Executive Secretary v. CA, 429 scra 781, GR 131719 May 25, 2004

7/24/2019 Executive Secretary v. CA, 429 scra 781, GR 131719 May 25, 2004

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PHILIPPINE SUPREMECOURT DECISIONS

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 131719 : May 25,2004]

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE,

THE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND

EMPLOYMENT, AND THESECRETARY OF FOREIGN

AFFAIRS, OWWAADMINISTRATOR, and POEAADMINISTRATOR,Petitioners,

v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALSand ASIAN RECRUITMENT

COUNCIL PHILIPPINE CHAPTER(ARCO-PHIL.), INC.,

representing its members:

Worldcare ServicesInternationale, Inc., Steadfast

International RecruitmentCorporation, Dragon

International ManpowerServices Corporation, Verdant

Manpower MobilizationCorporation, Brent Overseas

Personnel, Inc., ARL ManpowerServices, Inc., Dahlzhen

International Services, Inc.,Interworld Placement Center,

Inc., Lakas Tao ContractServices, Ltd. Co., and SSCMultiservices,Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CALLEJO, SR.,J.:
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In this Petition for ReviewonCertiorari, the ExecutiveSecretary of the President of thePhilippines, the Secretary of Justice,the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, theSecretary of Labor and Employment,the POEA Administrator and theOWWA Administrator, through theOffice of the Solicitor General, assail

the Decision1 of the Court ofAppeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 38815

affirming the Order2of the RegionalTrial Court of Quezon City datedAugust 21, 1995 in Civil Case No. Q-95-24401, granting the plea of thepetitioners therein for a writ ofpreliminary injunction and of the

writ of preliminary injunction issuedby the trial court on August 24,1995.

The Antecedents

Republic Act No. 8042, otherwiseknown as the Migrant Workers andOverseas Filipinos Act of 1995, tookeffect on July 15, 1995. TheOmnibus Rules and RegulationsImplementing the Migrant Workersand Overseas Filipino Act of 1995was, thereafter, published in theApril 7, 1996 issue of the ManilaBulletin. However, even before thelaw took effect, the AsianRecruitment Council PhilippineChapter, Inc. (ARCO-Phil.) filed, onJuly 17, 1995, a petition fordeclaratory relief under Rule 63 of

the Rules of Court with the RegionalTrial Court of Quezon City to declareas unconstitutional Section 2,paragraph (g), Section 6,paragraphs (a) to (j), (l) and (m),Section 7, paragraphs (a) and (b),and Sections 9 and 10 of the law,with a plea for the issuance of atemporary restraining order and/orwrit of preliminary injunction
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enjoining the respondents thereinfrom enforcing the assailedprovisions of the law.

In a supplement to its petition, theARCO-Phil. alleged that Rep. Act No.8042 was self-executory and that noimplementing rules were needed. It

prayed that the court issue atemporary restraining order toenjoin the enforcement of Section 6,paragraphs (a) to (m) on illegalrecruitment, Section 7 on penaltiesfor illegal recruitment, and Section 9on venue of criminal actions forillegal recruitments,viz: r bl r lllbr r

Viewed in the light of the foregoing

discussions, there appears to beurgent an imperative need for thisHonorable Court to maintain thestatus quo by enjoining theimplementation or effectivity of thequestioned provisions of RA 8042,by way of a restraining orderotherwise, the member recruitmentagencies of the petitioner will suffergrave or irreparable damage or

injury. With the effectivity of RA8042, a great majority of the dulylicensed recruitment agencies havestopped or suspended theiroperations for fear of beingprosecuted under the provisions of alaw that are unjust andunconstitutional. This HonorableCourt may take judicial notice of thefact that processing of deployment

papers of overseas workers for thepast weeks have come to a standstillat the POEA and this has affectedthousands of workers everyday justbecause of the enactment of RA8042.Indeed, this has far reachingeffects not only to survival of theoverseas manpower supply industryand the active participatingrecruitment agencies, the countrys


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economy which has survived mainlydue to the dollar remittances of theoverseas workers but moreimportantly, to the poor and theneedy who are in dire need ofincome-generating jobs which canonly be obtained from abroad. Theloss or injury that the recruitmentagencies will suffer will then beimmeasurable and irreparable. As ofnow, even foreign employers havealready reduced their manpowerrequirements from the Philippinesdue to their knowledge that RA 8042prejudiced and adversely affected

the local recruitment agencies.3r ll

On August 1, 1995, the trial courtissued a temporary restraining ordereffective for a period of only twenty(20) days therefrom.

After the petitioners filed theircomment on the petition, the ARCO-Phil. filed an amended petition, theamendments consisting in theinclusion in the caption thereofeleven (11) other corporations

which it alleged were its membersand which it represented in the suit,and a plea for a temporaryrestraining order enjoining therespondents from enforcing Section6 subsection (i), Section 6subsection (k) and paragraphs 15and 16 thereof, Section 8, Section10, paragraphs 1 and 2, andSections 11 and 40 of Rep. Act No.

8042.

The respondent ARCO-Phil. assailedSection 2(g) and (i), Section 6subsection (a) to (m), Section 7(a)to (b), and Section 10 paragraphs(1) and (2), quoted as follows: r bl r lllbr r

(g) THE STATE RECOGNIZES THATTHE ULTIMATE PROTECTION TO ALL
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MIGRANT WORKERS IS THEPOSSESSION OF SKILLS. PURSUANTTO THIS AND AS SOON ASPRACTICABLE, THE GOVERNMENTSHALL DEPLOY AND/OR ALLOW THEDEPLOYMENT ONLY OF SKILLED

FILIPINO WORKERS.4

Sec. 2 subsection (i, 2nd par.)

Nonetheless, the deployment ofFilipino overseas workers, whetherland-based or sea-based, by localservice contractors and manningagents employing them shall beencourages (sic). Appropriateincentives may be extended tothem.

II. ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT

SEC. 6. Definition. For purposes ofthis Act, illegal recruitment shallmean any act of canvassing,enlisting, contracting, transporting,utilizing, hiring, or procuringworkers and includes referring,contract services, promising or

advertising for employment abroad,whether for profit or not, whenundertaken by a non-licensee ornon-holder of authoritycontemplated under Article 13(f) ofPresidential Decree No. 442, asamended, otherwise known as theLabor Code of the Philippines:Provided, That any such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any

manner, offers or promises for a feeemployment abroad to two or morepersons shall be deemed soengaged.It shall, likewise, includethe following acts, whethercommitted by any person, whether anon-licensee, non-holder, licenseeor holder of authority: r bl r lllbr r

(a) To charge or accept directly or


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indirectly any amount greater thanthat specified in the schedule ofallowable fees prescribed by theSecretary of Labor and Employment,or to make a worker pay anyamount greater than that actuallyreceived by him as a loan oradvancechanr obles vir t u allawlibr ar y

(b) To furnish or publish any falsenotice or information or document inrelation to recruitment oremploymentchanr obles vir t uallawlibr ar y

(c) To give any false notice,testimony, information or documentor commit any act ofmisrepresentation for the purpose of

securing a license or authority underthe Labor Codec h an r obles vir t u allawlibr ar y

(d) To induce or attempt to induce aworker already employed to quit hisemployment in order to offer himanother unless the transfer isdesigned to liberate a worker fromoppressive terms and conditions ofemploymentchanr obles vir t uallawlibr ar y

(e) To influence or attempt toinfluence any person or entity not toemploy any worker who has notapplied for employment through hisagencyc h an r obles vir t u allawlibr ar y

(f) To engage in the recruitment orplacement of workers in jobsharmful to public health or moralityor to the dignity of the Republic ofthe Philippinesc h an r obles vir t u allawlibr ar y

(g) To obstruct or attempt toobstruct inspection by the Secretaryof Labor and Employment or by hisduly authorized representativechanr obles vir t uallawlibr ar y

(h) To fail to submit reports on thestatus of employment, placementvacancies, remittance of foreign


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exchange earnings, separation fromjobs, departures and such othermatters or information as may berequired by the Secretary of Laborand Employmentchanr obles vir t uallawlibr ar y

(i) To substitute or alter to theprejudice of the worker,

employment contracts approved andverified by the Department of Laborand Employment from the time ofactual signing thereof by the partiesup to and including the period of theexpiration of the same without theapproval of the Department of Laborand Employmentchanr obles vir t uallawlibr ar y

(j) For an officer or agent of a

recruitment or placement agency tobecome an officer or member of theBoard of any corporation engaged intravel agency or to be engageddirectly or indirectly in themanagement of a travel agencychanr obles vir t u allawlibr ar y

(k) To withhold or deny traveldocuments from applicant workersbefore departure for monetary or

financial considerations other thanthose authorized under the LaborCode and its implementing rules andregulationschanr obles vir t u allawlibr ar y

(l) Failure to actually deploy withoutvalid reason as determined by theDepartment of Labor andEmployment andc r alawlibr ar y

(m) Failure to reimburse expensesincurred by the worker in connectionwith his documentation andprocessing for purposes ofdeployment, in cases where thedeployment does not actually takeplace without the workersfault.Illegal recruitment whencommitted by a syndicate or in largescale shall be considered an offenseinvolving economic sabotage.


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Illegal recruitment is deemedcommitted by a syndicate if carriedout by a group of three (3) or morepersons conspiring or confederatingwith one another. It is deemedcommitted in large scale ifcommitted against three (3) or morepersons individually or as a group.

The persons criminally liable for theabove offenses are the principals,accomplices and accessories. Incase of juridical persons, the officershaving control, management ordirection of their business shall beliable.

SEC. 7. Penalties.

(a) Any person found guilty of illegalrecruitment shall suffer the penaltyof imprisonment of not less than six(6) years and one (1) day but notmore than twelve (12) years and afine of not less than two hundredthousand pesos (P200,000.00) normore than five hundred thousandpesos (P500,000.00).

(b) The penalty of life imprisonmentand a fine of not less than fivehundred thousand pesos(P500,000.00) nor more than onemillion pesos (P1,000,000.00) shallbe imposed if illegal recruitmentconstitutes economic sabotage asdefined herein.

Provided, however, That themaximum penalty shall be imposedif the person illegally recruited isless than eighteen (18) years of ageor committed by a non-licensee ornon-holder of authority.

Sec. 8.

Prohibition on Officials andEmployees. It shall be unlawful for


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any official or employee of theDepartment of Labor andEmployment, the PhilippineOverseas EmploymentAdministration (POEA), or theOverseas Workers WelfareAdministration (OWWA), or theDepartment of Foreign Affairs, orother government agencies involvedin the implementation of this Act, ortheir relatives within the fourth civildegree of consanguinity or affinity,to engage, directly or indirectly, inthe business of recruiting migrantworkers as defined in this Act. Thepenalties provided in the immediatepreceding paragraph shall beimposed upon them.(underscoringsupplied)r llbr r

Sec. 10, pars. 1 & 2.

Money Claims.Notwithstanding anyprovision of law to the contrary, theLabor Arbiters of the National LaborRelations Commission (NLRC) shallhave the original and exclusive

jurisdiction to hear and decide,

within ninety (90) calendar daysafter the filing of the complaint, theclaims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue ofany law or contract involving Filipinoworkers for overseas deploymentincluding claims for actual, moral,exemplary and other forms ofdamages.

The liability of theprincipal/employer and therecruitment/placement agency forany and all claims under this sectionshall be joint and several. Thisprovision shall be incorporated inthe contract for overseasemployment and shall be a conditionprecedent for its approval. Theperformance bond to be filed by the


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recruitment/placement agency, asprovided by law, shall be answerablefor all money claims or damagesthat may be awarded to theworkers. If therecruitment/placement agency is a

juridical being, the corporate officersand directors and partners as thecase may be, shall themselves be

jointly and solidarily liable with thecorporation or partnership for theaforesaid claims and damages.

SEC. 11. Mandatory Periods forResolution of Illegal RecruitmentCases. The preliminaryinvestigations of cases under thisAct shall be terminated within a

period of thirty (30) calendar daysfrom the date of their filing. Wherethe preliminary investigation isconducted by a prosecution officerand aprima facie case is established,the corresponding information shallbe filed in court within twenty-four(24) hours from the termination ofthe investigation. If the preliminaryinvestigation is conducted by a

judge and aprima facie case is foundto exist, the correspondinginformation shall be filed by theproper prosecution officer withinforty-eight (48) hours from the dateof receipt of the records of the case.

The respondent averred that theaforequoted provisions of Rep. ActNo. 8042 violate Section 1, Article

III of the Constitution.5 According tothe respondent, Section 6(g) and (i)discriminated against unskilledworkers and their families and, assuch, violated the equal protectionclause, as well as Article II, Section

126 and Article XV, Sections 17 and

3(3) of the Constitution.8 As the lawencouraged the deployment ofskilled Filipino workers, only
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overseas skilled workers are grantedrights. The respondent stressed thatunskilled workers also have the rightto seek employment abroad.According to the respondent, theright of unskilled workers to dueprocess is violated because they areprevented from finding employmentand earning a living abroad. Itcannot be argued that skilledworkers are immune from abuses byemployers, while unskilled workersare merely prone to such abuses. Itwas pointed out that both skilledand unskilled workers are subjectedto abuses by foreign employers.Furthermore, the prohibition of thedeployment of unskilled workersabroad would only encourage fly-by-night illegal recruiters.

According to the respondent, thegrant of incentives to servicecontractors and manning agenciesto the exclusion of all other licensedand authorized recruiters is aninvalid classification.Licensed andauthorized recruiters are thus

deprived of their right to propertyand due process and to the equalityof the person. It is understandablefor the law to prohibit illegalrecruiters, but to discriminateagainst licensed and registeredrecruiters is unconstitutional.

The respondent, likewise, allegedthat Section 6, subsections (a) to

(m) is unconstitutional becauselicensed and authorized recruitmentagencies are placed on equal footingwith illegal recruiters.It contendedthat while the Labor Codedistinguished between recruiterswho are holders of licenses and non-holders thereof in the imposition ofpenalties, Rep. Act No. 8042 doesnot make any distinction. The


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penalties in Section 7(a) and (b)being based on an invalidclassification are, therefore,repugnant to the equal protectionclause, besides being excessivehence, such penalties are violativeof Section 19(1), Article III of the

Constitution.

9

It was also pointedout that the penalty forofficers/officials/employees ofrecruitment agencies who are foundguilty of economic sabotage orlarge-scale illegal recruitment underRep. Act No. 8042 is lifeimprisonment. Since recruitmentagencies usually operate with amanpower of more than three

persons, such agencies are forced toshut down, lest their officers and/oremployees be charged with largescale illegal recruitment or economicsabotage and sentenced to lifeimprisonment. Thus, the penaltyimposed by law, beingdisproportionate to the prohibitedacts, discourages the business oflicensed and registered recruitmentagencies.

The respondent also posited thatSection 6(m) and paragraphs (15)and (16), Sections 8, 9 and 10,paragraph 2 of the law violateSection 22, Article III of the

Constitution10prohibiting ex-postfactolaws and bills of attainder. Thisis because the provisions presumethat a licensed and registeredrecruitment agency is guilty ofillegal recruitment involvingeconomic sabotage, upon a findingthat it committed any of theprohibited acts under thelaw.Furthermore, officials,employees and their relatives arepresumed guilty of illegalrecruitment involving economicsabotage upon such finding that


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they committed any of the saidprohibited acts.

The respondent further argued thatthe 90-day period in Section 10,paragraph (1) within which a laborarbiter should decide a money claimis relatively short, and could deprive

licensed and registered recruiters oftheir right to due process. Theperiod within which the summonsand the complaint would be servedon foreign employees and,thereafter, the filing of the answerto the complaint would take morethan 90 days. This would therebyshift on local licensed andauthorized recruiters the burden of

proving the defense of foreignemployers. Furthermore, therespondent asserted, Section 10,paragraph 2 of the law, whichprovides for the joint and severalliability of the officers andemployees, is a bill of attainder anda violation of the right of the saidcorporate officers and employees todue process. Considering that such

corporate officers and employees actwith prior approval of the board ofdirectors of such corporation, theyshould not be liable, jointly andseverally, for such corporate acts.

The respondent asserted that thefollowing provisions of the law areunconstitutional: r bl r lllbr r

SEC. 9. Venue. A criminal actionarising from illegal recruitment asdefined herein shall be filed with theRegional Trial Court of the provinceor city where the offense wascommitted or where the offendedparty actually resides at the time ofthe commission of theoffense: Provided, That the courtwhere the criminal action is first


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filed shall acquire jurisdiction to theexclusion of other courts:Provided,however, That the aforestatedprovisions shall also apply to thosecriminal actions that have alreadybeen filed in court at the time of theeffectivity of this Act.

SEC. 10. Money Claims.Notwithstanding any provision of lawto the contrary, the Labor Arbitersof the National Labor RelationsCommission (NLRC) shall have theoriginal and exclusive jurisdiction tohear and decide, within ninety (90)calendar days after the filing of thecomplaint, the claims arising out ofan employer-employee relationship

or by virtue of any law or contractinvolving Filipino workers foroverseas deployment includingclaims for actual, moral, exemplaryand other forms of damages.

Sec. 40.

The departments and agenciescharged with carrying out the

provisions of this Act shall, withinninety (90) days after the effectiviyof this Act, formulate the necessaryrules and regulations for its effectiveimplementation.

According to the respondent, thesaid provisions violate Section 5(5),Article VIII of the

Constitution11 because they impair

the power of the Supreme Court topromulgate rules of procedure.

In their answer to the petition, thepetitioners alleged, inter alia, that(a) the respondent has no cause ofaction for a declaratory relief (b)the petition was premature as therules implementing Rep. Act No.8042 not having been released as


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yet (c) the assailed provisions donot violate any provisions of theConstitution and, (d) the law wasapproved by Congress in theexercise of the police power of theState. In opposition to therespondents plea for injunctiverelief, the petitioners averredthat: r bl r lllbr r

As earlier shown, the amendedpetition for declaratory relief isdevoid of merit for failure ofpetitioner to demonstrateconvincingly that the assailed law isunconstitutional, apart from thedefect and impropriety of thepetition. One who attacks a statute,

alleging unconstitutionality mustprove its invalidity beyondreasonable doubt (Caleon v. AgusDevelopment Corporation, 207SCRA 748). All reasonable doubtsshould be resolved in favor of theconstitutionality of a statute (Peoplev. Vera, 65 Phil. 56). Thispresumption of constitutionality isbased on the doctrine of separation

of powers which enjoin upon eachdepartment a becoming respect forthe acts of the other departments(Garcia v. Executive Secretary, 204SCRA 516 [1991]). Necessarily, theancillary remedy of a temporaryrestraining order and/or a writ ofpreliminary injunction prayed formust fall. Besides, an act oflegislature approved by the

executive is presumed to be withinconstitutional bounds (NationalPress Club v. Commission on

Elections, 207 SCRA 1). 12r ll

After the respective counsels of theparties were heard on oralarguments, the trial court issued onAugust 21, 1995, an order grantingthe petitioners plea for a writ of


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preliminary injunction upon a bondof P50,000. The petitioner postedthe requisite bond and on August24, 1995, the trial court issued awrit of preliminary injunctionenjoining the enforcement of thefollowing provisions of Rep. Act No.8042 pending the termination of theproceedings: r bl r lllbr r

Section 2, subsections (g) and (i,2nd par.) Section 6, subsections(a) to (m), and pars. 15 & 16Section 7, subsections (a) & (b)Section 8 Section 9 Section 10pars. 1 & 2 Section 11 and Section40 of Republic Act No. 8042,otherwise known as the Migrant

Workers and Overseas Filipinos Actof 1995.13r ll

The petitioners filed a Petitionfor Certiorari with the Court ofAppeals assailing the order and thewrit of preliminary injunction issuedby the trial court on the followinggrounds: r bl r lllbr r

1.Respondent ARCO-PHIL. hadutterly failed to show its clearright/s or that of its member-agencies to be protected by theinjunctive relief and/or violation ofsaid rights by the enforcement ofthe assailed sections of R.A.8042chanr obles vir t u allawlibr ar y

2.Respondent Judge fixed aP50,000

injunction bond which is grosslyinadequate to answer for thedamage which petitioner-officialsmay sustain, should respondentARCO-PHIL. be finally adjudged as

not being entitled thereto.14r ll

The petitioners asserted that therespondent is not the real party-in-interest as petitioner in the trial


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court.It is inconceivable how therespondent, a non-stock and non-profit corporation, could sustaindirect injury as a result of theenforcement of the law. Theyargued that if, at all, any damagewould result in the implementationof the law, it is the licensed andregistered recruitment agenciesand/or the unskilled Filipino migrantworkers discriminated against whowould sustain the said injury ordamage, not the respondent. Therespondent, as petitioner in the trialcourt, was burdened to adducepreponderant evidence of suchirreparable injury, but failed to doso. The petitioners further insistedthat the petition a quo waspremature since the rules andregulations implementing the lawhad yet to be promulgated whensuch petition was filed. Finally, thepetitioners averred that therespondent failed to establish therequisites for the issuance of a writof preliminary injunction against theenforcement of the law and therules and regulations issuedimplementing the same.

On December 5, 1997, the appellatecourt came out with a four-pagedecision dismissing the petition andaffirming the assailed order and writof preliminary injunction issued bythe trial court. The appellate court,likewise, denied the petitioners

motion for reconsideration of thesaid decision.

The petitioners now come to thisCourt in a Petition for Reviewon Certiorari on the followinggrounds: r bl r lllbr r

1.Private respondent ARCO-PHIL.had utterly failed to show its clear


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right/s or that of its member-agencies to be protected by theinjunctive relief and/or violation ofsaid rights by the enforcement ofthe assailed sections of R.A.8042chanr obles vir t u allawlibr ar y

2.The P50,000 injunction bond fixed

by the court a quo and sustained bythe Court of Appeals is grosslyinadequate to answer for thedamage which petitioners-officialsmay sustain, should privaterespondent ARCO-PHIL. be finallyadjudged as not being entitled

thereto.15r ll

On February 16, 1998, this Court

issued a temporary restraining orderenjoining the respondents fromenforcing the assailed order and writof preliminary injunction.

The Issues

The core issue in this case iswhether or not the trial courtcommitted grave abuse of its

discretion amounting to excess orlack of jurisdiction in issuing theassailed order and the writ ofpreliminary injunction on a bond ofonlyP50,000 and whether or not theappellate court erred in affirmingthe trial courts order and the writ ofpreliminary injunction issued by it.

The petitioners contend that the

respondent has no locus standi.It isa non-stock, non-profitorganization hence, not the realparty-in-interest as petitioner in theaction. Although the respondentfiled the petition in the RegionalTrial Court in behalf of licensed andregistered recruitment agencies, itfailed to adduce in evidence acertified copy of its Articles of


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Incorporation and the resolutions ofthe said members authorizing it torepresent the said agencies in theproceedings. Neither is the suit ofthe respondent a class suit so as tovest in it a personality to assail Rep.Act No. 8042 the respondent isservice-oriented while therecruitment agencies it purports torepresent are profit-oriented. Thepetitioners assert that the law ispresumed constitutional and, assuch, the respondent was burdenedto make a case strong enough toovercome such presumption andestablish a clear right to injunctiverelief.

The petitioners bewail theP50,000bond fixed by the trial court for theissuance of a writ of preliminaryinjunction and affirmed by theappellate court. They assert that theamount is grossly inadequate toanswer for any damages that thegeneral public may suffer by reasonof the non-enforcement of theassailed provisions of the law. The

trial court committed a grave abuseof its discretion in granting therespondents plea for injunctiverelief, and the appellate court erredin affirming the order and the writ ofpreliminary injunction issued by thetrial court.

The respondent, for its part, assertsthat it has duly established its locus

standiand its right to injunctive reliefas gleaned from its pleadings andthe appendages thereto. UnderSection 5, Rule 58 of the Rules ofCourt, it was incumbent on thePetitioners, as respondents in theRTC, to show cause why noinjunction should issue.It avers thatthe injunction bond posted by therespondent was more than adequate


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to answer for any injury or damagethe petitioners may suffer, if any, byreason of the writ of preliminaryinjunction issued by the RTC. In anyevent, the assailed provisions ofRep. Act No. 8042 exposed itsmembers to the immediate andirreparable damage of beingdeprived of their right to a livelihoodwithout due process, a propertyright protected under theConstitution.

The respondent contends that thecommendable purpose of the law toeradicate illegal recruiters shouldnot be done at the expense and tothe prejudice of licensed and

authorized recruitment agencies.The writ of preliminary injunctionwas necessitated by the greatnumber of duly licensed recruitmentagencies that had stopped orsuspended their business operationsfor fear that their officers andemployees would be indicted andprosecuted under the assailedoppressive penal provisions of the

law, and meted excessivepenalties.The respondent, likewise,urges that the Court should take

judicial notice that the processing ofdeployment papers of overseasworkers have come to a virtualstandstill at the POEA.

The Courts Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

The Respondent Has Locus Standi

To File the Petition in the RTC in

Representation of the Eleven

Licensed and Registered

Recruitment Agencies Impleaded


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in the Amended Petition

The modern view is that anassociation has standing to complainof injuries to its members. This viewfuses the legal identity of anassociation with that of its

members.16 An association hasstanding to file suit for its workersdespite its lack of direct interest ifits members are affected by theaction. An organization has standingto assert the concerns of its

constituents.17r ll

In Telecommunications andBroadcast Attorneys of thePhilippines v. Commission on

Elections ,18 we held thatstanding jus tertii would berecognized only if it can be shownthat the party suing has somesubstantial relation to the thirdparty, or that the right of the thirdparty would be diluted unless theparty in court is allowed to espousethe third partys constitutionalclaims.

In this case, the respondent filed thepetition for declaratory relief underRule 64 of the Rules of Court for andin behalf of its eleven (11) licensedand registered recruitment agencieswhich are its members, and whichapproved separate resolutionsexpressly authorizing therespondent to file the said suit forand in their behalf. We note that,under its Articles of Incorporation,the respondent was organized forthe purposes inter alia of promotingand supporting the growth anddevelopment of the manpowerrecruitment industry, both in thelocal and international levelsproviding, creating and exploringemployment opportunities for the
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exclusive benefit of its generalmembership enhancing andpromoting the general welfare andprotection of Filipino workersand, to act as the representative ofany individual, company, entity orassociation on matters related to themanpower recruitment industry, andto perform other acts and activitiesnecessary to accomplish the

purposes embodied therein. Therespondent is, thus, the appropriateparty to assert the rights of itsmembers, because it and itsmembers are in every practicalsense identical. The respondentasserts that the assailed provisionsviolate the constitutional rights of itsmembers and the officers andemployees thereof. The respondentis but the medium through which itsindividual members seek to makemore effective the expression oftheir voices and the redress of their

grievances.19r ll

However, the respondent hasno locus standi to file the petition forand in behalf of unskilled workers.We note that it even failed toimplead any unskilled workers in itspetition. Furthermore, in failing toimplead, as parties-Petitioners, theeleven licensed and registeredrecruitment agencies it claimed torepresent, the respondent failed to

comply with Section 2 of Rule 6320ofthe Rules of Court. Nevertheless,since the eleven licensed andregistered recruitment agencies forwhich the respondent filed the suitare specifically named in thepetition, the amended petition isdeemed amended to avoid

multiplicity of suits.21r ll

The Assailed Order and Writ of
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Preliminary Injunction Is Mooted

By Case Law

The respondent justified its plea forinjunctive relief on the allegation inits amended petition that itsmembers are exposed to the

immediate and irreparable danger ofbeing deprived of their right to alivelihood and other constitutionalrights without due process, on itsclaim that a great number of dulylicensed recruitment agencies havestopped or suspended theiroperations for fear that (a) theirofficers and employees would beprosecuted under the unjust and

unconstitutional penal provisions ofRep. Act No. 8042 and metedequally unjust and excessivepenalties, including lifeimprisonment, for illegal recruitmentand large scale illegal recruitmentwithout regard to whether therecruitment agencies involved arelicensed and/or authorized and, (b)if the members of the respondent,

which are licensed and authorized,decide to continue with theirbusinesses, they face the stigmaand the curse of being labeled illegalrecruiters.In granting therespondents plea for a writ ofpreliminary injunction, the trial courtheld, without stating the factual andlegal basis therefor, that theenforcement of Rep. Act No.

8042, pendente lite, would causegrave and irreparable injury to therespondent until the case is decidedon its merits.

We note, however, that since Rep.Act No. 8042 took effect on July 15,1995, the Court had, in a catena ofcases, applied the penal provisionsin Section 6, including paragraph


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(m) thereof, and the last twoparagraphs therein defining largescale illegal recruitment committedby officers and/or employees ofrecruitment agencies by themselvesand in connivance with privateindividuals, and imposed thepenalties provided in Section 7thereof, including the penalty of life

imprisonment.22 The Informationstherein were filed after preliminaryinvestigations as provided for inSection 11 of Rep. Act No. 8042 andin venues as provided for in Section9 of the said act. In People v.

Chowdury ,23 we held that illegalrecruitment is a crime of economic

sabotage and must be enforced.

In People v. Diaz ,24 we held thatRep. Act No. 8042 is but anamendment of the Labor Code ofthe Philippines and is not an ex-postfacto law because it is not appliedretroactively. InJMM Promotion andManagement, Inc. v. Court of

Appeals ,25the issue of the extent of

the police power of the State toregulate a business, profession orcalling vis--visthe equal protectionclause and the non-impairmentclause of the Constitution wereraised and we held, thus: r bl r lllbr r

A profession, trade or calling is aproperty right within the meaning ofour constitutional guarantees. One

cannot be deprived of the right towork and the right to make a livingbecause these rights are propertyrights, the arbitrary andunwarranted deprivation of whichnormally constitutes an actionablewrong.

Nevertheless, no right is absolute,and the proper regulation of aprofession, calling, business or trade
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has always been upheld as alegitimate subject of a valid exerciseof the police power by the stateparticularly when their conductaffects either the execution oflegitimate governmental functions,the preservation of the State, thepublic health and welfare and publicmorals. According to the maxim, sicutere tuo ut alienum non laedas, itmust of course be within thelegitimate range of legislative actionto define the mode and manner inwhich every one may so use his ownproperty so as not to pose injury tohimself or others.

In any case, where the liberty

curtailed affects at most the rightsof property, the permissible scope ofregulatory measures is certainlymuch wider. To pretend thatlicensing or accreditationrequirements violates the dueprocess clause is to ignore thesettled practice, under the mantle ofthe police power, of regulating entryto the practice of various trades or

professions. Professionals leaving forabroad are required to pass rigidwritten and practical exams beforethey are deemed fit to practice theirtrade. Seamen are required to taketests determining their seamanship.Locally, the Professional RegulationCommission has begun to requirepreviously licensed doctors andother professionals to furnish

documentary proof that they hadeither re-trained or had undertakencontinuing education courses as arequirement for renewal of theirlicenses. It is not claimed that theserequirements pose an unwarranteddeprivation of a property right underthe due process clause. So long asprofessionals and other workersmeet reasonable regulatory


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standards no such deprivationexists.

Finally, it is a futile gesture on thepart of petitioners to invoke thenon-impairment clause of theConstitution to support theirargument that the government

cannot enact the assailed regulatorymeasures because they abridge thefreedom to contract. In Philippine

Association of Service Exporters,Inc. v. Drilon, we held that [t]henon-impairment clause of theConstitution must yield to the loftierpurposes targeted by thegovernment. Equally important, intoevery contract is read provisions of

existing law, and always, areservation of the police power forso long as the agreement deals witha subject impressed with the publicwelfare.

A last point. Petitioners suggest thatthe singling out of entertainers andperforming artists under the assaileddepartment orders constitutes class

legislation which violates the equalprotection clause of theConstitution. We do not agree.

The equal protection clause isdirected principally against unduefavor and individual or classprivilege. It is not intended toprohibit legislation which is limitedto the object to which it is directed

or by the territory in which it is tooperate. It does not require absoluteequality, but merely that all personsbe treated alike under likeconditions both as to privilegesconferred and liabilities imposed. Wehave held, time and again, that theequal protection clause of theConstitution does not forbidclassification for so long as such


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classification is based on real andsubstantial differences having areasonable relation to the subject ofthe particular legislation. Ifclassification is germane to thepurpose of the law, concerns allmembers of the class, and appliesequally to present and futureconditions, the classification doesnot violate the equal protection

guarantee.26r ll

The validity of Section 6 of R.A. No.8042 which provides that employeesof recruitment agencies may becriminally liable for illegalrecruitment has been upheld

in People v. Chowdury:

27

r ll

As stated in the first sentence ofSection 6 of RA 8042, the personswho may be held liable for illegalrecruitment are the principals,accomplices and accessories. Anemployee of a company orcorporation engaged in illegalrecruitment may be held liable asprincipal, together with hisemployer, if it is shown thathe actively and consciously

participated in illegal recruitment. Ithas been held that the existence ofthe corporate entity does not shieldfrom prosecution the corporateagent who knowingly andintentionally causes the corporationto commit a crime. The corporationobviously acts, and can act, only byand through its human agents, andit is their conduct which the lawmust deter. The employee or agentof a corporation engaged in unlawfulbusiness naturally aids and abets inthe carrying on of such business andwill be prosecuted as principal if,with knowledge of the business, itspurpose and effect, he consciouslycontributes his efforts to its conduct


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and promotion, however slight his

contribution may be.28r ll

By its rulings, the Court therebyaffirmed the validity of the assailedpenal and procedural provisions ofRep. Act No. 8042, including theimposable penalties therefor. Untilthe Court, by final judgment,declares that the said provisions areunconstitutional, the enforcement ofthe said provisions cannot beenjoined.

The RTC Committed Grave Abuse

of Its Discretion Amounting to

Excess or Lack of Jurisdiction in

Issuing the Assailed Order and the

Writ of Preliminary Injunction

The matter of whether to issue awrit of preliminary injunction or notis addressed to the sound discretionof the trial court. However, if thecourt commits grave abuse of itsdiscretion in issuing the said writamounting to excess or lack of

jurisdiction, the same may benullified via a writ ofcertiorari andprohibition.

In Social Security Commission v.

Judge Bayona,29 we ruled that a lawis presumed constitutional untilotherwise declared by judicialinterpretation. The suspension ofthe operation of the law is a matterof extreme delicacy because it is aninterference with the official acts notonly of the duly electedrepresentatives of the people butalso of the highest magistrate of theland.

In Younger v. Harris, Jr.,30the
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Supreme Court of the United Statesemphasized, thus: r bl r lllbr r

Federal injunctions against statecriminal statutes, either in theirentirety or with respect to theirseparate and distinct prohibitions,are not to be granted as a matter of

course, even if such statutes areunconstitutional. No citizen ormember of the community isimmune from prosecution, in goodfaith, for his alleged criminal acts.The imminence of such aprosecution even though alleged tobe unauthorized and, hence,unlawful is not alone ground forrelief in equity which exerts its

extraordinary powers only toprevent irreparable injury to theplaintiff who seeks its aid. 752 Bealv. Missouri Pacific Railroad Corp.,312 U.S. 45, 49, 61 S.Ct. 418, 420,85 L.Ed. 577.

And similarly, in Douglas, supra, wemade clear, after reaffirming thisrule, that: r bl r lllbr r

It does not appear from the recordthat petitioners have beenthreatened with any injury otherthan that incidental to everycriminal proceeding brought lawfullyand in good faith 319 U.S., at 164,

63 S.Ct., at 881.31r ll

The possible unconstitutionality of a

statute, on its face, does not of itselfjustify an injunction against goodfaith attempts to enforce it, unlessthere is a showing of bad faith,harassment, or any other unusualcircumstance that would call for

equitable relief.32 The on its faceinvalidation of statutes has beendescribed as manifestly strongmedicine, to be employed sparingly


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and only as a last resort, and is

generally disfavored.33r ll

To be entitled to a preliminaryinjunction to enjoin the enforcementof a law assailed to beunconstitutional, the party mustestablish that it will sufferirreparable harm in the absence ofinjunctive relief and mustdemonstrate that it is likely tosucceed on the merits, or that thereare sufficiently serious questionsgoing to the merits and the balanceof hardships tips decidedly in its

favor.34 The higher standard reflectsjudicial deference toward legislation

or regulations developed throughpresumptively reasoned democraticprocesses. Moreover, an injunctionwill alter, rather than maintain,the status quo, or will provide themovant with substantially all therelief sought and that relief cannotbe undone even if the defendantprevails at a trial on the

merits.35 Considering that injunction

is an exercise of equitable relief andauthority, in assessing whether toissue a preliminary injunction, thecourts must sensitively assess allthe equities of the situation,

including the public interest.36 Inlitigations between governmentaland private parties, courts go muchfurther both to give and withholdrelief in furtherance of public

interest than they are accustomedto go when only private interests are

involved.37 Before the plaintiff maybe entitled to injunction againstfuture enforcement, he is burdenedto show some substantial

hardship.38r ll

The fear or chilling effect of theassailed penal provisions of the law
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on the members of the respondentdoes not by itself justify prohibitingthe State from enforcing themagainst those whom the Statebelieves in good faith to bepunishable under the laws: r bl r lllbr r

Just as the incidental chilling effectof such statutes does notautomatically render themunconstitutional, so the chillingeffect that admittedly can resultfrom the very existence of certainlaws on the statute books does notin itself justify prohibiting the Statefrom carrying out the important andnecessary task of enforcing theselaws against socially harmful

conduct that the State believes ingood faith to be punishable under its

laws and the Constitution.39r ll

It must be borne in mind thatsubject to constitutional limitations,Congress is empowered to definewhat acts or omissions shallconstitute a crime and to prescribe

punishments therefor.40 The poweris inherent in Congress and is partof the sovereign power of the Stateto maintain peace and order.Whatever views may be entertainedregarding the severity ofpunishment, whether one believes inits efficiency or its futility, these arepeculiarly questions of legislative

policy.41 The comparative gravity ofcrimes and whether theirconsequences are more or lessinjurious are matters for the Stateand Congress itself to

determine.42 Specification ofpenalties involves questions of

legislative policy.43r ll

Due process prohibits criminalstability from shifting the burden of
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proof to the accused, punishingwholly passive conduct, definingcrimes in vague or overbroadlanguage and failing to grant fair

warning of illegal conduct.44 Classlegislation is such legislation whichdenies rights to one which are

accorded to others, or inflicts uponone individual a more severepenalty than is imposed upon

another in like case offending.45 Billsof attainder are legislative actswhich inflict punishment onindividuals or members of aparticular group without a judicialtrial. Essential to a bill of attainderare a specification of certain

individuals or a group of individuals,the imposition of a punishment,penal or otherwise, and the lack of

judicial trial.46r ll

Penalizing unlicensed and licensedrecruitment agencies and theirofficers and employees and theirrelatives employed in governmentagencies charged with the

enforcement of the law for illegalrecruitment and imposing lifeimprisonment for those who commitlarge scale illegal recruitment is notoffensive to the Constitution. Theaccused may be convicted of illegalrecruitment and large scale illegalrecruitment only if, after trial, theprosecution is able to prove all the

elements of the crime charged.47r ll

The possibility that the officers andemployees of the recruitmentagencies, which are members of therespondent, and their relatives whoare employed in the governmentagencies charged in theenforcement of the law, would beindicted for illegal recruitment and,if convicted sentenced to life
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imprisonment for large scale illegalrecruitment, absent proof ofirreparable injury, is not sufficienton which to base the issuance of awrit of preliminary injunction tosuspend the enforcement of thepenal provisions of Rep. Act No.8042 and avert any indictments

under the law.48The normal courseof criminal prosecutions cannot beblocked on the basis of allegationswhich amount to speculations about

the future.49r ll

There is no allegation in theamended petition or evidenceadduced by the respondent that the

officers and/or employees of itsmembers had been threatened withany indictments for violations of thepenal provisions of Rep. Act No.8042. Neither is there any allegationtherein that any of its membersand/or their officers and employeescommitted any of the actsenumerated in Section 6(a) to (m)of the law for which they could be

indicted. Neither did the respondentadduce any evidence in the RTC thatany or all of its members or a greatnumber of other duly licensed andregistered recruitment agencies hadto stop their business operationsbecause of fear of indictments underSections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No.8042. The respondent merelyspeculated and surmised thatlicensed and registered recruitmentagencies would close shop and stopbusiness operations because of theassailed penal provisions of thelaw.A writ of preliminary injunctionto enjoin the enforcement of penallaws cannot be based on suchconjectures or speculations. TheCourt cannot take judicial noticethat the processing of deploymentpapers of overseas workers have


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come to a virtual standstill at thePOEA because of the assailedprovisions of Rep. Act No. 8042. Therespondent must adduce evidence toprove its allegation, and thepetitioners accorded a chance toadduce controverting evidence.

The respondent even failed toadduce any evidence to proveirreparable injury because of theenforcement of Section 10(1) (2) ofRep. Act No. 8042. Its fear orapprehension that, because of timeconstraints, its members would haveto defend foreign employees incases before the Labor Arbiter isbased on speculations. Even if true,

such inconvenience or difficulty ishardly irreparable injury.

The trial court even ignored thepublic interest involved insuspending the enforcement of Rep.Act No. 8042 vis--vis the elevenlicensed and registered recruitmentagencies represented by therespondent. In People v.

Gamboa,50 we emphasized theprimary aim of Rep. Act No.8042: r bl r lllbr r

Preliminarily, the proliferation ofillegal job recruiters and syndicatespreying on innocent people anxiousto obtain employment abroad is oneof the primary considerations thatled to the enactment ofThe Migrant

Workers and Overseas Filipinos Actof 1995. Aimed at affording greaterprotection to overseas Filipinoworkers, it is a significantimprovement on existing laws in therecruitment and placement ofworkers for overseas employment.Otherwise known as the MagnaCarta of OFWs, it broadened theconcept of illegal recruitment under


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the Labor Code and provided stifferpenalties thereto, especially thosethat constitute economicsabotage, i.e., Illegal Recruitment inLarge Scaleand Illegal Recruitment

Committed by a Syndicate.51r ll

By issuing the writ of preliminaryinjunction against thepetitioners sansany evidence, thetrial court frustrated, albeittemporarily, the prosecution ofillegal recruiters and allowed themto continue victimizing hapless andinnocent people desiring to obtainemployment abroad as overseasworkers, and blocked the attainment

of the salutary policies

52

embeddedin Rep. Act No. 8042. It bearsstressing that overseas workers,land-based and sea-based, had beenremitting to the Philippines billionsof dollars which over the years hadpropped the economy.

In issuing the writ of preliminaryinjunction, the trial court consideredparamount the interests of theeleven licensed and registeredrecruitment agencies represented bythe respondent, and capriciouslyoverturned the presumption of theconstitutionality of the assailedprovisions on the barefaced claim ofthe respondent that the assailedprovisions of Rep. Act No. 8042 areunconstitutional. The trial courtcommitted a grave abuse of itsdiscretion amounting to excess orlack of jurisdiction in issuing theassailed order and writ ofpreliminary injunction. It is for thisreason that the Court issued atemporary restraining orderenjoining the enforcement of thewrit of preliminary injunction issuedby the trial court.


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IN LIGHT OF ALL THEFOREGOING, the petition isGRANTED. The assailed decision ofthe appellate court is REVERSEDAND SET ASIDE. The Order of theRegional Trial Court dated August21, 1995 in Civil Case No. Q-95-24401 and the Writ of PreliminaryInjunction issued by it in the saidcase on August 24, 1995 areNULLIFIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Quisumbing, (Acting Chairman),Austria-Martinez, andTINGA,JJ.,concur.

Puno, (Chairman), J., on officialleave.

Endnotes:

1 Penned by AssociateJustice Jesus M. Elbiniaswith Associate JusticesHector L. Hofilea and

Omar U. Amin concurring.2 Penned by JudgeTeodoro P. Regino, whowas later promotedAssociate Justice of theCourt of Appeals.

3 Records, Vol. I, pp. 86-87.

4 Section 2, paragraph(g).

5 Section 1. No personshall be deprived of life,liberty or property withoutdue process of law, norshall any person be deniedthe equal protection of the

laws.
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6 Sec. 12. The Staterecognizes the sanctity offamily life and shallprotect and strengthen thefamily as a basicautonomous socialinstitution. It shall equallyprotect the life of themother and the life of theunborn from conception.

The natural and primaryright and duty of parentsin the rearing of the youthfor civic efficiency and thedevelopment of moralcharacter shall receive the

support of theGovernment.

7 Section 1. The Staterecognizes the Filipinofamily as the foundation ofthe nation.Accordingly, itshall strengthen itssolidarity and activelypromote its total

development.

8 Sec. 3. The State shalldefend the following:r bl r lllbr r

(3) The right of the familyto a family living wage andincome.

9 Sec. 19. (1) Excessive

fines shall not be imposed,nor cruel, degrading orinhuman punishmentinflicted. Neither shalldeath penalty be imposed,unless, for compellingreasons involving heinouscrimes, the Congresshereafter provides for it.Any death penalty already
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imposed shall be reducedtoreclusion perpetua.(Section 19, Article III ofthe Constitution.)

10 Sec. 22. No ex-postfacto law or bill ofattainder shall be enacted.

11 (5) Promulgate rulesconcerning the protectionand enforcement ofconstitutional rights,pleading, practice, andprocedure in all courts, theadmission to the practiceof law, the Integrated Bar,and legal assistance to theunderprivileged. Suchrules shall provide asimplified and inexpensiveprocedure for the speedydisposition of cases, shallbe uniform for all courts ofthe same grade, and shallnot diminish, increase, ormodify substantive rights.Rules of procedure ofspecial courts and quasi-

judicial bodies shallremain effective unlessdisapproved by theSupreme Court.

12 Records, Vol. I, p. 223.

13Id. at 235.

14 CA Rollo, p. 10.

15Rollo, p. 19.

16 W.C.M. Winston Co.,Inc. v. Bernardi, 730 F2d486 (1984), citingNACCPv. Alabama, 2 L.ed.2d1488 (1958).
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17 Maite v. Chicago Boardof Education, 415 NE2d1034 (1980), citedin DeWitt CountyTaxpayers Association v.The County Board of DeliotCounty, 445 NE2d 509

(1983).18 289 SCRA 337 (1998).

19 National Associates forthe Advancement ofColored People v. State of

Alabama,2 L.Ed.2d 1488(1958).

20

SEC. 2. Parties. Allpersons who have or claimany interest which wouldbe affected by thedeclaration shall be madeparties and no declarationshall, except as otherwiseprovided in these Rules,prejudice the rights ofpersons not parties to the

action.21 SEC. 11.Misjoinder andnon-joinder of parties.Neither misjoinder nornon-joinder of parties isground for dismissal of anaction. Parties may bedropped or added by orderof the court on motion ofany party or on its owninitiative at any stage ofthe action and on suchterms as are just. Anyclaim against a misjoinedparty may be severed andproceeded with separately.

22 People v. Navarra, 352SCRA 84 (2001) People v.Fajardo, 345 SCRA 395
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(2000)People v.Saulo,344 SCRA 605(2000) People v.Gamboa, 341 SCRA 451(2000)People v.Banzales, 336 SCRA 64(2000)People v.Ordoo,335 SCRA 331(2000) People v. Mercadode Arabia,332 SCRA 49(2000) People v.Moreno, 314 SCRA 556(1999)People v.Castillon,306 SCRA 271(1999) People v.Mercado, 304 SCRA 504(1999)People v.Peralta,283 SCRA 81(1997) People v. Ortiz-Miyake, 279 SCRA 180(1997)People v.Villas,277 SCRA 391(1997) People v.Santos, 276 SCRA 329(1997)People v. TanTiong Meng, 271 SCRA125 (1997)People v.Maozca,269 SCRA 513(1997) People v.Seoron, 267 SCRA 278(1997)People v. DeLeon,267 SCRA 644(1997) People v.Benemerito, 264 SCRA677 (1996)People v.Pabalan,262 SCRA 574(1996) People v.Calonzo, 262 SCRA 534(1996).

23 325 SCRA 572 (2000).

24 259 SCRA 441 (1996).

25 260 SCRA 319 (1996).

26Id. at 330-332.
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27Supra at note 23.

28Supra.

29 5 SCRA 126 (1962).

30 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971).

31Ibid.

32 Id. Fieger v.Thomas, 74 F.3d 740(1996).

33 Broaderick v.Oklahoma, 37 L.Ed.2d841.

34 Latino OfficersAssociation v. Safir, 170F.3d 167 (1999).

35 Forest City DalyHousing, Inc. v. Town ofNorth Hempstead, 175F.3d 144 (1999).

36

Beal v. Stern,184 F.3d117 (1999).

37 Maryland Commissionon Human Relations v.Downey Communications,Inc., 110 Md.App. 493,678 A.2d 55 (1996).

38Croselto v. State Bar ofWisconsin, 12 F.3d 396(1993).

39 Younger v. Harris, Jr.,supra.

40U.S. v. Schnell,982 F.2d216 (1992) United Statesv. Bogle,689 F.Supp. 1121(1988).
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41 United States v. Bogle,supra.

42 Collins v. Joluston, 59L.Ed. 1071 (1915).

43 Gore v. United

States, 62 L.Ed.2d 1405(1958).

44U.S. v. Schnell, supra.

45State v. Murray,175 NE666 (1919).

46 Misolas v. Panga, 181SCRA 648 (1990).

47 The essential elementsfor illegal recruitmentare: r bl r lllbr r

(1) the offenderundertakes either anyactivity within themeaning of recruitmentand placement definedunder Art. 13(b), or any ofthe prohibited practicesenumerated under Article34 of the Labor Codeandc r alawlibr ar y

(2) he has no valid licenseor authority required bylaw to enable one tolawfully engage inrecruitment and

placement of workers.[People v. Pascua, 366SCRA 505 (2001)].

The essential elements forlarge scale illegalrecruitment are: r bl r lllbr r

(1) the accused engagesin the recruitment and
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placement of workers, asdefined under Article13(b) or in any prohibitedactivities under Article 34of the Labor Codec h an r obles vir t u allawlibr ar y

(2) accused has notcomplied with theguidelines issued by theSecretary of Labor andEmployment, particularlywith respect to thesecuring of a license or anauthority to recruit anddeploy workers, whetherlocally or overseas andc r alawlibr ar y

(3) accused commits the

same against three (3) ormore persons, individuallyor as a group. [People v.Saulo, 344 SCRA 605(2000)].

48 See Beal v. PacificRailroad Corporation, 85L.Ed. 577, cited inYoungerv. Harris, Jr., supra.

49 Boyle v. Landry,27L.Ed.2d 696 (1971).

50 341 SCRA 451 (2000).

51Id. at 456-458.

52 (a) In the pursuit of anindependent foreign policy

and while consideringnational sovereignty,territorial integrity,national interest and theright to self-determinationparamount in its relationswith other states, theState shall, at all times,uphold the dignity of itscitizens whether in country
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or overseas, in general,and Filipino migrantworkers, in particular.

(b) The State shall affordfull protection to labor,local and overseas,organized andunorganized, and promotefull employment andequality of employmentopportunities for all.Towards this end, theState shall provideadequate and timelysocial, economic and legalservices to Filipino migrantworkers.

(c) While recognizing thesignificant contribution ofFilipino migrant workers tothe national economythrough their foreignexchange remittances, theState does not promoteoverseas employment as ameans to sustain

economic growth andachieve nationaldevelopment. Theexistence of the overseasemployment programrests solely on theassurance that the dignityand fundamental humanrights and freedoms of theFilipino citizen shall not, at

any time, be compromisedor violated. The State,therefore, shallcontinuously create localemployment opportunitiesand promote the equitabledistribution of wealth andthe benefits ofdevelopment.


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(d) The State affirms thefundamental equalitybefore the law of womenand men and thesignificant role of womenin nation-building.Recognizing thecontribution of overseasmigrant women workersand their particularvulnerabilities, the Stateshall apply gendersensitive criteria in theformulation andimplementation of policiesand programs affectingmigrant workers and thecomposition of bodiestasked for the welfare ofmigrant workers.

(e) Free access to thecourts and quasi-judicialbodies and adequate legalassistance shall not bedenied to any person byreason of poverty. In thisregard, it is imperative

that an effectivemechanism be institutedto ensure that the rightsand interest of distressedoverseas Filipinos, ingeneral, and Filipinomigrant workers, inparticular, documented orundocumented, areadequately protected and

safeguarded.

(f) The right of Filipinomigrant workers and alloverseas Filipinos toparticipate in thedemocratic decision-making processes of theState and to berepresented in institutions


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relevant to overseasemployment is recognizedand guaranteed.

(g) The State recognizesthat the ultimateprotection to all migrantworkers is the possessionof skills. Pursuant to thisand as soon aspracticable, thegovernment shall deployand/or allow thedeployment only of skilledFilipino workers.

(h) Non-governmentalorganizations, duly

recognized as legitimate,are partners of the Statein the protection of Filipinomigrant workers and inthe promotion of theirwelfare. The State shallcooperate with them in aspirit of trust and mutualrespect.

(i) Government fees andother administrative costsof recruitment,introduction, placementand assistance to migrantworkers shall be renderedfree without prejudice tothe provision of Section 36hereof.

Nonetheless, thedeployment of Filipinooverseas workers, whetherland-based or sea-based,by local servicecontractors and manningagencies employing themshall be encouraged.Appropriate incentivesmay be extended to them.


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(Records, Vol. I, p. 35.)

Documents

Executive Secretary v. CA, 429 scra 781, GR 131719 May 25, 2004