EzIdentity WebToken Threat Analysis

8/8/2019 EzIdentity WebToken Threat Analysis

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EzIdentity Platform Next Generation Identity Protection

Stronger Authentication

EZMCOM offers 2 nd factor authentication with an end-usertransparent Mutual Authentication layer for organizationsseeking to protect the confidentiality and integrity ofsensitive data, communications and transactions. Thesolution guards against Man-In-The-Middle, Pharming,Man-In-The-Browser, Script-In-The-Middle attacks thatrender One-Time Password based token solutionsvulnerable.

The Problem:In 2006, regulators drove financialinstitutions to add security byimplementing strongauthentication to prevent fraudand identity theft. To comply withthe aggressive deadlines issued byregulators, virtually all financialinstitution implemented weakforms of authentication such ascookies, pictures, devicefingerprinting, IP Geolocation orOne-Time password (OTP) tokens.

In the meantime Phishing attackhave been upgraded to includeMan in the Middle (MITM), Manin the Browser (MITB), Pharming,Trojan Proxy Phishing attacks,which defeats virtually allprotections that have been put inplace by financial institutions toprotect against basic Phishing.MITM attacks, which have beenwell known in the security andhacking community for years, arenow being integrated into easy touse kits and with the availability ofMITM Phishing kits.

Hardware solutions typically haveissues of distribution, cost ofdeployment & maintenance forretail deployments and manysoftware based solutions posingcumbersome and steep learningcurve for users to the extent ofdisrupting business, a seriouschallenge for a commerciallyviable, mass deployableauthentication solution exists.

Man-In-The-Middle attacks :

This is a common and predictableattack. As an industry, we need toaccept that solutions not incorporatingstrong client and server authenticationcannot survive the Internet. Ten yearsago, this was evident with the adventof key SSL mechanisms. Its time toput them to work. Eric Greenberg, Former leader of Netscapes security group, whichoriginally created SSL

All the kit-using criminal has to do isregister a phony domain name, thenplug that and the URL of the real Website into the softwares administrativecontrol panel. The kit thencommunicates in real time with thetarget IP address and uses a proxy toredirect content from the legitimatesite to the bogus URL; thus the userinteracts with actual content from, say,his own bank, adding to the deception.The fake URL squats between theconsumer and the target -- thats

where the Man in the Middle phrasecomes from -- and captures all datafrom user to bank or bank to user.Gregg Keizer, InformationWeekNew Phishing Toolkit Poses Danger toConsumers

Two-factor authentication is notuseless. It works for local log-in, and itworks within some corporatenetworks. But it won't work for remoteauthentication over the Internet. Ipredict that banks and other financialinstitutions will spend millionsoutfitting their users with two-factorauthentication tokens. Early adoptersof this technology may very wellexperience a significant drop in fraudfor a while as attackers move to easiertargets, but in the end there will be anegligible drop in the amount of fraudand identity theftBruce Schneier, April issue of Communications of the ACM

The Solution:A commercially viable, roaming

friendly 2-way SSL (the way SSLwas designed to be used ratherthan only the server having a SSLcertificate) implementation thatdoes not rely on easily interceptedshared secrets, One-TimePasswords or easily spoofedinformation such as timezone, IPgeolocation. A software basedsolution that that obviates theoverall cost & complexity ofimplementing a 2-way SSLsolution that is easy to use and nodisruption in user behavior.

EzIdentity provides an easy to useand familiar username - password authentication interface thatbalance our usability, security &features. Ideal for massdeployments, EzIdentity solutionprovides compliance to regulatoryrequirements of strongauthentication using its patentalgorithms combining concepts of2nd factor authentication and PKIbased digital signatures.

The EzIdentity software installsinvisibly and runs on a wide rangeof platforms, making it easy toprotect customers, employees, andpartners from identity theft andfraud. For the first time,organizations can transparentlyprotect their users from identitytheft and fraud, without changinguser behavior and or requiringexpensive hardware.


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Threats and how EzIdentity defeats themTHREATSTHREATSTHREATSTHREATS DESCRIPTIONDESCRIPTIONDESCRIPTIONDESCRIPTION HOW EZIDENTITY DEFEATS THE THREATHOW EZIDENTITY DEFEATS THE THREATHOW EZIDENTITY DEFEATS THE THREATHOW EZIDENTITY DEFEATS THE THREAT

Brute ForceBrute ForceBrute ForceBrute Force The attacker copies the profilefile that contains the key to hisown workstation and attemptsmillions of passwords, whicheventually leads to thedisclosure of the private key.

EzIdentitys patented Mutual Authentication Payload technologyuses a combination of a PIN and a container fingerprint (CF) as abasis for encrypting the private key. It uses standard encryptionalgorithms and the patented process to protect the key. The resultof this process is that any decryption attempt, with either of the PINor CF incorrect, will fail to extract the private key. The CF isgenerated at run-time by the software component of EzIdentity andhence ensures that a copy of the profile file containing the privatekey to another workstation (i.e. container) does not compromisethe private key even if the PIN is brute-forced.

A six-character password will anyways have approximately 56.8billion permutations (upper case, lower case, and numbers), andonly of those permutations will unlock the private key within thesame workstation (container).

If the key decryption fails because an incorrect PIN or CF wasgenerated, the invalid password counter increases by one. Theauthentication server can block user access after a configurablenumber of invalid attempts (the default is five) Therefore, theattacker can attempt very few passwords before being locked out.

Challenge/ResponseChallenge/ResponseChallenge/ResponseChallenge/Response(Mutual(Mutual(Mutual(MutualAuthenticationAuthenticationAuthenticationAuthenticationPayload)Payload)Payload)Payload)

InterceptInterceptInterceptIntercept

The attacker intercepts theencrypted and signed challengeissued by the authenticationserver and the response from

the client. The attacker thenuses every possible private keyto recreate the signedchallenge or the response.

The authentication challenge/response is sent over a secure SSLchannel. Even if an attacker were able to break the channelsecurity, this attack still fails because the standard encryption andsignature algorithm always ensure the uniqueness of every

challenge/response. Only the authorized authentication server orthe rightful client (user) can decrypt challenge/response and verifythe signature.

Chosen PlaintextChosen PlaintextChosen PlaintextChosen Plaintext The attacker tests everypossible key against a knownpiece of text that has beenencrypted with the public keyand can tell when he hasdiscovered the true private keyas it would correctly decryptthe plaintext.

The attacker will not be able to mount this attack as neither theplain public key of the user is accessible or is it computationallyfeasible to generate private key in brute force that may decrypt anencrypted chunk to a chosen plain text.

FraudulentFraudulentFraudulentFraudulentAdministratorAdministratorAdministratorAdministrator

The attacker is a fraudulentadministrator who gets accessto the user key pair credentialson the server.

A fraudulent administrator may get access to the user credentials,but the administrator cannot use it as it is stored in a PKCS12container protected with a password that is encrypted with theserver public key.

The server private key is stored in a security hardware device (HSM)and is not exportable. It is initialized in run-time by theauthentication server itself and used only by the authenticationserver to extract the user private key from the PKCS12 at timewhen the client is roaming to a new workstation (container) and isinitializing the EzIdentity client software. The approach offers non-

EzIdentityPlatform features and benefits


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THREATSTHREATSTHREATSTHREATS DESCRIPTIONDESCRIPTIONDESCRIPTIONDESCRIPTION HOW EZIDENTITY DEFEATS THE THREATHOW EZIDENTITY DEFEATS THE THREATHOW EZIDENTITY DEFEATS THE THREATHOW EZIDENTITY DEFEATS THE THREAT

repudiation.

ManManManMan----inininin----thethethethe----MiddleMiddleMiddleMiddle The attacker intercepts thecredentials and data while theyare in transit. In this case, the

attacker appears as the targetserver to the user and as theuser to the target server.

The most insidious phishing attack is the Man-in-the-Middle.Protection from this type of attack is unique to EzIdentity solution.Each Challenge (Mutual Authentication Protocol: MAP payload) fromthe server contains information about the server that issued it. TheEzIdentity client automatically verifies the MAP payload to confirmthat it is connected to the correct server before generating its ownencrypted and signed response. If the server match is not found,the EzIdentity client will abort the session and the attacker will notbe able to complete the authentication.

PharmingPharmingPharmingPharming The attacker poisons the DNSserver and redirects users tothe fraudulent web site.Users do not suspect anythingbecause the redirect happenseven when the user selects theweb site from a saved favoriteor actually types in the correctURL.

As mentioned above, each MAP Payload issued from the servercontains information of the server and the domain that issued thatChallenge (MAP Server Payload). The EzIdentity client automaticallychecks to confirm that it is connected, via SSL, to the right domainbefore accepting the challenge (MAP Server payload) beforeencrypting and signing the response (MAP Client payload). If thedomains do not match, the EzIdentity client will abort the sessionand the attacker will not be able to complete the authentication.

PhishingPhishingPhishingPhishing The attacker targetsunsophisticated users and foolsthem into entering theircredentials into a fake web site.This usually occurs when acriminal sends an emailimpersonating a customerservice organization from alegitimate business (such as abank or payment site) and asksrecipients to click on a URL toperform account maintenance

or verification.The link takes them to afraudulent site, which promptsthem for their valid credentials.

One key advantage of the EzIdentity solution is the implicitimplementation of two-factor authentication to protect users fromphishing attacks. Assuming phishers can convince a user todisclose their password/PIN, they are still unable to impersonatethe user as they dont have the second factor (a trusted andEzIdentity initialized workstation). The phisher needs both what theuser has (the EzIdentity profile file on a trusted workstation) andwhat the user knows (the Password/PIN).

The initialization of the EzIdentity profile file on a trustedworkstation is achieved by utilizing any out-of-band authenticationto establish the identity of genuine user and the workstation on

which EzIdentity is getting initialized.

Replay AttackReplay AttackReplay AttackReplay Attack The attacker stores a copy of the user encrypted and signedresponse (MAP Client payload)and replays it to the site.

The EzIdentity authentication involves a PKI-basedchallenge/response model where the response sent to the serverfor verification always contains a unique One-Time usable code.The server decrypts and verifies the digital signature of responseand accepts the particular response only if the One-Time usablecode is verified. The uniqueness of the response defeats the replayattacks.

KeyKeyKeyKey----LoggerLoggerLoggerLogger The attacker installs key-logging malware that captures

every keystroke and mouseclick on the computer andperiodically sends thatinformation over the internet tothe criminal who created it.

EzIdentitys pointing device enabled PIN Pad thwarts loggingmalware. The PIN-pad is a virtual keyboard that shows up on the

screen; users enter their password by clicking with a mouse on ascreen-based key pad. The user will not use the keyboard to enterthe password and is hence protected completely from keyboardloggers.

MalwareMalwareMalwareMalwareBrowserBrowserBrowserBrowserMemory AttackMemory AttackMemory AttackMemory Attack

The attacker attempts to findthe private key in the memoryof a system that has initializedthe EzIdentity in roaming modeon a browser of public

EzIdentity private key is accessed only briefly in memory when theuser provides the password and the encrypted and signed responseis generated. EzIdentity leverages on a memory that managedsecurely as a sandbox that has restricted file-system and networkaccess , as well as access to browser internals.


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THREATSTHREATSTHREATSTHREATS DESCRIPTIONDESCRIPTIONDESCRIPTIONDESCRIPTION HOW EZIDENTITY DEFEATS THE THREATHOW EZIDENTITY DEFEATS THE THREATHOW EZIDENTITY DEFEATS THE THREATHOW EZIDENTITY DEFEATS THE THREAT

Internet kiosk. Immediately after response generation, the private key andpassword are cleared from memory; only the response (encryptedand signed MAP Client payload) is sent back to the authenticationserver.In public internet kiosks, EzIdentity recommends the roaming user

to initialize EzIdentity for a single browser session. The EzIdentityprofile file gets removed and unusable after a single browsersession.

Comparison between EzIdentity and other authentication technologiesMITMMITMMITMMITM PharmingPharmingPharmingPharming PhishingPhishingPhishingPhishing Replay AttackReplay AttackReplay AttackReplay Attack Key LoggerKey LoggerKey LoggerKey Logger

EzIdentityEzIdentityEzIdentityEzIdentity

OTP TokensOTP TokensOTP TokensOTP Tokens

Risk Based AnalysisRisk Based AnalysisRisk Based AnalysisRisk Based Analysis

Personal AssurancePersonal AssurancePersonal AssurancePersonal Assurance

Virtual KeyboardVirtual KeyboardVirtual KeyboardVirtual Keyboard NA NA NA NA

Identifying QuestionsIdentifying QuestionsIdentifying QuestionsIdentifying Questions

SMS/eSMS/eSMS/eSMS/e----mail/IVRmail/IVRmail/IVRmail/IVR

Scratch CardsScratch CardsScratch CardsScratch Cards

Comparison between EzIdentity and PKI authenticationBrute ForceBrute ForceBrute ForceBrute Force ScriptScriptScriptScript----InInInIn----

TheTheTheThe----Middle*Middle*Middle*Middle*MITMMITMMITMMITM RoamingRoamingRoamingRoaming

convenienceconvenienceconvenienceconvenienceCost of Cost of Cost of Cost of

deploymentdeploymentdeploymentdeployment

EzIdentityEzIdentityEzIdentityEzIdentity High Low

PKI Token (Hardware)PKI Token (Hardware)PKI Token (Hardware)PKI Token (Hardware) High High

ClieClieClieClient SSL Certificatent SSL Certificatent SSL Certificatent SSL Certificate Low Medium

ScriptScriptScriptScript----InInInIn----TheTheTheThe----Middle:Middle:Middle:Middle: Malicious JS/VB Script in a Phishing website uses the PKI Token to sign a fraudulent transaction.

Legend: = Full protection; = Partial protection; = No protection

About UsEZMCOM designs, develops, markets and supports identity protection products for the financial world,business and commerce over converging wired and wireless data channels.

Copyright 2007-2008 EZMCOM, Inc. All rights reserved.

Documents

EzIdentity WebToken Threat Analysis