadron, partof the 124th

Wing based at Gowen Field, Bois e Air

Terminal, Idaho, exchanged itsF-4s for A

lOs commencing 20 March 1996,

U ATO operations in Yugoslavia, fol

lowed, again operating f ro m A v ian o , D ur

in g 1 9 98 , the A-lOs o f t he 1 75 th hosted

t he A -I O W ea po ns Load Competition,

Lodeo , with three other A-1O units, Eight

aircraft and 130support personnel partici

p at ed i n alx hunder 9 8 f ro m E ie ls on

AFB, Alaska, and alsotook part in the Ford

Drum, New Y or k, Mu ltip le A- I 0 live

munitions d r op e x er c is e as well as con

tributing five aircraft to the combat search

and rescue training exercise at Patrick

AFB, Florida,

A-10 Thunderbolt IIof the190th FighterSquadron

coded 627 partof the124th Wing Idaho ir

National Guard at Gowen Field Boise Idaho.

Theport-wheelhousing isseen hinged downto

reveal theone-pointfuell ing connectionand the

onboardelectronicstest panel. In 1995 the 124th

FighterGroup becamethe 124thWing with

eighteen units two flying squadrons andfifteen

support units atGowen Field and an electroniccombattraining range control squadronassigned

to Mountain Home ir Force Base TheWing traded

i n i t s Wild Weasels the lastPhantom jetsin the

US ir Force to take on two newaircraft and

missions - one ofwhich was the A-10 ThunderboltII.

The first A-10 arrivedthere in 1995 andIdaho

National Guardpilots have used themto find

survivors ofa helicoptercrash Boththe A-10 and

the OA 10 are operated by the 190th Squadron.

Master Sgt Marion Lee 124th Wing Visual Informaton

Secton Idaho AirNatonal Guard

A pai r of its A- I 0 p ilots lo ca te d and

destroyed a Serbian mobile anti-tank gun

in retaliation f or th o se f or ce s f lee ing w ith

UN-confiscated equipment, in violation

of agreements, Unit honoured with the

Outstanding Unit A w ar d b y t h e A i r Force

i n 1 99 5, t h ei r t h ir d s uc h a wa rd i n f ou r

years, an unmatched r e co r d in recent his

tor y, I n Ma y 1 99 5, the A -lOs took part in

Exercise Air Warrior at N el li s A F B, e va

da, t h e e l ev e n deployed aircraft clocking

up 600 h ou rs i n an eighteen-day period,

Operation ecisive Edge in s u pp o rt o f

s aretaken away as t h e p i l ot o f an 175th Wing Maryland ANG A-10gets readyWarfield ANG Base nearBaltimore Maryland Air Natonal Guard 175th Wing

i n 1 98 1, 1 98 5, 1 98 8, 1 99 0 and

Canada in 1 98 2 and 1993; Hawaii in

Panama in 1 98 5 and 1989; Czecho

v a kia in 1 9 92 ; and I ta ly i n 1 99 3 and

175th was the first ANG A-IO unit

receive the L A S TE system and became

Best o f t h e Best by w inning the G un

91 World-Wide Gunnery Competi

Unit took part in Operation eny

November 1 99 3 t o F eb ru ar y 1 99 4,

Julyto September 1994, working o u t o f

ano A B to p a tr o l over Bosnia-Herze

as part of the UN/NATO task force,

128 129



AIR RESERVE AND NATIONAL GUARD OPERATIONS

air squadrons of most nat ions have

r own nickname, adopted years ago,

g rad u ally m o dified a s time goes by

t a re t r a l i t io na l f ro m Second World

days, and a lla re great fun. omehave

threatened by political correcrne -,

order to appea e the s h rill fe min ist

as ha traditional n o se a rt, which

i ts fin al flo urish ing in t he Gulf War.

A/OA-IO squadrons have a rich

in this f ie ld - see ta h le b elo w.

A-IO pain t and camouflage schemes

covered almo t the whole spectrum

n the years since the aircraft s intro

The variety o f p ai nt schemes

out is only exceeded by the number

( experimental pat terns de

to hide, ma k or con ce al t he

in v ery d iffe re nt p a rts of t he world.

subject is complex and covered well

specialist books, ol but t he t abl e right

s a general outline.

S a dd a m s f or ce s w er e t ho ug ht t o

been sufficiently reduced.

The A-I 0 w as destined to playa ke

in both p h as e s, b u t, in itially, itw a s l

not makingthe war at a ll. I ts e e m s in

i bl e n o w, i n v ie w of the preponderan

Iraqi tanks and armoured forc es in

vicinity of Kuwait, but o ffic ia ls h ig h

the U AF were reluctant at first evconsidersending A-lOs t ohe l pdo th

The fact t hat t he A-I h:lLl heen bu

exactly that purpose, the o ld p reju

came to t he fore again, and c e pt i ci m

expressed in the Pentagon. Lieute

GeneralCharle A. Horner, Central

mand Ai r Forces, was one who took

attitude. It to o k the personal interve

of t he Commander- i n-Chi ef, an A

Nose artIrom th e Gu lfWa r: Fightin Irish . Smon Watson

irreversible . This wa s f ol lo we d up t wo

d ay s la ter by the statement that Kuwait

w as n o w annexed and that i t h ad become

Iraq s nineteenth province.

The Gulf War developed through two

p ha s es ; in the first, the a im w as to rush

enough forces into Saudi Arabia to deter

Saddam from invading that country. This

holding p ha se was codenamed s nShield. Once a forc e la rg e enough to eject

Ira qi troo p s fro m K u wa it h a d been as em

bled, the offensive phase followed. There

was a l on g p er io d of strategic bombing

against the masses of dug-inarmour, which

lo ok e d im pre ss ive and p ro vid e d d a ily

headlines, but actually accomplished lit

tle. The land war, under t he codename

s n Stann, was due t o b e initiated once

s rt hiel and s rt torm

Developments in th e Gulf

ustification and indication

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

Iraqi Dictator Saddam Hussein, who had

long coveted oil-rich neighbouring states,

r e bu il t h is a r my a ft er h is d is as tr ou s w ar

with Ir m He began to move a la rg e a rmy

across the d e se rt, w h ile h is fo re ig n m inis

t er , T ar iq A zi z, b eg an to fabricate and

broadcast a string of lies and excuses for anattack. On 8July, Iraq reiterated its claim

t opar t o f Kuwaiti territory, andon 23 July,

audi Arabia p la ce d its armed forces on

alert. py satellitesrevealed the mRS ing of

Iraqi armouron the Kuwait border, but this

wa dismissed as a how of force and no

Western nat ion w as w illin g to act unilat

erally and issue a w a r n i n g ~I ra q t o ok i l en ce f or acquiescence and,

o n t he morning of 2 August 199 ,moved

intothe tiny independent Stateof Kuwait,

seized it and proclaimed it liberated . This

totally unprovoked Rssault on a pe<lceful

country finally roused the , although

words rather than deeds initially resulted.

Iraq h a d p o we rfu l frie nd s in the Russians

and theChinese, and thegovernments of

other Arab states, although fearing and

hating Iraq, dared not a ct t oo h a stily in

case theirown nationalists s tirre d u p tro u

ble. Only the West wa s i n a p os it io n t o

respond to Iraq s aggression, and, led by

the U A, the UK and Fra nc e , w ith the

worried backing of Saudi Arabia clearly

t he n ex t c ount ry on Saddam s menu), a

powerful coalition forc e w as g ra du Rlly

assembled. The mi sion of t hi s f or ce ,

under the overall c om man d o f G en er

al H. orman chwarzkopf tormin

Norman t o t he p re s ), w as t o e je ct t he

Iraq i a rmy fro m K u wa it. That was it N

brief, and chwarzkopf was kepton a tight

rein, and closely scrutinized by both b y h is

media-conscious superiors and a hesit<lnt

President George Bush. Meanwhile, the

I ra qi s d ug i n, c al l ed upon A ra bs every

where to back them, andon 6 August Sad

dam announced that the occupat ion was

OA-l0s at Osan, ROK temporary

75-0258.75-0259.75-0269 75-0262

146A-l0s

76-0530.77-0205.77-0227,77-0268 77-0272

75-0266 75-0269

76-0552

Al product on aircraft

One Alconbury expermentA-l0

75-0262

75-0263 - 75-0277

75-0261 75-0261

75-0261

73-1668 and 73-1669

75-0258, 75·0259 75-0260

73-1667

73-1665

73-1666

Second YA-O Prototype 73-1664

pplcaton

Both YA-O Prototypes

TAC Pattern FS3492Dark Green/FS34102 MediumGreen/

FS36231 Dark Gul Grey Charcoal Lizard

European 1- FS34092Dark Green, FS34102 Medium Green

orFS36081 DarkGrey

SuperDesothanF MASK-lOA dark/light

FS36118 Gunshp Grey overal

Gul WarPeanut - sand brown

Gulf WarFlpper - grey

JAWS Scheme variatons - FS36231 Grey/FS34092 Dark Green/

FS30118 Brown/FS34102 Olve Green/FS30227 Tan

Fase Canopy Scheme - with FS36118 Gunshp Grey canopy

shape undersideof cockpit

MonochromatC Grey

Ghost GreyFS36320 upper sdes); MASK- OA Iowerl

MASK·10A upper sdes Ghost GreyFS36320 Iowerl

Light GhostGreyFS36375

Ghost Grey/MASK-lOA

Mottled White loverBlack base)

4 0 p e r cent Ref ect ngM ASK-lOA

Post Gulf - FS36375 LightGhost Grey 7

FS36320Dark Ghost Grey t wo : o : n e: .:..:N.::ew:.:....::St:::a: ::nd::a::..:rd= _

DarkGhost Grey 36320

Mottled Grey White overBlack base)

Gunshp Grey FS36118

A-l0 paint schemes

Scheme

Aircraft Grey 16473 Standardl

An impressive line-up in th e ra in A-tOThunderbolt lisolthe 1901h FighterSquadron,

led by134, part the 124th Wing, Idaho Air NationalGuard, on the runway a t Go wen

Fie ld , Bo ise, Id ah o . Master Sgt Maron Lee, 124th Wing Vsua Informaton Secton, Idaho Air

Natonal Guard

Unit

25thTactcal Fighter Squadron

103rd Fighter Squadron


91 st TactcalFighter Squadron



78thTactcal Fighter Squadron510thTactcal Fighter Squadron

706thFighterSquadron

131stFighter Squadron




55thFighterSquadron



356th Tactcal Fighter Squadron

45thFighter Squadron




353rd Tactcal Fighter Squadron

509th TactcalFighter Squadron

21st Tactca Air Support

Squadron


92nd Tactcal Fighter Squadron


5111h Tactcal Fighter Squadron

70thFighterSquadronKnights

unit names

Dragons

Hogs

Foxes

Streaks

s from Syracuse

Vipers

Fifty-Fifth

Tg e rs

Yankees

Demons

Hogs

Hawgs

730 737



JUSTIFICATION ND VINDI TION S RTSHI L A D S RTSTORM J STIFI TION ND VINDI TION S RT SI·II L ND S RTSTORM

A-10 of the 355th TFS, Myrtle Beach, the commander spersonal mount, at a forward

operating base in Saudi Arabia during OperationDesert Storm. She carriesa single

AIM-9 Sidewinder for defence on the port outboard pylon. Simon Watson

A new development occurred when

began firing surface-to-surface missile

Israel and audi Arabia, in the hop

provoking the former and ga in ing A

wppor t. A l though Israel was restra

from retaliating, the cud-B a t ta

launched from mobile conta iners

were extr mely difficult to locate, wemost successful propaganda point for S

dam and caused much alarm. Th e att

caused only a smal l number of casual

but theyseemedunstoppable and untr

able. It wasalso clear that Saddam w

have absolute ly no qu,lIms about arm

the missiles with bacteriological or ne

gas warheads, and using them against c

ian targets.

The pilots accessladderdoorway is a prime

location for rich artwork on the A-lOs - here,

Yosemite Sam declares I m Torqued Easily, So

Watch Out . The aircraft belongs to the 355th T

theFalcons, and isseen here ata forward base

close to the Iraqi border during OperationDese

Storm. Simon Watson

Scud-B Hunting

period, theA-I 0 were achieving a tot

three sor ties a day - impressive, given

trying conditions. I twas very hot, and

and sand were keeping the ground te

on their toes, ensuring low downtim

between missions and high serviceabi

The A-lOsachieved an enviable 9 .67

cent weapon system rel iabi li ty du

esert Storm, a percentage f ar i n exce

other land-basedair units.

I. E as t and West Tac : heavy concentra

tions o fAPCs and trucks o f t he Iraqi

55th Infantry Brigade close to the town

of ukhayb. Named after two Nel l i

AFB bombing ranges.

2. Hicksville : an enormous ammunition

dump,spread overmany acres (first dis

covered by Captain AI Gator Hicks),

located between the town of Ramadi

and the yrian border.

3. Home Depot : another vast munition

storage bunker a nd w ar ehou se c om

plex, located nor th o f the main road

from Baghdadto Amman, Jordan.

4. Th e Villas : large ammunition dump

and storage facility, located to the

north of Home Depot .

Gradually, the tempo of opera tions huilt

up, and, over a twelve-hour operational

During the OC A phase, the A-lOs flew

175 combat sorties, mainly concentrating

on destroying Iraqi electronic warfare and

ground-control intercept sites_ ; Gradual

ly, as the A- lOs worked over the enemy

territory, they found and identified con

centration of the enemy force and sup

port facilities, which provided them with

a n a lm o t endless targeting menu. The

most rewarding sites included:

esert Shield

Th e A-IO, along with the AV- and F/A

I , was considered the primary weapon

system for halting any Iraqi army invasion

of Saudi Arabia during the initial phase of

the war. Th e Army was i n no doubt

abou t the ability of the A-IO: We would

be in se ri ous trouble if [the A-IO] hadn t

come, one officer was quoted as saying.

They arc the major weapons between us

a nd t h e Iraqis.

Th e A-IO was a ls o extensively used

ea rl y i n the war for taking out the enemy

early-warning radar screen along the bor

der with Iraq, thus denying Saddam s mil

itary commanders as much information on

the Allied build-up as pOSSible.

Th e very f irst A-IO sortie of the Gulf

War was carried out by the two-plane team

of Capta in Tony Ma ttox ( f lying sin 80

01 9) as leader, with Lieutenant BryanCurrier (flying sin 79-0210) a s h is w in g

man, from the 74th TF who lifted off in

the pre-dawndarkness of 17 January 1991,

and headed north. This was just the first of

322 A-IO sorties that day, 313 of which

were successful ly completed. In return,

small-arms fire slightly damaged just two

A-IO . This set the pattern for the remain

der of the initia l stage.

The deployment o f the A /OA- 0 was by

individual squadron, ra ther than by whole

Wing, and hoth regular and ANG units

were involved. Th u , the 353rdand 355th

TF swere sent from the 354th TFW as the

354th TFW (Deployed), i n e ff ec t a newunit, Similarly, t he 7 4t h a nd 76th TFS

were sent by the 23rd TFW as the 23rd

TFW (Deployed), bu t under their original

tate -ide commanding officers. By the end

of Augus t, t he se uni ts h ad m oved i nt o

their new base, set up a t t he King Fahd

In te rna t ional A irport ( KF IA ), n ca r

Damman, audi Arabia. An FOL was soon

established at the King Kahlid Military

City (KKMC) airfield, and a second

(christened Cajun West ) was added at AI

Jouf , close to the small neutral zone hard

by the 1r aq i bo rde r. A ten-strong A-IO

force was rota ted through thi base from

the F ah d q ua d for f ive-day periods. I twas

decided locally that i twas more logical to

merge t he se two dep loye d wings and,

accordingly, they officially became known

as the 23/354 TFW(D). Th is impre sive

array was given the unofficial title of The

F ah d q ua d by their pilots 1 The A-lOs

were joined by s ix OA-lOs of the 23rd

TASS in October.

By December 1990, al l the inth Air

Force s TFWs were organi:ed under the

umbrella of the 14th Air Division (Provi

s iona l) , a nd rec eived Provi siona l S tatus,

w i th the combined unit being redesignat

e d a s 23/354 TFW(P).

It became increasingly apparent that

much mor e f ir ep ower wou ld b e needed

once the l and war commenced, and rein

forcement- were deployed during Decem

b er 1 99 0 and January 1991, in readiness.

Accordingly, three extra A-lO squadrons

moved in to KFIA, the 23rd, 511 th an d

706th TF s, a nd e ve nt ua ll y s om e 155

A/OA-IOs were on sta tion s tahle left).

A GA IO Gulf War

Deployment

manwho knew the t rueva lue of the A-IO,

to g et t he aircraft included as a p ri or it y.

Eventually, reason prevailed, and Horner

was overruled by D ef en se Secretary

Richard B. Cheney, Th e -lOs began to

assemble.

Nose art from the Gulf War: PantherPrincess .

Simon Watson

deployment during the GulfWar

T SS 74th T S 76th T S 353rd T S 355th T S 511th T S 706rh T S

79-133 79-176 78-587 78-591 79-218 76-531

79-137 79-181 78-593 78-592 79-220 76-540

79-166 79-182 78-594 78-599 79-224 76-544

79-177 79-186 78-595 78-603 80-144 77-205

79-178 79-188 78-606 78-622 80-157 77-227

79-187 79-193 78-660 78-654 80-170 77-240

79-189 79-197 78-667 78-662 80-172 77-255

79-190 79-198 78-668 78-664 80-194 77-256

79-195 79-203 78-675 78-665 80-208 77-260

79-196 79-206 78-677 78-678 80-219 77-266

79-201 79-223 78-680 78-686 80-229 77-268

79-204 80-151 78-681 78-710 80-277 77-269

79-207 ~ 1 5 2 78-699 78-713 81-939 77-271

79-209 80-163 78-715 78-714 81-947 77-272

79-210 80-164 78-722 78-724 81-948 77-273

79-213 80-165 78-725 79-097 81-953 77-274

80-173 80-166 79-096 79-099 81-964 77-275

80-176 80-177 79-124 79-100 81-967 78-582

80-210 80-178 79-126 79-112 81-987

80-212 80-181 79-127 79-115 81-65780-224 80-186 79-128 79-158

80-246 80-188 79-130 79-160

82-663 80-189 80-250 79-163

80-190 82-661 79-168

80-197 82-662 79-173

80-223 82-664

80-248

82-653

This tabeIncudes r reserve arrcraft or a theAlGA· lOs present wereacrua y used In combar There was aI,mrted cross-over

rndvdua alfcraftbetween Units)

32 33



JUSTIF I T IO ND VINDI TJO I - S RTSHI L ND S RT STORM JUSTIFI TION ND VINDI TION - S RT SHI L A D S RT STORM

wi th L U-I, -3 and -6 target mar

Some 5,4 of these were scwn from

25 d ispenser s (modi f ied LA -10 r

pods with hemispherica l nose caps)

ried on p yl on s 2 and 10. The '

Hawgs' destroyed hundreds of enem

gets, and not o ne A-I 0 engaged in

operations received as much as a s

ground-fire hit in return

The Iraqi armymade only one aggre

move during all th istime, launching a

pronged probing atrack across the bo

under cover of darkness,crossing into S

Arabia hefore dawn on the morning

January 1991. One of these columns,

matedas having s o m f i ~ t ~ battlet

as tts core, evaded cOllriter-attacks, thr.far south as the dusty township of Khaf

south-western Kuwait,and dugitselfinU Marine CO' ll was sent to eject

a nd t he A-I 0 wereca ll ed up to lend

support. In the classic manner, which

been practisedso often,they andthe A

Cobra helicopters struck the enemy.

technique used, first demonstrated in

Middle East by the RAF a t t he Wadi

defile on the Nablus-Beisan road in P

tine on 21 September 191 , was

to smash the front and rear o f t h e e

Nose artfromthe GulfWar: SecritWeapin on 591 with the Falcons artwork on the

inside ofthe ladderaccess door. Simon Watson

Both Wings desigmlted one squadron to

voluntcer for the specialized work of

n igh t a t tack, and the N igh t Hawgs' were

born. The 355th TF became most profi

cient, and led the way in tacticaldevelop

ment in thisarea during the war. After ny

ing normal daylight a t tacks on days one

and two of operations, the 35 5th reverted

totally to night-n ~ , i o l ' work and was

joined in this after ,I lllther fortnight by

t he 7 4t h TFS. This concentration was

brought on by t he a dv en t o f t he Scud-B

mobile m issi Ie attacks.

A typica l loading was two Maverick

missiles and six Mk 2 iron bombs', the

latter being fitted with the FM -113radar

fuse, which gave an airburst 0-25ft above

the g round . A s a safety measu re , these

bombs were fitted with a brass ring fuse puller to prevent them accidentally arm

ing themselves on th e ground. This device

IVa attached to the aircraft, andwhen the

bomb was relea sed, i t pul l ed the wire,

which ran through a Mk 904 (nose) or Mk

9 5 ( ra il ) f use , allowing the homb to a rm

itselfas it dropped.

Widespread use was made of the Mk 22

or LUU-2 nares and the modified LUU-2,

known as the MJ -3 IRCM flare, along

Night Hawgs

wain's mount wasduly christened Chop

per Popper and currently re ides at Eglin

AFB, Florida.

The second enemyhelo to fall was a Mi-

, which was brought down by Captain

Todd Shanghai heehy ofthe 511 t hTF

(nyings/n 1-0964) on 15 February 1991.

Further opportunities to hack down Iraqi

rotaries with the Avenger were denied to

the A-lOs by a n o rde r o f 16 February,

which forbade itsuse until the land fight

ing commenced. This was due to casualties

being caused by MA PADS, which that

day had hit three A-lOs, two f a t a l l y . ~ '

I twa, the thitd mi ion of the dayand we were

working the kill-hoxten mile, we,t of Ali Am

alem airportwc r of Ku lir :lty t \\ a . ahout

1545Land the visihillty \\'a, three to (,, 'e n le,

due to the ha:e, oilfire' and hlOlving ,and. Spot

t ed a f lt gh t o( two helicopter> and chme to

engage the lead aircraft. U,ed 30mm Carling

gun a f te r l o l I n l I c c e s ~ ( l I l locks on t f i r ~ tpas,. Iput approximately 75 hullet thmugh hi,

rot (\ [ h lades hu t d id not d e, rr oy h im , I r e

attacked and ,hot appmxinl;llely 300 hullet on

him which ,ent him cmtwheeling into the

de,err flo \[ Not muchleftto i ,, ly In theair

c ra ft h ut i t i , I e,, ned to have heen a H-105

ol en'mion mf<lCkhel icopter.

Th is fi rst happenedon 6 February 1991,

when Captain Robert R. wain,Jr, of the

706th, nying s in 7 7- 2 05 , encountered a

BO 105. Captain wain report reads as

follows:

A significant development in the A-IO's

deploymentcame with the realization that

night fighting was increasingly giving the

US rmy an edge. With thi s in mind, the

implication for the A-IO were clear to

Colonel Irwin andy harpe, one o f t h e

A-IO commanders on the spot. He held

consultations with Gener al C ha rl es

Horner, a nd t he upshot was that Lieu

tenant-Colonel R ic k McDow , a f orme rVietnam POW and a highly respected com

hat leader, overcame his deep misgivings

and volunteered to trial the new mission. '

The method wa to utili:e the ix-inch

cockpit monitors lii.ked to the infra-red

seekers in the Mavericks a improvised

imaging sys tem. Once the pilots had fired

all their Mavericks, they continued their

attacks by illuminating their targets with

the old-style parachute narcs.

Air-to-Air

The A-IO was not really expected to 'mixit' with the Iraqi MiGsand did not tangle

with t hem too much; most were quickly

evacuated, to sit out t he war o n t he air

fields of Iraq's former enemy Iran. Howev

er, i n the early stages, there were some

brushes wi th lone enemy fighters. Due to

the aggres ive srance of the A-I s and the

timidity o f t h eMiG jockeys, no A-I was

lost to Iraqi aircraft. By contrast,when the

opportunity brieny presented itself, theA

lOs lost no t ime in hacking down Iraqi

helicopters, using the awesome power of

theGAU- .

The A-I was credited with the

destruction of fifty-one Scud-B launchers

d ur in g t he G ul f War, although careful

checking since seems to indicate that this

figure was rather optimistic.

Aborted cud-B hun ts m ig ht have

meant returning to base fully laden, but

there were ample targets o n t he way back

on which to expend the mi s il e , and thi

was encouraged by Colonel Bob Efferson at

Cajun We t ' .Later, th isorder wasreversed

and free-falling ordnance was placed on

targets of opportunitywhile en route to the

Scud-B hunting zones, leaving the A-lOs

free of all e nc umbr an ce s o th er t h an

their offensive Mavericks and defensive

Sidewinders (when they werecarried).

Nose artfromthe GulfWar: SharperThanAny Two-Edged Sword . Simon Watson

werein theopen under the illusory cover of

darkness. This involved great ri k t o t he

British soldiers, both from detection and

from accidents,but it was the only sure way

of raking out these elu ive pests. A typical

cud-B hunt would involvesome ten hours

in the air for the A-IO pilots.

ideal aircraft for hunting the elusive

d-B mobile launchers proved to be the

,with i ts longloiter time and built-in

potential, coupled with range.

while the A-I0 was mainly u sed in i ts

role ofCA /attack aircraft, it was

used to hunt down the Scud-Bs and

other 'Iook-and-see' missions. I

nitially, the method used wasfor teams

Os and A-lOs to bedeployed from

forward-operating location base of A I

Th ' y wou ld p at ro l over poten ti a l

launcher areas. Once a missile was

surveillanceaircraftwould mon

i ts night track, and pass the informa

back to the airborne A-lOs, which

thenattempt to follow its night path

to the firing point. They would then

on visual skills to find the launcher,

hy then would have packed up and

on to thenex t bolt-hole. nless by

the launching was conducted

a short di tance of patrollingA-I s

s was very much a hit-and-miss opera

that Kelied on luck as much as skill.

it achieved l imited success, it

by no means satisfactory. A more e(fi

was developed later on, with

ofthe Bri ti sh A operatinghehind

enemy lines, visually tracking down

launchers a nd t he n calling in the

i gh tH awgs ' to take themout while they

DesertStorm - munitionsspecial istsfrom the 23rd Tactical FighterWing

300101 roundsof ammunition intoCaptain R Patrick s A-10Thunderbolt II

ft replenishing the hungryAvengerGatl ing between high-intensity

againstIraqi armour. USAF

734 735



Two A-las Down

The worst day for the A-I 0 was 5 Feb

ary 1991, when two aircraft were lost, a

another was damaged. The tw o- m an te

o yph Phillis and w in gm an R ob w

was attacking units o f t he Republi

Guard some 6 mi les 95km ) nor th- w

Force Fight er WeaponsSchoo at N el s AFB, Nevada In August. while the squadro

deployed to Saud Arabia in support of Operaton DesertShield he traveled to N el

Air AFB He graduated fromFighter Weapons Schoo in December 1990 as a Distn

guished Graduate,being named OutstandingGraduate ofhis A 1 0 class, and thentrav

e l e d t o Saud Arabia to rejoin the 353rd Fighter Squadron to participate in Operaton

DesertShield and Desert Storm After theending of hostilities, hs squadron returne

to Myrtle Beach AFB, on 20 March1991.

Johnsonwas thenassigned asan instructor atthe Air Force FighterWeapons Scho

at N el s AFB, Nevada. Hs military decoratons Included the Air Force Cross and th

Dist nguished Fyng Cr oss He a n d his wife, the formerPatrcia Gibbons, from Oho

have three chidren, Chrstopher, Er ca n d Jessica.

Captains RandyGoff left) andPau Johnson rght), two p io ts whoservedin the Gulf

with the 354th Tactcal FighterWing. Theirmostfamous mission was flying escort to a

Sandy rescue. Both weredecoratedfor their dedicaton durng this extremelylong, b

highly successfulmission,Johnson receiving the Air Force Cross,and Goffthe

Distnguished Flyng Cross. Johnsons aircraft is now preserved and on display at the

USAF Museum, at Wr ght-Patterson AFB, Oho. Becky Coan va Peter B Mersky

whi Ie the ygotdow n a nd picked him up. An

Iraqi army truck, w hi ch h ad h om ed o n t he

radio transmissions and was trying to beat

them to it,was taken apart by 30mm GA

ciA fire, at 100ft 30m) A G L ,200ft 60m)

slam r ange f rom jone-, w ho w at ch ed

awe:truck. Following this, t h e A -l O s were

ahle to escort Lt jones back to safely.

HAWG N- Captain Paul 1. Johnson USAF USAF Museum Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio)

JUSTIFICATIO: \ Al\O VI:-JDICATIO:-J - DESERTSIII :U Ai\ O DESERTSTORM

Captain Pau Johnson was born in Gadsden,Alabama, o n 2 6 Apri 1958, and gradu

at ed f rom hgh schoo in Dresden, Tennessee, in1976. He attended Freed-Hardeman

University and graduated from Murray State University in 1980 with a Bachelorof Sc

ence degree in Agriculture.

Johnson received his commission in the USAF f rom t he Officer Training School at

Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, in May 1985. He then entered undergraduate pilot

training at Laughln Air Force Base in D e R o , Texas and received his wings inJune

1986.

Johnson s first operatonal assignmentwas tothe 353rd FighterSquadronat Myrtle

BeachAFB, SouthCarolna, in February1987, wherehis dutes included instructorpiot.

safety officer and search and rescue pilot. In 1990, he wasselect edt o at tendt he Air

Captan Pau T Johnson, USAF USAF u s e ~ m Wr ght-Patterson AFB, Ohio

was c on si de ra bl e a nd t he A -l Os h ad to

s p en d m u ch t i me o v er the area before the

pilot was safely pickcd up. Both the -lOs

had be refuellcd no les, than four times

during a mission that totalled eight hours

flying time.

Th e lead A-IO was the first to IOGlte

jones. It h o m cd t h e c o pt e r in, and circled

eager to have a prisoner hum iliate a nd

display on tele\ ision the watching

world, s e nt o u t s n a t c h teams to find him;

the race was on. A two-plane detail of A

lOs from t h e 3 5 4t h T F S was immediately

despatched cover the pilotuntil the 1st

SO W MH - 53j he lic opte r c ould r e ac h him

and then pr ovide c ove r for the outward

flight. The two pilots were Captain Paul

johnson a nd y 5 7) a nd Captain Randy

G of f w h o had already had a husy day ).

The distance from base the c r as h i t e

Nose art f ro m t he G u lf W a r : Leslie - The Seminole Warrior. Smon Watson

Nose art f ro m t he G u lf W a r : Dobber s Sting. Smon Watson

gun on rescue helicopters sent to recover

Jow ned A merican pilots b e hi n d e n em y

l i n e s . ~ During the Gulf War, t he A -I

was able to uphold that proud traditionon

several occasions.

On 2 january 1991, a N av y A -1 4

Bu 0 161430) from VF-103, based

aboard the carrier Saratoga CV-6 ), and

piloted by Lieutenant D e vo n j o n es , wa

hit by a ground-guided, optically-tracked

A - 2,a nd came down in southern Iraq, far

from land-based assistance. The Iraqis,

JL:STIFICATIO Al\O VI: \OICATIO: \ DI S :RT SHIHD \: \0 DI:SI:Rf STORM

made famous by t h e A - I Skyraider

was the search and rescue mis

, A DYs), w he r ehySpa ds r ode s hot-

art f ro m t he G u lf W a r : Play Time . Smon Watson

bringing it a standstill. Then it

methodically destroyed. One ight

Captain jack W Thomas of the

TF , personally nailed three T-55s

g two Mavericks and si xMk 2 homh s.

Missions

art from the Gu lfWa r: Bird of Prey . Smon Watson

136 137



JUSTIFICATION ND VINDI TION ESERTSHIEL ND ESERT STORM JUSTIFI TION ND VINDI TION ESERTSHIEL ND ESERT STORM

tations

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

A l0

AIM·9 2, 1OR Notcarred AGM-65 11 MK 82 21 Notcarred Not used Notcarred MK 82 2 AGM-65 11 Not car red ECM Pod

AIM-9 2, 1OR Mk 82 bomb AGM-65 11 MK82 11 MK 82 Not used MK 82 MK 82 1 A GM- 65 11 M k82 bomb ECM Pod

AIM·9 2, 1OR Not c a rr e d A GM -65 11 MK 82 31 Notcarred Not used Notcarred MK 82 31 AGM-65 11 Not car red ECM Pod

AIM-9 2, 1OR Not used AGM-65 21 MK82 11 MK82 Not used MK 82 MK 82 1 AGM-65 21 Not used ECM Pod

AIM-9 2, 1OR Mk 82 bomb AGM-65 31 MK82 11 MK 82 Not used MK 82 MK 82 1 AGM-65 31 Mk 82 bomb ECM Pod

AIM-9 2. 1OR SUU-25 AGM 65{ll MK 82 31 Not used Not used Not used MK 82 31 AGM-65 1 SUU-25 ECM Pod

AIM-9 2, 1OR SUU-25 AGM-65 21 MK 82 31 Not used Not used Not used MK 82 31 AGM-65 21 SUU-25 ECM Pod

AIM-9 2. 1OR Not used AGM 65{ll MK84 Not used Not used Not used MK 84 AGM 65{ll Not used ECM Pod

AIM-9 2, 1OR LAU-68 LAU-68 MK 82 31 Not used Not used Not used MK 82 {31 LAU-68 LAU-68 ECM Pod

AIM-912, 1OR Not used AGM-65 {21 Not used Not used Not used Not used Not used AGM-65 {21 Not used ECM Pod

AIM-912, 1OR Notcarred AGM 65{ll SUU-30 21 N ot c arr ed N ot used Notcarred SUU-30 21 AGM-65 11 Notcarred ECM Pod

AIM-912, 1OR 0 Not used SUU-30 SUU-30 SUU-30 Not used SUU-30 SUU-30 SUU-30 Not used ECM Pod

AIM-9 2, 1OR Not used AGM 65{ll SUU-30 {31 Not used Not used Not used SUU-30 3 AGM 65{ll Not used ECM Pod

AIM-9 2, 1OR 0 SUU-30 AGM-65 11 SUU-30 SUU-30 Not used SUU-30 SUU-30 AGM-65 11 SUU-30 ECM Pod

AIM-9 2. 1OR 0 SUU-25 AGM-65 1 SUU-30 31 Not used Not used Not used SUU-30 2 AGM 65{ll SUU-25 ECM Pod

AIM-9 2. 1OR 0 SUU-25 AGM-65 21 SUU-30 SUU-30 Not used SUU-30 SUU-30 AGM-65 21 SUU-25 ECM Pod

AIM-9 2. 1OR 0 Not used AGM-6511 SUU-64SUU·64

Not used SUU-64 SUU-64AGM-65 11 Not used ECM Pod

AIM-9 2. 1OR 0 Not used AGM-6511 SUU-65 SUU-65 Not used SUU-65 SUU-65 AGM-65 1 Not used ECM Pod

AIM-9 2, 1OR 0 Notcar red AGM-6511 Not c a rr e d Not c a rr e d Not used Not c a rr e d Not c a rr e d AGM-65 1 Notcarred ECM Pod

AIM-9 2, 1OR 0 Notcarred AGM-6511 Not carred Not carred Not used Notcarred Not carred AGM-65 1 Notcarred ECM Pod

AIM-9 2, 1OR 0 Not used MK20 MK 20 MK 20 Not used MK 20 MK 20 MK 20 Not used ECM Pod

AIM-9 2, 1OR 0 MK20 AGM-6511 MK20 MK20 Not used MK 20 MK 20 A GM- 65 11 MK 20 ECM Pod

AIM-9 2, 1OR 0 SUU-65 AGM-65111 Not used Not used Not used Not used Not used AGM-65 11 SUU-65 ECM Pod

AIM-9 2, 1OR 0 SUU-25 AGM-65 2 Not used Not used Not used Not used Not used AGM-65 21 SUU-25 ECM Pod OA l

- - -AIM-9 2, 1OR 0 LAU-68 LAU-68 Not used Not used Not used Not used Not used LAU-68 LAU-68 ECM Pod

AIM-9 2, 1OR LAU-68 Not used Not used Not used Not used Not used Not used Not used LAU-68 ECM Pod

AIM-9 2, 1OR 0 LAU-68 LAU-68 MK 82 MK 82 Not used MK 82 MK 82 LAU-68 LAU-68 ECM Pod

City, when Sweet's aircraft (s/n

0) took a hit from an IR SAM and

down. Th e A-LO tradition is to stick

wingman, and 'Syph', flying s/n 78

circled the area, despite the obvious

to himself in orderto establish a rescap

providesupport. He was downed inhis

by a SAM,and paidfor hisloyalty and

with his life. Sweet was made a

and was not finally released until

1991.

combined attack by A- IOs and AH

Apache helicopters was made on L9

< gainst a Large concentration of

and APCs estimated 300 strong that

just north of the Saudi border.

attacks, twenty-eight ranks,

vehicles a nd t hr ee mobile

ry pieces were claimed destroyed.

in Battlelandbattle was initiated on 24 February

much delay < nd politicalm<1chination.

opening shots werefired by the A-lOs,

the outlet valves controlling

flow of the oil pipelines that the lraqi

planning to use to feed defensive

trenches < S part of itselaborate defence

The A-lOs on this occasion put

the Gatling a nd t he Maverick, in

of 'conventional' dive-bombing uti

the 2,0001b (910kg) Mk 8 4 LDGP

The 353rdTFS fired some 138Mk66

round fin aircraft rockets (WAFAR)

M156 warheads at trenches that were

in an unsuccessful attempt

gnite t hem and render them ha rm

to the ground assault.

two A-IO squadrons deployed to

A OR t ha t operated exclusively by

used the IR Video of the AGM-65D

missiles as a 'poor man's FUR'.

IR seeker became a search too l for

not only for the Maverick itselfbut

for other weapons. ' Dug-in enemy

still proved detectable to IR, as

and sandcooled unevenly after sun

A-lOs operated under what was

the 'push-flow' method, which

n t tha t teams were despatched on a

lar basis to ensure a continual b<1ttle

presence in case CAS missions were

uired. Ifa team arrived at a t ime when

FAC had no immedi<1te use for them,

s assigned other targets.

normal A-LO employment, with

mth er t ha n four-pl::tne formations,

was used throughout. However, the low

level, contour-hugging flying foreseen in

the much- rehea r sed European sc ena rio

hardly applied in the relatively flat, fea

tureless desert. The two -s hi p t eams

ingressed at altitudes between 15,000 and

20,000ft (4,500-6,000m) in line-abreast,

wedge or trail formations. Some aircraft

released their ordnance first, thus giving

them much greater manoeuvrabili ty from

the onset, and then turned theGat l ingon

the enemy, thre a ts pe rm i tt ing . As usual,

most two-ship fonTI< tions flew with one

flight member in the high cover slot, while

the o ther carried ou t the attack, then the

roles were reversed. 4

There was no l< ck of customersawaiting

A-IO servicing. Saddam had deployed

4,000 Soviet-built and Soviet-supplied T

72, T-62 and T-55 tanks. According to the

offici< report:

The Imqi army provided a trememll1l target

alTaI. Pilots acquired targets easily, hut ta rge t

identification - discriminating a tank ll self

pmpelledartillery piecefroma truck - pnwed a

const ,m t cha llenge . When e ng ag in g a n

armoured or mcchani:cd position, some nights

made medium-al t i tude gun and/or reconnais

sance passes, dropping from 15,000 feet to

5,000-8,000 feet to attempt to distinguish

reverted trucks from reverted armour. PhotllS,

when provided, helped the pi lot ident i fy the

positionof his intended target. Some pilots used

hinoculars to assist in targetidentification;

ers remarked that the magnification 'as too lit

tle or that r h e p l an e v i hm t ed excessively. '

In general, A-IO pilots ::tlways tried visual

ly to acquire the desired priority target,

so that,when it c ame to thecrunch, Major

Kennedy's peE system came into its own.

To draw ou t the location ofenemy mobile

sorties were conducted at 12,000ft

(3,600m); the aircraft were t oo h ig h for

the Iraqi multi-barrelled weapons, bu t the

undis cip lined gunne rs would open fire

anyway. They t hus exposed themselves

and could then be methodically worked

over by t he A -I0 teams.Ordnance was principally the GAU-8

(withmore than one million 30mm rounds

being fired off during the war), and the

Maverick, eitherthe -DEOwith scene mag

for daytime use, o r t he fIR-D, fitted with

125lb (57kg) shaped-charge warheads, or

the G with larger blastwarhead. All were

carried on e it h er t he single-rail LAU-I L7

launcher, or via the triple-rail LAU-88,

each carrying sl::tnt-Ioaded pair of mis-

138

siIes. The Mk 20 Rockeye clusterbomb was

effective when used against soft-skinned

vehicles, but i t was found that singledrops

from medium level did not produce the

desired results. Instead, reverting to its

ancestry, the A-I 0 turneddive-bomber for

these missions and delivered the Rockeye

in sticks at angles of 70 degrees.

A-LOs ou to f the FOLs a t KKMCand AI

Jouf, working over enemy tank and troop

concentrations, used 1,033 CBU-8 CEMs,

which were delivered from the SUU-65

dispenser.

Protection from hand-held IR missiles

was essential and some355,381 chaff bun

dles were expended during esert Storm

along with 108,654 self-defence flares. In

s t ric t contras t , a l though the use of two

AIM-9L/M Sidewinders on a dual-rail

adapter wasofficially regarded as standard

for de fence , many unit s , e spe cial ly the

OA-LOs, carried only on eon a single-raillauncher. Others did not carry them at all,

and, o f those that did, none were required

to use them; theon ly th ree that werefired

were discharged accidentally. When car

ried , usually on pylon I, the rails were

mounted on each side of a L4 x 54in (35

x 3 Scm) spac er p lat e , s uspended from

the L4in (35cm) pylon lugs, with the rear

of the plate extending 14in out from the

pylon's trailing edge. This left the fronttip

ofthe Sidewinderextending 28in (70cm)

forward o f t h e leading edge o f t he plate.

Colour Schemes

Amazingly, the A/ OA- 0 operated

th roughout the Gulf War in i ts European

drab-green paint scheme, and stood out

l ike a sore thumb, whether on the ground

or a ir bo rn e, I nd iv id ua l u ni ts , both

CONUS- and UK-based, tried out desert

b lend ing pa in t jobs off their o wn b at

immediately before deployment. However,

this was inexplicably stamped on by Air

Force High Command, which insisted that

those few aircraft that had been so painted

should be hastily re-painted in the European scheme before they flew out toSaudi.

OA IO

Some 656 Forward AirControl (FAC) sor

t ie s were f lown by the OA-IOs, marking

targets not only for the A-LO t o t ak e ou t ,

but also for Air Force, Navy and Marine

Corps strike pl::tnes, like the A-6, A-7D ,

Actual Gulf War A/OA l0combat loadings

Nose artfromthe Gulf War: KimberlyAnne . Smon Watson Nose artfromthe GulfWar: BulletExpress . Smon Watson

139



On 6 February 1991, Captain Paul

son s A - I O took a shoulder-launched

hit in the u n de r sid e le ad ing e d ge

s tar b oa r d w in g. I t to ok out a twen

s ec t io n , d a ma g in g the h y dr a ulic

there, and tearing away the landin

housing, a nd t he resultant debris

damage to the starboard engine. Jo

jettisoned his ordnanceand nursed t

craft home safely and got it down

piece. The wing and housing were rep

theengine was replaced and i t w a s b

action again before t h e e n d of the

The A - IO s to ug h ne s s w as demonagain when 77-0186, t he m ou nt

commanding officer ofthe 23rdTFW

heavy damage t o its empennage,

heavy strike that chewed u p its e le

and caused severe perforation of bot

ders and tailplanes. The p i lo t w as a

bring the aircraft down u sin g ju

engine a n d a i le r on controls. In a

e x am p le , M a jo r J i m Rose o f t he

TFW, flying s n 76-540, was hit by a

747

The A-I 0 w as d es ig ne d f or s ur vi va l i n

the m os t da nger ous e n v ir o n me n t o f all,

and in the Gulf War i tp r o v e d it c ould ta ke

punishment a s w e ll a s d is h it out. Forgetful

or ignorant)of the fact t h a t t h e A-IO was

built to survive h its , c r itic s w o uld shake

their heads and s ay I t ol d y ou s o . They

were conveniently missing t h e p o in t t h at

the majority of A-lOs returned safe to base,

with pilots unharmed and w i th a n y d a m

age reparable within a v er y short t i me . I n

The abil i ty ofthe A l totake punishmentand survive. Here. s n 80 0186. ofthe 23rd

TFW hastakenheavydamage from a hitin thetai l . Despitethe devastation to the

empennage theaircraftgot safely back to base wasrepaired and carried on fighting.

On other jet-fighters a hitof thisseverity usuallymeanta combatloss. USAF

c o nt r as t , t h e c o nv e nt i on a l fast fighters,

supported by those who claimed that

speed is life , pr oved c onc lus ively thatthey could not take it. The lessons o f t h e

V i et n am W a r had to b e a b so r be d once

again, and aircraft such as the F-16 Fight

i ng F al c on f iv e l os t) , the F-15E Strike

Eagle two lost), a n d t h e P a na v ia G R. Mk

I Tornado six lost) took a higher propor

tion of los se s f or m iss ion s . The AV-8B

Harrier f iv e lo st) proved very vulnerable

t o S A M damage - if one was hit, i t w o uld

certainly crash.

The A - I O e njoye d unprecedented success

on 25 February, w h en a n e n ti r e c o l u mn o f

Iraqi ta nks s ur r ende r ed to a f lig h t of the

511 th TFS, as they circled them in p r ep a

ration for a n a tt ac k. T hi s move o n t he

e n em y s p a rt m ig ht h av e b ee n h el pe d

along by the work o f t h e 23rd TFS s two

man team of Captain Eric Salomonson

and Lieutenant John Marks who, between

them, r ac ke d u p an impressive twenty

three tanks totallydestroyed, plus ten oth

ers damaged, in just onethree-m iss ion day.

The panic-stricken Iraqi occupation

army, now f ac in g a v er y r ea l threat, fledthe city en masse, commandeering any

t h in g t h at had wheels. Baghdad dignified

this unseemly rout with the description of

a strategic withdrawal . I tg a v e Allied air

craft an unprecedented target array; they

took full advantage, a n d t h e six-lane road

the media s H ighwayof D eath ) between

Kuwait City and Basrah was turned into a

charnel house, w i th A - lO s j o in i ng other

predators against the fleeing enemy.

Dishing It Out an d Taking It

JUSTIFICATION AND VINDICATION - DESEIIT S IIELD AND DESERTSTORM

A - I O, F- 16 and F- 18 , to attack. T h e O A

l s o f t he 6 02 nd Tactical A i r C o nt r ol

Wing, part o f t he 353rd TrW , provided

tw o s e par a te groups, totalling f ifte en a ir

c ra ft , f or the target-marking in t he se

instances. Areas with potential high target

p ro fi le w er e m ar ke d o ff into g r id b ox e s,

which t h e O A- I Os diligently quartered,

;m d, w o rk ing with AFAC a nd A LO s, l it

up actual targets and passing the informa

tion on to thenext wave of incoming strike

a ir cr a ft f ro m la nd b as es and carriers, wh i e

t he A -1 0 w ou ld l et r ip w it h i ts Avenger

cannon w henever the opportunity to con

tribute safely offered itself.

The orthodox 2 .7 5i n 6 .8 cm ) w hi te

phosphorous WP or W illy Pe te ) rockets

were used by the 23 rd TASS, which fi red

off2,748 of them in the course of itsduties.

In addition to the W P s a n d the Gatling,

s o me , b u t by no means all, t h e O A -1 0 s

carried defensive AIM 9L M Sidewinders

and M k 8 2 Iron Bombs into action.

Two types of ECM pod werecarried: the

ALQ-IIO long by C ONUS units and the

ALQ-131 shallow byUK-basedsquadrons.

With a h ug e a rr ay of enemy forces dug

in, there was no shortage of targets, but

distinguishing b e tw ee n d um m y targets,

d u g- i n t a nk s and trucks, and evaluating

their destruction v a lu e a c co r din gly , w as

proving a r ea l problem.

Nose artfromthe Gulf War: NightPenetration . SimonWatson

740

JUSTIFICATION AND VINDICATION - DESERTSII ELD AND DESERTSTORM

in the desert heata 23rd TacticalWing A l stands on the runway readyfor anotherstr ike.

indesertwarfare thePentagon permitted no changes to theolive drab paintscheme. To theIraqi

these dark aircraft with theirdistinctiveshape and crucifix silhouette lack ofengine noise

s of ill omen. In the foreground armourers are working on a trailer of

Rockeye II cluster bombs and a Mk 7clusterbomb unit fi l ledwith 247 Mk 118 anti-tank bomblets

the A l used to supplementits Gatlingand Maverick kill power. Yves Debay/US Department of Defense

artfromthe Gulf War: Kissof Death. Simon Watson



JUSTIFICATION AND VINDICATION - DESEIIT SIIIEU AND DESE iT STOIIM

enter their \ e h i c l c ~ c 1 o ~ e h a tc h es a nd

away from thc gun cmplaccments.

8 Platoon h,td h cc n s wt io nm y a nd o

thcir \'Chicles for ahout fiftccn minutcs h

thisorder wasgivcn. Asthcy sta rtcd to co

onc Warrio r , ca l l-s ign 22 , cxplodcd. An

Warrior,call-sign 23, immcdiately m'lI1oc

in front of call-sign22, andsomc crc\\ mcm

had JUSt hcgun to movcthc c; ualtics to thc

a id I ' o s t IVhcn call-sign 23 also cxploded.

aircraft were seen in the fuca t

the t ime oexplosion, hut at first mines were slisp

E;rrlicrduringthc day, twosucccssivc ~ i gUnitcd S ta tc s Air Forcc aircraft \\ crc rask

Ile' lllquartcrs 1st (British) Armourcd Div

toattack Iraqi armourat grid rde rcnccPT

Suhsequently, a funhcr flighr of tlVO USAF

aircraftrcporrcd for [asking t o t h c Rritish

tant Di\'isional Air Liaison Officcr (DA

I l is in tcntion lVas that t h cs c a i rcm ft s

attack the same target as the ll prc,'iolls f

143

two \Varr io r \'Chiclcs hclonging ro thc 3rd Ra t

ta ion Thc Royal Rcgimcnr of Fusilicrs Bartle

(Jroul'(3RRF) hasnoll ' rcportcd. It has nothccn

the practice uf : l I c c c : : . s i \ t . ~ Covcrnmcnrs to p l l h ~lish rcporrs of rhis kind, hur 1wish to gi\ 'cas full

an account as pos:-,ihle o f t h e RnaILls findings.

On 26Fch ruary 1991 , 3RRFhad fought thcir

way through numher of enemy position:' in

southcrn Iraq. Aftcr a hricf hut in tcnsc sand

storm dur ing thc carll' p a no f t h c a l k a nc c , t h c

\\'C'ather had impftw(L { givC c1car

kic

<lndgood \'isihility hI ahout 1500 hou rs lo ca l t imc,

IVhcn C Company 3RRF,\\ i th somc 37 Warrior

;-lIld Engineer vchicles \\ ;1:-. rcurgani:ing. The

tcrrain in thc arca was tlat 'md fcaturcless ' tparr

from 'some Iraqi dc(cl1si\T positions and ahan

doncd I'chiclcsandcquipmcnr. During thc rcor

g:-lIli:atiol1, Royal Engineers prepared to destroy

ncarhy Iraqi artillery picccs. Whcn t h c dCllwli

tion charges were ahout to he hlown, C

I'any Commander instructed rncn

Tragedy

Thc Ro;trd of Enqui ry in ro thc inc idcnt whcn

ninc soldicrs wcrc killcd and c lc l' cn i n jurcd in

A view ofthe highway from Kuwait Cityto Basrah afterthe A-lOs had worked it over.Burnt-outIraqitanks

ammunition trucks andother military vehicles including an oil bowser strew theroad. BaghdadRadio

claimed a greatvictory Natonal Archives ColegePark MD

JUSTIFICATIONAND VINDICATION - DESEIIT SIIIEU AND DESERTSTOIIM

One episode marred the otherwise bri iant

record of the A-IO in the Gulf. The inci

dent, on 26 February J991,was as confusing

as i twas tragic, and became the focus of the

Western news medi a f ar more than the A

la 's innumerable successes. This case of

'friendlyfire' wasa single incident, in which

two British Army vehiclesweredestroyed by

tWO A-las firing MclVerick missiles, withheavy loss of life. The best and fairest way to

describe this regrettable aberration is to use

the dry,formal worcls ofthe Bri tish Min ister

for the Armecl Forces, Christopher Soames,

MP, who outl ined the conclusions o f t he

Official Board of Enquiry i n to the incident

t o t he House of Commons in July 1991 :2<

on 31 January 1991. hydraul ic control

was los t but Rose got the aircraft safely

home using the back-up sys tems. I t sur

vived to fight another day and was later dis

played a t t h e McClellan Air Museum.

Success in Desert Swrm failed to end the

old controversy between the devotees of

the F-16 and t hos e who loved the A-IO,

bu t the opera tion certa inly proved that

the new kid on th e blockwas no match for

the A-10 i n a ll a re as , except speed and

night-operation capability.The F-16 came

out a poor s e cond to the A-IO in terms of

vulnerability to ground fire, survivability

in case of damage, and accuracy (the

30mm gun pod fi t ted to the F-16 proved

unstable i n use and inaccurate in del ivery

c om pa re d t o the internally mounted

GAU-8). The bulk of Mavericks fired were

carried by A-lOs and proved to be magnif

icenttank killers.

All this cut little ice with the Pentagon,

which immedia tely s e t to work to replace

the expended Mavericks, a t t h e sametime

se eking to phase ou t the aircraft that was

utilizing them to optimum effect.

An overturned Iraqitank lies amid hordes of

commandeeredvehiclesand army trucks on themain highway o u t o f Kuwait City dubbed the Highway

ofDeath by themedia.Thefleeing Iraqis hadbeen

serviced by the A-10 and suddenlyeveryone felt sorry

forthe aggressorsl Natona Archives Colege Park MD

142

one aircraft thatreally stopped

s massivetank force was. Here a decapitated Iraqitank

the power ofthe

Natonal Archives Colege Park MD



JUSTIFICATION AND VI DICATION - IJESERT SIII UJ AND IJESERT STOI M JUSTIFICATION AND VINDICATION - IJESERT SIIIEL AND S RT STOI M

British armoured personnel carrierspass a blaz ing I raqi anti-tank vehicle during

theiradvance east intoKuwait from southern Iraq. It was in such conditionsthat a

tragic 'friendly fire' incident took place, and Maverick missiles from two A-lOs

destroyedtwo of the British Warrior vehicles, withheavyloss of life. National

Archives, College Park, MD

i, a conflict of e\ idence er I\'hether

grid reference for the ta rge t W<1 pa:l:lcd from

A i,tant DALO to the A-IO,. The target

\Va 0\ ( 1 20km to the ea r of C C O I l 1 ~ny 1RRF\ po,ition at 1500 houc>.

The A-IO pilot, identified what the\

I\'a, the t ar ge t a re a f rom a phy,ical

gl\ en rhem hy a departingUSAF F

rhe pre\ iou, flight, and ,hmt lyafterl\'ard,

what t h ey thought wcre ahnur 50 I raqi

[;mb and ,UPPort \Thicle, heading

pilor, had heen midthat rhere I\'ere

friendlyforce, I\' ithin ren kilomeftT of rheir

and the,e vehicles were clmer rhan that

rhe point rhey hadident i fied as their rarget.

lead aircraft made rwo pa e a r 15,000

HOOO f ee r, to oh,etTe rhe vehicle, I\'ith

hut sal\' n friendly , ,-king,. Hoth

then fired ne infra-red Ma\ erick mi,

f rom a heighr of ahour 9,000 feer, each

ofthe \ ( h i c l c ~ , hefore fcpuning

eng,lgemenr r the A i anr DALOand

rhe area.

The pi lor, report f fifry Iraqi \Thicle, dif

dramarica Ill from earlierde,cription, f

target tha r rhe A>si ant DALO a,kc'd rhem

confirm the I carion. The f l lghr leade r

d rhar rhe arrack had raken placear grid

rT -II 51 The A i,ranr DALO

edia rely real i :ed rhar rhis p h ion \\'a,

rhan twentykilomerre, from rhe intenJed

and corre,ponded wi rh rhe locat ion of

rhen ca lledupa reconnai ance flighr

rhe area, which rep rred that flume,cenr

on panel: coulJ he : 1111 from 6.000

and rhe type of \ ehiclecould he idenrified

m 14,000 feet.

The H ard f Inquiry f undrha t H rl:1I <,,,n, C

y ,RRF I\'ere n peration, asordered.

H ardalso f und that the air planning pro

all wing a distance f more th, , ,fi(teen

hetween the ta rge t for any arrack

friendly forces had heen f ' lo l\ ' ed and

ld have heen suff icient to ensure the ,uc

l a nd Ife conduct of operations. The

rd further concluded that air control at

and Divis iona l I e\TI I \ 'h ich provided

informationto the A, O:-. was in aCCOf

I\' ith estahlished procedures.

The Hoard found that ' rlamon s vehiclescorrect in\ crrcJ V recognition

and flumescent panels. The Bo,,,d noted

some o f t h e panels could have heen pa r

y ohscured by open hatches m equipment,

thar whilea reconnaissance flightobserved

panels at 6,00 feet, this wasbelow the oper

heightofthe A-lOs. The Board could nm

k e ,my f in d in g as to whether the pilots

have seen the identification panels at

operating height. The Board concluded

that no hlame m responsibility fm the incident

could be arrrihuted m lRRF

The Hoard noted that there 1\ a Clmflict of

e idence h ct l l l l the ra rCIl1Cllh o f t he wit,

ne es f rom I leadqua rrec> ht (British)

Armoured Di \ i, ion and thme of the A-I0

pilor,. The A btant DALO t a red thar he

p a ed t he target grid reference hut the A-IO

r i l o t ~ deny rccei,·ing thb. There \ \ a ~ no e\ i

dence to :-.ugge:-.r t h at t h e two pre\ ious missions

had ,ltt,lCked anything hut the correct rargets.

Once the ev idence was presenred, the Board

found t hatno blame or re,ponsihility should be

attached to the A istant DALO.

The pilots stated that, notwithstanding the

ab,enceofa grid rderence, they attackedon the

basis of information pa ed to them by the pre

viousflight andof thei r positive identification

of the targets b enemy vehicles. The board

notedthat a USAF reconnaissance flight ,hort

II after the Warriors were attacked I \as able ro

identify the types of vehicles fmm 14,000feet.

On the basisofthe e\ idence hefore it, the Board

was unable to e,tahli,h why the attacked War

rior vehicle, I\'ere mi,idenrified hI the A-IO

pilots a s enemy T54/55 tanb, parricubrly in

,·iew of their rrl IOU l identification rUIl:-t at

l,OOO feet ami 15,000feet. In f(lt\varding the

Board\ finding t he Jo in t Commander has

drawn attention to the way i n which bpect,

weather and light condition, can critically

a f fec ta pi lot ' sahi l i ty to identify the details of

objeers on t h e ground.

The Board did not estahlish I\'hether the

USAF personnel invoked were at faulL. I t wa,

clearly established t hat theUSAF A-lOsdeli\'

ered the missiles, hut the Hoard could nm estab

lish preciselywhy they attacked rhewrongtarget.

The Hoard remarked rhat i twas clear that all

UK and USAF personnel il1\'olved I\'erestri\'

ing to 'lChieve their individual tasks to the hesr

of thei r abi li t ies in a fa st-moving ba t tle . The

Hoard thought it inc'vitable t hat ,at somestage

difficulties mayarise when individualsarc under

pressure.On 26February1991,difficultiesarose

in relation t o t h e location and identificationof

the target, an d t h e Board concluded thar only

the clearest of,tandard operational procedures

and sophi icatec l ident i f ic a t ion sy>rems will

help to prevent such tTagedie, in future.The Board recommends thar astudybe ini ti

a tedto identify a suitable air recognition system

for future ust', confirm ing the importance of

standard operating procedure for thecontrol of

aircraft in offensiveair support operatiolls and

recommended tba r they must a lways include

instrucrions that a grid re fe rence or a latitude

and longitude is specifically included in mission

briefs and thar this is always acknowledged by

the pilots.

144

The ( J e rnm en r ( and t he Un it ed SLues

Adminbtration) wi,h to expre their deepe,t

'ymp'1Ihy and condolences to relati\T oftho,e

whudied In the tragic incidenT.

tany important detai remained unclarrfied

hy thi, ,tatement: the information ,upplied to

the A-la , hI the rerurning F-16; t he d pute

between what t heDALO, rold t heA-IO pilot

including Ihe r a l ~ i n g of the grid reference; and

the pilot- denial ofthe receipt of such inforrna

tion. Both rhe,e matte r s should have been

in lt;lndy resoked, a:-. the \ erhal me:-.:-.age of

comhat aircraft can he recorded on t a pe a nd

played back. Either this procedure wa,notdone

on t h es e twooc ca si o ns , o r r he tapes wcre not

produced Cs e \ idence. Ei ther way, something

was not right. Tbe fact that Warrior APCs

could viswtlly he confirmed as T54/55 tanks is

also peculiar, notwilhst;-lnding the Joint

mandcr\ extenuation, (ur, in the pilot\ own

worlls, I-he idenrifiGltion was ·positin:: .

Despite the amhiguities,a witch-hunt should

not he Gl rri ed OUI. Tcrrihle ;1 it i- m i : . r d k e n ~identity deari ha\ e always heen commonplace

in I \a rs , , tlthough the USAF s r ecord in f ~ S ~ r lSronn was worse than any in earlier contlict:-..:l

Thl i, pmhably due to the ,peed of the Iraqi

co ll ap,e and the r e ,u lr ing t ime complexity of

the situation imposed o n t he military by the

Allied polltic ,n,.

Gener al o rman chwarzkopf, the Allied

C-in-C, made the following statement:

The very chaotic nature ofthe battlefield,where

quick deci, ionsmake the difference between life

and death, h b resultedin numerousincidents of

troops heingkilled by their own sidein e\'erywar

thar 11<1S ever beenfought. This docs nor makeit

acceptahle. N t even one suchavoidable dearh

should ever beconsideredacceptable.2t

Certainly, since the Gulf War, great effort

has been put into introducing a be tte r lD

system for the A-I0 force.21

Of course, the a l l-pervad ing media

presence highlighte I this incident among

many others. The instant-reaction ap

proach by journal ismfor TV, whereobjec

tivity may come a poorsecond to the needto be first w ith t h e news, a nd whe re n o

time for reflection is allowed, ca t a long

hadowovercombat situations in modem

wars. The media pre ence was held

responsible , in part, for the SA's loss in

the Vietnam War. One-sided images were

shown,and the North Vietnamese firmly

censured anything harmful t o t h ei r own

cause, on ly permitt ing broadcast ing of

favourable film footage showing them as

the victims where they were, in truth,

the aggressors. The a dv ent o f satellite

transmission has only served to increase

the pace o f s uc h d is semb la nc e, a nd

instant news' is now coupled with

instant verdicts' by journalists who may

have virtually no military knowledge nor

underswnding.211

While the British press was at its self

righteous worst in relating the A- I0 inci

dent, i t made hardly any mention of the

fact t ha t o n 27 Feb ruary 1991, Bri ti sh

Challenger ranks from the 14/20 Hussars

pulverized two British corpion armoured

car of the 7thArmoured Brigade,injuring

two soldiers of 10 Air Defence Battery,Royal Artillery.

Prior to the tragedy on 26 February

1991, on 31 January, five US Marines in

an armoured personne l ca rr ier had been

k il le d i n a n ight a t tack by a Maverick

launched by an A-lOw Despitethese ter

rible losses, the question has to be asked:

how many A ll ie d soldiers would have

died if the A-lOs had not destroyed 987

Iraqi tanks?

A/OA-IO Gulf War Statistics

By any standard, the record of the A-lOin

theGulfWar was an outstanding one.

l. The A-IO flew only 16.5 per cent of all

coalition air strikes.21l

2. The A-I 0 fl ew a t ot al of 8,755 sorties,

totalling 1 9, 54 5 h ou rs f lyi ng t im e,

striking 6,834 targets , including 1,041

CAS missions, and delivering ord

nance on 7,445 occa ions. 214 This was

16.5 per cen to f all tr ike sortiesflown.

3. The A-I fired 5,013 AGM-65D Mav

erick missiles, which was more than 9

per c e nt o f t h e Mavericks fired by AirForce aircraft. 2t ;

4. The 132 A-lOs were credited with the

destruction of9 7 tanks (25 per cent of

the to tal destroyed by ALL arms),

I ,106 trucks, 926 artillery pieces (25

per cen to f the total destroyed by ALL

arms), 501 APCs (30 per cent o f t he

total destroyed by ALL arms), 249 CPs,

51 Scud-B launchers (although this

total is thought t o be too h igh) , II

145

FROG missile launchers, 112 mi

structures, 96 radar installation

bunkers,2 CPs, 10 enemy aircra

the ground, 2 helicopters, 9 AM

and fuel tanks.

5. The A-IO ave raged 2 .37 hou r

flight and achieved a mi sion-ca

rate of 7.7 per cent.

6. The A -I r ec or de d one o f t h e l

rate of losses per 1,000 combat s

flown, at 0.5 per cent against a c

tion average of 13 losses per 1,00

ties.

7. Despite endless predictions of vul

bility, theonly three A-lOs werel

MA PADS andone to AAA.

A-10 target attack breakdownduringGulfWar

Targets struck Sor

Ground order of battle IGOBI 3.3

Offensivecounter-air lOCAl 1

Scud-B missile launchers 1Command. control. communications IC3) 1

SAM sites

Petroleum. 011. lubricants IPOLI

Industrial

Lines of communications (LOCI

Nu clear. c hem ica l. b to lo gi cal lN CB)

Nationalcommandcentres (NCC)

Other 2.9

TOT 6 8

Forward air control (FACI missions by OA- Os 6

Further breakdown of these figures s

that,ofthe 0 A strikes, the effort wa

mariIy focused on destroying elect

warfare and ground control intercep

during the first few days o f t he air

paign. The forty-nine strikes during

sions to suppress enemy air defences s

t imes saw t he A -lOs t eamed with

FAGs to attack fixed SA-2/3/6 site

the bulk of the 3,367day and night s

againstIraqiartillery andarmour unit

weapons ofchoice were AGM-65 M

icks and the internal 3 mm cannon

135 Scud-B total included both Sc

CAP t<lrget a nd a nt i- c ud -B areconnaissance mission .21 The OA

flew their 656 missions as dedicated

assets providing airborne control of

aircraft. 217 A/OA-IOs also contri

fully t o t h e search and rescue (SAR)

sions and were on cont inuous a ler t

the beginning o f t h e war. In one cas

lOs escorted a Special Operations

(SOF) c omba t s ea rc h a nd rescue

copter to re trieve a downed F-14 pilo



JUSTIFICATION NDVINDIC TION - ESERTSII ELI ND IJESt RTSTORM

Opinions

The ~ i n g l e mn...,t n:cngni:ahle and feared,lircra(t

at 10\1' 1c\C1 \Va, t h eA · I 0 Thunderholt II. Th h

dark·coloured jet \l'a, d ead ly accu ra te , ra rely

mb: ling targct. It conduc ted homhing raid;.,

three or (our time;., a day and \\a:- fI seemingly

uhiquitous t h re at . A l th ough t h e actual hOl11h

run WCIS terrifying, the ;lircrafr\ Inircring around

I. Ca rry ing ou[ aerial moni[oring

enforc ing compliance wi[h the U

arionsSecurity Resolu[ion (UNS

16, which banned f li gh [s by fwing aircraf[ in [he Bosnia-Her:e

ina airspace, hy patrolling a no-fly

FZ .

2. Giving 'upporI' U [roops on

ground, a[ their reques[, shou J

feel [hrea[ened by superior for e w

carryingou[ [heir du[ies.

3. Car ry in g ou[ a pp rove d air sr

agains[ Jesigna[ed rargets, again in

ordinarion wi[h the UN.

the powder keg of Europe. Sarajevo

been[he place where the tinder-box o

FirsI Wor ld War h ad b ee n i gn it ed ,

[he resul[ing slaugh[er of million

Europe's young men. Th e [ribal feu

he[lveen CroaI's, Bosnians, Albanians

Serhs, [he machina[ions o f the B

H'lIld, the Communis[s versus Ce[

and mher hiner dispu[es, had all see

ancien[ hisrory, relega[ed the di

past , a s long as [he menac e o f t he

War hung over every[hing. In [he

'oviet era, however, all [he old har

which haJ hecn fes[ering below

,urface , re-emerged, hringing with t

genocide on ,1 scale thought impossib

[hemode rn world.

Far from heeding [he lessons of the

on [he difficul[y of interceJing be[w

these permanently warring fac[ions

Yugoslav panisans had h el d down fi

German divi s ions during the e

World War), ATO wok i[ upon i[s

assume responsibility for [he implcm

tion of [he mili[ary aspects o f t h e P

Agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina.

of iI S s el f -a ppointe d duti e s incluJed

pa[rols, which would main tain an a

presence in [he skies ove r [h is unh

country.

Set up on 12 April 1993, eny ligh

given three missions:

Operation Deny Flight

Wi[h [he break-up of the former

Yugoslavia, following [hedeath of Marshal

Tiw, who h'lll held wgether [he widely Jif

fcring factions anJ rradi[ ional enemies

since 1945, [he area of [he Balkans had

once more resumed iIS tradi[ional r ol e as

Post-Gulf Operations

A·10 of the Massachusetts Air National Guard s 104th Fighter Group moving down

the runway at Aviano, Italy, in readiness to participate in NATO air strikes against the

Bosnian Serbs. USAF

Seen at Spangdhelm Air Ba se in Ge rma n y thisA-l0, 81-0962 of the 81st FS illustrates

the fulldownlock of theundercarriage configurationalongwith theBlack Panther

logo on herengine fairing atop hertwo-tone paint scheme. Smon Watson

CHAPTER EVE TEE

teadying resen e

Since [heA- I a f inal ly proveJ iI S power in

Deser tStorm, i t ha sbe en a c[ ive over vari

ous flashpoinrs a round [he world. In each

case, the arrival of[ha t distinc[ive silhou

cue has gi v en [ he agg resso r pause f or

[houghI', and a feeling of securi[y [0 [he

men on [he ground surrounded by hostile

clements.

Upgrades Announced

A i r ~ r o ~ g r o l l n d ;.lCtlonagan:-.r I raqitargcb in tht'

Per>i n Gul( \l 'atm y have saved the Thunder·

holt I.. ,(ml11 imminent retirement. Although

,en' ice offici I h d predicted hefl)re the \\' r thar

II USAF A·I 0, \l'ould either he releg;ltwllOrhe

honey rdnr turnedm'Cr t h eUS Army, current

th inkingh , turned toupgrades th t \li11 gi\'C the

clircr;.lft improved m i ~ : - . i o n c a p a h i l i t i e s . ~ 2

etais

Shotdown by Optcal AAA. 2 0 nm SW of Kuwait Cit y

Piot KIA

Shot down by IR SAM. 60nm NWof Kuwait City

Piot KIA

Shotdown by IR SAM. 60nm NW of Kuwait City

Piot POW

OA·10shot down by IR SAM. 62nm NWof Kuwait Cty.

Piot POW

Hit by IR SAM.crashed at base. Piot unharmed

OA· O hit by IR SAM. crashed on landingat KKMC.

Piot KIA

the t a rg et a reap r io r to target aCLJui:lition GHI:-.ed

much, i fno tmo re , anxiety ~ i n c e the Iraqi : o l ~d i e r ~ were unsure o f t h e h o ~ n target.

This new programmewasin addition ro the

LA TE improvemen[s [hal' had a l re a Jy

been announced for abou[ nine[y of the

s even- to fifteen-year-olcl A-las. Colonel

Chrisropher Russo, [he A-I a programme

manager a[ the acramenro Air Logis[ics

Cente r, McCle ll a nd AFB, California,

announced inJuly 199I [hal ' [ he I 50 -m il

l ion LA TE programme was scheJuled for

completion by l at e 1 992 , wi[h GeneralDynamic' as the prime conrraeror. Beyond

[hal' he predic [ed the ins[allarion of a

F UR , o r nigh[-vision goggle-comparihlc

cockpit l ight ing, ro improve the A-I 's

nigh[-figh[ing capabil i ties. In adJi[ion, 'A

global posi[ioning system is an op[ion

under sruJy, and the first improved dara

moJem sys[ems (lDM ) - similar ro auto

matic mrge[ hand-off sy st ems - wil l sran

being ins[al led in Ime 1996. ' ''

No doub[ [hey became very sure immeJi

atelyafter l

In summer 1991, following an evalua[ion

of [he A-la's 's[erling performance':::, [he

upgrading of [he Thunderbo [ II's capabil

i t ies were announced:

Cp tRch Biey

1st Lt Patrck Olson

Lt Robert JamesSweet

Cpt Steven Richard P hi s

Lt·Col Jeffrey 0 Fox

Piot

Cpt Richard DaleStorr

79·130

76-537

79·181

77-197

78-222

22Febr

27Feb

A·10 Gulf War losses

ate lfcraft

2 Feb 80-248

15 Feb

15 Feb

19 Feb

o martel ' howmuch they m ight have Jis

liked the iJea, by its JeeJs the A-IO

proved its critics wrong. Among others,

L ieu tenant-Gene ra l Char l es A . Horner

was gracious enough to aJmit, 'I takeback

all the bad things I've ever said about the

A-las. I l ove them . They're s av ing our

asses.' : :; Back in Washing[on, DC, the Air

Force Ch ie f o f Staff, General Merrill A.McPea k, r e- qu es ti on eJ [ he im mi n en r

re[irement of t he A- IO from [he USAF' s

invenwry. He was qumeJ as saying in Feb

ruary 1991, 'We 're going to keep [he A-IO

in [he inventory asfaras [he eye can see.' :

Thischangeof hean was des[ineJ , howev

er, nm [0 ou[-las[ [he en J of [he war for

long.

Wha [e ve r t he A ir Force migh[ [hink,

[he enemy haJ the I s measure in full.

On e Iraqi Army BrigaJier General, taken

prisoner af[er having his commanJ raken

apart by t he A -I , JeclareJ emmionally

[har thi' aircraft, above al l else, haJ 'won[he war ' f or [he Allies. Anmher Iraqi

colonel ta[eJ [he following:

shift of the FSCL, anJ i t was shifted back

w the south again, this was only for a brief

perioJ befo re i t was again moveJ back to

the Euphrates R i v e r : ~In t he e n J, there was no final 'Hawg

cull' of aJJam's fines[ to rounJ off the A

la's outstanJing accomplishments.

[hough the A-las ' achievcmenrs

were J u ri n g [ he Gu lf War,

e sc ape of a l ar ge propon ion of [he

can GuarJ ,: wi[h more [han 700

[ he ir bes[ [anks, many o f t he m T

took [heeJge of f [he vicI'ory. Cer

, [his ' reverse Dunkirk' meanr [hat

Husscin has haJ enough mili[ary

ro b e proppeJ up since thaI' [ime,

ro cru h very harshly [wo immeJiate

Various Army commanJers have

e b ee n c en so re d a n d d e fe n Je d in

w [his los[ opportunity, but one

s t ion [ha t did arisc wa 'Where was

A iI Force1 :2

faer, noblamecan be artacheJ for [he

lican Guard's reprieve from what

J certain annihilation. As early a

even ing of 25 Feb ruar y, I raqi army

inrercep[s revealed w [he Jo inrSur

an J Targe[ Auack RaJa I ' y s[ em

AllieJ Inrelligence that 'a general

of I raqi forces was unJer way': . I f

Armycould nm CUI them off, then [he

Force coulJ have been thrown in ,It

w reJuce their numbers. It JiJ not

pen. Ce rt a in ly, the A i r Force planneJ

a n a tt ac k, b ut the C- in -C, at the

of VII Corps CommanJer General

M. Franks, moveJ the Fire u p

Co-orJination l ine (FSCL) u p a s f ar

Euphrates River. This was no Joubt

by fear of more frienJly-fire inci

In faer , the Republican GuarJ was

outsiJe the area where AllieJ aircoulJ strike an J [herefore paralyse

IyA II ieJ force able to h i t the enemy.

the rules of engagement, such tar

coulJ o nl y h av e b ee n t ak en unJer

proviJeJ there was clear direction

FA s. There were obviously none on

grounJ that far forward, and baJ

t her mean[ that, for the most pa rt ,

were n o a ir bo rn e F AC s e it he r.

ugh the A iI Force protesteJ a t th is

issed Opportunity?

t r oye J an Iraqi raJio intercept truck

for [he pi1m.:

A-IO and two OA-IOs were com

losses in theGulf War, while a funher

were JamageJ in comlat. Of

,Tfouneen, tcn wcre returneJ [() action

one Jay, anJ a ll bu [ one flew again

ng the war, proving the resilience of

A -I . A funhcr [hirty-seven aircraft

JamageJ [() varying Jegrees through

acciJen[ Jamage.:'·'

146 147



A STEADYING PR ESEN C E- POST GULFOPERATIONS A STEADYING PRESE CE - POST GULFOPERATIONS

Domestic upset and violence have

b ee n c on f in e d t o t h e Balkans o r t h e

d le Eas t. The old American patrona

the Monroe D octrine sawnell applic

in the rene\\ al of anorher old feud.

t i me , i t w as t h e a n ci e n t e n mi t y b e t

t\\ o tiny island nations in the C aribb

t h e D o mi n ic a n Republic an d t he

party dictatorship of Haiti. Claims b

Haitian president for the Republic re

bled t h os e m a de by Saddam H u ss e

relation to Kuwait; and thos e c la im s

met by an equally fierce and active re

o n t he part o f t h e U S A.

In Se ptem be r , the s e threats led to

mounting of Operation UI hol.d. Demo

Operation Uphold

Democracy - Haiti

deployed from Westfield, Ma sachusett

6 A u gu s t, f or a two-month spell in the

r ol e. A s s u ch , t h e y w or ke d w i t h g r

f or ce i n d ir e ct i ng a nd c o- ordina tin

strikes and ground fire by A T O f

While conducting s uc h m i i on s the A

c am e u nd er sustained attack from

ground, and o n o n e sortie one a ir cr af t

0626) had no less than six AMs laun

against it,all of which it avoided. 0 A

w er e l os t i n e i th er o f these two miss

Retaliatory strikes werein order a n

lOstoted full combatordnance int

Bosnian skies. Along with the Ave

the Maverick and the A /ALQ-131

pod, chaffand anti-missile flares were

r ied in ter n ally ,a s w ell a s dumb bomb

IM-9M Sidewinder missiles.

Operation Deliberate Force

a n d o u t to safety via Croatia and the Adri

atic. This episode was thc highlight o f t h e

deployment of the tw o u nits, which both

r e tu r ne d ta te s id e on 3June.

The scope of ATO airactivity over Bosnia

increased in autumn 1995, with the estab

lishment of Operation Deliberate Force. This

led to the planned deployment ofC A S and

other aircraft to enforce the compliance of

t h e U N peace resolutions on a truculentand

devious Serb government.

Fresh Thunderbolt lis, with Air National

G ua rd u ni t 3 FS J 04 FW), were

Taxiing inthe earlymorning sunshineat theLas Vegas Air Show. Nevada.Apri l 1998.

is A l0 Nbr. 00274. New OrleansBaby . a DesertStormveteran assignedto the55th

Fighting Fifty-Fifth ) FighterSquadron. 20th FighterWing. Kengo Yamamoto

Frontalstudyof two A-lOs onthe main runway at Davis-MonthanAFB. Tucson. Arizona, in February 1998.

Thedihedralof theouter wing panels can be seen clearly onthe nearest aircraft Nbr. 80159), as canthe

raised cockpit positionsof bothaircraft. KengoYamamoto

Dynamics/Lockheed F-16C Viper. During

spring 1995, the SlO th s p lac e in the front

line wa taken by A/OA-l u n its f ro m

home, with the 303rd F i gh te r q ua d ro n

442nd Fighter Wing) deploying to Aviano

along with A-lOs from t h e 4 6 th F 917

FW), from Barksdale AFB, Louisiana.

The porency o f t he e r b d e fe n ce s w as

revealed when o ne o f their SAMs shor

down a n F -1 6C on 2 June 1 99 5. A r es cu e

force was despatched a t o n ce to f in d Cap

tain Scott O Grady, the pilot, before the

Serbs did. Marine Corps CH-53 helicopters

were despatched o n t he S AR mission, and

flying shorgun o n t h em went a p ai r of A

lOs from the 917th FS They escorted the

helos outof Bosniawith the rescued airman,

I n A p ril 1 99 4 , the squadron was dcacti

vated, but it wa reactivated again on I

J uly in the same year, still at Aviano. On 5

August 1 99 4, in the S arajevo Exclusion

Zone EZ), the Bosnian S e rb A r my B A)

s eiz ed a n u mb e r o f he a vy w e apons from

the lIidza weapons collection site. Includ

i ng i n t h i s humiliating h ijac k w as a 76mm

M-78 Tankbuster, a m o bile , tracked, anti

tank gun. Fortunately, t h e A - IO w as a b le

to rctaliate in short order. C alled on to the

scene, i t u se d i ts GAU- in earnest, and,

firing of f s om e 600 rounds, totally demol

ished the gun b ef or e i t could be us ed

against i ts f o rm e r o w ne r s. The BA then

returned the other weapons it ha d s tole n.

A nother incident took place on 22 ep

tember 1994, when the BA madean attack

on a F r en c h a r mo u re d p e rs o nn e l c ar r ie r AP ) , a g ain near arajevo, with a f or c e

that included a he a vy ta nk. U PROFOR

requested an air strike and two RAF Jaguar

a ir cr a f t r e sp o nd e d, a l on g w it h 1 single

O A -I , w hi ch shot up the Bosnian erb

tank. It h a d b e e n found w ithin the 20-km

EZ around the town.

ince the end of 1994, the SlOth has

g iv en u p the A-IO for the new, single

seat, single-engine multi-role General

support of IFOR s Operation Joint Endeav-

our. D ur ing this time, CAS and a ir s tr ike

sorties over Bosnia-Her:egovina totalled

2 7, 0 77 , a f ai r percentage o f t h e 100,420

m iss ion s f low n b y a ll a ir a r m s .

The A-IO f e atu re d la rg e in these mis

siems. The opposition would not be

impressed by talk alone, oreven by a show

of force, for the nell Russia was justas pro

tective of i ts Ba lka n s o u sin s a s it ha d be e n

under the Czars a n d t h e Soviets. However,

practical demonstration of the firepower

of the A -1 O d id eventually sink home,

e v en t o the warringparties.

The nine ATO countries that were

involvedin and contributed aircraftto these

missions were France, Germany, Italy, the

I e th er Ia nd s, o rw ay , p ai n, T ur ke y, the

n ited K ing d om and the nited tates.Twelve O A /A -l s w er e b as ed at Aviano

Airbase, Italy. These were from SlOthFight

e r q ua dr on , w hi ch h ad m ov ed i n f ro m i ts

base at pandahlem, G e rm a ny . Be tw e en

1993 and 1994, sporting the ir ne w Ghost

Grey paint scheme, this unit flewmore than

1,700 combat sorties over Bosnia-Herzegov

ina; its members were subsequently named

Bosnia Buzzards . They did not just threat

e n , b u t bit aswell.

26this isWarthog 78626 seen ato n 3 0 July 1998. Frank A. Hudson

nder the S upreme Allied Commander

op e ACEUR), th es e m iss ion s w e re

a te d t o the C ommander-in-C hief,

e d For c es Southern Europe ClNC

based at aples, Italy, who in

delegated theC om mander, II ied Air

Southern Europe COMAIR

whose HQ was a ls o i n a pl es .

tual ope r ational c ontrol of the day

missions and sorties was the respon

ofthe C ommander, 5th AlliedTac

ir Force, based at Vicenza,Italy, with

co-ordination done via HQ at

a n d S a ra j ev o v ia I iais on o f fic er s

TO a nd t he U ni te d ations

For c es NPROFOR). On 23

1993, ATO committed CA units,

hich A-I s predominated. A do:en

s ofthe 52nd Fighter Wing wereinisent from Spangdahlem in Germany,

wererelieved periodically by both Air

e Reserve a nd A ir ational Guard

s , a ll w o rk ing o ut o f Aviano, Italy.

whole operation r a n f o r a p e rio d of

d ay s, f in al ly being terminated on 2

1995, when the Implementa

Force IFOR) assumed responsibility

B os ni an a ir sp ac e. With this, Deny

transitioned into Decisive Edge in

Starboardquarter view of Battle Creek,

172 FS at Macdill AFB, 18 April 1998.

A. Hudson

148 149



A STEADYI G PRESENCE PO ST- G UL F O PERATIONS A STEADYI:- :G PRESENCE POST GUI_F OPERATIONS

peration Southern Watch 05W

This operation began i n 1 99 2, wit

mi sion to enforce the FZ belo

32nd para l le l i n I raq. Working fro

Jaber Airhase, Kuwait , the A II ied a

fly patrols to monitor Iraqi move

and deployments. The A/OA-lO ha

a t t h e forefront of this operation fro

s t ar t , a nd ove r the years manyuni t sbeen on th ree-month rotations of

from the mainland USA, includin

Reserve and Air ational Guard

Typical of t he deployments was

made by the 1 3rd F igh t er Squadron,

l l th Fighter Wing, from Willow

Air Reserve ration (AR , near Ph

phia, Pennsyh'ania. The Wing sent t

A-lOs with 36 unit members to A

AI- Jaber, Kuwai t, hecoming the

peration orth rn

Provide omfon end 'd \I 1A.{:Cfllltt:l

to be replaced byOp fa l lon

0 W), inJanuary 1997, flldare was for a six-month I

reviewed by the Turkish pmh III I

June and D ec em be r. h ar g d \ ing the FZ north of th th I I

Iraq and monitoring I raqi o ll l l h \I

non-compliance) with • I

tions 67 , 6 7 and 6 , the op r.1l11

defined not as 'an aggre sion again,t I

a violat ion of itssovereignty, [bur] a n

sary and legit imate mea ur to l imit

aggressive air activities .211 Not surpri

Iraq s rulerdid not see i t that way and

the Western media to continue towag

paganda protestinghis country s inno

a nd t o expose the wickedness of the

Western air forces.This policy led to a

ually escalating number of incident .The American contingent is sup

by the Uc European Command with

forty-five aircraft and more t ha n

personnel hased at Incirlik Airbas

Turkey, and is currently command

Brigadier General David A. De

USAF, and Brigadier General avas

iturk, Turkish Air Force (TAF). Afte

ing part in many o f t he earlier p

A/OA- Os ceased to be employed i

operation, although in an emergenc

are in a position to be f lown in qu

The more l ikely use for the A-lO re

in the south, with Kuwait as vulnera

ever, a nd t he A/OA-l 0 continues t

gainful employment at t he c en e

greatest triumph.

them at every tu rn . I n a be la t ed eff or t to

help the Kurds of Iraq, who were being sys

tematically eliminated by the Iraqi army,

two FZs covering northern and southern

Iraq were established. This was to prove to

be an ongoing commitmenr, which conrin

ues to thisday. In order to cu rt ai l addam s

gunships and jets joining in, the United

Na tions s et up a Combined Task For ce

(CTF) to enforce these :ones, and Opera

tion Provide omfon came into being.

Four A-l0 Thunderbolt l istaxi atAhmedAI Jaber Air Base Kuwait. before takingoff

fora combat patrol mission overIraq. Morethan 230 personnel and 18 aircraft were

deployedfrom 74th FighterSquadron in supportof Operation Southern Watch. USAF

US Air Force A 10Thunderbolt II groundcrewrunfromthe aircraftafterperforming

final inspections and giving approvalto launch from AhmedAI Jaber Air Base Kuwait

o n 1 2 March 1998 fora combatpatrolmission overIraq.The Thunderboltsof the 74th

Fighter Squadron were deployedfrom the 23rd FighterGroup Pope AFB North

Carolina. The A lOshavebeenflying since 1994 in supportof Operation Southern

Watch the US andcoalition enforcementofthe no flyzoneoverSouthernIraq. 000

Return to Iraq

I t was inevirable that, having failed to fin

ish offSaddam Hussein when they had him

on the ropes, the United Nations would be

faced with a recurr ing problem. The dicta

torship reasserted i tself , took cruel revenge

on those of itscitizens who had tried to take

advantage of i ts defeat , and gradually re

e me rg ed as a potent force, hell-bent on

humiliating its enemies and frustrating

autonomy, but this wis e p ol i y had been

abandoned on his death, and the price of

this was fina lly pa id i n 199 . With an

upsurge in separatist guerrilla warfare, fol

l owed by harsh r ep ri sal a tion from the

forces of the central government, another

diresitua tion arose quickly, and, seeming

ly, ou to f nowhere.

Once ag,l in, massacre a nd a tr oc it y

arou ed people in the Western World, via

selective media coverage, and ATO was

obliged to respond to the moral outrage.

peration Cobalt Flash

On 9 October 1998, Operation uhalt

lash was put in train as the Allies began

to assemble some 430 warplane, for possi

ble usage agaimt mili tary target should

diplomacy again fail to re 'olve the prob

lem. G iv en t h at t he problem i , \ irtual ly

irresolvablegiven the Balkan ,cenario and

age-old enmity, the A-I may wel l again

see action in that part of the globe.

As pa rt ofthe 31st AEW-SA, O/A-lOs

are once more on standby for hard strikes.The Serb-dominated defences a re wel l

equipped, with former oviet weaponry,

including SA-6 radar-guided missi les,

which, although noll old, arest i l l rated as

effective. They also possess h ,m d -h el d A

7 and A-16 m is si le s as w ell a many

23mm mobi leAAA systems. Many of the

AM sy t ems have been re cently upgrad-

ed and ATO planners wil l b e giving

them some respect. 2k

peration Determined Falcon

In it i at e d on 15 June 1998, Operation

Determined alcon W,lS an exercise based on

an aer ial patrol plan s imi lm to previous

ATO multinational operations, with the

r emi t to patrol the area over the Yugosla

vian borders withAlbaniaand Macedonia.

The commitmentof ground force, wasalsoa possibility, although the solid fronr hith

erto displayed s oon h eg an t o falter, with

France refusing to act, and Rus,-ia threat

en ing the vet o ove r a ny attempt t o ga in

UN approval for inrervention. In the opin

ion of the US, such approval was not nec

essary; according to France and Germany,

i t was. The Moscow-Belgrade, Yeltsin

Mi10sevic axis was as strong a, ever and,

although a i r exer c ise du ly took p l ace in

Macedonian and Alhanian airspace, and

A-IO deployment from pangdahlem and

home bases wa, a feature of this operation,

no shooting de\ Cloped.

Kosovo

further mi iom. In theevent, on learning

tha t the American force was airborne and

on irs way, the H 1itian presidenr resigned,ami the crisiswas quickly over.

A- - oon asone region of former Yugoslavia

s ee me d t o h av e b ee n pacified, violence

flared e ls ew he re . P re si de nr T it o h ad

allowed the e thnic A lban ian majority in

the Kosovo province a l ar ge degree of

the 510th FighterSquadron lifts offfromAviano Air Base Italy to crossthe

tains andthe Adriatic to carry outOperationDeliberate Force contingency relief

in supportof Operation Joint Force. USAF

January 1993 afterthesuddenend tothe Cod War the 510th FS movedto its new

e atSpangdhalemin thereunifiedGermany. Tail bands reflectedthe change with

SP codingsand theGerman national colours on thebanding. Thisis 81 0952 of

s in GhostGreydeployed atthat base. Smon Watson

inrended to be the largest combat per

air drop since the Second World

Some 3,000 paratroopers o f t he 82irborne Division were to be dropped on

Port au Prince airport, H liti.

As par t o f t he active support for this

the 75th Fighter c quad r on was

p lo ye d t o h aw AFB, South Carolina,

where they were scheduled to launch

missions for the invasion

The plan was for the -I to fly

combat s or ti es f rom h aw , and then

and replenish at Puerto Rico readyfor

750 757



Guard unit to 0rerate front-line

from Kuwait. Over a three-month

the I03rd flewa total of 931 orties

t he FAC role. This gave ANG pilots,

supply, communications and

s up po rt p er so nn el a n excellent

tunity to hone theirskills in a contin

environment in an actual milestone

n retu rn t o t he U A, t he

ami sionconversion,dur

h its A-las changed from theFAC

to the a t tack mission profile.

The A-I o· of the 74th Fighter

deployed from the 23rd Fighter

p,at Pope Air Force Base, orthCar

had been enforcing the no-fly zone

Ahmed AI-Jaber regularly since

th 'ir last deployment was in March

By February 1999, theA-I a force in

ait had been reduced to a s ingle a ir

ft , hut, should the th rea t escalate, the

arewell rlaced to b e in the forefrontdefensive measures.

A STEADYING PRESENCE POST GULF OPERATIONS

TwoA 10 aircraft ofthe 74thFighter Squadron Pope AFB deploy on the f1ightline

atthe Ahmed AI Jaber Air Base Kuwait as partof Operation SouthernWatch

USAF0 s rt Fox

1998, the Iraqi government failed to co

e with t he UN teams charged under

Secur ity Resolut ions with inspect ing

dam s chemical, toxic and suspected

arsenal. When the inspection teams

e expelled from the country, the U s

dy patrollinggave way, in December, to

action, with the briefairstrikes

Operation Desert Fox Among the many

d aircraftdeployedfor this, thirteenA

were based in Kuwait.

llie orce

the beginning of 1999, the insurrec

activities of the Ko'ovo Liberation

y, a emi-terrorist organi:ation deter

on attaining a degree of autonomy

Kosovo, or even ou tr igh t indepen

provoked a brutal responsefrom the

The e rb a rmy and police moved

the area, and carried out terrible

that provoked a mass exodusof the

van populace across the borders. Th

of the West was once more turned

to the Balkans. ATO commenced

operations, initially against Serb

trol, air-defence and mnmunition

s: A the scale ofthe human tragedy on

ground began to dictate more urgent

ion, the opera tions had to be hastily

to attacks on Serbian ground

es, whose anti-a ircraft capability was

still largely intact. The A-IO was called

upon to try and hunt down and des troy e r

bian armour in the mountainsand valleys.

The media r roduced the usual mish

mash of f ac t ami f ic t ion to de cribe the

A-IOand i t t ask. The follOWing is typical:

UGLY IW NAME, UGLY BY NATURE.

In Phase II of Operation Allied Force rhe A-I 0

Thunderholt grllllnd-arrack aircraft, known as

the '\Varrhog' hecall,e of its 11< x-like shape, will

be ca lled upon hI ATO. The Warrhog was

de,igned ro wirlbrand all but the n >r devasrat

ing impach and it ahle to ~ l r \ i \ c direct h i t ~from armour piercing r l n d ~ Lip [ 23ml11. The

21- ron plane ca rr ie , up ro 7.2 r omo f Garling

hullets and 4 of weaponry, including

,idewinder mis,de , and c luste r bombs. [The

mediaseems to remain unaware ofthe fact that

rhe Sidewinder is all air;dcfcncc and not an a n t i ~rank missile.1 Prmected hI layers[sic of heavy

nrmOUf and special titaniulll cockpit sc to

shield the pilm, the formidable armour allows it

roliterally fly through AA f ir ea s i tskims above

the ground Isicllooking for targets.

This aircraft is a beas[ . I t can stay in the air

forhours, is virtually indestructihleand when it

finds something to shoot a t the re isn t much left

of it after a few seconds. The \X/arthog is the

most deadly and most feared ground-arrack

152

aircraft in the world a, well,, heing oneof the

hardest ~ h o o [ Jown. t

The erbian defence included over lOa

AM ,a mixture of radar-guided A-2, A

3, A-6 (which brought down an F-16 over

Bosnia in June 1995), and optically guided

SA-?, SA-l4 and SA-16 systems. In addi

tion, they had 1,850 air-defence artillery

pi ec es , whi ch po sed a s ev er e threat

N TO aircraft. They had 240 combat air

craft, including MiG-21s and MiG-29s,

althoughmany of the e were earlytargetsfor

initial air strike, and they also fielded forty

attack helicopters.The army wa headed up

by l ,270tanks,includingT 72, T 74 , T55s

and M- 4s, plu 25 armoured fighting

vehicle . IThere was no shortage of targets

for the A-lOs, once fully unleashed.

Deployed to Italy again, the A-las of

the 81st Expeditionary Fighter Squadron,

from Spangdahlem AF, Germany, having

first arrived at Aviano Airbase, completed

their transfer to Giona del Colle in south

east Italy, on I I Apr i l. Tge81st EFS com

menced operations over Kosovo on Mon

day and Tuesday, 29 a nd 30 Mar ch 1999.

According to one spokesman, 'We're in an

xpeditionary minliser. This is the waywe

have to be to be responsive. Master

Sergeant James Low, the logistic pl;:mner

TwoA lOsfromthe 357th Fighter Squadronflying formation It was from thisunit with its dragon emblem and yellow tail

flash thatCaptain Craig Buttonwas flying when he disappeared on 2Apri l 997near Vail Colorado USAF

SgtTimothyKing ofthe 40th Air ExpeditionaryGroup with an Ital ianpoliceman atGioia delColle Italy

King an aircraft battle damage repairman was deployedfromthe 652nd Combat Logistics Support

Squadron McClellan AFB The A lOsat Gioia del Colle were deployedfromthe 81st FighterSquadron

SpangdahlemAB Germany andthe 74th FighterSquadron from Pope AFB North Carolina USAF

153



An Air Force Thunderbolt II pilotgetsoutof hisaircraft afterflying amission against

targetsin the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia on 30 March 1999. The pilotwas partofthe

81stExpeditionary Fighter Squadton deployed to AvianoAir Base. Italy from

Spangdahlem Ait Base Germany to support NATO s Operation Allied Force. USAF

155

Two USAF A-l0 Thunderbolt lis fromthe 81st FighterSquadronout ofAviano. ful ly

armed.just afterrefuelling on theitway to conduct astr ike againstSerbianforces in

Kosovo during OperationAllied Force. USAF

A STEADYING PR ESEN C E - POST-GULFOPERATIO S

I{ s not safe to go in there now. We'regoing in l

I'ery he;,,'\, <lir-defence system, and we aredoing

our hest nd , ne e ry successfully degrading it

while we go in. When youdegr<lde the ability to

cue tactic<llsystems such S the SA-7s, then you

;ncre<lse your ah il i t \, t o operate in different

el1\' imnmenr, and different <llritudes. It's obl'i

ously l )f increased danger when you' r e down

tower, and we h a ve t um a ke the determination

thcH we c a n c ondu ct t h e l)perations w i th t h e

appropriate amount of risk t o t h e s i tu at i on .

The media persisted: 'The shoulder-fired

SA-7s are going be there in profusion,

so you're really never going to get to the

point, are you, where you've got t he air

defenceseroded to the point where it'ssafe

to g o i n l Rear Admiral Thomas R Wil

son, Jo in t S taf f Director of Intelligence,

responded as follows:

With respect to the A-las, you get back to the

issue of t h e r obu st n es s o f [MjJosevic'sl airdefence systems. It isn 't jus t the mohile SAMs

and the communication links hetll'een them

a nd t he radms, hut there <1re thousands of

MAN PADs, a nd o n ce you g et d own helmv

15,000 feet withthe wea the r as bad < S it's heen,

huteven in good , .Ieather, wo rse in good wc,uh,

cr, you\c going to plllCC ourpi lo tsa t a trcmcn,

dOllS amountof risk, (lnt we\ c got to \veigh that

< we proceedwith this c a m p a i g n \ ~

accomplishment \vhcn it ' sover. Logistics,wise,

it's heen a l i t tlemorecha l lengingthan going to

other locationswhere CI least l quarter to; l half

of theequipment is already in place.1'4

On a v is it to the front-line flyers on ZI

April, the BritishDefenceMinisterwasseen

climbing in and out o f an A-l O However,

noconfirmedall-out combat deployment of

these aircraft was noted, even after F-ISs,

trying to do the A-lO's job from high alti

tude, h ad mis takenly b la sted Albanian

The A-lOs found themselves working

alongside both I ta lian and British aircrew,

with a GR-7 Harr ie r squadron, under

Wing Commander Graham Wrigh t, also

deployed from that field. They wereable to

talk to each o ther on theground, shar ing

information that would aid their co-oper

ation on similarmissionsin the air. At this

stage, the A-lOs were flying CSAR mis

siems. Vice Admiral Scott A Fry Joint

Staff Director of Operations, DoD, when

asked why the A-lOs were not 'being used

for what they're designed for - rake out

tanks and armour', replied as follows:

154

Thunderbolt lis fromthe 355th FighterSquadron. Eielson AFB. Alaska flying overthe coast ofSouthKorea

atthe KunsanBomb Range. The A-lOsare on a liveordnancebombdrop. USAF

Below A t t h e e nd o f t h e i r first deploymentagainst Yugoslavaggresion OperationCobalt Flash. the

81st Squadroncontr ibuted A-lOs.At theend ofthat phase. and with the winding downof Operation

Joint Force. thisA-l0 isseen atAviano on 9 November 1998. preparingto return to Spangdalem. AFB.

Germany. USAF

A STEADYING PR ESENC E - POST-GULF OPERATIONS

You train II year l o ng t o do t h in g s like this.

what ifyou lI'ork 16 or 18 hours d,,\,' This

II 'h ,n i t 's a l l ahour. You get a r ea l sense of

the 40th Air Expeditionary Group

added this commenton the actual



A STEADYING PR ESEN C E POST GULF OPERATIONS

Thunderbolt II ofthe Slst FighterSquadron. carrying Maverick missiles. is

on to therunway atAviano Air Base. Italy.pendinga tank hunting

Kosovo on 3 March 1999 USAF

ered by theArmyand theAir Force to

fil the same m iss ion w e re l ead ing t

possible duplication of tha t finance.

Reviews

The United S tate s General Accoun

Office (GAO) took an in-depth look at

forces various plans to upgrade their cl

support weapons capabilities. This G

review2

; probed deeply, and i ts f inddirectly affected the 1O s future.

GA O found that, in the period 19

2001, the Army planned t o spend alm

5.5 billion todevelopand field morem

ern target-acquisition systems; the Ma

Corps p lanned to s pend 3 .2 billion

remanufacture AV-8Baircraft; and the

Force planned to spend over 547 mi l

to upgrade its target acquisition and ni

operations capabilities. However, the D

h ad n ot , a t t ha t time, de te rmined

appropriate number and type of weap

cssential for joint close-support missi

The GA O review alsofound tha t the v

ous services had taken ac tion to enha

theirown close-support capabilities, 'w

out adequately considering the capabil

of other weapons systems .

To be fair, the DoD had instituted a j

war-fighting capabilities assessmentpro

a s e a r ly a s 1 99 4, but a separate assessm

of the close-support mission had no t t

been made. Itwasclear,therefore, that u

a comprehensive assessment of joi nt

sion needs was made, the DoD could

decide which was the best moderniza

programme to fund.

Th eGAO review, therefore, took aremit a study of the following areas:

1. Military procurement.

2. Air defence systems.

3. Advanced weapons systems.

4. Combat readiness defence capabilit

5. Helicopters.

6. Air warfare.

7. Tactical air forces.

8. Fighter aircraft.

been vital t o squar e up to the re-emer

gence of genocide o n t he European scene

in the former Yugoslavia, with the atroci

t ies in Bo sn ia and Kosovo. Iraq continues

to playa cat-and-mouse game against the

UnitedNations Disarmament Delegation,

and to make increasingly demonic threats

against its neighbours, Kuwait, Saudi Ara

bia and Turkey. North Korea remains

determined continue i ts b e llic os ity

against the world while its people starve.

The A-I 0 continues to stand watch.S al e t o f or ei gn b uy er s w as another

option, but, desp i te firm enquiries from

countries a s f ar apart as the Middle East,

South Amer ica and Asia, none has come

to fruition. The specialized na tu re o f the

depleted uranium ammunition has often

proved a stumbling block. Mostpromising

w as a deal w ith NATO member Turkey,

announced in June 1993, for the purchase

of fifty of the mothballed A-lOs at Davis

Monthan AFB. These aircraft were to be

brought back into s e rv ice , r e fitted and

then shipped to the Turkish Air Force over

a three-year period. They were to have

been based at Eskisehir Airbase, in north

west Anatolia, south-east of Istanbul. Suf

ficient f u nd s w e re made available for the

purchase to proceed , bu t t h en t h e whole

deal fell apart d ue t o the cost of the refit

ting and support package.

Clearly, there w as a continuing r o le f or

the CAS aircraft, but, w i th Desert torm

behind them, all the arguments about the

suitability of different types of aircraft

came to the fore again. Despite the mas

sive cutbacks, defence needs and require

ments are not static, and a steady flow of

renewal and modernization is essential ifthe limited forces that are maintained

are to be efficient. The DoD continually

a ss es s ed m iss ion n e ed s , capabilities and

modernization p r op o sa ls f or the close

support mission, but, as always, each ser

vice tended to have its own priorities.

A lt ho ug h t he US e co no my remained

buoyant enough to support first-class

defences, there was clearly a limit to fund

ing, and the varying options beingconsid-

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

ossi le utur s

Cutbacks

With the collapse of theSovietUnion, the

dissolutionof the Warsaw Pact in 1991 and

the subsequent lifting of the immediate

th rea to f the invasion of Western Europe,

thc Western powers immedia t ely took

steps to reduce their defencc commit

ments. W it h t he new independence of

many former parts of the Soviet Em pir e a

bufferzone appeared, and with Poland and

the Czech Republic joining NATO, newthinking w as o b vio us ly r e qu ire d , in c as e a

change of leadership in Russia should pro

duce renewed hostility towards the West.

Across the board, large-scale reductions in

forces took place, with the wholesale lay

ing-up of comba t aircraft and closure of

bases. With a Ru ss ian p r om ise to s c ra p a

proportion of the tens of thousands of tanks

that had posed the biggest land threat to

NATO, the role o f t h e A-IO, continually

under pressure from the powerful speed

before accuracy lobby (until the tri

umphant v ind ica t ion of Desert storm),

carne under the microscope once more.

Reductions were made, both in v iab le

operating bases, and in numbers ofcombat

ready aircraft.Following the closure of such

formerly vital A-IO bases as RAF Alcon

bury, and with the recommended closure of

horne bases such a s My r tle Be a c h AFB and

England AFB, dramatic retrenchment was

the order of the d ay . Ev en a lar g e p r op o r

tion of surviving Thunderbolt-lls went

i n to mothbal l s at 'boneyard' locations,

with the 100+ cocooned a t Davis-Mon

than AFB in the dry desert air of Arizona

being the largest available reserve.

Not every A-I0 was phased out. Whilemany j oi ne d t h e various Air Na tiona l

Guard units, o th er s mai nt ai ne d t he ir

front-line status, standing watch over

strategicallysensitive locations. The world

might b e a s af er place in th eo r y, but, in

practice, the need for an accurate close

support aircraft to back up U as well as

ATO policy still exists. The removal of

the overwhelming Communist threat has

no tmean t t he e nd o f 'hot' confl icts. I t h a s

The sort i e r a tc s t ead ily buil t up during

May, but targets proved elusive, with the

Serbs making excellent use of caves, tun

nels, barns and o ther places of conceal

ment for their t an k s and h eavy weapons.

Evenso, the A-lOs, hunting byday and by

night, began to report a s teady culling of

the Serb armour, a l thoughno t on the spec

tacular scale of Desert torm as there were

no massed targets. With t h e higher-flying

aircraft committing blunders against both

refugee co lumns and wrong targets,2 M

once again, theA-I 0 getting'up close and

personal' t o t he enemy, was shown to be

the better bet.

In fact the political decision by the Pres

i de nt t o restrict all US flights above

3,000ft and limit the A -IO t o the 'seek'

role rather than 'destroy' mode, for fear of

losses, meant tha t a mere 13 Serbian tanks

were destroyed,despite incredible ATO

claims at the t im e. I n t r ut h, t h e A-lOs

w er e w as te d over Kosovo. This 'high

flight policy meant t ha t it took 2,615

sorties to kill each tank

By 4 June, the Serbshad decided to face

facts and agreed an accord, which w as , in

effect, worse than the one they could have

had six months earlier, with no casualties.

In the light of previous reneging b y Bel

grade on treaties, the A-lOs were not stood

down, but kept on wait and watch unti l

the tr oo p s, p a ra m iI iw r ie s and police,

which had so devastated K os o vo , d id

indeed withdraw.2 \

refugees - on two occasions. Apache heli

copter gunships also moved in b ut , for a

while, the A - lO s r e ma ine d chained. Not

u nt i l M ay d id the 40 th Air Expeditionary

Group become seriously engaged in hunting

down Serbian ranks and troop columns.

An A l pilotprepares foranotherpatrol

ionover theFederal Republicof Yugoslavia

Gioia delColle.Italy.in connection with

ion Allied Force. USAF

antQuentinAdkins giving the thumbsup

A l p i lo t a t t he e nd o f a r u nw a y i n s pe c ti o n

to a patrol overKosovo.flown fromGioiadel

Apri l 1999 USAF

756 757



IDjvlwill allow CAS pilots to receive moreacc

r;lte ;md t imely targe t ing infonnation fro

some F-16s) for the night-targeting syst

for thei rcont inuedCAS role. They c

ment ed t hat , a l though the Ai rForce

longer-range CAS aircraft by retiring

A-7s in the early I990s, 'it now emp

A/OA-Ws and multi-role F- I6s for C

The A/OA-IO, specifically designed

CAS, is able tocarrya large amountof

nance, can loiterin the battle area for u

l. 7 hours, and wasdesigned to survive l

airdefences at lowaltitudes.'They claim

that the F-16 had greater speed and

able to engage targets from higher altitu

than the A/OA-lO, but did nor comm

on itsdegree of accuracy

Among the various services ' p lans

modernizing close-support capabilities

fiscal years 1996-200 I, the projected c

for the Thunderholt-II programme (

A/OA-IO CAS upgrades) were as foll

(figures in millions o fUS dollars): R

52.1; procurement - 225 .1 ; total- 27The Air Force's stated policy was

improve its fixed-wing CAS capabilit

by providing, among other things, n

capability and a digital data-burst com

nications system, known as improved d

modem (IDM), to its A/OA-IO airc

POSSI L FUTUR S

generalization surely applied to those air

craft that had not beendesigned for the job,

bu t t h e A-lO was not excluded, except in

thesta tement that,of all the services aircraft

pelforming CAS (Air Force A/OA-I Os and

F-16s, avy F/A-18s and A-6Es, and

Marine Corps F/A-18s and AV-Bs), 'only

the A/OA-IO was designed specifically for

CAS functions'.

Between June 1993 and October 1995,

the commit tees reviewed the DOD's and

the s er vi ce s r eq u irements-generations

process and thei r previous reports o n t he

acquisition process. They obtained infor

mation from t heJo i n t Staff o n t h e devel

opmentof t heJWCA process and assessed

the capabilities and characteristics of

existing close-support systems, reviewed

technical manuals, doctrinal puhlications,

and service documents, and held discus

sions withusers in operational units. They

discussed capabilities, force structure, andoperational i ssue s acros s the whole

defence spectrum and carried out observa

tions of training and exercises. Included in

thei r in-depth study was t he A ir Force

CAS and A rmy fire-support t rai n ing a t

the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort

Irwin, California.

Th e most notable improvements includ

ed the upgrading of t he A/OA-IOs (and

In 199 I , P ie rr e Sprey wrote the following

about esert Storm

The low-tech A - I 0 - much despised hI' USAi r

Force hr<lss - W l the real he ro o f t h e <lir war.

Even th<lligh it represented only one-twelfthof

the fighter force, it flew o n c ~ t h i r d ofthe sorries

and <lccounted I r two-thirds o f t h e t ,mk k i ll s

c l aime d du ri n g t h e ;- r c ampa i gn a nd he tt e r

th ,mnine - tenths of the artillery kills. Ir domi

na ted the inte rdic t ion cunpa igns againsr rhe

ro'ili. The aircraft pro ed tough enough t o su r

vive the a n t i ~ a i r c r < l f t exposure and fire anti

rankMaverick missiles, while the F-16s, F-I I I,

and F-ISs were ju s t too vulne rahle to gmund

guns to heuseahle in this rolc. 241

The proposed p la n t o replace the A-lOs

w it h F -1 6s wa s, as Mr Sprey sta ted on

another occasion, ' one of t he most monu

mentally fraudulent ideas t ha t t he Ai r

Forcehas everp e r p e t r a t e d : ; ~

In the overall scheme of thing s i t was

acknowledged t ha t t he fixed-wing aircraft

f il le d a n iche , b eing capab le of carrying

heavier weapons against hardened rargets,

and having greater speed and range than

attack helicopters.They also stated, howev

er, that 'they have moredifficulty in identi

fying and acquiring targets and providing

accurate strikesfrom higheraltitudes'. This

Immaculatein thenew two-tonegreypaintscheme apair ofA-lOs from the 343rd Tactical Fighter Wing

headout into thenorthernskies. Each carries the emblem GunsmokeChampions atopher red-tipped

tailplane. USAF

forward uni t deep in such terra in, relying

on artillery that could not penetrate close

enough, or was beyond the endurance of

short-range helicopters l

In 1994, theJoint Chiefs ofStaff estab

lished the JWCA process t o p rovi de

insight into issues involving joint war

fighting requirements. A y ea r l at er , this

was renamed the Land and Li ttora l Wa r

fare JWCA, to assess joint close-support

mission needs and capabilities. TheGAO

recommended that, to assist the Secretary

for Defen se in determining whether and

which proposed enhancements to c1ose

support systems should be funded, and in

what quant i t ies a nd o rd er of priority , a

comprehensiv cross-service assessment of

overall joint close-support mission needs,

existing close-support systems cmd

planned enhancements should be set up

on a routine basis, perhaps within thecon

text of the JWCA. They would determine

which systems should be enhanced and

which should not.

The inventory ofSystems Used to Pro

vide Close Support gave the following

rundown figures for the Thunderbol t -II in

three fiscal years: FY 1990 - 639 ; FY 1994- 38 1; FY 2001 (projected) - 3 66 . Thus,

ou t of a projected total of 1,191 fixed-wing

CAS aircraft(F-16 andOA-10s), less than

halfwere to beA-lOs,despite the fact that

the F-16was not built for the job. The Air

Force continued to be reluctant to admit

t ha t t heA-I0 wasa better aircraft t han t he

F-16 for the CAS role, but this attitude

was the subject of knowledgeable criticism

from sources v n inside the Pentagon.

Il lustrating howthetricycle undercarriageall folds forward.this Battle Creek Hawg

isfromthe Air National Guards 11 th Fighter Group working outof W K Kellogg

Airport,Michigan. USAF

POSSI L FUTUR S

and can at high alti tudes to avoid air

defense systems.'

The report found that, since the mid

1980s, the services had all wo rk ed t o

increase efficiencyof existing systems: 'The

Air Force hasadded limited night capabil

ity to the A/OA-tO. ' It was alsofound that,

while some of the various services upgrades

might enhance other mission capabilities,

others , 'such as the upgrades to t he A ir

Force A/OA-l Os are designed specifically

to improve close-support capabilities'.

D ue t o the fact t ha t t he DoD had not

then determined the appropriate number

and type of weapons it neededfor the joint

close-support mission, the lack ofan overall

assessment had allowed the services to

improve their capabilities in this fie ld uni

laterally. The Air Force, for example, had

decided inMay 1994 to modifyits A/OA-I 0

aircraft ratherthan procure a new aircraft

solely for CAS. This decision was made,

however, 'without considering whether

attack helicopters and artillery could satis

fy some ormos t ofthe CAS requirements'.

The Army, in its submission to t he Com

mission on Roles and Missions of the

Armed Forces, acknowledged that theadded firepower of rockets, artillery and

attack hel ic op te rs h ad 'substantially

reduced the need for fixed-wing fire sup

port'. Improvements to artillery andat tack

helicopterspermit the Army to engage tar

gets that could formerly only be attacked

by fixed-wing aircraft, the report went on.

The report does not s eem to have consid

e reda Vietnam-type conn i ct in dense jun

gle, and how th iswould affect CAS for a

services have developed I,lrge numher of

that can he lIsed for closesupport. Some

specifically for the close-support

, while others were developedas tl1ulti

weapons that Gll1 <llso perform interdiction,

or l i r ~ . l l l p C r i ) r i t y missions.

ugh the systems itemized for study

to include t he A-IO itself 2\S i t was

that this premier CAS aircraft

constantly appear in the findings.

28 June 1996, the Congressional Com

vi w was presented by Richard

is, Director, National Security Analy

His report s ta ted that, in the six years

2001, the military services had a

s pe nd i n excess of \ 0.5 billion

aircraft and other systems t o improve

capabilities. Such ambit ionsdid not

well at a time 'of reduced defense bud

, force structure reductions and ques

about affordability of future defense

programs'2 '.

r epor t therefore discussed the

capabilities o f t he military ser

to provide close support and the

to which thosecapabilit ies contin

to be modernized and enhanced as well

the process the DoD used tocapabilitiesand mod

proposal for the close support

The report wasdescribedas being

of our broader effort to assess how

can bet ter adapt its combat air power

future needs' ; .

subject was defined thus: 'Close

weapons fire on targetscloseto US

forces and, asa result, are likely to

uence t he ou tcome of a battle.' They

t o n to describe the background as

listing the various services systems,

report defined the targets as 'enemy

s; ranks and other fighting vehicles

ery; fortifications; command, control

communicationssystems; air defences

racticallogistical support units ' .I t a lso

i t ted t hat , a s c lo se support was a

for such a broadrange of comsituations, there was ' no one simple,

answer. Therefore, close

systems of choice will vary, based

t he specific mission at hand , t h rea t

time of day, weather concli

and proximity to forces needing sup

Acknowledging the role of artillery

a t tack helicopters, it went on to say

'Fixed-wing aircraft have greater

and range than attack helicopters

158 159



POSSIBLE FUTURES POSSIBLE FUTURES

7

An A l0 pilotmakes last minute adjustments a s h e sett les into hisseatpriorto a

mission. Perched up high and forward an A l0 driverhas an all roundview for those

timeswhen laserswill nothelp himidentifya Serbiantankfroma civilian b u s.F 1 7 s

and the like lack such abilityto eyeball theirtargets before releasing theirordnance

as events in Kosovoshowed onlytoo clearly. USAF

Extending the Life of the A-I

theAir Force's overall capability'. It w

also reduce the Amer ican comman

options: 'Having multiple means of at

is a distinct advantage for a comma

because it forces the enemy to defend i

against multiplethreats.'The withdraw

the CAS role would mean 'the loss o

ability to react and deploy quickly', w

was inherent in such aircraft as the A

'With fewer a ircraf t in t he A ir Fo

inventory that are capable ofCAS, de

may occur beforesignificantassets arriv

theatre to perform that mission.' Fin

t he y h ad to acknowledge that 'sha

reducing thenumbero fUS aircraft cap

of providing close air support would el

nate many of the aircraft that contrib

to an early victory in the Gulf War

helpedto keep downthe loss of US Iive

Perhaps, then, the A/OA-lO is ass

of a prolonged existence as a front

battle aircraft, as it surely deserves.

Air Data Recorder ADR

The collection and analysis of flight da

v ital i f the AlOA-10 fleet is t o b e k esafe, effective and viable instrumentof

for such an extended period. The struc

integrity programme is an essentialfact

the safety of flight under such condit

Although forty of the Thunderbolt-IIs

already fitted with airdata recorders, t

own mean time betweenfailure (MTB

only 245 hours and they arealready o

lete and becoming unsupportable. UProgramEl ement 0207131 F, initiated o

September 1996, the life of the new A

will be approximately ten t imes as l

2,400 hours. The Air Force is there

looking hard at the possibility of util

the mega data transfer cartridge (MD

as a nADR to do the job. Should this p

feasible it would allow every A-LO sti

service to collect the necessary da ta

would be cost-efficient, requiring no

Extending the life of a fighting air

f rom its o rigina l 8 ,000 hours (unt i l

2005) , rev is ing i t to L2,000 hours

2016), and then to an incredible 18,

24,000 hours (FY 2028), is an enorm

undertaking. ot surprisingly, a hos

mod if ic at io ns a nd imp ro vement s

deemed essential to keep the A-lOs fl

for that long. Some of the most impor

are described below.

767

There were, however,significant drawbacksto this option. Eliminating one-quarter of

the F-16s would limit the ability of theAir

Force to carry out its other multi-role mis

sions and ' r ep resen t a majo r reduc t ion in

Half a c en tu ry o n, e ve ry th in g had

changed, but nothinghad changed'

The advantages of hand ing over all

aspects ofCAS to the Army were outlined

as follows:

which included close air support as well as

BAI, and that , as numbers of A-lOs had

declined,assigned increasing numbers of F

I6s to that mission. None the less, the fact

remained that, since the F-L6 is a mul t i

role aircraft, it is 'not l ikely to be as well

sui ted to the CAS mission as the A-lO,

which wasdesigned specifically for it'.Nor,

in v iew of the F-16's other commitments

('of more importance to t he A ir Force'),

wou ld i t necessa ri ly be ava ilab le when

required, or sowell trained. The summariz

ing of these factors highlighted Army com

manders' concerns 'that Air Force aircraft

might not be available whe n t he A rmy

needed them to provide air support'm.

Discussion was then madeof the Army's

latest efforts to provide its own airborne

firepower. It might havebeen 1961 allover

again, or the Vietnam Wardebate , o r the

Korean War arguments that led t o t he

Skyraider, oreven those heated exchangesbetween Allied land and air forces com

manders in Tun isia in December 1942.2il

Indeed, sobad had things become in 1942

that the Assistant Secretary of War, John

J. McCloy, went to look a t t he CA S posi

tionfor himself. His conclusion was bleak:

That change would simplify opermions since the

Air Force would not helve [0 co,ordinatc its elir

strikesso closely with theArmy in o rder to avo id

atmcking (riendly troops. Moreover, t he A ir

Force could retire all of its A-lOs and reduce the

numher of rypes of aircraft in i t s inventory, there

by realizing some budgetarysavings ... retiring all

of theAir Force's A-lOs andabout one-qu>lrter of

irsF-16s wouldreduce the size of the AirFo rceby

about five wings. Such a reduction in (orce could

save 120 million in 1998 and 3. 2 hill ion over

the next five years in operating costs. ;)

It is my firm belief t h a t r h e A i r Fo rcesare not

interested in this type of work, think it is

unsound, and arc very tnuch concerned lest it

resul t in control of air units by grnund forces.

The ir interest,enthusiasm and energy is direct

e d t o different f i d d s . ~

Even rhough the Air Fo rce has had responsihil

ityfor prnviding close airsupport (CAS) t o t h e

Army for the past fifty years, several defence

exper ts have expressed c onc e rn s a nd douh t s

abour rhe willingness or ability o(the Air Force

to do soadequately. TheCAS mission involves

attacking hostile t<1rgets that are near friendly

forces and requiresclose co-ordination with the

Army. Although the Air Fo rce has airplane,

t h e A - I0, rha r is dedicared s ol e ly t o r h e CAS

mission, the service has perimlically attempted

to eliminme all of the A- lOsfmm itsforce struc

ture. The A ir Forcestill has 169 A-lOs, but that

is fm (ewer t ha n t h e 400 it fielded i n 1 98 8.

Moreover, more than half ofthe remaining ~ l i r ~craft a rc in the reserve components.

2S1

It was acknowledged t ha t t he A ir Force

had traditionally allotted 25 per centof its

fighter 8ircr8ft to ground-attack missions,

believes that fixed-wing CAS is s t il l requi red

a nd t h a t it the re fore inrcnJs to rC[ lin primary

CAS responsibilities and rhe means to execute

them. As a result, t he A ir Force is now com

mitted to retaining A/GA-IO aircraft a nd t o

modernizingthe A/GA-I 0 ami F-16aircraft for

the CAS role. Al though t h e A i r Force had

planned to retire all of its A/GA-IOs as early as

fiscal year2002, it now plans to mainta in316 of

these ai rcraf t in its force structurethrough fiscal

year 2 0 2 8 . ~

Therefore, barring another sudden reversal of policy, it seemed that the A-LO was

assured of an ex tension to its already long

life. Lt seemed that, against all the odds,

this highly individualistic aircraft would

playa lead ing role in combat air warfare

for the foreseeable future. 24 1

However, the problem would not go

away andArmy fears were once again res

urrected in March 1997 during the Con

gressional Budget Office's review on ways

of further cutting back on defence spend

ing.2\ Once more, the same argumentsand

counter-arguments were pa ins takingly

reviewed, as they had been so many times

previously. There was still much doub t

a bo ut t he s in ce ri ty a nd c ommi tment o f

the USAF to the CAS role:

re-evaluation compared with the attitude

held in the L960s.

Personalitieshad much todo with theAir

Force's disdain for CAS and, in December

1994, a change in the Air Force Chief of

Staffbrought about another abrupt change

of position. In December, the commission

was informed that theAir Force now

other indirect costs between fiscal years

1995-2001.

The potential loss o f t he A /OA- lO s

woulJ force the Army to rely more on its

attack helicopters for CAS than i t h ad i nthe pas t. I f t he A ir Force eliminateJ its

A/OA-I0s, i ts mul t i- role F-l6s woulJ

b ec om e t he A ir Force's primary CAS

a i r c r a f t ~ 4 IAsmigh thave been expecteJ, although

it recognized t h at th e need for fixeJ-wing

CAS had declined over time, the Army

opposed theAir Force'sproposal to down

grade Air Force CAS responsibilities. The

Army argument was that, although fixed

wing CAS h aJ Jecl ined , ' I t remains an

important capability espec ial ly in ear ly

entry operations, under circumstances

when close-support targets exceed the

range of land-based systems, <md/or when

special munitions, such as heavy anJ/or

precision-guiJed bombs , a re requireJ.:';'One Army Roles anJ Missions official

informed the committees that t he Army

was more concerned abou t the Air Force

retaining primary responsibilities for CAS

than it was about what kinJof aircraft the

Air Force woulJ use. While the Army sup

ported CAS as a primary func t ion of the

Air Force , i t considered the types and

quantities of the aircraft to be the prerog

ative o f t h e Air Force. Here was another

l. Davis-Monthan AFB, Ariz. The 355th

Wing was to gain an additional four

A-LO a ir cr af t i n l at e L995 due to

increased Air Force formal training

requirements.2. The L03rJ Fighter Group (ANG) was

to lose one OA-L0 in miJ-l996.

3. The 124th Fighter Group (ANG) wasto covert from twenty-four FAGs to

seventeen A/OA-IO aircraft from the

beginning of L996.4. The 175th FighterGroup (ANG) was

to lose one OA-l 0 from mid-I996.

5. The 104th Fighter Group (A G) was

to lose one OA-LO from mid-1996.

6. The 100th Fighter Group (ANG) was

to lose one OA-I 0 from mid-l996.

7. The II I th Fighter Group (ANG) wasto lose one OA- l 0 from mid- J996.

These changes stabilizeJ all Air National

Guard A/OA-IO squadrons at seventeenaircraft each.

In 1994, the Congressional Budget

Office estimateJ that about $1.9 billion

cou ld be saveJ over five years if t he A ir

Force retired allA/OA-L0 aircraft. The Air

Force told the Commission on Roles and

Missions of the Armed Forces that, if it

retired all of its OA/A-LOs, it could save

approximately$5.8 billionin procurement,RDT&E, operation anJ maintenance, and

changes in the future operational

ofA/OA-IO units from the 1995

iew was contained in a DoD's Ne ws

The Air Force , g g e 't e d t h at t h e Army C\ dd

prm·ide ii' \ 11 clo,e air >l'ppor lI'ith attack heli

cop ters ,md t h at t h e A rmy , ho l ii d he a igned

CAS as a primary mi ion. The Air Fmce al,o

propo,ed that irs CAS role he dOll'ngraded from

< primary tll < collate ;ll fUllction.. In connection

lI'ith this prop , al , the Air Fmce f'l\'ollred elimi

na t ing A/OA-IO aircraft frum it, il1\·enrory.'

bombshell indeed' It appeareJ

J a specific aircraft for

particular role, and having proved i t inba t, the Air Force was anxious to J is

both aircraft and responsibility as fast

i t cou ld . I t wanted to get back to the

e miles high' policy with which, since

USAF days, the majority had alwaysfeltcomfortable.

ground,h;.-t:-.cd and airhorne forward aircontrollers

who ,Ire r c ~ p o n s i h l l for (nnrrollingCAS strike:--.

r Force Structural

1995

most important factor was the same as

beenfo r the p,lst five or six decades:

cont inu ing deba te between t he A ir

and the Army over the role of fixed

ng a ircraf t for CAS. Th is cont inued

of argument seemed, to the commit

s, to illustrate the need for a comprehen

assessment of battlefield requirements.

y cons idereJ the JROC - the senior

boJyto the Chairman of theJoint

of Staff- tohave been toolimiteJ in

oversight of close-support acquisitionOne criticism was that it was

'narrowly focused', andeventhe JWCA

ocess assessments, set up in 1994, were

still 'too narrow''''.

The Air Force submitted to thecommit

t ha t t he n umbe r o f fixeJ-wing CAS

ties flown to support grounJ troops 'haslined significantly since the Korean

r. Moreover, t he A ir Force expects the

for fixeJ-wing CAS to fur the r

as attack helicopter capabilitiesThe Air Force was aJamant that

and scout helicopters operating in

co-orJination wit h g ro un d u ni ts

ld represent the op timum t eam foranJ that fixeJ-wing aircraft should

be used foremergencyback-up:



POSSIBLE FUTUR S POSSI L FUTU R S

High offthe ground on its tricycle undercarriage the A,10 providesampleroomfor

loading ofunderwingmissilesand pods refuelling andreammunitioning with the

pilot sti l l in situ to givea highsortierate Natonal Archives Colege Park MD

o t he r t h an maintenance data

GPS/INS EGI

emhedded global positioning ,mdiner

navigation system (EG I) is a self-con

n e d, a l l- w ea t he r n a vi g at i on system,

c h o u tp u t s positioning, n:locity ami

data for the A-IO. The EG I

ads its radiofrequencysignalsfrom

e G P , satellite transmission, \\ ith the

l i ty to track upto fi\C satellitessimulta

Th e single laser ring unit lR U )

a ring laser gyro inertial naviga

n u n i t I U ) a n d G P S functions.

This system replaces the existing IN - 39

currently the highest fail-rate com

e n t o n t h e A / OA - IO . ECI will have a

of 2,000 hour s MTB F rate against the

l - 39s 185 1TBF. It is estimated

more than I) million will be savedoperations and support costings once

full f leet is modified . It is deemed

entia l for this system to be installed

ickly , as GP accuracy is crucial for

situation awareness data link

,md s m ar t w e ap o n i n te g ra t io n .

Congress hasalready m andat edt hat no

may be per formed on any

GP -equipped platforms after the

r 2000, time is fast running out.:

TE Computer Upgrade

current l TE system is at its

ghput and memory limits and will

future growth, so the development

installation of a new computer for th is

is essential. The new computer

l also incorporate the operational flight

OFP) software upgrading. Kit

will include I 9 k it s f or the

of spa re s. ymbology and

message com put er V MC ) changes

i m mi n en t a n d wil l a lso ne c e s itate

w a r e c ha nge s w ith lR , re ulting in

costs. : 9

Gearbox AGB Life

necessary modification, this

-cveral design changes to the

associated with unit removals d ue t o

j o in t oil analysis programme j O A P)

and bearing failures. T h e e design

ext end t he u efull ife oft he AG B

reduce the existing maintenance

associated with the high removal

rate. The change wi significantly

improve flightsafety andengi ne reliability

and will increase MTBF from 3,482 hours

to Z3,021 hours.:

Improved Airborne Video TapeRecorder fAVTR

This proposed newsystemcomprises a Mil

Standard 8mm colour \ ideo-tape recorder

and a high-resolution colour head-up di

play H D) camera to replace the current

hlack and whitesystemin use o n t h e active

duty A/OA-lOs. T h e A ir ational Guard

A G) have already anticipated this and

have insta lled a commercial off-the-shelf

COTS) 8mm colour recorder in their air

craft. This system is limited to th irty min

utes record time, whereas the average

A/OA-IO mission is in exces s of two

hours, making coverage less than 25 per

c en t o f mission time. Post-flight review(PFR) of all aspects of tra in ing sorties

rake-offprocedure, rejoin, low-level naviga

tion, weapons usage and landing procedure

- is deemed especially desirable for the sin

gle-placeversion, justas the instructorpilot

or supervisor is in other aircraft. These

aspects, in total, exceed the thirty- minute

limit of the old system, so the old system

jeopardized safety-of-flight issues, and poor

ha bit pa tte r ns a re l iable to he mis sed and

never corrected. The low resolution of the

existing system reduces the effectiveness of

mission e va lua tion a nd training, whereas

the proposed new HUD camera g iv es a

m uch hi gher resolution. In addition, be

cause of advances in design and build ,it is,

in fact, c he ap er t h an t he existing black

and w hite e quipm e nt.

The gaining units also had to purchase

their own playback u n it s a t o ta l of sixteen

c o lo u r m m v i de o -r a pe p laye rs - fou r p er

briefing room, in four briefing rooms), as

well as all the associated wiring and

witching hardware, and these were

included in the costings.:r.

Common Missile Warning System CMWS

C MWS is an advanced missile warning

system, which pa sively de tec ts inc oming

mi siles,gives audible w a r ning to the pilot

and initiates automatic countermeasures

responses. The programme integrates with

the electronics warfare management uite

E WMS)G roup Bequipment beingdevel

oped by lead service, S rmy A C l

acting Air Force programme manager. The

162

system gives the pilot increased situational

awareness and thus provides increased sur

vivability for missile e ngage m ents , w hich

arc c ur re ntly unde tec te d. Th e automatic

countermeasures employment wi ll a ls o

increase survi\ ability through reduced task

loading during criticli phases of flight.: :

Electronics Warfare ManagementSuite EWMS

The introduction of an EWM, will

c ons olidate EW c oc kpit controls, imprm C

the pilot/vehicle interface and generally

increase reliability and maintenance effi

ciency. The EWMS integrates the chaff/

flare dispenser A L E -4 0 ), m d ar w ar n in g

receiver RWR), a n d t h e ECM pods war

~ l r management system forsemi-,lutomat

ic and automaticoperation, superseding the

c u rr e nt m a nu a l lJperation based on the

pilot s system interpretation. It is a followon modification for t h e A i r Force based on

the ANG/AFRC program. E W M tics into

the CMW modification and it is hoped

the latter can be rescheduled to allow con

current installation oft he two complemen

taryprograms with resultant cost savings. :,d

EnhancedPosition Location ReportingSystem EPLRS with Multi-FunctionalDisplay MFD Situational warenessData Link SADL

On Z3 May 1997, COMACC recei\ ed a

briefing advocating SADL i n p la ce of

LlNK-16 for t he A /O A- ] . A vast

i mp ro ve me nt o n t he IFF procedures,

SADL comprises an EPLRS with a colour

MFD containing a computer processor.

The system will provide digital air-to-air

and a ir -toground da ta communications,

which will s ubs ta ntially im prove itua

tional awa rene ss . I t w il l a lso provide a

seamless integration, via direct link, into

the Army digitized battlefield.

The speedy identification of friendly air

and ground forcesequipped with E Pl A R

typ e rad io wil l avo id the risk of future

friendly fi re s enarios, like those that somarred the de ploym e nt of the A-lOs in the

Gulf War. Itwill become the primarymeans

of communication a nd c o- ordina tion w ith

t h e F A C in the CA role, the primary mis

sion o f t h e /OA-IO. As a spin-off, it will

much reduce pilot workload for thissingle

place aircraft. It will also provide the neces

sary flexibilityto beabsorbed into any future

digitized force structure by way of direct

in tegrat ion and gateway s, for examp le ,

VMF and LI K-I6. The new MFD will

increase MTBF rate of the current television

monitor TVM) fr om 4 4 h ou rs to 2,00

hours; MBTF ratefor TVM with EGI mod

ification is projected as 81 hours, while the

current TVM is unable to support SADL.:

Digital Terrain System DTS

Apart from the usual enemy threats

involved in low flying, there is alway the

constant danger o f t he A-IO accidentally

flying itself into the ground (controlled

flight into terrain, or C FI T) duringcomplex

manoeuvringover the battle zone. CFIT has

long been recognized as the A/OA-IO s

prime cause of Class A mishaps (accidentsleading to loss).To alleviate thisdanger, the

A-IO s ground collision avoidance system

GCA ) is also to be upgraded by the pro

vision o f D T via the use of a mega data

transfer cartridge/procesor MOTC/P).

Th e ligital terrain data is loaded on to the

MOTC and terrain elevation is continually

processed within 6 miles (IOkm) o f t h e air

craft sposition. DTS will provide predictive

GCAS, t er ra in referenced nav ig at ion

TR ) , database terrain cueing OBTC),

passive ranging P R) a nd obstacle warn

ing/cueing OWC).

In addition, DT is expected to improve

the A/OA-IO s weapons accuracy via PT

and target e va lua tion da ta due to t heT hun

derbolt-II s la k of any other means to

determine the bombing triangle slant range

to the target. I t will g ive increasedcoordi

nate accuracy by eliminating elevation

errors. The current system radar altimeter,

or RA), treats the earth a sa f la tp lane , but

t h e D T modificationprovide a new capa

bility to t h e A / O A- ] ,which will signifi

cantly improve system effectiveness.

The UK is a t t he forefront of t h is n e w

technology. However, d ifficulties are curr e ntly be ing encountered with regard to

the licensing issue of terrain profile and

m a tc h in g T E RP R OM ) f rom B ri ti sh

Aerospace. Initial costs estimates in 1994

for unlimited rights for the A /O -I were

3.5 million, ami the programme in 1999

was sti in t he developm ent stage.:

DT will undoubtedly significantly

im prove e xisting GCAS and give pilo ts a

predictive system to avoid CFIT.

163

Unit Training Device UTD

Th e UTD is a low-cost, semi-portable

ulatorwith a limitedvisualdisplaydes

for unit-level pilot-training capabili

support qualification and continu

t r ai n in g a t b o th t r ai n in g and operat

units. Again, th isprogramm was init

by the A G andt he AFR and is man

by A C/yWPD. om e thir tee n UTD

a re requi red for the surviving A/O

fleet. The s e, a long w it hA G p ur ch a

six uch sy t ems, w il l ful ly e q ui p

A/OA-tO squadron with on UTD

Currently, noneof the Thunderbolt-li

operational squadrons have any simul

capability, andt he st udent in t heA / O

flies his first, and all subsequent s

solo without the benefit of simulated

in a controlled environment. Hi first

in instrument conditions is solo, whil

fir t fl ight w it h an emergency iswith an actual emergency that has n

heen either practised or simulated u

c ontrolled c onditions. This to ta l la

any tr a ining de vice prevents simul

a nd e va lua tion of emergency proced

instrument f ligh t and weapons em

ment in a realistic, but safe a nd c ontr

envi ronm ent , and is considered a cr

deficiency.

Funding is t ight, as always, and

result in a shortfa ll of five TDs . T h

Force is currently working with the

t r a c to r , y m vi o n ic , with Armstrong

to restructure the program to accoun

recent fee-for-service/contra t o r t r a

servicesguidance for incorporation i n

D MT pl anu

Onboard Oxygen Generation Syst OBOGS

The current liquid oxygen system o

A/OA-tO aircraft requires pecial han

due to its cryogenicpropertie . Th e p

handling precautions involved inc

maintenance costs and aircraft down

This combined reliability/maintaina

problem will be alleviated with the iduction of the OBOG modific

whichwill replace the present liquidox

sy t em wi th a COT capablc of gener

oxygen.: ;

O t her programmes are under re

including an improved 3-D audio sy

H a lon r e pla c em e nt; he lm et- m ounte d

ing y tem HMCS); targeting pod;

red shielding; three-position MIC sw

Link-16; GATM; a nd A I M-9X integra



POSSIBLE FUTURES pass IBLE FUTURES

164

ative aircraft from ll the TFS units based in the UK makea low passover

lconbury Cambridgeshire justp rior to its demise a sa n operational base

the run-down ofAl l ied ai rpower inEurope in the 1990s USAF

t o t h e crash.. There wasal so no evidence th

a lcoholor drugs might have p layeda ro le in [h

crash. 6i1

Total Force Concept

The harmonizing of both AFRES

act ive unit s continues to be fine-tun

With ever-decreasing budgets, and shri

ing numbers of bo th men and machin

the need is to optimize what force is

This especially applies to the A/OA

aircraft, which started from a base of s

low numbers, and hasseen much hard

vicesince. One such exercise took plac

South-West Asia (ACCNS) dur

autumn 1 99 8. I t involved the 440

Operations Group (Provisional) a nd

74 th and 303rd F igh ter Squadrons , w

the A-lOs representing a shared active

reserve tasking of labour and equipmIn a 45-day exercise , reservists wor

alongside their active colleagues, with

two A-IO reserve units combining effo

The learning curve flowed both ways

applied t o p i lo t s a s wel l a s g roundc r

The 303 Id FS CO, LieutenantColonel

Waller, said, 'We're also sharing the l

in the mission planning cell and h

started doing some flying together

well.'wl

He added tha t the pi lots were mutu

impressed with the quality o f t h e taer

interface and successful flights toget

Deployment Proje I Officer Major J

S tout o f the 442nd FW agreed: 'There

excellent planning initiated by getting

three project officers and NCOs toge

a t Whi teman. Th is made all the plann

focus in the right direction.' '

The aircraft were generated shortly a

the 442nd's a rr iv al i n mid-Septemb

despite the fact that there hadbeenno

surveys and only a small advance team

the ground. While the 74 th Intel pers

nel were n ew t o the A-IO mission, t

had an impressive country-s tudy kno

edge. By sharing the workload, and br

ing each other, the pilots' mutual inter

pendency was obviously beneficial.

I t was only an exercise, but this is h

it is likely to be in future operations: l i

notice, not much t ime, fast deploym

and the n e ed t o ge t the A-lOsactive o

the hot-spots , wherever in the world t

might be.

Th is then is the future of the A-IO. L

mayit grace the sky.

student assigned to the355th Wing, work

ingfrom Davis-Monthan, was flyinga rou

tine training mission near the Barry Gold

water training r ange , wes t of Tucson,

Arizona, with four 500lb (230kg) bombs

up. At 1158, Button's aircraft suddenly

broke formation from his two team-mates

without any warning. Radio calls from his

two companions e li ci te d no response.

Radar t r acked t he A-IO and last logged

him some 800 miles (l,300km) off-course,

passing over south-western Colorado.

A full-scale hunt and search was initiat

ed, from Arizona to the area north o fTel

luride, and then extended to a location 15

miles (25km) south -west o f Vail, Col

orado. The area was changed, as Federal

Aviation Administration radar reports

were supplemented by eyewitness s ight

ings and publiC response to a special te le

phone hotline. Even a U-2 high-altitude

reconnaissance plane from the9 th Reconnaissance Wing at BealeAFB, California,

was broughti n to a id the search.

Eventually, on 20 Apr il , a ft er eighteen

days of intense operations, debris and wreck

age were found ina very remote mountain

ouslocation, arounu Golu Dust Peak, some

15 miles (25km) south-west of Vail. The

debris was later identified as the missing

-10. The huntcontinued for Captain But

t on a nd t he missing bombs, and Air Force

pararescuespecialistsand munitions experts

began a systematic combing of the area in

July. They warned to recover Button's

remains,as well as the munitions, flares and

ejection-seat pyrotechnics, and other mate

rial that might be useful t o t he Accident

Investigation Board studying the cause of

the crash. The Air Force also wanted to

ensure that the site was safe enough to be

restored to environmental stanuards set by

theUS ForestService.

Although Button's family anu friends

wereas baffled by the incident ashis wing

men, theAir Force investigators conclud

ed the followi ng:

165

There were no m imemll1ce prohlems withthe

rlane, no mechanical failure andno evidence of

hird strike thm might have disahled the jet.

The Air Fo rce Iso doesn't- helieve Rutton was

trying to ste,,1 the plane . In fac t, on t h emo r n

ing o f t h e c ra s h, h e i ndi ca t ed h e was excited

clhout going out on his irst live bomhing r u n i n

the A-I O Rut investigators have Iso conclud

ed th t Rutton was not disahled - hI hrain

..lIlCUfYSI1l, a l ac k of oxygen Of some other

ica] reason - hecause o f e v i d en c e t h a t h e was

s t il l in control :-1nd manoeuvringthe planepr ior

Attrition

in the modification programme and relat

ed support equipment and maintain a full

complement ofengineering data. Current

ly, the Engineering Sration Chief is Sal

Alestra, with Bill Eves as Program Man

agement Section Chief. The aircraft sys

tems section under Lead Engineer Doug

Allen, has the following divisions:

I. ASIP/ACI/SLMP.

2. A BDR/structure.

3. Bonded repair.

4. Corrosion control/NDI/paint.

5. Structures.

6. A-IO project administration.

Th e aircraftstructures section, under Lead

Structural Engineer Kevon Ward, is divid

ed in to the following divisions:

I. Aero performance.

2. Egress.

3. Engineering data, drawings, specifica-

tions.

4. Eng in es .

5. Environmental controls.

6. FI igh I controls.

7. Fuel.

8 . Hyd raul ics .

9. Landing gear.

10. Weights and balances.

I J. Logistic management.

The A-lOis constantly exercised and,

w it h n ew pilots joining the ranks all the

time, losses are the inevitable price of sus

tained vigilance and realistic training.

On ] June 1997, o ne o f t h e first s ix

female pilots flying A-lOs, Captain Lynn

Svoboua, with more than 1,400 hours of

Jet flight time, was killed on a night mis

sion from Davis-Monthan. The accident

was later determined to be the result of

pilot error.

Other A-lOs havebeen written off: one

crasheu on 17 April 1997 when working

from Moody A FB, Georgia; the pilot safely ejected. At J525 on 14 May J998,

another, assigned to the335 th Wingou t o f

Davis-Monthan, crashed 3 m il es (5km)

south-west of Kitt Peak, a mountain range

in Arizona. Again, the pilot, Captain

Christopher Hamilton, from the test pilot

school at Edwards AFB, ejected and sus

tained only minor injuries.

A more unusual A-IO loss occurred on 2

April 1997, when Captain Craig Button, a

Systems Program

Management Division

re-work, 3 bearing inspections and oil

supply tube fixes.

Based at McClellan, AFB, theA-IO/F -I l l

systems programme office has the respon

sibility o f s up po rt in g t he war-fighting

force. The SPD is Colone l Thomas D.

Brown, Jr, with Frank Garcia as Deputy.

The organization is responsible for 374

A/OA-lOs and 142 F-Ills assigned to six

commands. The SPMD provides world

wide logistics and engineering support to

meet command combat readiness and sus

tainabili ty requirements , a nd USAF for

eign milirary sales commitments. It is alsoresponsible for bo th the A 1 0 350 mil

lion) and F-li l ( 19 million) modifica

t ion programmes.

The systems/structures branch supports

both types around the world and provides

specific expertise relating to both aircraft

systems and airframes. The branch re

sponds to requests for assistance both from

in the field and from depots. Their engi

neers andequipmentspecialists participate

Low LTITUDE FONCE

Wi th t he A O l 0 a nd t he F-ll l repre

sent ing theUS F s low-level attack capa

bility a nd b ot h systems becoming rather

long in the tooth, a special low-altitude

force (LA F) hasbeen es tab li s hed to 'keep

'em flying' (in the words o f t he S ec on d

World War s lo gan) A s p ar t o f this the

-10 has its own problem parts integrated

process team (lTP), with POC Mike Ret

zlaff, A-IO Weapons System Support Offi

cer. The t eamhas asits primedirective the

review of any supply-type item tha tmigh t

affect the supportability o f t h e A-IO air

craft. The i tems maybe identified by high

M ICAP hour s or inciden t s, by customer

inquir iesor by known supply supportabili

ty problems.

Th e A-IO system support programmeoffice (SPO) has as its mission the deliv

ery of total weapons system support to all

units th:H fly the Thunderbolt-Il. It is

based at Hil l AFB , Utah , a nd its brief

includes provis ion o fA- I 0 field support,

managemen t o f A -IO p ro du ct invest

ment, provision of resources and t ool s to

accompl ish the SPO mission, identifica

t ion and prepara t ion of specific material

solutions for A-IO investments, anu sup

port of 'product line' evolution.

G£NENAL LOW COST MOD/I7CATIONS

There is also budgeting (again, at less than

900K) for any modi f ica t ions that are

deemed necessary to enhance the A/OA10's reliability or maintainabily, and/or to

improve system performance and reduce

logistic costs. Previous such modifications

have included electronic clock, cold-hole

greater precision in the attack. By pulling

on the trigger to the first detent, the PAC

is activated and dampens the S S pitch

i npu t , which g iv es a f ine-tuning aiming

window t o t he p ilot . A second pull not

only fires the Garl ing but in it i at es the

SAS's automatic override of pilot control

stick input. Under this system, the old

method of firing, lining up the target with

the shots, then holding the target while the

GAU-8/A recoil and barrel rotation bumps

the sightingaround, is r ev er sed. ow, extra

time is t a ken t o g e t on to the target. Once

thePAC kicks in, the A-tO's nose is 'frozen'

on t h e target and the bulletimpact remains

concentrated on it, no mat te r how the

pilotand aircraft arc distracted.

seat reuunuancy;

coliision avoidance system

enhancement; and

augmentation system (SAS)

the precison attitude controlwith the stability augmentation sys

(S S), which synchronizes the pitch

yaw i np ut s a nd smoot he s ou t t he

flightpath, the pilot is able t o gain

money is also being allocated

modifications, as listed

COST SAFETY MODIFICATIONS

provide for low-cost modifications

than 900K) to improve safety. This

goes to support engineering stud

TCTOs to the field in response to

investigations and safety-related

deficiency reports. These stud ies arc

sent p lanned for three main areas:

Modifications



T HE S AG A O F T HE FIRE-FIGHTING A-I

CHAPTER NINETEEN

The Saga the Fire Fighting lOs

n artist s impression ofthe A-l0 ThunderboltII conversion into an airtanker. The conversion would

involve de-Mil itar izing theaircraft.equipping themwith an infra-red lR) sensorpackageIshown hereas

the white ballunderthe aircraft s nose).fi tting a large bellytank andpipe to housethe fireretardant and

discharge system, and with a p r o be s h ow n h e r e on the lefthand sideof theaircraft s nose)for aerial

retardant reloading. eroTech td

release them from 'boneyards' and

r e sting p lac e s, a s they migh t b e r e

for comba t duty in the f u tu r e. I t

requirements were undergoing a p e

re-evaluation and changing prioritie

the release of w ar m at er i al , i n thi

combat aircraft, is strictly cont

Defense Department regulations ar

cerned, ironically, with public safet

make i t d iff icu lt f or civilian u sa ge

readily accepted. Another po in t o f

that the fire-fighting missions of fagencies are legislated by Congres

the way to get A-lOs released for fire

ing conversions w ou ld be v ia a n a

ment in the House, with federal fire

ers given missions over u rb an a r

extremely dangerous cases.

Apart from those a ir cr a ft in m u

some 174 A-lOs w er e i n s to re at

Monthan AGB, n ea r Tu cs o n, A r

on Iy 274 of t he 4 00 A-lOs left on

l in es w er e l is te d on the USAF

proved capable of doing the job as w ell a s

could be expected. However, most had not

seen the A-10 inaction, and cou Id not

makefair comparison. Indeed, cost became

a b ig f ac to r i n the arguments and counter

arguments that developed, but no t the only

factor. The AWA conversion, i t w as e st i

mated, w o uld c o st only ha lf as much as

converting the turbine S - 2, f or example.

The federal tanker f o rc e c o mp r ise s

f o rty -s e ve n o ld a irc r af t o f n in e different

types, the newes t o f which was built as anairliner in the 1960s. They are ill equipped

and, with noaiming aids, haveto use 'Ken

tucky windage , or crop-dusting methods,

to estimateconditionsand to release their

retardant loads. They cannot opera te a t

n igh t o r when there is heavy smoke haze,

which is normal with wildfires.

The USA i r Force seemed to adopt an

ambiguous attitude; o n t he o ne h an d, it

seemed eager to rid itselfof the A-I 0 , b u t,

on t he o t he r h an d, it seemed reluctant to

a contract for commercialoperation of the

Government-owned S-2s. The heavy,

multi-engined airtankers, converted trans

ports, airliners a nd t he like, with useful

payloads of 2 ,0 00 to 3,000 gallons, are pri

vately owned and contracted to agencies

such as the Forest Service, the Bureau of

Land Manag emen t a nd t he C DF . E ac h

state contracts for their use against its own

budget. They a r e r e str icte d to operating

from larger airfields, and lack the ability to

get into tight situations.Converse ly, the he licop ter a i rtankers

are able to get into canyons and draws to

tacklesuch blazes, but lack thecapacityto

deal effectively with the larger blazes, and

to ach ieve the necessary speed of

response. They are also ineffective in high

winds, the very condition that make wild

fires so deadly.

Many fire-fighting districts, alarmed at

the cost, rejected the project out o f hand,

stating that their e x istin g a irc r af t had

to remain just airborne while at i ts r e tar

dant drop s pe ed t y pi ca l ly 1. 3 t i me s i ts

stall speed), is likely to crash, should it roll

into a 30-degree bank in a tight area such

as a canyon.

The California Department of Forestry

and Fire Protection (CDF), the Bureau of

Land Management and other federal agen

cies became involved in arguments over

areas of r e sp o ns ibility . Fire s to r ms , like

those that devastated Malibu Canyon,

La gu n a Be ac h , Harmony Grove Carls

bad), Oakland Hills (which claimed twen

ty-four lives), Lake Arrowheadand north

east Sacramentothreaten built-upa r ea s in

the urban/wilderness interface, beyondthe

jurisdictionof the CDF. The fire damageto

each affected area is estimated to havecost

1.5+ billion dollars.

The CDF, the state s forestry and fire

fighting agency, was controlled by a p o lit

ically appointed d ire c tor , in charge of the

Forestry/Wildlife and State Fire Marshal s

office. The threat f r om w ild f ir e s w as v e ry

serious, and urban fire departments wereill

e qu ip pe d t o c op e w it h t hem when t he y

spread in to the suburbs. California did not

own an airtanker fleet outright but leased

converted aircraft, which, in addition to

t he f ou rt ee n p is to n- en gi ne d S -2 As ,

included OV-IO Broncos, 0- 2 Skymasters

and UH-I Huey helicopters, all on perma

nent loan from the Departmentof Defense

via the General Services Administration

(GSA) a nd , ultimately, t hr ou gh t he US

Department ofAgriculture (USDA).

California's S-2s have an 'initial attack'

prerequisite, which is to reach any threat

ened area within a commendable twentyminute period from the o order being

received. Their job is to head off poten

tially damaging blazes, with up ) twelve

missions a n h ou r operating from strategi

c al ly p la ce d airtanker bases. Their

response time is more crucial than thei r

(restricted) payload.

In the unincorporated state lands out

side the 'state responsibility area , there is

n o t im e limit for responding t o u rb an i

wilderness interface fires, and theCDF has

Recently we w e re n o t if i ed t ha r t he Uni ted

States Air Force is going to excess som e A-IO

aircraft which theya re willing to transfer to the

Forest Service. BeGlUSe our analysisshows thar

aircraft might hecome a v e ry c o st - e ff e ct i v e

m i t l m ~ s i z airtanker would liketo lequire

two for 111 R D projecr.2il

Agriculture, written on 2 Fe br u ar y 1 99 2,

reads as follows:

This R D project never came to fruition,

and was term inated when the Forest Ser

vice later became embroiled in unrelated

airtanker fraud problems, but the ideawas

taken up by other groups. There was some

interest on the West Coast, most signifi

cantly in Southern California, where reg

u lar f o re s t f ir es are an increasingly com

mon occurrence, threatening millions of

lives and frequently engulfing populated

suburbs of major cities such a s Los Ange

les. The profile of the a i rborne water

bomber was extremely high in t hi s a re a

and, although local fire-fighting services

were equipped wi th such aircraft, such as

convertedC-130 transports,many of them

w er e e lde r ly . Others were considered

unsuitable to deal with th is ty pe of subur

ban fi r e sto rm , w h ic h c a lis f o r some degree

of accuracy a s w e ll a s v o lu m e.

The Cal ifornia Department of Forestry s

main air defence rests with the converted

Grumman S-2 Tracker aircraft, designed

in the l at e I 9 40 s, and discarded by the

Navy two decades later. They were con

verted at great cost t o r ep la ce the old

wartime F-7F conversions , wh ich had

worn themselvesout, andhave served eversince. These were due t o b e r ep la ce d i ni

tially by eight S-2E/Gs, which are to be

converted to Turboprop a ir cr a f t a s S- 2Ts ,

with the option of a further fifteen. Some

sixteen S-2s h ad b ee n lost in c r as h es

delivering fire r et ar da nt a t t he required

low a l ti tude and speed, ju st above stall

speed, and especially when bank ing in

tight a re as , w as a dangerous manoeuvre.

As stall speed increases, with an increase

in bank angle, an aircraft that w ill b e a b le

h the apparen t eclipse o f t he S ov ie t

US military cutbacks resulted, and

a irc r af t w er e p r em a tu r ely r e tir ed to

a nd t he like. The future for the

II looked bleaker by the day,

it was natural that thoughtsshouldturn

a p ea ce fu l b ut m ea ni ng fu l u se f or the

that were now s u rp lus to r e qu ire

One of the m os t p r om isin g and

roles was deemed to be that o f

w at er -b om be r, t o f ig ht f or es t f ir es .

en the A-IO s handling ability at low

es itseemed, on the face of i t, a p r ac

l proposition. The US ForestryService

e a p r op os a lto p u rc h as e tw o A - lOs a n d

ert them for the fire-fighting purpose

stripping out all the armamentand mili

avionics, and fitting a large tank below

fuselage capable of holding some 1,500

of fire retardant. However, the pro

has become bogged down in acrimony

costs, suitability and practicalities.

arguments have been raging for many

and seem irresolvable, given the atti

of the various parties.

The expansion of the USA s sprawling

ou t in to the fringes of wildareas,has

increasing th rea ts to expens ive

burban homes (be longing to rich and

voters) fromwildfires.The dev

in Washington State, southern

fornia and Flor ida , in 1 99 8, is typical

t hi s n ew and growing danger. Modern

fire-fighting forces, equipped with the

s t v e hic les and technology t o f ig ht

fires, have little orno exper

s e i n t ac kl i ng , or stopping such fi res

they e nt er t h e urban s e cto r. A ir

both fixed-wing and helicopters,the obvious answer, but t he effec

o f t h e drops they make over fire

is no t ce rta in . Recen t experience

that the efficiency is compro

d by the fact tha t the aircraft used are

allyold and ungainly converted piston

which lack the capacity, the speed

response, the ability to get in where it

ts, and the accuracy required.

The original letter from the Chief of

Forest Service t o t he Secretary of

766 767



THESAGA OF THE FIRE FIGHTING A IDs THE SAGA OF THE FIRE FIGHTING A IDs

FactSheeth il e t he b al an ce were flying spares or

trainers. in addition, fifty A

LOs h ad b ee n mothballed a fte r be ing

byTurkey. It was considered that

gh spa reA- lOs could be made avail

for federal and sta te fire-fighters, pro

Congress passed the required

to fly high-rerformance air

t just as NASA does.

On 22 July 1992, Brigadier General

E. Eberhart, Director of the Direc

of Programs and Evaluation, inWash

DC, replied toMr L. A Amicarella,

of Fire and Aviation Management,

Forest Service, also in Washington,

regarding his original request for two

s for initia l prototype conversion to

a nd t he House Appropriations

language which had directed

o f tw o A -I 0 aircraft t o t he Forest

ice. His lettersta ted the

following:

A ir Force comb<lt aircraft,such as theA- I 0 ,arc

normally restricted ro rransfers w it hi n t he

Department of Defense. Gene r al l y t h e on ly

exceprions to theserestrictions lrc thoseautho-

rized hI legislation, e.g. foreign miliwry i1 es. I (

the a i rcraf t a rc nor , old thmugh FMS, they arc

demilitarized.The Air Force is notce r ta inth:n

t h e A -IO :,ircra(r, once demilit:,rized, can be

operared s<l(elyin the manner inrended hI the

Forest Service. We recommend rh<lt you con

wct rhe General Sen-ices Administl <ltion:md

Federal Aviarion Agency to ascerra in whether

waivers will he provided toallow a comhat air

craft transfer <lnd FAA cerrifiG,rion to openlte

these a i rcraf t. Compl i : lI l ce wi rh rhe Congres

sional Cnmmincc directionwil lrequire theco

operation o these agcncics.2'i

He went on to add t hat t he Forest Ser

would be responsible for all cost affili

with A-IO aircraft transfer, demilita

and equipment removal and return

t he A ir Force: Upon accept<mce of

e twoA-IO aircraft, the Forest Service

tadhe re toDoD guidelines on t h e ha n

and disposal of a combat aircraft.'

In addition to the information requiredthe Congressional Committee direc

n, he requested that the Forest Service

a range of ques t ions to enable the

Force to evaluate the planned use of

e A -I O. These included the following:

How would the A-10 beused within the

Forest Service 7

How would this combat aircraft be

dem iI itarized and still meet safety of

fl ight considerations?

• If there were a ny p la ns t o transfer the

a ir c ra f t outs ide the Forest Service,

wou ld i t b e temporary or permanent?

• Would there be confirmation that the

arrangements for aircraft logistic sup

port wou ld be o th er t ha n t he USAF?

• Would the GSA and FAA provide the

required waivers to permit Forest Ser

vice use of t he A-I 0 7

Th e General summed up in this way:

While the Air Forcehas beensupporrive of your

previousrequests for excess USA F non-combat

a i rcraf t ,you rreques t for USA F combm aircraft

presents l uniqueand unprecedentedsituation.

We will workclo se lywi th your s taff in <In efforr

comply with any Congressional dircction.27

Mr Amicarella replied on 17 September,

answering most of these queries. He sentthe General a medium a i rt a nke r plan ,

which contained many of the details

requested, and he rei t er ated that fact that

the two A-lOs would beused for prototype

developmentand field evaluations. He also

confirmed in writing that all combat equip

ment would be removed and re turned to

the Air Force as soon as practicable, and

suggested a meet ing be tween the Forest

Serviceand the Air Force to decide exact

ly what equipment should be removed, a

schedule of remova I a nd a nA i r Force loca

t ion where the equipment could be deliv

ered. He s ta te d that the aircraft 'will

remain Government proper ty w ith the

modification work performed by civilian

contractors and would only be used within

the United States'2 . If in the future, any

plans arose to transfer either aircraft tem

porarily or permanently from the Forest

Servic e, such plans wou ld be negotiated

with prior approval from t he A ir Force.

Mr Amicarella also confirmed t hat t he

Forest Se rvice had been in contact with

the Grumman factory, whi ch had con

fi rmed wi ingness to provide the neces

sary airframe logistic support, and t hat t he

Air Forcewould not therefore be required fulfil this role. He also confirmed that

the GSA and the FAA would not put up

any barriers to processing the transfer,

accomplishing the modifications and

completingthe flight evaluations. Mr Fred

Fuch would work out any details that arose

and answer any further questions. Th e let

ter concluded as follows: We will work

closely with your staff in an effort to com

ply with Congressionaldirectionand meet

yourneeds. 2;\

768

Some five years a f te r th is exchange ,

Howard Kaloogian, a California Assem

blymanwho hadhimsel f twice to be evac

uated from t he p a th of wildfires in Carls

bad area and worried about threat t o h is

constituents r e sident there abouts , took

the mat ter up with the Air Forcefrom the

State Assembly's Capitol Office in Sacra

men to 7 Th e Air Force responded on 16

July 1997:

The A- 10 maintains an integral role in t h eA i r

Force'sstructure now {lnd\vill continue todo so

i n to t h e (uture. The A- I0 aircraft in storageat

Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona, <lre he ing he ld

in anticip:-ltion o f A i r Force operational m i s ~sinn needs andarc unavailable for other uses. In

a ddi t io n , t h e A - IO is a USAF <lircraft which

was procured solely as 1 military comb(l[ air

crafr. The Departments of the Air Force, Army

a nd Na vymusr

(olioII' str ict procedures whendisposing of rheseaircr fr. Combat aircraft that

arc exces s t o t he U SA F :md Depar rment of

Defense needs arc demilitarized to precludeany

reconditioning fnr (ur the r mili ta ry usc then

sold fnr scrap.277

A fac t sheet was enclosedwhich theAir

Force cons ide red answered the specific

questions Mr Kaloogian had raised. Dated

7 July 1997, it deserves to be included in

full see box oppsite).

A letter from Arthur J. Negrette, Presi

dent, Flight Safety Institute , Sacramento,

to the Air F or ce r ec ei ved a simil;u

response on 26 February 1998. Th e Chief,

Mission Support Division, Colonel Joanne

M. Roedefer, stated t ha t Th e A ir Force

remains f irm in i ts position on the A-lO.

The A-I 0 maintainsan in tegral role in the

Air Force's structure now and will contin

ue to do so into the future.27H

There followed the usual information

on the standard disposal procedure, which

was identical word forword to that used in

all previous communications.

Members of California s Congressional

delegation took up the cause and received

equally short shrift for their trouble. On18 February 1998, Congressmen George

Radanovich , R icha rd Pombo and Jerry

Lewis wro te t o the Secretary o f t h e A ir

Force, Whitten Peters. They poin t ed

out that the issue was critical for the west

ern sta tes and, in particular, for Califor

nia ,where high-performanceaircraft were

required for combating wildfires. Despite

this, the Air Force had recently declined

to t r ans fe r r e ti r ed Fai r chi ld A- IO Thun

derbolt II aircraftto fire-fightingagencies

SUBJECT A-l aircraft

QUESTION: How many of the Air Forces A-lOs a re in

f.yabe storage?

ANSWER:None. Aircraft in flyable storage are gener

ally defined as aircraft awaiting disposition andmain

tained in a flyable holdstatusat theAerospaceMain

t enance and Regenerat on Center AMARC) at

Davis-MonthanAFB for a period ofup to 90daysoras

required.

QUESTION: How many of the Air Forces A-lOs are still

in theact ve inventory?

ANSWER: There are 413AIDA-IDs in the active inven

tory. The A-1O and DA-l0 basic airframes are identcal.

Dfthis number, 370are fying Ii active duty, reserveand

guard units; 26 are maintenance trainers; and 17 are

used foraircraftbattle damage repair ABDR .

QUESTION: In total. howmanyA-lOs doestheAir Forcepossess?lIf this number is different fromthe sum ofthe

first two categores, please explain.

ANSWER: The Air Force possess 588 AIDA-IDs. Besde

the413actively fyng. anadditional 175A-IDs are stored

at AMARC for long-term storage. The A-1O aircraft in

storage at Davis-Monthan AFB. I are being held in

anticipationofAir Force operatonalmission needs and,

therefore,are not avaiable forother uses. The A-I0 air

craft is a USAFcombat aircraft andwas procured solely

for amilitary combataircraft. The Departmentsof theAir

Force, ArmyandNavymust folowstrict procedureswhen

disposing of these aircraft. Combat aircraft that are

for testing as airtankers, after having been

p re pa re d t o d o so in 1992: T he A ir

Force Congressional Liaison staff reiter

ated that posi t ion re cently while also

stating that all A- lOs would be retired

within ten years.'

I t was also pointed out that:

The r ~ t r i t i o n against transferringretired COIll

hat aircnl t to civilian government ; lgcncics is

not required hI Un ir ed S t at e sC ode o r C om

bined Federal Regularion. Ir is also unprece

dented since earlier transfers of aircr<lft to fire

fighters Cre doclIlllented by other comh(lt

aircraft tr<lns(ers to NASAand t h e oper a ti o no (

transferred aircr<l(t hI pr iva teent i t ie s, such S

the CollingsFoundation - ..Over 5 per cent of

existing I ar e o n displClY in museums.

Without compromising narioncJ security, f e d r ~al and Californian fire-fighters could make usc

o( approximarely less th:m 4 per c e n t o f r h eA

lOs controlled by the Air Force. Using tha r

small numher of aircr(l(r to save lives would

ha ve no impac t on t h e future operationalneeds

excess to the USAF and Department of Defense 000

needsare demitarizedtoprecludereconditonfor further

military use and then soldfor scrap.

QUESTION: What arethe Air Forces plansfor the A-l

fleet fromnow through theirfinal retrement?

ANSWER Current plans for the A-IDs areto remainin

the inventoryuntil the end of their service life and then

be replacedby the Joint Strike Fighter JSF) near the

end of theJSF buy,

QUESTION: Are there any plans to transfer any A-lOs

fromthe Air Forceor the Department of Defenseto any

state or federal agency orother mission? IIf so, please

expan.1

ANSWER: No. The Air Force is unaware of anyagency

currenty having an interest inexcessAirForce aircraft. In

1992. the USDA ForestServce expressed an interest in

usng A-IDs as airtankers, but eventualy dropped the

idea due to the cost and regulatory requirements. TheDepartment of theAirForce, ArmyandNavymust folow

strict procedures outned in 000 4160.21-M Defense

Reuthzatonand Marketng Manual, whendisposing of

military aircraft. Aircraft which become excess to Air

Force needsare screenedwith theothermilitary servces

and 000 actvites. Those combat aircraftthat aredeter

mined tobe excess to 000 needsare demitarizedto pre

cude further reconditon for further use and then sold for

scrap. The noncombat-typeaircraft with no known 000

requirements are then offered to the General Servces

Administration GSA) GSA will then screen the aircraft

with the other Federa andStateagenciesbeforethe air

craft is offered for general sale to the general pubc.

o( a Oeetwhich i, heing re t i red ,md of which 37

Jler cent (Ire no longer n y i n g . ~

Th e Congre ssmen there fore reques ted

that the Air Force shouldconsidermaking

A-10 aircraft available to appropriate fed

eral or Californian fire-fighting agencies,

and t ha t t he California Department of

Forestry and Fire Protection should fully

evaluate the urban interface wildfire sup

pression potential of convert ed A-lOs,

regardless of availability issues.

This request was routed to the office in

charge of disposing of surplus property andtheir policy question was not answered. At

the end of June J998, therefore, the Secre

tary of the Air Force was still unaware of

the issue o r t h e fact that several Congress

men wan te d bet te r a ir ta nk er s for their

state . Hisstaff had failed to rass on the let

t er o r the request. lnstead, a letter was

received back f rom Rea r Admiral S. R.

Morgan o f t he Defense Logistics Support

Agency, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. ' It merely

repeated, yet again, the standard blurb on

769

the policy of surplus military aircraf

referred to the GSA by t h eDoDa n

made unflyable and unrepairable

DRMS. It passed the Congressmen b

the GSA a t S an Francisco.

Assemblyman Howard Kal

re turned to the fray in March 1998,

a different tack. He w ro te t o the D

ment of Forestry and Fire Protect

Sacramento, on 5 March, asking

contract provision allowing some

tion be used to allow detailed study

A-lO s te chnica l merit.2'2 Our c

radial engine-powered S-2A aircr

becoming extremely difficult to ma

ina safe, flyable condition... finding

able replacement for our existing air

becoming more critical.'2

The reply came on 8 April, und

signature of the then Director, Rich

Wilson:

I can a lll·e you rha tCDF hasnot prema

e limina tedrhe A-IO as a coml etitor. We

howe er, through numerous direct conrac

\\'ell <S cO Tespundcnce, heen consis

informed hI r h eUn i l ed S t at e sA i r Force

the A-lOis no t, a nd will nor he availah

u n e r ~ i o n for lise ,b ; airranker. Furrher,

i f i l were availahle today, the <lirframe and

erplant r ~ n g i n e e r i n g tnl l redesign need

ClllWert theA- I 1 an airmnker, wouldra

addition:r1 three to fouryears to coml lere h

the first prototypecould hegin the rYle c

G,tion I'rocess. Only after successfully p

type ce r ti f ica t ion, could huilding o f t he

ol erational a i rcraf t h egin . Finally, the

operating;'b an airtanker, is completely u

of the purpose for which i twas designed. T

is no guar a nt e e t h at , a (t e r all that time

A-IOcould be successfullyconverred.2H

Wilson had no avia t ion or fire-fi

experience, and this response raised

wry comments from those in the

Conversion o f t he A-IO would no

anything like the period of t imequ

converting an attack aircraft so

could attack fires would be relativeple,especially when compared to co

ing anti-submarine aircraft, a irI ine

transports for the same purpose I

The Director did not completel

the door, however,adding a rider:

Clearly, should t h eA - I0 become :l\ ailahle

the proponents could prove the aircraf

competitive ret(lrd; lnt delivery platform,

most pleased ro include i t for considerati

CDF s Oeet. .. Iandl to work with I- o



HighBypassTurbne

57ft 6in

53ft 4n

14ft Bn

46,BOOb

43,BOOb

5 BOOlb

3,950ft

3,400ft

4,090ft

2,725ft

2,500fpm

Positve Displacement

1,550 Galons

310- KIAS = 350m ph

Yes (restricted)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Mid 1970s

Crca 1,500,000

Kaloogian and hissraffro ensure rhar CDF has

rimely acquisirion o( the mostappropri, lte fire

fighring tools, 'ailahIe2

, the impasse continued.

In 1998, a small company of like-mind

individuals was set up at Anaheim, Cal

AeroTech , consi s ti ng main ly of

rilots, instructors and aero-engi

rhe majoriry of whom were ex-ser

whohad flown close-supporrmis

for the Army and Marines. Their

was encarsulared thus:

We're speciali:ed inflying support (or good guys

in c lose comhat just l ike you o n t h e fire line.

on the fooled: dropping anything, retardant,

homhs or srrafe, is 90pe r cent aviarionand 10

percent specific torhe thing heing droPl1ed. We

alsoall have families living hetween Los Ange

les andSan Diego. '

could jusrifiably claim to have the

ssary skill and the motivation. The

rhar the A-IOcould deliver ordnance

hin 80ft (25 metres), o r ' ab ou r five

from friendly forces, and could

be entrusted safely ro deliver fire

in suburban areas, was a powerful

They claimed t ha r t h e end of

mean t r har two hundred A

Os had been mothba l led rhirty years

the military had planned to retire

from service. They set to work to

ence rhe local and federal politicians,

t h m ix ed fortunes. Opposirion was

from many quarrers, and their fight

unresolved.

The group's principal argument is based

rhe fact t he CDF proposes ro spend

on rebuilding parr of the exisr

S-2 fleet ( 3,000,000 peraircraft).The

of rhe A-IO would give new

wirh 1,500-gallon capacity againsr

S-2's 800 gallons; acruisingspeedof 340

(545km/h) , compared w ith 180 mph

for the S-2, and therefore a

ter reacrion time; and up-to-dare rech

including computer aiming, abilirynight dropping, infra-red to see through

oke and in-flighr reloading capability.

cost, rhe claim was also made that rhe

Scooper ' would cost 24,000,000+

Canadair. The cost of converring each

was put at just 2 million apiece, so

of rhem could be purchased for rhe

of one of rhe large airrankers:

Converted A-lOs will he there <H 3amwhen you

ICDFIfinally get an advantageover a Santa Ana

THE SAGA OF THE FIRE-FIGHTING A-II

driven wildfire. They'll be there for youinside the

smoke c loud tha r grounds all other aircrafr.2s;

O n i8 Seprember 1997, a flight demon

stration waslaid on ar EI Toro Marine Air

Corps Air Starion, Orange County, ar the

time o f t he Warershed Fire Council of

Southern California. This enabled the

assembledCalifornian fire-fighters ro ev l-

uate for the first rime the A-I O s capabi Ii-

ries. (The Warershed Fire Council had

been established almost fifty years before

bysupervisorsfrom then ine most souther

ly Californiancounties to work together in

many areas, i ncluding rhe co-ordination

and improvement of fire services for the

region, as well as rhe CDF and the Forest

Service of rhe Deparrmentof Agriculture.

This experienced group of fire-fighrers

represents two-th irds of the population of

California, most ofwhom are at consider

able risk from forest fires.)

During rhe demonstrarion, rhe two A

lOs raxied out in front o f t he US Marine

Museum at EI Toro in front o f t h e assem

bled fire-fighters, and med ia represenra

rives They came in low and s low in rhe

firsr of three demonsrration runs, showing

boththeir silence in approach (a particular

asset when t ack l ing urban blazes), and

rheir versatility and manoeuvrability. Both

flewa consrant-speed, controlled descend

i ng r ur n f rom 1 ,5 00 ft (450m) down ro

250ft (75m).

The firsr pass byrhe leading A-lO was a

level run, of the type rhat could be used as

a rerardant drop pattern, and the run fin

ished with a 25-degree climb, which g ve

good ins ight inro how t ighr to the ground

the A-IO can operare. The canyons and

creeks of California presenr difficult terrain

for convenrional aircraft, but not for the

A-IO I The second A-1O followed the

leader down and rhen demonstrated the

aircraft's unique abiliry to maintain its low

speed while safely r u rn ing w ith 60 degrees

of bank, utilizing rhe parrially exrended

wingtip speed brakes. The facr that rhese

brakes, which c lo se in under a second,allow the rurbine s ro run a t h ig h r ow er ,

wirhour gaining unnecessary airspeed, was

another plus; eliminating the lag between

slowflight and high power was cited as an

important safety point.

For years, A- lOs had hunted tanks in

their offset rrail duo f o rmarion, w i th rhe

wingman300ft (90m) behind and slightly

to starboard of rhe leader, and the second

descending turn, drop run and steep c1imb

out, was done in this way. Such a partern

170

would seem to demonstrate how easy i t

would be for an A-10 ream to spread the

retardant over a wider a re a, or to make

linking parterns of cover

The landing by the flight leader showed

rhe A-IO' s abi li ry to operare from

makeshifr airstrips in the field, using only

1,500ft (450m) of runway. The rwo a ir

crafr were rhen taxied overand placed on

static display while their pilors fielded

quesrions from rhe audience. Some have

dismissed this d isplay a s ' jus r a couple of

guys on a cross-country hopbeating up the

patten,', rarl,er than a proper meaningful

display, bur it clearly impressed the watch

ers on the ground.

There was an in-builr resistance on the

part of many fire-fighters to inflatedclaims

by compering parties rrying to s el l a ir

tankers. They felr that, although a useful

adjunct, such ai rcr af t could not solve all

their problems. The daybefore,a Canadair

CL-415 'Super Scooper' had been demon

stI-ared, and Los Angeles had leased thar

tanker. This aircraft, r he CL- 215T , h ad

been evaluared from 1994 rhrough 1997

after two such tests. One reporr concluded

the following:

T ho u gh t he C L- 21 5T aircraft offers some

,Kh antagcs for wil l n fire suppression to the

existingairresources of the Los Angeles Coun

ty Fire Depar tmenr , they havenor proven rohe

all exceptional resource to opcrClte in all terrains

of Los AngelesCounty and in any l11udcra[c to

high windconditions. ; i

I r w as s ai d t ha r t he cost of leasing rhe

Scoopers was more rhan r h ree t imes the

cost ofconvertingan A-I O None the less,

LA took the aircraft on lease, despire some

objections by the counry fire-fighters.

Basic arguments againsr the A-IO pro

posal were many and varied, despite the

fact tha t the aircraft were neverevaluated.

They included rhefact that rhe aircraft was

not available in rhe first place, its develop

menr wou ld rake roo long, and replace

menr S-2s would bea quicker solurion; rhefacr rhat it had never flown as an airranker;

and that ir was t echnological ly too

advanced for fire-fighting aircrew ro han

dle. AlthoughCDF leaders were quoted on

cameraand in writing as welcoming an A

10 airtanker test, they tu rneddown Con

gressional offers ro deliver A-lOs for such

tes ting and, when a California Assembly

man requesred the CDF Director ro evalu

a te t he A-lOon merit, he was refused.

CDF' s upper management conta ined no

pilors, and the pilotswere norconsulted in

airranker selection.

The Scooper did not work very wel l in

rhe Southern Californian area, according

to five separate reports. Examples of slow

or'ineffective response were given as

proof rhar airtankers were not very effi

c i en t, b ut the A-IO's supporters coun

tered by rointing our rhar delays ro such

aircraft , caused by smoke-filled v lleys

obscuring their vi sion, would be over

come by the A-IO's infra-red sysrem. This

infra-red sensor package would be built in

under the nose of the A-10, along with a

retardanr-discharge system, a b el ly rank

and pipe, a nd a n aerial retardanr-reload

ing sysrem via a probe on t h e p o rt side of

the nose. Th e intention was not to use

the A -I O t o replace all orher types of

fixed-wing airtankers a nd h ea vy -l if t

he licop ters , bu t to use ir efficienrly and

Comparison between A-lOA F 5-2FT

A lOA

Engne Specification

Wing Span

Length

Height

Operatng Weight - Fu

Weight wll .5 hours fuel

EmptyWeight 30 mins fuel

Take-Off Distance - Fu

Take-Off Distance w/t.5 hours, fuel

Landing Distance - Fu

Landng Distance - Empty

Initial Rateof Clmb - Fu

RetardantDel very System

Retardant Capacity

Cruse Speed at 5,000ft

Night Capacity

Infrared Vision System

Inflight Reloading

ComputerAim ing System

Head-Up Display

Crash Warning System

Fuly Aerobatc

Orginal Manufacturing Date

Costper aircraft alter R D

THE SAGA OF THE FIRE-FIGHTINGA-IDs

relarively cheaply to f il l a niche in the

system.

The proposed S-2Ts originated from the

Grumman Tracker anti-submarine aircrafr

rerired from service in 1972. Th e A-IO had

been designed thir ty years larer, specifical

ly for low-level, tight-manoeuvring work

from makeshift airstrips. It is not sched

uled to retire unr il 2020, so i r is current

rechnology, but with numbers available,

along w it h r he aircrew skilled enough to

handle them efficienrly.

Relevant comparison figures are shown

in the table below.

AeroTech continues to champion irs

'new-generation airtanker' proposal, cit

ingits usefulness in orher roles:

Fmexample they will mhit over a majorearth

lJuakesite with rheir 'infra-red videodownlinked

to recovery llgencics. That airhornei n r r ~ r d

COF 5 FT

Turboprop

691t Bn

42ft Bn

17ft 5n

26,1001b

24,6001b

13,7001b

4,750ft

4,100ft

4,450ft

2,B50ft

420fpm

Bomb Bay-type Doors

1,200 Galons

200KIAS = 230mph

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Eary 1950s

2,000,000

171

survey w )rk is also important over wildfire

is nowbeing flown hI NASA spy planesat

IllOUS cost airtankcrs will simultane

facilitate ground communications hy ca

radio and cellularphone relaygem. I

The arguments continue and progr

been l imi t ed . Th e Forest Service

responsibility for the urban interfac

Lake Arrowhead and north -east

mento examples notwirhstanding. E

rhe fire-fighters and the various C

Departments were fully convince

DoD continues to inform interesred

cians that there are no spare A-lOs

though an es timated th ir ty- two

museums across the US, a nd 300

have been 'retired' . In the Decembe

issue of r orceMagazine ir wasre

thar thirty-six A-lOs were to be sa

from the 'boneyards', r o be ful lybished for active service.

The pros and cons continue to be

ed. Some argue rhat theA-10 is uns

for canyon work, due to its h ig h

speed, estimated to b e 200 KIAS. O

say thar the fact that ninery A- lO

been assigned to AMARC does nor

they are surplus and available, for th

marked either as 'war reserve ma

which means attrition replacemen

not just combat. An average of four

are lost to accidenral causes everyye

they are a wasting asser, or stripp

spare parrs, which can no long

obtained from Grumman Norrhro

addition,the Air Force, which woul

pily have scrapped t h eA-1 0 years

srill under the Congressional mand

provide the Army with CAS, a nd

10 is still the only aircraft in irs inv

able to do this job properly. Ir

claimed in somequarters thar the U

est Service is not allowed ro posse

a l though o the rss ta te tha t this is n

case, and that the problems are ad

n-ative rather than legal. And soit g

Wheth er t he A-iO will ever be s

fire-fighting mode, and yer anotheof life, is still doubtful, but there is

hope.



CHAPTER TWENTY

• .1-

New England Air Museum sA-10 s/n79-0173)is seen here inboth internal andexternaldisplays. T

display isquite comprehensivewith theGatl inggun andammunitiondrums. a variety ofordnance

otherinterestingdetai ls incorporated.This aircraft hasbeen on loanto New England from theUni

States Air Force Museum since 1993, and prior tothat wasflown by the Connecticut Air National G

based nearto the Museumat Bradley International Airport. Mchea Speciale,ExecutveDirector,New

Ar Museum, Wndsor Locks, Connectcut

A c1ose,up ofA-10 76-0540. now displayedat theAviationMuseumat McClelland AFB, California.

Dooner

reserv tions nd urvivors

Oppositepage, top A-10s/n 76-535 on display at

the Cradleof Aviation Museum, long Island, New

York. This aircraftwas gained by the USAF on

December 1977 a nd i n J u n e 1978 was assigned to

the354th TacticalFighterWing TFW), Tactical Air

Command TAC at Myrtle Beach AFB, South

Carolina. February 1982, i twas reassignedfor

work wi th the SacramentoAir logisticsAreaat

McClellan AFB, California, before being sentto the

45thTactical FighterSquadron TFS inJune 1983,

as partof the US Air Force Reserve,based at

Grissom AFB, Indiana. Joshua StoH, Courtesyof Cradle

ofAviaton Museum, NY

Oppositepage, middle The A-10 s/n 73-1666) on

display atthe AerospaceMuseumat Hill AFB,

close toSalt lake Cty, July 1995. Peter Smith

Despite the fa that the A/OA-lO is s t il l a

f ighting warplane in act ive service many

have been honourably retired and are now

on public display at air museums. Others

ha ve be e n savedas staticdisplays at various

USAF bases in t h e U S A bu t t h e n u mb er s

of t he se a re in a permanent state of flux as

more and more basescloseclowna n d t h e air-

craft are moved elsewhere. Other A-lOs are

carried on no registers b ut h av e b ee n

p h ot o gr ap h ed a n d observed on display

a lthough not being recorded as such.

Oppositepage, bottom ThisA-10 with droptank,

sIn 77-0228, is on display at Grissom Air Park,

HeritageMuseum Foundation, Grissom AFB,

Indiana. Shewas recievedinto the U SA F o n 2 6

November 1978 andthe following month was

assigned tothe 355th Tactical FighterWing Tactical

Air Command), at Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona. In

January 1978 she went to Europe as partof the81st

Tactical FighterWing USAFE , at RAF Bentwaters,Suffolk. where sheremainedfor threeyears. In May

1981 shearrived atthe Sacramento Air material

Area AirForce logistics Command) at McClellan

AFB.California,beforebeing re-assignedto the45th

Tactical FighterSquadron Air Force Reserve)at

Grissom AFB. She remained in service with thatunit

fornine subsequentyearsbeforebeing retired.She

was assignedto theHeritage MuseumFoundation

on 1January 1990 andhas been an open-air static

displaythere eversince. still painted inher olive

draband with Air Force Reservemarkings.

John S March

172 173



PRESERV TIONS NI SURVIVORS

77

PRESERV TIONS NI SURVIVORS

Oppositepage, topleft New England irMuseum sA-10(s/n 79-0173 . Front view showing

gooddetail ofthe aircraft s frontwheel andundercarr iage, offset tomake room forthe Gatling

gun;the firing barrel isone ofthe seven situated direct starboard on thecentre-l ine. Also

shownare the two ALR-69 radar warning receivers on ei thers ide of thenoseandthe UARRSI

fuell ing receptacleplaced rightin frontof thepilot, with i tsguiding cues forthe refuell ing

tanker boom. Michael Speciale, Executve Director, New England Air Museum, Windsor Locks,

Connectcut

Opposite page, topright ItsGhostGrey paintscheme showing clear signsof weathererosion,

thisA-10, pictured at PopeAFB, Fayetteville,North Carolina, in May 1998, still proudly bears

theshark s mouth andeyesmarkings.Thesewere adopted by the23rdTactical FighterWing

as atr ibute to theChennault s legendaryAmerican VolunteerGroup,which painted them on

their Curtiss P-40sin Burmaand China inthe SecondWorld War. Appropriately, the first true

tank-busters, the German Junkers Ju 87 Stuka,much earl ier inthe war, were thefirst warplanesto carry this marking intobattle,in Francein thesummer of 1940. KengoYamamoto

Oppositepage, bot/om Fairchild-RepublicA-10 s/n 75-298 in July 1998,on exhibition atPima

Air Space Museum,Tucson,Arizona as partof theArizona Aerospace Foundation display.

In August 1977, she was assigned to the354th Tactical FighterWing TACL MyrtleBeach AFB,

SouthCarolina, and in Febrauary 1979, movedto the 57th TacticalTraining Wing TAC at Nellis

AFB, Las Vegas, Nevada. In April 1980 hernext assignment waswi th the 355th TacticalTraining

Wing TAC at Davis-MonthanAFB, which is r ightacrossthe street from theMuseum, so they

plan tokeepher on display on loanin thatunit s markings. From 1990 she servedwith the 358th

TFS ( Lobos ) to at leastApri l 1992, entering AMARCduring November1992. She was given

tothe Pima ir SpaceMuseum on 25 January 1994, andremains in excellent condition.

Kirsten Tedesco,Deputy Drector/Curator of Colectons, Pima Air SpaceMuseum, Tucson

77

Thispage Head-on (top) and port quarter(above) vie

the Empire StateAerosciences Museum A-10 (BuNo 75

on externaldisplayat Scotia, New York. Built in 1975,

aircraft was thetwelfth,but onlythe sixthproduction

A-10,and sawgood service,accumulatingsome5,947

hours. Acquired by the 355th Tactical Training Wing T

Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Tucson, Arizona, befor

in March 1976, tothe 333rd Tactical FighterTrainingSq

TFTS the Lancers . It saw furtherservicein thesubs

years andthenarrivedat Shaw AFB from Myrtle Beac

South Carolina,afterthat base hadbeendeactivated.

assigned tothe 507th TAIRCWat Shaw,which laterch

tothe 20th FighterWing.Theaircraftwas designated

battle damagerepairprogramme aftera crackwasdiscovered inthe RT engine mount o n 1 8 March 1990,

restr icted to normal, non-tacticalfl ighttraining.

I twas acquiredfrom 20 F Wb y the Empire StateAeros

Museum and delivered on 4May 1995 to Schenectady

County Airport,at Glennville, New York on the s iteof

formerGeneral Electr icfl ight-testfaci l i ty,vacated in

A four-man museum crew tookfive days todismantle

plane atShaw,for transportto themuseum viaa New

irGuard C-5 Galaxytransport,fromStewartAir Nati

Guard Base,New York. It thentook approximately one

to reassembleit. It carriesthe nose code263. JohnPa

Empire State Aerosciences Museum, Scota, New York



PRESERVATIONS AND SURVIVORS PRESERVflTIONS N SURVIVORS

Th e Air Force Museum official ly owns

all the A lOs in the various museums and

tacks them by their tail number . Only two

were not flyable w hen they were s tr ipped

for display one that bell ied in at George

A FBa nd is n ow o n display at Davis Mon-

than and the McClellan exhibit . Th e rest

were justsurplus to requirements.

Given this state of constant change it is

difficult to list all the AjOA IOs that have

been preserved but the followingtable

a fa ir indication of those that the

might be able to visit. There is not e

space to feature eachand everyexamp

the photographs here are represen

Hawgs Iave also been reported on display the following locato

Bradley Air Natonal GuardBase, Windsor Locks, Connectcut

Connectcut ANG,East Grandby, Connectcut

Eieson AFB, Alaska

Expermental Aircraft Associaton Air Adventure Museum,

Oshkosh, Wisconsin Wing ony)

FortCampbel, Kentucky

Fort Hood, Texas

Fort LeonardWood, Missouri

Lackand AFB, Texas

Maryland ANG, Westfield

McChord AFB, Wisconsin

Naval Air Staton, New Oreans, Louisiana

New Cumberand

osan AB, Korea

Sprangdahlem AB, Germany

Whiteman FB Missouri

Willow Grove,ARS, Pennsylvania

Wisconsin Natonal Guard Memorial Libraryand Museum,

Vok Fied, Camp William, Wisconsin

A/DA-10Preservations

Locaton

Air Force Museum Wright-Patterson FB Dayton,Oh o YA- 1

Air Force Flght Test Center Museum, Calfornia YA-l0BI

Hi AFB Museum, Utah

Engand AFB, Hertage Park, Louisiana

New Oreans Naval Air St at on Colect on, New Oreans, Louisiana

Empre State Aerosciences Museum,Scota, New York

McChord Air Museum, Washington

Pma Air SpaceMuseum, Tucson, Arzona

Defense Distribution Center East New Cumberand, Pennsyvania

PopeAFB, NorthCarolna

Massachusetts ANG, Barnes Municipal Airport, Westfield, Massachusetts

New York ANG, Syracuse ANGB, New York

Crade of Aviaton Museum, Garden Cty, New York

McClelan Aviaton Museum, NorthHighlands, Calfornia

USAF History and Traditons Museum, San Antonio, Texas

Barksdale FB Bosser, Louisiana

USAF Armament Museum, Elgn FB Florda

Grssom Air Park, Hertage Museum Foundaton, Grssom AFB, Indiana

Pennsylvania ARS, Willow Grove,Pennsy vania

Imperial War Museum, Duxford Airfield, Cambrdge

UnitedStates Air Force Museum, Wright-Patterson AFB, Oho

Myrtle Beach FB Hertage Park, Myrtle Beach, South Carolna

Davis-Monthan FB Warrior Park, Arzona

Connectcut ANG, Bradley InternationalAirport, Windsor Locks, Connectcut

Davis-Monthan AFB, Warrior Park, Arzona

New Engand Air Museum, Bradley InternationalA irport, Connectcut

Aerospace Maintenance Regeneraton Center Celebrity Row , Davis-Monthan AFB, Tucson, Arzona

s

71-1370

73-1664

73-1666

73-1667

75-0255

75-0263

75-0270

75-0298

75-0303

75-0308

76-0100

76-0523

76-0535

76-0540

76-0547

75-0552

77-0205

77 228

77-0248

77-0259

78-0681

79-0097

79-0117

79-0103

79-0116

79-0173

79-0244

A-l0 76-0540, a Gulf War veteran, now displayed at the Aviation Museum at McClelland AFB, California.

It still carriersits Desert Storm nose art and AFRES squadron markings. W i a m Dooner

The preserved A-l0 at Duxford in th e new USAF hangar. The nosewheel

its gear are offset to th e starboard side o fth e aircraft s n o se to

th e Ge n e ra l Electric A/A 49E-6 cannon system. Peter C Smth

A-l0 almost inevitably ends u p a s amuseum display. This mounted

e a n d cockpit section was an outdoor display at Eglin AFB, Shalimar,

i n M a y 1998. Kengo Yamamoto

VA-lOB was the sole dual-seat A-l0 made over from th e first

tion aircraft, 73-1664, which wasbailed to Fairchild-Republic at

Farmingdale plant from April 1978 for experimental conversion into a

dverse weathervariant. No te th e insignia on t he n os e o f an owl

an umbrellarepresenting these two duties. A right-hand pod-mounted

radar, and a forward-looking infra-red FURl pod were added

th e sa me side, as well as an IN-39 INSa n d AN/APN-1 94 radar altimeter.

tail was raised by 20in 50cm). In th e e ve n t,th e Air Force decided not to

with it and this aircraft was retained at Edwards AFB, where it is

on display. I tslo n g nose boom is clearly shown. Air Force Flght Test Center

FB

176 177



aryfunctions: CAS; AFAC

tryinto service: March 1976and ArmyMaterial Command (AMC) to find

solution.Together,they identified 200diffe

potential solutions covering the whole DTL

(doctrine, training, leader development,

organization, material and soldier support)

spectrum.

Thebattlefield combat identification sy

(BClS) is one rE?sult from thisclose study.

wastestedduring Task Force XXI Advanc

Warfighting Experiment. An active rather

passive system, like thecurrent Mark XII

usinga millimetrewave system, BCIS allo

the pilot to look through a sight, placethe

cross-hairs on the targetusinga laser and

toldwhether it isfriendor foe. Concurren

this normal action, BCIS queriesthe targe

a codedmillimetrewavesignal. If it is loc

on to a BClS-equipped vehicle, it will reply

kind. The return signalactivatesa light in

sight and also atone signal, clearly indicat

friendly contact.

The FAC can relay this information and

identityconfirmation to any CAS aircraft li

theA-l 0, which maybe in the area awaiti

ordersto strike. Thelocationof friendlyfo

c an b e passed on via the situation-awaren

datalink (SADL), an enhanced position loc

reporting system EPLARS) radio in the A

which can communicate directlywith Arm

groundunits via a situational awareness

picture. This, with modification, can displa

thepilot'sHUD thefriendly locationsnear

thetargetthe A-lOis aboutt o engage. 1J

For night missions, advances are equal

impressive. FAC missionsare now flown

the NVG linked the air commander's po

ACP), which is a finger-attachment. Thep

attaches the ACP, a n infra-red laser device

hisfinger with Velcro. The pilot has to use

protective, wraparound, laser-protectiveglasses underthe NVG to shield his eyes

anybeamreflectionoff hisown aircraft's

canopy. Oncethe FAC A-l 0, so equipped

locates atarget, thepilot merely points h

fingerat it,the beam lockson and fellow

with NVG lock in on the laserdot generat

This gives the A-l 0 covertability of targe

selection, so thatthe enemy does noteve

know he is targeteduntil he is hit. This is

butmakescorrect target identication byt

FAC even more crucial in future conflicts.

179

APPENDIX

of assurance ' i Conditions overthe battlefield,

when the warwent hot, wereverydifferent. In

theenvironmentof fast-moving tank forces,

and the general tension and confusion of

battle, incidents of 'friendly fire' began to be

reported once more. There wasmuch renewed

horror, and disbeliefthatsucha thing could

happen in the 1990s.

Twodetailed and accurate studies by

Americans on the SecondWorld War, Vietnam

and GulfWarfiguresput them into similar

brackets, rangingfrom 10 to 14 per cent,with 17

per cent forthe Gulf War. If the Scud-Bmissile

attacks on rear areas are omitted as irrelevantto

the issue,the percentage rises to 23 percent. '

In Britain, theAmericans wereagain seen as

themain villains, principally dueto thetragic

incident when two A-lOsmistakenly shot up a

British armoured scoutcolumn of the3rd

Battalion, T h e R o ya l Regimentof Fusiliers

BattleGroup, with heavylossof life see

Chapter 16). Naturally, the bereaved families,

grieving and angry, went tothe British High

Court to force the Ministryof Defenceto reveal

what reallyhappened. They werenot to be

given much satisfaction

It can be of little consolation tothose British

families, but fratricide also occurred between

American forces in the Gulf. In fac t, 35of the

146American battledeaths during Desert

Storm an incredible24 percentof thetotal,

resulted from 'friendlyfire'. Furthermore, 72 of

the480 Americanswounded - or 15per cent of

thetotal- werevictims oferrors on thepartof

theirown sides. In addition, American forces

destroyed seven M1A1 tanks and twenty

Bradleyfighting vehiclesof their own forces.1 N

The furore in themediafollowingsome of

these casesof 'friendly fire' has concentrated

theminds of themilitary, spurred on byCongress. For theA-l O s part, this hasinvolved

the retro-fitting of awhole new system

designed to eliminate, as far as humanly

possible, the chances of such errors occurring

in future conflicts

TheAir Force is workingcloselywith the

Army on this, for obvious reasons. In the

immediateaftermathof Desert Storm theArmy

Vice Chiefof Staff, General Gordon R. Sullivan

(laterto be CoS), directed TRADOC Training and

Doctrine Command)at Fort Monroe, Virginia,

riendly ire

Fratricide is agrim fact of warfare, and onethat

is often swept underthe carpet. In everywar,

fratricide has played apart in the casualty

total,m and, with theadventof airpower, it is

increasingly likelyto happen. The higherthe

altitude, thegreater the riskof hittingfriendly

forces. Duringthe SecondWorld War, the

Allies'insistence on area bombing led to some

particularlyhorrendousdisasters, not leastthe

five hundred-plusFrench civilians massacred in

thebombing of Le Portal,near Boulogne on the

night of 8/9September 1943N On the

material side, the bombing of MonteCassino

was an equally futile exercise.m

Becauseof the natureof CAS, ground forces

are laid open to risk, no matter how precisely

the strikes are made. Perhaps the most

consistentlyaccurate bombing of the Second

World Warwas conducted by theVultee

Vengeance dive-bomber squadrons of the RAF

againstJapanese troops besiegingImphal and

Kohima in 1944. Attackswere made up tofour

times a day on enemypositions justyardsfrom

British trenches. Even these skilledpilots would

err o n r a re occasions, and accidentallyhit their

own troops 2 ;

These disasters were sufficientlycommon

that advocates of CAS, including the US Marine

Corps aviators in the Philippines in 1944, had

the greatestdifficulty in convincing Army

commanders to use even their SBDs in support

of ground forces So many attacks had been

misdirected by the USAAF thatthe Marine flyers

had to demonstratetheir skillsmanytimes before

theywere acceptedas part ofthe team2 ;

In Korea, thesamebitterlessonswere

imparted; again, onlythe US Marine flyers,

specialists in CAS and dedicatedto it, flying the

Douglas AD Skyraider in thejet age, were

deliveringthe goodsaccurately. Britishmemories are especially bitter. On 10

September 1950, USAF P-51 Mustangs,

operating as fighter-bombers, dropped their

bombs on the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders

at Naktong, killing and maiming sixty296

Withthe beginning of theGulf War, these

tragedies seemed to be quickly forgotten by

the media, and television pictures showing the

much-heralded 'precision' guidedweapons

delivering bombs down skylights in the heartof

Baghdad,gavethe general publica false sense

$8.8 million (original)

Fairchild-Republic Company/Grumman Northrop

One

Douglas Escapac zero/zero

Twox 40.3 3-kN General ElectricTF34-GE-l00 non-afterburning turbofans

9,0651b 4,111 kg) each engine

178

Length53ft 4in 1626 m); height 17ft8in (5.38m);wingspan 57ft6in (1753m); wing area 506 sq ft 47 sq m)

Empty 24,9591b 11 ,319kg); typical combat weight 30,5341b (13,850kg); ferry TO weight 47,0941b (21,361 kg);

max. TO weight 50,0001b 22,361 kg); wing Idg at ferry TO weight93lb/sq ft (454kg/m'); max wing loading 99lb/sq ft (482kg/m');

power Idg atcombatweight 1.7Ib/lbst (l72kg/kN); power Idg atferry TO weight 26Ib/lb.st. (265kg/kN);

max. power loading 2.8Ib/lb.s.t. 271 kg/kN)

Cruise speed274 knots(507km/h)

Max. speed 518mph (834km/h)450.81 knots

Max. speed at20,000ft(6,000m)355 knots (675km/h)

Combatspeed sea level) 330 knots 611 km/h)

Initial climb rate at max.TOweight 1,970ft/min (10m/sec)

Initial climb rate atcombatweight 4,792ft/min (24.3m/sec)

Time to climb to 22,500ft(6,860m) 23 mins

Combatceiling 34,800ft 1 0,600m)

Optimum combat 1,000ft (300m) with 1 miles 24km visibility

Combatrange 288 miles (250nm/465km)carrying 9,5401b (4,325kg) stores, 750rounds of 30mm,

and 1,646 US gallons 6,231 litres)fuel. 1.7 hours loitertime

Unfuelledferry range 2,289nm (4,220km)

One30mm GAU-8/Aseven-barrel Gatling gun,3,900 rpm; 16,0001b (7,200kg) mixed ordnance on eight underwing

and three under-fuselage pylon stations including 500lb (225kg) of retarded bombs, 2,0001b 91 Okg) GP bombs incendiary

and Rockeye II CBs, CEM, AGM-65NB/D/GMaverick missiles and laser-guided/electro-optically guidedbombs; AIM-9

Sidewindermissiles; IR countermeasuresflares, ECM chaff, jammer pods, 2.75in (699cm) rockets and illuminationflares

NVIS; LASTE PAVE PENNY Laser Tracker; ECM;AN/ALE-40; AN/ALO 119

Active 72 A-l 0, 60 OA-l 0; ANG 84A- lO,24 OA- l 0; AFRES 87A -l0

354th Fighter Wing; 355th Wing; 442nd Fighter Wing; A-lO/F-ll l SPO

Specifications

APPENDIX I

tion seat:

tank capacity: Internal 1,646 US gallons 6,231 litres); external provision for three 600 US-gallon tanks

Units:

(1999)



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

NASM Collection1989-0060

CHAPTERONE

See Peter Smith, Straight Downl CrecyBooks,

Manchester, 1999

See for example, Daniel R. Mortenen, A Pattern for

Joint Operations: World War I Close Air Support

North Africa Office of Air Force History, Washing

ton, DC, 1987,for detai ls of these incidents and the

ensuing arguments

For theful l story of the 'Spad', see Peter C Smith,

Douglas AD Skyrader Crowood Press, 1999

In line with theAl liedAirForcesown prejudices,the

other Sov ie t c lose-support a ircra ft , the far more

accurate and much faster Petlyakov Pe-2 Peshka

received relatively l i tt le public ity in the Western

media, perhaps because it wasa dive-bomber and

thus disproved the long-cherished theoriesof the

R A F a n d the USAAF

Bil l Sweetman, Modern Fighting Aircraft. A-IDA

Thunderboll-II.Aviation Fact Fie, SalamanderBooks,

1984

A anti-aircraftweapons and units in Germanycame

underthe authori ty of theLuftwafferather than the

army, as inBri tainand theUSA

See Peter C. Smith, Junkers Ju87 Stuka Crowood

Press, 1998

See Hans-Ulrich Rude, SlUka P ot Euphorin, 1952,

for details of thisinterrogation

For a moredetailed examinationof al thesefacets

of CAS, see Peter C. Smith, Close Air Support

Shrewsbury and Washington, DC, Airl i fe, 1990

CHAPTERTWO

The Ar Force F ght Test Centers 'Evauaton of the YA

10s Leading-Edge Sats, 1July 1974, is contaned in

the microfilmdocumentA r Force F ght Tes tC enter,Cal Number K286.69-42 V.9; IRIS Number 01019723,

Rol 000032471,AFHRS/RSA,Maxwe AFB

Senator Russ Symington of Missouri , whose son

wasa Congressman from St Louis,opposed out

right the 58mil l ion purchaseof theAV-18AHarr

e r, a s this money would have jeopardized thepur

chase of seventeen McDonnellF-4 Phantoms,built

in thatcity. He overlookedthe factthat McDonnell

Douglas wouldbe involved inthe future manufac

turing rights. Also, al though the original l icensing

agreement was approved by Congress, it refused

tosanctionmoneyto move productionto the U S i n

1971.Russell Murray II, assistant to the Assistant

ot s

Secretaryof Defense(SystemAnalysis), DrAlain C.

Enthoven, was equal ly virulently opposed to the

V/STOLproject,and in a 1978article, describedthe

Harrier as a relativelyundistinguished aircraft in al

respectssaveone'. See RussellMurray II, 'The AV

8B- risingverticallythrough the air, invulnerable to

runawaycuts', Treatise1978

13 See US Congress; House Committee on Armed

Services, 'Close Air Support' (218 pp), Hearings

SpecialSubcommittee on Tactca AirSupport,89th

Congress, 1st Session, Washington, DC, 1966

14 See US Congress, House Committee on Armed

Services, 'Close AirSupport', report(15pp), Special

Subcommitteeon Tactca Air Support, 89th Congress, 2ndSession, Washington, DC, 1966

CHAPTER THREE

15 Theauthorowes adebt tothe fol lowing two defin

itivedocuments in chroniclingthe A-X programme:

Dr Edward C. Mishler, 'The A-X Specialised Close

Support Aircraft: Origins and Concept Phase 1961-

1970', Office of History, Air Force System Com

mand, andDr George M. Watson, Jr, 'The A-lOA

Close Air Support Aircraft 1970-1976', Office of

History, AirForce SystemsCommand

16 Dr Edward C. Mishler, 'The A-X specialised close

supportaircraft: origins and concept phase 1961-

1970 opcit

17 Ibid

18 Ibid

19 See Major Michael J. Doan, 'What 's r ight and

wrong with close airsupport', Combat ForcesJour

nal Vol. 1, No. 12, 24, Washington, DC, July 1951

20 Ibid

21 See Development Concept Paper DCP) 23A. 'AX

close support aircraft', USAF, dated 6 Apr il 1970

See AFSC Fact Sheet, 'A-X special ised close ar

supportaircraft',June 1971, p. 2

23 As detailed in J. Phil ip Geddes, 'A-lOA - USAF

choicefor thecloseair supportrole', International

Defense Review January 1974

24 See General MarkW. Clark, 'Whatk i nd ofar sup

port does theArmy want?' , Air Force Magazine

Vol. 33,No. 12, pp24-25,Washington, DC, Decem

ber1950

25 DevelopmentConcept Paper23A, p. 4, opcit

26 DevelopmentConcept Paper23A, p. 2, opcit

27 See J. Phil ip Geddes, 'A-lOA - USAF choice for

c lo se a r s uppo rt r ol e , International Defense

Review January 1974, p . 7 2

28 Ibid

180

29 SystemManagement Directive (D/GDS-83), SMD

1-453-329A(3), Document 1, 5May 1971

30 SeeC M. Pattner, 'Severaldesignstudiesexpected

for AX', article in AviationWeek andSpace Technol-

ogy 3 April 1967

31 Ibid

3 Ibid

33 Draf t 23 S), Rev B, 'A-Xspecialised closea r sup

port a i rc raf t' , 9 January 1973. A lso AFSC Fact

Sheet, 'A-X special ised close ar support aircraft' ,

June 1971

34 See Chapter 7

35 DCP 23A S), opcit

36 See 'Fairchild-Hiller, Northrop to build A-X proto

types', Armed ForcesJournal. 4January1971, p. 17

37 'The A-lOA CloseAir SupportAircraft' , opcit

38 SystemsManagementDirective(C/GDS-83), SDM

1-453-329A(3I, Document 1, 5May 1971

39 See Joint design-to-costguide- l i fe cycle cost as

a design parameter', DARCOM P700-6, NAVMAT

P5242, AFLCP/AFSCP, 800-19, 15 October 1977,

pp5-6

40 SystemsManagementDirective(C/GDS-83), SMD

1-453, 329A(3), Document 1, 5May 1971

41 See Colonel James E. Hildebrandt, Director, A-X

SPO, Memorandumto Deputy Systems Manage

ment, ASD, 'AirForceSPO/contractorrelationships

during A-X competi tive prototype program', Apri l

1971. S ee a ls o Contract Management Office,

Edwards AFB, 'YA-10A Aircraft', 14 September

1984, Microfilm Cal Number K243 0708-47; IRIS

Number 01010750, AFHRAIRSA, Maxwel l AFB,

Alabama

42 Ibid

CHAPTER FOUR

See 'History of Aeronautical Systems Division,

FY 1973',quoted in 'TheA-lOAClose AirSupport

Aircraft', opcit

44 'TheA-lOA Close AirSupport Aircraft', opcit

45 'TheA-lOA Close Air Support Aircraft', opcit

46 SeeTechnical Report73-2, 'AirForce Flight Evaua

t ion (Systems) of the A-9A proto type a irc ra f t' ,

AFFTC, EdwardsAFB, CA. March 1973

47 See 'NorthropstreamlinesA-9Amanagement',arti

c le i n Aviation Week and Space Technoogy 26

June 1972,p. 109

48 Ibid

49 Ibid

50 SeeWoodsHansen,'A-lOA prototypedesignedfor

production', article in Aviation Week and Space

Technoogy ppl17 118 26June1972

51 See Frank N. Lucero, Thomas R. Yechout and Roy

Bridges, Technical Report 73-3, 'Air Force Fl ight

Evaluation (Systems) of the A-lOA prototype air

craft', AFFTC, Edwards A F B, C A , March 1973

5 See 'Analysisof A-X competitive fly-offdata, Study

GroupReport, 29 December1972

53 Technical Report73-2, p. 3, opcit

54 Technical Report 73-3, p . 9 , opcit

55 'A-lOA- USAF choice forclose air supportrole', op

cit

56 Ibid

57 See Minutes C), DSARC 'Review of A-X aircraft

program - Milestone II', Doc 4, 17 January 1973

58 See DefenseSystems Acquisition ReviewCouncil

(DSARCI, 'Recommendations on A-lOA', Memo

randum C) tothe Secretaryof Defensefrom John

S. Foster, Jr, DDR E Doc 5), 16 February 1973

59 Ibid

60 Ibid

61 CSAF to AFSC, A-lOA Program, Message timed

012216Z, March 1973, quoted in 'TheA-lOA Close

AirSupport Aircraft', opcit

62 Memo C) to Sec re tary o f S ta te of the A ir Force

from Dr Foster, A-lOA SAR, 14 May1973,quoted

in 'The A-lOA Close Air Support Aircraft ' , o p c i t

63 See 'Historyof ASD, FY74, I, p87, quoted in'The

A-lOAClose Air Support Aircraft', opcit

64 Thefour cancelledmachineswere final ly complet

edunderthe first full productioncontract

CHAPTER FIVE

65 Memorandum,JohnS. Foster, Jr, DDR E,to Assis

tant Secretaryof theAir Force (R D), A-X, 26July

1972,quoted in 'The A-lOA Close Ar SupportAir

craft', opcit

66 Memorandum, BrigadierGeneralRaymond B. Fur

long, DeputyAssistantSECDEF (LegislativeAffairs)

to Director of DefenseResearch and Engineering,

Doc 6, 17 September 1973. Also USAF News

Reease , ' SAF McLuc as s peak s t o Rot ar y in

Boston', 19 June 1974

67 Ibid

68 Let ter, EdwardG Uhl, President and Chief Execu

tive, Fairchi ld Industries, to General George S.

Brown,Chiefof Staff, USAF, 4February1974.Cited

in 'The A-lOA Close Air Support Aircraft' , o p c it

6 9 I bi d

70 Hearing before the SenateCommitteeon Armed

Servi ces, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, Report

S1263, Doc 7, 28 March 1973, quoted in 'The A

lOAClose Air Support Aircraft', opcit

71 Hearingsbefore House Subcommitteeof the Com

mittee on Appropriations, 93rd Congress, 1st Ses

sion, DoDAppropriationsfor 1974,pt 7, p p 9 9 ~ 1 1cited in 'TheA-lOAC oseA r SupportAircraft', opcit

72 Memorandum,from MalcolmR. Currie, DDR E, to

Secretary of theArmy,Secretaryof the Air Force,

NOTES

Director,Weapons SystemsEvaluationGroup,'Fly

off betweenthe A-7 andA-lOAaircraft', 23 October

1973. Also Information Memorandum from Mal

colm R. Currie, DDR E to Secretary of Defense,

'F ly -O ff Between theA- lOAand A-T, 2 October

1973, ci ted in The A-IDA Close Air Support op cit

73 Letter to TAC.CC, AFSC/CC, AFLC/CCfrom Gener

al George S. Brown,Chief of Staff, USAF, 'A-10AlA

7 FlyoffPlanning, 10 December1973,w/atch: Test

Concept Paper, cited in The A-IDA Close Air Sup

portAircraft op cit

74 The A-IDACloseAir Support Aircraft. op cit

75 Program Management Directive for A-1 OAlA-7 Fly

Off, PMD R-P4022(1), 11 February 1974,p . 2 , cited

in The A-IDACloseAir Support Aircraft. op cit

76 AFSC Fact Sheet, 'A-10AlA-7 Evaluation, 4 Apri l

1974

77 Program ManagementDirective for A-1 OAlA-7 Fly

Off opcit

78 The word 'Feller' is usually substituted in printed

sources forthe real wordthe pi lotsusedl

7 9 A FS C Fact Sheet, 'A-10AlA-7 Evaluation, 4 Apri l

1974

80 Briefing by Department of the Air Force, in Hear

ings before theHouse Committeeon Armed Ser

v ices , 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, 'Fl y-Of f

Between the A-7 andthe A-lOA Aircraft' , 20June

1974, pp16-23

81 Letter to Hon. John L. McClellen, Committeeon

Appropriations, from Will iam Clements, Jr,

DEPSECDEF, 20 June 1974, c ited in The A-IDA

Close AirSupportAircraft op cit

82 Minutes, DSARC I li A, Rev iew o f A -l OA Pro

gramme, 9July 1974, cited in TheA-IDA Close Air

SupportAircraft op cit

83 Ibid

84 Ibid

85 Act io n memorandum t o Deput y Sec re ta ry o f

Defense, f rom Arthur I. Mendol ia, Assistant

SECDEF (I LI, 'A-lOA Close Air Support Aircraft

Program', 26July 1974, ci ted in 'The A-lOA Close


86 Memorandum, t o Deput y Sec re ta ry o f t he A ir

Force, from DEPSECDEF Clements, 'A-lOA Pro

duction Decision', 31 Jul y 1974, a lso CSAF to

AFSC, 'A-lOAProductionApproval',timed 312150Z

July1974,cited in 'TheA-lOACloseAir SupportAr

craft', op cit

87 SeeAir Force Flight TestCenter, Vol. I of X, 'A-lOA

aircraftGAU-8 gun problems', 9 September 1984,

Microfilm Cal Number K286.69-42 V 1 , I R IS Num

ber 01050866; and also USAir Force, 'Accidentsinvolving GAU-8 30mm PAU-14/B gun ammuni

tion', Microfilm Cal NumberMICFILM 40239, IRIS

Numbe r 01073545, 1 Nov embe r 1978; b ot h

AFHR/RSA. Maxwell AFB, Alabama

88 See 'Presentation' Colonel Samuel J. Kishline,

Deputy Director, Dep/A-10A. ASD, DSARC Pro-

gram Review. also DSARC Program Review, 'The

A-lOA Close Air SupportAircraft', undated, Dir/Prg

Control . Dep/A-10Afi les; also 'Historyof Air Force

Command Systems', FY75, I, pp255-257; 'History

of AeronauticalSystems Division',July-December

1974, pps136-139; al cited in 'TheA-lOA Close


181

CHAPTERSIX

89 The author gratefully acknowledges his d

this section of thebookto Kent A. Mitchell,

and his defini t ive work, Fairchild Aircraft

1987, Santa Ana, California1997

90 'TheA-lOA CloseAir SupportAircraft ', opc

91 Woods Hansen, 'A-lOA Prototype Desig

Production', article Aviation Week Spac

nology 26June1972

9 Ibid

93 See Lieutenant General Robert E. Has ,Vc

mander, TAC, 'Report relative to productio

nesspostureof theA-lOA program', 30 Sep

1974 (hereafter referred to as 'The Hails R

94 'The A-lOA CloseAir SupportAircraft' , opc

95 Ibid

96 The Hails Report, opcit

97 Ibid

98 The Has Report, opcit

99Ibid

100 Warren C Wetmore, 'A-lOA Program A

Reshaped, article Aviation WeekandSpac

nology 10 February 1975

101 Ibid

102 Ibid

103 The Hails Report, opcit

104 Ibid

105 Ibid

106 'A-lOAProgram Approach Reshaped, op

107 Ibid

108 Ibid

109 'The A-lOA CloseAir Support Aircraft ' , op


111 See article, New York Times 27 Februa

p59

112 'The A-lOA CloseAir SupportAircraft' , op

113 Letter, Mr Charles Collis, President, F

Republic Company, to Colonel Merton W

Commander AFPRO, Fairchild-RepublicCo

3 January 1975, cited in 'TheA-lOA Close

port Aircraft', op cit

114 'The A-lOACloseAir SupportAircraft' , op

115 Memorandum fromLieutenant General R

Has to General Richard H. E s, AFPR

Organization, 26 September1974,cited inlOAClose Air Support Aircraft', opcit

116 Lettersbetween GeneralSamuel C. Philli

mander AFSC and General R. H. E s,

October 1974 and 20 December 1974,

'TheA-lOA CloseAir SupportAircraft', op

CHAPTER SEVEN


118 'The A-lOA CloseAir Support Aircraft ' , o



'A-lOAProgramApproach Reshaped, opcit

0 Draft study by staffof theUS GeneralAccounting

Office IGAO), 'A-lOA Aircraft Program', Deputy

Secretaryof theAir Force,dated December 1975,

pp23-24, cited in 'The A-lOA CloseAir Support

Aircraft', opcit

Decision co-ordinating paper (DCP), 'A-lOA Spe

cial ised Close Air Support Aircraft', 7 January

1976, cited in 'The A-lOA Close AirSupport Ar

craft', opcit

Article, Aviation Weekand Space Technoogy, 2

January 1975, p. 9

Decision co-ordinating paper (DCP), op cit See

also Air Force Systems Command, Aerospace

Medical DivisionHistory, 'GAU-l0, 3 September

1993, Microfilm Cal Number K237.01 V1, IRIS

Number 01003874, AFHA/RSA, Maxwell AFB,

Alabama

Ibid

CHAPTER EIGHT

Roy Wilkinson, The World s Great AttackAircrafr,

London, 1988

6 SeeWilliam I Smallwood, 'Old'Hog, NewTricks,

article in Air Space Feb/March 1999 edition

7 'A-lOA - USAF choice for thec lose ar support

role, op t

Ibid

See Peter C Smi th , Douglas AD Skyraider,

Crowood Press, 1999

0 'A-lOA- USAF Choicefor theClose AirSupport

Role, opcit

'A-lOAPrototypeDesignedfor Production', opcit

Ibid

Ibid

'A- lOA - USAF Choicefor the CloseAir Support

Role, opcit

Seealso 'Charting the aircraft losses', article in

Journal of the Armed Forces, Vol. 105, nbr. 42, 15

June 1968,pp4-5

6 'A-lOA - USAF Choicefor the CloseAir Support

Role, opcit

See A . K uo , 'Assessment of damage tolerance

requirements and analyses' (AFWAL TR 96-3003),

Fairchild-Republic, Farmingdale 1986; Damage

ToeranceAsse ssment Handbook, Vol. II, Airframe

damage tolerance evaluation, Cambridge, MA,

Vope National Transportation Systems Center1993, NTIS Springfield, VA, DOT/FAA/CT-93/69, II;

and H. Kan, 'Effects of stiffener/rib separation

on damage g rowth and r es idua l s tr engt h' ,

Northrop Grumman Corporation, Hawthorn, CA,

and M Mahler, NASA Langley Research Center,

May 1996, DOT/FAA/AR-95/12

SeeFlightInternational, 24 January 1976;also Air

Force magazine, July1983

Ibid

0 Ibid

NOTES

CHAPTER NINE

141 See 'Justice Departmentvetoes RB. 401',a World

Newssectionarticle, Flight International, 24 Janu

ary1976

142 See Edward H. Heinemann and Rosario Rausa,

Combat Aircraft Designer. the Ed Heinemann

Story, Annapolis, 1980

143 Ibid

144 For thefull storyof thetr ialsandtr ibulationsof the

Skyshark, W. A. Schoech,Acting Chief of Bureau,

'A2D Data Requested by Senate Preparedness

Invest igating Subcommi ttee' , f rom Chief of

Bureau of Aeronauticsto Chief of Legislative liai-

son, 6 August 1957. Some other information is

contained in Gerry Markgraf, 'Skyshark, Son of

Spad, article AmericanAviationHistorical Society

Journal, Vol. 22, No 3 , Fal 1977

145 Ibid

146 Combat Aircraft Designer. the Ed Heinemann

Story, opcit

147 This company h ad n o connection with GEC, UK

148 'AirForce Flight Evaluation(Systems)of theA-lOA

Prototype Aircraft', opcit

149 'TheA-lOA Close AirSupportAircraft', opcit

CHAPTER TEN

150 See Peter C. Smith, Victorias Victories, Speld

hurst, 1987

151 On 1July1916, thefirst day ofthe Sommeoffen

sve, the BritishArmy lost20,000dead and 40,000

wounded, the bulk to German machine guns,

which had remained inviolate despite days of

bombardment by heavy artillery

152 Requirement ActIOn Directive (RAD), 'Air-to

Ground Gun Systems for CloseAir Support Air

craft', RAD-8-218-(1) 5 January 1968. See also

DCP 103 (S/SGDS-89, Development Concept

Paper, 'Close Air Support Gun, 5 June 1970,

revised 23 June 1970

153 Ibid

154 'Historyof AirForceSystemsCommand' FY 72,

P 16, cited in 'A-lOA Cose Air Support Aircraft',

opcit

155 Memorandum of Agreement. '30mm Close Air

Support Aircraft GAU-8 Gun Program', signed by

BrigadierGeneralThomas H. McMullen, Dep for

A-lOA and BrigadierGenera Gerald K Hendricks,

Commander, AFTAL, 1 September 1973

156 History ofAir Force Systems Command, FY71n2, 201, Program Management Plan, 30mm CAS

Gun SystemGAU-8A, PE 63605F, PMD 100-2, 10

June1973

157 'A-lOACloseAir Support Aircraft', opcit

158 Briefing, 'GAU-8/A, DSARC II, May1973, cited in

'A-lOACloseAir Support Aircraft', opcit

159 Ibid

160 See Navy/Naval Postgraduate School Report,

'Combat DamageAssessmentTeam, A-1 OA/GAU

8 low-angle firings versus simulated Soviet Tank

Company', 19 April 1982, Microfilm Cal Number,

182

K237.01 l IRIS Number 01003874; AFHR/RSA,

Maxwell AFB, Alabama


'Combat DamageAssessmentTeam, A-IOA/GAU


Company (Array 171 , 5 Apri l 1982, Microfi lm Cal

Number, K180.711-2., IRIS Number 01037113;

AFHR/RSA, Maxwell AFB, Alabama


Combat DamageAssessment Team, A lOA/GAU


Company', 19 April 1982, Microfilm Cal Number,

K180 711-5., IRIS Number 01038650; AFHR/RSA,

Maxwell AFB, Alabama


Combat Damage Assessment Team, 'A- lOA Ar

craftWeaponsSystems Gun Ammunition Lethali

ty', 25 November 1981, Microfilm Cal Number,

K180.711-9, IRIS Number 01039459; AFHR/RSA,

MaxwellAFB,Alabama

CHAPTER ELEVEN

164 See 'Conduct of the Persian Gul f War ', p T-l1

165 SeeWilliam L. Smallwood, 'Old'Hog, New Tricks,

article in Air Space February/March 1999edition

166 SeeRobertWall, 'TheDevastating Impact of Sen

sor Fuzed Weapons', article Air Force Magazine,

March 1998

167 Lieutenant-Colonel Steven Welch, 'Area Attack

Systems', quoted in Jake Swinson, Air Force

Development Test Center Pub c Affai rs , Egn

AFB, Forda, 'Wind-corrected munitions dis

penser beginsproduction',AFMC News Service,

14 August1998

168 Wa, opcit

169 See FY 96 Annual Report, CBU-97/B 'Sensor

Fuzed Weapon (SFW) OSD, Washington, DC, 6

November 1998

170 Ibid

CHAPTER TWELVE

171 A-IDA - USAFChoice for the CoseAir Support

Role opcit

172 Ibid

173 Ibid

174 See Squadron; 355 Tactca Fghter, 354 Tactca

FighterWing,Myrtle Beach AFB, SC; 'After-Action

Report, Opportune Journey'(undated), MicrofilmCal Number K-SQ-FI-355-HI. IRIS Number

00888887; AFHRA/AFS, Maxwell AFB, Alabama

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

175 Thebulkof thissectionisbased on alecturedeliv

eredbyA-lOA pilotMajorBriceKennedy, USAF, of

the 509th TFS Ithe Skulls), to an invited audience

a t t he Royal Aircraft Establishment, Thurleigh,

Bedford, on Wednesday,20 September 1989, and

questionand answersessionafterwards. Tape in

author's collection

176 So ca edbecause i thad to be 'draggedin tothe air

craft, and becausethe ammunitionit loadedenabled

theA-lOAto emitflamesand fire lke adragon

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

177 See 'Congressvotes to terminate A-lOAproduc

tion',article in Aviation Weekand Space Techno

ogy, 23August 1982

178 Ibid

179 Dave Griffiths, article in Defense Week Pars Air

Showedition 1983

180 'Congressvotes to terminateA-lOA production',

opcit

181 See LindaDuffield, 'Final A-lOA fl ies off to mark

end o f e ra , AP, in The Morning Herad, Hager

stown, Maryland, 21 March 1984

182 Ths staf f , now reduced, stil l exists at Northrop

Grumman as the A-lOA Engineering, Pant 25, at

Bethpage, New York, now undersenior manager

George C. Leavy, who waswith theproject from

the beginning

183 Kent A. Mitchell, FairchildAircraft 1926-1987, op

cit

184 See USDOJ/GOV/OPA PR/PRE 96 December

94/718, 'Twomilitary contractors payUS 8.1 mil

l ion to sett le dispute', Tuesday, 20 December

1994

185 Kennedy Lecture, opcit

186 Duringthe periodtheyoperatedfrom RAF Alcon

buryatleast threeA-lOscrashed in and around the

Fens. One camedown between the v il lages of

Over andWil lingham, thepilot safelyejecting; a

second crashed nearthe town of Chatteris, killing

the pilot, Captan Roberts from New York; a third

over-shotthe runwayat Alconburyand ended up

a t Owl End, but the pilot escaped wi th minor

injuries (information froma contact in the Cam

bridgeshire Fre Service who frequently had to

attendthe crash sitesI

187 SeeWilliam L. Smallwood, 'Old'Hog, New Tricks,

opcit

188 Ibid

189 Ibid

190 Ibid

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

191 Highly recommended i s D an a Be , Colours

Markings of the A-IDA War thog, KalmbachBooks/Airlife, 1994

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

192 The US Army, under General H. Norman

Schwarzkopf and the US Marines, conducted the

joint Exercise 'Internal Look' in Forda in July

1990, whichin manyways paralleled theirsubse

quent actions inthe Gulf War, seeAFM 2-1, Tac

tical AirOperations - Counter Air, Close Air Sup

port and Interdiction', John Heidrik, 9TIS/INT

'Planning Procedures for Internal Look - 90 and

NOTES

Operation Desert Shield, undated paperprovided

for Gul f War Air Power Survey (GWAPS) and

MFRIS), USAF/INT Targeting/MC G 'Support to

Desert Shield, Colonel James R. Blackburn,

USAF/INT, 17 October 1990

193 See Jack Anderson Dale Van Atta, 'The Hero

ThatAlmost Missedthe War', article, Washington

Post 5 March 1991

194 SeeWilliam Smallwood,Warthog, New York, 1993

195 GulfWarAir PowerSurvey, Vol. IV, Weapons, Tac-

ticsand Training Washington, DC, 1993

196 'The HeroThat Almost M issed the War ', op t

197 GWAPS Statistical Compendium Table 177,

'Strikesby AIF Categories'

198 Although greatacclaimwas heaped on the Patriot

anti-missile systemfor destroying incoming Scud

Bs at the time, post-war analysis revealed that

they destroyedveryfew,if any

199 See Gulf WarAir Power Survey, Vol. IV, op c it

200 TheThunderbolt-II pilots,weary ofwatching the F

1 5 a n d F-l 5Es screamingacross the TV screens

dayafter day, whilethey,who

weredoing thereawork, were total ly ignored, wryly named these

two helicopter-killing A-lOs'Wart Eagles

2 1 SeeWilliam I Smallwood, 'Old 'Hog, New Tricks,

op Cit

2 2 See Peter C. Smith, Douglas AD Skyraider,

Crowood Press, 1999

203 See 'Conduct of the Persan Gulf War', p. T-11,

cited in GulfWar Air PowerSurvey, Vol. IV opcit

204 See Tactca Analysis Bulletin, Vol. 91-2, pp6-8

(S/NF/WN/NC)

205 See Gulf WarAir Power Survey, Vol. IV, op c it

206 See Tactcal Anayss Buetn,Vol 91-2,pp6--9, op cir

207 See Hansard, Statement on Official Board of

Inquiry,by The Rt Hon.Christopher Soames, MP,

Westminster,July 1991. For furthercomment on

'friendly fire', see Appendix II

208 See US Department of Defense, Final Report to

Congress on Operation DesertStorm, Title V, p.

589: 'Three factors helpexplain the higher propor

tion of casualties from friendly fire in Operation

.Desert Storm as opposed to previous confl icts'

209 General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, quoted by

RchardTownshend Bickers in Friendly Fire USNI

London1994

210 See Chapter 18

211 For the influence of the media, especiallyinstant

news organizations, see Major General Perry

Smith, How CNNFought theWar New York 1991.Also Rear-Admiral Brent Baker, USN, 'Decision at

the Speed of Satellite',articleUnitedStatesNaval

Proceedings, August 1992, Annapolis, Maryland

212 See Commander George Cornelius, USN IRtd),

'Haiti Bang l Who GoesThere r ,article in US Naval

Institute Proceedings, June 1993, Annapolis,

Maryland

213 CENTCOM Mission Database, opcit

214 See Desert Score, p. 20, cited in Gul f War Air

Power Survey, Vol. IV, opcit

215 SeeConduct ofthe PersanGulfWar, opcit

183

216 GWAPS Statistical Compendium, Table

'Strikes by AIF Categories', cited in Gulf Wa

Power Survey, Vol. IV, 'Weapons, Tactcs,

Training, Washington, DC, 1993

217 See GWAPS Statistical Compendium Table

OA-l0: 'USAF Sorties by MissionType, cite

Guf WarAir PowerSurvey, opcit

218 See 'Conduct of the Persan Gulf War', p.

cited in GulfWarAir PowerSurvey, opcit

219 GWAPS Statistical Compendium, T ab le

DesertStorm Coalition Aircraft Attrition'

220 See GulfWarAir PowerStudy, Washington,

May 1993

221 See H. Norman Schwarzkopf, It Doesn t T

Hero New York, October1992

222 Colonel James G. Burton, USAF IRtd), 'Pu

Them Out the Back Door', article in USN

ceeding Journal, June 1993

223 See GulfAir WarSurvey, opcit, p . 5 0

224 See William S. Lnd, letter, USNI Procee

December 1993, P 23

225 See Jack Andersonand Dae Van Atta, 'TheThat AlmostMissed theWar', opcit

226 Quotesfromthe massive records ofthe Gu

collected by t he Gul f War A r Power S

(GWAPSI, whichare heldat the ArchivesBr

Ar Force Historical Research Agency IAF

Maxwell AFB, Alabama. There are two ma

lections, the Individual Collections11,500,0

and the SAF/OSG CentralCollection (350,00

Personal papers are listed alphabeticall

accessed via the IRIS system. AirTaskng O

have the Cal Number CATO

227 See DesertStorm performance sparks pr

to extendactive service li fe of A-lOA 'War

article in Aviation WeekandSpace Technoo

July 1991

228 Ibid

229 Ibid

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

230 See Jim Rande, Kosovo/Air Defense, Pe

PR, 8 October1998

231 United States European Command Bulle

February1999

232 'NATO calls inthe Warthog', teletextfromt

Network, UK, 30 March 1999

233 See 'Operation All ied Force, DefenseLi

March 1999

234 See Captain Patricia Lang, USAFE News

press release, 'Spangdahlem A-OS op

fromsouth-eastItaly', 26April 1999

235 DoD news brief ing, Tuesday, 30 March

5:20pm, 'Operation AlliedForce, Washing

236A Once agan, theWesternmediahomed i n

few mistakesandalmosttotally ignored an

tionof actual success in their television an

reportingof this war

236B In October1999, thirty-four CONUSbase

were withdrawn



CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

See ombata r power: assessment of jointclose

support requirementsand capabilities is needed

(Chapter Report, 06/28/96, GAO/NSAIAD-96-451.

Report to CongressionalCommittees,June 1996

The systems evaluated were: the Apache heli

copter; the AH-64 helicopter; the multiple-launch

rocketsystem (MLRS); F/A-18aircraft; AV-8B air

craft ; 155-mm howi tzer; OH-58D heli copter ;

Kiowa helicopter; AH-1 W helicopter;A-6E aircraft;

armytacticalmissile system; low-altitude naviga

tion and targeting infra-redsystemfor night pro

gramme; Harrieraircraft; Marine Corps AV-8B Har

rier remanufacture programme; Army Crusader

sys tem; Longbow Apache hel icopter; Army

advancefield artillerysystem;Air Force F-16 mod

ernization programme; and t he A rmy AH-64

Apache Longbowupgradeprogramme

CongressionalCommitteesReport, 28June 1997,

B-262230

The committees were: Committee on Armed Ser

vices, US Senate; Committee on Appropriations,

US Senate; Committee on National Security,House of Representatives, and Committee on

Appropriations, House of Representatives

See Pierre Sprey, EE Spectrum , September

1991

Pierre Sprey, quoted in WallStreet Journal 1991

See Major acquisitions: DoDs process does not

ensure properweaponsmixfor close support mis

sion (GAO/NSAID-92-180I, 17 April 1992

Ibid

5 See US Department of Defense, news release,

dditional forcestructural changes , Ref Nr. 441

95, 11 August1995

Ofcourseit wasnotthatsimple; as atrade-off, the

need toconsidertheimpacton the F-16s primary

role - interdiction - would haveto beassessed if

i twereto be increasingly usedfor CAS. Ths, ulti

mately, gavefurtherpause forthought

See Armyavaton: modernizationstrategyneedsto

be reassessed (GAO-NSIAD-95-9I, 21 November

1994

Ibid

The most l ikelysuccessorto theA-lOis the Lock

heed Mar tin Joint Str ike F ighter , along wi th

Northrop Grumman and British Aerospace. Ths

aircraft JSFI i s being developed as the next-gen

eration f ighter air craf t for the US Air Force,

Marines andNavy and the British Roya Navy, and

some 3,000 of al variants are planned, tailored to

the missionneeds of themilitarybranches.A CAScapability is included. The lead aircraft is under

constructionat theLockheedMartin plantat Pam

dae, California,and is expectedto enterservice in

2007just as the A-1 0 is finally phased out

0 See educingthe DeficitSpending and Revenue

Options , Congressional Budget Office, March

1997, DEF-16 Make the Army responsible for

closea r support

Ibid

Ibid

NOTES

253 For more detailed analysis of these differences,

see Peter C. Smith, Close Air Support Shrews

bury, UK, andWashington, DC, 1990

254 Memorandum,AssistantSecretary forWar John

J McCloytoGeneral Lear, 15 May1943 See Kent

Roberts Greenfield, AGF and Air Ground Battle

Team AGF Study No. 35 , Washington, DC; Hs

torical Section, Army Ground Forces 1948, p. 50

255 DEF-16 Make theArmy responsible forclose air

support , opcit

256Ibid

257 See 1067 Number andTitle: Development Plan

Date Tit le Air to Sur face Cur rent CINC IPL,

Development Plan, 30 September 1997. ACC

PEMMajorG Smith,DRPF, 4-5279,Air ForceMis

sionArea Plan (MAPI

258 See ProgramElement 0207131 MNSNumber

Title CAF 401-91, Adverse ORD Number Title:

CAF 401-91-IIIIIIII-C, Weather Precision Strike

Capability WPSC OAlA-lOA Embedded Global

Positioning System/Inertial Navigation System

EGI . Air to Surface Development P lan , 30 Sep

tember 1996, Major G Smith, DRPF, 4-5279, AirForce MAP

259 See Program Element 0207131 Air to Surface

Development Plan, 30 September 1996, opc i t

6 Ibid

261 Ibid

262 Ibid

63 Ibid

64 See CAF 315-92 -IIIIIIII-C, Real Tme Information

in Cockpit RTIC ICDL ORD. Airto SurfaceDevel

opment Plan, 30September 1996. MajorG Smith,

DRPF, 4-5279.

265 Ibid

266 See TAF SON 312-88, Follow-onCAS Aircraft; TAF

SON 302-81, NightAttack CapabilitiesJoint MNS

forCloseAir Support, CAF 311, CMNSforAlOA1

Night Vision Goggles and Compatible Aircraft

Lighting, MajorG. Smith, DRPF, 4-5279

67 See Air to Surface Development Plan, 30 Sep

tember1996, opcit

268 CNN report

269 MajorClancy Preston,442nd FW,ACC NewsSer

vice, 15 October1998

270 Ibid

CHAPTER NINETEEN

271 Mr L. A. Amicarella, Director, Fre and Aviation

Management. USDAForest Service,Washington,

DC, to Director, Directorateof Programsand Eval

uation, Departmentof theAir Force,Headquarters

UnitedStates Air Force, Washington, DC, 2 Feb

ruary 1992

272 BrigadierGeneral Ralph E. Eberhart, USAF, Direc

tor, Directorateof Programsand Evaluation,Head

quartersUnited StatesAirForce,Washington, DC,

to Mr L. A. Amicarella, Director, Fre andAviation

Management. USDAForest Service,Washington,

DC, 22 July1992

184

273 Ibid

274 Mr L. A. Amicarella, Director, Fire and Aviation

Management. USDA, Washington, DC, to

BrigadierGeneral Ralph E. Eberhart, USAF, Direc

tor, Directorate of Programs and Evaluation,

Departmentof theAir Force,HeadquartersUnited

StatesAir Force, Washington, D C, 2 7 September

1992.S700

275 Ibid

276 TheHon. Howard Kaloogian, The State Assembly,

CapitolOffice, Sacramento, California, to SAP/LL,

Pentagon, Washington. DC, n.d.

277 SAP/LL, Department of theAir Force Pentagon,

Washington, DC, 16 July 1997

278 Chief, Mission Support Division, Colonel Joanne

M. Roedefer, Department of the AirForce, Wash

ington, DC, toArthur J. Negrette, President, Flight

Safety Institute, Sacramento, 26 February 1998

279 CongressmenGeorgeRadanovch,R chard Pombo

and Jerry Lewis, Congress of the United States,

Washington, DC, to Secretary of the Air Force,

Pentagon, Washington, D C, 1 8 February 1998

8 Ibid

2 81 R ea r Admiral S. R. Morgan, Acting Executive

Director, Logistics Management, Defense Logis

tics Support Command, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, to

Hon. George Radanovich, Houseof Representa

tives, Washington, DC, n.d., DLSC/LC

282 Assemblyman Howard Kaoogan, The State

Assembly, Capitol Office, Sacramento, California

tothe Department of ForestryandFre Protection

in Sacramento, on 5 March1998

283 Colonel Joanne M. Roedefer, USAF, Chief, Mis

sion Support Division, Directorate of Programs,

Departmentof theAir Force,HeadquartersUnited

StatesAir Force,Washington, DC, to Mr ArthurJ

Negrette, President. Flight SafetyInstitute, Sacra

mento,California,dated 26 February1998

284 Rchard A. Wilson, D irec tor, Department of

Forestry andF i re Protection, Sacramento, Califor

nia, to Honourable Howard Kaoogan, California

StateAssembly,Capitol, Sacramento, California,8

April 1998

285 Ibid

286 See Next-generation airtankers for California: a

modernization proposal , AeroTech, 27 October

1998

87 Ibid

88 Ibid

289 Ibid

APPENDIX I

290 Basedprincipallyon figures quoted by Lou Ravi,

Combat magazine, November 1997

APPENDIX II

291 French Genera Alexander Percn made a close

studyof FirstWorldWarFrench lossesand cameto

theconclusionthatone millionFrenchcasualties,or

20per cent, werecausedby theirown artilleryfire.

Hedare notuse his own figures and, instead, pub

lisheda moreacceptable figure of 2.2 percent. See

Alexander Percn, Le Masaere de Notre Infanterie

Airlife, Paris 1921

292 See M. Cumming, The Starkey Sacrifice The

AlliedBombing Le Portal 1943, 1996

93 See Rudolf Bohmler, Monte Cassno USN I Lon

don,1964

294 Squadron Leader Arthur M. G , CO of No. 84

Squadronin Burma, had toremove oneof his sub

ordinatecommandersbecausehe bombedfriend

ly troops Gi in conversation with PeterSmith, 8

October1984)

NOTES

295 See Robert Sherrod, History MarineCorpsAvi-

ation in WorldWar II Washington, DC, 1952

296 See Peter C. Smith, Close Air Support Shrews

buryand Washington, DC, 1990

97 See Wil li am V Kennedy, The mil itary and the

media: whythe presscannot be trustedto cover

a war , Westport . CT 1993. See also Major

MichaelSater, USMC, Losingthe next war , arti

cle in USNI Proceedings November 1993. Such

views agan seemto have been provento be true

in the television coverage of the Kosovo crisis

298 See Major Charles Hawkins, US Army Reserve,

Friendly fire - facts, myths and misperceptions ,

article in USNIProceedings June1994, and David

185

M. Saadah, Friendlyfire:wil l we getit r igh

time] paperpresented at 31 st US Army O

tions Research Symposium, Fort Lee, Virg

November 1992

299 See Ray W. Burgess, PGM, Friendly

Louisiana Freemason, October 1973. See

GAO findings onfratricide atUmm Hau, and

Senate hearingsthat followed

3 See Colonel Thomas Page, ystems to red

fratricide to be tested inAWE , Pentagon PR

February1997



GLOSSARY

CEP circularerror probable DLA Defense Logistics Agency FEBA forward edge of battl

CFIT controlled flight into DME defence-measuring area

terrain equipment fire and forget

CFSR Contract Funds Status Don nepartmenr of Defense FG Fighter Group

Report DoDIC Department of Defense FUR forward looking infra

loss ry :

·ClLOP conversion in lieu of identif ication code FLOT forward line of own

procurement DPE Directorate of Programs troops

ClNCSOUTH Commander-in-Chief, and Evaluations FMA Federal Managemen

Allied Forces Southern DRA dual rail adapter Agency

Europe. DRMM De fe ns e R eu ti li za ti on F MS foreign military salesanti-aircraft artillery AFSC Air Force Systems ASOC AirSupportOperat ions ClTS central integrated test and Market ing Manual FOD foreign object damagAlaskan AirCommand Command Center

Isystem DSARC Defence Systems FOL forward operating

ArmyAir Force AFTEC Air Force Test and AT anti-tank CM combat mix Acquisition Review location

advanced aerial fire Evaluation Center ATAF Allied Tactical Air CM SEP Co ntr acto r Management Council FOUO forofficial use onlysupport system AGB accessory gearbox Force

ISystem Evaluation DSMS d igi taIstores FPS feet per second

air to air missile AGL aboveground level ATC air target chart I Program management system FRC Fairchild Republ icairbase AGM air-to-ground missile ATM air target material CMWS common missile warning DTC design-to-cost Company

aircraft harrle damage AH attack he Iicopter ATMP air target materials system DT E development test and FS Fighter Squadronrepair AHRS attitude and heading programme COIN counter insurgency evaluation FSCL firesupport co-ordinaAirhaseWing reference system ATO air tasking order COMACC Commander, Air DTLOMS doctrine, training, leader lineAirCombat Command AI air interdiction ATTG

automated tactical targetCombatCommand development, FSD full scale developme

Aviation Combat AIM air intercept missile graphic COMAJRSOUTH o rg an iz at io n, m at er ia l F TR S Fighter Training ResDevelopmentAgency ALARM air-launched anti- AWACS airborne warning and Commander, Allied Air and soldier support Squadron

advanced concept radiation missile control system Forces Southern Europe DTS digital terrain system FTU Formal Training Uni

ejection seat ALC Air Logistics Center AWOP automated weaponeering COMED cen tra li n tegrated test DU depleted uranium FW Fighter Wing

analytical condition ALQ active countermeasure optimization programme system FWS Fighter Weaponsinspection equipment A X attack experimental CONUS Continental United ECM electronic Squadron

air combat manoeuvre ALR radar-warning receiver States countermeasures FWW Fighter Weapons Wiarmament control panel ALS automatic loading BAI battlefield air interdiction COTS commercial off theshelf EEl essential elementsof fiscal yearAirControl Wing system BCIS battlefield combat CP command post information

Air Division AMARC Aerospace Maintenance identification system CPP competi tive prototype EFS expeditionary fighter GAO Government

Air Defence Battery and Regeneration Center BDA battle damage 1 phase squadron Accounting Officealtitude director indicator AMC Army Material assessment CRT cathode ray tube EFT engineering flight test GATM globalair traffic

air delivered mine Command BFDW basic flight design weight CSAF Air Force Chiefof Staff EGI embedded global management

air data recorder ANG Air Nat ionalGuard BLM Bureau of Land CSAR combat search and rescue positioning and inertial GBU guided bomb unitArmament Development ANGB Air National Guard Base Management CT F combined task force navigation system GCAS ground collisionand Test Center AOC Aerojet Ordnance BPR bypass ratio CY calendar year EUNT electronics intelligence avoidance systemAir Expeditionary Group Company BTG battle target graphic CW composite wing EMD effective miss distance GCI ground control

EW/SA airborne early AOP air operations programme BVR beyond visual range CW P) composite wing EO electro-optical installations

warning/search aircraft AP armour-piercing or ant i- rovisional) EPLARS enhanced position GEC General ElectricAir Force Base personnel CAIG Cost Analysis location reporting Company USA)

Air Force Contract APC armoured personnel ImprovementGroup DALO Divisional Air Liaison system GGI S globalgeospatialManagement Division carrier CAS closeair support Officer ESM electronic support information and servAir Force FlightTest API armour-piercing CASSUM close airsupport DARIN display attack, ranging measure GOB groundorder of battl

Center incendiary summary message and inertia l navigation EVS electro-optical viewing GP general purposeAir Force Historical APPS analytical CBI China-Burma-India DBTC database terrain cueing system GPS global positioningResearch Agency photogrammetric CBU cluster bomb unit

I DCA defensive counter air EW electronic warfare systemA iI Force Logistics position system CCCI command, control DCP development concept EWMS electronic warfare GPWS guided proximity

Command APS advanced planning commun ications paper managemen t suite warningsystemAir Force Mission system intelligence DCS Deputy Chiefof Staff EZ exclusion zone GSA genera IservicesSupport System APU auxiliary power unit CCIP continuously computed DCS/S Deputy Chief ofStaff adm in istration

FOG Air Force Orientation ASC advanced switching impact point Systems FAA Federal Aviation GSFG Groupof Soviet ForcGroup communications CDFFP California Department DDR E Director of Defense Agency in GermanyAir Force Plant ASD Aeronautical Systems of Forestry and Fire

Research and FAC forward air control GWAPS GulfWara i r power

Representative Office Division Protection Engineering FAM fire and aviat ion surveyAir Force Plant ASDP air to surface CDR critical design review DEP deflection error probable management GWER GulfWar electronics

Representative development plan CDU control display unit DEPSECDEF Deputy Secre ta ry of F FP force and financial recordAir Force Rescue ASIP aircraft structural CEB combined effects bomb Defence programme

Command integrity programme CEM combined effects D1PEC Defence Industrial P la nt F AS CAM family of aerial HARM high speed anti-radiaAir Force Reserves ASM air to surface missile munitions EquipmentCenter scatterahle mines missile

186 8



GLOSSARY GLOSSARY

Tactical Air Control

Group

Tactical AirControl

Wing

Tactical A iI Support

Squadron

Tactical Air Support

Training Squadron

Tactical Air Warfare

-enter

terrain clearance radar

tactical command

technical officer

training and doctrinal

command

target data inventory

testand evaluation

group

triple ejector rack

terrain contour

matching

terrain profile and

matching

Test Evaluation Squadr

Test Wing

Tactical Fighter Group

terrain-following radar

Tactical Fighter

quadron

Tactical Fighter Traini

Squadron

Tactical FighterTraini

Wing

Tactical Fighter Wing

Tactical Fighter

Weapons Center

Tactical Fighter Wing

(Provisional)

tra ining guided missile

target intelligence

target identification

system laser

'That looks about rig

tactical munitions

dispenser

time on target

tube-launched, optica

tracked, wire comman

missiletarget practice

tra ining and doctrine

command

target recognition and

attack multi-sensor

terrain reference

navigation

Tactical Reconnaissan

Wing

Tactical Training Win

television monitor

TOT

TOW

TFW(P)

TFW

TFWC

TFTW

TTW

TVM

TFTS

TR

TRA

TGM

TI

TISL

TE

TESTW

TFG

TFR

TFS

TRW

TERPROM

TP

TRADOC

TLAR

TMD

TER

TERCOM

TDl

TEG

TDC

TC R

TCTO

TAWC

TASTS

TASS

TAIRCW

TAIRCG

89

Tactical Air Command

tactical a irnavigation

Tactical Air Control

Group

Royal Thai A i r Force

Base

real time in cockpit

r ldar warning receiver

Strategic Air Command

upreme Allied

Commander Europe

i tuation awareness data

link

Officeof the Secretary

of t heAi r Force Gulf

WarAir Power Survey

surface-to-air missile

semi armour-piercing

high-explosive

search and

rescue/selected

acquisition report

stability augmentation

system also Bri tish

'Special Air Service')

shaped charge

suppression of enemyair

defence

South-East Asia Treaty

Organization

Secretary of t he Air

Force

Secretary of Defence

sensor fused weapons

single

service life extension

ECDEF

FW

GL

LEP

CEAD

M

APHE

AR

AF/OSG

TA C

TACAN

TACG

programme

SLIME strip lighting i dentity

marking extremities

SM- ALC Sacramento A ir

Logistics Center

M-ALC/LAFM

Sacramento Air Logistics

Center/low-alti tude

flight maintenance

MD systems management

directive

OF special operations forces

PD system programme

director

SPMD systems programme

management divisionsystem programme office

state responsibility area

short-rangeattack missile

single-scatnight attack

short take-off and

landing

SECAF

SEATO

SAS

RTIC

RWR

RTAFB

SADL

SA C

ACEUR

radar altimeter

Royal Air Force

requirement action

directive

radar intelligence

retardant capacity

research and

development

repeaterd eception

jamming

retardant delivery system

research developmen t

testami evaluationrange error prohahle

request for

procurement/prop()sal

radar homing and

warning

'ripple' release

range measuring system

rules of engagement

Republ ic of Korea

Royal Regiment of

Fusiliers

quality assurance

Queen's Royal Irish

Hussars

qualification test

Pacific Air Force

'pilot's calculating

eyeball'

programmed depot

maintenance

post-flight review

precise geopositioning

capability

precision guided

munition

precision guided weapon

proposal instructions

predicted kill

programme management

directive

procurement

management review team

point of contact

petroleum, oil

lubricants

planning, programmingand budgeting system

pre-planned product

improvement

passive ranging

production readiness

review

precise radarsignificant

location

poundsper square inch

RADINT

RC

R D

RDJ

RD

RDT E

RRAF

RAD

QT

REP

RFP

PRSL

PPPI

RIP

RMS

ROE

ROK

RRF

PMRT

PPB

QQRIH

RHAW

PR

PRR

POC

POL

p.s.i.

PGM

PGW

PI

PK

PMD

PFR

PGC

PDM

PACAF

PCE

munitions effectiveness

assessment

multiple ejection rack

multi-function display

muzzle horsepower

mission report

mobility kill

multiple launch rocket

system

main operating base

major regional

contingency

mean sea level

mean time between

failure

maximum take-offweight

precision attitude control

naval air station

ational Air andSpace

Adm in istration

North Atlant ic TreatyOrganization

new acquisition video

navigationaland

weapons-aiming system

night/adverse-weather

numericallycontrolled

nuclear chemical,

biological

ational Command

Centers

no date

net explosive weight

no-fly zone

numberofhi ts

nautical mile

night vision goggles

navigation and weapons

delivery system

offset aim point

offensive avionics system

onboard oxygen

generation system

offensive countera iI

operational flight

programme

operationsgroup

Operation Northern\ latch

Office of the Secretary

of Defence

operational service trial

Operation Southern

\ latch

operational test

outstanding unit award

obstacle warning/cueing

MEA

PAC

N/AW

N/C

NCB

NAV

NAVW.

n.d.

NEW

FZ

H

nm

NVG

JWD

ATO

MTOW

MSL

MTBF

A

NASA

MOB

MRC

MER

MFD

MHP

MISREP

M-Kill

MLRS

OCA

OFP

OT

OW C

OAP

OA S

OBOGS

OSD

OST

OSW

OG

ON W

joint war-fighting

capabilitiesassessment

mission assessment

mutually assured

destruction

infra-red SAMs

mutual assistance

programmeor mission

area plan

ma in ba tt l e t a nk

major defence

acquisition programme

mega data transfer

cartridge/processor

King Fahd International

Airport

ki II the crew of the

vehicle

King Khalid Military City

88

low-altitude bombing

system

low-aIti tude force

Los Angeles Fire

Department

Low-Altitude Force

Executive

low-altitude force

investment

low-altitude force

maintenance

Low-Altitude ForceOffice

low-altitude force

planning

low-altitude force

support

low-angled navigation

and targeting infra-red

for night

light armed

reconnaissanceaircraft

lightweight airborne

recovery system

laser inte II igence

low-altitude safety and

target enhancement

low-drag general purpose

l inear error

leading-edge extension

laser-guided bombs

launch and leave

low-Iight-Ievel

television

lines ofcommunications

laser ranger and marked

target seeker

line replacement unit

LANTIRN

LARA

LOC

LRMT

LAFE

LDGP

LE

LEX

LGB

LL

LLLTV

LAFI

LAF

LAFD

LARS

LASINT

LASTE

LAFM

MBT

MDAP

LAFP

LAFS

LAB

LR

LAFO

MANPADS

MAP

K-Kill

KFIA

MDTC/P

KKMC

MMAD

JWCAuman-computer

interface

high explosive

high explosive

incendiary

ha lt or hold

horizontal situation

indicator

helmet-mounted cueing

system

height of burst

headquarters

head-up display

head-up display and

weapon-arming system

human intelligence

hypervelocity missile

improved airborne

video-tape recorder

integrated databaseimproveddata modem

identification - f ri end or

foe

implementation force

instantaneous field of

view

imaging infra-red

installationsand

logistics

instrument landing

system

imagery intelligence

inertial navigationsystem

inertial navigation unit

initial operational

capacity

initia l operational test

and evaluation

initi<ll point

image productarchive

integrated process team

infra-red

infra-red countermeasures

integnHed tasking order

integrated process team

joint aira ttack team

joint air weapons systemjoint direct a ttack

munition

joint digital target

material

joint oil analysis

programme

Joint Requirements

Oversight Council

joint strike fighter

joint stand-off weapon

joint test force

L

I



GLOSSARY

Test Wing UTD unit trainingdevice WAFAR wraparound fin aircraftrockets

universal air-refuelling VA vulnerable area WCMD wind-correctedreceiver slipway VCS Vice Chiefof Staff munitions dispenserinstallation VHF very high frequency WGS World Geodeticunit basic load VMC voice message computer Systemultra-high frequency VN vulnerability number WP white phosphorusUnited Kingdom VNAF Vietnamese Air Force WPSC weather precision strikeUnitedNations VTAS visual target-acquisition capabilityProtection Forces system WS Weapons SchoolUnited Nations Security V/STOL vertical/short take-off WSEG weapons systemResolution and landing evaluation groupUnited States Air Force VTOL vertical take-off and WSO weapons systemsUnitedStates Air Force, landing officerEurope VTP video-tape player WTC Weaponsand TrainingUnited States Army VVS Voenno vozdushnye sili CenterSecurity Agency Air Force Soviet)UnitedStates ZSU Zenitny Samochodna aDepartmentof WAC weapons-aiming Usternov/<a self-propelledAgriculture computer multi-barrel AA system)

9

Alestra, Sal 165

Aliksanian, Neil 122

Allen, Doug 165

Allied Force Operation 152

Amicarella,L.A. 168

Anderson, Richard H. 34Array-I 7 T es t 8 6Aziz Tariq 131

Bell 309 KingCobra 18,103Bell Iroquois Warrior 18

Bignamini, Riccardo 17

Boeing747 Jumbo 48Boeing AH-64 Apache 20, 138

Bonadede, Ralph

Brill, Brigadier General Jay R. 52

Brill, Colonel Jay R. 46Brown,Colonel Thomas D. Jr 164

Brown, General George S. 43

BSh-2 Bronirovanny Shturmovik 10,21Button, CaptainCraig 165

Byrd Admiral Richard 48

C-124Globemaster 16

C-5 Galaxy 78Canadair CL-415 Super Scooper 170-1Cannon, SenatorHoward W. 41, 44Casablanca, US escortcarrier 77

Certain Sentinel Operation 106Cessna 0 1 E Bird D og 22

CessnaT 37122

CessnaT-37A 14

Cheney, Richard B. 132Clark, General Mark W 23

Clements, William P 38 45 46 58

Cobalt Flash, Operation ISO

Collins, Ben 77

Collis, Charles 51-2

Coronet Fille , Operation 104Couch, Captain Robert 34Currie, Malcolm R. 43

Currier, Lt Bryan 133

CurtissP-40 8

Davis, Richard 158

Decisive Edge, Operation 148

Deliberate Force Operation 149Deny Flight, Operation 148

Deptula, Brigadier General David A. 151

Desert Fox, Operation 152

n ex

Desert Shield, Operation I31-2Desert Storm, Operation 90 93 96 113

131 46 147 157 8

Determined Falcon, Operation ISO

Dixon, General Robert J. 58

Dolan, Major Michael J. 22

Douglas A4D Skyhawk 16 77

Douglas AD Skyraider 8 9 14 16 20 2

31

DouglasXA2D-1 Skyshark 77

Downey, Congressman Tom J. 52

Eberhart, BrigadierGeneral Ralph E.

168

Efferson, Colonel Bob 134

Eichelberger, Lt Cdr William R. 9Ellis General Richard H. 45, 50English Electric PIA Lightning 100

Evans, General William J. 43 58

Eves Bill 165

Fairchild C-119A Flying Box Car 48FairchildC-123B Provider 48Fairchild C-82A Packet 48Fairchild FC-I 48Fairchild FC-2W2 48Fairchild M 62 48Fairchild T-46A 122

Fairchild, Sherman Mills 47 8

Fairchild-Hillier FH-237 48Fiat G.91R-3 16

Fokker D.Vll 47

Fokker F-27 Friendship 48Forrestal, US ai rcraft carrier 15

Foster J1 Dr John S. 38Franks, General Frederick M. 146

Fry Vice Admiral Scott A. ISS

Fuch, F re d 1 68

Gabreski, Brigadier General Francis S.

100Garcia, Frank 164Gatling, Richard 83

General Dynamics F-16C Viper 149

Goff, Captain Randy 136-7Grossman, Dr Norman 31, 51, 62Grumman Gulfstream 2 30Grumman S-2 Tracker 166, 171

Hails Report 50-1

9

Hamilton, Captain Christopher 165

Hawker Harrier/Sea Harrier 17 109 I

HawkerSiddeley P II27 Kestrel 17-18

41

HawkerSiddeley S.2 Buccaneer 98HawkerTyphoon 13-14

Healey,John 51

Heinemann, Ed 16,77Henschel H s 1 29 B 13

Hicks,Captain Al 133

Hildebrandt, Colonel James E. 25-6Hildreth, Lt Cdr James R. 9Hitler, Adolf 13

Horner, Lt General Charles A. 131 13146

Hunger, Frank W. 122

Hussein, Sadam 8 131-46, 149 151

Ilyushin 11-22 Shturmovik 8 9Ilyushin 11-102 124

Jack Frost, Operation 99Jacks, Commander Angus 77

Jansen George 77Johnson, Captain Paul 136-7,141Johnson,Colonel Robert S. 100Johnson, Major Al 18

Joint Endeavour, Operation 148Jones, Lt Devon 136-7Joshua HendeCompany 77

JunkersCLl 13

JunkersJ1 13

Junkers Ju 87 Stuka 8 12-13Junkers Ju 88 13

Kaloogian, Howard 168-9Kennedy, Major Brice 107-14,118-19

122

Kerchner, Captain Ronald L. 34Kishline, Colonel Samuel J. 46Klemin, Prof Alexander 48

Laird, Melvin 25

Lanphier, Lt Colonel ThomasG. 129

Laws, MajorJeff 96Lewis Jerry 168Livingstone, CG . Doc 77

Lockheed AH-56A Cheyenne 18,41Lockheed Electra 77

Lockheed F-I04 Starfighter 15



S-3A Viking 30-1 78

Arm Project 14

MasterSgt james 152

Major Michael G. 100

Milton A. 45

Ltjohn 141

Major john 123

T on y 1 33

Sen ator john L 45

john j. 161

john 19 21

Douglas AA 30

FAD Phantom 21 48 100

129

Colonel R ic k 1 35

john L. 40

General Thomas H.

22-4 40 45 52 101

R ob er t S . 2 0

General Merrill A. 146

L 1 51

Arthur 1. 45

hmittBf 110 3

I, Programm e 35

Major Williard K 45

Admiral S .R . 1 69

egrette Arthur j. 16

elson Howard Sam 27 102-3

ewhart Colonel William B jr 34

orth A merican A -36A 9 11

orth A merican F-86A Sabre 129

orth A merican F -I00S uper S ab r e 4 3

orth A merican P-51 Mustang 14 129orth A merican T 2 8 D 9

onhern Watch Operation 15 I

orthrop A /Y A -9 26 30-40 66 124

N-156F Freedom Fi ght er 14

20 30

orthrop T3 8 Talon 15

y em an R -I O 9

Captain Scott 149

Journey Operation 104

erne 122

G R I T or n ad o 9 8 1 4 1

Whitten 16l yakov Pe-2 9

IN X

Phillips G eneral S am C 52

Phillis Colonel S yp h 1 37 -8

Pombo R i chard 168

Porker 500 Operation 104

Porter Lt C d r j o h n M 9

Pom ex E xerci se 22

Provide omfonOperation 151

Putz Vizerfeldwebel 13

Quick Fire Operation 105

Radanovich George 168

Red Flag Operation 99

Reforger Operation 99

Repp Lt Cdr 9

Republic F-84 Groundhog 100

Republic F-84F Superhog 101

Republic F-105 Superhog 101

Republic F-I05DThunderchief 21 48 71

Republic PA7D Thunderbolt 8 10-11

1 3 4 8 5 1 1 0 0

Retzlaff POC M ik e 1 64

Richardson Elliot L 41

Ridgely Lieutenant Diane 61

RockwellOV-IO Bronco 9 22 166

Roedefer Colonel joanne M. 16

Rose Major jim 141-2

Rudel H auptmann H ans-U lrich 13

Ruehl Lt C olonel S teve 95

Rush Kenneth M 38

Russo C olonel C hristopher 146

Rutskoj C olonel A lexander V 124

Saffell Lt C d r j o h n A. 9

alomonson Captain Eric 141

Sanliturk Brigadier General Savas 151

Saratoga US ai rcraft carri er 136

Schlesigner james R 41

Schwarzkopf G eneral N orman 131

144Seamans Robert C j I 25 38

Sexton Captain M ik e 4 5

Sharpe Colonel Irwi n 135Shedlock j.B. 51

Sheehy C8ptain T od d 135

Sikorsky S-66 18

Sikorsky S-67 BlackhawkSmith Kenneth W 34

Soames Christopher 143Solt Lt Col Lou 18

792

Sopwith Salamander 10 12

Sorensen Donald L 59-60

Southern Watch Operation 151-2

Spangler C aptainS eldon 77

prey Pierre 159

talin Josef 10 13 21

Starbird Alfred D 45

Stepp Hauptmann Hans-Karl 13

Stout Major john 165

trait Don81d 49 51

Sukhoi Su-2 10

ukhoi Su-25 Frogfoot 124

S ukhoi S u-39 124

Sukoshi T igerprogram me 20

Svoboda Captain L yn n 1 65

Swain C aptain R obert R 135

Swanner Exercise 22

Sweet Major Rob 13 7-8

T3 4 t an k 1 0 12

T -55 t ank 89 135T6 2 tank 85-86 89

t an k 8 9

Thomas Captain jack W 136

Tito President 150

Tizio Vincent 48-9 65

Uhl Edward G. 41

U/Jhold Democracy Operation 149

von Greim Oberleutnant Robert Ritter

13

V ought A -7 Corsair II 20-1 40 41-6

6 2

Waller Colonel J ef f 16 5

Ward Kevon 165

Watson Dr George M jr 43 79

Weiss Oberleutnant Ot t o 13

Welch Lt C o lo n el S t ev e n 9 6

Whetmore W 8r re n 5 I

Wilson Rear Admiral Thomas R 155

Wilson Richard A. 169

Wise Colonel William 96

Wood Hugh 77

Wright Wing C ommander G raham 155

Yam8llltlto Admiral 129

Zitadelle Operation 13

'



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Fairchild-Republic a-10 Thunderbolt II