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8
Choosing Rationally
and
Choosing Correctly
alph Wedgwood
Tw o
Views
of
Practical Reason
Suppose
t ha t you are faced
with several d i f ferent options
( that i s,
several way s
in which you might act in a given si tuation) . Which option should you
choose?
L et u s take an example t ha t B erna rd W ill iams mad e fam ou s (W ill iams 1980:
1 0 2 Suppose
t ha t you
w a n t
a gin and
tonic,
and you
believe
t ha t the
s tuff
in
f ront of you is gin. In fact, however , the s tuff is not gin but petrol . So if you
d r i nk
the s tuff (even mixed with tonic), it will b e d ecided ly unpleasant , to say
the least. Should you choose to d r i nk the s tuff o r
not?
It
seems to m e
t ha t
there are at least two w ays of inte rpre ting this qu estion .
If
we interp ret the question in one way, wh a t you should
choose
depends on
wha t the available option s are r e l l y l i k e not j u s t on wha t you b e l i e v e abou t
what these options are like). For example, it may depend on the actual causal
consequences o f those options, or on other external
facts t ha t
are quite
This
chap te r is an extensively revised restatement of the a rguments of an earlier paper
(Wedgwood 2002d), which
w as
based
on the
talk that
I
gave
at the
conference Weakness
of
W ill
and Varieties o f
Practical
Irrationality, Universite d e Mont rea l , M ay 2001. This restatement of
those a rguments was presented to audiences at Oxford and at the University of Ar izona in
February 2002. I am grateful to all those audiences and especially to my c o mmen t a t o r
in Mont rea l , Josee
B rune i ),
and also to Carla Bagnoli , Jo hn B room e, Alex Byrne, Philip Clark,
N ed Hall , Elizabeth Harman, Sally Haslanger, Richard Holton, Leonard
K atz,
Ka t h r i n
K oslicki,
J im Pryor,
Su san na Siegel, David Ve lleman,
and the
ed i tors
of
this volum e,
f or
helpful comm ents .
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202
Ralph Wedgwood
indepe nden t of yo ur state of m ind. In this case, the option of drink ing the
stuff involves drink ing petrol , and so giving yourself a decidedly unpleasant
experience, while many of the othe r available options h ave no comparable
drawbacks.
So, w hen the question is inter pre ted in this way, you shouldn t
choose ' to drink the stuff. We could call this an external , or 'objective' ,
should .
I
shall express this external should
by
saying
that in
this case,
choosing to mix the
stuff
with tonic and dr ink it is an i n c o r r e c t choice for you to
make. As we might say, in choosing to mix the stuff with tonic and drink i t ,
you
have
got
things
w r o n g ;
your choice
was a
mis take
If we interpret the question in another way, however,
what
you should
choose ' depends only on y ou r o v e r a l l s t a t e o f m i n d (not on external facts
that
could vary while yo ur state of m ind remained unch ange d). Even though you
mistakenly believe
that
the stuff in f ron t of you is gin and no t petrol, it could
still be
that
there is an impeccable process of reasoning
that
leads from y ou r
current state
of
mind
to
you r choosing
to mix the
stuff with tonic
and
dr ink
it.
In that
case,
the
choice
to mix the stuff
with tonic
and
dr ink
it fits
perfectly
w ith yo ur c ur re nt overall state of m ind . So in this case, w hen the question is
interpreted
in
this way,
it
would
be
wron g
to say
that
you
shouldn t
choose '
to drink the
stuff.
We could call this an ' internal ' , or
'subjective' ,
'should ' .
1
I
shall express this internal
should by
saying that
in
this case, choo sing
to mix
th e stuff with tonic and dr ink it is a perfectly r a t io n a l choice for you to make .
The central topic of this chapter is the relationship between these tw o
kinds of should , the ' internal ' and the external should —or, in other
words, between choosing 'rationally' and choosing
'correctly ' .
It would be
odd if these two kind s of 'sho uld ' were completely indepe nden t of each o ther;
it
seems more likely that
the
truths involving
one of
these
tw o
kinds
of
I need not claim that the term 'should ' is simply a m b i g u o u s . It may be tha t 'should ' is
c o n t e x t
s e n s i t i v e . Perhaps, for example,
'should '
is always implicitly relativized to a contextually deter-
mined parameter
of
some sort . Then
we
could
sa y
tha t
th e
external,
or objective, 'should ' is
relative to the
parameter
of this
sort that
is
determined
b y
certain contexts, w hile
the
internal ,
or
subjective, 'should ' i s relative to the parameter of this sort tha t is determined by oth er contexts.
Unfortunately, I
can n o t
go
fur ther
into these semantic
issues
here.
That is, I am assuming that something l ike th e thesis t h a t
epistemologists—such
as
Fumer ton
(1995:
60 —9)—call
' internalism' holds of rat ional choice jus t as m u c h as of rat ional
or 'justified' belief. I shou ld emphasize that in using the term s ' internal ' and 'external' to indicate
this con trast between two ways of evaluating choices, I am following the usage that i s s tandard
am ong epistemologists. I am
n o t
following the usage that is mo st com mo n am ong meta-ethicist
So it should not be assumed that wh at I am here calling th e ' internal should ' has any relation
to
th e so-called 'interna l oug ht ' tha t has been discussed by Steph en Darw all (1995: 9 — 1 2 and
others.
1
2
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Choosing
Rationally
and
Correctly
203
should are in
some
w ay e x p l a i n e d by
t ru th s involv ing
t he
o ther .
B ut in
which
direct ion does the o rde r of explanation go? A re the tru ths ab out which
choices
are
( internally
or
subjectively) r a t i o n a l
ultimately explained
by
m o r e
f u nd a m e n t a l
t ru ths abou t w hich choices a re (e xternally or objectively) c o r r e c t ?
O r
does
the
o rder
of
explanation
go in the
other
direction?
This issue marks
a
crucial disagreement between
tw o
views
of
p ract ical
reason. In effect, it is the
issue that underlies
the
d isagreement between what
G arre t t Cul li ty
and
Berys G aut hav e called
the
r e c o g n i t i o n a l
and the c o n s t r u c t i v i s t
views of
practical reason (Cull ity
and
Gau t 997k
1 — 6 .
3
As
I
shall un ders ta nd them, recognit ional views
of
practica l reason take
as
f u nd a m e n t a l
some pr incip le ab out w hen
a
choice
is
(externally
or
objectively)
c o r r e c t For
example, such re cogn it ional views m ight take
as
f u n d a m e n t a l
the
principle that
a
choice
i s
co r rec t
if and
only
if the
option chosen really
is in a
certain way a
g o o d t h i n g
to
do
— where w hether or not an option is a good thing
to do in this way may depend, at least in part , on external facts, such as the
ac tual causal conse quen ces o f the available options, a nd the like.
These re cogn it ional views rely on this fun da m en tal principle in giving an
acco u n t
of
w h a t
it is for a
choice
to
co u n t
as
( internally
or subjectively)
r a t i o n a l
Proponen ts
of
these views ca nn ot
say
t ha t
a
choice
is
r a t ional
jus t in
case the option chosen really is a good thin g to do. W he the r or not a choice is
rat ion al is , I am
assuming,
an i n te rna l
mat ter , de te rmined
by the
agent s
overal l s tate of m ind alone, where as whe ther or not an option is a good thing
to do is an
external mat ter , which
m ay
depend,
a t
least
in
par t ,
on
ex ternal
facts.
Ins tead , proponents
of
these recogn it ional views could
say
something
like this: a choice is r a t ional
jus t
in case th e agent
b e l i e v e s
t ha t th e option
chosen is (in the relevant way) a good thing to do. But this would not be a
very
plausible thin g
to
say:
if the
agent s
belief
t ha t
the
option chosen
is a
good
thing to do is a grossly i rrat io na l belief,
then
surely th e choice will b e equally
irrat ion al. So it
w ould
be
mo re plausible
to say
this:
a
choice
is
r a t ional
j u s t in
case it is
r a t i o n a l for the a g e n t to b e l i e v e
t ha t the option chosen is (in the r e levant
w a y a good th ing to do. A s m an y ep istem ologists agree, w he the r or not i t is
ratio na l for the age nt to hold a certa in belief is also an
i n te rna l
matter in the
relevan t sense, determ ined by the bel iever s overal l s tate of m ind, and not b y
facts
that could vary whi le that s ta te of m ind rema ined unch ang ed.
According
to
this conception
of
r a t ional
belief,
what makes
it
r a t ional
for
Chris t ine Korsgaard (1996k 35) calls these tw o views of pract ical reason realism and
co ns t r u c t i v ism respectively.
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204
Ralph Wedgwood
one to hold a certain belief are in ternal facts abo ut one s experiences,
memories , intu i tions , backgroun d beliefs, and so
on.
4
The first
task
for any
version
of the
recognitional view,
then,
is to identify a
certain con cept th at represen ts the pro per ty o f being in the relevan t way a
good
th ing
to do .
Then
this view will give
an
a ccou n t
of
w h a t
it is for a
choice
to be
ra t ional
in
terms
of the
ra tionali ty
o f
holding certain
b e l i e f s
tha t involve
this concept. Fo r example, acco rding to the v ersion of the recog nitiona l view
under considera t ion, whenever
it is
ra tional
for one to
choose
a
certain
option, what makes it ra tional for one to choose this option is the
fact
tha t
it is ra t ional for one to hold a certa in belief invo lving this
concept—namely,
the
belief tha t
the
option
is in the
relevant
way a good
thing
to do .
Intuitively, if the fundamental principle applying to choices is tha t one
should (in the
external
or objective
sense
of should )
choose options that
really
are
good things
to do, then
this seems
to e x p l a i n
w y there
is
also
a
subsidiary
principle applying
to
choices,
to th e effect
tha t
one should (in the
internal
or
subjective sense
of
should ) choose options that
it is
ra t ional
for
one to believe to be good things to do. But what exactly is the na tu re of
the explanatory con nection between these two principles? I t m ay be that the
explanatory connection
is
this.
5
The
fact
tha t
an
option
is a
good thing
for one
to do is an
external
fact
about that option;
it is not
de termined
by facts
abou t
one s state
of
m ind alone.
So one
cannot
d i r e c t l y
comply with
the
r equ i rement
that one should choose options that real ly are good things to do. One can
only comply with this requirement
i n d i r e c t l y by
means
of
com plying with
an
internal requirement that one should
ad jus t
one s choices to some intern al
fact
abo ut one s m ental s tates. The best intern al requirem ent of this sort to
comply with, in order to achieve the external result of choosing options that
really are
good things
to do, is the
requirement that
one
should choose
options that
it is
ra tional
for one to
believe
to b e
good thin gs
to do. In
this way,
then, a recognitional view may not only give an account of the
feature
tha t
makes rational choices rational;
it may
also
help to e x p l a i n
w y
one
should
make choices that have that
feature,
r ath er t han choices that lack it.
4
So, if one has sufficiently
mislead ing evidence,
it
m igh t
be
ra t ional
for one to
believe
an
option to be a good thing to do, even
if
it is not in fact a good thing to do. In this
case,
according to
this accoun t o f
rational choice,
it is ra t ional to choose the opt ion, even tho ug h th e opt ion is not a
good thing to do. Convers ely, m isleading evidence m ight prev ent it from being rat ional to believe
an opt ion to be a good thing to do, even thoug h in fact it is a good thing to do. In this case, it is
irrational to
choose
th e
opt ion, even tho ug h
t he
option
is a
good thing
to do.
5
I have developed
this
approach to unders tanding th e relation between internal and external
uses of
should
in
o ther wo rk (Wedgwood 2 0 0 2 £ > .
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Choosing Rationally and Correctly 205
A reco gnit ional view of this so rt can a lso give a n explanat ion o f why akrasia
is i r rat ional . Let us assume t h a t akrasia involves choo sing to do som ething
t h a t one believes not to be a good thing to do. Now , one s bel ief t ha t a cer tain
option is not a good thin g to do is either a ratio na l belief fo r one to ho ld or it is
not . If it is not a rational belief for one to ho ld , then one is being i r ra t ion al in
one s beliefs. If, on the oth er ha nd , i t is a ratio na l belief fo r one to hold, th n it
cannot s imul taneously
be
ra t ional
for one to
believe t ha t
the
option is
a
good
thing to do. So, one is choosing the opt ion even t h o u g h i t is not ratio na l for
one to believe the opt ion to be a good th ing to do;
h e nc e — a c c ord ing
to the
recognit ional view of r a t ional
cho ice—one s
choice is i r ra t ional . So akrasia
necessarily involves i rrat ional i ty, ei ther in one s
beliefs
or in one s cho ices.
W e m i g h t express the recognit ional view, metaphorical ly, by saying t h a t
rat ional pract ical reasoning
a ims
at choosing opt ions t h a t really are good
things to do . In this way, the recog nit ional view of rat ion al choice paral lels a
certain claim t h a t is o f t en made abou t b e l i e f A c c o r d i n g to th is claim about
belief, if one f o r m s and revises one s beliefs ra t ional ly, one s reas oning
a ims
at
believing
th e t r u t h an d n o t h i n g but the t r u t h ab o u t th e quest ion a t issue. In
this sense,
th e
recognit ional view holds t h a t rat ional choice
a ims a t
options
t h a t a re good things to do, j u s t as rat iona l bel ief a ims a t the t r u t h .
I
have only given a crude sketch of the recognit ional view of pract ical
reason here. The recognit ional view m i g h t be ref ined in man y ways. For
example, the recog nit ional view could be gen eral ized so t h a t i t app lies not j u s t
to
c h o i c e s (which
are
m e n t al events involving
the
f o r ma t i o n
of a new
in ten-
tion), but to all k inds
o f
i n t e n t i o n r e v i s i o n ( includ ing m e n t al events in wh ich one
reaff irms
or ab an d o n s an old in tent ion) . It could also be gen eral ized so
t h a t
it
even applies to one s
f iling
to revise one s inte nt ion s o n a certain occasion,
since
intui t ively failing to revise one s inten t ions can also sometimes be a
serious mistake.
In
o ther work (Wedgwood 2002a) I have suggested tha t th e s logan that
belief
aims at the
t r u t h is best interp reted as mak ing a claim a bou t belief tha t is ana logous to the c la im that th e
recogni t ional
v iew makes ab out choice.
Th e
fundamental pr incip le applying
to
belief
i s
t h a t
a
belief is co r rec t i f and only if the proposition believed is t rue. This fundamental pr incip le of
correct belief explains th e principles of rational belief. Roughly, th e f o rmat ion of a belief is
rat ion al if and on ly if , in f o rming tha t
belief,
th e believer w as fo l lowing th e appropriate rules and
procedures—namely , those ru les and p ro cedure s t h a t it is ra t ional for the believer to regard as
reliable way s o f r each ing the t r u t h .
Proponent s
of the
reco gnition al view need
not
maintain that
the
good
is the
const i tu t ive
aim of all desire or of all action as su ch . They c an agree w ith David Vellem an (1992:
1 1 7 — 2 2 ;
1996:
1 9 0 — 1
t h a t it is qu ite possible for on e to desire states o f
a f f a i r s ,
or to p e r fo rm actions, t h a t one
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206 Ralph Wedgwood
This view might also be revised to give a more r e f ined account of when
exactly a choice is rational. According to the simple account that I am
currently considering, a choice is rational i f and only if it is rational for the
agent, at the time of choice, to believe the chosen option to be a good thing to
do. But suppose that one has to make a choice in an emergency, in which one
does not have enough time or information for it to be rational for one to hold
an outright belief about whether any of the available options is a good thing to
do.
In cases of this sort, one s choice can surely still be rational, even though it
is not rational for one to believe the chosen option to be a good thing to do.
This suggests
that
the account must be
r e f ined
so that it requires one to
a d j u s t
one s choice to the
ev idence
that one has in f a vour of beliefs about whether or
not the available options are good things to do, even if
that
evidence is not
good enough to make it rational for one to hold an outright belief to the
e f fec t
that
the
chosen option
is a
good thing
to do.
I shall return to the task of r e f in ing the recognitional view of practical
reason in the final section of this chapter. In most of this chapter, however, I
shall ignore
all
these refinements
to the
recognitional view.
To
s implify
the
discussion, I
shall
j us t focus on the
simple version, according
to
which
a
choice
is
correct
if and
only
if the
chosen option
is a
good thing
to do, and
a
choice
is
rational
i f and
only
if it is
rational
for the
agent
to
believe
the
chosen option to be a good thing to do. All the arguments that I shall make in
the
next f o u r sections could
be
adapted
to
apply
to the
more r e f ined versions
j u s t as much as to this simple version.
This simple version makes it particularly clear why it is appropriate to call
this a recognitional view of practical reason. According to this view, there are
simply truths about which of the available options are good things to do and
which are not; and the central or canonical method of practical reasoning is
j u s t to
attempt
to recognize or
to f orm rational e l i e f s about these truths,
and
then
believes not to be good in any way. Pro pon en ts of the rec ognitio nal view only insist tha t i f one
per fo rms
such act ions,
one is
akratic
a nd
therefore i r ra t ional.
8
Joh n Broom e has objected to me that in presenting the
issues
in this way, I am
conflat ing
tw o
separate qu estions:
th e
quest ion
of the
relative prio rity
o f the
in ternal
and the
external
shou ld ,
and the que stion of the relation between the terms should and good . But as I explain in the next
section,
there
i s a form al way of
using
th e
term
good
suc h tha t
to say
that
a
certain option
i s n o t
a
good thing
to d o in
this
w ay
j u s t
is to say
that
it is
some thing that
one (in the
external sense)
should not
choose .
There are also many m ore substant ive ways in which som ething c an be
good: for example, something can be good for me , or good for O xford Universi ty, or moral ly good.
T he
quest ion
of how
these substantive ways of being good
ar e
related
to
w ha t
on e (in the
external
sense) should cho ose is one tha t I shal l not be addressing here.
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Choosing
Rationally and Correctly 207
to
mak e one s choice according ly. Som ething like this conception
of
ra t ional
practical reasoning
is
suggested
by
A ristotle s claim tha t practic al wisdom
involves bo th
the
practical i n t e ll ec t — that
is ,
sound reasoning abo ut act ion
based on a
t rue unders tand ing
of the
h u m a n
g ood — an d
choice
in
accordance
with w hat the practical intellect
asserts.
10
Proponents
of the c o n s t r u c t i v i s t view o f practical reason, on the o ther hand,
take as
fund am enta l certa in in ternal requirements tha t
a
choice m ust meet
in
order to be rational. They deny that these internal requirements o f ra t ional
choice are explained by any principle about when a choice is (externally)
correct ,
or w h en an option is (externally) a good thing to do . Thus, the
construct ivists deny that these internal requirements o f rationality are
explained by the good external results to which complying with these
requirements either will actually lead,
o r may
reasonably
be
expected
to
lead.
A cco rding to the constructiv ists , these intern al requirem ents either
require
no
explanation
at
all,
or
else
are
explained
in
some other way.
For this reason, according
to the
constructivists , there
is no
external
concept of an option s being
good
in some way such that it is a basic
requ irement of rationality that one must choose options that it is ra t ional
for one to believe to b e good in that way. (If this w ere a basic r equ i rement of
rat ionali ty, i t wo uld b e all but irresistible to co nclude th at the reason why one
shou ld choo se actions that it is ra t ional for one to b e l i e v e to be good in tha t way
is because
of a
more fundamental pr incip le that
one
should choose actions
that really a re good in tha t w ay.) Instead, co nstruc tivis ts typically propose that
the requirements o f practical rationality are e i ther purely p r o c e d u r a l require-
ments ,
or
e lse pure requirements
o f f o r m a l c o h e r e n c e
am ong one s choices
or
preferences.
There are two main versions o f cons truct ivism that are defended by
contemporary philosophers . O ne version is d e c i s io n th e o r e t ic cons truct ivism,
according to which one s preferences are ra t ional if and only if they satisfy
certain
condit ions o f coherence o r consistency. Typically, the idea is tha t
9
I
describe this
as the
central
o r canonica l
method
o f
prac t ical reasoning b ecause str ict ly
speaking, acco rding to this view as I for m ula ted i t, i t may also be rat ional to take certain s h o r t c u t s in
one s
pract ical reasoning.
So long as it is
rationally permissible
for one to believe that th e
chosen
opt ion
is a
g ood t h in g
to do, and one s
choice
is
suitably sensitive
to whatever
considerat ions
make
it th e
case
that it is
rationally permissible
for one to
believe th is , then one s choice
may be
ra t ional even
i f one has not
ac tual ly formed
any
belief
a t all
a b o u t whether
or not the option in
quest ion is a good thing to do.
See A ristot le s defini t ion of practical wisdom phroms i s ) in N i c omachean
Eth ic s
6. 5, 1140 5
(repeated
at
1140
b
22);
and
compare
also 6. 2,
1139*24,
and 6. 9,
1142
b
34.
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208
Ralph Wedgwood
these preferences
must satisfy
the ax ioms ( trans i t iv i ty , monotonic i ty , inde-
pendence , and so on)
that
a re necessary t o m ake i t possible to represent those
preferences
by
means
of a
u t i l i ty
func t ion
(Joyce 1999: 84— 9).
For an
agent
whose preferences
a re
coherent
in
th i s way ,
i t is
r a t iona l
to
choose
a n
option
i f
a nd only if no a l ternat ive opt ion i s p referred .
1 1
The o ther main version of construct ivism is ant ian construct ivism,
according to which the fund a me nta l pr inc iple of ra t iona l choice requi res
that
in making choices, one should follow a p rocedure
that meets
cer ta in
fo rmal
condi t ions of consistency a nd universa l izabi l i ty . Specifical ly , a ccording
to K a nt (1788, Ak. v.
30— 1),
to be rat ional, one
must
a lways ma ke one s choice
thro ug h fol lowin g some maxim or general rule, which i t
must
also be
consistent
for one at the
same t ime
to
will
to be a
universa l
l aw.
12
In these constructivist theories,
then,
these internal requirements
of
rat ional choice
a re
fundamenta l . Const ruct iv is t s have made many c la ims
about these requirements: some construct ivists have compared them to the
require men ts of logical consistency am ong our beliefs;
13
and some const ruct -
ivists have claimed
that
these requirements of rat ional choice are a priori .
14
B ut
they
a ll
deny
that the
external not ions
of a
choice s being correct
or of an
option s being a good th ing to do play a ny role in the explanat ion of the
requi rements of ra t ional choice . T he external not ions a re e i ther denied to
have
a ny
necessary connect ion
to the
no t ions
of
r a t iona l prac t ica l reasoning
or of
reasons
for
act ion,
or
else they
a re
simply e f i n e
in
terms
of
w h a t
it is
I tenta t ively suggest tha t th e b road ly p rocedura l account of r a t iona l p r a c t i ca l r ea son ing
sketched by
Be rna rd Will iams (1980:
1 0 4 — 5
is also a
version
of construct ivism.
W illiams seems
to
th ink
t h a t
i t is j u s t
in tu i t ively clear tha t cer ta in procedures
of
deliberation
a re
r a t iona l .
H e
certainly does
not try to
explain
w hy
these procedures
a re
r a t iona l
by
appea l ing
to the
good
externa l resul ts tha t com ply ing wi th these proced ures may be expected to have.
This in terpreta t ion o f K an t — w hi c h is basica lly due to Korsgaard (1989)— is controv ersia l ,
and
rejected
by some phi losophers ,
such
a s W ood (1999), who regard themselves a s
Kant ians .
But
for
p resent purposes ,
i t
does
not
ma t te r whether th i s i n te rp re t a t ion
of K an t i s
cor rect .
All
t h a t
mat ters
here
is
t h a t
th e
v i ew tha t
I am
call ing
Kan t i an construct ivism is
w o r th y
of
ser ious
examinat ion .
13
For
example, Richard
Jeffrey
ta lks
of the
pr inciples
of
r a t iona l
choice as the
logic
of
decision (Jeffrey 1983);
and
Korsgaard c la ims tha t ,
j u s t a s
if
I am
going
to
t h ink
I
mus t th ink
in accordance w i th th e pr inciple of
non-cont rad i c t ion ,
so too, in essentially th e s ame way ,
if
I a m
going
to will at all I m u s t do so
u n i v e r s a l l y . . .
The r equ i r ement of universali ty is in th is way
const i tut ive of will ing (Korsgaard 1996fc
235).
14
K an t repeatedly
insists
t h a t th e f undam enta l p r inc ip le o f
p rac t ica l
r ea son mus t be a p r ior i
(Kan t
1785,
Ak. iv. 388—90, 4 0 6 — 1 2 ,
425— 7). Some decis ion- theoret ic
construct ivists,
s u c h
a s
Gauthier (1985) and Dreier (1997),
also
seem to suggest tha t the fund am enta l requiremen ts of
ra t iona l preference are a pr ior i .
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Choosing Rationally and Correctly 209
ra t ional
to
choose .
F or
example, a ccord ing
to
some
of
these
ph i losophers, for
an option to be a good th ing for one to do j u s t is for it to be a n option t ha t it
w o u l d
be
ra t ional
for one to
choose,
if one
we re ideally well info rm ed abou t
th e
relevant
facts.
1 5
Acco rd in g to this definit ion, a ll t ru ths about which choices
are
corre ct , and a bo ut which options are good things to do, are
cons t ruc ted
out of the internal requirements of rat ional choice.
Paraphras ing
C hris t ine Korsgaard
1 9 9 6 f c : 3 6 — 7 ) , we can
express
the differ-
ence between constructivism and the recognit ional view as follows. C o n -
structivists
believe
t ha t
there
are
tru ths abou t what
is a
good th ing
for one to
do b e c u s e there are ra t ional procedures for mak ing cho ices— whereas
according to the
recog nit ional view, there
are
ra t ional proced ures
for
m ak ing
choices b e c u s e
there
are
t ru ths abo u t what
is a
good th ing
for one to do,
wh ich
it is
ra t ional
for one to
expect those procedures
to
t rack .
For the
construct iv -
ists,
these rat iona l p ro c ed u re s— o r m o r e gen erally,
the
in ternal requirements
of ra t ional c h o ic e— a re f und am ental . Eve rything else
t ha t
has any necessary
connection to reasons for action
m u s t
be explained on the
basis
of these
in ternal requirements
of
ra t ionali ty. This
is wh y
both
the
Kan t ian cons t ruc t -
ivists,
such as K orsgaard 1 9 9 6 f c ) , and the decision- theoretic construc tivists ,
such as David G auth ier (1986) , seek to con stru ct the wh ole of ethics on the
basis o f
thei r account
o f
these in ternal requirem ents
o f
rat iona l choice.
In
this chapter
I
shall con sider some
of the
ob jec t ions
t ha t
the
construct iv -
ists
have directed against
th e
recogn it ional view. Ironically,
as I
shall argue,
these ob jectio ns apply j us t as
m u c h
to constructivism a s to c ertain versions o f
the recognit ional view.
hen
I shall argue
t ha t
there is a version of the
recognit ional view
t ha t
is
i m m u n e
to con structivist ob jectio ns. This, i t
seems to m e, provides considerable supp ort for this version of the recogni-
tiona l view.
F o r m a l and Substant ive Vers ions of the Recogni t ional
View
As I explained in the pre viou s section, the simple v ersion of the re co gnitio na l
view t ha t
I am focu sing on here f irst identifies a certain concept
t ha t
15
Com pare Chr is tine
Korsgaard (1986a:
122):
w h a t
makes
the
object
of
you r ra t iona l
choice
good is tha t it is the object of a ra t ional choice . Here Korsgaard is b roadly speaking followin
Kant, w ho appears to believe tha t an option is a good th ing to do (not merely good in relation t o
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210
Ralph Wedgwood
represents
the
proper ty
of
being
an
option that
is in a
certain
way a
'good
thing
to
do',
and then
claims tha t
a
choice
is
rational
if and
only
if it is
rationa l
for the
agent
to
hold
a
certain
fcehe/involving
his
concept—namely, the belief
tha t th e chosen option is in this way a 'good thing to do' .
But
wh ich
way of
being
a
good thing
to do is the
relevant
way'? A s
Judi th
Thomson (2001: 17—19)
and
others have pointed ou t, there
are
m a n y
different
ways
in which something can be good: it may be good for me, or good for
Oxford U niversity, or m orally good, and so on. Perhaps there can also be mor e
than
one
concept that represents
the
very same property (such
as the
concepts 'good
for Cicero' and
'good
for Tully ,
perhaps).
If so, then
even
after the
recognitional view
has
identified
the
relevant
way of
being good,
it
must
still identify
the
relevant c o n c e p t that represents
the
proper ty
of
being
in
this
way a good th ing to do . So exactly
wh ich
out of all the concepts that can be
expressed by the term
'a
good thin g to do', is the one th at the recognitiona l
view
is
employing here?
According to David Velleman (1996: 176—7) , there are two main types of
concept that proponents of the recognitional view can employ here. They
could
employ
a
concept th at gives
a
purely 'formal' specification
of the
'object
of
practical
reasoning'; or
they cou ld employ
a
concept th at gives
a 'sub stan-
tive' specification of the 'object of practical reasoning'.
As Vellema n explains,
a
conce pt gives
a
' formal ' specification o f ' t h e object
of
an enterprise' if it is simply th e concept of the
object
of tha t enterprise. For
example,
the
concept 'winning' gives
a formal specification o f ' t h e object of a
competitive game , since the concept ' winning j u s t is the concept of
succeeding in
competition
(Velleman 19 96: 17 6). Similarly, Velleman sug-
gests,
one
concept that could
be
ex pressed
by the
term
'a
good thing
to
do
is
simply
th e
concept
of the 'object ' of
practical reasoning .
Velleman believes tha t practical reaso ning literally has an 'object ' or aim . I
shall
not
assume this here. Instead,
I
shall suppose that
a
purely
'formal'
concept
of a
'good thing
to
do
is a
concept such tha t
it is a
conceptual t ru th
that
an
option
is a
'good thing
to do in
this sense
if and
only
if it is an
option that
it is
c o r r e c t
to
choose—in
precisely
th e
same sense
of the
term
'correct ' that
I
exp lained
in the
previous section.
O ne
such concept, which
can be expressed by describing an option as a 'good thing to do' , is as I have
argued
elsewhere (Wedgwood
2001o) a
concept
th e
content
of
which
is
determined
by the
special 'conceptual role tha t
it
plays
in
rational practical
some end, but good s i m p l ic i t e r j u s t in
case
it is an o ption that no well-informed agent c an
reject
wi t h o u t violating the fundamental internal requirem ent of ra tionality.
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Choosing Rationally
and
Correctly
211
reasoning.
Specifically,
if a ra t ional agent makes judgements us ing th is
concept , about which
of the
available op tions
fall
under th is concept
and
which do not , then she will choose one of the op tions tha t she jud ge s to fall
un de r the co ncept , and not one of the opt ions that she judg es not to
fall
u n d e r it. I have argued that if the c o n t e n t o f a c onc ep t is de termined by its
having a
conc eptual role
o f
this kin d,
then i t
fo l lows that
an
op t ion
falls
u n d e r
th e c onc ep t if and on ly if it is c o r r e c t to choose it.
T o
j udg e tha t
an
op t ion
is a
good th ing
to do , in
this fo rm al sense, then,
is
not to m a k e a specific v a l u e - ju d g e m e n t , such as t ha t th e op t ion is m o r a l ly good,
or good /or
the a g e n t ,
or good
a s a m e a n s to a c e r ta i n e n d .
It is s imply to j udge tha t it is
an op t ion that it is c o r rec t to c hoose . This judg em en t could a lso b e exp ressed
in
many o ther w ays .
For
example, this judgement could also
be
exp ressed
by
saying tha t the opt ion i s cho icew orthy or
O K .
The judgement tha t an
opt ion
is in
this formal sense
no t a
good th ing
to do
c ou ld
be
expressed
by
saying tha t
the
opt ion
is
som ething that
one had bet ter
not
do, or
tha t there
is a conclusive
r eas on
for one not to do, or simply tha t one should
not
do.
16
O ne
version
of the
recogni t ional v iew, t h e n , w o u l d
use the
t e rm
a
good
thing to do to express this pu rely fo rm al conc ept. I shall cal l this the f o r m a l
version
of the recognit ional view. T he formal vers ion of the recogni t ional
view is
d is t inct f rom
the
constructivis t view, because whether
or not
some-
th ing c ounts as a
good
th ing to do , in this formal sense, is typically
determined
not by
interna l
facts
a b o u t
the
agen t s o verall state
o f
m i n d ,
bu t
at least in p a r t by ex ternal facts w hich co uld vary whi le the agent s overall
s tate of m ind rem ained un cha ng ed.
Alternat ively , the recogn i t ional v iew might use the term a good th ing to
do
to
express
a
m o r e
s u b s t a n t i v e
c onc ep t
of an
op tion s being good
in
some
specific w a y . I shall call views of this sort substantive versions of the
recogn i t ional v iew.
Fo r
example,
one
su ch sub stantive version
of the
recogni-
t ional v iew wou ld use the t e rm
a
good th ing to d o to m e a n o p t i m a l for th e a g e n t s
h a p p i n e s s .
This version
of the
recogni t ional v iew would
in
effect
be
w h a t
Derek Parf i t (1984:
1-2)
has called the Self-interest Theory o f
Rat ional i ty .
Ac c or d ing to
th is theory ,
a
choice
is
c o r r e c t
if and
only
if the
chosen opt ion
maximizes the agent s hap piness ( that is , there is no alternative to the chosen
op tion that wil l m ake a greater co ntr ibu tion to the agent s happ iness) ; and a
16
To say
t h a t X is a g o o d thing
t o
do
(in this form al
sense) does
not
imp ly t ha t
o ne
s h o u l d
d o
X O ne
m i g h t
be in a
Bur idan s ass
case, in
w h i c h b o th
X and Y are
good things
to do, but it is
impossible to do
bo t h .
In this case, i t is not
t rue t ha t
one
s h o u l d
do X or
t h a t
one
s h o u l d
d o Y
Still,
they
are
both good things
to do .
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212 Ralph Wedgwood
choice is rational if and only if it is rational for the agent to be l ieve that th e
chosen option maximizes her happiness.
Another substantive version of the recognitional view would use the term
a
good thing to do to mean o p t im a l fo r s t i s f y i n g
the
to tal i ty
o f the
agen t s
p r e s e n t
desires.
This would in effect be what Parf i t (1984: 9 2— 4 ) has called the the Instrumen-
tal version of the Present-aim Theory . According to this theory, a choice is
correct if and only if the chosen option optimally satisfies the totality of the
agent s present desires; and a choice is rational if and only if it is rational fo r
the
agent
to
believe that
the
chosen option optimally satisfies
the
totality
of
his
present
desires.
17
A
Problem
for Substantive
Versions
of the
Recognit ional
View
Let us start by considering
substantive
versions of the recognitional view. For
example, consider
th e
egoist ic
version
of the
recognitional view
(P arfit s
Self-
interest Theory ). This view interprets
the
notion
of a good
thing
to
do
as
opt imal f or the agen t s o w n happ iness (where the term happiness expresses a
substantive
concept of some
sort—not
simply the purely f o rmal concept of
a life
of the
sort that
it is
correct
to
choose). According
to
this view,
if one
makes
a
choice, one s choice
is
correct
if and
only
if the
chosen option
maximizes one s happiness;
and
one s choice
is
rational
if and
only
if it is
rational
for one to
believe that
the
chosen option maximizes one s happiness.
A s I
shall argue here, this egoistic version
of the
recognitional view faces
a
problem that Christine Korsgaard (1996fc : 9— 21) has called the normative
question .
According to this egoistic view, it is irrational—indeed ak ra ti c — f o r
one to choose any option if one rationally believes
that that
option will not
maximize one s own happiness. But we can imagine an agent (let us call her
Alice)
who knows that a certain option will not maximize her happiness, but
is still uncertain about whether or not to choose that option—perhaps
because
the
option
has
some other
fea ture
that
she is
tempted
to
regard
as
highly important. Al ice need not doubt that the
fact
that the option will not
maximize her happiness is
s o m e
reason for her not to choose it. But she may
17
This instrumentalist version of the recognitional view m u s t be distinguished from the
decision-theoretic version of
constructivism, since according
to
this
instrumentalist view, the
internal requirements of rational
choice
are
explained
by a
mo re
fundamental principle t ha t
defines when
a
choice
counts as (externally) correct.
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Choosing
Rationally and Correctly 213
still be unce r t a in whe ther to t reat this fact as an o v e r r i d i n g o r d e c i s i v e r eason, as
the
egoist ic view requires
her to do. She
might express
he r
perplexity
b y
asking, Why shou ld I a lways choose opt ions that maximize m y o w n happi-
ness?
W h y
s h o u l d n t
I
somet imes choose op t ions tha t w on t m aximize
m y
happiness instead?
In asking this
no rm at ive ques t ion ,
Alice seems to be seeking some
compell ing f u r t h e r
r e a s o n
not to
choose
any
opt ion that does
no t
maximize
her happiness. T ha t i s , she is loo king for some con siderat ion th at cou ld
rat ional ly p e r s u a d e her not to choose any op t ion tha t she believes not to
maximize
her
happiness—even
i f she did not yet
have
the
disposition
to
avoid
choosing any op t ions tha t she rationally believes not to maximize he r
happiness. But according to the egoist ic version of the recognit ional view,
there a re no such f u r t h e r r easons. T he on ly way in wh ich any considera t ions
can ra t iona l ly persuade
one not to
choose
an y
op t ion , according
to
this
egoistic
v iew, is by mak ing i t i rrat io nal for one to bel ieve that the opt ion
maximizes one s o wn happiness. So accord ing to this egoistic view, i f som eo ne
lacked the disposition not to choose any op t ion tha t i t was not r a t iona l f o r her
to
believe
to
maximize
h e r
happiness, there would
b e no
op t ions tha t
she
could b e r a t iona l ly persuaded not to choo se; such an agent would b e b e y o n d
the p o w e r o f r a t iona l persuasion a l together .
So ,
it seems, the egoistic ve rsion o f the recognit ional view must accept that
if any agents lack the disposit ion to com ply w ith this a lleged rat io nal re quire -
m nt—th r equ i rement t ha t
o n e
shou ld
n o t
choose
an y
op t ion tha t
i t is no t
rat ion al for one to bel ieve to maxim ize one s ow n happ iness—there i s no way
of
r a t iona l ly persuad ing
th m
to do so. In that sense, the egoistic view
must
regard th is ra t iona l requi rement as
b a s i c
If one is not a lready disposed to
c o n f o r m t o th is requi rem ent , there i s no w ay of ra t iona l ly persuad ing one to
do so, since ra t ional p ersuasion precisely consists in e xploi ting a pe rson s
disposition to comply wi th th is requi rement .
There do seem to be some basic ra t iona l requi rements of th i s sor t . For
exam ple, i f som eo ne is not alread y disposed to accept instance s of the
basic
laws of logic, there will be no way of rat ional ly persu ading him to do so, since
a l l a rgum ents tha t
o n e
m ight employ
in
o rder ra t iona l ly
to
persuade
h im
will
themselves involve instances of those very laws of logic. So why sho u ldn t t he
egoistic r equi rement a l so be a basic ra ti ona l r equ i reme nt o f this
sort?
Ho w eve r, i t does not seem plausible that this egoistic req uirem en t is a
basic
r e q u i r e m e n t o f this sort . I f you violate a r a t ion a l r e q u i r e m e n t — t h a t is, if yo u
m a k e
an
i r ra t ion al choice
o r
f o r m
an
i r ra t iona l
b e l ie f— this
reflects
a
co gni t ive
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214
Ralph Wedgwood
defect
i n y o u (This is a f u n d a m e n t a l d i f ference be tween the in te rna l not ion of a
ra t ional choice and the externa l no t ion of a cor r ec t choice . There need be no
defect
in you at all if you make an incor rec t choice , by choosing an opt ion
tha t
is not in
fact
a
good th ing
to do; i t ma y be
sheer
bad
luck tha t
the
s tuf f
was
pet rol
and no t
gin,
s o
tha t y our choice
to mix the s tuff
with tonic
and
d r ink
i t
was in fact an
incor rec t choice .) Since ir ra t iona l i ty
is
always
a
d e f ec t
in
you ,
then, so long as you are being
sufficiently
sane and intelligent, you will ten d to
avoid
such
defects .
At the very least , if it is a b a s i c r equ i r emen t of r a t ional i ty
tha t one should not f o rm a se t of beliefs o r choices that has a ce r ta in f ea tu re ,
then if you r e c o g n i z e
t ha t
a
ce r ta in
set of beliefs or
choices
h as
tha t f ea tu re ,
you
will not rema in unc er ta in about whethe r or not to form tha t se t of beliefs and
choices,
unless you are being less than pe rfe ct ly sane and intell igent . For
example, suppose that
it is a
basic pr inciple
of
r a t ional i ty tha t
it is
i r r a t iona l
to
believe any p roposi t ion tha t is logica l ly se l f -cont radic tory.
Then
if you
recognize tha t
a
cer tain proposit ion
is
logically self-contradictory,
y ou
will
no t r em a in unce r t a in abou t whe the r o r not to believe tha t prop osit ion, unless
you are being less tha n per fec t ly sane and intell igent .
Intuit ively, however,
it
seems quite possible that Alice
is
be ing per fec t ly
sane and intelligent, even if she recognizes that it is not r a t ional for her to
believe tha t the opt ion in question will maximize he r happiness, but still
r emains unce r t a in abou t whe the r
to
choose tha t opt ion. A l ice s unc er ta in ty
abou t whe the r or not to choose this opt ion har dly seems in the same ca tegory
as a failure to be
convinced
by
instances
of the
e lementary laws
of
logic.
Inde ed , her perplexity seems em ine ntly intelligible. So it seems implausible to
claim tha t
it is a
basic r equ i r emen t
o f
r a t ional i ty tha t
one
should never choose
any
opt ion that i t is not ra t ion al for one to believe to m aximize one s own
happiness. But as we have seen, the egoistic version of the recognit ional view
entails tha t it is a basic r equ i r ement . So this seems to be a ser ious problem for
the
egoistic version
of the
recognit ional view.
The
same problem also arises
for
o ther substant ive versions
of the
reco gni t ional view . For exam ple , accord ing to the ins trum enta l is t ver s ion of
the
recognit ional view,
a
choice
is
r a t ional
if and
only
if it is
r a t ional
for one
to believe that the chosen option optimally satisfies the totali ty of one s
present desires. S o, a cco rd ing to this view, it is i r ra t iona l (indeed akra t ic) for
one to choose an opt ion if one ra t iona lly believes that the opt ion does not
optimally satisfy the totali ty of one s prese nt desires. But we can ima gine a n
agent (call
him
George)
w ho
star ts
to
regard
the
m a j o r i t y
of his
desires with
suspicion;
perha ps he becom es at t ra cte d to the ideal of de tach ing himself
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Choosing
Rationally and Correctly 215
f rom a ll self-centred desires. Geo rge cou ld be convinced that a cer tain option
will not
optimally satisfy
the
totality
of his
present desires,
bu t
s t i l l wonder
w hether or not to choose tha t opt ion. He m ight ask himsel f , W hy should I
always choose options that optimally
satisfy
the total i ty o f m y p resent desires?
W hy sho uldn t I som etimes choose opt ions tha t do n t o pt im al ly
satisfy
those
desires instead?
In
asking this question, George appears
to be
seeking
a
compell ing f u r t h e r
r e s o n not to
choose
any
option that does
no t
optimally satisfy
the
totality
o f
his present desires. T ha t is, he is seeking som e considera t ion that could
ra t ional ly
persuade him not to choose any such o p t i o n—e ve n if he is not
yet disposed to r e jec t a ll op t ions tha t i t is not r a t iona l f o r him to
regard as optim ally satisfying the total i ty o f his desires. B ut a ccord ing to the
ins t rum enta l is t v iew, there a re no such f u r t he r reasons. The only consider-
at ions t ha t
can
ra t ional ly persuade
one not to
choose
any
opt ion
a re
cons iderat ions
that make i t i r rat ional for one to believe that the option wil l
opt imal ly satisfy th e total i ty o f o ne s desires. So , unless George is a l ready
disposed
not to choose any op t ion that i t is no t r a t iona l for him to r egard as
opt imal ly
satisfying
the tota lity of his desires,
th n
there are sim ply no option s
tha t
he
could
be
ra t ional ly persuaded
not to
choose.
Thus, the i n s trum enta l is t m u st c laim that it is sim ply a
b s i c
r eq u i rem en t o f
ra t ional i ty
tha t one sho uld n ot choose any opt ion that i t i s not ra t ional for
one to r egard as optimally satisfying one s total set of desires. But it seems
do ub t f u l w h e th e r
the
ins t rumenta l is t requirement rea l ly
can be a
basic
r eq u i r emen t o f ra t io nali ty. George cou ld surely be per fect ly sane and intelli-
gent, even if he recognizes that it is not r a t iona l for him to r egard a cer tain
opt ion
as
optim ally
satisfying his
to ta l
set of
desires,
but
s t i l l remains uncer-
ta in about whether to choose tha t opt ion.
In
general, this problem will arise
fo r
ll substantive versions
of the
recogni t ional v iew. Whatever substant ive concept o f a good th ing to do
the rec o gnitio nal view takes as its ce ntr al co ncep t, it will have to tak e the
requ irem ent tha t one should not choose any opt ion that i t i s not ra t ional for
one to believe to be, in this substantive sense, a g ood th ing to
do
as a
basic
r eq u i r emen t o f r a t ional i ty . Bu t i t seems do ub t f u l whether there can be any
basic r eq u i r emen t o f r a t iona l i ty o f this sort . Fo r every such requirement , it
seems that agents could be per fect ly sane and intelligent, even if they
recognize t ha t it is not r a t iona l fo r
th m
to believe a cer tain option to be
(in this substantive sense) a good th ing to do , and yet still
feel
uncer ta in
about whether
to
choose
the
op t ion . None
o f
these al leged requ irem ents
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216
Ralph Wedgwood
resemb les the
clear examples
of basic requirements—such as the
r equi rement
that
one
should
not
believe logical contradictions.
For
every substantive
concept
of a
good thing
to do , one
could always ask, without revealing
any
insanity
o r
lack
of
intelligence, B ut
why
should
I
always choose option s
that
are
good things
to do in
tha t
way? W hy
sh ouldn t
I
sometimes choose
options that aren t in tha t way good things to do at all? So the substantive
versions of the recognition al view all seem to face a serious problem .
A n
A nalogou s Problem
for
Cons t ruc t iv is t
Views
As I
shall argue,
a
closely analogous problem also arises
for
con struct ivis t
views of
practical reason.
A s I
ment ioned
in the first
section, there
are two
main varieties of constructivism that have many p ropo nen ts today: decision-
theoretic constructivism and Kant ian construct ivism.
According to decision-theoretic constructivism, rational choices are
choices
tha t
cohere in a
certain
way
with each other
and
with one s
preferences
and beliefs.
Specifically, one s preferences should
be
t rans i t ive, monoton ic ,
independent , and so on; and it is ra t ional to choose an option only if no
alternative option
is
preferred. A cco rd ing
to
this view, one s choices should
(in the
in ternal
use of
tha t
term) satisfy
these conditions
of
coherence.
But
now it seems that we can
raise
the norm ative question again. W h y shou ld our
choices satisfy
these conditions
of
coherence?
W hy
does
it ma t t e r
whether
or
not our choices a re coherent in this
way?
According to
Ka ntian constructivism , rational choices
are
choices that
are
made by means
of a . p r o c ed u r e
tha t
satisfies
certain
formal
condi t ions o f
cons i s tency
and universal i ty .
Specifically,
one must
mak e one s choice
by
fol lowin g
a
general
rule
or
maxim , wh ich
i t
must also
at the
same time
be
consistent
for one to
will
to b e a
universal law. Acc ord ing
to
this view,
on e should (in the
in ternal
sense
of
tha t term) always m ake one s choices
by
fol lowing
a
unive rsalizable
maxim
of
th is kin d.
But the
normative
quest ion arises
here too.
W h y shou ld we
always
make
our
choices
by
fol lowing such universal izable m axims?
W hy
does
it ma t te r
whether
or not we
make
our
choices
in
this
way?
According to the cons tructiv ists, the
fact
that one always
should
make
choices
tha t
meet
these inter nal conditio ns
of
coherence
or
universalizability
is not explained by the go od external results t o w hich su ch ch oices either will
actually
lead,
or may
rationally
b e
expected
to
lead.
But
this seems
to
imply
that it matters s imply i n
i t s e l f
purely fo r i t s o w n sake whether or not one s
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Choosing Rationally and Correctly 217
choices meet these in terna l condi t ions
o f
coherence ,
o r
w hether they
a re
m ade by fo l low ing a sui tably universa l izable
m a x im .
18
On the face of i t , how ever, this is a rather surpris in g idea. W hy on ear th
should such a th ing m at ter p ure ly for i t s ow n sake? Perhaps choices t h a t d o
no t
meet these in terna l condi t ions
o f
cohe rence
o r
universal izabil i ty
a re
aesthetical ly unattract ive
in
some way: they fo rm
a
less pr ett y
m e n t a l
pa t te rn
t h a n choices t h a t do meet these condit ions. B u t this hardly seems a suffi-
ciently weighty c ons idera t ion
to
explain
w hy ( in the
i n t e rna l
use of the term
one s hou l d n e v e r m ake choices
t h a t
do no t satisfy these internal condit ions. I t
w o u l d
defy
belief
to
claim t h a t
it
mat te rs pure ly
for i ts ow n
s ake whe the r
o r
n o t one s choices meet these in terna l condi t ions in the re levant way, b u t
absolutely
no
explanation
can be
given
of why it
mat te rs .
So
cons t ruc t iv is ts
must sure ly offer some fu r th er explanation of why i t m a t t e r s — t h a t i s , of w hy
one s choices should
meet
these in terna l condi t ions
o f
cohe rence
o r
un ive r -
salizability.
19
Many cons t ruc t iv is ts t ry to offer such an explanation by arguing
t ha t
it is
cons t i tu t ive of having the capacity fo r choices a t al l
t h a t
on e s choices must
tend
to
satisfy these in terna l condi t ions
o f
coherence .
For
example, some
o f
the d ecis ion- theoretic constru ctivis ts , such as David Lewis (1974), argue
t h a t
w e
w o u l d
no t
even
be
in te rpre table
as
having preferences
at all
unless
our
choices tended, by and large, to satisfy these condit ions of coherence .
2
Bu t is this claim, t h a t i t is con sti tut ive of having p referen ces at a l l t h a t one s
choices
m u s t
tend, by and large, to satisfy these condi t ions of in terna l
coherence , rea l ly enough all by itself to explain why it is
a l w a y s i r r a t io n a l
to
make choices
t h a t
do no t
satisfy
these condi t ions
( tha t
is ,
t h a t
one s hou ld
never make choices
t ha t
do not satisfy these condit ions)?
21
Even if it is
impossible to have preferences at all unless your choices tend, by nd
l a r g e
to
This p o i n t is m o r e or less explicit in
Kan t ,
w ho c laims (K ant 1785, Ak . iv. 3 9 6 — 4 0 0 t h a t th e
g o o d will
—i.e. th e wil l that complies with th e f undam enta l p r incip le of ra t ional choice, rejecting
all
non-universal izable maxims precisely b e c a u s e they
are not
universalizable
in the
relevant
way—is valuable purely
in
itself,
not
mere ly because
of its
a c tua l
or
expected results.
Decis ion- theoret ic
constructivis ts often
appeal to the so-called
m o n e y
p u m p
a r g u m e n t .
For som e cri ticism of the m o n e y
p u m p
a r g u m e n t , s ee B r o o m e 1999:74—5 a nd Maher 1993:
3 6— 8 .
Alternatively, this argument could be based on the idea that unless one conforms to these
condit ions o f cohe rence , on e will not c o u n t a s a unified agent wi th a gen uine wil l, a s opposed t o a
bundle
of
d isparate desires
a nd
needs;
s ee
G auth ier 1985.
21
I need no t c la im tha t s uch cons t i tu t ive claims are s imply irrelevant to explaining why we
shou ld comply wi th
th e basic
r equ i rement s
o f
rat ionali ty. Indeed,
I
suggested tha t s uch const i -
tut ive claims prov ide part o f the explanation i n some of my earl ier w ork (Wedg woo d 1999, §4). A ll
t h a t I am c laiming here is tha t these const i tu t ive c laims are not sufficient all by themselves to
8
2
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218
Ralph Wedgwood
sa t is fy
these condi t ions , how can this explain w hy your choices should l w y s
sa t is fy
these condi t io ns ? Perhaps
i t
does
not
m a t t e r
a t a l l i f you s o m e t i m e s
m a k e
choices that do not
s a t i s fy
these condi t ions .
A n y w a y , i t s eems doub t fu l whe the r the claim
that
a d isposi t ion no t to
ma ke s uch in terna l ly inc oheren t choices i s cons t i tu t ive of having pre ferences
a t a l l can be the b s i c
explana t ion
o f why i t i s
i r r a t i ona l
t o
ma ke such choices .
If
this cla im were the basic explana t ion of why i t i s i r ra t iona l to make such
in ternal ly incoherent choices ,
then i t
would
in effect be a
ba sic principle
o f
r a t iona l i t y
that
i t is i r ra t iona l for any one to go aga ins t those d i spos i t ions
that
a re
cons t i tu t ive
o f
hav ing pre ferences
a t
all.
But i t i s
dou b t f u l whe the r the re
can be any s uch bas ic principle o f ra t i ona l i t y .
As I a rgued in the previous s ec t ion, i f you ma ke an i r ra t ion a l choice , th i s
choice
reflects
a cogni t ive
defect
in you Since i r ra t i ona l i ty is a lways a
defect
in
y o u ,
then
so long as you are be ing suff ic ient ly sane and intel l igent , you wil l
tend to avoid such
defects.
At the very least , i f i t is a b s ic pr inciple of
r a t iona l i t y
that
i t is i r r a t i ona l f or a n y o n e to f o rm a set of beliefs or choices
that h a s a
ce r ta in f e a tu re ,
then i f you
recognize
that a
cer t a in
se t of
beliefs
or
choices h a s
that
f e a t u r e , y ou will no t r ema in uncer t a in abou t whe the r o r no t
to form
that
se t of beliefs a nd choices, unless y ou a re being less tha n perf ect ly
sane
a nd
intel l igent .
But i t
seems intui t ively qui te possible
that a
per fec t ly
sane
a nd
in tel l igent agent might recognize
that
a
cer t a in choice would
involve going against
a
d i spos i t ion
that i s
cons t i t u t ive
o f
hav ing pre ferences
at all, a nd s t i l l remain uncer ta in about whether o r no t to m a k e that choice.
Such
a
person
might a sk
hersel f ,
I
recognize
that a
disposi t ion
not to
m a k e
choices
o f
th i s k ind
i s
cons t i tu t ive
o f
hav ing pre ferences
a t
all,
bu t why
shou l dn t
I
somet imes res i s t
that
d isposi t ion,
a nd
m ake
a
choice
of
thi s k ind
a n y w a y ? So i t seems do ub t f ul wh ether the in terna l condi t ions of ra t io na l
choice can be explained in this way.
The sam e problem a lso seems to ar ise for the Ka nt ia ns explana t ion of why
we should never make
a ny
choices except
by
fo l lowing the i r supreme
principle of pract ical reason (see Kant 1785, Ak. iv. 4 4 6 — 7 , a nd K o r sga a rd
9 9 f c :
9 2 — 1 00 ) .
Th is Ka n t i an exp lana t ion
i s
based ul t ima te ly
on the
p ropos-
i t ion
that
the will is free
Then
t he K an t i a ns a rgue
that
i t is cons t i tu t ive of
hav ing
free
will a t a l l
that
one
must
have the c apac i ty t o fol low a l aw
that
one
gives to oneself . Final ly, they argue
that
the only possible law of this kind is
provide
s uch
an explana t ion. In the case of the bas ic r equi rement tha t one should not bel ieve
logical c on t r ad ic t ions , for exam ple, i t also seems
c ruc ia l
t h a t i t is r a t i o n a l for one to believe tha t
one
m u s t
conform to th is
r equ i r emen t
i f one is to
r each
the
t r u t h a b o u t
the
ques t ion
a t i ssue.
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Choosing Rationally and Correctly 219
their suprem e principle
o f
p ract ical
r e a s on—t he law
that
one
ought always
to
m ake one s choices by follow ing a general maxim that one ca n con sistently at
the same time will to be a universal law.
N ow ,
the
Ka nt ians canno t argue that
it is
consti tut ive
o f
having
free
will
tha t
one
actually makes
a ll
one s choices
by fo l lowing
t h i s fundamenta l
principle;
then
i t would be impossible to violate this principle of rational-
i ty—in which case
it
would surely
not be a
gen uine p rinciple
of
ra t iona l i ty
a t
all.
So ,
instead,
the
K antian s typically argue only tha t
it is
consti tut ive
of
free
will that one has the capacity to follow this law. But then the normative
question arises
yet
again.
A
pe rfectly sane
and
in tel l igent person might
ask
himself:
I
recognize that having
th e
capacity
to
fol low this
law is
consti tut ive
of having
free
will
a t all but why
should
I
a lways make
m y
choices
by
exercising
this capacity?
W hy
s h ou ld n t
I
somet imes mak e choices w i tho ut
exercising
my capac ity to f ollow this law? So i t seems most do ubtfu l whether
this approa ch can give a satisfactory explanation of why we shou ld follow the
Kant ians supreme principle
o f
practical reason.
In
general , i t seems do ub tfu l w heth er the c onstruc tivists can explain w hy
we should com ply with the in tern al requ irem ents of rat ion al choice, in a way
that deals adequately with
the norm ative quest ion .
Indeed,
i t
seems that
const ruct iv is t
views
are
j u s t
a s
vu lnerable
to
th is problem
as the
substantive
versions of the
recogn i t ional v iew.
The
Formal
Vers ion
of the
Recognit ional View
So
far as I can
see, there
is
only
one
approach
to
pra ctical reason th at avoids
this
p rob lem— namel y , the
version
o f the
recog nit ional view that
is
based
on a
pur y
f o r m l concept
of a
good th ing
for one to do .
22
A s I
explained above,
it
is
a
conceptual truth, buil t into
the
n a tu re
o f
th is fo rm al concept
o f a good
th ing
to
do , t ha t
an
option
is a
good th ing
to
do
in
th is sense
if and
only
if it is
an optio n tha t it is cor rec t to choose. A cco rding to the
formal
version of the
recog nit ional view,
a
choice
is
ra t ional
if and
only
if it is
ra t ional
for the
agent
to believe tha t the optio n cho sen is, in this pu rely fo rm al sense, a good thin g
to do.
Suppose that someone raises
the
normative question with respect
to
this
no t ion of w h a t is a good th ing to
do : W hy
should I a lways choose options
22
One phi losopher
w h o m
i t
m ay
be
correct
to
interpret
a s
accepting
this formal
version of
th e
recogni t ional
view
is Law rence
(1995).
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220
Ralph Wedgwood
that are good things to do ? W hy sho uldn ' t I sometimes choose options that
are not
good things
to do?'
Whe n
th e
question
is
unders tood
in
this way,
it is
equivalent
to the
question 'Why shou ldn ' t
I
sometimes choose options th at
it
is
not
correct
for me to choose?' But as I
explained
in the first
section,
to say
that it is not correct ' to choose an o ption is ju st to say that one shouldn t
choose
it. So
asking this q uestion
is
also equ ivalent
to
asking: 'Why shou ldn ' t
I
sometimes choose options th at I sho uld n' t choose?' But that question will
ha rdly perplex any sane and intelligent person If you s hou ldn' t choose i t, you
sho uld n' t choose i t . That is an u tterly tr ivial truth—not a tru th that requires
any
fur the r explanation.
So it may
well
be a
basic requirem ent
of
rationali ty
that one sho uld n ot choose an y option tha t it is not ration al for one to believe
to be, in this form al sense, a good thing to do.
A s I
suggested
in the
second section, this for m al concep t
of a 'good
thing
to
do' may, more specifically,
be a
concept
the
very content
of
which
is
given
b y
its
special
'conceptual role in
p ractical reasoning.
If so, then it is by
def in i t ion
a concept such tha t if one is rational, a nd
judges
that a certain option is in this
sense
not a
good thing
to do,
then
one
cannot need
any
fur ther reasons
to
persuade one not to choose that option. A ny rational thinker w ho masters
this concep t will treat the ju dg em en t that an option is not in this sense a good
thing to do as simply settling the practical question of whe ther to choose the
option. In effect, it would be buil t into the very natu re of this concept that it is
a basic requirem ent of rationali ty that o ne shou ld not choose options that
one rationally believes not to be good things to do.
The objection that this view must
face
is not tha t it imposes substa ntive
requirements that
it
cannot adequately explain,
bu t
rather that
it is
empty
or
tr ivial—an object ion that
has
been pressed
forcefully by
Vellem an (1996:
174—8).
H
W h e n th e term is used in this form al sense, to say that an option is a
'good thing to do ' is just to say that it is correct to choose it. So the
f undamen ta l principle
of the
recognitional view—that
it is
correct
to
choose
2 3
For Velleman (1996: 190), this 'emptiness
charge'
is
ju s t
one stage in his a rgum e n t for a
conception of practical
reason that
seeks
'to avoid
t he
twin
pitfalls
of
internalism
and
external-
ism'. Specifically,
Velleman attacks
the recognitional
view
of
practical reason because
it
appears
to
provide one way of defending 'externalism'—by
wh i ch
h e
means
th e
view that there
are
some
reasons fo r action that are entirely independ ent of the agent's contingent desires. Even if the
recognitional view wou ld provide
one way of
defending 'externalism', however,
we
should
not
assume
w i t h o u t fur ther
discussion
t ha t th e reco gnitio nal view is o m m i tt e d to
'externalism'.
(Perhaps
it is not
rat ional
to
believe that
an
action
is a
good thing
to do
unless that action
satisfies
one of one's contingent desires.) At all events, I shall
focus
purely on Velleman's
objection to the
recognitiona l view,
and
ignore
t he
o the r aspects
o f his
a rgum ents here .
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Choosing
Rationally and Correctly 221
an
option
if and
only
if the
option
is a
good thing
to d o — a m o u n ts to
no th ing
more than the trivial claim th at it is cor rec t to choose an option if and only if
it is
cor rec t
to
choose
it . So how can
this principle explain anything
at all?
2 4
Proponents
o f the
recog nit ional view could reply
as
follow s. This specifica-
t ion
of the
fun da m en ta l pr incip le , using th is form al concept
of a 'good
thing
to
do' ,
is
indeed trivial .
B ut
perhaps
the
proper ty
of
being
in
this form al sense
a
good thing
to do can be
also specified
in
o the r w a y s — n o t
jus t b y
means
of
this
pure ly fo rm al concept. For example, perhap s this prope rty is identical to the
proper ty
of
being
a
mo rally permissible option that ,
out of all
such moral ly
permissible options, best
satisfies
the agent's total set of desires. Then the
f u n d am en t a l
principle could also
be
specified
in a
non- t r iv ia l way—as
the
principle that a choice is cor rec t if and only if the option chosen is a moral ly
permissible
option that, out of all such morally permissible options, best
satisfies the
agent's desires.
However, the formal version of the recognit ional view itself te l ls us
nothing about which such non- t r iv ia l specifications are true. I t j u s t tells
us to form
ra t ional
beliefs,
involving this purely formal concept, about
w hich of the available options are good things to d o and w hich are
not,
and
then to
choose accordingly .
But all
tha t
it
tells
us
about wha t
it is for an
option to be a good th ing to do is simply tha t it is an op tion th at it w ould be
correct to
choose. Velleman
(1996: 175—6)
objects that this
'would
b e . . . lik e
asking
[the agen t] to hunt for som ething described only as the quarry , or to
play a game with an eye to something described only as
w i n n i n g '.
According to
this objec t ion ,
the
formal vers ion
of the
recognit ional view
is
too
empty
to
tell
us how to set
about making ra t ional choices about w hat
to
do. T rue , it tells us to
form
ra t ional
beliefs
abo ut wh ich of the available options
are
good things to do and w hich are not . B ut acco rding to this complaint , this
view
tells us so little ab ou t wh at it is for an option to be a good thin g to do tha t
i t can no t tel l us how to set abo ut form ing such rat ion al
beliefs.
In fact, it is not
obvious tha t this objec t ion
is
correct .
It is
t rue tha t
the
formal version of the recognitional view does not by itself give us any non-
trivial
specification
of w h a t it is for an option to be a good thing to do
(a l though,
as I
have argued,
it is
quite compatible with
the
existence
of
t rue non- t r iv ia l specifications of this sort) . Nonetheless, this view may tell
24
A s
Velleman claims (Velleman
1996: 176—8),
there
cannot be any
'objec t
of
pract ic
reasoning' unless there is some
subs t n t i ve
specificat ion of what achieving this object consists in.
A s
he p u t s i t: 'A game w h o s e objec t w as spe cifiable only as
winning
wouldn't have an
ob jec t—
that is, wouldn' t have any objec t in par t i cu la r ' (176).
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Choosing Rationally and Correctly 223
belief can be
suff icient
to
mot ivate choice
in
this
w ay
un less that be l ie f
w as
i tself o r ig ina l ly p roduced , a t leas t in p a r t , by s ome o f one s des i res . So,
as suming these
tw o
t h e se s abou t mo t iva t ion ,
beliefs
a b o u t w h a t
is a
good
th ing to do
m u s t
a lso be bas ed, in som e w ay, on som e of one s desires . (This
is not to say
tha t these
beliefs
can be
based
on
any
o f
one s des i res ;
i t may be
only cer ta in
s p e c i a l
des i res that
can
p lay this role
as
p a r t
of the
u l t i m a t e
ra t iona l
basis
for
these beliefs.) M oreove r , s ince one s pract ical reaso ning
must
u l t imate ly b e based on o rd in ary empi ri cal i n fo rm at io n abo u t the
available
op t ions
and
wha t the i r non-normat ive p roper t i e s would
be , the
same
m u s t
be t ru e o f these
beliefs.
Final ly, the general principles of rat ional
belief
apply
to
these
beliefs a s
m u c h
a s to any
o ther s :
one
s h o u l d
try to
keep
these
beliefs
cons i s t en t , un i f i ed
b y
re la t ions
o f
exp lana to ry coherence ,
and
so on.
R o ug h l y ,
t h e n ,
the ep i s temology of these beliefs is as follows . A be l ie f abou t
a p a r t i cu la r op t ion A to the effect t h a t A i s , in the
f o rmal
sense, a good
th ing t o d o ,
m u s t
b e based on (1) o rd ina ry empi ri ca l
beliefs
a b o u t
A
to the
effect
t h a t
A has
s u ch -an d - s u ch n o n -n o rm a t i v e p ro p e rt ie s ,
and (2)
s ome
a t
l eas t rough general pr incip le to the effect that , at leas t typical ly and for the
mos t par t , op tions tha t have those no n-norm at ive p roper t ie s
a re
good th ings
to
do .
2
Th is rou gh general pr incip le
m u s t
in turn be based on a search for
w h a t J o h n
Rawls
(1972: 4 6 — 5 3 ) has
called
reflective e qu i l i b r ium .
This
is a
process tha t s tar t s ou t by t rea t ing one s d i spos i t ion to have a cer ta in sor t o f
desire
for cer ta in op t ions as w eak , p r ima facie ev idence that those op t ions are
in
the
fo rm al sense good th ings
t o do ;
th i s process
th n
a ims
to
f o r m ,
on the
basis
o f th i s ev idence, a max imal ly coheren t se t of rough general pr incip les
about which op t ions are ( in th i s sense) good th ings to
do.
27
This
is
on ly
a
rough ske tch
of
th i s ep i s t emolog ica l accoun t . Much more
w ou ld have to be said to m ake i t p laus ib le that th i s i s an adeq u ate ac co u nt of
the
ep i s temology
of the
re levant
beliefs. M y
main po in t he re
i s
s imply
to
a rg ue
2
Su ppo s e t ha t
one of
t hese r o u g h general pr inciples
is the
p r inc ip le tha t
(a t
least typically
and for the
m os t par t )
no
op t ion tha t
has
p r o pe r t y
P i s a
good th ing
t o do . W hy
c an t s o m eo n e
raise the
no rmat ive ques t ion aga in ,
W hy
s h o u l d
I (at
least
for the
mos t par t ) avo id choos ing
opt ions t ha t have proper ty P T B u t
this
pr inciple is not an i n t e r n a l r equ i r em en t of r a t i o n a l i t y It is an
external
fact a bo u t wh ich op t io ns are good things to do. So even if it is
j u s t
a basic p r inc ip le tha t
cann o t be any f u r t h e r explained, the re i s no reason to expec t tha t i t m u s t b e convinc ing to all
agents who are suff icient ly sane and in te l l igent .
W e
s h o u ld pe r haps
also
r equ i r e t ha t
i t
m u s t
be
r a t iona l
for one to
expec t tha t
a p rocess o f
fur ther ref ining this
r ou gh genera l pr inc ip le ,
a nd f u r t h e r
em pir ical inves t igat ion
o f A and the
o t h e r available opt ion s , w ou ld no t finally defeat the conclus ion t h a t A i s a good th ing to do.
2 7
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224
alph
Wedgwood
tha t it is far f rom obvious tha t no such accoun t can be developed. Once such
an a c c ou n t is developed, the f o rma l ver s ion of the recogni t ional view wil l
clearly be able to give an i n f o r m a t i v e a c c ou n t o f how ra t ional pract ical
reasoning proceeds: one f i r s t follows the rules and procedures tha t a re
specified in this epistemology to a r r ive a t r a t ional beliefs a b ou t wh a t is and
w hat is not a goo d thin g to d o; and
th n
one chooses accordingly , by choosing
an
opt ion tha t
o ne
rationally believes
to be a
good th ing
t o do .
I n s t r u m e n t a l
Reasoning
an d
Ch oos ing
in
Unc e r t a in ty
The formal version of the recogni t ional view appears, then, to have the
resources to deal both wi th Vel leman s emptiness ob jec t ion and wi th the
d e m a n d
fo r
explanat ion that
is
expressed
by
Ko rsgaard s
n o r m a t iv e
ques t ion .
But can i t
really give
a
satisfactory a c c ou n t
o f
pract ical rat ional i ty?
In
this
final
section
I
shall sk etch
a
refined version
o f
this recogni t ional view.
I
shall
try to make it plausible that this
ref ined
reco gni t iona l view gives an adeq uate
acc o un t of two crucial aspects of rat ion al pract ical reaso ning: the im po rtance
of
i n s t r u m e n t a l r e a s o n i n g
and the
c ond i t i ons
fo r
ra t ional choice
in
u n c e r t a i n t y .
A great deal
o f
practical reason ing
is
i n s trum en ta l .
O ne
s tar ts
by
consider-
ing an end
tha t
o ne
in tends
to
achieve,
a nd
th n choo ses wh ich m e a n s
to use in
o rder to achieve that e nd. Indeed, such instru m en tal reaso ning is involved in
a lmost
a ll
cases w hen pract ical reason ing leads
to
act ion. (The on ly exception
is
the
special case where
the
opt ion tha t
o ne
j u d g es
to be a
good th ing
to do
and th n cho oses is w hat A rt h u r D anto (1965) has called a basic a c t io n — t h a t
is,
som ething tha t o ne can j u s t do , wi thout having to choose any f u r t h e r
m ea n s
in
o r d e r
to do
it.)
But how can the
recogn i tional view accou nt
for the
crucial
role
o f
such ins t rum en ta l
reasoning?
To account for ins t rumenta l reasoning, the recogni t ional v iew has to be
ref ined,
in two
ways. First ,
the
fundamenta l pr inc iple
m u st be
ref ined
so
t ha t
it applies no t on ly to choices but also to i n t e n t i o n s . (A choice is a consc ious
m enta l event involving the f o r m a t io n o f an in tent ion , w hi le an in tent ion is an
enduring mental s tate that typical ly lasts unt i l
it
ei ther leads
to
act ion
or is
abando ned.) Secondly , th i s funda m en ta l princ iple
m u st b e
refined
so
that ,
fo r
an in tent ion to be correc t , it i s not eno ugh tha t one s in tended course of
ac t ion sho uld
be a
good th ing
to do; it m u st
also
be a
course
o f
act ion th at
on
w i l l a c t u a l l y c a r r y ou t if o ne i n tends to do so. The und er ly ing idea here is t ha t an
in tent ion tha t
o ne
simply will
no t
execute
is
pointless,
and to
that extent
a
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228
Ralph Wedgwood
B ut suppose that one does know for cer ta in that exac t ly o ne of these propos
itions
is tru e. M oreove r, suppose that one is also rationally certain that these
uncer ta in proposi t ions are all beyond one s co ntro l ; noth ing that one can do
can determ ine wh ich on e of these proposit ions is tru e. Finally, suppose that
each of these relevant uncertain proposit ions has a certain probabil i ty given
one s evidence. Then, we can say t ha t an option s expected shor t fa l l
f rom optim ality is the sum of the degrees to which the o ption falls shor t of
optimali ty according
to
each
o f
these relevant un cer tain proposit ions,
weighted b y the p robab il i ty of that proposit ion s being true . I propose that
it is ra t ional to choose an option if and only if that option has minimal expec ted
s h o r t f l l from optimali ty . (In effect, th is proposal about how to make choices in
unce r t a i n ty is directly modelled on expec ted u ti l it y theory except that it uses an
objective evaluative
n o t ion — shor t fa l l
f rom opt imali ty — instead of the
mo re famil iar not ion
o f a
u t i l i ty func t ion .
3 2
)
This
proposal—that
on e should always choose an op t ion wi th minimal
expected sho rtfa l l f rom opt imali ty—is a plausible gener alization of the simple
version of the rec ogn ition al view that I con sidered above. This propo sal en tails
that
if
there
are any
options such that
it is
ra t ional
for you to
have
the
ou trigh t belief that those options
are
optimal, then
it is
ra t ional
to
choose
any
of
those options. If it is ra t ional for you to have the ou trig ht belief that a
certain option is optimal, then, g iven you r evidence, the proba bil i ty that that
option
is
optimal
is 1; so the
expected shortfal l f rom optimali ty
of
such
an
option will always be 0. On the oth er ha nd , this propo sal seems a plausible
extension of the simple v ersion of the rec ogn ition al view to cases in w hich it is
not
ra t ional
to
have
an y
outright belief about which
of the
available options
will
be, one m ay
still
be
u ncer ta in whether
it is
better
for one to
perform
the first
o ption, with
a ll
of its causa l effects, or to pe r fo rm the second option, with all of its cau sal effects. This is why we
need to
focus
on uncer ta in ty abou t normative or eva lua t i ve p roposi t ions of this sor t .
I have here followed so-called causal decision t heory
(Joyce
1999:
115—18)
in relying on the
u n c o n d i t i o n l
probability of the re levant un certain proposi t ions , ra ther than on their proba bility
conditional on
one s per fo rming
th e
option
in
question . (This
is why I
have also
had to
follow
th e
causal
decision theorists
in
assuming that
the
re levant unc ertain proposi t ions
are all
beyond
one s cont rol .) If the
no t ion
of an
opt ion s shortfal l f rom
optimality
accord ing
to a
cer tain
relevant
uncer ta in proposi t ion is
identified
wi th the
difference
between i ts utility and the utility
of the opt ion that is opt imal according to that prop osi t ion , then this a c c o u n t of ra t ional choice
will actually c o i n c i d e wi th the causal version of expected uti l i ty theor y. It wou ld be a wor thwhi le
pro jec t
to
investigate w hat
the
consequenc es wou ld
be of
revising th is a ccoun t
by
relying
on
c o n d i t i o n l
probabilities (instead of unconditional probabil i t ies), and on o ther definitions of
shortfal l
f rom optimality
as well. B ut
un fo r tuna te ly
I c an n o t
carry
ou t
this
investigation here.
32
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Choosing
Rationally and Correctly 229
are
opt ima l . In such cases, you can no t choose a n opt ion such tha t i t is rat iona l
for you to have an outr ig ht bel ief in the propo si t ion th at th at o pt ion is
optimal, since ex h y p o t h e s i it is not r a t ional for you to have any such ou t r igh t
belief.
So it seems plausible tha t the best thing to d o in this case is to cho ose an
opt ion w i th minim al e x p e c t e d degree
o f
shor t fa l l f rom opt imali ty.
I f you
c anno t
aim at what you firmly believe to be optimal, you can at least aim to min im i ze
your e x p e c t t i o n o f f lling s h o r t of o pt imali ty. In this way, then, th e r ecogni t ional
view may be able to give an a dequ ate a cco un t of how i t is rat iona l to m ake
choices
i f one is uncer t a in abou t w hich of the available options are good
things
to do and
wh ich
a re
not
M any mo re r e f inement s may be necessary before the f orm al vers ion of the
recog nit ional view c an give a ful ly
satisfactory
a c c o u n t of rat ional choice. B ut
in this section I hope to have made it p lausible tha t the view has the r esources
to provide such a
satisfactory
account. Given that this view also seems to have
a
p lausible answer both
to
Kor sgaard s
n o r ma t i ve ques t ion and to Velle-
m a n s empt iness
ob jec t ion ,
i t seems to m e tha t th is view is a un iqu ely
promising approach to unders tanding prac t ical reason.