Executive Order CP

***1NC Shells1NC A-Spec ShellInterpretation: The affirmative must specify which branch of government it uses in the plan. They didnt and that is a voter because:1.Education: The affirmative robs the debate of topic specific implementation by focusing on the pros and cons of policy action by specific branches of government.2.Fairness: By not specifying the branch the affirmative can spike out of links to specific solvency argument and disadvantages predicated off of actions by specific governmental actors.3.Real World: The USFG does not implement policies. Congress passes bills, the president makes executive orders, and the Supreme Court overturns cases. No policy has gone through the entire government simultaneously.

1NC XO ShellText: The President of the United States should Executive fiat is faster than congressional and avoids separation of powersEndelman & Mehta 9 (Gary Endelman obtained a BA. History, University of Virginia, PhD in U.S. History, University of Delaware (1978), J.D., University of Houston (1984). He has practiced immigration and nationality law in Houston in private practice (1985-1995) and as the in-house immigration counsel for BP America Inc. & Cyrus D. Mehta a graduate of Cambridge University and Columbia Law School, is the Managing Member of Cyrus D. Mehta & Associates, PLLC in New York City. The firm represents corporations and individuals from around the world in a variety of areas such as business and employment immigration, family immigration, consular matters, naturalization, federal court litigation and asylum.) [The Path Less Taken: Is There An Alternative To Waiting For Comprehensive Immigration Reform? online @ http://www.ilw.com/articles/2009,0225-endelman.shtm, loghry]Dinesh Shenoy made a huge first step but it was only a first step. Is action by Congress the only, or even the best, way to break the priority date stranglehold on US immigration policy? The authors do not think so. Amendment of INA Section 245 is unlikely since action by Congress, even in the best of times, takes time. When Congress finds such time, legalization and other priority items (like recapture of unused visas) will absorb it. Beyond this, is it necessary to relax the rules on adjustment of status? What do potential immigrants really want for themselves and their spouses? The ability to work in the United States on a long-term basis and travel back home for vacation and/or family emergency. Can they only do that as adjustment applicants? Is there another way? The authors think there is. While INA Section 245 conditions adjustment of status on having a current priority date and meeting various conditions,9 there would be prohibition anywhere that would bar USCIS from allowing the beneficiary of an approved I-140 or I-130 petition to apply for an employment authorization document (EAD) and advance parole. No action by Congress would be required; executive fiat suffices. For those who want some comfort in finding a statutory basis, the government could rely on its parole authority under INA Section 212(d)(5) to grant such interim benefits either for "urgent humanitarian reasons" or "significant public benefit.10 There is nothing in 8 CFR Section 212.5 that would prohibit the DHS from granting parole for this reason on the grounds that the continued presence of I-140 or I-130 beneficiaries provide a significant public benefit. Since such parole is not a legal admission,11 there is no separation of powers argument since the Executive is not trying to change existing grounds of admission or create any new ones. Moreover, Congress appears to have provided the government with broad authority to provide work authorization to just about any non-citizen.12

Executive orders increase presidential power Risen 4 [Clay, Managing editor of Democracy: A Journal of Ideas, M.A. from the University of Chicago The Power of the Pen: The Not-So-Secret Weapon of Congress-wary Presidents The American Prospect, July 16, http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=the_power_of_the_pen]

In the modern era, executive orders have gone from being a tool largely reserved for internal White House operations -deciding how to format agency budgets or creating outlines for diplomatic protocol -- to a powerful weapon in defining, and expanding, executive power. In turn, presidents have increasingly used that power to construct and promote social policies on some of the country's most controversial issues, from civil rights to labor relations to reproductive health.

Presidential powers stabilize economy and global hotspot conflictsSouth China Morning Post 2k(staff) 12/11/2000 [Position of weakness lexis, loghry]A weak president with an unclear mandate is bad news for the rest of the world. For better or worse, the person who rules the United States influences events far beyond the shores of his own country. Both the global economy and international politics will feel the effect of political instability in the US. The first impact will be on American financial markets, which will have a ripple effect on markets and growth across the world. A weakened US presidency will also be felt in global hotspots across the world. The Middle East, the conflict between India and Pakistan, peace on the Korean peninsula, and even the way relations between China and Taiwan play out, will be influenced by the authority the next US president brings to his job. There are those who would welcome a weakening of US global influence. Many Palestinians, for example, feel they would benefit from a less interventionist American policy in the Middle East. Even within the West-ern alliance, there are those who would probably see opportunities in a weakened US presidency. France, for example, might feel that a less assertive US might force the European Union to be more outward looking. But the dangers of having a weak, insecure US presidency outweigh any benefits that it might bring. US global economic and military power cannot be wished away. A president with a shaky mandate will still command great power and influence, only he will be constrained by his domestic weakness and less certain about how to use his authority. This brings with it the risks of miscalculation and the use of US power in a way that heightens conflict. There are very few conflicts in the world today which can be solved without US influence. The rest of the world needs the United States to use its power deftly and decisively. Unfortunately, as the election saga continues, it seems increasingly unlikely that the next US president will be in a position to do so.***Solvency 2NC SolvesGeneric Executive agreements are distinct from XOs and solve the affNelson 2009 (Anne E. [J.D. Candidate, University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law, 2010]; From Muddled to Medellin: A Legal History of Sole Executive Agreements; 51 Ariz. L. Rev. 1035; kdf)Can the President of the United States unilaterally make federal law? For most students of American Government, the knee-jerk reaction to this question is an emphatic "no," as they are taught that it is the legislature's role to create laws and the President's role to see that the laws are faithfully executed. n1 Indeed, the United States' political identity depends on a delicate separation of powers that prevents the President from accumulating too much power. n2 Over time, however, the delicate separation of powers balance has shifted, and this emphatic "no" has [*1036] transformed into a more muddled "maybe," with the President's use of sole executive agreements. Sole executive agreements present a unique challenge to traditional separation of powers principles. These agreements are legal tools the President can use to unilaterally resolve foreign disputes with other countries. The Supreme Court has upheld the President's authority to enter into sole executive agreements and has broadly held that these agreements, being analogous to treaties, are fit to preempt conflicting state law. Thus, sole executive agreements are a means by which the President can sideline the legislature and unilaterally create federal law. Sole executive agreements have been used since the early days of the Republic. n3 Since the turn of the twentieth century and the rise of the United States as a global power, Presidents have aggressively used sole executive agreements to resolve significant matters of foreign policy. The expansive use of sole executive agreements has attracted debate amongst scholars as to their constitutional validity, why they have been held to preempt federal law, and, most importantly, how the preemptive effect of these agreements could be limited to better harmonize with the Supremacy Clause and traditional separation of powers principles. n4 Until recently, the Supreme Court has not provided much guidance to this debate. In a series of decisions, n5 the Supreme Court has sanctioned the use of sole executive agreements and concluded that such agreements can be considered "the supreme Law of the Land." n6 In doing so, the Court has granted sweeping power to the President to effectively create federal law through sole executive agreements without any meaningful limitations.2NC SolvesEconomic Engagemet An XO is a valid mechanism for economic engagementStephens 2008 (Beth [Rutger-Camden Law School]; CORPORATE LIABILITY FOR GRAVE BREACHES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ARTICLE: JUDICIAL DEFERENCE AND THE UNREASONABLE VIEWS OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION; 33 Brooklyn J. Int'l L. 773; kdf)The administration also asserts that human rights lawsuits undermine the executive branch's decision to use "constructive engagement" to promote reform. In an argument repeated in several corporate-defendant cases, the executive branch asserts that the "policy determination of whether to pursue a constructive engagement policy is precisely the type of foreign affairs question that is constitutionally vested in the Executive Branch and over which the courts lack institutional authority and ability to decide." n184 This statement by itself is uncontroversial. The administration proceeds, however, to a less obvious assertion that ATS accountability undermines the policy of constructive engagement, defined as U.S. efforts "to promote active economic engagement as a method of encouraging [*808] reform and gaining leverage." n185 As explained at length in a forth-coming article, the administration does not support its far-from-obvious conclusion that litigation undermines constructive engagement. n186 To the contrary, litigation might well complement a constructive engagement approach. Constructive engagement is based on the assumption that U.S.-based corporate investors will promote human rights and democracy. n187 A corporation that is complicit in genocide, summary execution, or torture offers nothing to the pursuit of constructive engagement, because its "engagement" is not "constructive."Burma proves-XOs are best for economic engagementWebb 2012 (Jim [Jim [Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs]; Senator Webb Statement on Expansion of Economic Engagement with Burma; Jul 11; votesmart.org/public-statement/722384/#.Udh-0PnviSo; kdf)"I am pleased that the administration has followed through on its commitment to expand economic engagement with Burma, also known as Myanmar. We are facing a critical window of time to push for continued reforms and political reconciliation within that country. The steps taken today will incentivize positive conduct, while ensuring that so called "bad actors' from the previous military junta or those who resist reforms will not benefit from economic relations with the United States. It is important to note that the European Union suspended all sanctions on Burma in April, except for the arms embargo, and that all major U.S. partners including Australia, Japan and Canada have suspended sanctions and are offering assistance for economic development in the country. It is essential that the United States continue to use executive authorities to ease all economic sanctions on Burma, such as suspending the ban on imports."2NC SolvesCuba An XO solves the aff and avoids the DAWashington Office on Latin America et al 2010 (Center for Democracy in the Americas and Latin America Working Group also contribute; Why President Obama should issue an executive order on travel to Cuba; Nov 24; progreso-weekly.com/ini/index.php/home/in-the-united-states/144-angelicas-eyes-on-washington-blogs/angelicas-eyes-on-washington/495-why-president-obama-should-issue-an-executive-order-on-travel-to-cuba; kdf)The administration is considering an Executive Order to be issued by the President that would broaden the scope of whats generally called people to people non-tourist travel to Cuba. This is the same authority President Obama used in April 2009 to restore the unrestricted rights of Cuban Americans to visit their families on the island. Issuing the executive order is in the economic interest, the foreign policy interest, and the national security interest of the U.S. It fulfills the Presidents commitment to seek new openings with Cuba, and encourages and responds to the processes of change going on in Cuba itself. There is broad support for these changes among U.S. organizations and constituencies. Announcing an executive order to permit more travel to Cuba and more engagement would not harm the President politically. In fact, it would strengthen the President at home and position the U.S. on the side of the Cuban people at a critical moment in their history.2NC SolvesCuba Embargo An XO can eliminate the embargoKnowles 2009 (Robert [Acting Assistant Professor, New York University School of Law]; American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs Constitution; 41 Ariz. St. L.J. 87; kdf)Realism is particularly compatible with functional methods of constitutional interpretation. The demands of realpolitik require ultimate flexibility and discretion, but formalist modes of interpretation impose absolute limits on the exercise of power. It was functionalism that enabled realism to become part of constitutional foreign affairs law. Although realist and functionalist conceptions of presidential power were expressed from the beginning - especially by Alexander Hamilton n181 - realist ideas did not begin to enter judicial discourse until the early twentieth century. The turn to realism was embodied in Curtiss-Wright, which rejected a challenge, on non-delegation grounds, to a joint resolution empowering the President to enforce a criminal prohibition on the sale of arms in the United States to countries engaged in a war in South America. n182 [*117] Under the resolution, the President could choose when to impose the embargo and when to end it, and could make exceptions to its implementation, or set limits to its terms, without congressional approval. n183 This resolution seemed like a non-starter under the courts' then-strict application of the non-delegation doctrine. n184 But the Court, drawing a clear distinction between foreign and domestic affairs in constitutional law and advancing a controversial theory of extra-constitutional powers, approved the broad delegation of power to the President and offered a paean to the practical importance of an executive-centered constitutional foreign affairs framework. n1852NC AT Cuba Relations Solvency Deficit The Counterplan is better for relations than the planWashington Office on Latin America et al 2010 (Center for Democracy in the Americas and Latin America Working Group also contribute; Why President Obama should issue an executive order on travel to Cuba; Nov 24; progreso-weekly.com/ini/index.php/home/in-the-united-states/144-angelicas-eyes-on-washington-blogs/angelicas-eyes-on-washington/495-why-president-obama-should-issue-an-executive-order-on-travel-to-cuba; kdf)Implementing the EO fulfills the Presidents commitment on policy toward Cuba In the campaign and later at the Summit of the Americas, President Obama promised to engage Cuba if Cubas government took steps to reform its economy and release political prisoners. Cuba is in the process of laying off 500,000 state workers and expanding self-employment and the small business sector in order to absorb the unemployed workers. It has also freed more than 50 political prisoners since July 2010. Issuing the Executive Order now would demonstrate recognition of the important changes taking place in Cuba and the U.S.s interest in encouraging continued reforms. It would fulfill the commitment the President made.2NC SolvesMexico Trans-border Cooperation Executive orders solve discrepancies between the US and MexicoSunstein 2012 (Cass R.; [Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs @ US Chamber of Commerce]; Eliminating Red Tape Through International Regulatory Affairs; May 1; www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/speeches/eliminating-red-tape-through-international-regulatory-cooperation.pdf; kdf)In the past decade, it has often been urged, especially by those in the business community, that economic growth and job creation can be compromised by unnecessary divergences, across nations, in regulations. There might be different requirements in Canada, Mexico, and the United States, not because of any different judgments about facts or values, but because of excessive red tape and inadequate cooperation and consultation. In an economy in which business is often done across national boundaries, diverse requirements can in turn make it more difficult for American companies to grow. In the words of President Obamas Jobs Council, Divergent requirements can create unnecessary costs, burdens and delays that hinder market access, particularly for small and medium-sized companies that rely on exports to grow their businesses and hire workers. . . . [T]he administration should seek better alignment between U.S. regulations and the well-crafted regulatory approaches of major trading partners . . . . We have been listening carefully to these suggestions. Of course we must respect domestic law and will not compromise U.S. priorities and prerogatives. But even while insisting on those priorities and prerogatives, we can eliminate pointless red tape. My principal goal here is to announce and describe a historic Executive Order, issued on this day by President Obama. The Executive Order, titled Promoting International Regulatory Cooperation, is intended to spur economic growth and job creation by eliminating trade barriers, red tape, and unnecessary differences across nations. I will spend most of my time on todays Executive Order, but let me begin with Executive Order 13563, which was signed by President Obama in January 2011, and which is designed to ensure that our regulatory system protects the public while also promoting growth, innovation, competiveness, and job creation.2NC SolvesMexico Energy AgreementsAn executive order can solve the affThe Whitehouse 2011 (Fact: Sheet: Enhancing US-Mexico Cooperation; Mar 3; www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/03/fact-sheet-enhancing-us-mexico-cooperation; kdf)During the May 2010 State Visit, President Obama and President Caldern directed the creation of a High-Level Regulatory Cooperation Council to identify areas of mutual interest for regulatory cooperation, with a focus on improving intra-North American commerce and enhancing the competitiveness of North American producers. In September, senior officials from the United States Office of Management and Budget and the Mexican Secretariat of the Economy co-chaired the first meeting of the HLRCC and discussed their shared commitment to regulatory cooperation on key issues that affect both countries. The two sides agreed to work collaboratively to share information about upcoming regulations, identify those regulations that might impede North American competitiveness, and consider joint work in specific sectors. Today, the U.S. and Mexico finalized Terms of Reference for the Council, which set out six major goals: Making regulations more compatible and simple; Increasing regulatory transparency; Promoting public participation; Improving the analysis of regulations; Linking regulatory cooperation to improved border-crossing and customs procedures; and Increasing technical cooperation. As follow-up, the Council will create a Work Plan to implement these goals. Both governments will be reviewing the Council's progress on a regular basis. Clean Energy and Climate Change: President Obama and President Caldern reaffirmed the strong commitment of both the United States and Mexico to combat global climate change and create markets for clean energy technologies. President Obama applauded President Calderns leadership on the successful outcome of the climate negotiations in Cancn, including the creation of the Green Climate Fund, a new multilateral vehicle to deliver financing to address climate change mitigation and adaptation in developing countries. The United States strongly supports Mexicos ongoing leadership in this area. The Presidents agreed to work together this year to implement the other major agreements reached in Cancn, including on transparency, technology, adaption, and forest preservation. The leaders welcomed the achievement of significant milestones under the Bilateral Framework on Clean Energy and Climate Change, including plans for cooperation on mapping of wind resources in Mexico, and wind turbine testing and design. Mexico and the United States continue to work together, with Canada, to complete by April 2012 a North American Carbon Storage Atlas under the North American Carbon Atlas Partnership (NACAP). President Caldern and President Obama noted progress on the Cross Border Electricity Task Force to promote a bilateral renewable energy market, increase grid reliability and resiliency, and make energy use more efficient in both countries. Transboundary Energy Negotiations: Today, President Obama and President Caldern reaffirmed the desire of the United States and of Mexico to conclude an agreement on transboundary reservoirs. In May 2010, the Presidents issued made a joint commitment to the safe, efficient, and equitable exploitation of transboundary reservoirs with the highest degree of safety and environmental standards, and the two governments began work on a transboundary agreement. The two leaders have acknowledged the energy security benefits to both countries of responsible stewardship and development of these resources and the high level of significance of completing such an agreement for both countries. President Obama and President Caldern both reiterated their commitment to conclude these negotiations by the end of 2011.Empirically provenXOs solve best and are better for the environmentGood Neighbor Environmental Board 2011 (The Potential Environmental and Economic Benefits of Renewable Energy Development in the US-Mexico Border Region; December; www.epa.gov/ofacmo/gneb/gneb14threport/English-GNEB-14th-Report.pdf; kdf)Several U.S. federal agencies play a role in regulating and promoting renewable energy along the border. The Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for implementing Executive Order (EO) 10485, which was amended by EO 12038. It authorizes exports of electric energy and issues Presi dential permits for the construction, operation, maintenance, and connection of electricity transmis sion facilities at the international border. Before a permit can be issued, DOE must establish that the permit is consistent with the public interest and has received favorable recommendations from the U.S. Departments of State and Defense. In determining consistency with the public interest, DOE considers the potential environmental impacts of the proposed project under the National Environ mental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), implements other relevant executive orders such as EO 13186 regarding the responsibilities of federal agencies to protect migratory birds, determines the projects impact on electric system reliability (including whether the proposed project would adversely affect the operation of the U.S. electric power supply system under normal and contingency conditions), and considers any other factors that DOE may find relevant to the public interest. DOE also finances research and development for renewable energy and energy efficiency technologies.2NC SolvesSanctions Sanctions are a tool of XOs, means they can be reversedMyo Nyun 2008 (Thihan [Fellow, Frederick K. Cox International Law Center, Case Western Reserve University School of Law and Program Officer, Uplift International]; FEELING GOOD OR DOING GOOD: INEFFICACY OF THE U.S. UNILATERAL SANCTIONS AGAINST THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF BURMA/MYANMAR; 7 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 455; kdf)The U.S. unilateral sanctions programs prohibit U.S. persons, and sometimes foreign entities controlled by U.S. firms, from conducting business and financial dealings with target countries, the governments of those countries, or entities controlled by those governments. n48 The prohibitions contained in the unilateral sanctions programs can be broadly categorized into two interconnected components: trade restrictions and financial restrictions. Trade restrictions consist of export controls, import controls, and denial of certain trade preferences. n49 Financial restrictions, on the other hand, include freezing the target country's foreign assets, banning foreign investment, and withdrawing foreign development and security assistance. n50 Most unilateral sanctions programs involve some combination of trade and financial restrictions. The sanctions are either partial or comprehensive, depending on the extent to which trade and financial relations with the target country are cut off. Authority to impose unilateral sanctions is vested in the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government. Under the executive powers, unilateral sanctions programs carried out by the United States are instituted pursuant to Presidential Executive Orders under several statutes. n51 Prior to 1977, unilateral sanctions programs were exercised under the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, which now may be invoked only during a congressionally declared war. n52 The current sanctions programs, however, derive their authority from the International [*470] Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA). n53 The IEEPA empowers the president to declare a national emergency and subsequently to impose broad economic sanctions if the President determines that "any unusual and extraordinary threat [exists] to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States." n54 Finally, unilateral sanctions can also be instituted pursuant to congressional enactment of special legislation authorizing or directing specific sanctions programs. n552NC AT Executive Lacks AuthorityExecutive orders frequently overstep the bounds of presidential authority and Congres rarely rolls them backKirk Strohman, 12/11/2008, The Legality, "Executive Orders: The power of the president's pen," http://www.thelegality.com/2008/12/11/executive-orders-the-power-of-the-presidents-pen/

While the mandate of Article II seems broad, it also limits the presidents power to only directing the actions of the executive branch. For example, orders like President Bushs likely-to-be-changed E.O. 13435 (regarding the limited use of stem cells in research) have a limited effect because they only reach government agencies, here the National Institutes of Health (NIH). At the same time, this example demonstrates that the power of an order can be greater than it appears on its face. Several private research companies depend on NIH funding, so if the government cuts off funding for a certain type of research, the private sector might not be able to continue the work on their own. By definition an executive order is issued by the executive, leaving the process relatively unchecked. The only mandate comes from Executive Order 11030, which at least forces the president to let a few lawyers from the Department of Justice and the Office of Management and Budget take a chop at it before the president can issue the order. This means that an executive order is often signed and in effect before any outside legal debate is possible. When the president abuses this power, Congress can subvert the order by passing a law to preempt it. However, this remains unlikely considering that it has happened only about 20 times in 100 years and that the president still has the power to veto the law from Congress. Since the process is largely unregulated by Congress, it is up to the courts to rule that an E.O. exceeds the presidents executive authority.2NC AT States Rollback States cannot rollback an XORutledge 2011 (Peter [Prof of Law @ U of Georgia]; Foreign state immunity at home and abroad: Samantar and Executive Power; 44 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 885; kdf)Medellin involved, among other things, a claim by the Executive Branch that, pursuant to its power to conduct foreign affairs, an executive order could displace state rules, such as the state procedural default rules in post-conviction proceedings. n108 In support of that position, the government cited the American Insurance Ass'n v. Garamendi decision, which held that a sole executive agreement displaced a California law providing for discovery from certain insurance companies and extending the statute of limitations. n109 Critical for present purposes, the Medellin Court rejected the government's reliance on Garamendi and described Garamendi in narrow terms, involving "a narrow set of circumstances: the making of executive agreements to settle civil claims between American citizens and foreign governments or foreign nationals," which enjoyed "a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned." n1102NC AT Congress Rolls back

Congress supports Obama fully, support on Israel proves.Gorenberg 9Gershom Gorenberg, political writer for southjerusalem.com, Obama isnt Blinking, and Congress Still has his Back July 2, 2009 http://southjerusalem.com/2009/07/obama-isnt-blinking-and-congress-still-has-his-back/A key reason that President Obama can avoid blinking is that Congress has his back. I spoke this morning with Rep. Robert Wexler, one of Israels most dependable supporters in Congress. The level of Congressional support for the presidents policies is substantial, and thats reflected by public statements of prominent members of Congress, he told me. I also spoke this week with a foreign policy aide to a key senator. He gave the same assessment: The president has a great deal of confidence and support from Congress.Congress has shown repeated inaction on rolling back XOs- only acting once more than 25 years agoOlson, Attorney 99William Olson of William Olson, PC, Attorneys at Law, The Impact of Executive Orders on the Legislative Process http://www.cato.org/testimony/ct-wo102799.html October 27, 1999Congress has done little more than the courts in restricting presidential lawmaking. Nevertheless, Congress did make one bold step to check executive powers in the related arenas of executive orders, states of emergency and emergency powers. The Congressional concern led to the creation of a Special Senate Committee on the Termination of the National Emergency, co-chaired by Sens. Frank Church (D-ID) and Charles Mathias, Jr. (R-MD), more than 25 years ago.

***AT Links to Politics 2NC No LinkMomentum We dont link to politics--Executive orders are effective policy tools and cause momentum and defuses oppositionCooper 2 [Phillip, Professor of Public Administration @ Portland State University, By Order of the President: The Use and Abuse of Executive Direct Action Executive orders can also be used to hit quickly with policies aimed at important problems, providing a strong and immediate sense of momentum for a new administration. These messages are sent to reassure an administrations supporters that the issue positions for which they campaigned are going to be acted upon. In the case of symbolic orders, which are often used for this purpose, the reward can be given to allies without a serious commitment of political resources in Congress, legal resources in administrative rulemaking, or financial resources associated with building really substantive programs. They also serve to send a message to potential adversaries that the administration is truly in charge and moving. Those seeking to mobilize opposition in such conditions find themselves reactive and defensive.2NC AT Costs PC Obama can pass laws without using political capital Jacobine 10Ken Kenn Jacobine is an international educator currently teaching history for the American School of Doha, Qatar. He has also taught at international schools in Ecuador, Mali, and Zambia. 2-16-2010, http://blogcritics.org/politics/article/executive-orders-nullification-and-recess-appointments/, With no political capital left and much of his legislative initiatives dead in Congress, President Obamas administration recently announced that he intends to use executive orders to advance his agenda. According to White House chief of staff Rahm Emanuel, We are reviewing a list of presidential executive orders and directives to get the job done across a front of issues. Those issues include everything from budget commissions to environmental law to health care funding. Of course, executive orders are nothing new. They have been around since at least Lincolns so called Emancipation Proclamation and probably before that. George W. Bush signed the most ever as president and was rightly criticized by Obama in his campaign for president. This is key because it doesnt matter which party controls the White House. When push comes to shove and the president cant get his way he resorts to this underhanded tactic.***AT Perm2NC Links to Politics Perm links more to politics than the plan Cox and Rodriguez 9Adam B. Cox & (Prof. of Law, Univ. Chicago Law School) Cristina M. Rodriguez (Prof. of Law, NYU School of Law) December 2009[The President and Immigration Law 119 Yale L.J. 458, lexis, loghry]At the same time, it is also possible that the changes over time in the relationship between Congress and the Executive have been the product of political dynamics not unique to immigration law. It could be, much as William Stuntz has suggested of the growth in criminal law, that Congress has intentionally delegated in-creasing amounts of immigration authority to executive officials for political reasons. Congress might accrue political benefits from making immigration law on the books ever harsher and bear few of the political costs associated with immigration enforcement efforts that portions of the public might see as excessive (perhaps, as in Stuntz's story, because the public blames the Executive for these enforcement efforts). Were such an account true, immigration law would involve a sort of one-way ratchet of ever-widening deportability for non-citizens. n2382NC Perm FailsCuba Obama must act alone to boost credibility with alliesWashington Office on Latin America et al 2010 (Center for Democracy in the Americas and Latin America Working Group also contribute; Why President Obama should issue an executive order on travel to Cuba; Nov 24; progreso-weekly.com/ini/index.php/home/in-the-united-states/144-angelicas-eyes-on-washington-blogs/angelicas-eyes-on-washington/495-why-president-obama-should-issue-an-executive-order-on-travel-to-cuba; kdf)9. It would demonstrate political strength and independence by the President Moving confidently forward with Cuba travel and food sales regulations would fulfill the Presidents principled call for a new beginning with Cuba which has to date gone unfulfilled. And it would make clear that the President will take principled positions, rather than backing down in the face of hardliners in the Congress. At the same time, failing to respond to Cubas release of more than 50 political prisoners and major economic reforms underway on the island undermine the Presidents credibility not only in Havana, but among allies who will see the Presidents inaction as a foreign policy cowardice caused by nothing more than domestic politics.2NC Doesnt Solve Prez Powers Only congressional silence solidifies and expands presidential power of CongressBellia and Spring 2k2Patricia L. Bellia, Assistant Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School, Spring 2002 (Constitutional Commentary) p. lexisCourts' reluctance to face questions about the scope of the President's constitutional powers - express and implied - creates three other problems. First, the implied presidential power given effect by virtue of congressional silence and judicial inaction can solidify into a broader claim. When the Executive exercises an "initiating" or "concurrent" power, it will tie that power to a textual provision or to a claim about the structure of the Constitution. Congress's silence as a practical matter tends to validate the executive rationale, and the Executive Branch may then claim a power not only to exercise the disputed authority in the face of congressional silence, but also to exercise the disputed authority in the face of congressional opposition. In other words, a power that the Executive Branch claims is "implied" in the Constitution may soon become an "implied" and "plenary" one. Questions about presidential power to terminate treaties provide a ready example. The Executive's claim that the President has the power to terminate a treaty - the power in controversy in Goldwater v. Carter, where Congress was silent - now takes a stronger form: that congressional efforts to curb the power are themselves unconstitutional.

Doesnt solve presidential power simultaneous legislative and executive action creates a mixed precedent, undermining presidential authority Bellia 2 [Patricia, Professor of Law @ Notre Dame, Executive Power in Youngstowns Shadows Constitutional Commentary, , 19 Const. Commentary 87, Spring, Lexis]Second, courts' failure to resolve the contours of the President's constitutional powers creates uncertainty about whether some forms of constitutionally based executive action have the same legal force as a federal statute. Returning to Dames & Moore, the fact that the Court rested the President's authority on grounds of congressional approval rather than implied constitutional authority avoided the difficult question of how the President could by his sole authority displace the application of the federal statutes that had provided the basis for Dames & Moore's original cause of action against the Iranian enterprises. 291 Similar questions arise with respect to the displacement of state law by operation of sole executive agreements. The result is confusion about whether sole executive agreements are the "supreme Law of the Land," 292 with the available precedents suggesting that they are 293 and the weight of recent commentary suggesting that they are not. ***Prez Powers Good XO Key to Prez PowerObamas presidential power will only increase with executive ordersZelizer 9 [Julian, professor of history and public affairs at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School Commentary: Can Obama and Congress Share Power? CNN Online, January 5, http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/01/05/zelizer.power/index.html]

Obama must be held responsible as well. While presidents don't like to give up power, maybe this president will be different. At a minimum, Obama should avoid the techniques used so often in recent years to circumvent legislative will. It is not enough to reverse Bush's executive orders -- the crucial question is whether Obama uses such orders as frequently himself. If the nation can create a better balance between the executive and legislative branches, the country will benefit. The New Deal proved when both branches work together, the nation can produce some of its finest and most effective programs.

Executive orders control policy and set agendas key to presidential powerMayer 1 [Kenneth, Professor in the Department of Poli Sci @ University of Wisconsin-Madison, Executive Orders and Presidential Power, pg. 28-29]

This theoretical perspective offered by the new institutional economics literature provides a way of making sense of the wide range of executive orders issued over the years, and is the centerpiece of my approach. The common theme I find in significant executive orders is control; executive orders are an instrument of executive power that presidents have used to control policy, establish and maintain institutions, shape agendas, manage constituent relationships, and keep control of their political fate generally. Within the boundaries set by statute of the Constitution, presidents have consistently used their executive power often manifested in executive orders to shape the institutional and political context in which they sit. There are, to be sure, limits on what presidents can do relying solely on executive orders and executive power, and presidents who push too far will find that Congress and the courts will push back. Yet the president retains significant legal, institutional, and political advantages that make executive authority a more powerful tool than scholars have thus far recognized. This emphasis on control allows for a longer-term view than that generally taken by informal approaches to presidential leadership. I conclude that presidents have used executive orders to alter the institutional and political context in which they operate. The effects of any one effort in this regard may not be immediately apparent, and in many cases presidents succeed only after following up on what their predecessors have done. In this respect I view presidential leadership as both strategic and dynamic, a perspective that brings into sharper relief the utility of executive power to the presidency. I also differ with Neustadt on this score, as he looks at how presidents can be tactically effective within a particular structure context over which they have no control.

1NC Economy Strong executive powers are critical to restrain federal spending Calabresi 95 (Steven G., Associate Prof, Northwestern U School Law, Arkansas LR, Lexis) Now imagine a whole Congress of such officeholders, all of whose careers depend in significant part on their abil [*35] ity to get back more for their small electoral constituency than their constituents pay in. The net result is a collective action problem in which every member of Congress's career depends on an ability to be ever more creative in funnelling federal resources back to their constituencies while imposing the cost in federal taxes, borrowing, or regulation on someone else's constituency or on the nation as a whole. The collective action problem exists because most of the constituencies might be better off with less largesse and lower levels of taxation, borrowing, and regulation. But no member of Congress will dare vote for this absent an effective mechanism of collective enforcement for fear that other members of Congress will cheat and will continue to steer national pork to their local interests. The only official with any incentive under our present electoral structure to stop this game is the President who is (along with the Vice President) our only nationally elected official. 33 Representing as he does a national electoral college majority, the President at least has an incentive to steer national resources toward the 51% of the nation that last supported him (and that might support him again), thereby mitigating the bad distributional incentives faced by members of Congress. In fact, most modern presidents probably see their potential electoral base as comprehending up to 60% of all voters 34 and perhaps as many as 90% of all state electoral college votes. 35 Moreover, elections over the last thirty years suggest that virtually every state in the nation is in fact in play in these contests. Thus, the President is our only constitutional backstop against the redistributive collective action problem described above. [*36] Now how does this fact bear on the quite different fact that because of a change in circumstances since 1937 the federal government has grown exponentially in wealth and power? Well, in brief, the huge increase in the amount of federal largesse has greatly exacerbated the collective action problem created by the congressional electoral system. It has transformed members of Congress into constituent service agents whose raison d'etre is to recover for their constituencies as much federal largesse as possible, even if the end result is only to set off a race with other members of Congress that ultimately intensifies the growth in the size of the federal pie thereby requiring ever higher levels of constituent service. The only practicable way out of this situation is to strengthen presidential power and unitariness. 36 The essential ingredient to combating the congressional collective action problem is the President's national voice, because he, and he alone, speaks for the entire American people. Failure to hold the line on spending ensures deficits destroy the U.S. economy Ornstein 04 (Norman, Resident Scholar / AEI, Roll Call, 7-7, Lexis) Todays budget deficit is 4.2 percent of our GDP. Thats a large but not alarming number -a figure that, by itself, could be sustainable indefinitely without deeply damaging the economy. But any realistic projection of the revenue base that we can use to cover these future obligations shows a dismal future - one in which the deficit balloons to almost 16 percent of GDP by 2030, and nearly 29 percent of GDP by 2040. That is not merely unsustainable. Its downright catastrophic - the equivalent of a suitcase nuclear bomb set off in the middle of our economy. All of this is occurring while we blithely go about cutting the tax base and adding funding for a host of other problems, including homeland security, defense, the environment, education and highways - just to name a few that get overwhelming support from Congress and the American people. Our debate about fiscal discipline focuses overwhelmingly on the tiny share of the budget that is in discretionary domestic spending. Cut it all out and we still have staggering obligations and huge future deficits. 1NC Foreign Policy A weak executive is the source of arrogant foreign policy and inability to manage foreign policy crises. Its a critical factor.Mallaby 2kSebastian Mallaby, Member of the Editorial Board, Washington Post, January/February 2000 (Foreign Affairs) p. lexisFinally, some will object that the weakness of the presidency as an institution is not the main explanation for the inadequacies of American diplomacy, even if it is a secondary one. The ad hominem school of thought argues instead that Bill Clinton and his advisers have simply been incompetent. Others make various sociological claims that isolationism or multiculturalism lies at the root of America's diplomatic troubles. All of these arguments may have merit. But the evidence cited by both camps can be better explained by the structural weakness of the presidency. Take, for example, one celebrated error: President Clinton's declaration at the start of the Kosovo war that the Serbs need not fear NATO ground troops. This announcement almost certainly cost lives by encouraging the Serbs to believe that America was not serious about stopping ethnic cleansing. The ad hominem school sees in this example proof of Clinton's incompetence; the sociological school sees in it proof of isolationist pressure, which made the option of ground troops untenable. But a third explanation, offered privately by a top architect of the Kosovo policy, is more plausible. According to this official, the president knew that pundits and Congress would criticize whichever policy he chose. Clinton therefore preemptively took ground troops off the table, aware that his critics would then urge him on to a ground war -- and also aware that these urgings would convince Belgrade that Washington's resolve would stiffen with time, rather than weaken. The president's stand against ground troops was therefore the logical, tactical move of a leader feeling vulnerable to his critics. Other failings of American diplomacy can likewise be accounted for by the advent of the nonexecutive presidency. Several commentators, notably Samuel Huntington and Garry Wills in these pages, have attacked the arrogance of America's presumption to offer moral leadership to the world. But American leaders resort to moral rhetoric largely out of weakness. They fear that their policy will be blocked unless they generate moral momentum powerful enough to overcome domestic opponents. Likewise, critics point to the hypocrisy of the United States on the world stage. America seeks U.N. endorsement when convenient but is slow to pay its U.N. dues; America practices legal abortion at home but denies funds to organizations that do the same abroad. Again, this hypocrisy has everything to do with the weak executive. The president has a favored policy but is powerless to make Congress follow it. Still other critics decry American diplomacy as a rag-bag of narrow agendas: Boeing lobbies for China trade while Cuban-Americans demand sanctions on Cuba. Here, too, presidential power is the issue. A strong presidency might see to it that America pursues its broader national interest, but a weak one cannot. This is why Clinton signed the Helms-Burton sanctions on Cuba even though he knew that these would do disproportionate harm to U.S. relations with Canada and Europe.1NC Heg US leadership is dependent on presidential power - Exploiting advantages over Congress is essentialHaas 95Richard N. Haas, Director of National Security Programs, Council on Foreign Relations, 1/11/1995 (Paradigm Lost) p. lexisBut no choice of ends and means will count for much if the United States is not able and willing to act in the world -- and do so consistently and reliably. The United States emerged from the Cold War as the world's only superpower. But it will not remain one for long unless it harnesses its power to purpose. What is needed is not a new doctrine to take the place of containment, but a leadership dedicated to forging a new consensus around an augmented realism and what we as a nation will do to achieve it. This will require sustained presidential involvement -- in making the case for liberal trade and necessary uses of force to the public, in approaching the Congress for adequate resources to support defense and aid programs, in cultivating political and military relations with key allies. The Republican triumph in the recent elections will make this more difficult for a Democratic president, but the president still enjoys important advantages in the conduct of foreign policy. The question is whether these advantages will be exploited. One hopes that they will, for U.S. leadership without presidential leadership is all but impossible.1NC Terrorism Sole presidential control of foreign policy is essential to combating terrorismLansford and Pauly 3 [Tom, assistant professor of political science, University of Southern Mississippi, Gulf Coast + Robert J. adjunct professor of history and political Science at Norwich University, Northfield, Vermont, and Midlands Technical College National Security Policy and the Strong Executive Special Conference Report of American Diplomacy online May 20, http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/2003_04-06/lansfordpauly_exec/lansfordpauly_exec.html]Furthermore, American foreign policy is rooted in the notion of the sole organ theory which holds that the president is the sole source of foreign and security policy.15 This theory has served as the underpinning for the dramatic twentieth-century expansion of executive power. For instance, the Supreme Court decision United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corporation (1936) gave executive agreements the weight of law (and thereby bypassed the senatorial approval required of treaties), while Goldwater v. Carter (1979) confirmed the ability of the president to withdraw from international treaties without congressional consent.16 The result of this concentration of power has been the repeated presidential use of the U.S. military throughout the nations history without a formal congressional declaration of war and an increased preference by both the executive and the legislature for such actions.17 One feature of this trend was consistency in U.S. foreign policy, especially during the Cold War era. Even during periods when the United States experienced divided government, with the White House controlled by one political party and all or half of the Congress controlled by the party in opposition, the executive was able to develop and implement foreign and security policy with only limited constraints.18 Given the nature of the terrorist groups that attacked the United States on 11 September 2001, such policy habits proved useful since a formal declaration of war was seen as problematic in terms of the specific identification of the foe and the ability of the Bush administration to expand combat operations beyond Afghanistan to countries such as Iraq.Terrorism causes extinctionAlexander 3 Yonah, Terrorism myths and realities, The Washington Times, http://www.washingtontimes.com/commentary/20030827-084256-8999r.htmLast week's brutal suicide bombings in Baghdad and Jerusalem have once again illustrated dramatically that the international community failed, thus far at least, to understand the magnitude and implications of the terrorist threats to the very survival of civilization itself. Even the United States and Israel have for decades tended to regard terrorism as a mere tactical nuisance or irritant rather than a critical strategic challenge to their national security concerns. It is not surprising, therefore, that on September 11, 2001, Americans were stunned by the unprecedented tragedy of 19 al Qaeda terrorists striking a devastating blow at the center of the nation's commercial and military powers. Likewise, Israel and its citizens, despite the collapse of the Oslo Agreements of 1993 and numerous acts of terrorism triggered by the second intifada that began almost three years ago, are still "shocked" by each suicide attack at a time of intensive diplomatic efforts to revive the moribund peace process through the now revoked cease-fire arrangements (hudna). Why are the United States and Israel, as well as scores of other countries affected by the universal nightmare of modern terrorism surprised by new terrorist "surprises"? There are many reasons, including misunderstanding of the manifold specific factors that contribute to terrorism's expansion, such as lack of a universal definition of terrorism, the religionization of politics, double standards of morality, weak punishment of terrorists, and the exploitation of the media by terrorist propaganda and psychological warfare. Unlike their historical counterparts, contemporary terrorists have introduced a new scale of violence in terms of conventional and unconventional threats and impact. The internationalization and brutalization of current and future terrorism make it clear we have entered an Age of Super Terrorism (e.g. biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear and cyber) with its serious implications concerning national, regional and global security concerns. 2NC Terrorism

Terrorism and Rouge WMD Use can only be checked by a unitary and powerful executiveYoo 4John Yoo, Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley School of Law Stanford Law Review, Dec 2004 v57 i3 p793(31) These developments in the international system may demand that the United States have the ability to use force earlier and more quickly than in the past. Use of force under international law, to be consistent with the United Nations Charter, must be justified by self-defense against an imminent attack (in those cases when not authorized by the Security Council). Elsewhere, I argue that the rise of WMD proliferation, rogue states, and terrorism ought to lead to a reformulation of self-defense away from temporal imminence and toward a calculation of expected harm of an attack. If we understand the use of force as a function of the magnitude of possible harm from an attack adjusted by the probability of such an attack, the United States might need to use force in situations when an attack is not temporally imminent, but nonetheless threatens massive casualties and remains probable. In order to forestall a WMD attack, or to take advantage of a window of opportunity to strike at a terrorist cell, the executive branch needs the flexibility to act quickly, possibly in situations where congressional consent cannot be obtained in time to act on the intelligence. By acting earlier, perhaps before WMD components have been fully assembled or before an al Qaeda operative has left for the United States, the executive branch might also be able to engage in a more limited, more precisely targeted, use of force.