Explaining the Arab democracy deficit the role of oil and conflicts

Explaining the Arab democracy deficit the role of oil and conflicts Ibrahim Elbadawi, Samir Makdisi and Gary MilanteProf. Ghassan DeibahPrepared by: Mohammed Ghiath HASAN AGHA Outline:IntroductionDemocratization in the Arab world Assessing the Arab democracy deficitModeling the democratization processResultsDemocracy and economic growthConclusions IntroductionThe distance between world and Arab median polity scores has widened dramatically, and authoritarian regimes have thrived in the Arab region. (1960-2003). The Arab Human Development Report (UNDP and Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, 2002) state that 'There is a substantial lag between the Arab countries and other regions in terms of participatory governance, whether lasting economic growth equitable and sustainable development are possible in autocratic regimes?IntroductionThe failures of Arab authoritarian regimes to sustain earlier gains, or to at least contain mounting economic and social crises of the Arab world, have been directly linked to the non-democratic and non participatory nature of the regimes. the difficulty of managing the consequences of frequent oil shocks which affect all Arab oil and non oil-producing alike - has been linked to the lack of political institutions for mediating the conflicting interests of various social groups in a way that ensures sustainability of growth-promoting policies and maintenance of a basic social development agenda.Democratization in the Arab world The Lipset hypothesis and modernization theory in suggest that standard of living is the most robust determinant of a country's propensity to experience democracy. While countries in the Arab world enjoyed substantial economic growth between the 1960s and the 1980, it is puzzling that these gains have not been associated with increased political rights.Economic growth is necessary condition but not sufficient for political liberalization in the Arab Countries.The main factors driven the legitimacy were Arab nationalism, socialism and the declared struggle to liberate Palestine.

5Democratization in the Arab world

The graph illustrates that the Arab world has lagged behind the rest of developing world with little to no progress in political representation in the past average Arab country entered the 1960s with a polity score of -5.3.Democratization in the Arab world

Assessing the Arab democracy deficitTo describe the state of democracy in the Arab world, we consider three measures of democracy: the Gastil concept of political and civil liberties embodied the Freedom House Index; a classification system of political regimes proposed Przeworski; and the Polity IV Index of democracy.The Freedom House Index measures both political and civil liberties. Political rights refer to the extent to which the people in a regime are able to participate in the electoral process, including voting in free and fair elections, participate in political parties and organizations, competition for accountable and the impact of those offices on public policies.Assessing the Arab democracy deficit

Assessing the Arab democracy deficitA global classification of political regime for 141 countries between 1950 and1990 using more objective criteria was compiled by a team led by Przeworski and detailed in Democracy and Development (Przeworski et 2000).According to this system, a regime is classified as a dictatorship if any of the following conditions holds: the chief executive is not elected; the legislature is not elected.Polity IV Index as a measure of democracy. This measure is somewhat more objective than the Freedom House Index because it uses objective questions with a wider range of measurement and more current data than the democracy and development classifications. The Polity IV Index is based on two concepts: 'institutionalized democracy' (DEM:) and 'institutionalized autocracy' (AUT).

Assessing the Arab democracy deficit

Modeling the democratization processThe positive relationship between levels of development and democracy was advanced by Seymour Lipset and expanded upon by Robert Barro (Lipset, Barro, 1996). In this worldview, increases in the level of income result in pressures for democratization because a growing middle class demands political representation to ensure that their interests are met through the provision of public goods by the state. The modernization variableshistorical effects of colonization; religion as a foundation for the political system; cohesion, including its effect through system of governance; type and breadth of social development; oil as a source of regime-supporting finance; regional wars, international and international intervention through aid and strategic supportModeling the democratization processThe positive relationship between levels of development and democracy was advanced by Seymour Lipset and expanded upon by Robert Barro (Lipset, Barro, 1996). In this worldview, increases in the level of income result in pressures for democratization because a growing middle class demands political representation to ensure that their interests are met through the provision of public goods by the state. The modernization variableshistorical effects of colonization; religion as a foundation for the political system; cohesion, including its effect through system of governance; type and breadth of social development; oil as a source of regime-supporting finance; regional wars, international and international intervention through aid and strategic supportResults

Results

Democracy and economic growth

Democracy and economic growth

Countries with low probabilities of 'successful democratization' that attempt reforms and revert to autocracy likely experience economic unrest associated with this political reversion. Meanwhile, countries that successfully democratize, such as Thailand (1992-2002), Malaysia (1971-81), Brazil (twice, 1974-95) and Argentina (1983-93) experience higher levels of growth, perhaps in synergy with political reforms. The impact of quality of institutions and the ability to absorb exogenous shocks suggests that these shocks tended to be magnified by the inadequate capacity for conflict management found in autocratic Arab states. As the results in indicate, those countries that were able to successfully democratize in the period 1960 to. 2003 were able to halve volatility, suggesting that democratizing countries are better able to absorb economic shocks.ConclusionThe democracy deficit is identified through a significant and negative dummy Variable for Arab countries in an extended Lipsetian model of democracy that accounts for the economic, Social and historical variables assumed to be associated with democratization in the current literature.we argue that region specific factors, most notably oil and war.Arab oil dependency has been a hindrance to the region's Democracy.Arab democracy deficit appears to be uniquely associated with inter-state wars (notably the Arab-Israeli conflict) and violent conflicts.Arab democracy deficit may very well be attribute able to the large reliance on oil and on the Low participation of women in the economy.

ConclusionA major reason for the collapse of economic growth in the Arab region has been the poor capacity of the Arab countries to manage conflicts following external shocks suffered in the region.Credible economic argument for democratization in the Arab world. Indeed, greater diversification of Arab economies associated with accelerated growth would help to reduce the impact of external shocks, minimizing the pressure on Arab states to manage domestic social conflicts and saving on economic costs.